

**The Fourth Amendment
and
Search & Seizure**
An Update

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How To Use This Manual: To locate the law on any particular subject of interest to you, it is suggested that you first note the general description of the subject under "***Chapter Summary***," on page iii, below. This will guide you to the correct page of the ***Table of Contents*** under "***Topics***," beginning on page iv. There you will find a more detailed description of the various legal issues. This in turn will note for you the specific page in the expanded ***Outline*** where you will find the relevant cases and rules on that topic.

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Chapter 1:

The Fourth Amendment, United States Constitution:

The Fourth Amendment: “The right of the people to be secure in their *persons, houses, papers, and effects*, against *unreasonable searches and seizures*, shall not be violated, and *no warrants shall issue*, but upon *probable cause*, supported by oath or affirmation, and *particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.*” (*Emphasis added*)

California Constitution, Art I, § 13: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable seizures and searches may not be violated; and a warrant may not issue except on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons and things to be seized.”

The Supremacy Clause:

“A state legislature does not have the power to ‘deem’ into existence ‘facts’ operating to negate individual rights arising under the federal

constitution. (See U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2 [supremacy clause]; *Marbury v. Madison* (1803) 5 U.S. 137, 177-180 [2 L.Ed. 60]; *Younger v. Harris* (1971) 401 U.S. 37, 52 [27 L.Ed.2nd 699; 91 S.Ct. 746] [‘a statute apparently governing a dispute cannot be applied by judges, consistently with their obligations under the **Supremacy Clause**, when such an application of the statute would conflict with the Constitution’].) A statute attempting such a feat would be a ‘nullity.’ (*Gibbons v. Ogden* (1824) 22 U.S. 1, 210-211 [6 L.Ed. 23].)” (*People v. Arredondo* (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 186, 200-201; see also *People v. Mason* (2016) 8 Cal.App.5th Supp. 11, 29.)

Note: Petition for Review was granted by the California Supreme Court in *People v. Arredondo* on June 8, 2016, making this case unavailable for citation.

Scope:

Due Process: Initially intended to control the actions of the federal government only (See *Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore* (1833) 7 Pet. 243.), the United States Supreme Court eventually ruled that a violation of the **Fourth Amendment** by state (which includes all county and municipal) authorities does in fact constitute a **Fourteenth Amendment**, “*due process*” violation, thus imposing compliance with this protection upon the states as well. (*Mapp v. Ohio* (1961) 367 U.S. 643 [6 L.Ed.2nd 1081]; *Baker v. McCollan* (1979) 443 U.S. 137, 142 [61 L.Ed.2nd 433, 440-441]; *People v. Bracamonte* (1975) 15 Cal.3rd 394, 400; *People v. Espino* (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 746, 755.)

The **Fourteenth Amendment** provides that no “*state*” shall deprive its citizens of “*life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.*” Violations of the **Fourth Amendment** constitute such a deprivation. (*Mapp v. Ohio, supra.*)

See also **Article I, section 7**, of the California Constitution.

“The **Fourth Amendment’s** protection extends beyond the sphere of a criminal investigation.” (*Grady v. North Carolina* (Mar. 30, 2015) __ U.S. __, __ [135 S.Ct. 1368, 1371; 191 L.Ed.2nd 459]; finding that the use of a “satellite-based monitoring” (“SBM”) device, attached to a recidivist sex offender’s ankle to monitor his movements, although imposed in a post conviction, post sentence proceeding that is “civil in nature,” constitutes a “search” under the **Fourth Amendment.**”

Persons, Houses, Papers, and Effects: Also, the **Fourth Amendment** protects against *trespassory searches* only with regard to those items (i.e., “*persons, houses, papers, and effects*”) that it enumerates. (*United States v. Jones* (2012) 565 U.S. 400, 404-413 [132 S.Ct. 945, 949-954; 181 L.Ed.2nd 911].)

The Exclusionary Rule; Overview: The **Fourth Amendment** serves as the primary basis for the “*Exclusionary Rule*,” excluding evidence from the courtroom which would be otherwise admissible, when seized by law enforcement in violation of its terms. (*Weeks v. United States* (1914) 232 U.S. 383 [58 L.Ed. 652].)

Theory: “Exclusion of evidence due to a **Fourth Amendment** violation is not automatic. As the high court stated: ‘The **Fourth Amendment** protects the right to be free from “unreasonable searches and seizures,” but it is silent about how this right is to be enforced. To supplement the bare text, this Court created the exclusionary rule, a deterrent sanction that bars the prosecution from introducing evidence obtained by way of a **Fourth Amendment** violation.’” (*Davis v. United States* (2011) 564 U.S. 229 [180 L.Ed.2nd 285, 131 S.Ct. 2419].) ‘The rule ... operates as “a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard **Fourth Amendment** rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved.’” (*United States v. Leon* (1984) 468 U.S. 897, 906 [82 L.Ed.2nd 677, 104 S.Ct. 3405].)” (*People v. Macabeo* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1219-1220.)

History:

“Because officers who violated the **Fourth Amendment** were traditionally considered trespassers, individuals subject to unconstitutional searches or seizures historically enforced their rights through tort suits or self-help.” (*Utah v. Strieff* (June 20, 2016) __ U.S. __, __ [136 S.Ct. 2056, 2060-2061; 195 L.Ed.2nd 400]; citing *Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment*, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 547, 625 (1999).

“The *exclusionary rule* was originally adopted in *Weeks v. United States* (1914) 232 U.S. 383 [58 L.Ed. 652, . . .], which barred evidence obtained by federal officers in violation of the **Fourth Amendment**.

The Supreme Court subsequently held that the rule was *not* constitutionally imposed upon the states. (*Wolf v. Colorado* (1949) 338 U.S. 25 [93 L.Ed. 1782, . . .]; see *Breithaupt v. Abram* (1957) 352 U.S. 432, 434 [1 L.Ed.2nd 448, 450, . . .].)

It was not until 1961, when *Wolf* was overruled, that the exclusionary rule was made mandatory in state prosecutions. (*Mapp v. Ohio* (1961) 367 U.S. 643 [6 L.Ed.2nd 1081, . . .]; see *Schmerber v. California* (1966) 384 U.S. 757, 766 [16 L.Ed.2nd 908, 917, . . .].)” (*People v. Bracamonte* (1975) 15 Cal.3rd 394, 400, fn. 2.)

*The primary purpose of the Exclusionary Rule “is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the **Fourth Amendment** against unreasonable searches and seizures.”* (*United States v. Calandra* (1974) 414 U.S. 338 [38 L.Ed.2nd 561]; *Illinois v. Krull* (1987) 480 U.S. 340 [94 L.Ed.2nd 364]; *People v. Robles* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 799; see also *People v. Arredondo* (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 186, 206-210.)

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“[T]he “*prime purpose*” of the [exclusionary] rule, if not the sole one, “is to deter future unlawful police conduct.” [Citations]’ (Citations)” (Italics added; *People v. Sanders* (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318, 324.)

It is also *the purpose* of the **Fourth Amendment** to “safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by government officials.” (*Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco* (1967) 387 U.S. 523, 528 [18 L.Ed.2nd 930, 935].)

Use of the exclusionary rule is a preferable sanction over outright dismissal of a case (*United States v. Struckman* (9th Cir. 2010) 611 F.3rd 560, 574-578; noting that dismissal under a court’s “inherent supervisory powers” might be appropriate if necessary to (1) implement a remedy for the violation of a recognized statutory or constitutional right; (2) preserve judicial integrity by ensuring that a conviction rests on appropriate considerations validly before a jury; and (3) deter future illegal conduct, but even then, only after the defendant demonstrates sufficient prejudice.)

“(T)he exclusionary rule is not an individual right and applies only where it ‘result[s] in appreciable deterrence.’ (Citation)” (*Herring v. United States* (2009) 155 U.S. 135, 141 [172 L.Ed.2nd 496])

See “*Remedy for Violations; The ‘Exclusionary Rule,’*” under “*Searches and Seizures*” (Chapter 5), below.

The Rule of Reasonableness:

“(T)he ultimate touchstone of the **Fourth Amendment** is ‘reasonableness.’” (*Riley v. California* (June 25, 2014) 573 U.S. ___, __ [134 S.Ct. 2473, 2482; 189 L.Ed.2nd 430]; citing *Brigham City v. Stuart* (2006) 547 U.S. 398, 403 [164 L.Ed.2nd 650]; *Heien v. North Carolina* (Dec. 15, 2014) 574 U.S. ___, __ [135 S.Ct. 530; 190 L.Ed.2nd 475, 482]; *People v. Steele* (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1116; *People v. Macabeo* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1213; see also *Ohio v. Robinette* (1996) 519 U.S. 33, 39 [136 L.Ed.2nd 347].)

“The question, then, is whether the warrantless searches at issue here were reasonable.” (*Birchfield v. North Dakota* (June 23, 2016) __ U.S. __, __ [136 S.Ct. 2160; 195 L.Ed.2nd 560]; citing *Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton* (1995) 515 U. S. 646, 652 [132 L. Ed. 2nd 564]: “As the text of the **Fourth Amendment** indicates, the ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a governmental search is ‘reasonableness’”).

“(R)asonableness “depends ‘on a balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers,’” [citation].’ (*Maryland v. Wilson* (1997) 519 U.S. 408, 411 [137 L.Ed.2d 41, 46, 117 S. Ct. 882].) ‘Officer safety is a weighty public interest.’ (*Id.*, at p. 413 [137 L.Ed.2nd at p. 47].)” (*People v. Steele* (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1116.)

An otherwise lawful seizure can violate the **Fourth Amendment** if it is executed in an unreasonable manner. (*United States v. Alvarez-Tejeda* (9th Cir. 2007) 491 F.3rd 1013, citing *United States v. Jacobsen* (1984) 466 U.S. 109, 124 [80 L.Ed.2d 85].)

While a parolee is subject to search or seizure without probable cause or even a reasonable suspicion, searching him may still be illegal if done in an unreasonable manner, such as by a strip search in a public place. (See *People v. Smith* (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1354; checking defendant’s crotch area for drugs, while shielded from the public, held not to be a strip search and not unreasonable.)

See “*Use of a Motorized Battering Ram*,” under “*Searches With a Search Warrant*,” (Chapter 6), below.

“To be reasonable is not to be perfect, and so the **Fourth Amendment** allows for some mistakes on the part of government officials, giving them ‘fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community’s protection.’” (*Heien v. North Carolina* (Dec. 15, 2014) 574 U.S. __, __ [135 S.Ct. 530; 190 L.Ed.2nd 475, 482]; quoting *Brinegar v. United States* (1949) 338 U.S. 160, 176 [93 L.Ed. 1879].)

In *Heien*, the United States Supreme Court held that an officer’s misapprehension as to the law “may” be reasonable when the issue is not yet settled. (See “*Mistake of Law vs. Mistake of Fact*,” under “*Types of Detentions*,” and “*Detentions*,” below.)

The standard to be applied when evaluating the legality of the length of time a suspect is deprived of his property pending a search is one of “reasonableness,” taking into account the “totality of the circumstances,” and not necessarily requiring that the Government pursue the least intrusive course of action. Determining reasonableness requires a “balancing test,” balancing “the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.” (*United States v. Sullivan* (9th Cir. 2015) 797 F.3rd 623, 633; citing *United States v. Van Leeuwen* (1970) 397 U.S. 249, 252 [25 L.Ed.2nd 282, 285]; and finding 21 days to be reasonable during which time the defendant’s laptop was in law enforcement custody, in that defendant was in custody at the time so he couldn’t use it anyway, was subject to a **Fourth** wavier, gave consent, and where the computer had to be transferred to a different agency to conduct the necessary forensic search.)

Private Persons and the Exclusionary Rule: Evidence illegally obtained by private persons, acting in a private capacity, is *not* subject to the Exclusionary Rule. (See *Krauss v. Superior Court* (1971) 5 Cal.3rd 418, 421; *Jones v. Kmart Corp.* (1998) 17 Cal.4th 329, 332.)

Even a peace officer, when off-duty and acting in a private capacity, may be found to have acted as a private citizen. (See *People v. Wachter* (1976) 58 Cal.App.3rd 911, 920, 922.)

However, a civil rights action pursuant to **42 U.S.C. § 1983** was held to be proper against non-law enforcement employees of a private corporation that operated a federal prison under contract. (*Pollard v. GEO Group, Inc.* (9th Cir. 2010) 607 F.3rd 583.)

The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) was held to qualify as a governmental entity for **Fourth Amendment** purposes. Even though NCMEC is privately incorporated, its two primary authorizing statutes, **18 U.S.C. § 2258A** and **42 U.S.C. § 5773(b)**, mandate its collaboration with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in over a dozen different ways. For example, Internet Service Providers (AOL, in this case) are required to forward emails suspected of containing child pornography to NCMEC, and NCMEC is required to maintain a CyberTipline to receive such emails. NCMEC is then allowed to review the emails and is required to report possible child sexual exploitation violations to the government. (*United States v. Ackerman* (10th Cir. Kan. 2016) 831 F.3rd 1292.)

Limited Use of the Exclusionary Rule:

General Rule:

The Exclusionary Rule is not intended to prevent all police misconduct or as a remedy for all police errors. “*The use of the exclusionary rule is an exceptional remedy typically reserved for violations of constitutional rights.*” (*United States v. Smith* (9th Cir. 1999) 196 F.3rd 1034, 1040.)

“The exclusionary rule generates substantial social costs, which sometimes include setting the guilty free and the dangerous at large. We have therefore been cautious against expanding it, and have repeatedly emphasized that the rule's costly toll upon truth-seeking and law enforcement objectives presents a high obstacle for those urging its application.” (*United States v. Dreyer* (9th Cir. Nov. 4, 2015) 804 F.3rd 1266, 1278.)

“To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.” (*Herring v. United States* (2009) 555 U.S. 135, 144 [172 L.Ed.2nd 496]; see also *People v. Leal* (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1064-1065.)

The exclusionary rule should only be used when necessary to deter “deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances, recurring or systematic negligence.” (*Herring v. United States*, *supra*, at p. 144 [172 L.Ed.2nd at p. 507].)

But, officers who took 26½ hours to obtain a search warrant for a residence while the residence was “detained” (i.e., the occupant was kept from reentering), failing to recognize that they were required to act with due diligence and to expedite the process, were not excused by the rule of *Herring*. The resulting evidence, therefore, was subject to exclusion. (*United States v. Cha* (9th Cir. 2010) 597 F.3rd 995, 1004-1006.)

“(E)ven when there is a **Fourth Amendment** violation, (the) exclusionary rule does not apply when the costs of exclusion outweigh its deterrent benefits. In some cases, for example, the link between the unconstitutional conduct and the discovery of the evidence is too attenuated to justify suppression.” (*Utah v. Strieff* (June 20, 2016) ___ U.S. ___, ___ [136 S.Ct. 2056, 2059; 195 L.Ed.2nd 400]; existence of an arrest warrant “attenuated the taint” between an unlawful detention and the discovery of evidence incident to the arrest on the warrant, at least where the police misconduct was not flagrant.

See *United States v. Monghur* (9th Cir. 2009) 588 F.3rd 975, where a case involving the illegal warrantless search of a container was remanded for a determination of whether the exclusionary rule required the suppression of the gun found in that container.

The argument has been made that the exclusionary rule should not apply to the penalty phase of a capital murder trial when the prosecution is attempting to introduce **P.C. § 190.3, “factor (b)”** evidence. Specifically, the A.G. argued that the exclusionary rule has little deterrent value at the penalty phase of a capital case, the purpose of which is “to enable the jury to make an individualized determination of the appropriate penalty based on the character of the defendant and the circumstances of the crime.” Because

law enforcement is not likely to be deterred from conducting unreasonable searches and seizures where it is a remote possibility that the evidence could not be used during the penalty phase in an unrelated prosecution occurring potentially years later, any limited deterrent value is outweighed by the societal costs of exclusion of the evidence and the resultant incomplete picture of the defendant's criminal activities. However, because this issue was not first raised by the prosecution in front of the trial judge, and finding admission of the questioned evidence to be harmless error anyway, the Supreme Court declined to resolve this question in this case. (*People v. Casares* (2016) 62 Cal.4th 808, 834.)

Note: The hint here make by the California Supreme Court is that this argument should be attempted by a prosecutor at the trial level, to test this issue.

Evidence obtained in violation of someone else's (i.e., someone other than the present defendant's) **Fourth Amendment** (search and seizure) rights *may be used* as part of the probable cause in a search warrant affidavit, unless the defendant can show that he has "*standing*" (i.e., it was his reasonable expectation of privacy that was violated) to challenge the use of the evidence. (*People v. Madrid* (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1888, 1896.)

See "*Searches and Seizures*," "*Remedy for Violations; The 'Exclusionary Rule'*," (Chapter 5) "*Searches and Seizures*," below.

Good Faith:

Searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance (i.e., "*good faith*") on binding appellate precedent in effect at the time of the search, despite a later decision changing the rules, are not subject to the Exclusionary Rule. (*Davis v. United States* (2011) 564 U.S. 229, 236-239 [180 L.Ed.2nd 285]; see also *People v. Youn* (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 571, 576-579; *People v. Rossetti* (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1070, 1074-1077; four officers held defendant down as a warrantless forced draw was made in a medically approved manner; *People v. Harris* (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 671, 697-704, and *People v. Jimenez* (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1337,

1360-1365; applicability of *Missouri v. McNeely* (2013) 569 U.S. 141 [133 S.Ct. 1552; 185 L.Ed.2nd 696], to cases occurring before.)

Illegally collecting blood samples from defendant, mistakenly believing that he qualified under the newly enacted **DNA and Forensic Identification Data Base and Data Bank Act of 1998 (P.C. §§ 295 et seq.)**, even if it was a **Fourth Amendment** violation to do so, did not require the suppression of the results in that the mistake was not intentional, reckless, the results of gross negligence, nor of recurring or systematic negligence. (*People v. Robinson* (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1104, 1124-1129.)

Under **28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)**, clearly established federal law includes only the Supreme Court's decisions issued before the relevant adjudication of the merits of a prisoner's claim, regardless of when the prisoner's conviction became final. A direct appeal was thus the relevant adjudication of the merits. (*Greene v. Fisher* (2011) 565 U.S. 34 [132 S.Ct. 38; 181 L.Ed.2nd 336], citing *Gray v. Maryland* (1998) 523 U.S. 185 [140 L.Ed.2nd 294]; see also *Thompson v. Runnels* (9th Cir. 2013) 705 F.3rd 1089, 1095-1097.)

Whether or not the theory of *Florida v. Jardines* (2013) 569 U.S. 1 [133 S.Ct. 1409; 185 L.Ed.2nd 495], involving the illegality of using drug-sniffing dogs within the curtilage of a person's home, is applicable to a drug-sniffing dog used around the outside, and leaning up against, the open bed and tool box in a suspect's truck (which would over-rule prior case law), was left open by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal, holding that the pursuant to the "faith-in-case law" rule of *Davis v. United States* (2011) 564 U.S. 229, 236-239 [180 L.Ed.2nd 285], it was unnecessary to decide the issue. (*United States v. Thomas* (9th Cir. 2013) 726 F.3rd 1086, 1092-1095.)

Also, a forced blood draw performed in 2011, before *Missouri v. McNeely* (2013) 569 U.S. 141 [133 S.Ct. 1552; 185 L.Ed.2nd 696] (requiring a search warrant to force a blood draw in a DUI case absent an exigent circumstance) was decided, does not require the suppression of the blood result in that police officers are entitled to act on the law as it is understood at the time to apply. The **Fourth**

Amendment exclusionary rule does not require suppression of evidence from a warrantless blood draw because the draw was conducted in an objectively reasonable reliance on then-binding precedent. (*People v. Youn* (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 571, 576-579; *People v. Jimenez* (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1360-1365; see also *People v. Rossetti* (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1070, 1074-1077; four officers held defendant down as a warrantless forced draw was made in a medically approved manner; and see *People v. Jones* (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1257, 1262-1265.)

Griffith v. Kentucky (1987) 479 U.S. 314, 328 [93 L.Ed.2nd 649], holding that in criminal prosecutions, a new constitutional rule is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a “clear break” with the past, does not apply when the offending violation involves the **Fourth Amendment’s** Exclusionary Rule. (*Griffith* involved a jury selection issue.) (*People v. Jones, supra*, at pp. 1264-1265.)

The Ninth Circuit has held that for “good faith” to save an otherwise unlawful search, the officers must have relied upon prior “binding appellate precedent.” Prior authority that is merely “unclear” only allows an officer to escape civil liability under a “qualified immunity” argument. Whether or not an officer may search a cellphone based upon a “**Fourth** waiver probationary search” is not the subject of any binding appellate precedent. Therefore, “good faith” does not save such a search where current or subsequent cases (e.g., *Riley v. California* (June 25, 2014) 573 U.S. __ [134 S.Ct. 2473; 189 L.Ed.2nd 430].) have held such a search to be unlawful. (*United States v. Lara* (9th Cir. 2016) 815 F.3rd 605, 612-614.)

A search of a cellphone “incident to arrest” (as opposed to a **Fourth** waiver search) was clearly lawful prior to *Riley*, and therefore, the officer’s good faith reliance upon that pre-*Riley* binding precedent will save a warrantless search of defendant’s cellphones found on his person when he was arrested. (*United States v. Lustig* (9th Cir. 2016) 830 F.3rd 1075, 1077-1085.)

However, the California Supreme Court concluded in a warrantless cellphone search case (reversing a lower appellate court decision) that the search of defendant's cellphone would not have been proper even under its prior decision in *People v. Diaz* (2011) 51 Cal.4th 84 (a search incident to arrest case), and that a reasonably well-trained officer would have known this. Defendant was not under arrest when officers searched his phone. Under *Riley v. California* (June 25, 2014) 573 U.S. __ [134 S.Ct. 2473; 189 L.Ed.2nd 430], which overruled *Diaz*, even if defendant had been properly arrested, a warrant was required to search his cellphone. The search in this case violated the **Fourth Amendment**; the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply. Also, the search was not the result of negligence, nor did it result from any pressure to apply a newly enacted statutory scheme that was confusing and complex. The officers' conduct, including the search, was deliberate. Exclusion of the evidence in this case serves to deter future similar behavior. (*People v. Macabeo* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1212-1226.)

Statutory Violations: By the same token, not all courts are in agreement that the exclusionary rule is reserved exclusively for constitutional violations. (See discussion in *United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga* (9th Cir. 2000) 206 F.3rd 882, 886-887, and in the dissenting opinion, p. 893.)

A civil rights “action under (42 U.S.C.) **section 1983** ‘encompasses violations of federal statutory law as well as constitutional law.’ (*Maine v. Thiboutot* (1980) 448 U.S. 1, 4, . . . 65 L.Ed.2nd 555.) Thus, **section 1983** may be used to enforce rights created by both the **United States Constitution** and federal statutes. (*Gonzaga University v. Doe* (2002) 536 U.S. 273, 279, . . . 153 L.Ed.2nd 309.) But conduct by an official that violates only state law will not support a claim under **section 1983**. (*Malek v. Haun* (10th Cir. 1994) 26 F.3rd 1013, 1016; . . .)” (*Ritschel v. City of Fountain Valley* (2005) 137 Cal.App.4th 107, 116.)

“(T)he Supreme Court has approved of using the (exclusionary) rule to remedy statutory violations only in rare circumstances,” although such a remedy is generally limited to statutes with “constitutional underpinnings.” (*United States v. Dreyer* (9th Cir. Nov. 4, 2015) 804 F.3rd

1266, 1278-1279; finding that suppression is an available remedy for violations of the statutory **Posse Comitatus** rules, although not appropriate in this case.)

See also *United States v. Roberts* (9th Cir. 1986) 779 F.2nd 565, 568; “(A)n exclusionary rule should not be applied to violations of **10 U.S.C. §§ 371-378** (i.e, Posse Comitatus) until a need to deter future violations is demonstrated.”

Rule of Exclusion: “Evidence which is obtained as a direct result of an illegal search and seizure may not be used to establish probable cause for a subsequent search.” (*United States v. Wanless* (9th Cir. 1989) 882 F.2nd 1459, 1465; see “*Searches and Seizures*,” “*Remedies for Violations*” (Chapter 5), below.)

Justice Benjamin Cardozo: In the immortal words of the Honorable Justice *Benjamin Cardozo*: “*The criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered.*” (*People v. Defore* (1926) 242 N.Y. 13, 21 [150 N.E. 585, 587].)

Factually Based Question: What constitutes an illegal search or seizure is necessarily a *factually based question* that must be determined on a case-by-case basis: “The constitutional validity of a warrantless search is pre-eminently the sort of question which can only be decided in the concrete factual context of the individual case.” (*Sibron v. New York* (1968) 392 U.S. 40, 59 [20 L.Ed.2nd 917]; *City of Los Angeles v. Patel* (June 22, 2015) __ U.S. __, __ [135 S.Ct. 2443, 192 L.Ed.2nd 435]; discussing the difficulties in facial challenges to a statute that seeks to control or authorize police searches.)

Verbal Evidence: This includes “*verbal evidence*,” (i.e., a suspect’s admissions or confession), when obtained as a direct product of an illegal detention, arrest or search. (See *United States v. Crews* (9th Cir. 2007) 502 F.3rd 1130, 1135.)

Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 402:

“All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by:

- The Constitution of the United States;
- Act of Congress;
- These rules; *or*

- Other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority.”

Fruit of the Poisonous Tree:

General Rule: The exclusionary rule encompasses both the “primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure” as well as “evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality;” i.e., the so-called “*fruit of the poisonous tree.*” (*Utah v. Strieff* (June 20, 2016) __ U.S. __, __ [136 S.Ct. 2056, 2061; 195 L.Ed.2nd 400]; citing *Segura v. United States* (1984) 468 U. S. 796, 804, 82 L. Ed. 2nd 599; *United States v. Gorman* (9th Cir. 2017) 859 F.3rd 706, 716; as amended at 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 18610.)

The evidence that is suppressed is extended to the “*indirect*” as well as the “*direct products*” of the constitutional violation; i.e., the “*fruit of the poisonous tree.*” (*Wong Sun v. United States* (1963) 371 U.S. 471, 484 [9 L.Ed.2nd 441]; *United States v. Gorman, supra.*)

Factors:

In determining where the line is between the direct and indirect products of an illegal search (which will likely be suppressed) and that which is *not* the “*fruit of the poisonous tree*” (which will *not* be suppressed), it has been held that the following factors are relevant: (1) The temporal proximity of the Fourth Amendment search and seizure violation to the ultimate procurement of the challenged evidence; (2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the flagrancy of the official misconduct. (*People v. Rodriguez* (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1137.)

Using the above factors, the fact that the defendant had an outstanding arrest warrant may, depending upon the circumstances, be sufficient of an intervening circumstance to allow for the admissibility of the evidence seized incident to arrest despite the fact that the original detention was illegal. (*People v. Brendlin* (2008) 45 Cal.4th 262; an illegal traffic stop.)

The United States Supreme Court is in accord: “(E)ven when there is a **Fourth Amendment** violation, (the) exclusionary rule does not apply when the costs of

exclusion outweigh its deterrent benefits. In some cases, for example, the link between the unconstitutional conduct and the discovery of the evidence is too attenuated to justify suppression.” (*Utah v. Strieff* (June 20, 2016) ___ U.S. ___, ___ [136 S.Ct. 2056, 2059; 195 L.Ed.2nd 400]; existence of an arrest warrant “attenuated the taint” between an unlawful detention and the discovery of evidence incident to the arrest on the warrant, at least where the police misconduct was not flagrant.

In *Strieff*, the lower Utah Supreme Court declined to apply the attenuation doctrine because it read the U.S. Supreme Court’s precedents as applying the doctrine only “to circumstances involving an independent act of a defendant’s ‘free will’ (such as) in confessing to a crime or consenting to a search.” (2015 UT 2, 357 P. 3rd 532 at p. 544.) The *Strieff* Court specifically disagreed with this interpretation. “The attenuation doctrine evaluates the causal link between the government’s unlawful act and the discovery of evidence, which often has nothing to do with a defendant’s actions. Per the Supreme Court; “the logic of (its) prior attenuation cases is not limited to independent acts by the defendant.” (*Id.* at 136 S.Ct. p. 2061.)

But, per the Ninth Circuit, even though the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine does *not* apply to the lawful search of a residence after the house was “detained” for an unreasonable time while a search warrant was obtained, the resulting evidence recovered from the residence when the home was searched with the warrant will be suppressed anyway in that the officers were not acting reasonably in taking 26½ hours to get the warrant, and some punishment must follow such an unreasonable delay. (*United States v. Cha* (9th Cir. 2010) 597 F.3rd 995, 1003-1004.)

See also “*Fruit of The Poisonous Tree*,” under “*Searches and Seizures*” (Chapter 5), below.

Exceptions:

Demise of the Independent State Grounds Theory;
“**Proposition 8:**” Cal. Const., Art I, § 28(d), the “*Truth in Evidence*” provisions of **Proposition 8** (passed in June,

1982), abrogated California’s “*independent state grounds*” theory of exclusion of evidence, leaving the **United States Constitution** and its amendments as the sole basis for imposing an “*Exclusionary Rule*” on the admissibility of evidence. (*In re Lance W.* (1985) 37 Cal.3rd 873; *People v. Gutierrez* (1984) 163 Cal.App.3rd 332, 334; *People v. Macabeo* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1212.)

While a state may impose stricter standards on law enforcement in interpreting its own state constitution (i.e., “*independent state grounds*”), suppressing evidence for having violated a state exclusionary rule under a state constitution, a prosecution in federal court is guided by the federal interpretation of the **Fourth Amendment** and is not required to use the state’s stricter standards. (*United States v. Brobst* (9th Cir. 2009) 558 F.3rd 982, 989-991, 997.)

Until passage of **Proposition 8**, California Courts were obligated to follow California’s rules that in some circumstances may (and lawfully were allowed to) have been stricter than the federal standards. (See *American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 307, 327-328; *Raven v. Deukmejian* (1990) 52 Cal.3rd 336, 353.)

Since passage of **Proposition 8**, California state courts now determine the reasonableness of a search or seizure by federal constitutional standards. (*People v. Schmitz* (2012) 55 Cal.4th 909, 916; *People v. Steele* (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1114-1115.)

“Under the current provisions of the **California Constitution**, evidence sought to be introduced at a criminal trial is subject to suppression as the fruit of an unconstitutional search and seizure “only if exclusion is . . . mandated by the federal exclusionary rule applicable to evidence seized in violation of the **Fourth Amendment** [of the **United States Constitution**].” (*People v. Maikhio* (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1074, 1089 . . . , quoting *In re Lance W.* (1985) 37 Cal.3rd 873, 896, . . . ; see **Cal. Const.**

art. I, § 28, subd. (f)(2).)” (*People v. Harris* (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 671, 681-682.)

Per at least one court, however, it is “doubtful” whether **Proposition 8’s** “truth-in-evidence provision applies where the requested remedy is not suppression of evidence, but dismissal of all charges based on the state’s violation of a defendant’s (**Sixth Amendment**, speedy trial, delay in filing charges) due process rights.” (*People v. Lazarus* (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 734, 756.)

In a child sexual abuse case, the trial court did not err when it admitted a recorded telephone conversation between a defense witness and the mother of one of the defendant’s victims, obtained in violation of **P.C. § 632(d)**; Eavesdropping. Although **section 632(d)** bars the admission of evidence obtained as a result of recording a confidential communication without the consent of all parties, the right to truth-in-evidence provision of **Cal. Const. art I, § 28(f)(2)**, as enacted by passage of **Proposition 8** in June, 1982, abrogated that exclusionary rule to the extent it is invoked to suppress relevant evidence in a criminal proceeding. **Proposition 8** allows the admission of evidence collected in violation of the **Invasion of Privacy Act** where the evidence is relevant and its admission is not otherwise barred by the **U.S. Constitution**. Both prongs were met by the recording in question in this case. (*People v. Guzman* (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 184.)

Note: Review granted by the California Supreme Court in this case on June 27, 2017. (2017 Cal. LEXIS 5922.)

Defendant and His Identity: It is a rule of law that neither a defendant’s body nor his or her identity is subject to suppression, “even if it is conceded that an unlawful arrest, search, or interrogation occurred.” (*Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza* (1984) 468 U.S. 1032, 1039-1040 [82 L.Ed.2nd 778].)

For purposes of this rule, it makes no difference that the illegal arrest, search or interrogation was “egregious” in nature. (E.g., the result of “racial profiling.”) (*United States v. Gudino* (9th Cir. 2004) 376 F.3rd 997.)

It is illegal to resist any arrest or detention by a peace officer, even if it is determined to be an *illegal* arrest or detention. (*Evans v. City of Bakersfield* (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 321; *King v. State of California* (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 265, 294-295.) However, the person illegally arrested or detained may have a civil remedy against the offending officer(s). (See **42 U.S.C. § 1983**; and **Civil Code § 52.1**; the “*Bane Act*.”)

Identity of a Witness: “Where the testimony of live witnesses is at issue, the test focuses primarily on the effect of the illegality on the witness’s willingness to testify, and less on whether illegal conduct led to discovery of the witness's identity.” (*People v. Boyer* (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 448-449, citing *United States v. Ceccolini* (1978) 435 U.S. 268, 276-279 [55 L.Ed.2nd 268].)

“The greater the willingness of the witness to freely testify, the greater the likelihood that he or she will be discovered by legal means and, concomitantly, the smaller the incentive to conduct an illegal search to discover the witness.” (*United States v. Ceccolini, supra*, at p. 276.)

In *People v. McCurdy* (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1063, at pp. 1092-1093, the Court ruled that nothing in the record suggested that any assumed illegality concerning defendant’s arrest, which resulted in defendant’s picture in the news media, influenced a witness’s willingness to identify defendant as the man he saw with an 8-year-old abduction and murder victim outside a grocery store on the day she disappeared. Law enforcement did not generate the publicity over this case. And the witness came forward on his own, testifying voluntarily. As such, this testimony was too attenuated from any perceived illegality in defendant’s arrest and was not subject to suppression.

Immigration Issues:

The exclusionary rule generally does not apply in federal removal proceedings unless the alien can show “egregious violations of the **Fourth Amendment.**” Defendant alien, a native and citizen of Guatemala, who was removable due to the fact that he stayed in the U.S. beyond his visa’s expiration, was not entitled to relief from removal because he failed to present a prima facie case showing that the search and seizure leading to his arrest amounted to an egregious violation of the **Fourth Amendment.** (*Corado-Arriaza v. Lynch* (1st Cir. 2016) 844 F.3rd 74.)

Searches by Foreign Entities:

The **Fourth Amendment’s** exclusionary rule does not apply to foreign searches and seizures unless the conduct of the foreign police shocks the judicial conscience or the American law enforcement officers participated in the foreign search or the foreign officers acted as agents for the American officers. (*United States v. Valdivia* (1st Cir. 2012) 680 F.3rd 33, 51-52.)

Formalized collaboration between an American law enforcement agency and its foreign counterpart does not, by itself, give rise to an “agency” relationship between the two entities sufficient to implicate the **Fourth Amendment** abroad. The **Fourth Amendment** exclusionary rule does not impose a duty upon American law enforcement officials to review the legality, under foreign law, of applications for surveillance authority considered by foreign courts. Defendant was not, therefore, entitled to discovery of the wiretap application materials, submitted by Jamaican law enforcement to courts in that nation, underlying the electronic surveillance abroad. (*United States v. Lee* (2nd Cir. 2013) 723 F.3rd 134.)

An ongoing collaboration between an American law enforcement agency and its foreign counterpart I the

course of parallel investigations does not, without American control, direction, or an intent to evade the Constitution, give rise to a relationship between the two entities sufficient to apply the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained abroad by foreign law enforcement. In this case, also the warrantless searches and surveillance performed by the foreign entity did not shock the judicial conscience. (*United States v. Getto* (2nd Cir. 2013) 729 F.3rd 221, 227-234.)

Impeachment Evidence: Also, evidence illegally seized may be introduced for the *purpose of impeaching* the defendant's testimony given in both direct examination (*Walder v. United States* (1954) 347 U.S. 62 [98 L.Ed. 503].) and cross-examination, so long as the cross-examination questions are otherwise proper. (*United States v. Havens* (1980) 446 U.S. 620 [64 L.Ed.2nd 559].)

California authority prior to passage of **Proposition 8** (The "*Truth in Evidence Initiative*"), to the effect that evidence suppressed pursuant to a motion brought under authority of **P.C. § 1538.5** is suppressed for all purposes (i.e., *People v. Belleci* (1979) 24 Cal.3rd 879, 887-888.), was abrogated by **Proposition 8**. Now, it is clear that suppressed evidence may be used for purposes of impeachment should the defendant testify and lie. (*People v. Moore* (1988) 201 Cal.App.3rd 877, 883-886.)

Also, suppressed evidence pursuant to **P.C. § 1538.5(d)** is admissible at the defendant's probation revocation hearing unless the officer's actions were egregious. "(T)he exclusionary rule does not apply in probation revocation hearings, unless the police conduct at issue shocks the conscience." (Citations omitted; *People v. Lazlo* (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1068-1072.)

However, inculpatory statements made by the defendant but suppressed as a product of the defendant's illegal arrest *may not* be used to impeach other defense witnesses. (*James v. Illinois* (1990) 493 U.S. 307, 314-316 [107 L.Ed.2nd 676].)

New Crimes Committed in Response to an Illegal Detention or Arrest:

Whether or not a detention or an arrest is lawful, a suspect is not immunized from prosecution for any new crimes he might commit against the officer in response. A defendant's violent response to an unlawful detention, such as assaulting a police officer, may still be the source of criminal charges. A suspect has a duty to cooperate with law enforcement whether or not an attempt to detain or arrest him is later held to be in violation of the **Fourth Amendment**. (*In re Richard G.* (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1252, 1260-1263.)

Even when the detention is illegal, every person has a legal duty to submit (*Evans v. City of Bakersfield* (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 321.), although declining to do so is *not* a violation of **P.C. § 148** in that a peace officer is *not* acting in the “*performance of his (or her) duties*” by unlawfully detaining someone.

Searches Based Upon Existing Precedent; the “Faith-In-Case Law” Exception: Searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent in effect at the time of the search, despite a later decision changing the rules, are not subject to the Exclusionary Rule. (*Davis v. United States* (2011) 564 U.S. 229, 236-239 [180 L.Ed.2nd 285]; 180 L.Ed.2nd 285].)

See *United States v. Sparks* (1st Cir. 2013) 711 F.3rd 58; holding that the use of a GPS prior to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in *United States v. Jones* (2012) 565 U.S. 400 [132 S.Ct. 945; 181 L.Ed.2nd 911].), even if done in violation of the **Fourth Amendment**, does not require the suppression of the resulting evidence due to the officer's good faith reliance in earlier binding precedence. (See also *People v. Mackey* (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 32, 93-97; reaching the same conclusion.)

Also, whether or not the theory of *Florida v. Jardines* (2013) 569 U.S. 1 [133 S.Ct. 1409; 185 L.Ed.2nd 495], involving the illegality of using drug-sniffing dogs within the curtilage of a person's

home, is applicable to a drug-sniffing dog used around the outside, and leaning up against, the open bed and tool box in a suspect's truck (which would over-rule prior case law), was left open by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal, holding that the pursuant to the "faith-in-case law" rule of *Davis v. United States* (2011) 564 U.S. 229, 236-239 [180 L.Ed.2nd 285], it was unnecessary to decide the issue. (*United States v. Thomas* (9th Cir. 2013) 726 F.3rd 1086, 1092-1095.)

A search of a cellphone "incident to arrest" (as opposed to a **Fourth** waiver search) was clearly lawful prior to the United States Supreme Court case of *Riley v. California* (June 25, 2014) 573 U.S. ___ [134 S.Ct. 2473; 189 L.Ed.2nd 430], where it was held that a warrant must be obtained, and therefore, the officer's good faith reliance upon that pre-*Riley* binding precedent will save a warrantless search of defendant's cellphones found on his person when he was arrested. (*United States v. Lustig* (9th Cir. 2016) 830 F.3rd 1075, 1077-1085.)

See also "Good Faith," under "Limited Use of the Exclusionary Rule," above.

The "Minimal Intrusion Doctrine:" California's First District Court of Appeal (Div. 5) has found this theory to be a whole separate exception to the search warrant requirement, calling it the "Minimal Intrusion Exception." (*People v. Robinson* (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 232, 246-255; the insertion and turning of a key in a door lock; citing *Illinois v. McArthur* (2001) 531 U.S. 326, 330 [148 L.Ed.2nd 838].)

"The minimal intrusion exception to the warrant requirement rests on the conclusion that in a very narrow class of 'searches' the privacy interests implicated are 'so small that the officers do not need probable cause; for the search to be reasonable.'" (*People v. Robinson, supra*, at p. 247.)

See "Minimal Intrusion Exception," below.

In a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Civil Suit:

The exclusionary rule is inapplicable in a **42 U.S.C. § 1983** civil suit. The need for deterrence is minimal in such a context. Application of the exclusionary rule in such a context would not prevent the State from using illegally obtained evidence against someone, but instead would prevent state actors (i.e., civil defendants) merely from being able to defend themselves against a claim for monetary damages. Exclusion of evidence in this context would not remove any preexisting incentive that the government might have to seize evidence unlawfully. It would simply increase state actors' financial exposure in tort actions that happen to involve illegally seized evidence. In effect, **§ 1983** plaintiffs would receive a windfall allowing them to prevail on tort claims that might otherwise have been defeated if critical evidence had not been suppressed. Even if such application of the rule might in some way deter illegal police conduct, that deterrence would impose an extreme cost to law enforcement officers that is not generally countenanced by the doctrine. The cost of applying the exclusionary rule in the **§ 1983** context is significant, and the deterrence benefits are miniscule. The availability of the exclusionary rule in **§ 1983** cases would vastly over-deter police officers and would result in a wealth transfer that is at least peculiar, if not perverse. (*Lingo v. City of Salem* (9th Cir. 2016) 832 F.3rd 953, 957-960.)

In an Administrative Proceeding:

In discussing California's "implied consent" statute (i.e., **Veh. Code § 23612**), noting that such consent cannot overcome the **Fourth Amendment's** provisions for refusing to consent to a warrantless search (i.e., a blood draw), it has been noted that such a "deemed" consent, while not effective (by itself) in the criminal context, does not prevent a DUI arrestee's refusal to submit to a blood or breath test of the alcohol content of his blood from being used against him in an administrative license-revocation proceedings before the Department of

Motor Vehicles. (*People v. Mason* (2016) 8 Cal.App.5th Supp. 11, 18-33.)

“While this statutory ‘deemed’ consent may be sufficient where the issue is whether the administrative consequences of refusal to consent are properly imposed *Hughey (v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles* (1991)) 235 Cal.App.3rd (752) at p. 754; [DMV properly revoked driver’s license for express refusal to consent; court did not consider constitutional issues]), a state legislature does not have the power to ‘deem’ into existence ‘facts’ operating to negate individual rights arising under the U.S. Constitution. (*People v. Mason, supra*, at p. 29.)

Expectation of Privacy: Whether a search or seizure is “unreasonable” under the **Fourth Amendment**, and therefore requires the exclusion of evidence obtained thereby, turns on “whether a person has a constitutionally protected *reasonable expectation of privacy*, that is, whether he or she has manifested a *subjective expectation of privacy* in the object of the challenged search (or seizure) that society is willing to recognize as reasonable.” (*Emphasis added; People v. Robles* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 794.)

Rule: The United States Supreme Court has held: “Our **Fourth Amendment** analysis embraces two questions. First, we ask whether the individual, by his conduct, has exhibited an *actual expectation of privacy*; that is, whether he has shown that ‘he [sought] to preserve [something] as private.’ [Citation.] . . . Second, we inquire whether the individual’s expectation of privacy is ‘one that society is prepared to recognize as *reasonable*.’ [Citation, fn. omitted.]” (*Bond v. United States* (2000) 529 U.S. 334, 338 [120 S. Ct. 1462, 1465, 146 L. Ed.2nd 365, 370]; see also *People v. Maury* (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 384; *United States v. Wahchumwah* (9th Cir. 2013) 710 F.3rd 862, 867.)

Examples:

A hotline for citizens to call in tips on criminal activity, advertised as guaranteeing the caller’s anonymity, does not create a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy in either the caller’s identity or the information

provided. It was expected that the information would be passed onto law enforcement. The caller in this case became the suspect in the alleged crimes, thus negating any reasonable expectation to believe that the police would not determine and use his identity in the investigation. (*People v. Maury*, *supra*, at pp. 381-403.)

A defendant has the burden of proving that he had standing to contest a warrantless search. In other words, he must first prove that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the areas searched. A person seeking to invoke the protection of the Fourth Amendment must demonstrate both that he harbored a subjective (i.e., in his own mind) expectation of privacy and that the expectation was objectively reasonable. An objectively reasonable expectation of privacy is one that society is willing to recognize as reasonable. Among the factors considered in making this determination are whether a defendant has a possessory interest in the thing seized or place searched; whether he has the right to exclude others from that place; whether he has exhibited a subjective expectation that it would remain free from governmental invasion; whether he took normal precautions to maintain his privacy; and whether he was legitimately on the premises. (*People v. Nishi* (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 954, 959-963; defendant held to not have an expectation of privacy in his tent on public land without a permit, nor the area around his tent.)

See “Standing,” under “Searches and Seizures” (Chapter 5), below.

Juvenile Cases: This same *exclusionary rule* applies to juvenile proceedings that are filed pursuant to the **Welfare and Institutions Code**. (*In re William G.* (1985) 40 Cal.3rd 550, 567, fn. 17; *In re Tyrell J.* (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68, 75-76.)

Standard of Review On Appeal:

Motion to Suppress:

Denial of a motion to suppress evidence is reviewed by an appellate court “*de novo*.” (*United States v. Bautista* (9th Cir. 2004) 362 F.3rd 584, 588-589; see also *United States v. Crawford* (9th Cir. 2004) 372 F.3rd 1048, 1053.)

“A determination whether there was reasonable suspicion to support an investigatory ‘stop and frisk’ is a mixed question of law and fact, also reviewed de novo.” (*United States v. Williams* (9th Cir. 2017) 846 F.3rd 303, 306; citing *United States v. Burkett* (9th Cir. 2010) 612 F.3rd 1103, 1106.)

The district court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error. (*United States v. Williams, supra*, citing *United States v. Crawford, supra*, and *United States v. Hammett* (9th Cir. 2001) 236 F.3rd 1054, 1057-1058.)

Appeal from a P.C. § 995 Motion to Dismiss Ruling:

“[I]n proceedings under **section 995** it is the (preliminary hearing) magistrate who is the finder of fact; the superior court has none of the foregoing powers, and sits merely as a reviewing court; it must draw every legitimate inference in favor of the information, and cannot substitute its judgment as to the credibility or weight of the evidence for that of the magistrate. [Citation.] On review by appeal or writ, moreover, the appellate court in effect disregards the ruling of the superior court and directly reviews the determination of the magistrate’ (*People v. Laiwa* (1983) 34 Cal.3rd 711, 718 . . . ; see *People v. Konow* (2004) 32 Cal.4th 995, 1025) ‘Insofar as the **Penal Code section 995** motion rests on issues of statutory interpretation, our review is de novo.’ (*Lexin v. Superior Court* (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1050, 1072) “““As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task here is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. [Citation.] We begin by examining the statute’s words, giving them a plain and commonsense meaning.””” (*People v. Scott* (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1415, 1421) ““[W]e consider the language of the entire scheme and related statutes, harmonizing the terms when possible.’ (*Riverside County Sheriff’s Dept. v. Stiglitz* (2014) 60 Cal.4th 624, 632 . . . ; see *People v. Gonzalez* (2014) 60 Cal.4th 533, 537)’ (*People v. Gonzalez* (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1138, 1141.)

Constitutionality of a Statute:

“Where an issue presented involves the constitutionality of a statute, (an appellate court will) review the lower court’s

determination de novo. (*Vergara v. State of California* (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 619, 642) In conducting (the court’s) review, (it will) adhere to the settled principles that “[statutes] are to be so construed, if their language permits, as to render them valid and constitutional rather than invalid and unconstitutional” [citation] and that California courts must adopt an interpretation of a statutory provision which, ‘consistent with the statutory language and purpose, eliminates doubt as to the provision’s constitutionality.’””” (*People v. Morera-Munoz* (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 838, 846; quoting *People v. Armor* (1974) 12 Cal.3rd 20, 30; and citing *People v. Harrison* (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1211, 1228.)

Sufficiency of the Evidence:

In a “*sufficiency of the evidence case*,” an appellate court will “consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the judgment and presume the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence in support of the judgment. The test is whether substantial evidence supports the decision, not whether the evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.]” *People v. White* (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 881, 884, citing *People v. Mincy* (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 432. See also *King v. State of California* (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 265, 278-279; *People v. Jimenez* (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1353.)

In a criminal case, the issue is “whether a rational fact finder could have concluded defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (*People v. Rowland* (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 269 [14 Cal. Rptr. 2nd 377, 841 P.2nd 897].) ‘Reversal on this ground is unwarranted unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].” [Citation.]’ (*People v. Bolin* (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331 [75 Cal. Rptr. 2nd 412, 956 P.2nd 374].) Evidence is substantial when it is reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value. (*People v. Ramsey* (1988) 203 Cal.App.3rd 671, 682 [250 Cal. Rptr. 309].) We consider the evidence, including the reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence, in the light most favorable to the judgment. (*People v. Valdez* (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 104 [8 Cal. Rptr. 3rd 271, 82 P.3rd 296].)” (*People v. Nicolas* (2017) 8 Cal. App. 5th 1165, 1171.)

“‘Substantial evidence’ is evidence of ponderable legal significance, evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value.” (Citation) ‘The focus is on the quality, rather than the quantity, of the evidence.’ (Citation) ‘Inferences may constitute substantial evidence, but they must be the product of logic and reason. Speculation or conjecture alone is not substantial evidence.’ (Citation) ‘The ultimate test is whether it is reasonable for a trier of fact to make the ruling in question in light of the whole record. (Citation) The testimony of a single witness may be sufficient.’ (Citation)” (Internal quotations and citations omitted; **King v. State of California**, *supra*.)

The same standards apply when the evidence being evaluated constitutes circumstantial evidence. (**People v. Snow** (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 66; **People v. Jimenez** (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1354; **People v. Lopez** (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1230, 1234.)

The same standards also apply when the defendant is a minor, and the issue is whether or not there was “substantial evidence” supporting a true finding that she’d violated a particular criminal offense (P.C. § 148(a), in this case). (**In re Amanda A.** (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 537, 545-546.)

But, “a jury may not rely upon unreasonable inferences, and ... ‘[a]n inference is not reasonable if it is based only on speculation.’” (Citation) “Before the judgment of the trial court can be set aside for the insufficiency of the evidence, it must clearly appear that on no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the verdict of the [finder of fact].” (Citation) (**People v. Goode** (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 484, 488.)

“The federal standard of review is to the same effect: Under principles of federal due process, review for sufficiency of evidence entails not the determination whether the reviewing court itself believes the evidence at trial establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but, instead, whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] The standard of review is the same in cases in which the prosecution relies

mainly on circumstantial evidence. [Citation.] ““Although it is the duty of the jury to acquit a defendant if it finds that circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence [citations], it is the jury, not the appellate court[,] which must be convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. ““If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.””””” (*People v. Dealba* (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1148-1149, quoting *People v. Rodriguez* (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11.)

“““An appellate court must accept logical inferences that the [finder of fact] might have drawn from the circumstantial evidence.” [Citation.] “Before the judgment of the trial court can be set aside for the insufficiency of the evidence, it must clearly appear that on no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the verdict of the [finder of fact].” [Citation.]” (*People v. Sanghera* (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1573.) As our Supreme Court said in *People v. Rodriguez*, *supra*, 20 Cal.4th 1, while reversing an insufficient evidence finding because the reviewing court had rejected contrary, but equally logical, inferences the jury might have drawn: ‘The [Court of Appeal] majority’s reasoning . . . amounted to nothing more than a different weighing of the evidence, one the jury might well have considered and rejected. The Attorney General’s inferences from the evidence were *no more inherently speculative* than the majority’s; consequently, the majority erred in substituting its own assessment of the evidence for that of the jury.’ (*Id.*, at p. 12, italics added.)” (*People v. Dealba*, *supra*, at p. 1149.)

“On appeal of a conviction under (**Penal Code**) **section 288(a)**, “[t]he proper test for determining a claim of insufficiency of evidence . . . is whether, on the entire record, a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.] On appeal, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the People and must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (*People v. Villagran* (2016) 5

Cal.App.5th 880, 889-890; quoting *People v. Jones* (1990) 51 Cal.3rd 294, 314.)

Habeas Corpus:

In ruling on a denial of a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus, where a state court has ruled against a defendant and the federal district court has denied the petition, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal will consider the issue “de novo.” But then, it can only reverse the district court’s denial of the petition, and overturn the state decision, if the state court decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” (*Jones v. Harrington* (9th Cir. July 22, 2016) 829 F.3rd 1128, 1135-1136; **28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2).**)

Civil Liability: A law enforcement officer who violates a subject’s **Fourth Amendment** rights also, in addition to having the resulting evidence exposed to possible suppression in a criminal case, potentially opens him or herself up to civil liability as well.

Qualified Immunity:

“A government official (who is) sued under (42 U.S.C.) § 1983 is entitled to qualified immunity unless the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.” (See *Ashcroft v. al-Kidd* (May 31, 2011) 563 U.S. 731, 735 [179 L.Ed.2nd 1149, 1155]; *District of Columbia v. Wesby et al.* (Jan. 22, 2018) __ U.S. __, __ [138 S.Ct. 577; 199 L.Ed.2nd 453].)

“A right is clearly established only if its contours are sufficiently clear that ‘a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.’” (*Anderson v. Creighton* (1987) 483 U.S. 635, 640 [97 L.Ed.2nd 523].)

“‘Clearly established’ means that, at the time of the officer’s conduct, the law was “‘sufficiently clear’ that every “‘reasonable official would understand that what he

is doing”” is unlawful. (Citations)” (*District of Columbia v. Wesby et al., supra.*)

It has also been noted that in discussing the “clearly established” requirement, the “*specificity*” of the rule is “especially important in the **Fourth Amendment** context.” Finding probable cause to arrest must necessarily turn on a specific set of facts and circumstances. (*Ibid.*)

In other words, “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” (*Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, supra*, at p. 741 [179 L.Ed.2nd at p. 1159].)

“This doctrine ‘gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments,’ and ‘protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”’ (*Id.*, at p. 743 [179 L.Ed.2nd at p. 1160; quoting *Malley v. Briggs* (1986) 475 U.S. 335, 341 [89 L.Ed.2nd 271].)” (*Carroll v. Carman* (Nov. 10, 2014) 574 U.S. ___, ___ [135 S.Ct. 348, 350; 190 L.Ed.2nd 311]; see also *Guillory v. Hill* (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 240, 250-252.)

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a civil allegation of unlawful arrest so long as at the time of the arrest (1) there was probable cause for the arrest, *or* (2) “it is *reasonably arguable* that there was probable cause for arrest—that is, whether reasonable officers could disagree as to the legality of the arrest such that the arresting officer is entitled to qualified immunity.” (*Rosenbaum v. Washoe County* (9th Cir. 2011) 663 F.3rd 1071, 1076; finding that because no Nevada statute applied to the plaintiff’s “scalping” of tickets to a fair, his arrest was unlawful and because no reasonable officer would have believed so, the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity.)

See also *City & County of San Francisco v. Sheehan* (May 18, 2015) ___ U.S. ___, ___ [135 S.Ct. 1765; 191 L.Ed.2nd 856], severely criticizing the Ninth Circuit Court of appeal for using the general rationale of prior decisions in holding that officers should have been aware of any

particular rule. “We have repeatedly told courts—and the Ninth Circuit in particular—not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality.” (*Id.*, 135 S.Ct. at pp. 1775-1776; quoting and citing *Ashcroft v. al-Kidd* (2011) 563 U. S. 731, 742 [179 L. Ed.2nd 1149, 1160]; and *Lopez v. Smith* (Oct. 6, 2014) 574 U.S. __, __ [135 S.Ct. 1; 190 L.Ed.2nd 1, 5].)

It was also noted in *Sheehan* that the fact that officers may violate or ignore their training and written policies in forcing entry and using force does not itself negate qualified immunity where it would otherwise be warranted. (*Id.*, 135 S.Ct. at pp. 1174-1178.)

“The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. (Citation) A clearly established right is one that is sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right. (Citation). We do not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate. Put simply, qualified immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law. (Citation) We have repeatedly told courts . . . not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality. (Citation) The dispositive question is whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established. (Citation) This inquiry must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition. (Citation) Such specificity is especially important in the **Fourth Amendment** context, where the Court has recognized that it is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to the factual situation the officer confronts. (Citation)” (Internal quotations and citations deleted; *Mullenix v. Luna* (Nov. 9, 2015) 577 U.S. __ [193 L.Ed.2nd 255; 136 S. Ct. 305, 308].)

“[Q]ualified immunity is a question of law, not a question of fact. [Citation.] But Defendants are only entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law if, taking the facts in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff], they violated no

clearly established constitutional right. The court must deny the motion for judgment as a matter of law if reasonable jurors could believe that Defendants violated [the plaintiff's] constitutional right, and the right at issue was clearly established.' (*Torres v. City of Los Angeles* (9th Cir. 2008) 548 F.3d 1197, 1210.) 'The availability of qualified immunity after a trial is a legal question informed by the jury's findings of fact, but ultimately committed to the court's judgment.' (*Acevedo-Garcia v. Monroig* (1st Cir. 2003) 351 F.3rd 547, 563.) ""[D]eference to the jury's view of the facts persists throughout each prong of the qualified immunity inquiry."" (*A.D. v. California Highway Patrol* (9th Cir. 2013) 712 F.3rd 446, 456.) ""[T]he jury's view of the facts must govern our analysis once litigation has ended with a jury's verdict."" (*Id.*, at p. 457.) ""Where, as here, the legal question of qualified immunity turns upon which version of the facts one accepts, the jury, not the judge, must determine liability."" (*Sova v. City of Mt. Pleasant* (6th Cir. 1998) 142 F.3rd 898, 903.)" (*King v. State of California* (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 265, 289.)

"Qualified immunity attaches when an official's conduct ""does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."" *Mullenix v. Luna*, 577 U.S. at __-__, 136 S.Ct. 305; 193 L.Ed.2nd 255, 257. While this Court's case law ""do[es] not require a case directly on point"" for a right to be clearly established, ""existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate."" *Id.*, at __, 136 S.Ct. 305; 193 L.Ed.2nd 255, 257. In other words, immunity protects ""all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law."" *Ibid.* (*White v. Pauly* (Jan. 9, 2017) __ U.S. __ 137 S.Ct. 548, 551; 196 L.Ed.2nd 463, 468].)

In *White, supra*, the Court "again . . . reiterate(d), the longstanding principle that ""clearly established law' should not be defined ""at a high level of generality."" *Ashcroft v. al-Kidd*, 563 U.S. 731, 742, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2nd 1149 (2011). As this Court explained decades ago, the clearly established law must be ""particularized"" to the facts of the case. *Anderson v. Creighton*, 483 U. S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed. 2nd 523 (1987). Otherwise, ""[p]laintiffs would be able to convert

the rule of qualified immunity . . . into a rule of virtually unqualified liability simply by alleging violation of extremely abstract rights.” *Id.*, at 639, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed. 2nd 523.” (*White v. Pauly, supra.*)

On the issue of determining the propriety of qualified immunity in a given case, “requiring the comparing of a given case with existing statutory or constitutional precedent, is quintessentially a question of law for the judge, not the jury. A bifurcation of duties is unavoidable. Only the jury can decide the disputed factual issues, while only the judge can decide whether the right was clearly established once the factual issues are resolved. “The controlling distinction between the power of the court and that of the jury is that the former is the power to determine the law and the latter to determine the facts.” (**Morales v. Fry** (9th Cir. 2017) 873 F.3rd 817, 823; quoting *Dimick v. Schiedt* (1935) 293 U.S. 474, 486 [55 S.Ct. 296; 79 L.Ed. 603].)

Qualified immunity may be available, depending upon the circumstances, to off-duty police officers acting as private security guards, but only if it is shown that the officer was, under the circumstances, serving a public, governmental function even though being paid by a private company to provide private security. Where the off-duty officer/defendant in this case, while acting as a hotel security but in full uniform complete with his badge, failed to intercede to stop an assault on the plaintiff by other hotel security guards, he was held *not* to be entitled to qualified immunity for failing to have met this standard. Also, where a reasonable jury could find that the officer exposed the plaintiff to harm he would not otherwise have faced, that the harm was foreseeable, and the officer acted with deliberate indifference to the presence of a known danger that was created by his conduct, he was not entitled to qualified immunity. (**Bracken v. Okura** (9th Cir. 2017) 869 F.3rd 771.)

The fact that there is a genuine issue to debate does not end the inquiry. “(T)he existence of a genuine dispute about the reasonableness of an officer’s use of force does not preclude granting qualified immunity or eliminate any basis for an immediate appeal of denial of qualified immunity.”

(Isayeva v. Sacramento Sheriff's Department (9th Cir. 2017) 872 F.3rd 938, 944-950.)

Effect of a Prior Conviction or Sentence:

Heck v. Humphrey (1994) 512 U.S. 477 [129 L.Ed.2nd 383] bars a **42 U.S.C. § 1983** civil rights lawsuit if the lawsuit is inconsistent with a prior criminal conviction or sentence arising out of the same facts, unless the conviction or sentence has been subsequently resolved in the plaintiff's favor. (*Id.*, at pp. 486-487.) *Heck* requires the reviewing court to answer three questions:

- (1) Was there an underlying conviction or sentence relating to the **section 1983** claim?
- (2) Would a "judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the **section 1983** action necessarily imply the invalidity of the prior conviction or sentence?
- (3) If so, was the prior conviction or sentence already invalidated or otherwise favorably terminated?

(Fetters v. County of Los Angeles (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 825, 834-835; citing *Magana v. County of San Diego* (S.D.Cal. 2011) 835 F.Supp.2nd 906, 910. See also *Yount v. City of Sacramento* (2008) 43 Cal.4th 885, 893-894.)

The defendant's later withdrawal of his plea and dismissal of the case, following the completion of his sentence, does not negate the applicability of the rule of *Heck*. (*Fetters v. County of Los Angeles*, *supra*, and fn. 6.)

However, a subsequent dismissal of the civil plaintiff's criminal conviction under **P.C. § 1203.4** (permitting the dismissal of a guilty verdict after a person has successfully fulfilled their term of probation) does not invalidate the conviction for purposes of removing the *Heck* bar, and thus prevents the plaintiff from bringing a civil action under **42 U.S.C. § 1983** where it was alleged that the plaintiff was the victim of excessive force used by a police officer/civil defendant and the criminal jury's guilty verdict necessarily found that the force used was not unreasonable under the

circumstances. (*Baranchik v. Fizulich* (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1210.)

Also, pleading guilty to a charge (possession of firearms on the grounds of the U.S. Capital) does not prevent defendant from challenging on appeal the constitutionality of the statute to which he pled guilty. (*Class v. United States* (Feb. 21, 2018) __ U.S. __ [__ S.Ct. __; __ L.Ed.2nd __; 2018 U.S. LEXIS 1378].)

Summary Judgment:

An Appellate Court is to review a trial court's granting of summary judgment in a civil case "de novo." The Court is to determine whether "taking the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there are no genuine issues of material fact." In the absence of material factual disputes, the objective reasonableness of a police officer's conduct is "a pure question of law." (*Lowry v. City of San Diego* (9th Cir. 2017) 858 F.3rd 1248, 1254; citing and quoting *Torres v. City of Madera* (9th Cir. 2011) 648 F.3rd 1119, 1123; and *Scott v. Harris* (2007) 550 U.S. 372, 381 n.8 [127 S.Ct. 1769; 167 L. Ed.2nd 686].).

"A motion for summary judgment shall be granted when 'all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.' [Citation.] A summary adjudication is properly granted only if a motion therefor completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty. [Citation.] Motions for summary adjudication proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment." (*Jameson v. Desta* (2015) 241 Cal.App. 4th 491, 497; quoting *Jameson v. Desta* (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1144, 1163.)

"On appeal, the reviewing court makes 'an independent assessment of the correctness of the trial court's ruling, applying the same legal standard as the trial court in determining whether there are any genuine issues of material fact or whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" (*Jameson v. Desta, supra*,

241 Cal.App.4th 491; citing *Trop v. Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc.* (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1133, 1143; which quotes *Iverson v. Muroc Unified School Dist.* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 218, 222-223.)

In a summary judgment finding favoring the civil defendants, the appellate court is to “independently review the record that was before the trial court when it ruled on defendants’ motion. [Citations.] In so doing, (the Court will) view the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs as the losing parties, resolving evidentiary doubts and ambiguities in their favor.” (*B.H. v. County of San Bernardino* (2015) 62 Cal.4th 168, 178; quoting *Elk Hills Power, LLC v. Board of Equalization* (2013) 57 Cal.4th 593, 605-606.)

Directed Verdict:

“A directed verdict (in a civil suit) in favor of a (civil) defendant (or a civil plaintiff) is proper if, after disregarding conflicting evidence and drawing every legitimate inference in favor of the plaintiff, there is no evidence of sufficient substantiality to support a verdict in favor of the plaintiff (or defendant). (*Wolf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1119) In ruling on the motion, the trial court may not weigh the evidence, consider conflicting evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. (*Hilliard v. A.H. Robines Co.* (1938) 148 Cal.App.3rd 374, 395) Appellate review of an order granting a directed verdict is quite strict, with all inferences and presumption drawn against such orders. (*Alshafie v. Lallande* (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 421, 432) The reviewing court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff (or defendant), resolve all conflicts in the evidence and draw all inferences in the plaintiff’s (or defendant’s) favor, and disregard conflicting evidence. (*Wolf, supra*, at p. 1119.) (*Guillory v. Hill* (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 240, 249.)

In federal court, see **Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 50(a)**: “(I)f, under the governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict.” (*Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.* (1986) 477 U.S. 242, 250 [91 L.Ed.2nd 202] Conversely, “[i]f reasonable minds could differ as to the import of the evidence, . . . a verdict

should not be directed.” (*Id.*, at pp. 250-251.) When deciding whether to grant a **Rule 50(a)** motion, “[t]he court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” (*Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.* (2000) 530 U.S. 133, 150 [147 L.Ed.2nd 105].)

Civil Liability of an Employing Government Entity: Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York (1978) 436 U.S. 658 [56 L. Ed. 2d 611].): Municipalities may *not* be held vicariously liable for the unconstitutional acts of their employees under the theory of *respondeat superior*.

“A municipality may be liable under **42 U.S.C. § 1983** for constitutional violations inflicted by its employees ‘when the execution of the government’s policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury.’ (Citations)” (*Lowry v. City of San Diego* (9th Cir. 2017) 858 F.3rd 1248, 1266.)

Standards of Proof:

Reasonable Suspicion:

Information which is sufficient to cause a reasonable law enforcement officer, taking into account his or her training and experience, to *reasonably believe* that the person to be detained is, was, or is about to be, involved in criminal activity. The officer must be able to articulate more than an “*inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch’ of criminal activity.*” (*Terry v. Ohio* (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 27 [20 L.Ed.2nd 889, 909].)

The “*reasonable suspicion*” standard is “not a particularly demanding one, but is, instead, ‘considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence,’” (*People v. Letner and Tobin* (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 146; quoting .” (*United States v. Sokolow* (1989) 490 U.S. 1, 7 [104 L. Ed. 2nd 1]; *United States v. Valdes-Vega* (9th Cir. 2013) 738 F.3rd 1074, 1078.)

See “*Reasonable Suspicion*,” under “*Detentions*” (Chapter 3), below.

Preponderance of the Evidence:

“A preponderance of the evidence standard . . . ‘simply requires the trier of fact “to believe that the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence”’ (*Lillian F. v. Superior Court* (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 314, 320.)

“Proof by a ‘preponderance of the evidence’ for an uncharged offense is a considerably lower burden of proof than the due process requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt for a charged offense. (Citation)” (*People v. Nicolas* (2017) 8 Cal.App. 5th 1165, 1177.)

Probable Cause:

“Probable cause means ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] belief or suspicion’ that the person is mentally disordered. [Citation.]” (*In re Azzarella* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3rd 1240.)

“[P]robable cause means ‘fair probability,’ not certainty or even a preponderance of the evidence.” (*United States v. Gourde* (9th Cir. 2006) 440 F.3rd 1065, 1069.)

“Reasonable or probable cause is shown if a *man of ordinary care* (or *caution*) and *prudence* (or a *reasonable and prudent person*) would be led to believe and conscientiously entertain an *honest and strong suspicion* that the accused is guilty.” (See *People v. Lewis* (1980) 109 Cal.App.3rd 599 608-609; *People v. Campa* (1984) 36 Cal.3rd 870, 879; *People v. Price* (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 410.)

Note: The terms “*reasonable*” and “*probable*” cause are used interchangeably in both the codes (see **P.C. § 995(a)(1)(B)**) and case law, but (when properly used) mean the same thing. “*Reasonable cause*” and “*reasonable suspicion*” (i.e., the standard of proof for a detention), on the other hand, *do not* mean the same thing, and are not to be confused.

“(R)easonable cause”—a synonym for “probable cause” (*Heien v. North Carolina* (Dec. 15, 2014) 574 U.S. __, __ [135 S.Ct. 530; 190 L.Ed.2nd 475, 483].)

See “*Standard of Proof*,” under “*Arrests*” (Chapter 4), and “*Probable Cause*,” under “*The Affidavit to the Search Warrant*,” under “*Search Warrants* (Chapter 6), below.

Clear and Convincing Evidence:

“Clear and convincing” evidence requires a finding of high probability. Such a test requires that the evidence be “so clear as to leave no substantial doubt”; “sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind.” (*People v. Mary H.* (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 246, 256; quoting *Lillian F. v. Superior Court* (1984) 160 Cal.App.3rd 314, 320.)

“This standard, which ‘is less commonly used’ (Citation), tends to be seen in civil cases involving ‘interests . . . deemed to be more substantial than mere loss of money.’” (*People v. Mary H.*, *supra.*)

Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt:

CALCRIM No. 220: “Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you with an abiding conviction that the charge is true.”

In “a criminal case, . . . [in which] the interests of the defendant are of such magnitude that historically and without any explicit constitutional requirement they have been protected by standards of proof designed to exclude as nearly as possible the likelihood of an erroneous judgment. In the administration of criminal justice, our society imposes almost the entire risk of error upon itself. This is accomplished by requiring under the **Due Process Clause** that the state prove the guilt of an accused beyond a reasonable doubt.” (*People v. Mary H.*, *supra*; quoting *Addington v. Texas* (1979) 441 U.S. 418, 423 [99 S.Ct. 1804; 60 L.Ed.2nd 323]; *Addington v. Texas* (1979) 441 U.S. 418, 423-424 [60 L. Ed. 2d 323, 99 S. Ct. 1804].)

“*Burden of proof*” refers to the obligation of a party to establish by evidence a requisite degree of belief concerning a fact in the mind of the trier of fact or the court. (**Evid. Code § 115**)

Plea Bargaining and Cooperation Agreements:

Rule: A police officer has no independent authority to plea bargain with criminal suspects.

“A cooperation agreement generally involves ‘an agreement between a defendant and a law enforcement agency.’ ((*People v. C.S.A.* ((2010)) 181 Cal.App.4th (773) at p. 778.) ‘As with a plea agreement, “[t]he government is held to the literal terms of [a cooperation] agreement” [Citation.] And, like a plea agreement, “an agreement to cooperate may be analyzed in terms of contract law standards.”’ (*Id.* a pp. 778-779.) However, and of particular importance to this case, “[a] defendant who seeks specifically to enforce a promise, whether contained in a plea agreement or a freestanding cooperation agreement, must show . . . that the promisor had actual authority to make the particular promise” (*C.S.A.*, *supra*, 181 Cal.App.4th at p. 779.) (fn. omitted.) In California, “state and local prosecutors are invested with the prosecutorial power of the state.” (*C.S.A.*, *supra*, at p. 783.) “And just as federal law enforcement officers have no independent authority to make promises about the filing and prosecution of federal criminal charges, state and local law enforcement officers have no independent authority to make promises about the filing and prosecution of state criminal charges.” (*Ibid.*) Thus, in order to enforce a cooperation agreement in California, the defendant must show that a state or local prosecutor authorized the agreement, thereby granting the law enforcement officer ““actual authority”” to enter into the agreement. (*Id.* at p. 779; see also *Id.* at p. 784 [concluding that trial court erred in dismissing charges based on law enforcement officer’s ““apparent authority”” to enter into cooperation agreement].) (*People v. Perez* (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 863, 879-880.)

“[T]he remedy for breach of an unauthorized cooperation agreement usually is a sanction short of dismissal.’ ((*People v. C.S.A.* ((2010)) 181 Cal.App.4th (773), 780, citing, *inter alia*, *State of North Carolina v. Sturgill* (1996) 121 N.C.App. 629 [469 S.E.2d 557, 568] [concluding exclusion of evidence, rather than dismissal of charges, was proper remedy for defendant’s reliance on unauthorized cooperation agreement and stating, ‘[W]e are not required, as a result of the “constable’s blunder,” to place defendant in a better position than he enjoyed prior to making the agreement with the police.’” (*People v. Perez*, *supra*, at p. 881, fn. 12.)

Case Law:

The Courts’ Order of Priority: Federal and California law is cited in this outline. In reviewing the cases listed, it must be remembered that tactical decisions and actions of state and local law enforcement officers, as well as state and local prosecutors, are bound, and must be guided, *in order of priority*, by the decisions of:

- The *United States Supreme Court*
- The *California Supreme Court*
- The various state *District Courts of Appeal* (Districts 1 through 6)
- The various state *Appellate Departments of the Superior Court*
- Opinions of the *California Attorney General*
- The *Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal*
- All other *Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal*
- The *Federal District Courts*
- Decisions from *other states*.

Decisions from the United States Supreme Court: California’s courts, interpreting the **U.S. Constitution**, federal statutes, etc., must abide by decisions in prior cases when based upon similar facts as announced by the U.S. Supreme Court. (*Auto Equity Sales v. Superior Court* (1962) 57 Cal.2nd 450, 454, 456.)

The **United States Constitution** is the “*Supreme Law of the Land*, and therefore takes precedence over any contrary rules from the states. (**U.S. Const. Art VI, clause 2:** “This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.”)

See also **Cal. Const., Art. III, § 1:** “The State of California is an inseparable part of the United States of America, and the United States Constitution is the supreme law of the land.”

“I fully recognize that under the doctrine of stare decisis, I must follow the rulings of the Supreme Court, and if that court wishes to jump off a figurative Pali, I, lemming-like, must leap right after it. However, I reserve my **First Amendment** right to kick and scream on my way down to the rocks below.” (*People v. Musante* (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 156, 159; conc. opn. of Gardner, P.J.)

Decisions from lower Federal Courts: Decisions of the *Federal District* (i.e., trial) *Courts*, and *federal Circuit Courts of Appeal* (including the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal), while entitled to “*great weight*,” are considered to be “*persuasive*” only, and *are not controlling* in California state courts. (*Raven v. Deukmejian* (1990) 52 Cal.3rd 336, 352; *People v. Bradley* (1969) 1 Cal.3rd 80, 86; *In re Tyrell J.* (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68, 79; *People v. Zapien* (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 989; *Clark v. Murphy* (9th Cir. 2003) 317 F.3rd 1038, 1044; *Tully v. World*

Savings & Loan Assn. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 654, 663; *People v. Noriega* (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 991, 1003.)

State Court Interpretation taking Precedence: For state and local law enforcement officers, a state court interpretation of the various **Fourth Amendment** rules will take precedence over *Federal District* (i.e., trial) and *Circuit Court of Appeal* decisions. (See *People v. Middleton* (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 732, 738, fn. 3.)

“Where California intermediate appellate court cases conflict, any trial court may choose the decision it finds most persuasive.” (*Sears v. Morrison* (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 577, 587.)

Federal decisions cannot be ignored. Even purely state cases may eventually end up in a federal court, where federal rules will be applied, through a *Writ of Habeas Corpus* or in a civil rights lawsuit pursuant to **42 U.S.C. § 1983**.

“A federal court may grant habeas relief to a state prisoner if a state court’s adjudication of his constitutional claim was ‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’” (*Middleton v. McNeil* (2004) 541 U.S. 433, 436 [158 L.Ed.2nd 701]; citing **28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)**.)

Title 42 United States Code § 1983: Provides for *federal civil liability* for “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . .” subjects, or causes to be subjected any person within the United States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the United States Constitution and laws.

Decisions From Other States: California courts are not bound by case decisions from other states (*J.C. Penney Casualty Ins. Co. v. M.K.* (1991) 52 Cal.3rd 1009, 1027.), although they may be considered absent any direct California case law on the issue. (*People v. Valencia* (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 922, 932.)

Where “no California cases have decided the issue presented, we may look to other jurisdictions *for guidance*.” (Emphasis added: *Rappaport v. Gelfand* (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1227.)

“(O)ut-of-state decisions . . . *have persuasive value*. ‘In resolving questions of statutory construction, the decisions of other jurisdictions interpreting similarly worded statutes, although not

controlling, can provide valuable insight.” (Italics added: *People v. Wade* (May 9, 2016) 63 Cal.4th 137, 141; quoting *In re Joyner* (1989) 48 Cal.3rd 487, 491.)

Opinions of the California Attorney General: A published opinion of the California Attorney General is apparently on about equal footing with federal appellate court decisions, it having been held that these opinions are “*entitled to great weight in the absence of controlling state statutes and court decisions*” to the contrary. (*Phyle v. Duffy* (1948) 334 U.S. 431, 441 [92 L.Ed. 1494, 1500].)

Writs of Habeas Corpus: When a defendant claims to be in actual or constructive custody in violation of the **United States Constitution** (e.g., as the result of a **Fourth Amendment** violation), a *Writ of Habeas Corpus* filed in state (**P.C. §§ 1473 et seq.**) or federal (**28 U.S.C. § 2254**) court (see *Wright v. West* (1992) 505 U.S. 277 [120 L.Ed.2nd 225].) is the vehicle by which he or she may test the issue.

When a habeas corpus remedy is sought in federal court, the United States Supreme Court has noted that: “(W)here the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a **Fourth Amendment** claim, a state prisoner *may not* be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.” (fns. omitted; *Stone v. Powell* (1976) 428 U.S. 465, 494 [49 L.Ed.2nd 1067, 1088]; see also *Allen v. McCurry* (1980) 449 U.S. 90 [66 L.Ed.2nd 308].)

Also, pursuant to **28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)**, a federal court “may not grant habeas relief from a state court conviction unless the state court proceedings were ‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States[,]’ or if the state court’s conclusions were ‘based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceedings.’” (*Jackson v. Giurbino* (9th Cir. 2004) 364 F.3rd 1002, 1005 (reversed on other grounds), quoting *Killian v. Poole* (9th Cir. 2002) 282 F.3rd 1204, 1207.)

Also see **28 U.S.C. § 2255**: “**Section 2255** is a substitute for habeas corpus relief for federal prisoners . . . and allows a petitioner to file a motion to ‘vacate, set aside or correct’ the petitioner’s conviction or sentence ‘upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to

impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.’ **28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).**” (See *United States v. Swisher* (9th Cir. 2014) 771 F.3rd 514, 519.)

Unpublished Decisions: (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 8.1115(a)): “(A)n opinion of a California Court of Appeal . . . that is not certified for publication or ordered published must *not* be cited or relied on by . . . a party in any other action.” (Italics added)

The Outline: The following, throughout this Outline, are the rules developed by the courts for the purpose of protecting society’s reasonable privacy expectations and effectuating the purposes of the **Fourth Amendment**.

Police-Citizen Contacts: Contacts between law enforcement officers and private individuals can be broken down into three distinct situations: (See *Florida v. Royer* (1983) 460 U.S. 491 [75 L.Ed.2nd 229]; *In re James D.* (1987) 43 Cal.3rd 903, 911-912; *In re Manuel G.* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 821; *People v. Hughes* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 327-328; *People v. Steele* (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1115.):

- *Consensual Encounters* (Chapter 2).
- *Detentions* (Chapter 3).
- *Arrests* (Chapter 4).

Other Topics: Treated separately, despite common overlaps, are issues involving:

- *Searches and Seizures* (Chapter 5).
- *Searches with a Search Warrant* (Chapter 6)
- *Warrantless Searches* (Chapter 7).
- *Searches of Persons* (Chapter 8).
- *Searches of Vehicles* (Chapter 9).
- *Searches of Residences and Other Buildings* (Chapter 10).
- *New and Developing Law Enforcement Technology* (Chapter 11).
- *Open Fields* (Chapter 12).
- *Searches of Containers* (Chapter 13).
- *Border Searches* (Chapter 14).
- ***Fourth Waiver Searches*** (Chapter 15).
- *Consent Searches* (Chapter 16).

Chapter 2:

Consensual Encounters:

General Rule: Contrary to a not uncommonly held belief that law enforcement contacts with private citizens require some articulable reason to be lawful, it is a general rule that any peace officer may approach and contact any person in public, or anywhere else the officer has a legal right to be, and engage that person in conversation without necessarily having to justify such a contact. (*Wilson v. Superior Court* (1983) 34 Cal.3rd 777; *People v. Parrott* (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 485, 492.)

No “probable cause” or even a “reasonable suspicion” is needed. (See below)

The law does not prohibit an officer from approaching any person in a public place and engaging that person in uncoerced conversation. (*People v. Divito* (1984) 152 Cal.App.3rd 11, 14; *Florida v. Royer* (1983) 460 U.S. 491 [75 L.Ed.2nd 229]; *People v. Mendoza* (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1056, 1081.)

“(L)aw enforcement officers do not violate the **Fourth Amendment** by merely approaching an individual on the street or in another public place, by asking him if he is willing to answer some questions, (or) by putting questions to him if the person is willing to listen.” (*Florida v. Royer, supra*, at p. 497 [75 L.Ed.2nd at p. 236]; *People v. Parrott, supra*, at pp. 492-493.)

It does not become a detention (see below) merely because an officer approaches an individual on the street and asks a few questions. (*In re Manuel G.* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 821.)

But: The person contacted is free to leave and need not respond to an officer’s inquiries. (See below)

Test: Would a *reasonable person* under the same or similar circumstances feel that he or she is free to leave? (*Wilson v. Superior Court, supra*, at p. 790, quoting from *United States v. Mendenhall* (1980) 446 U.S. 544, 554 [64 L.Ed.2nd 497, 509]; *Desyllas v. Bernstine* (9th Cir. 2003) 351 F.3rd 934, 940; *Martinez-Medina v. Holder* (9th Cir 2010) 616 F.3rd 1011, 1015.)

It is *not* what the defendant himself believes or should believe. (*In re Manuel G., supra*, at p. 821.)

If a reasonable person would *not* feel like he has a choice under the circumstances, then the person contacted is being *detained*, and absent

sufficient legal cause to detain the person, it is an illegal detention. (*People v. Bailey* (1985) 176 Cal.App.3rd 402.)

“(T)he officer’s uncommunicated state of mind and the individual citizen’s subjective belief are irrelevant in assessing whether a seizure triggering **Fourth Amendment** scrutiny has occurred. (*In re Christopher B.* (1990) 219 Cal.App.3rd 455, 460.)” (*In re Manuel G.*, *supra*, at p. 821 see also *Whren v. United States* (1996) 517 U.S. 806 [135 L.Ed.2nd 89]; (*People v. Linn* (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 46; noting that the test is an “objective one.” See also *United States v. Magallon-Lopez* (9th Cir. 2016) 817 F.3rd 671, 675.)

“The test is necessarily imprecise because it is designed to assess the coercive effect of police conduct, taken as a whole, rather than focus on particular details of that conduct in isolation.” (*People v. Verin* (1990) 220 Cal.App.3rd 551 556.)

The “*reasonable person*” test presupposes an “*innocent person*.” (*Florida v. Bostick* (1991) 501 U.S. 429, 438 [115 L.Ed.2nd 389, 400]; *United States v. Drayton* (2002) 536 U.S. 194, 202 [153 L.Ed.2nd 242, 252].)

“(T)he court ‘assesses the coercive effect of police conduct as a whole, rather than emphasizing particular details of that conduct in isolation.’”

The circumstances which a court will take into account in determining whether a person is detained include (but are not limited to):

- The threatening presence of several officers;
- The display of a weapon by an officer;
- Some physical touching of the person of the citizen;
- The use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled;
- The time and place of the encounter;
- Whether the police indicated the defendant was suspected of a crime;
- Whether the police retained the defendant’s documents; *and*
- Whether the police exhibited other threatening behavior.

(*People v. Linn* (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 46, 58; see also *In re Manuel G.* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 821; *People v. Parrott* (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 485, 493.)

Note: Courts tend to ignore the inherent coerciveness of a police uniform and/or badge, and the fact that most people are reluctant to ignore a police officer’s questions.

However, see People v. Linn (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 46, 68, fn. 10, where the Court notes that: “These and similar cases are particularly noteworthy in light of recent empirical research suggesting that a significant number of people do not feel free to leave when approached by police, and even less so when police assert even mild forms of authority.” (See *Casual or Coercive? Retention of Identification in Police-Citizen Encounters* (2013) 113 Colum. L.Rev. 1283, 1313, noting studies such as one in which half the respondents indicated that they would feel either not free to leave or less than somewhat free to leave in a mere conversation with police on a sidewalk and concluding, “[t]hus, it appears that any interaction with a police officer, even at the lowest level of intrusiveness, makes most citizens feel that they are not free to leave;” *Smith et al., Testing Judicial Assumptions of the “Consensual” Encounter: An Experimental Study* (2013) 14 Fla. Coastal L.Rev. 285, 319–320, noting that while nearly three-quarters of the sample used in the study perceived the encounters with sworn, armed security as consensual, 45 percent also believed they had no right to walk away or ignore the security officers’ requests. See also *Ross, Can Social Science Defeat a Legal Fiction? Challenging Unlawful Stops Under the Fourth Amendment* (2012) 18 Wash. & Lee J. Civil Rts. & Soc. Just. 315, 331–339 [discussing empirical studies].

Limitations:

Searches, Frisks and Detentions Not Allowed: Obviously, there being no “probable cause” or “reasonable suspicion” to believe any criminal activity is occurring during a consensual encounter, no search, frisk, or involuntary detention is allowed absent additional information amounting to at least a “reasonable suspicion” to believe that the person contacted is, was, or is about to be involved in criminal activity. (See below)

Unintended Detentions: Elevating a “consensual encounter” into a “detention” without legal cause may result in one or more of the following legal consequences:

Suppression of any resulting evidence under the “*Exclusionary Rule.*” (See “*The Exclusionary Rule,*” under “*The Fourth Amendment, United States Constitution,*” Chapter 1, above.)

Criminal prosecution of the offending law enforcement officer(s) for false imprisonment, pursuant to P.C. §§ 236 and 237.

Civil liability and/or criminal prosecution for violation of the subject's civil rights. (E.g.; P.C. § 422.6, Cal. Civil Code § 52.1, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242.)

See “*Consensual Encounters vs. Detentions or Arrests*,” below.

No Detention: Consensual encounters may involve *investigative functions* without necessarily converting the contact into a detention or arrest. *Examples:*

Obtaining personal identification information from a person and *running a warrant check*, so long as nothing is done which would have caused a reasonable person to feel that he was not free to leave, does not, by itself, convert the contact into a detention. (*People v. Bouser* (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1280; *People v. Gonzalez* (1985) 164 Cal.App.3rd 1194, 1196-1197; *Florida v. Rodriguez* (1984) 469 U.S. 1, 5-6 [83 L.Ed.2nd 165, 170-171]; *United States v. Mendenhall* (1980) 446 U.S. 544 [64 L.Ed.2nd 497].)

However, a person who has been “*consensually encountered*” only, need not identify himself, nor even talk to a police officer if he so chooses. (*Kolender v. Lawson* (1983) 461 U.S. 352 [75 L.Ed.2nd 903]; *Brown v. Texas* (1979) 443 U.S. 47, 52 [61 L.Ed.2nd 357].)

In consensually talking to a non-detained person, an officer's reasonable suspicion may be aroused through inconsistent responses, allowing for additional questioning, a patdown, and an eventual arrest. (E.g., see *United States v. Clark* (1st Cir. ME 2018) 879 F.3rd 1.)

Asking for identification, by itself, is not usually a detention. (*People v. Gonzales* (1985) 164 Cal.App.3rd 1194; *People v. Ross* (1990) 217 Cal.App.3rd 879; *People v. Lopez* (1989) 212 Cal.App.3rd 289; *People v. Terrell* (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1251; *People v. Bouser* (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1280, 1287; *People v. Lopez* (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 815, 825; *People v. Parrott* (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 485, 494.)

“In the ordinary course a police officer is free to ask a person for identification without implicating the **Fourth Amendment**.” (*Hübel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada* (2004) 542 U.S. 177, 185 [159 L.Ed.2nd 292].)

But; retaining the identification longer than necessary *is* a detention, and illegal unless supported by a reasonable suspicion the detainee is engaged in criminal conduct. (*United States v. Chan-Jimenez* (9th Cir. 1997) 125 F.3rd 1324: The consent to search obtained during this illegal detention, therefore, was also illegal.)

Asking for defendant’s identification and holding onto it while running a check for warrants would cause a reasonable person to believe he was not free to leave. The detention, however, was held to be reasonable under the circumstances. (*People v. Castaneda* (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1227.)

Merely requesting identification from a suspect, or even retaining it, absent more coercive circumstances, does not by itself convert a consensual encounter into a detention. (*People v. Leath* (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 344, 350-353.)

However, where a robbery had just occurred in the vicinity with the suspect and vehicle description, although not perfect, very close, and with defendant having just parked his car “weirdly,” not quite at the curb, with a door left open, and defendant apparently attempting to separate himself from his car, the officers had a reasonable suspicion to detain defendant anyway. (*Id.*, a pp. 353-356.)

“(C)onsidering all of the circumstances surrounding Officer Moe’s approach and the words he directed towards defendant (i.e. asking if she had a driver’s license), we cannot conclude his verbal and non-verbal conduct ‘constituted a show of authority so intimidating as to communicate to any reasonable person he or she was “not free to decline [his] requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.’” (*People v. Lopez* (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 815, 825.)

However, in suppressing evidence related to defendant’s DUI arrest, it was held held that although the taking of a person’s identification does not necessarily result in a detention, under the “totality of the circumstances” (which included the officer stopping his marked police motorcycle within three feet of defendant’s already stopped vehicle as she exited her vehicle, talk with her about her passenger flicking ashes out of the vehicle’s window as defendant drove, asking her for her driver’s license without explanation as he commanded her to put out her cigarette and put down her soda can, retaining her driver’s license as he conducted an unexplained record check, and questioning of the passenger for

personal details that the officer recorded on a form), defendant had been detained, and such detention was unsupported by reasonable suspicion in that the officer did not notice the odor of alcohol on her until after all the above had occurred. “No objectively reasonable person would believe she was free to end this encounter under the totality of these circumstances, regardless of the officer’s polite demeanor and relatively low-key approach.” (*People v. Linn* (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 46, 50.)

Tip: Ask for identification, transfer the necessary information to a notebook without leaving the person’s immediate presence, and promptly return the identification to the person. (See *People v. Linn, supra.*, at p. 67: “The taking of defendant’s driver’s license would be less significant if (the officer) . . . had merely taken defendant’s driver’s license, examined it, and promptly returned it to her.”)

“(M)ere police questioning does not constitute a seizure.” (*Desyllas v. Bernstine* (9th Cir. 2003) 351 F.3rd 934, 940; quoting *Florida v. Bostick* (1991) 501 U.S. 429, 434 [115 L.Ed.2nd 389, 398; *Martinez-Medina v. Holder* (9th Cir 2010) 616 F.3rd 1011, 1015.)

Contacting and questioning a person without acting forcefully or aggressively will, in the absence of any other factors which would have indicated to a reasonable person that he was not free to leave, be a consensual encounter only. (*United States v. Summers* (9th Cir. 2001) 268 F.3rd 683, 686.)

Generally, a conversation that is non-accusatory, routine, and brief, will not be held to be anything other than a consensual encounter. (*People v. Hughes* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 328.)

Walking along with (*People v. Capps* (1989) 215 Cal.App.3rd 1112.), or driving next to (*Michigan v. Chesternut* (1988) 486 U.S. 567 [100 L.Ed.2nd 565].), a subject while asking questions, but without interfering with the person’s progress, is *not* a detention.

See *United States v. Gross* (D.C. Cir. 2015) 784 F.3rd 784, where it was held that driving alongside the defendant who was walking down the sidewalk, flashlighting him, and, while the officer was still inside his car, asking him, “Hey, . . . how are you doing? Do you have a gun?”, and then, “Can I see your waistband?”, and then, when defendant lifted only one side of his jacket, “Can I check you out for a gun?”, causing defendant to flee, all held *not* to be a detention, and lawful.

But, in a “close case,” the act of asking a subject to stop walking, after the officers had been driving parallel to him while talking to him and asking him questions, was held to be a detention without the necessary reasonable suspicion. The later discovered firearm was suppressed. (*United States v. Hernandez* (10th Cir. Colo. 2017) 847 F.3rd 1257; a questionable decision, depending upon how the defendant was “asked.”)

Asking a vehicle passenger to step out of the vehicle is not a detention. (*Pennsylvania v. Mimms* (1977) 434 U.S. 106 [54 L.Ed.2nd 331]; *People v. Padilla* (1982) 132 Cal.App.3rd 555, 557-558.)

But see *Brendlin v. California* (2007) 551 U.S. 249 [168 L.Ed.2nd 132], below.

Asking a person to remove his hands from his pockets (when done for officers’ safety), or asking him to keep his hands away from his pocket, without exhibiting a “show of authority such that (a person) reasonably might believe he had to comply,” is *not*, necessarily, a detention. (*People v. Franklin* (1987) 192 Cal.App.3rd 935, 941; *In re Frank V.* (1991) 233 Cal.App.3rd 1232; *People v. Parrott* (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 485, 494.)

During a lawful search, although commanding a person to show his hands is a “*meaningful interference*” with a person’s freedom, and thus technically a “*seizure*” for purposes of the **Fourth Amendment**, it is such a “*de minimis*” seizure that, when balanced with the need for a police officer to protect himself, it is allowed under the **Constitution**. (*United States v. Enslin* (9th Cir. 2003) 315 F.3rd 1205, 1219-1227.)

“*Flashlighting*” or “*spotlighting*” a person, by itself, is *not* a detention. (*People v. Franklin* (1987) 192 Cal.App.3rd 935; *People v. Rico* (1979) 97 Cal.App.3rd 124, 130.)

However, see *People v. Garry* (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1100, where it was held to be a detention when the officer spotlighted the defendant and then walked “briskly” towards him, asking him questions as he did so. (See also “*Detentions*,” below.)

Inquiring into the contents of a subject’s pockets (*People v. Epperson* (1986) 187 Cal.App.3rd 118, 120.), or *asking if the person would submit to a search* (*People v. Profit* (1986) 183 Cal.App.3rd 849, 857, 879-880; *Florida v. Bostick* (1991) 501 U.S. 429 [115 L.Ed.2nd 389].), does not

necessarily constitute a detention, so long as done in a manner that a reasonable person would have understood that he is under no obligation to comply.

Asking a person to remove his hands from his pockets (when done for officers' safety), without exhibiting a "show of authority such that (a person) reasonably might believe he had to comply," is *not*, necessarily, a detention. (*People v. Franklin* (1987) 192 Cal.App.3rd 935, 941; *In re Frank V.* (1991) 233 Cal.App.3rd 1232.)

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A consensual transportation to the police station is not necessarily a detention. (*In re Gilbert R.* (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1121.)

Inquiring into possible illegal activity: A consensual encounter does not become a detention just because a police officer enquires into possible illegal activity during an otherwise unthreatening conversation. (*United States v. Ayon-Meza* (9th Cir. 1999) 177 F.3rd 1130.)

Displaying a badge, or even *being armed*, absent active brandishing of the weapon, will not, by itself, convert a consensual encounter into a detention. (*United States v. Drayton* (2002) 536 U.S. 194 [153 L.Ed.2nd 242].)

Contacts on buses, as long as conducted in a non-coercive manner, do not automatically become a detention despite the relative confinement of the bus. (*United States v. Drayton, supra*; *Florida v. Bostick, supra*; see below.)

During a "knock and talk": Contacting a person at the front door of their residence, done in a non-coercive manner, is not a detention. (*United States v. Crapser* (9th Cir. 2007) 472 F.3rd 1141, 1145-1147.)

Drawing a person out of his residence by simply knocking at the door and then stepping to the side for purposes of insuring the officer's safety: No detention when the officers then contacted him outside. (*People v. Colt* (2004) 118, Cal.App.4th 1404, 1411; "The officers did not draw their weapons. (Defendant) was not

surrounded. No one stood between (defendant) and the room door. No one said that (defendant) was not free to leave.”)

Entering the defendant’s driveway, through an open or unlocked gate to a low, chain-link fence, to contact and talk with (consensual encounter) a subject observed working in the driveway (apparently stripping copper wires from an air-conditioner), even if that area is considered to be part of the curtilage of the residence, is not illegal. (*People v. Lujano* (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 175, 182-185; “(T)he officers exercised no more than the same license to intrude as a reasonably respectful citizen—any door-to-door salesman would reasonably have taken the same approach the house.”)

The “constitutionality of police incursion into curtilage depends on ‘whether the officer’s actions are consistent with an attempt to initiate consensual contact with the occupants of the home’” (*Id.*, at p. 184; citing *United States v. Perea-Rey* (9th Cir. 2012) 680 F.3rd 1179, 1188.)

It is an open, undecided issue, with authority going both ways, as to whether it is lawful for an officer to conduct a “*knock and talk*” at other than the front door. The U.S. Supreme Court declined to resolve the issue. (*Carroll v. Carman* (Nov. 10, 2014) 574 U.S. ___ [135 S.Ct. 348; 190 L.Ed.2nd 311]; determining that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity in that the issue is the subject of some conflicting authority.)

However, while declining to decide the correctness of the generally held opinion that a police officer, in making contact with a resident, is constitutionally bound to do no more than restrict his “movements to walkways, driveways, porches and places where visitors could be expected to go,” the Court cited a number of lower federal and state appellate court decisions which have so held: E.g., *United States v. Titmore* (2nd Cir. 2006) 437 F.3rd 251; *United States v. James* (7th Cir 1994) 40 F.3rd 850, vacated on other grounds at 516 U.S. 1022; *United States v. Garcia* (9th Cir. 1993) 997 F.2nd 1273, 1279-1280; and *State v. Domicz* (2006) 188 N.J. 285, 302. (*Carroll v. Carman*, *supra*, at p. ___ [135 S.Ct. at pp. 351-352].)

Consensual Encounters vs. Detentions or Arrests:

The Three Contact Categories: “Police contacts with individuals may be placed into three broad categories ranging from the least to the most

intrusive: consensual encounters that result in no restraint of liberty whatsoever; detentions, which are seizures of an individual that are strictly limited in duration, scope, and purpose; and formal arrests or comparable restraints on an individual's liberty. [Citations.] . . . Consensual encounters do not trigger **Fourth Amendment** scrutiny. [Citation.] Unlike detentions, they require no articulable suspicion that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime.” (*People v. Linn* (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 46, 57; quoting *In re Manuel G.* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 821.)

Factors to Consider:

However, a consensual encounter *may* be inadvertently converted into a detention, or even an arrest, by “any (or a combination of) the following: . . .

. . . the presence of several officers,

. . . an officer’s display of a weapon,

. . . some physical touching of the person, or

. . . the use of language or of a tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled. [Citations]” (*In re Manuel G.*, *supra*; see also *In re J.G.* (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 402, 408-413.)

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has added several other factors to consider (*United States v. Washington* (9th Cir. 2007) 490 F.3rd 765, 771-772, citing *Orhorhaghe v. INS* (9th Cir. 1994) 38 F.3rd 488, 494-496.):

Whether the encounter occurred in a public or nonpublic setting (nonpublic being more intimidating).

Whether the officers informed the person of his right to terminate the encounter.

A consensual encounter might also become an unlawful arrest if done without probable cause. (See *United States v. Redlightning* (9th Cir. 2010) 624 F.3rd 1090, 1103-1106, adding a consideration of the act of *confronting the defendant with evidence of his guilt.*)

Examples:

In *United States v. Washington* (9th Cir. 2007) 490 F.3rd 765, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal found a detention when two white police officers had contact with the black defendant late at night, and then asked him for consent to search. The consensual encounter, however, reverted to an illegal detention due to the “authoritative” manner of conducting the search, by walking defendant back to the patrol car, having him put his hands on the patrol vehicle while facing away from the officer, during a patdown, with the second officer standing between him and his car. It was also noted that the local “Police Bureau” (in Portland, Oregon) had published a pamphlet telling African-Americans to submit to a search when “ordered” to do so by the police following several instances of white police officers shooting black citizens during traffic stops.

While it is a crime to falsely identify oneself when lawfully detained, per **P.C. § 148.9**, this section is not violated where (1) the person is unlawfully detained, or (2) where he is the target of a consensual encounter only. (*People v. Walker* (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1392.)

Because defendant discarded a firearm prior to being taken into physical custody, recovery of the gun was not a **Fourth Amendment** violation. Defendant’s momentary hesitation and merely walking away from the officers instead of running as the officers approached did not constitute submission. Until a person is physically taken into custody, or submits to the officer’s authority, there is no detention. (*United States v. McClendon* (9th Cir. 2013) 713 F.3rd 1211, 1214-1217; citing *California v. Hodari D.* (1991) 499 U.S. 621 [113 L.Ed.2nd 690].)

A consensual encounter developed into an illegal detention (there being no reasonable suspicion to believe defendant was engaged in any criminal activity) at some point during the encounter, and certainly upon asking defendant and his brother if they would sit on the curb, because of the number of officers present (four), a consensual patdown, and the series of other accusatory questions, so that by the time the officer asked for permission to search defendant’s backpack, the defendant was being detained. The gun found in the backpack, as a product of that illegal detention, should have been suppressed in that the consent to search was involuntary. (*In re J.G.* (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 402, 408-413.)

Asking a person to walk to the sidewalk, reasonably under the circumstances understood for safety reasons, is not as intrusive as telling him to sit on the curb, and does not (absent more) constitute a detention. Asking him to verbally identify himself also is not a detention. (*People v. Parrott* (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 485, 494.)

Specific Issues:

Contacts on Buses:

The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that law enforcement officers checking buses for immigration or drug interdiction purposes are *not* detaining the passengers when the officers do no more than “ask questions of an individual, ask to examine the individual’s identification, and request consent to search his or her luggage so long as the officers do not convey a message that compliance with their requests is required.” The fact that the contact took place in the cramped confines of a bus is but one factor to consider in determining whether the encounter was in fact a detention. (*Florida v. Bostick* (1991) 501 U.S. 429 [115 L.Ed.2nd 389]; *United States v. Drayton* (2002) 536 U.S. 194 [153 L.Ed.2nd 242].)

However, the *Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal* held to the contrary in a similar circumstance, without attempting to differentiate the facts from *Bostick* (the case being decided before *Drayton*), finding that the officers should have informed passengers that they were not obligated to speak with the officers. (*United States v. Stephens* (9th Cir. 2000) 206 F.3rd 914.)

The Supreme Court in *Drayton*, *supra*, however, has specifically held that it is not required that officers inform citizens of their right to refuse when the officer is seeking permission to conduct a warrantless consent search. (*United States v. Drayton*, *supra*.)

Note: It is questionable whether *Stephens* is good law in light of *Bostic* and *Drayton*.

Other circuits have upheld such a “bus interdiction,” finding them lawful. (*United States v. Wise* (5th Cir. TX 2017) 877 F.3rd 209.)

Flight:

Rule: The long-standing rule has always been that “*flight alone*,” without other suspicious circumstances, is *not* sufficient to justify a detention. (*People v. Souza* (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224.)

A vehicle driver’s apparent attempt to elude a police officer when there is no legal justification for making a traffic stop, is not illegal in itself in that the driver is under no duty to stop. (*Liberal v. Estrada* (9th Cir. 2011) 632 F.3rd 1064, 1078.)

Note: If a person may walk away from a consensual encounter, he or she may also leave at a full run. The courts, state and federal, have consistently held that this act, *by itself*, is not suspicious enough to warrant a detention.

Note: A defendant’s flight may be used as evidence against him at trial, showing an “*awareness of guilt*.” (See **P.C. § 1127c** and **CALCRIM No. 372**. See also *People v. Price* (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 409, 454-458.)

Exceptions:

Flight, however, need not be ignored. The Supreme Court has recognized that “[U]nprovoked flight upon noticing the police . . . is certainly suggestive’ of wrongdoing and can be treated as ‘suspicious behavior’ that factors into the totality of the circumstances.” (*District of Columbia v. Wesby et al.* (Jan. 22, 2018) __ U.S. __, __ [138 S.Ct. 577; 199 L.Ed.2nd 453], citing *Illinois v. Wardlow* (2000) 528 U.S. 119, 124-125 [120 S.Ct. 673; 145 L.Ed.2nd 570].)

“In fact, ‘deliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of . . . law officers are strong indicia of mens rea.’” (*District of Columbia v. Wesby et al.*, *supra*, at p. __; citing *Sibron v. New York* (1968) 392 U.S. 40, 66 [88 S.Ct. 1889; 20 L.Ed.2nd 917].)

Also, the U.S. Supreme Court has lowered the bar a little by holding that flight from officers while in a “*high narcotics area*” is sufficient in itself to justify a temporary detention (and patdown for weapons). (*Illinois v. Wardlow* (2000) 528 U.S. 119 [145 L.Ed.2nd 570].)

Flight of two people is more suspicious than one. Added to this the fact that there appeared to be drug paraphernalia on a table where the two persons had been sitting and that defendant was carrying something in his hand as he fled, it was held that the officer had sufficient reasonable suspicion to detain them. (*People v. Britton* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1118-1119.)

Stopping, detaining, and patting down a known gang member, observed running through traffic in a gang area while looking back nervously as if fleeing from a crime (as either a victim or a perpetrator), was held to be lawful. (*In re H.M.* (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 136.)

Observing defendant and three others running down the street, carrying rudimentary weapons (i.e., a brick, rock and part of a lamp) in a gang area, with defendant being recognized as a member of that gang, with one of the subjects yelling “*He’s over there*” and another pointing up the street, was sufficient probable cause to arrest the subjects for possession of a deadly weapon for the purpose of committing an assault, per **P.C. § 12024** (now **P.C. § 17500**). (*In re J.G.* (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1501.)

Tossing an unknown object over a fence during a foot pursuit, particularly when this occurs immediately after defendant had been seen in a vehicle that had refused to stop, and which defendant abandoned during a high speed pursuit, is sufficient to justify a detention. (*People v. Rodriguez* (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1540, 1543.)

Flight, when combined with grabbing his front pants pocket while in a high-crime area, provided sufficient reasonable suspicion to justify defendant’s detention and a patdown for weapons which resulted in the recovery of a firearm. Also, no detention occurred when the officers initially chased defendant who fled from the attempted contact. (*United States v. Jeter* (6th Cir. 2013) 721 F.3rd 746, 750-755.)

Flight of a person who is subject to a lawful detention, thus avoiding a statutory requirement that he identify himself (as required under Nevada law), is probable cause to arrest him. (*United States v. Williams* (9th Cir. 2017) 846 F.3rd 303, 310-312; discussing the interplay of Nevada statutes **N.R.S. §§ 171.123** and **199.280**, which, together, make it

an arrestable offense for a lawfully detained individual to refuse to identify himself.)

There was no detention under circumstances when defendant fled from an officer, where the officer had not yet objectively communicated the use of his official authority to restrain defendant until he grabbed defendant's arm because prior to that the officer had acted on his own, he had not touched his weapon, he had not touched defendant, and he had not given any orders or made any threats even though defendant had stopped when the officer called his name. (*United States v. Belin* (1st Cir. Mass. 2017) 868 F.3rd 43)

Chasing the Suspect:

Trying to catch a person who runs from a consensual encounter *is not* a constitutional issue until he is caught. A person is *not* actually detained (thus no **Fourth Amendment** violation) until he is either physically restrained or submits to an officer's authority to detain him. (*California v. Hodari D.* (1991) 499 U.S. 621 [113 L.Ed.2nd 690]; “*threatening an unlawful detention,*” by chasing a person with whom a consensual encounter is being attempted, is not a constitutional violation in itself. See also *United States v. Smith* (9th Cir. 2011) 633 F.3rd 889.)

Actions taken by the subject being chased, such as dropping contraband prior to being caught, will, if observed by the pursuing officer, justify the detention once the subject is in fact caught. (*People v. Rodriguez* (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1540, 1543-1544.)

Defendant who refused to submit to an illegal, suspicionless detention, physically threatening the officer before fleeing, could lawfully be arrested upon the making of the threat. Therefore, arresting him after a foot pursuit was lawful. (*United States v. Caseres* (9th Cir. 2008) 533 F.3rd 1064, 1069.)

Defendant discarding a firearm as officers were attempting to (arguably) illegally arrest him, did not require the suppression of the firearm in that when the gun was discarded, defendant had not yet been “touched” nor had he

“submitted” to the officers. Thus, the **Fourth Amendment** was not yet implicated. (*United States v. McClendon* (9th Cir. 2013) 713 F.3rd 1211, 1214-1217.)

The Court noted that neither defendant’s temporary hesitation, nor the officer’s use of a firearm while telling him he was under arrest, alters the rule of *Hodari D.* (*Id.*, at pp. 1216-1217.)

Photographing and Videotaping Subjects:

“(T)he police surveillance and photographing of defendant entering and exiting the drop-off point is not a subject of **Fourth Amendment** protection since defendant knowingly exposed his whereabouts in public.” (*People v. Maury* (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 384-385.)

Membership in a street gang is not in and of itself a crime. (See **P.C. § 186.22**) The practice of stopping, detaining, questioning, and perhaps photographing a suspected gang member, based solely upon the person’s suspected gang membership, is illegal. (*People v. Green* (1991) 227 Cal.App.3rd 692, 699-700.)

Stopping and detaining gang members *for the purpose of* photographing them is illegal without a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Merely being a member of a gang, by itself, is neither illegal nor cause to detain. (*People v. Rodriguez* (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 232, 239.)

The *Rodriguez* court noted that; “While this policy (of stopping and questioning all suspected gang members) may serve the laudable purpose of preventing crime, it is prohibited by the **Fourth Amendment**.” (*Id.*, at p. 239; citing *Brown v. Texas* (1979) 443 U.S. 47, 52 [61 L.Ed.2nd 357, 363].)

“Video surveillance does not in itself violate a reasonable expectation of privacy. Videotaping of suspects in public places, such as banks, does not violate the **Fourth Amendment**; the police may record what they normally may view with the naked eye. (Citation)” (*United States v. Taketa* (9th Cir, 1991) 923 F.2nd 665, 667.)

However, in a place where a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, to videotape him without a court’s

authorization (i.e., a search warrant) is illegal. (*Id.*, at pp. 675-677.)

See **P.C. § 632**: Illegal eavesdropping on confidential communications. However, a hidden security video camera that takes pictures, but with no sound, is *not* a violation of **section 632**, but only because of the lack of a sound-recording capability. (*People v. Dremmam* (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1349.)

A warrantless videotape surveillance in the mailroom of a hospital, open to some 800 hospital employees but not of the defendant's private workspace, did not violate the defendant's expectation of privacy and was therefore lawful. (*United States v. Gonzalez* (9th Cir. 2003) 328 F.3rd 543.)

The **Fourth Amendment's** protections do not extend to information that a person voluntarily exposes to a government agent, including an undercover agent. A defendant generally has no privacy interest in that which he voluntarily reveals to a government agent. Therefore, a government agent may make a secret audio-video recording of a suspect's statements even in the suspect's own home, and those audio-video recordings, made with the consent of the government agent, do not require a warrant. (*United States v. Wahchumwah* (9th Cir. 2013) 710 F.3rd 862, 866-868; an investigation involving the illegal sale of eagle feathers under the **Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act (16 U.S.C § 668(a))** and the **Lacey Act (16 U.S.C. §§ 2271(a)(1) & 3373(d)(1)(B).)**

See also *Maryland v. Macon* (1985) 472 U.S. 463, 470-471 [86 L.Ed.2nd 370]: "The use of undercover officers is essential to the enforcement of vice laws. (Citation) An undercover officer does not violate the **Fourth Amendment** merely by accepting an offer to do business that is freely made to the public. A government agent, in the same manner as a private person, may accept an invitation to do business and may enter upon the premises for the very purposes contemplated by the occupant."

The Court further noted that the fact that the technology is not generally available to the public, and is more intrusive than mere audio surveillance, is irrelevant to the **Fourth Amendment** analysis. (*Id.*, at p. 868.)

However, the warrantless installation of a hidden video camera in a suspect's home, leaving it operating after the

informant leaves the premises, is a **Fourth Amendment** violation. (*United States v. Nerber* (9th Cir. 2000) 222 F.3rd 597, 604, fn. 5; *United States v. Wahchumwah*, *supra.*, at p. 867.)

A private citizen has a **First Amendment** right to videotape public officials (i.e., police officers) in a public place. The arrest of a citizen for doing this, charging him with a Massachusetts state wiretapping violation, violated the citizen's **First and Fourth Amendment** rights. (*Glik v. Cunniffe* (1st Cir. 2011) 655 F.3rd 78, 82-84.)

See also *Turner v. Driver* (5th Cir. 2017) 848 F.3rd 678, where it was held that at least until the decision in this case, whether or not the **First Amendment** protects a person's right to record the police was an undecided issue in the Fifth Federal Circuit [Texas], providing the officers with qualified immunity when they detained him and took his video camera. However, arresting him was clearly a **Fourth Amendment** violation for which the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity.

See “*Detentions*,” below.

See also “*Videotaping and Photographing*,” under “*Law Enforcement Technology*,” below.

Knock and Talks: Where the officer *does not* have probable cause prior to the contact (thus, he is not able to obtain a search warrant), there is no constitutional impediment to conducting what is known as a “*knock and talk*,” i.e., making contact with the occupants of a residence at their front door for the purpose of asking for a consent to enter and/or to question the occupants. (*United States v. Cormier* (9th Cir. 2000) 220 F.3rd 1103.)

State authority similarly upholds the practice. (*People v. Colt* (2004) 118, Cal.App.4th 1404, 1410-1411.)

Contacting a person at the front door of their residence, done in a non-coercive manner, is not a detention. (*United States v. Crapser* (9th Cir. 2007) 472 F.3rd 1141, 1145-1147.)

See also *People v. Michael* (1955) 45 Cal.2nd 751, at page 754, where the California Supreme Court noted that: “It is not unreasonable for officers to seek interviews with suspects or witnesses or to call upon them at their homes for such purposes. Such inquiries, although courteously made and not accompanied

with any assertion of a right to enter or search or secure answers, would permit the criminal to defeat his prosecution by voluntarily revealing all of the evidence against him and then contending that he acted only in response to an implied assertion of unlawful authority.”

The key to conducting a lawful “*knock and talk*,” when there is no articulable suspicion that can be used to justify an “*investigative detention*,” is whether “a reasonable person would feel free ‘to disregard the police and go about his business.’” [Citation] If so, no articulable suspicion is required to merely knock on the defendant’s door and inquire of him who he is and/or to ask for consent to search. (*People v. Jenkins* (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 368.)

But see *United States v. Jerez* (7th Cir. 1997) 108 F.3rd 684, where a similar situation was held to constitute an “*investigative detention*,” thus requiring an “*articulable reasonable suspicion*” to be lawful, because the officers knocked on the motel room door in the middle of the night continually for a full three minutes, while commanding the occupants to open the door.

An otherwise lawful “*knock and talk*,” where officers continued to press the defendant for permission to enter his apartment after his denial of any illegal activity, converted the contact into an unlawfully “extended” detention, causing the Court to conclude that a later consent-to-search was the product of the illegal detention, and thus invalid. (*United States v. Washington* (9th Cir. 2004) 387 F.3rd 1060.)

The information motivating an officer to conduct a knock and talk may be from an anonymous tipster. There is no requirement that officers corroborate anonymous information before conducting a knock and talk. (*People v. Rivera* (2007) 41 Cal.4th 304.)

The United States Supreme Court has found it to be an open, undecided issue, with authority going both ways, as to whether it is lawful for an officer to conduct a “*knock and talk*” at other than the front door, the Court declining to resolve the issue. (*Carroll v. Carman* (Nov. 10, 2014) 574 U.S. __ [135 S.Ct. 348; 190 L.Ed.2nd 311]; determining that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity in that the issue is the subject of some conflicting authority.)

However, while declining to decide the correctness of the generally held opinion that a police officer, in making contact with a resident, is constitutionally bound to do no more than restrict his “movements to walkways, driveways, porches and places where visitors could be expected to go,” the Court cited a number of lower federal and state appellate court decisions which have so held: E.g., *United States v. Titemore* (2nd Cir. 2006) 437 F.3rd 251; *United States v. James* (7th Cir 1994) 40 F.3rd 850, vacated on other grounds at 516 U.S. 1022; *United States v. Garcia* (9th Cir. 1993) 997 F.2nd 1273, 1279-1280; and *State v. Domicz* (2006) 188 N.J. 285, 302. (*Id.*, at p. __ [135 S.Ct. at pp. 351-352].)

See “*Knock and Talk*,” below, under “*Searches of Residences and Other Buildings*” (Chapter 10), below.

Chapter 3:

Detentions:

General Rule: A police officer has the right to stop and temporarily detain someone for investigation whenever the officer has a “*reasonable suspicion*” some criminal activity is afoot and that the person *was, . . . is, . . . or is about to be* involved in that criminal activity. (*Terry v. Ohio* (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 27 [20 L.Ed.2nd 889, 909]; *People v. Walker* (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1381; (*United States v. Williams* (9th Cir. 2017) 846 F.3rd 303, 308-310; *People v. Parrott* (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 485, 492, 494-495.)

Often referred to as a “*Terry stop*.” (See *Thomas v. Dillard* (9th Cir. 2016) 818 F.3rd 864, 875.)

But the other side of this coin dictates that: “The **Fourth Amendment** protects the ‘right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures’ by the government. **U.S. Const. amend. IV.** ‘This inestimable right of personal security belongs as much to the citizen on the streets of our cities as to the homeowner closeted in his study to dispose of his secret affairs.’” (*Thomas v. Dillard, supra*, at p. 874; quoting *Terry v. Ohio, supra*, at pp. 8-9.)

In perhaps an understatement, it has been noted that; “(t)he interaction between a peace officer and a person suspected of committing a crime is not a game.” (*People v. Quick* (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1006, 1008; chastising a detained defendant for attempting to create his own “do it yourself” suppression motion” by throwing his jacket containing a controlled substance into his vehicle, along with the car keys, and locking the door.)

The officer’s belief that two subjects are engaged in an act of domestic violence by itself is insufficient to justify a detention and a frisk for weapons absent some other facts indicating that at least one of the subjects is armed. (*Thomas v. Dillard, supra*, at pp. 875-886; but see dissent at pp. 892-901, arguing that the fact alone that domestic violence is involved, given the dangerousness of domestic violence incidents, is sufficient to justify a patdown for weapons.)

Nor did the suspect’s non-compliance with the officer’s illegal order to submit to a frisk make the subsequent continued detention lawful. (*Id*, at p. 889.)

Also, merely being present at the scene of some unexplained police activity, being observed opening a garage door, appearing to be surprised, and wearing baggie clothing with the pockets apparently being “full of items,” held not to justify a “*Terry* stop” nor a patdown of the defendant’s clothing. (*United States v. Job* (9th Cir. 2017) 871 F.3rd 852, 861.)

“A detention occurs when an officer intentionally applies physical restraint or initiates a show of authority to which an objectively reasonable person innocent of wrongdoing would feel compelled to submit, and to which such a person in fact submits.” (*People v. Linn* (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 46, 57; see also *People v. Parrott* (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 485, 492.)

Detentions are sometimes referred to in the case law as simply an “*investigative stop*,” particularly by the federal courts. (See *United States v. Kim* (9th Cir. 1994) 25 F.3rd 1426; and *United States v. Summers* (9th Cir. 2001) 268 F.3rd 683.)

Purpose:

A detention is allowed so a peace officer may have a reasonable amount of time to investigate a person’s possible involvement in an actual or perceived criminal act, allowing the officer to make an informed decision whether to arrest, or to release, the subject. “An investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Similarly, the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion in a short period of time.” (*In re Antonio B.* (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 435, 440.)

Standard of Proof; “Reasonable Suspicion:”

See “*Reasonable Suspicion*,” under “*Standards of Proof*,” under “*The Fourth Amendment, United States Constitution*” (Chapter 1), above.

“In contrast to a full-blown arrest, an investigatory stop need only be justified by reasonable suspicion.” (*Sialoi v. City of San Diego* (9th Cir. May 24, 2016) 823 F.3rd 1223, 1232; see also p. 1235.)

“The **Fourth Amendment** protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.; *Terry v. Ohio*, *supra*, 392 U.S. at p. 8.) ‘A detention is reasonable under the **Fourth Amendment** when the detaining officer can point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective

manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal activity.” (*People v. Souza* (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 231) Such “reasonable suspicion” cannot be based solely on factors unrelated to the defendant, such as criminal activity in the area. (See *Illinois v. Wardlow* (2000) 528 U.S. 119, 124 . . . [individual’s presence in an area of expected criminal activity not alone sufficient to support reasonable suspicion he or she is committing a crime].)” (*People v. Casares* (2016) 62 Cal.4th 808, 837-838.)

“There are two different bases for detaining an individual short of having probable cause to arrest: (1) reasonable suspicion to believe the individual is involved in criminal activity (*Terry v. Ohio* (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 [20 L.Ed.2nd 889,) and (2) advance knowledge that the individual is on searchable probation or parole (*In re Jaime P.* (2006) 40 Cal.4th 128, 136, 139; *People v. Reyes* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743, 754)” (*People v. Douglas* (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 855, 863-873.)

See “*Fourth Waiver Searches*,” below.

“A detention is reasonable under the **Fourth Amendment** when the detaining officer can point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal activity.” *People v. Suff* (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1013, 1053; quoting *People v. Hernandez* (2008) 45 Cal.4th 295, 299.)

An officer “may ‘draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that ‘might well elude an untrained person.’”” (*People v. Parrott* (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 485, 495.)

Although “consensual encounters present no constitutional concerns and do not require justification . . . ‘when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen,’ the officer effects a seizure of that person, which must be justified under the **Fourth Amendment** to the **United States Constitution**.” (*People v. Brown* (2015) 61 Cal.4th 968, 974, where the officer pulled his patrol car in behind the defendant’s car and activated his emergency lights, quoting *Florida v. Bostic* (1991) 501 U.S. 429, 434 [115 L.Ed.2nd 389], the Court held that the stop was supported by a reasonable suspicion.)

“[A]n investigative stop or detention predicated on mere curiosity, rumor, or hunch is unlawful, even though the officer may be acting in complete good faith.” (*In re Tony C.* (1978) 21 Cal.3rd 888, 893.)

However, ordering a person out of his house with only a reasonable suspicion to believe that he might be involved in criminal activity, and to back up as he did so, holding onto him (albeit without handcuffs) with his hands behind his back while asking for his consent to search his person, was illegal. Full probable cause was necessary. (*People v. Lujano* (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 175, 185-189; The subsequent consent to search his person and his house was the product of that illegal detention and invalid.)

Test: Generally, a person is detained if a *reasonable person* in the suspect's shoes, under the circumstances, would have known that he or she is not free to leave. (*People v. Rios* (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 584, 592; *People v. Walker* (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1382; *People v. Parrott* (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 485, 492.)

However, courts also consider the reasonableness of the officer's actions, under the circumstances, and may find a detention only, despite the suspect's reasonable belief that he is under arrest. (See *People v. Pilster* (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1406, below.)

The fact that "an encounter is *not* a seizure when a reasonable person would feel free to leave do(es) not mean that an encounter *is* a seizure just because a reasonable person would not feel free to leave." There must be "an *intentional* acquisition of physical control." A detention occurs "only when there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement *through means intentionally applied*." (*United States v. Nasser* (9th Cir. 2009) 555 F.3rd 722; defendant stopped his vehicle on his own even though Border Patrol agents had not intended to stop him. Resulting observations, made before defendant was detained, were lawful.)

A detention is a "*seizure*" for purposes of the **Fourth Amendment**, and occurs whenever a law enforcement officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, in some way restrains the liberty of a citizen. (*Florida v. Bostick* (1991) 501 U.S. 429, 434 [115 L.Ed.2nd 389, 398]; *People v. Rios, supra*.)

"The **Fourth Amendment** prohibits 'unreasonable searches and seizures' by the Government, and its protections extend to brief investigatory stops of persons or vehicles that fall short of traditional arrest." (*United States v. Arvizu* (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 273 [151 L.Ed.2nd 740, 749].)

"In situations involving a show of authority, a person is seized 'if 'in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave,'" or ""otherwise terminate the encounter"" (quoting

Brendlin v. California (2007) 551 U.S. 249, 254-255 [168 L.Ed.2nd 142].), and if the person actually submits to the show of authority.” (*People v. Brown* (2015) 61 Cal.4th 968, 974; see also *People v. Linn* (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 46.)

The California Supreme Court in *Brown* explains the analytical sequence depending upon the circumstances. Citing *United States v. Mendenhall*, 446 U.S. 544, 554 [64 L. Ed.2nd 497], the Court held that a seizure occurs if “in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” If, however, the circumstances did not allow for the defendant to leave, such as when he is a passenger on a bus (see *Florida v. Bostic* (1991) 501 U.S. 429, 434-435 [115 L.Ed.2nd 389, 398-399]) then the test is whether “a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.” When the suspect is the passenger in a motor vehicle driven by another which is stopped by police, we must ask whether “any reasonable passenger would have understood the police officers to be exercising control to the point that no one in the car was free to depart without police permission.” (*Brendlin v. California* (2007) 551 U.S. 249, 254-255 [168 L.Ed.2nd 142].) The Court also compared the circumstances such as described in *California v. Hodari D.* (1991) 499 U.S. 621 [113 L.Ed.2nd 690], where it was held that a person who lawfully runs from the police, there being no reasonable suspicion which would have allowed for his detention, a person is not actually detained (thus no **Fourth Amendment** issue) until he is either physically restrained or submits to an officer’s authority to detain him. (*Id.*, at pp. 975-980.)

“A seizure of the person within the meaning of the **Fourth** and **Fourteenth Amendments** occurs when ‘taking into account all the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would “have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business.”’ [Citations]” (*Kaupp v. Texas* (2003) 538 U.S. 626, 629 [155 L.Ed.2nd 814, 819-820].)

A person is not actually detained (thus no **Fourth Amendment** issue) until he is either physically restrained or submits to an officer’s authority to detain him. (*California v. Hodari D.* (1991) 499 U.S. 621 [113 L.Ed.2nd 690]; “threatening an unlawful detention,” by chasing a person

upon whom a consensual encounter is attempted, is not a constitutional violation in itself.)

See also *United States v. McClendon* (9th Cir. 2013) 713 F.3rd 1211, 1216-1217; where defendant was threatened with an arguably illegal arrest, resulting in him discarding a firearm. The firearm was held to be admissible in that the officers had yet to “touch” defendant, nor had he yet “submitted,” when the gun was tossed.

“A person is seized by the police and thus entitled to challenge the government’s action under the **Fourth Amendment** when the officer ‘by means of physical force or show of authority’ ‘terminates or restrains his freedom of movement.’ (Citations)” (*Brendlin v. California* (2007) 551 U.S. 249 [168 L.Ed.2nd 132]; *People v. Zamudio* (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 341-342; *Nelson v. City of Davis* (9th Cir. 2012) 685 F.3rd 867, 875.)

Factors:

Factors to consider when determining whether a person has been detained include:

- The number of officers involved.
- Whether weapons were displayed.
- Whether the encounter occurred in a public or nonpublic setting.
- Whether the officers’ officious or authoritative manner would imply that compliance would be compelled.
- Whether the officers advised the detainee of his right to terminate the encounter.
- (*Orhorhaghe v. INS* (9th Cir. 1994) 38 F.3rd 488, 494-496; *United States v. Washington* (9th Cir. 2004) 387 F.3rd 1060, 1068; (*United States v. Brown* (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3rd 410, 415; *People v. Davidson* (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 966, 972 *In re J.G.* (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 402, 409-410.)

Note : *Brown* is also instructive in how removing some of the above listed factors can convert what appeared to be an arrest back into merely a detention or even a consensual encounter; e.g., putting the firearms away, removing the handcuffs, telling the subject that she was not under arrest, and then letting her return to her apartment unaccompanied.

As analyzed by a California state court, the relevant factors include:

- A threatening police presence;
- The display of a weapon by an officer;
- The physical touching of the citizen approached;
- The officer’s language or voice indicating compliance with police demands might be compelled.

(*People v. Walker* (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1382.)

Patdown for Weapons During a Detention:

A “*stop and frisk*” (where a patdown for weapons is conducted during a detention) is constitutionally permissible if two conditions are met:

- The investigatory stop must be lawful; i.e., when a police officer reasonably suspects that the person apprehended is committing or has committed a criminal offense.
- The police officer must reasonably suspect that the person stopped is armed and dangerous.

(*Arizona v. Johnson* (2009) 555 U.S. 323 [172 L.Ed.2nd 694].)

“A police officer has a strong need to practice caution and self-protection when on patrol.” (*People v. Parrott* (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 485, 495-496; a patdown for firearms was justified by a nervous suspect’s continual touching of a bulge in his sweatshirt and his physical resistance to being detained.)

See “*Frisks*,” under “*Searches with Less Than Probable Cause*,” under “*Searches of Persons*” (Chapter 8), below.

Officer Safety:

The plight of police officers and the *dangers* they face on the streets are not lost on the courts:

“(E)ven when a police officer is careful, he is still subject to attack. The judiciary should not ‘lightly second guess’ an officer’s decision to conduct a ‘stop and frisk (P)olice officers (are) entitled to protect themselves during a detention: ‘This is a rule of necessity to which a right even as basic as that of privacy must bow. To rule otherwise would be inhumanely to add another

hazard to an already very dangerous occupation. Our zeal to fend off encroachments upon the right of privacy must be tempered by remembrance that ours is a government of laws, to preserve which we require law enforcement—live ones. Without becoming a police state, we may still protect the policeman’s status.’ [Citation omitted]” (*In re Richard G.* (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1252, 1255.)

“(L)aw enforcement officers may lawfully detain a defendant when detention is necessary to determine the defendant’s connection with the subject of a search warrant and related to the need of ensuring officer safety.” (*People v. Steele* (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1116-1117; recognizing “officer safety” as “a weighty public interest,” and citing *People v. Glaser* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 365.)

Glaser involved the temporary detention of the defendant by putting him on the ground and handcuffing him when he suddenly showed up at a residence that the officers were just about to enter to execute a search warrant. The detention was upheld as necessary for officer safety under the circumstances.

Steele involved the defendant’s detention when he was driving a second vehicle that was caught between the officers’ vehicle and another car that the officers were attempting to stop late at night in a dimly lit area. Finding that defendant had been detained, the detention was upheld for officer safety reasons.

The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that for officer safety purposes, passengers in a lawfully stopped vehicle may be ordered to exit the vehicle. Passengers, by virtue of merely being present in a lawfully stopped vehicle, are detained. If anything, the need to protect the safety of the officers is even greater when he must deal with more than just a lone driver. (*Maryland v. Wilson* (1997) 519 U.S. 408 [137 L.Ed.2nd 41]; see also *Ruvalcata v. City of Los Angeles* (9th Cir. 1995) 64 F.3rd 1323.)

An occupant of a house being subjected to a search pursuant to a *search warrant* may be detained during the search (1) in order to prevent flight, (2) to minimize the risk of harm to the officers, and (3) to facilitate an orderly search through cooperation of the residents. (*Michigan v. Summers* (1981) 452 U.S. 692, 702-703 [69 L.Ed.2nd 340, 349-350]; *People v. Castillo* (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 414, 421-425.)

This includes those who otherwise are not necessarily involved in the suspected criminal activity. (*Bailey v. United States* (2013) 568 U.S. 186, 192-202 [133 S.Ct. 1031, 1037-1043; 185 L.Ed.2nd

19]; citing *Muehler v. Mena* (2005) 544 U.S. 93 [161 L.Ed.2nd 299].)

Detention Without a Reasonable Suspicion: In some instances, a person may be lawfully detained even though there is no reasonable suspicion to believe that he, himself, is involved in criminal activity.

See “*Officer Safety*,” Above.

The United States Supreme Court has held that at least in a private motor vehicle (as opposed to a taxi, bus, or other common carrier), the passenger, by virtue of being in a vehicle stopped for a possible traffic infraction, is in fact detained, giving him the right to challenge the legality of the traffic stop. (*Brendlin v. California* (2007) 551 U.S. 249 [127 S.Ct. 2400; 168 L.Ed.2nd 132].)

The test is whether, “in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” Or, in the case where the person has no desire to leave, “whether ‘a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.’” (*Id.*, 127 S.Ct., at pp. 2405-2406.)

If the driver is stopped for a traffic-related offense, a “passenger will expect to be subject to some scrutiny, and his attempt to leave the scene would be so obviously likely to prompt an objection from the officer that no passenger would feel free to leave in the first place.” If the driver is stopped for something unrelated to his driving, a “passenger will reasonably feel subject to suspicion owing to close association” with the driver. (*Id.*, 127 S.Ct., at p. 2407.)

Although *Brendlin*, on its face, appears to deal only with the right (i.e., “*standing*”) of the passenger to challenge the legality of the traffic stop (*Brendlin v. California*, *supra.*, at pp. 256-259.), and arguably was not intended as authority for the continued detention of a passenger who might choose to walk away, the U.S. Supreme Court subsequently ruled quite clearly that “(t)he police need not have, in addition, cause to believe any occupant of the (lawfully stopped) vehicle is involved in criminal activity” to justify a continued detention for the duration of the traffic stop. (*Arizona v. Johnson* (2009) 555 U.S. 323 [172 L.Ed.2nd 694].)

Also; “The temporary seizure of driver and passengers ordinarily continues, and remains reasonable, for the duration of the stop.” (*Id.*, at p. 325.)

And then: “(A) traffic stop of a car communicates to a reasonable passenger that he or she is not free to terminate the encounter with the police and move about at will.” (*Ibid.*)

The California Supreme Court is in apparent agreement with this interpretation, holding that upon ordering the passenger out of the vehicle; “there is a social expectation of unquestioned police command, which is at odds with any notion that a passenger would feel free to leave without advance permission.” (*People v. Hoyos* (2007) 41 Cal.4th 872, 892-894; brief, one-minute detention, necessitated for purposes of officer safety, held to be lawful.)

In *People v. Steele* (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1110, defendant’s detention was upheld when he was driving a second vehicle that was caught between the officers’ vehicle and another car that the officers were attempting to lawfully stop late at night in a dimly lit area. Finding that defendant had been detained, the detention was upheld for officer safety reasons despite the lack of any reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant himself was engaged in any criminal activity (at least until the odor of marijuana was noticed coming from defendant’s car).

The Court in *Steele* (*supra*, at p. 1118) cited the Colorado Supreme Court case of *People v. Taylor* (Colo. 2002) 41 P.3rd 681, where the Colorado High Court balanced the interests of the government and the defendant and did not require the government to demonstrate reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant. In *Taylor*, an officer stopped the vehicle the defendant was driving in order to arrest the defendant’s passenger, for whom there were arrest warrants. The defendant did not commit a traffic violation, did not exhibit aberrant behavior, and the officer did not suspect that the defendant was engaged in criminal wrongdoing. The court in *Taylor* said that although the officer had seized the defendant within the meaning of the **Fourth Amendment**, the seizure was not an arrest or an investigatory stop. According to the Court, the circumstances presented “one of those rare situations . . . “in which the balance of interests precludes insistence upon some quantum of individualized suspicion” that defendant is engaged in criminal activity to justify a seizure.”

Racial Profiling:

While a person's race may properly be used as an identification factor when in conjunction with other factors, but standing alone, a person's race is insufficient to justify the detention of a person as the suspect in a crime. (See *People v. Walker* (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1388-1389, and the cases cited therein: "(T)here was a sense that the detaining officer relied too heavily on the common general traits of race and age in attempting to justify a stop that had no other circumstances to warrant it.")

"(T)he race of an occupant (of a vehicle), without more, does not satisfy the detention standard." (*People v. Bates* (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 60, 67; citing *People v. Bower* (1979) 24 Cal.3rd 638, 644.)

California has sought to prevent racial and identity profiling through mandated written guidelines, training, and extensive reporting requirements on the details of all detentions and arrests. (See Gov't. Code § 12525.5: "The Racial and Identity Profiling Act of 2015.")

See also P.C. §§ 13012 and 13519.4.

"A peace officer shall not engage in racial or identity profiling."
(P.C. § 13519.4(f))

Also, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that a defendant's **Sixth Amendment** right to a fair trial takes precedence over a state statute that precludes or restricts inquiry into the validity of a jury's verdict (i.e., the "no impeachment rule") when there is "compelling evidence" that a juror, during deliberations, made a clear statement indicating that he or she relied upon racial stereotypes or animus to convict a defendant. (*Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado* (Mar. 6, 2017) __ U.S. __ [137 S.Ct. 855; 197 L.Ed.2nd 107].)

The Supreme Court has also held that a defendant (a black male) in a capital murder case received ineffective assistance of counsel (a **Sixth Amendment** violation) when his attorney called as an expert witness a psychologist who, as a part of his expert opinion as to the potential future dangerousness of the defendant, testified that black men are statistically more likely to be violent. The Court ruled that it was inappropriate for a jury to consider race no matter how it was injected into the proceeding, rejecting the argument that it was invited error because defendant's own attorney was the one who called the expert to testify. (*Buck v. Davis* (Feb. 22, 2017) __ U.S. __ [137 S.Ct. 759; 197 L.Ed.2nd 1].)

See "*Pretext Stops*," below.

Detentions vs. Arrests: If not handled properly, a “*detention*” could become an “*arrest*” (i.e., a “*de facto arrest*”) which, if not supported by “*probable cause*” to arrest, would be illegal. (*Orozco v. Texas* (1969) 394 U.S. 324 [22 L.Ed.2nd 311]; *In re Antonio B.* (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 435; *United States v. Redlightning* (9th Cir. 2010) 624 F.3rd 1090, 1103-1106; *People v. Espino* (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 746, 758-760.)

General Rule: “There is no bright-line rule to determine when an investigatory stop becomes an arrest.” (*Sialoi v. City of San Diego* (9th Cir. May 24, 2016) 823 F.3rd 1223, 1232; quoting *Washington v. Lambert* (9th Cir. 1996) 98 F.3rd 1181, 1185.)

The use of *firearms, handcuffs*, putting a person into a *locked patrol car, transporting him without his consent*, or simply a “*show of force*,” may, under the circumstances, cause the court to later find that an attempted detention was in fact *an arrest* (i.e., a “*de facto arrest*.”) and, if made without “*probable cause*,” illegal. (*United States v. Ramos-Zaragosa* (9th Cir. 1975) 516 F.2nd 141, 144; *New York v. Quarles* (1984) 467 U.S. 649 [81 L.Ed.2nd 550], handcuffs; *Orozco v. Texas*, *supra*, force.)

Factors to consider, including:

- Whether the suspect was handcuffed;
- Whether the police drew their weapons;
- Whether the police physically restrict the suspect’s liberty, including by placing the suspect in a police car;
- Whether “special circumstances” (such as an uncooperative suspect or risk of violence) are present to justify the “intrusive means of effecting a stop”; *and*
- Whether the officers are outnumbered.

(*Washington v. Lambert* (9th Cir. 1996) 98 F.3rd 1181, 1188-1190; *Sialoi v. City of San Diego* (9th Cir. 2016) 823 F.3rd 1223, 1232.)

Examples:

Handcuffing a detainee will *not* result in an arrest when, “at the time of the detention, the officer had a reasonable basis to believe the detainee presented a physical threat to the officer or would flee.” (*In re Antonio B.* (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 435, 442.)

Handcuffing an otherwise complaint 11-year-old minor (even though reported to be out of control, uncooperative, and “off his meds” by school officials) and transporting him from his school to a relative held to be an excessive use of force under the circumstances, and an unlawful seizure. Officers were not entitled to qualified immunity. (*C.B. v. City of Sonora* (9th Cir. 2014) 769 F.3rd 1005, 1029-1031, 1039-1040.)

Handcuffing the defendant and having him sit on the curb found to be a “de facto” arrest which, under the circumstances, was not supported by probable cause and also which, under the circumstances, negated his subsequent consent to search his vehicle. (*People v. Espino* (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 746, 758-760.)

Indicators of an Arrest: Other courts have illustrated the relevant factors to an arrest:

The Use of Firearms. (*People v. Taylor* (1986) 178 Cal.App.3rd 217, 229; *United States v. Ramos-Zaragosa*, *supra*; *Washington v. Lambert* (9th Cir. 1996) 98 F.3rd 1181, 1185-1189; *Green v. City & County of San Francisco* (9th Cir. 2014) 751 F.3rd 1039, 1047-1048.)

The Use of Handcuffs. (*New York v. Quarles*, *supra*; *United States v. Purry* (D.C. Cir. 1976) 545 F.2nd 217, 220; *Washington v. Lambert*, *supra*; *Green v. City & County of San Francisco*, *supra*; *People v. Espino*, *supra*.)

While putting a juvenile in a security office at the border, and frisking her, were not enough to constitute an arrest, handcuffing her shortly thereafter when contraband was found in her car *was* an arrest. (*United States v. Juvenile (RRA-A)* (9th Cir. 2000) 229 F.3rd 737, 743.)

Whether or not a detention becomes an arrest depends upon “whether the use of handcuffs during a detention was reasonably necessary under all of the circumstances of the detention.” (*In re Antonio B.* (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 435, 441; defendant found to have been arrested, due to his handcuffing without probable cause.)

Handcuffing a person suspected of possible involvement in a narcotics transaction, but where the officer testified only that he was “uncomfortable” with the fact that defendant was tall (6’-6”) and that narcotics suspects sometimes carry

weapons (although the officer did not conduct a patdown for weapons), converted a detention into a “de facto” arrest, making the subsequent consent to search involuntary. (*People v. Stier* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 21.)

A Locked Patrol Car. (*People v. Natale* (1978) 77 Cal.App.3rd 568, 572; *United States v. Parr* (9th Cir. 1988) 843 F.2nd 1228; *United States v. Ricardo D.* (9th Cir. 1990) 912 F.2nd 337, 340; “Detention in a patrol car exceeds permissible *Terry (v. Ohio)* (1968) 392 U.S. 1 [20 L.Ed.2nd 889].) limits absent some reasonable justification.”

During an Overwhelming Show of Force. (*Orozco v. Texas, supra*; *United States v. Ali* (2nd Cir. 1996) 86 F.3rd 275; defendant was asked to step away from the boarding area at an airport, his travel documents were taken, and he was surrounded by seven officers with visible handguns; and *Kaupp v. Texas* (2003) 538 U.S. 626, 628-630 [155 L.Ed.2nd 814, 819-820], three officers, with three more in the next room, commanded the 17-year-old defendant to get out of bed at 3:00 a.m., and took him to the police station for questioning.)

The *Physical Touching* of the person of the suspect. (*Kaupp v. Texas, supra*, at p. 630 [155 L.Ed.2nd at p. 820].)

Transporting a Detainee. (*Dunaway v. New York* (1979) 442 U.S. 200, 206-216 [60 L.Ed.2nd 824, 832-838]; *Taylor v. Alabama* (1982) 457 U.S. 687 [73 L.Ed.2nd 314].)

As a general rule: *Detention +
nonconsensual transportation =
arrest.*

See also *People v. Harris* (1975) 15 Cal.3rd 384, 390-392; transporting a subject from the site of a traffic stop back to the scene of the crime for a victim identification, absent one of the recognized exceptions, was an arrest.

“(W)e have never ‘sustained against **Fourth Amendment** challenge the involuntary removal of a suspect from his home to a police station and his detention there for investigative purposes . . . absent probable cause or judicial authorization.’ [Citation]” (*Kaupp v. Texas* (2003) 538 U.S. 626, 630 [155 L.Ed.2nd 814, 820].)

But see “Non-Consensual Transportation Exceptions,”
below.

Use of Emergency Lights:

Even though a vehicle is already stopped without police action, merely activating emergency lights on a police vehicle as officers contact the occupants of the vehicle is automatically a detention, and illegal if made without a reasonable suspicion. (*People v. Bailey* (1985) 176 Cal.App.3rd 402.)

Defendant was detained under the **Fourth Amendment** when a deputy sheriff investigating an emergency call of a fight in progress at 10:37 p.m. on a Sunday night, stopped his patrol car behind defendant’s parked vehicle and activated his emergency lights. The Court held that a reasonable person under the circumstances would not have felt free to leave. Defendant submitted to the show of authority by remaining in his parked car. However, defendant’s brief detention was supported by a reasonable suspicion based on the totality of the circumstances which included a reliable citizen’s report of a violent fight potentially involving a firearm, the deputy’s quick response time (3 minutes), and defendant’s presence near the scene of the fight in the otherwise vacant alley. (*People v. Brown* (2015) 61 Cal.4th 968, 974-987.)

Defendant was the driver of a vehicle that was following another vehicle. Officers determined that the owner of the lead vehicle had an outstanding warrant for his arrest. Sheriffs Deputies activated their emergency lights just as both vehicles were in the process of parking. Defendant’s vehicle was caught between the officers and the lead vehicle. The Court held that defendant was necessarily detained by this action, per *Brown*, even though there was no cause to believe that he was involved in any criminal activity. Officer safety considerations justified contacting defendant before proceeding to the lead vehicle. The odor of marijuana and plain sight observations of marijuana in the car lawfully lead to a search of the car and discovery of more contraband. (*People v. Steele* (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1115-1120.)

The use of the “wig wag” lights on a patrol car upon pulling up behind defendant’s parked vehicle, done only to identify the officer as law enforcement and without turning on the full light bar, was held *not* to be a detention. The Court held that a reasonable person seeing the wig wag lights under these circumstances would have thought that he was still free to ignore the police presence and go about his business. (*United States v. Cook* (8th Cir. 2016) 842 F.3rd 597.)

Exceptions: The use of firearms, handcuffing, a non-consensual transportation, and/or putting a subject into a patrol car, if necessary under the circumstances, particularly if precautions are taken to make sure that the person knows he is only being detained as opposed to being arrested, or when the use of force is necessitated by the potential danger to the officers, may be found to be appropriate and does *not* necessarily elevate the contact into an arrest. (See *People v. Celis* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 673-676.)

In general, the investigative methods used should be *the least intrusive means reasonably available* (*Florida v. Royer* (1983) 460 U.S. 491, 500 [75 L.Ed.2nd 229].) Although the use of some force does not automatically transform an investigatory detention into an arrest, any overt show of force or authority should be justified under the circumstances. (See, e.g., *United States v. Holzman* (9th Cir. 1989) 871 F.2nd 1496, 1502, restraints justified by belief suspect was attempting to flee; *United States v. Buffington* (9th Cir. 1987) 815 F.2nd 1292, 1300, given officer’s knowledge of suspect’s history of violence, show of force justified by fear for personal safety. (*In re Ricardo D.* (9th Cir. 1990) 912 F.2nd 337, 340.)

Factors: The courts have allowed the use of especially intrusive means of effecting a stop yet still found the intrusion to be merely a detention in special circumstances, such as:

- Where the suspect is uncooperative or takes action at the scene that raises a reasonable possibility of danger or flight;
- Where the police have information that the suspect is currently armed;
- Where the stop closely follows a violent crime; *or*
- Where the police have information that a crime that may involve violence is about to occur.

(*Green v. City & County of San Francisco* (9th Cir. 2014) 751 F.3rd 1039, 1047; noting that “(t)hese factors should all be considered in light of the specificity of the information law enforcement has to suggest both that the individuals are the proper suspects and that they are likely to resist arrest or police interrogation.” See also *Washington v. Lambert* (9th Cir. 1996) 98 F.3rd 1181, 1189.)

Also relevant, per the *Green* court, is the number of officers present. (*Green v. City & County of San Francisco, supra.*)

Examples:

Firearms: United States v. Rousseau (9th Cir. 2001) 257 F.3rd 925; *People v. Glaser* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 366; *United States v. Abdo* (5th Cir. Aug. 19, 2013) 733 F.3rd 562; *People v. Turner* (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 151, 162-164; *United States v. Edwards* (9th Cir. 2014) 761 F.3rd 977, 981-982.

Handcuffing: People v. Brown (1985) 169 Cal.App.3rd 159, 166-167; *United States v. Purry, supra*; *United States v. Rousseau, supra*; *United States v. Juvenile (RRA-A)* (9th Cir. 2000) 229 F.3rd 737, 743; *People v. Williams* (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 949, 960; *People v. Davidson* (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 966, 970-973; *People v. Turner, supra*; *United States v. Edwards, supra.* 761 F.3rd 977, 981-982.

“(A) police officer may handcuff a detainee without converting the detention into an arrest if the handcuffing is brief and reasonably necessary under the circumstances.” (*People v. Osborne* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1062.)

Handcuffing defendant at gunpoint while making him lie on the ground held not to convert a lawful detention into a de facto arrest where defendant was suspected of possessing a handgun on school property and where it was known that defendant had threatened to carry out a threat outside the stadium after the game. Handcuffing him while attempting to determine whether he was armed was reasonable under the circumstances. (*People v. Turner* (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 151, 162-164.)

However, handcuffs should not be used as a routine, absent some reason to believe that it is necessary. “The proliferation of cases in this court in which ‘*Terry*’ stops involve handcuffs and ever-increasing wait times in police vehicles is disturbing, and we would caution law enforcement officers that the acceptability of handcuffs in some cases does not signal that the restraint is not a significant consideration in determining the nature of the stop.” (*Ramos v. City of Chicago* (7th Cir. 2013) 716 F.3rd 1013].)

“Handcuffing a suspect during an investigative detention does not automatically make it (a) custodial interrogation for purposes of *Miranda*.” (*People v. Davidson* (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 966, 972.)

Putting into a patrol car: People v. Natale (1978) 77 Cal.App.3rd 568; *United States v. Parr* (9th Cir. 1988) 843 F.2nd 1228.

Additional Case Law:

United States v. Meza-Corrales (9th Cir. 1999) 183 F.3rd 1116; “(W)e allow intrusive and aggressive police conduct (handcuffing, in this case) without deeming it an arrest in those circumstances when it is a reasonable response to legitimate safety concerns on the part of the investigating officers.”

United States v. Rousseau (9th Cir. 2001) 257 F.3rd 925, where it was held that using firearms and handcuffs did not convert a detention into an arrest when the use of force was necessitated by the potential danger to the officers.

Haynie v. County of Los Angeles (9th Cir. 2003) 339 F.3rd 1071: Handcuffing and putting an uncooperative suspect in the backseat of a patrol car while the officer checked the vehicle for weapons held *not* to be an arrest. “A brief, although complete, restriction of liberty, such as handcuffing (and, in this case, putting into a patrol car), during a *Terry* stop is not a de facto arrest, if not excessive under the circumstances.” (*Id.*, at p. 1077.)

Referring to *Terry v. Ohio* (1968) 392 U.S. 1 [20 L.Ed.2nd 889].

Stopping two suspects suspected of committing felony drug offenses, with the officers displaying their firearms, handcuffing the suspects, and making them sit on the ground while a two-minute check of their house for additional suspects, did not convert what was intended to be a detention into an arrest. (*People v. Celis* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 673-676.)

The California Supreme Court in *Celis* noted the below listed important factors to consider:

- Whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation reasonably designed to dispel or confirm their suspicions quickly, using the least intrusive means reasonably available under the circumstances.
- The brevity of the invasion of the individual's **Fourth Amendment** interests.

Information that defendant had threatened a victim with a firearm and was presently sitting in a described vehicle justified a “*felony stop*,” pulling the defendant and other occupants out of the car at gun point and making him lay on the ground until the car could be checked for weapons. Given the officers’ safety issues, such a procedure amounted to no more than a detention. (*People v. Dolly* (2007) 40 Cal.4th 458.)

“Generally, handcuffing a suspect during a detention (without converting the contact into a de facto arrest) has only been sanctioned in cases where the police officer has a reasonable basis for believing the suspect poses a present physical threat or might flee.” (*People v. Stier* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 21, 27.)

Circumstances listed by the *Stier* court (at pp. 27-28) where handcuffing has been found to be reasonably necessary for a detention include when:

- The suspect is uncooperative.

- The officer has information the suspect is currently armed.
- The officer has information the suspect is about to commit a violent crime.
- The detention closely follows a violent crime by a person matching the suspect's description and/or vehicle.
- The suspect acts in a manner raising a reasonable possibility of danger or flight.
- The suspects outnumber the officers.

Handcuffing a detained suspect based upon defendant's size (6 foot, 250 pounds), the fact that he was "real nervous," and because he began to tense up as if he were about to resist, handcuffing him was held to be reasonable. (*People v. Osborne* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1062.)

Confronting three people in the early morning hours, where one (defendant) had an "attitude," and another was carrying a knife on his belt in an open sheath, was sufficient cause to detain the three subjects and to initiate a patdown of the one with the knife. "A consensual encounter may turn into a lawful detention when an individual's actions give the appearance of potential danger to the officer." (*People v. Mendoza* (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1056, 1081-1082.)

Telling a person that he is not under arrest *may not* be enough by itself to negate what is otherwise an arrest (See *United States v. Lee* (9th Cir. 1982) 699 F.2nd 466, 467.). But even if it is not, it is at least a factor to consider when considering the "totality of the circumstances." (*United States v. Bravo* (9th Cir. 2002) 295 F.3rd 1002, 1011.)

An officer was held not to be entitled to qualified immunity from **Fourth Amendment** claims in a federal civil rights lawsuit arising out of a detention of individuals during an investigation of a completed misdemeanor because there was no likelihood for repeated danger and there was a dispute as to whether it was reasonable to threaten to use a Taser under the circumstances. (*Johnson v. Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist.* (9th Cir. 2013) 724 F.3rd 1159, 1168-1170.)

With information that defendant had threatened another person, and that he was armed, detaining him at gunpoint, making him lie on the ground and handcuffing him before checking him for weapons, was lawful and not a “de facto arrest.” (*People v. Turner* (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 151, 162-164.)

Stopping defendant at gunpoint, having him kneel on the ground, and then handcuffing him, held to be a detention only in that the officers were investigating a report (anonymous, nonetheless) of someone, who matched defendant’s description, shooting at vehicles. (*United States v. Edwards* (9th Cir. 2014) 761 F.3rd 977, 981-982.)

“If a police officer knows an individual is on **PRCS**, he may lawfully detain that person for the purpose of searching him or her, so long as the detention and search are not arbitrary, capricious or harassing.” (*People v. Douglas* (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 855, 863.)

See “*Post-Release Community Supervision Act of 2011*,” under “*Fourth Waiver Searches*,” below.

Miranda: “*Custody*” for purposes of *Miranda v. Arizona* (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 445 [16 L.Ed.2nd 694, 708].), under the **Fifth Amendment**, involves a different analysis than “*custody*” for purposes of a detention or arrest under the **Fourth Amendment**. “In contrast (to **Fourth Amendment** search and seizure issues, where the reasonableness of the officer’s actions under the circumstances is the issue), **Fifth Amendment Miranda** custody claims do not examine the reasonableness of the officer’s conduct, but instead examine whether a reasonable person (in the defendant’s position) would conclude the restraints used by police were tantamount to a formal arrest.” (*People v. Pilster* (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1406.)

Non-Consensual Transportation Exceptions: The Courts have found exceptions to the “*detention + transportation = arrest*” rule when the following might apply: “(T)he police may move a suspect without exceeding the bounds of an investigative detention when it is a reasonable means of achieving the legitimate goals of the detention ‘given the specific circumstances’ of the case.” (*United States v. Charley* (9th Cir. 2005) 396 F.3rd 1074, 1080.)

In *Charley*, the defendant had just murdered her three children and, after calling police from another location, encouraged law enforcement to go with her to check on their welfare without specifically telling the officer what she had done. She was also told that she was not under arrest, and was transported without handcuffs. (*United States v. Charley*, *supra*, at pp. 1077-1082.)

“(T)he police may move a suspect from the location of the initial stop without converting the stop into an arrest when it is necessary for safety or security reasons.” (*United States v. Ricardo D.* (9th Cir. 1990) 912 F.2nd 337, 340; citing *Florida v. Royer* (1983) 460 U.S. 491, 504-505 [75 L.Ed.2nd 229, 241-242].)

Non-consensual transportation necessary to continue the detention out of the presence of a gathering, hostile crowd, held to be lawful under the circumstances. (*People v. Courtney* (1970) 11 Cal.App.3rd 1185, 1191-1192.)

See also *Michigan v. Summers* (1981) 452 U.S. 692, 702, fn. 16 [69 L.Ed.2nd 340, 349], where it was held that moving the detained suspect from the walkway in front of his home into the house, where he was held while the house was searched pursuant to a search warrant, was not considered constitutionally significant.

But see *Bailey v. United States* (2013) 568 U.S. 186, 192-202 [133 S.Ct. 1031, 1037-1043; 185 L.Ed.2nd 19], restricting such detentions to occupants who are still in the “immediate vicinity” of the residence being searched. The detention of an occupant who had just left the residence, and was already about a mile away, held to be illegal, at least under the rule of *Summers*.

Temporarily handcuffing a smuggling suspect stopped at the International Border where escape routes were close by, particularly when the subject is told that he is not under arrest and that the handcuffs were merely for everyone’s safety and would be removed momentarily, and then walking him to a security office about 30 to 40 yards (*United States v. Bravo* (9th Cir. 2002) 295 F.3rd 1002.) or 35 feet (*United States v. Zaragoza* (9th Cir. 2002) 295 F.3rd 1025.) away, is reasonable and does not convert a detention into an arrest. (See also *United States v. Hernandez* (9th Cir. 2002) 314 F.3rd 430.)

An individual is not arrested but merely detained when, at the border, he is asked to exit his vehicle, briefly handcuffed while

escorted to the security office, uncuffed, patted down, and required to wait in a locked office while his vehicle is searched. (*United States v. Nava* (9th Cir. 2004) 363 F.3rd 942.)

People v. Soun (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1499; defendants, removed from their vehicle at gunpoint, were forced to lie on the ground, handcuffed, put into police vehicles and transported three blocks to a safer location: Detention only, based upon the circumstances.

Gallegos v. City of Los Angeles (9th Cir. 2002) 308 F.3rd 987; where a 2-to-1 majority found that stopping a subject at gunpoint, handcuffing him, and then transporting him back to the scene of a crime to see if the victim could identify him, a procedure which took 45 minutes to an hour, *was not* an arrest, but was no more than an “*investigative stop (that) worked as it should.*”

Using handcuffs to detain individuals on the sofa of a residence while a search warrant was executed, particularly when told that they were not under arrest, did not convert the temporary detention of the individuals into custody for purposes of *Miranda* so that when asked about who lived in the residence, the defendant’s admission that he did was usable later in trial against him despite the lack of a *Miranda* admonishment and waiver. (*People v. Castillo* (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 414, 421-425.)

Transporting defendant to the police station for questioning from the hospital, when he was not handcuffed nor patted down for weapons prior to entering the patrol car, and where defendant did not object, held not to be “custody” for purposes of *Miranda*. (*People v. Kopatz* (2015) 61 Cal.4th 62, 80-81.)

The transportation of a criminal suspect to the police station for questioning will likely convert the contact to an arrest (See “*Transporting a Detainee,*” under “*Detentions vs. Arrests,*” above). However, where the subject is asked to voluntarily accompany the officers to the station for an interview, he is told he is not under arrest and that the proposed interview is voluntary, that he could stop the questioning at any time, no handcuffs were used, and he is in fact driven home after the interview, it was held that the defendant was neither under arrest nor even detained. (*People v. Zaragoza* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 21, 56-57.)

“Reasonable Suspicion:” Less than “*probable cause*,” but more than no evidence (i.e., a “*hunch*.”) at all.

Defined: “*Reasonable suspicion*” is information which is sufficient to cause a reasonable law enforcement officer, taking into account his or her training and experience, to *reasonably believe* that the person to be detained is, was, or is about to be, involved in criminal activity. The officer must be able to articulate more than an “*inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch’ of criminal activity.*” (***Terry v. Ohio*** (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 27 [20 L.Ed.2nd 889, 909].)

“(O)fficers need only ‘reasonable suspicion’—that is, ‘a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped’ of breaking the law.” (***Heien v. North Carolina*** (Dec. 15, 2014) 574 U.S. __, __ [135 S.Ct. 530; 190 L.Ed.2nd 475, 482]; quoting ***Navarette v. California*** (Apr. 22, 2014) 572 U.S. __, __; 134 S.Ct. 1683, 1688; 188 L.Ed.2nd 680, 686].)

See also ***People v. Corrales*** (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 696, 699; a “reasonable suspicion,” sufficient to justify a traffic stop, is less than “probable cause.”

Note: “*Hunch:*” The inability to articulate reasons behind the belief.

“Because the ‘balance between the public interest and the individual’s right to personal security,’ [Citation] tilts in favor of a standard less than probable cause in such cases, the **Fourth Amendment** is satisfied if the officer’s action is supported by reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity “‘may be afoot,’” (***United States v. Sokolow*** (1989) 490 U.S. 1, 7 [104 L.Ed.2nd 1, 10]; quoting ***Terry v. Ohio***, *supra*, at p. 30 [20 L.Ed.2nd at p. 911]; see also ***People v. Osborne*** (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1058.)

The “*reasonable suspicion*” standard is “not a particularly demanding one, but is, instead, ‘considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence,’” (***People v. Letner and Tobin*** (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 146; quoting .” (***United States v. Sokolow*** (1989) 490 U.S. 1, 7 [104 L. Ed. 2nd 1]; ***United States v. Valdes-Vega*** (9th Cir. 2013) 738 F.3rd 1074, 1078.)

“In reviewing the propriety of an officer’s conduct, courts do not have available empirical studies dealing with inferences drawn from suspicious behavior, and we cannot

reasonably demand scientific certainty from judges or law enforcement officers where none exists. Thus, the determination of reasonable suspicion must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.” (*Ibid.*, quoting *Illinois v. Wardlow* (2000) 528 U.S. 119, 124–125 [145 L. Ed. 2nd 570].)

In *People v. Letner and Tobin*, *supra*, a majority of the Supreme Court found that the unexplained driving at 40 mph in a 55 mph zone, indicating a possible DUI driver, particularly when combined with the officer’s suspicions that the car might be stolen when there were water beads on it from a storm some hours earlier, indicating that it had not been driven far, and when found in an area known for its many thefts from the nearby car lots, justified an investigative traffic stop.

“The reasonable-suspicion standard is not a particularly high threshold to reach. ‘Although . . . a mere hunch is insufficient to justify a (traffic) stop, the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.’” (*United States v. Valdes-Vega*, *supra*, at p. 1078, quoting *United States v. Arvizu* (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 278 [151 L.Ed.2nd 740].)

Further, “(r)easonable suspicion is a ‘commonsense, nontechnical conception that deals with the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.’” (*Id.*, quoting *Ornelas v. United States* (1996) 517 U.S. 690, 699 [134 L.Ed.2nd 911].)

“The ‘reasonable suspicion’ necessary to justify such a (traffic) stop ‘is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.’ [Citation] The standard takes into account ‘the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture.’ [Citation] Although a mere ‘hunch’ does not create reasonable suspicion, [Citation], the level of suspicion the standard requires is ‘considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence,’ and ‘obviously less’ than is necessary for probable cause. [Citation]” (*Navarette v. California* (Apr. 22, 2014) 572 U.S. __ [134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687; 188 L.Ed.2nd 680].)

However, “(r)easonable suspicion depends on ‘the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.’” (*Id.*, 134 S.Ct. at p. 1690; citing *Ornelas v. United States* (1996) 517 U.S. 690, 696 [134 L.Ed.2nd 911]; and ruling that the single act of running another vehicle off the road, as reported by the victim, was sufficient to cause a reasonable officer to believe that the defendant was driving while under the influence of alcohol.)

“Reasonable suspicion is a lesser standard than probable cause and can arise from less reliable information than that required for probable cause.” (*People v. Espino* (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 746, 757; citing *People v. Wells* (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1078, 1083.)

Observing defendant parked in a van next to a convenience store at night, in the shadows where other marked parking stalls were available, and even with the knowledge of prior thefts from that store where getaway cars would commonly park in such a position, was not enough to justify a reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a detention of the defendant in that van. (*People v. Casares* (2016) 62 Cal.4th 808, 837-838; holding that the results of a patdown search of his person, and a consensual search of the van, should have been suppressed.)

Detention of a Victim or Witness:

While a victim or witness, as a general rule, may not be detained or forced to cooperate in a police investigation, it is argued by some that when the governmental need is strong and the intrusion upon the victim or witness is minimal, a temporary stop or detention of the victim or witness *may* be justifiable. (See *Illinois v. Lidster* (2004) 540 U.S. 419 [157 L.Ed.2nd 843]; vehicle check point used to locate witnesses to a previous fatal hit and run.)

See also *Metzker v. State* (Ak 1990) 797 P.2nd 1219; “It appears the police are justified in stopping witnesses only where exigent circumstances are present, such as where a crime has recently been reported.”

Note: No case law yet upholds more than just a minimal detention, nor the transportation, of a victim or witness without that person’s consent.

In deciding whether this was reasonable, a court must look to “the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty.” (*Brown v. Texas* (1979) 433 U.S. 47, 51 [61 L.Ed.2nd 357].)

A traffic stop of a witness absent evidence that he himself is involved in criminal activity, is illegal. Because defendant’s stop was for “generalized criminal inquiry,” it was illegal. (*United States v. Ward* (9th Cir. 1973) 488 F.2nd 162, 168-170.)

As a general rule, a witness to crime may not be stopped and detained in any way, or frisked, and he refuse to cooperate if he so chooses. A brief detention, however, may be reasonable depending up the importance of the Government’s interest. “At a minimum, officers had a right to identify witnesses to the shooting, to obtain the names and addresses of such witnesses, and to ascertain whether they were willing to speak voluntarily with the officers.” (*Walker v. City of Orem* (10th Cir. 2006) 451 F.3rd 1139, 1148-1149; 90 minute detention held to be excessive.)

It is a “settled principle that while the police have the right to request citizens to answer voluntarily questions concerning unsolved crimes they have no right to compel them to answer.” (*Davis v. Mississippi* (1969) 394 U.S. 721, 727, fn. 6 [22 L.Ed.2nd 676].)

Detaining potential witnesses to a murder for some five hours pending being interviewed, particularly when using force, held to be an illegal arrest done without probable cause. (*Maxwell v. County of San Diego* (9th Cir. 2013) 708 F.3rd 1075, 1082-1086.)

Securing a home from the outside, detaining the occupant on his own porch pending the obtaining of a warrant, was upheld by the United States Supreme Court. (*Illinois v. McArthur* (2001) 531 U.S. 326 [148 L.Ed.2nd 838].)

During the execution of a search warrant, until the rest of the house is checked for the suspects, other occupants may be detained. (*Los Angeles County v. Rettele* (2007) 550 U.S. 609 [167 L.Ed.2nd 974].)

See “*Detention of Residents (or Non-Resident) During the Execution of a Search Warrant,*” below.

An occupant of a house being subjected to a search pursuant to a *search warrant* may be detained during the search (1) in order to prevent flight, (2) to minimize the risk of harm to the officers, and (3) to facilitate an orderly search through cooperation of the residents. (*Michigan v. Summers* (1981) 452 U.S. 692, 702-703 [69 L.Ed.2nd 340, 349-350]; *People v. Castillo* (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 414, 421-425.)

But see *Bailey v. United States* (2013) 568 U.S. 186, 192-202 [133 S.Ct. 1031, 1037-1043; 185 L.Ed.2nd 19], restricting such detentions to occupants who are still in the “immediate vicinity” of the residence being searched. The detention of an occupant who had just left the residence, and was already about a mile away, held to be illegal, at least under the rule of *Summers*.

See “*During Execution of a Search or Arrest Warrant, or during a Fourth Waiver Search,*” below.

Prosecutors may enjoy absolute immunity from civil liability so long as the forced detention of a victim, done for the purpose of interviewing her, is considered to be “advocacy conduct that is intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” (*Giraldo v. Kessler* (2nd Cir. 2012) 684 F.3rd 161.)

Articulate Objective Suspicion: A detention, even if brief, is a sufficiently significant restraint on personal liberty to require “*objective justification.*” (*Florida v. Royer* (1983) 460 U.S. 491, 498 [75 L.Ed.2nd 229, 236-237].)

“Reasonable suspicion requires specific, articulable facts which, together with objective and reasonable inferences, form a basis for suspecting that a particular person is engaged in criminal conduct. (Citations) An officer is entitled to rely on his training and experience in drawing inferences from the facts he observes, but those inferences must also be grounded in objective facts and be capable of rational explanation. (Citation)” (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted; *People v. Nice* (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 928, 937.)

Note: Reasons which an officer feels give him or her reasonable suspicion to detain *must be articulated*, in detail, in an arrest report and later recounted in courtroom testimony.

An officer's inability to articulate those suspicious factors that give rise to the need to stop and detain a suspect is one of the more common causes of detentions being found to be illegal.

A prosecutor's failure to elicit a thorough description of all the suspicious factors by asking the right questions is another common cause.

A Hunch: An officer's decision to detain cannot be predicated upon a mere "hunch," but must be based upon articulable facts describing suspicious behavior which would distinguish the defendant from an ordinary, law-abiding citizen. (*Terry v. Ohio* (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 27 [20 L.Ed.2nd 889, 909]; *People v. Nice* (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 928, 937; *United States v. Williams* (9th Cir. 2017) 846 F.3rd 303, 308.)

"A *hunch* may provide the basis for solid police work; it may trigger an investigation that uncovers facts that establish reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or even grounds for a conviction. A hunch, however, is not a substitute for the necessary specific, articulable facts required to justify a **Fourth Amendment** intrusion." (Italics added; *People v. Pitts* (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 881, 889; quoting *United States v. Thomas* (9th Cir. 2000) 211 F.3rd 1186, 1192.)

A stop and detention based upon stale information concerning a threat, which itself was of questionable veracity, and with little if anything in the way of suspicious circumstances to connect the persons stopped to that threat, is illegal. (*People v. Durazo* (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 728: Threat was purportedly from Mexican gang members, and defendant was a Mexican male who (with his passenger) glanced at the victim's apartment as he drove by four days later where the officer admittedly was acting on his "*gut feeling*" that defendant was involved.)

Seemingly innocuous behavior does not justify a detention of suspected illegal aliens unless accompanied by some particularized conduct that corroborates the officer's suspicions. (*United States v. Manzo-Jurado* (9th Cir. 2006) 457 F.3rd 928; standing around in their own group, conversing in Spanish, watching a high school football game.)

Observing defendant sitting in a parked motor vehicle late at night near the exit to a 7-Eleven store parking lot, with the engine running, despite prior knowledge of a string of recent robberies at

7-Elevens, held to be not sufficient to justify a detention and patdown. (*People v. Perrusquia* (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 228.)

However, “the possibility of innocent explanations for the factors relied upon by a police officer does not necessarily preclude the possibility of a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. (*People v. Letner and Tobin* (2010) 50 Cal. 4th 99, 146; quoting *United States v. Arvizu* (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 274 [151 L. Ed. 2nd 740]; *Navarette v. California* (Apr. 22, 2014) 572 U.S. ___, ___ [134 S. Ct. 1683, 1691; 188 L.Ed.2nd 680]; also quoting *United States v. Arvizu*, *supra*, at p. 277.)

Detaining defendant, who was 5’10” tall, well-groomed, medium to dark-complected, with a mustache and slight goatee, based upon his alleged similarity to a suspect who was described as 6’1” tall, unkempt, light-complected, and with no facial hair, held to be insufficient to justify a reasonable suspicion. The fact that the suspected crime occurred at the same location a week earlier, and that the area was known as a high crime area, added nothing. (*People v. Walker* (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1381-1393.)

“[A]n investigative stop or detention predicated on mere curiosity, rumor, or hunch is unlawful, even though the officer may be acting in complete good faith.” (*People v. Wells* (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1078, 1083; *People v. Espino* (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 746, 757.)

The Totality of the Circumstances: The legality of a detention will be determined by considering the “totality of the circumstances.” (*United States v. Arvizu* (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 273 [151 L.Ed.2nd 740, 749]; see also *People v. Dolly* (2007) 40 Cal.4th 458; *People v. Turner* (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 151, 160-161.)

“All relevant factors must be considered in the reasonable suspicion calculus—even those factors that, in a different context, might be entirely innocuous.” (*United States v. Fernandez-Castillo* (9th Cir. 2003) 324 F.3rd 1114, 1124, citing *United States v. Arvizu*, *supra*, at pp. 277-278 [151 L.Ed.2nd at p. 752] *United States v. Valdes-Vega* (9th Cir. 2013) 738 F.3rd 1074, 1078-1079.)

“This process allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that might well elude an untrained person. (Citations) It also precludes a “divide-and-conquer analysis” because even though each of the suspect’s “acts

was perhaps innocent in itself . . . taken together, they [may] warrant further investigation.” ‘A determination that reasonable suspicion exists . . . need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.’” (*United States v. Valdes-Vega, supra.*)

The lawfulness of a detention is determined by balancing the public interest with the individual’s right to personal security and the right to be free from arbitrary interference by law enforcement officers. (*People v. Turner* (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 151, 161-162.)

A detention prolonging a lawful traffic stop was held to be lawful where the officer (1) had prior information suggesting that defendant may not have been in compliance with **Penal Code section 290’s** registration requirements, (2) was aware that a confidential informant had information suggesting defendant may have been involved in selling drugs and guns, and (3) a civilian ride along had observed defendant making a furtive movement as the stop was being made. (*People v. Espino* (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 746, 755-765.)

With police officers who had information from a telephone tipster who fully identified himself, including his phone number and address, and who described current on-going criminal activity (i.e., a trespass), while also indicating some knowledge of other more serious wrongdoing by the person described (i.e., selling drugs in the area), when the area itself was known by the officers to be a “high crime area,” it was held that the officers would have been remiss had they not at least checked the parking lot for the described vehicle and suspect. Upon arrival in the area, the described vehicle, with defendant sleeping inside, was exactly as the telephone tipster had indicated. Upon contacting defendant, his immediate actions added to the officers’ suspicions; i.e., looking around furtively and attempting to drive away. Upon contacting him, defendant attempted to flee on foot. With all this, the officers were held to have more than enough reasonable suspicion to detain defendant for investigation. (*United States v. Williams* (9th Cir. 2017) 846 F.3rd 303, 308-310.)

The Officer’s Subjective Conclusions: Whether or not an officer has sufficient cause to detain someone will be evaluated by the courts on an “objective” basis; or how a reasonable person would evaluate the circumstances. The officer’s own “subjective” conclusions are irrelevant. (*Whren v. United States* (1996) 517 U.S. 806 [135 L.Ed.2nd 89]; *United States v. Magallon-Lopez* (9th Cir. 2016) 817 F.3rd 671, 675.)

A Seizure: Although a detention is a “*seizure*” under the **Fourth Amendment** (*Terry v. Ohio*, *supra*, at p. 19, fn. 16 [20 L.Ed.2nd at pp. 904-905].), it is allowed on less than probable cause because the intrusion is relatively minimal and is done for a valid and necessary investigative purpose.

Probable Cause vs. Reasonable Suspicion: The occasional inarticulate judicial references to the need to prove “*probable cause*” (e.g., see *United States v. Willis* (9th Cir. 2005) 431 F.3rd 709, 715, referring to the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in *Whren v. United States* (1996) 517 U.S. 806 [135 L.Ed.2nd 89].) was not intended to raise the standard of proof from one of needing only a “*reasonable suspicion*.” (*United States v. Lopez* (9th Cir. 2000) 205 F.3rd 1101-1104.)

See *Ybarra v. Illinois* (1979) 444 U.S. 85 [62 L.Ed.2nd 238], condemning the detention and patdown of everyone at the scene absent individualized evidence connecting each person so detained with the illegal activity being investigated.

Various Factors which, when taken individually or in combination, help contribute to justifying a detention.

In General: Such factors include, but are not limited to, the following (see above and below):

- Whether the suspect resembles a wanted person.
- The suspect is contacted in a wanted vehicle.
- The suspect appears intoxicated or injured.
- The suspect’s suspicious actions.
- The suspect’s erratic or evasive driving, or other suspicious actions.
- The officer’s prior knowledge of criminal activity by the suspect.
- The suspect’s demeanor and/or reaction to seeing the officer.
- The suspect’s nervousness, belligerence, etc.
- The suspect’s evasive replies to questions.
- The time of day.
- Criminal history of the area. (E.g., a “*high narcotics area*.”)
- The proximity to a recent, or a series of crimes.
- The officer’s expertise, training and/or experience for the type of crime suspected.
- The suspect’s actions consistent with common patterns for the type of crime suspected.
- Informant information.

A “*High Crime*” or “*High Narcotics*” Area:

Although being in a so-called “*high crime*” or “*high narcotics activity*” area is a factor to be considered; “(a)n ‘officer’s assertion that the location lay in a “*high crime*” area does not (by itself) elevate . . . facts into a reasonable suspicion of criminality. The “*high crime area*” factor is not an “*activity*” of an individual. Many citizens of this state are forced to live in areas that have “*high crime*” rates or they come to these areas to shop, work, play, transact business, or visit relatives or friends. The spectrum of legitimate human behavior occurs every day in so-called high crime areas. . . .” (Italics added; *People v. Pitts* (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 881, 887; quoting *People v. Loewen* (1983) 35 Cal.3rd 117, 124; and *People v. Bower* (1979) 24 Cal.3rd 638, 546; see also *People v. Walker* (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1390-1391.)

“(T)he time and location of an encounter are insufficient by themselves to cast reasonable suspicion on an individual.” (*People v. Medina* (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 171, 177; noting that neither the “*nighttime factor*” nor the “*high crime area factor*” are “*activities*” by a person sought to be detained.)

The mere presence in a high-crime area of a Samoan family, celebrating a birthday by barbecuing and singing songs, cannot serve as the basis for detaining them, “because it merely ‘cast[s] suspicion on entire categories of people without any individualized suspicion of the particular person to be stopped.’” (*Sialoi v. City of San Diego* (9th Cir. 2016) 823 F.3rd 1223, 1235; quoting *United States v. Sigmond-Ballesteros* (9th Cir. 2001) 285 F.3rd 1117, 1121.)

However, note that the United States Supreme Court has held that a subject’s flight on foot from the police when it occurs in a so-called “*high narcotics area*” is sufficient in itself to justify a temporary detention (as well as a patdown for weapons). (*Illinois v. Wardlow* (2000) 528 U.S. 119 [145 L.Ed.2nd 570]; see “*Flight*” under “*Consensual Encounters*” (Chapter 2), above.)

“Although ‘[a]n individual’s presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime,’ police can consider the ‘relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation’” (*United States v.*

Williams (9th Cir. 2017) 846 F.3rd 303, 309; quoting *Illinois v. Wardlow*, *supra*, at p. 124.)

Statutory Interpretation: The legality of a detention is often based upon an interpretation of a statute which the suspect is suspected of violating. This will necessarily involve an appellate court's employment of the rules of statutory interpretation, considering the meaning of the statute "*de novo*" (i.e., from the beginning, while ignoring the lower court's interpretation). (*People v. Campuzano* (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th Supp. 14, 18; citing *People v. Glaser* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 262.)

The rules of "*Statutory Interpretation*" are as follows:

- (1) Courts look to the Legislature's intent to effectuate a statute's purpose.
- (2) Courts give the words of a statute their usual and ordinary meaning.
- (3) A statute's plain meaning controls the court's interpretation unless the statutory words are ambiguous.
- (4) If the words of a statute do not themselves indicate legislative intent, courts may resolve ambiguities by examining the context and adopting a construction that harmonizes the statute internally and with related statutes.
- (5) A literal construction does not prevail if it is contrary to the apparent legislative intent.
- (6) If a statute is amenable to two alternative interpretations, courts will follow the one that leads to the more reasonable result.
- (7) Courts may consider legislative history, statutory purpose, and public policy to construe an ambiguous statute.
- (8) If a statute defining a crime or punishment is susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, courts will ordinarily adopt the interpretation more favorable to the defendant. (*People v. Arias* (2008) 45 Cal.4th 169, 177; *People v. Campuzano*, *supra*, at pp. 18-19.)

(See also *People v. Moon* (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1249-1250; *People v. Farleigh* (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th Supp. 12, 14-15.)

“Another ‘fundamental rule[] of statutory construction is that a law should not be applied in a manner producing absurd results, because the Legislature is presumed not to intend such results.’

[Citation.]” (*People v. Farleigh*, *supra*, quoting *San Jose Unified School Dist. v. Santa Clara County* (2017) 7 Cal App.5th 967, 982.)

Types of Detentions:

Traffic Stops:

Legal Basis: Under the **Fourth Amendment**, a police officer may stop and detain for investigation a motorist on reasonable suspicion that the driver has violated the law. (*Ornelas v. United States* (1996) 517 U.S. 690, 693 [134 L.Ed.2nd 911]; *People v. Dolly* (2007) 40 Cal.4th 458, 463.)

“A police officer may legally stop a car to conduct a brief investigation if the facts and circumstances known to the officer support a reasonable suspicion that the driver may have violated the Vehicle Code or some other law.” (*King v. State of California* (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 265, 279; citing *People v. Superior Court (Simon)* (1972) 7 Cal.3rd 186, 200.)

“A traffic stop is a seizure subject to the protections of the **Fourth Amendment** of the United States Constitution.” (*People v. Nice* (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 928, 937, 940, fn. 3; noting that only a “*reasonable suspicion*,” as opposed to “*probable cause*,” is needed in order to justify the stop.)

“(A) lawful traffic stop occurs when the facts and circumstances known to the police officer support at least a reasonable suspicion that the driver has violated the Vehicle Code or another law.” (*Id.*, at pp. 937-938.)

“[A]n officer may stop and briefly detain a suspect for questioning for a limited investigation even if the circumstances fall short of probable cause to arrest.” Reasonable suspicion that criminal conduct has occurred “requires that officer to be able to ‘point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal activity.’” (*Brierton v. Department of Motor Vehicles* (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 499, 509.)

Despite local statutes to the contrary, an officer need not, under the **Fourth Amendment**, have personally observed a traffic violation in order to justify making a traffic stop, so long as the necessary “*reasonable suspicion*” to believe a violation (such knowledge coming from another officer in this case) did in fact occur. (*United States v. Miranda-Guerena* (9th Cir. 2006) 445 F.3rd 1233.)

Detention vs. Arrest: Although issuing a traffic citation is technically an *arrest and release* on the person’s written promise to appear (see *United States v. Leal-Feliz* (9th Cir. 2011) 665 F.3rd 1037.), it is treated as a detention because of the minimal intrusion involved. (*Berkemer v. McCarty* (1984) 468 U.S. 420, 439 [82 L.Ed.2nd 317, 334]; *Arizona v. Johnson* (2009) 555 U.S. 323 [172 L.Ed.2nd 694].)

“A seizure for a traffic violation justifies a police investigation of that violation. ‘[A] relatively brief encounter,’ a routine traffic stop is ‘more analogous to a so-called “*Terry* stop” . . . than to a formal arrest.’ [Citations]” (*Rodriguez v. United States* (Apr. 21, 2015) __ U.S. __, __ [135 S.Ct. 1609; 191 L.Ed.2nd 492]; referring to *Terry v. Ohio* (1968) 392 U.S. 1 [20 L.Ed.2nd 889].)

See also *People v. Suff* (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1013, 1054, quoting *People v. Hernandez* (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 773; “Traffic stops are treated as investigatory detentions for which the officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts justifying the suspicion that a crime is being committed.”

“When a motorist ‘sees a policeman’s lights flashing behind him,’ he expects ‘that he will be obliged to spend a short period of time answering questions and waiting while the officer checks his license and registration, that he may then be given a citation, but that in the end he most likely will be allowed to continue on his way.’” (*United States v. Gorman* (9th Cir. 2017) 859 F.3rd 706, 714; as amended at 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 18610; citing *Berkemer v. McCarty*, *supra*, at p. 437; and noting that “less than 10 minutes is acceptable,” citing *Illinois v. Caballas* (2005) 543 U.S. 405, 406, 410 [125 S.Ct. 834; 160 L.Ed.2nd 842].)

Standard of Proof: In that the *traffic stop* itself (i.e., prior to the issuing of a citation), is considered to be no more than a detention, it only requires a “*reasonable suspicion*” that a traffic offense had been committed in order to be a lawful stop. (*United States v. Lopez-Soto* (9th Cir. 2000) 205 F.3rd 1101, 1104-1105; *People v. Miranda* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 917, 926; *Brierton v. Department of Motor Vehicles* (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 499, 509-510; *United States v. Miranda-Guerena* (9th Cir. 2006) 445 F.3rd 1233; *United States v. Magallon-Lopez* (9th Cir. 2016) 817 F.3rd 671, 674; *People v. Nice* (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 928, 937.)

In establishing the necessary “*reasonable suspicion*,” the officer is not required to personally “observe all elements of criminal conduct.” He need only “be able to ‘point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal activity.’ [Citation]” *Brierton v. Department of Motor Vehicles*, *supra.*, at p. 509.)

Then the citation (i.e., the arrest and release) is written based on the “*probable cause*” to believe a traffic infraction had been committed by the person being cited. (*Ibid.*)

A random license check on the defendant’s vehicle, resulting in information that the owner had an outstanding traffic warrant, justified the stop of that vehicle. (*People v. Williams* (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 467.)

However, a misreading of a license number by an “automated license plate reader,” at least when not verified by a visual check of the license number on the car, held not to provide a reasonable suspicion as a matter of law that the car is in fact stolen, it being a question for a civil jury to decide. (*Green v. City & County of San Francisco* (9th Cir. 2014) 751 F.3rd 1039, 1045-1046.)

When No Law Enforcement Involvement:

A suspect who stops on his own, even if mistakenly believing he was required to stop, but where law enforcement does nothing affirmatively to cause him to stop, has not been detained for purposes of the **Fourth Amendment**. A detention requires a “governmental

termination of freedom of movement ‘*through means intentionally applied.*’” (*United States v. Nasser* (9th Cir. 2009) 555 F.3rd 722.)

See *People v. Linn* (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 46, 63-68, where defendant stopped and parked her car prior to being contacted, resulting in no more than a consensual encounter up until the officer took her driver’s license to do a radio check, at which time she was detained.

Moving Violations:

A citizen’s report of a vehicle driving erratically, with a specific description of the vehicle (including a personalized license plate, although one digit was wrong), where the officer observed the vehicle shortly thereafter weave outside its lane, was cause to effect a traffic stop. (*People v. Carter* (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1139-1142.)

A pedestrian crossing diagonally across an intersection without interfering with any traffic is not a violation of **V.C. § 21954(a)** (Pedestrian’s interference with traffic), and therefore does not justify a detention. (*People v. Ramirez* (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 849.)

Failure to stop a vehicle before the front bumper crosses a crosswalk’s limit line at an intersection is a violation of **V.C. § 22450**, justifying a traffic stop. *People v. Binkowski* (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1.)

Defendant stopping on his own, even though maybe under the mistaken belief that an officer wanted him to stop, is *not* a detention. A detention requires a “governmental termination of freedom of movement “*through means intentionally applied.*” (*United States v. Nasser* (9th Cir. 2009) 555 F.3rd 722.)

A passenger in a vehicle, where there’s evidence that she encouraged the driver to drive faster than is safe, and did so with the knowledge of the likelihood that the vehicle’s tires would leave the roadway, resulting in a fatal accident, may herself be guilty of a violation of **V.C. § 21701**. (*Navarrete v. Meyer* (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1276; a civil case.)

V.C. § 21701: “No person shall wilfully interfere with the driver of a vehicle or with the mechanism thereof in such manner as to affect the driver’s control of the vehicle.”

Vehicle Code § 22107 (Failure to signal while turning): Turning without signaling is *not* a violation of this section unless there is another vehicle close enough to be affected by the defendant’s failure to signal. (*People v. Carmona* (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1385; the officer’s vehicle, being the only other car in the vicinity, was headed towards defendant and some 55 feet away when defendant turned off onto a side road without signaling; not a violation.)

See also *In re Jaime P.* (2006) 40 Cal.4th 128, 131; *People v. Cartwright* (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1362, 1366; and *United States v. Mariscal* (9th Cir. 2002) 285 F.3rd 1127 (interpreting a similar Arizona statute, but where other “traffic,” instead of “vehicle,” may be affected).

Vehicle Code § 22108, requiring that a person signal for at least 100 feet before turning, is not a separate offense that may be charged. It takes effect only if, under **section 22107**, the driver was required to signal. (*People v. Carmona, supra.*, at pp. 1391-1393.)

Turning at an intersection without signaling was held *not* to be a violation of **V.C. § 22108** where there was no evidence of another vehicle that was there that “*may be affected by the movement.*” (*United States v. Caseres* (9th Cir. 2008) 533 F.3d 1064, 1068-1069.)

However, when an officer is within 100 feet, traveling in the same direction and at the same speed, the defendant’s failure to signal a turn *was* a movement that could have affected the officer’s vehicle. Failing to signal while changing lanes where “any other vehicle may be affected by the movement,” per **V.C. § 22107**, applies even though the only affected vehicle is a police car. (*People v. Logsdon* (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 741, 744; see also *People v. Suff* (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1013, 1055-1056.)

V.C. §§ 22107 and 22108 requires a signal when turning right at an intersection, even if the driver doesn't decide to turn until at the intersection, despite the sections' requirement (under § 22108) that a driver do so for 100 feet before making the turn. The Supreme Court ruled that the signaling requirements of §§ 22107 and 22108 apply whether turning "from a direct course" or "mov(ing) right or left upon a roadway," reflecting a legislative intent "that the signaling requirements apply to lane changes as well as changes of course." (*People v. Suff*, *supra*, at pp. 1054-1056.)

The Court also rejected the defendant's argument that § 22107's requirement that a driver must signal only "in the event any other vehicle may be affected by the movement" eliminated the need to signal in this case in that there was no vehicle that could have been affected by his turn, where a motorcycle officer was in fact directly behind defendant when he made his right turn in that had the officer attempted to move around to defendant's right side, as he legally could have done with defendant turning from a center lane, they would have collided. (*Id.*, at pp. 1055-1056.)

Defendant's erratic driving and failing to signal during a right-hand turn. (*People v. Evans* (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 735, 743.)

Defendant, having been observed while stopped at the side of the road and texting, was lawfully stopped five minutes later when observed pulling into traffic while learning forward and looking down, with hand movements consistent with texting, a violation of V.C. § 23123.5 (texting while driving). (*People v. Corrales* (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 696, 669-700.)

But, seeing defendant bent over his phone which he was holding in his right hand *may not* be sufficient cause to effect a traffic stop when there are other uses of a cellphone while driving that are not illegal.

(United States v. Paniagua-Garcia (7th Cir. 2016)
813 F.3rd 1013.)

Note: Per *People v. Spriggs* (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 150, 156; some other uses of one's cellphone, such as using the map application while driving, are not prohibited by California law.

Under the basic speed law (**V.C. § 22350**), a police officer may stop and cite a person who is driving at a speed which, although under the posted speed limit and at a speed which is safe for current road and weather conditions, is unsafe when considering the manner in which the person is driving. (*People v. Farleigh* (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th Supp. 12; driving 45 mph in a posted 50 mph speed zone, but with no hands on the steering wheel because she was holding a cigarette out the window with one hand and her cellphone in the other.

Estimates of Speed:

A properly trained and experienced police officer's estimate of defendant's speed is sufficient to provide the necessary reasonable suspicion to justify a traffic stop. (*People v. Nice* (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 928, 937-944.)

See also *People v. Ramirez* (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1551-1555; and *United States v. Ludwig* (10th Cir. 2011) 641 F.3rd 1243, 1247.

But see *United States v. Sowards* (4th Cir. 2012) 690 F.3rd 583; 591: "[T]he reasonableness of an officer's visual speed estimate depends, in the first instance, on whether a vehicle's speed is estimated to be in significant excess or slight excess of the legal speed limit. If slight, then additional indicia of reliability are necessary to support the reasonableness of the officer's visual estimate."

Lying to the Suspect as to the Reasons for the Stop:

In that an officer's reasonable suspicion of a violation of the law is enough to justify a stop a vehicle, and test being an objective one so that the officer's subjective thinking is irrelevant, the fact that the officer lied to the defendant

about the reasons for the stop is also irrelevant. (*United States v. Magallon-Lopez* (9th Cir. 2016) 817 F.3rd 671, 675.)

Avoiding a DUI (or Immigration) Checkpoint:

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeal held that a driver's decision to use a rural highway exit after passing drug checkpoint signs may be considered as one factor in an officer's reasonable suspicion determination, but it is not a sufficient basis, by itself, to justify a traffic stop. The court noted that an officer must identify additional suspicious circumstances or independent evasive behavior to justify stopping a vehicle that uses an exit after driving past ruse drug-checkpoint signs. (*United States v. Neff* (10th Cir. 2012) 681 F.3rd 1134.)

Purposely avoiding an immigration checkpoint, plus other suspicious circumstances (i.e., the proximity of the checkpoint to the border and the defendants' peculiar attempt to conceal their avoidance of the checkpoint by purchasing containers of peppers at the vegetable stand) was held to be sufficient to justify a stop and detention. (*United States v. Compton* (2nd Cir. 2016) 830 F.3rd 55.)

Vehicle Code Registration Violations: A police officer may make an investigatory traffic stop anytime the officer has a "reasonable suspicion" to believe that the vehicle is in violation of the registration laws. (*People v. Dotson* (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1045, 1049.)

A license plate, although only partially obscured by a trailer hitch, violates V.C. § 5201 and justifies a traffic stop and citation. (*People v. White* (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1022.)

It has been held that it is reasonable for an officer to assume (without the court deciding whether the officer was actually right) that a license plate holder that obscures the registration tab only is a violation of a state requirement that the plate be "clearly visible." (*United States v. Henry* (5th Cir. La. 2017) 853 F.3rd 754; a Louisiana state case with a statute similar to California's V.C. § 5201(a); Positioning of License Plates.)

Note: V.C. § 5201(d) (to be **subd. (e)** as of 1/1/2019) excuses the obstruction of a rear license plate by a wheelchair lift or carrier if by a disabled person with the applicable disabled person plates or placard, and a decal with the license plate number is clearly visible in the rear window.

Mounting a license plate (the front plate, in this case) upside down is also a violation of V.C. § 5201, in that it is not “*clearly legible*” as required by the statute. (*People v. Duncan* (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1014.)

Plates must be positioned “so that the characters are upright and display from left to right, . . .” (V.C. § 5201(a))

A missing front license plate, a violation of V.C. § 5200, is legal justification upon which to base a traffic stop. (*People v. Saunders* (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1129, 1136; *People v. Vibanco* (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1, 8.)

It is not a search to randomly check license plates that are otherwise visible to an officer, and to check law enforcement databases for information about that vehicle. Discovering in the process that a vehicle’s registered owner has a suspended license, and noting that the observed driver resembles the physical description of the registered owner, stopping the car to check the driver’s license status is lawful. (*United States v. Diaz-Castaneda* (9th Cir. 2007) 494 F.3rd 1146, 1150-1152.)

A traffic stop for the purpose of checking the validity of a red DMV temporary operating permit displayed in a vehicle’s window (i.e., the red sticker; see V.C. § 4156), when the number on the permit was visible to the officer before the stop and appeared to be current, is a stop based upon no more than a “*hunch*,” and is illegal. (*People v. Nabong* (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1; vehicle with expired registration tab on plate; *People v. Hernandez* (2008) 45 Cal.4th 295, vehicle with no license plates.)

It is irrelevant that the officer believes, in his experience, that such temporary operating permits are often forged or otherwise invalid. (*People v. Hernandez, supra.*, at p. 299.)

In a case decided by the United States Supreme Court out of California, it was assumed for the sake of argument, without discussing the issue, that stopping a car for the purpose of checking the validity of the temporary operating permit without reason to believe that it was not valid, is illegal. (See *Brendlin v. California* (2007) 551 U.S. 249 [168 L.Ed.2nd 132].)

On remand, the People conceded that a traffic stop made for the purpose of checking the validity of the temporary red sticker visible in the window, absent cause to believe it was invalid, was an illegal traffic stop. (*People v. Brendlin* (2008) 45 Cal.4th 262, 268; expired registration tab on plate.)

But, a traffic stop *is* legal when the vehicle had only one license plate (the front plate being missing) and the registration tab on the rear plate was expired. (*People v. Saunders* (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1129: The missing license plate, a violation of **V.C. § 5200**, at the very least constitutes a reasonable suspicion to believe that the red temporary operator's permit, despite a current visible month on the permit, might not be for that vehicle.)

A missing rear license plate and no visible temporary registration displayed in the rear window, even though the temporary registration is later found to be in the front windshield, but not visible to the officer coming up behind the vehicle, is sufficient reasonable suspicion to justify a traffic stop. (*In re Raymond C.* (2008) 45 Cal.4th 303.)

As noted in fn. 2: "A temporary permit is to be placed in the lower rear window. However, if it would be obscured there, it may be placed in the lower right corner of either the windshield or a side window."
(*DMV Handbook of Registration Procedures* (Oct. 2007) ch. 2, § 2.020, p. 7.)

An officer's observation that a vehicle was missing both license plates, absent some other indication that the vehicle was properly or temporarily registered, was enough by itself to establish a reasonable suspicion for the officer to believe that defendant was in violation of V.C. § 5200. (*People v. Dotson* (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1045, 1051-1052; rejecting the defendant's argument, and the Attorney General's concession, that the officer had a duty to look for a temporary registration in the vehicle's windows before making the traffic stop.)

Information from DMV that a vehicle's registration has expired, at least in the absence of any other information to the effect that the vehicle is in the process of being re-registered, justifies a traffic stop despite the visible presence of an apparently valid temporary registration sticker in the window. (*People v. Greenwood* (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 742.)

Upon observation of a piece of paper in the window of a vehicle without license plates, but not being able to determine whether the piece of paper was a temporary registration, allowed for the stop of the vehicle for the purpose of determining whether the vehicle was registered. (*United States v. Givens* (8th Cir. 2014) 763 F.3rd 987.)

As it turned out, the piece of paper was in fact a valid temporary registration sticker. But by then, the officer had smelled the odor of marijuana emanating from the car. The officer was able to testify that in his experience, registration stickers were normally legible from a distance. (*Ibid.*)

The federal Tenth Circuit Court of Appeal has held that once an officer has been assured during a traffic stop that a temporary tag is valid, the stop having been made because the tag was not visible due to the tint in the rear window, the officer should explain to the driver the reason for the initial stop and then allow the driver to continue on his way without requiring the driver to

produce his license and registration.
(*Vasquez v. Lewis* (10th Cir. 2016) 834 F.3rd 1132.)

Vehicle Code Equipment Violations:

A cracked windshield (V.C. § 26710) justifies a traffic stop. (*People v. Vibanco* (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1.)

An inoperable third (rear window) brake light is a **Vehicle Code** violation (V.C. § 24252(a)), and justifies a traffic stop and citation. (*In re Justin K.* (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 695.)

Seat belt violations:

An officer's determination that defendant was not wearing a seat belt, even where it is reasonably uncertain whether the defendant's vehicle was even equipped with a shoulder harness, justified a stop to determine whether California's mandatory seat belt law was being violated. (*Kodani v. Snyder* (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 471.)

Police officer had probable cause to arrest a driver for a violation of California's safety belt statute upon observing the driver wearing his seat belt under his left arm and not across his upper torso, barring the driver's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unlawful arrest claim. The driver was not "properly restrained by a safety belt," as required by V.C. § 27315(d)(1). (*Hupp v. City of Walnut Creek* (N.D. Cal. 2005) 389 F.Supp.2nd 1229, 1232.)

See also *Collier v. Montgomery* (5th Cir. 2009) 569 F.3rd 214, 218; addressing a similar safety belt statute.

The requirement in V.C. § 27315(d)(1) that the driver and all passengers 16 years of age and older be "properly restrained" while the vehicle is in operation requires that both the shoulder harness and the lap belt portions of the safety belt assembly be used. (*People v. Overland* (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th Supp. 9.)

Windshield Obstructions:

An Anchorage, Alaska, Municipal Code ordinance forbidding any item affixed to the windshield (similar to California's **V.C. § 26708(a)(1)**; see *People v. White* (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 636, below.) *was not* violated by an air freshener dangling from the rear view mirror. A traffic stop was found to be illegal. (*United States v. King* (9th Cir. 2001) 244 F.3rd 736, 740.)

A traffic stop was illegal when based upon a perceived violation of **V.C. § 26708(a)(2)**, for obstructing or reducing the driver's clear view through the windshield, for having an air freshener dangling from the rear view mirror. (*People v. White, supra.*)

However, an air freshener hanging from a car's rearview mirror was held to be a violation of **V.C. § 26708(a)(2)** in another case where a more thorough foundation was established through testimony of the officer, citing his personal experience and noting that the object was big enough to block out the view of a pedestrian or a vehicle, and where there was no defense-offered expert testimony relevant to the overall size of the air freshener relative to the size of the window. (*People v. Colbert* (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1068.)

A traffic stop for an equipment violation in a "high crime" (i.e., gang) area at night is *not* reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a detention or patdown for weapons. (*People v. Medina* (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 171.)

Observing a vehicle with the front windows illegally tinted in violation of **V.C. § 26708(a)** makes it lawful to stop the vehicle to cite it's driver. The arrest of defendant who was a passenger in the vehicle and who resembled the suspect in a robbery just minutes earlier, was lawful. (*People v. Carter* (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 522, 529-530; also holding that even if the stop had been illegal, discovery of an arrest warrant for defendant would have attenuated the taint of an illegal traffic stop.)

But see *United States v. Caseres* (9th Cir. 2008) 533 F.3rd 1064, 1069: An officer noting that a person’s vehicle windows are tinted, believing that the windows might have been tinted in violation of V.C. § 26708(a)(1) (i.e., after-factory), is not reasonable suspicion of a violation absent other evidence tending to support this belief. “Without additional articulable facts suggesting that the tinted glass is illegal, the detention rests upon the type of speculation which may not properly support an investigative stop.”

Weaving Within the Lane:

State Rule:

Erratic driving that does not constitute a traffic violation may justify an officer to stop a vehicle. (*People v. Russell* (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 96, 102; “drifting and weaving” in traffic sufficient cause to stop the driver to determine whether he was driving under the influence of alcohol (i.e., “DUI”).)

Observation of the defendant weaving within his traffic lane for one half of a mile is sufficient cause to stop him to determine whether he is *driving while under the influence* or the vehicle has some unsafe mechanical defect. (*People v. Bracken* (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1; weaving within his lane for half a mile.)

Weaving within a lane for three quarters of a mile justified a traffic stop for driving while under the influence. (*People v. Perez* (1985) 175 Cal.App.3rd Supp. 8.)

Weaving within a lane, almost hitting the curb, is sufficient reasonable suspicion for driving while under the influence to justify a traffic stop. (*Arburn v. Department of Motor Vehicles* (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1480.)

The fact that the weaving was not for a “substantial” or “considerable” distance did not mean that the officer didn’t have reasonable suspicion to justify the stop. (*Id.*, at p. 1485.)

An officer's detention of the driver was justified where he drove 20 miles under the speed limit and was "weaving abruptly from one side of his lane to the other." (*People v. Perkins* (1981) 126 Cal.App.3rd Supp. 12, 14.)

Federal Rule: See *United States v. Colin* (9th Cir. 2002) 314 F.3rd 439, where the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal held that weaving from lane line to lane line for 35 to 45 seconds is neither a violation of the lane straddling statute (V.C. § 21658(a)) nor reasonable suspicion that the driver may be under the influence; a questionable decision, and one that may probably be ignored by state law enforcement officers in light of *Bracken* and *Perez*.

Weaving Plus: A single pronounced weave within the lane, plus an experienced Highway Patrol officer's observation of the defendant sitting up close to the steering wheel, which the officer recognized as something an impaired driver does, was sufficient to corroborate second-hand information concerning defendant's "erratic driving" from Montana Department of Transportation employees, justifying the stop of the defendant's car. (*United States v. Fernandez-Castillo* (9th Cir. 2003) 324 F.3rd 1114.)

Veh. Code § 2810.2: *Vehicle Stops Involving Agricultural Irrigation Supplies:*

Subd. (a)(1): A peace officer may stop any vehicle transporting agricultural irrigation supplies that are in plain view for the purpose of inspecting the bills of lading, shipping, or delivery papers, or other evidence, to determine whether the driver is in legal possession of the load, whenever the vehicle is on an unpaved road within the jurisdiction of the Department of Parks and Recreation, the Department of Fish & Game, the Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, the State Lands Commission, a regional park district, the U.S. Forest Service, or the Bureau of Land Management, or is in a timberland production zone.

Subd. (a)(2): If there is a "reasonable belief" that the driver of a vehicle is not in legal possession of the load, the

peace officer “shall” take custody of the load and turn it over to the sheriff for investigation.

Subd. (b): the Sheriff is thereafter responsible for the “care and safekeeping” of the apprehended materials, and for its “legal disposition” and any resulting investigation.

Subd. (c): Any expense incurred by the sheriff is a “legal charge against the county.”

Subds. (d) & (e): If the driver is in violation of V.C. § 12500 (driving without a valid license), the peace officer who makes the stop shall make a reasonable attempt to identify the registered owner of the vehicle and release the vehicle to him or her. Impoundment of the vehicle is prohibited if the driver’s only offense is V.C. § 12500.

Subd. (f): “Agricultural irrigation supplies” include agricultural irrigation water bladder and one-half inch diameter or greater irrigation line.

Subd. (g): A county board of supervisors must adopt a resolution before this section may be implemented in a particular county.

Note: The stated purpose of the above statute is to assist law enforcement in the combating of illegal marijuana cultivation sites in state parks and other resource lands due to the negative environmental effects of such grows (but not necessarily just because illegal grows are a bad thing). (Stats 2012, ch 390.)

Community Caretaking Function:

Although the “community caretaking function” may justify a traffic stop, it will do so only when an officer is acting reasonably in determining that an occupant’s safety or welfare is at risk. (*People v. Madrid* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1050; see also *Cady v. Dombrowski* (1973) 413 U.S. 433 [37 L.Ed.2nd 706].)

Per the *Madrid* Court (at pg. 1059, citing *Wright v. State* (Tex.Crim.App. 1999) 7 S.W.3rd 148, 151-152; and *Corbin v. State* (Tex.Crim.App. 2002) 85 S.W.3rd 272.), four factors are to be considered in

determining whether the officer's actions are reasonable, with the most weight going to the first:

- The nature and level of the distress exhibited by the individual;
- The location of the individual;
- Whether or not the individual was alone and/or had access to assistance independent of that offered by the officer; and
- To what extent the individual—if not assisted—presented a danger to himself or others.

Parking Tickets:

Writing a parking ticket justifies a temporary detention of the vehicle's occupant. The fact that parking tickets are subject to civil penalties only and governed by civil administrative procedures is irrelevant. (*People v. Bennett* (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 907; citing *Whren v. United States* (1996) 517 U.S. 806 [135 L.Ed.2nd 89]; and *United States v. Choudhry* (9th Cir. 2006) 461 F.3rd 1097.)

Gang-Related Investigations:

Seeing three vehicles with four Black male occupants each, one of the occupants who is known to be a gang member, driving as if in military formation at 12:30 at night, hours after a prior gang shooting, the vehicles being in one of the warring Black gang's territory, held to be *insufficient* to justify a stop and detention. (*People v. Hester* (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 376, 385-392.)

Narcotics-Related Traffic Stops Using a "Controlled Tire Deflation Device" ("CTDD"):

The use of a "*controlled tire deflation device*" to stop a vehicle suspected of being used to smuggle controlled substances over the US/Mexico border held to be a detention only (thus requiring only a reasonable suspicion) and not excessive force under the circumstances. (*United States v. Guzman-Padilla* (9th Cir. 2009) 573 F.3rd 865.)

Note: The “*controlled tire deflation device*,” or “*CTDD*,” is an accordion-like tray containing small, hollow steel tubes that puncture the tires of a passing vehicle and cause a gradual release of air, bringing the vehicle to a halt within a quarter to half a mile.

See “*A Controlled Tire Deflation Device (‘CTDD’)*,” under “*New and Developing Law Enforcement Technology*” (Chapter 11), below.

Checking the Vehicle for a Wanted Suspect:

To serve a warrant, the officer need only know that the registered owner has an outstanding warrant and may stop the vehicle even without seeing the driver or the vehicle’s occupants. (*People v. Dominquez* (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1315, 1317-1318; *People v. Williams* (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 467, 476.)

Mistake of Law vs. Mistake of Fact:

Mistake of Law:

Original Rule:

The long-standing rule has been that an officer making a traffic stop based upon a misapprehension of the law, (i.e., a “*mistake of law*”), even if reasonable (but, see *Heien*, below), is an illegal stop. (*United States v. Lopez-Soto* (9th Cir. 2000) 205 F.3rd 1101; *United States v. Morales* (9th Cir. 2001) 252 F.3rd 1070, 1073, fn. 3.)

As a general rule, a mistake of law, whether reasonable or not, could not be the basis for finding probable cause or a reasonable suspicion. (*People v. Teresinski* (1982) 30 Cal.3rd 822; involving an officer’s mistaken belief that a curfew violation applied. “Courts on strong policy grounds have generally refused to excuse a police officer’s mistake of law.” (*Id.*, at p. 831.)

See *People v. White* (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 636, 643-644; police officer unaware that Arizona did not require a front license plate; stop illegal.

There is some authority to the contrary. (*People v. Glick* (1988) 203 Cal.App.3rd 796.) But this is based upon an unusual fact situation; i.e., California police officer did not know that New Jersey doesn't require registration stickers on their license plates. This is a minority opinion that most courts will not follow.

An officer's mistake of law; i.e., his belief that Baja California, Mexico, required motorists to affix a registration sticker on the car so that it would be visible from the rear of the vehicle (the registration sticker is actually supposed to be affixed to the vehicle's windshield) resulted in a traffic stop made without the necessary reasonable suspicion. The resulting evidence, therefore, should have been suppressed. (*United States v. Lopez-Soto* (9th Cir. 2000) 205 F.3rd 1101.)

See *United States v. Twilley* (9th Cir. 2000) 222 F.3rd 1092; California police officer mistakenly believed that Michigan required two plates.

An officer's misapprehension that a person crossing the street other than in a cross walk was in violation of V.C. § 21954(a), did not justify a detention to cite for that offense when it is later held that the section did not apply. (*People v. Ramirez* (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 849.)

An officer's mistaken belief that defendant's vehicle, with no front license plate, violated California law (i.e., V.C. § 5202), because it didn't have a front license plate but had a valid rear Florida license plate, when

unknown to the officer Florida does not issue two license plates to automobiles, was an inexcusable mistake of law. (*People v. Reyes* (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 856.)

New Rule:

Where a mistake of law is based upon a misapprehension of the scope of a statute that has yet to be decided, then such a mistake is “reasonable,” and *not* a violation of the **Fourth Amendment** when a traffic stop is made based upon that misapprehension. (*Heien v. North Carolina* (Dec. 15, 2014) 574 U.S. __ [135 S.Ct. 530; 190 L.Ed.2nd 475]; unclear under North Carolina statutes whether a vehicle with one brake light out was a vehicle code violation.)

Note: Although the general rule continues to be that a mistake of law does not excuse an otherwise illegal stop, detention, or arrest, *Heien* discredits any of the above cases to the extent that they held that such a mistake of law cannot overcome the fact of an illegal stop, detention, or arrest even though such a mistake is “objectively reasonable.”

Heien cites *Michigan v. DeFillippo* (1979) 443 U.S. 31 [61 L.Ed.2nd 343], where a city ordinance allowing for defendant’s arrest was declared, after the fact, to be unconstitutional. The officer’s good faith reliance upon the city ordinance was held to be a reasonable mistake of law, justifying the arrest.

Where police officers detained defendant because he was “riding a bicycle in a business district,” eventually arresting him for being under the influence of a controlled substance, when the initial detention was based upon a local ordinance prohibiting the

operation of operating a bicycle “upon any sidewalk fronting any commercial business establishment unless official signs are posted authorizing such use” (**San Diego Municipal Code § 84.09(a)**), the detention was held to be illegal. Defendant was stopped in front of a building that was no longer operating as a business and thus, as interpreted by this court, not covered by the ordinance. With no prior guidance, however, the officers’ “expansive” interpretation of the statute (“mistake of law”) was not unreasonable under the circumstances. Pursuant to the rule of *Heien v. North Carolina, supra*, therefore, the officers’ reasonable mistake of law did not negate defendant’s detention and subsequent arrest. (*People v. Campuzano* (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th Supp. 14, 18-21.)

Mistake of Fact: An officer making a traffic stop based upon a “mistake of fact,” “held reasonably and in good faith,” will not invalidate the stop. (See below.)

Sheriff’s deputies stopping defendants’ car based upon a computer check indicating that the vehicle’s registration had expired, when in fact the registration had already been renewed. Absent some reason to believe that the computer information was not accurate, the stop was held to be lawful. (*United States v. Miguel* (9th Cir. 2004) 368 F.3rd 1150.)

A missing rear license plate and no visible temporary registration displayed in the rear window, even though the temporary registration is later found to be in the front windshield, but not visible to the officer coming up behind the vehicle, is sufficient reasonable suspicion to justify a traffic stop. (*In re Raymond C.* (2008) 45 Cal.4th 303.)

As noted in fn. 2: “A temporary permit is to be placed in the lower rear window. However, if it would be obscured there, it may be placed in the lower right corner of

either the windshield or a side window.”
*(DMV Handbook of Registration
Procedures* (Oct. 2007) ch. 2, § 2.020, p. 7.)

An officer stopping a vehicle for having illegally tinted windows, when the Plaintiff alleges that the windows were rolled down and not visible to the officer, is, at best, an unreasonable mistake of fact, and does not provide the officer with qualified immunity from civil liability. (*Liberal v. Estrada* (9th Cir. 2011) 632 F.3rd 1064, 1077-1078.)

However, where a “high risk” stop of a suspected stolen vehicle was made, such stop being precipitated by a misreading of the license plate by an “automated license plate reader” and where the stop was made without first making a visual verification that the license on the stopped vehicle was as interpreted by the plate reader, the lawfulness of such a stop was held to be a triable issue for a civil jury to decide. (*Green v. City & County of San Francisco* (9th Cir. 2014) 751 F.3rd 1039, 1045-1046; discounting without discussion the possibility that the stop was based upon a reasonable mistake of fact.)

Note: In a case in which two organizations petitioned for a writ of mandate to compel disclosure of requested automated license plate reader (ALPR) data pursuant to the **California Public Records Act**, the California Supreme Court, reversing a lower court, concluded that the ALPR scan data at issue are not subject to **Govt. Code § 6254(f)**’s exemption for records of investigations. The process of ALPR scanning does not produce records of investigations because the scans are not conducted as a part of a targeted inquiry into any particular crime or crimes. Regarding the application of the catchall exemption set forth in **Govt. Code § 6255(a)**, the Supreme Court noted the trial court appeared to have placed significant weight on speculative concerns about

possible disclosure of mobile ALPR patrol patterns, without record evidence to support its conclusions. The Court held this to be error. (*American Civil Liberties Union Foundation v. Superior Court* (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1032.)

Pretext Stops: A “*pretext stop*” is one where law enforcement officers stop a vehicle usually for some minor traffic infraction but where the officers’ true motivation is actually to investigate some more serious offense for which there is no reasonable suspicion.

Whren v. United States: A prior three-way split of opinion on the legality of such a practice was finally resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court in *Whren v. United States* (1996) 517 U.S. 806 [135 L.Ed.2nd 89], upholding the legality of such a practice. (See also *People v. Gomez* (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 531, 537; and *People v. Gallardo* (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 234.)

A law enforcement officer’s actions, so long as *objectively reasonable*, might still result in the admissibility of illegally seized evidence because of the “*good faith*” exception. (*United States v. Leon* (1984) 468 U.S. 897 [82 L.Ed.2nd 677]; see also *People v. Hull* (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1448; *People v. Suff* (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1013, 1054.) (See “*Good Faith*,” below.)

Per *Whren*, so long as there is some lawful justification for making the stop, the officers’ *subjective motivations* are irrelevant. (*Ibid*; see also *United States v. Miranda-Guerena* (9th Cir. 2006) 445 F.3rd 1233.)

Whren is based upon the United States Constitution’s **Fourth Amendment**, precluding a state’s attempt to impose a stricter standard upon law enforcement, unless the state chooses to employ its own Constitution (under the theory of “*independent state grounds*”) (*Arkansas v. Sullivan* (2001) 532 U.S. 769 [149 L.Ed.2nd 994].)

The “*pretext stop*” theory of *Whren v. United States* applies to civil parking violations as well as

any criminal violation. (*United States v. Choudhry* (9th Cir. 2006) 461 F.3rd 1097.)

California Rule:

Until passage of **Proposition 8**, California Courts were obligated to follow California's stricter rules that in some circumstances may (and lawfully were allowed to) have been stricter than the federal standards. (See *American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 307, 327-328; *Raven v. Deukmejian* (1990) 52 Cal.3rd 336, 353.)

California Courts' ability to use "*Independent State Grounds*" as a basis for imposing stricter rules on law enforcement was eliminated with passage of **Proposition 8** in June, 1982, and its "*Truth in Evidence*" provisions. (*In re Lance W.* (1985) 37 Cal.3rd 873.)

Since passage of **Proposition 8**, California state courts now determine the reasonableness of a search or seizure by federal constitutional standards, and thus follows *Whren*. (*People v. Schmitz* (2012) 55 Cal.4th 909, 916; *People v. Steele* (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1114-1115.)

Pretext Issues:

Use of the federal material witness statute (**18 U.S.C. 3144**), authorizing the detention of a material witness based upon a reasonable suspicion, may lawfully be used as a pretext to arrest a material witness under certain circumstances, even where shown that there was no real intent to use the detainee as a witness. (*Ashcroft v. al-Kidd* (May 31, 2011) 563 U. S. 731, 741-744 [179 L. Ed. 2nd 1149].)

Stopping defendant's vehicle upon observing an expired temporary registration sticker upheld despite the officers' real purpose of investigating his involvement in the sale of narcotics. (*United States v. Fowlkes* (9th Cir. 2015) 804 F.3rd 954, 971.)

In that an officer's reasonable suspicion of a violation of the law is enough to justify a stop a vehicle, and test being an objective one so that the officer's subjective thinking is irrelevant, the fact that the officer lied to the defendant about the reasons for the stop is also irrelevant. (*United States v. Magallon-Lopez* (9th Cir. 2016) 817 F.3rd 671, 675.)

Exceptions: The theory of *Whren* is subject to exceptions:

Rule: Contrary to the general rule, an officer's motivations in conducting a search *do* matter in *three* limited situations; i.e., in "*special needs*" searches, "*administrative searches*," and when conducting a "*knock and talk*" within the curtilage (e.g., front porch) of a home. (*United States v. Lundin* (9th Cir. 2016) 817 F.3rd 1151, 1159-1160; see also *United States v. McCarty* (9th Cir. Sep. 9, 2011) 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18874 [vacated and remanded]; child pornography observed during a lawful TSA administrative search may lawfully be used to establish probable cause to arrest.)

On remand of *McCarty*, defendant's motion to suppress was denied at *United States v. McCarty* (2011) 835 F.Supp.2nd 938.

In *Lundin*, the Ninth Circuit quoted the Supreme Court in *Florida v. Jardines* (2013) 569 U.S. 1 [133 S.Ct. 1409; 185 L.Ed.2nd 495], noting that: "After *Jardines*, it is clear that, like the special-needs and administrative-inspection exceptions, the 'knock and talk' exception depends at least in part on an officer's subjective intent." (*United States v. Lundin*, *supra*, at p. 1160.)

In *Jardines*, in discussing the legality of entering the front porch area of defendant's home (i.e., the "curtilage") with a drug-sniffing dog, the Supreme Court noted that: "Here, however, the question before the court is precisely *whether* the officer's

conduct was an objectively reasonable search. As we have described, that depends upon whether the officers had an implied license to enter the porch, which in turn depends upon the purpose for which they entered. Here, their behavior objectively reveals a purpose to conduct a search, which is not what anyone would think he had license to do.” (Italics in original; *Id.*, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 1416-1417.)

See *United States v. Orozco* (9th Cir. 2017) `858 F.3rd 1204, 1210-1212, for a description of the various cases illustrating the exceptions to the rule of *Whren*.

Administrative Searches:

When the pretext used for making a stop is to conduct an “*administrative search*,” such as inspecting the licensing of a taxicab, per local ordinance, or an inventory vehicle search, making a traffic stop is unlawful, and any direct products of that stop are subject to suppression. (*People v. Valenzuela* (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1202; *Whren v. United States*, *supra*, at pp. 811-812, [135 L.Ed.2nd at p. 97].)

Narcotics detection in the form of a highway check point cannot be justified as a valid administrative purpose. (*City of Indianapolis v. Edmond* (2000) 531 U.S. 32 [146 L.Ed.2nd 333].)

Use of Nevada’s “NAS Level III paperwork inspection” administrative search statutes, which authorize the suspicionless search of a commercial truck under statutes that are intended “to enforce the provisions of state and federal laws and regulations relating to motor carriers, the safety of their vehicles and equipment, and their transportation of hazardous material and other cargo,” as a pretext to search for smuggled drugs, held to

be a illegal pretext search. The only purpose of the stop was to investigate criminal activity and that any alleged administrative purpose for the stop was “only a charade to camouflage the real purpose of the stop.” (*United States v. Orozco* (9th Cir, 2017) 858 F.3rd 1204.)

The Court held in *Orozco* that the presence of a criminal investigatory motive, by itself, will not necessarily render an administrative stop and search an illegal pretextual stop or search in all cases. The test is an objective one: A pretextual administrative search will be held to be illegal only in those cases where the officer would not have made the stop or search except for the presence of the invalid purpose. (*Id.* at pp. 1213-1216.)

Vehicle Impound Searches:

An officer’s intent to use the impoundment of a vehicle driven by an unlicensed defendant and an inventory search as a pretext to look for narcotics-related evidence was found *not* to come within the legally recognized grounds for impounding vehicles pursuant to law enforcement’s community caretaking function. Inventory searches being an exception to the rule of *Whren*, the officer’s subjective intent in impounding defendant’s car was held to be relevant. (*People v. Torres* (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 775, 785-793.)

When a Pretext Use is illegal:

When a stop or search is *not* a “run-of-the-mine” case, such as “cases where ‘searches or seizures [were] conducted in an extraordinary manner, usually harmful to an individual’s privacy or even physical

interests—such as, for example, seizure by means of deadly force, unannounced entry into a home, entry into a home without a warrant, or physical penetration of the body.’ (Citing *Whren v. United States*, *supra*, at p. 818.)” (*United States v. Ibarra* (9th Cir. 2003) 345 F.3rd 711, 715.)

The theory of *Whren* is limited to those circumstances where a police officer is aware of facts that would support an arrest. “(A)lthough *Whren* stands for the proposition that a pretextual seizure based on the illegitimate subjective intentions of an officer may be permissible, it does not alter the fact that the pretext itself must be a constitutionally sufficient basis for the seizure and the facts supporting it must be known at the time it is conducted.” (*Moreno v. Baca* (9th Cir. 2005) 431 F.3rd 633, 640; finding that a belatedly discovered arrest warrant and parole search conditions did not justify a detention and search.)

Whren requires that there be some legal reason for the officer’s actions. This does not allow for officers to bring a drug-sniffing dog into the curtilage of a suspect’s home (i.e., the front porch), without a warrant, for the purpose of seeking evidence of the presence of contraband; held to be a search by the United States Supreme Court. (*Florida v. Jardines* (2013) 569 U.S. 1, 10 [133 S.Ct. 1409; 185 L.Ed.2nd 495].)

Racial Profiling: Query: Does *Whren* validate a traffic stop when the officer’s real motivation is based upon prohibited “*racial profiling*?” The answer has to be: *No!*

Balancing the constitutional principles involved (e.g., **Fourteenth Amendment** and **Calif. Const. Art I, §§ 7, 15**, *equal protection* and *due process*), and the state and federal statutes the officer would be violating (**18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242**; **42 U.S.C. 1983**; **P.C. §§ 422.6(a), 13519.4**; and **C.C. § 52.1**),

a court will *not* likely uphold such a stop. (See also *Baluyut v. Superior Court* (1996) 12 Cal.4th 826; *equal protection*; and *Shapiro v. Thompson* (1969) 394 U.S. 618 [22 L.Ed.2nd 600]; discrimination may be so arbitrary and injurious as to be deemed a *due process* violation.

The Supreme Court itself, in *Whren*, specifically noted that; “We of course agree with petitioners that the Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race.” (*Whren v. United States*, *supra*, at p. 813 [135 L.Ed.2nd at p. 98].)

Discrimination by law enforcement officers based upon a person’s race in the providing of both protective and non-protective services is a constitutional equal protection violation. (*Ae Ja Elliot-Park v. Manglona* (9th Cir. 2010) 592 F.3rd 1003.)

However, to sustain an “equal protection” argument, a plaintiff must produce evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable trier of fact to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the officer’s actions were racially motivated. (*Sandoval v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t.* (9th Cir. 2014) 756 F.3rd 1154, 1167)

Such “*racial profiling*” would be a **Fourteenth Amendment** “*due process*” violation. (*Ae Ja Elliot-Park v. Manglona*, *supra*; see also *United States v. Ibarra* (9th Cir. 2003) 345 F.3rd 711, 714.)

While a person’s race may properly be used as an identification factor when in conjunction with other factors, but standing alone, a person’s race is insufficient to justify the detention of a person as the suspect in a crime. (See *People v. Walker* (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1388-1389: “(T)here was a sense that the detaining officer relied too heavily on the common general traits of race and

age in attempting to justify a stop that had no other circumstances to warrant it.”

“(T)he race of an occupant (of a vehicle), without more, does not satisfy the detention standard.” (*People v. Bates* (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 60, 67; citing *People v. Bower* (1979) 24 Cal.3rd 638, 644.)

Note also that California has sought to prevent racial and identity profiling through mandated written guidelines, training, and extensive reporting requirements on the details of all detentions and arrests. (See Gov’t. Code § 12525.5: “**The Racial and Identity Profiling Act of 2015.**”

See also P.C. §§ 13012 and 13519.4. “A peace officer shall not engage in racial or identity profiling.” (P.C. § 13519.4(f))

Also, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that a defendant’s **Sixth Amendment** right to a fair trial takes precedence over a state statute that precludes or restricts inquiry into the validity of a jury’s verdict (i.e., the “no impeachment rule”) when there is “compelling evidence” that a juror, during deliberations, made a clear statement indicating that he or she relied upon racial stereotypes or animus to convict a defendant. (*Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado* (Mar. 6, 2017) __ U.S. __ [137 S.Ct. 855; 197 L.Ed.2nd 107].)

The Supreme Court has also held that a defendant (a black male) in a capital murder case received ineffective assistance of counsel (a **Sixth Amendment** violation) when his attorney called as an expert witness a psychologist who, as a part of his expert opinion as to the potential future dangerousness of the defendant, testified that black men are statistically more likely to be violent. The Court ruled that it was inappropriate for a jury to consider race no matter how it was injected into the proceeding, rejecting the argument that it was invited error because defendant’s own attorney was the one who called the expert to testify. (*Buck v.*

Davis (Feb. 22, 2017) __ U.S. __ [137 S.Ct. 759; 197 L.Ed.2nd 1].)

Motor Vehicle Passengers:

To Arrest a Passenger:

The stop of the defendant's car upon observing a passenger in the car for which there was a known outstanding arrest warrant was upheld. When the stop revealed the defendant/driver was in possession of a billy club, the officer lawfully arrested him as well. (*In re William J.* (1985) 171 Cal.App.3rd 72.)

“A momentary stop of an automobile by police to investigate a passenger reasonably believed to be involved in a past crime is proper. It creates a minimal inconvenience to the driver of that automobile, when balanced against the government's interest in apprehending criminals.” (*Id.*, at p. 77.)

To Detain a Passenger: Is a passenger in a vehicle when the driver is stopped and detained also subject to being detained, thus implicating the passenger's privacy rights?

The United States Supreme Court reversed the California Supreme Court on this issue and held that at least in a private motor vehicle (as opposed to a taxi, bus, or other common carrier), the passenger, by virtue of being in a vehicle stopped for a possible traffic infraction, is in fact detained, giving him the right to challenge the legality of the traffic stop. (*Brendlin v. California* (2007) 551 U.S. 249 [127 S.Ct. 2400; 168 L.Ed.2nd 132].)

The test is whether, “in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” Or, in the case where the person has no desire to leave, “whether ‘a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.’” (*Id.*, 127 S.Ct., at pp. 2405-2406.)

If the driver is stopped for a traffic-related offense, a “passenger will expect to be subject to some scrutiny, and his attempt to leave the scene would be so obviously likely to prompt an objection from the officer that no passenger would feel free to leave in the first place.” If the driver is stopped for something unrelated to his driving, a “passenger will reasonably feel subject to suspicion owing to close association” with the driver. (*Id.*, 127 S.Ct., at p. 2407.)

This decision is in accord with the majority of prior cases that have considered this issue. (See *People v. Bell* (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 754; see also *People v. Grant* (1990) 217 Cal.App.3rd 1451, 1460; *People v. Hunt* (1990) 225 Cal.App.3rd 498, 505; *People v. Lionberger* (1986) 185 Cal.App.3rd Supp. 1, 5; and *People v. Lamont* (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 404; *United States v. Twilley* (9th Cir. 2000) 222 F.3rd 1092, 1095; *United States v. Eylicio-Montoya* (10th Cir. 1995) 70 F.3rd 1158, 1164; *United States v. Kimball* (1st Cir. 1994) 25 F.3rd 1, 5-6; *United States v. Roberson* (5th Cir. 1993) 6 F.3rd 1088, 1091; *United States v. Rusher* (4th Cir. 1992) 966 F.2nd 868, 874, fn. 4.)

Note also that even if the passenger is illegally detained, any evidence recovered from the vehicle, if not the product of the illegal detention, will be admissible. (*United States v. Pulliam* (9th Cir. 2005) 405 F.3rd 782, 787; a vehicle search was done independent of the defendant’s detention.)

Although *Brendlin*, on its face, appears to deal only with the right (i.e., “standing”) of the passenger to challenge the legality of the traffic stop (*Brendlin v. California*, *supra.*, at pp. 256-259.), and arguably was not intended as authority for the continued detention of a passenger who might choose to walk

away, the U.S. Supreme Court subsequently ruled quite clearly that “(t)he police need not have, in addition, cause to believe any occupant of the (lawfully stopped) vehicle is involved in criminal activity” to justify a continued detention for the duration of the traffic stop. (*Arizona v. Johnson* (2009) 555 U.S. 323 [172 L.Ed.2nd 694].)

Also; “The temporary seizure of driver and passengers ordinarily continues, and remains reasonable, for the duration of the stop.” (*Id.*, at p. 325.)

And then: “(A) traffic stop of a car communicates to a reasonable passenger that he or she is not free to terminate the encounter with the police and move about at will.” (*Ibid.*)

The California Supreme Court is in apparent agreement with this interpretation, holding that upon ordering the passenger out of the vehicle; “there is a social expectation of unquestioned police command, which is at odds with any notion that a passenger would feel free to leave without advance permission.” (*People v. Hoyos* (2007) 41 Cal.4th 872, 892-894; brief, one-minute detention, necessitated for purposes of officer safety, held to be lawful.)

Should additional justification be required to continue the detention of a passenger, prior case law notes that the detention can be justified by a showing that the passenger is in “*close association*” with persons (e.g., the driver) reasonably suspected of illegal activity. (*People v. Samples* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1197.)

Otherwise, there must at least be some reason for the officer to believe that his safety will be placed in jeopardy in order to justify a refusal to allow a passenger to walk away from a traffic stop. (See *People v. Vibanco* (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1; and “*Ordering In,*” below.)

Ordering Out: The law is clear that upon making a lawful traffic stop, the *driver* may be ordered out of the vehicle without the need for the officer to justify why.

(***Pennsylvania v. Mimms*** (1977) 434 U.S. 106, 111 [54 L.Ed.2nd 331, 337]; ***People v. Evans*** (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 735, 743.)

Although previously subject to a split of opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that the same rules apply to *passengers* other than the driver. If anything, the need to protect the safety of the officers is even greater when he must deal with more than just a lone driver. (***Maryland v. Wilson*** (1997) 519 U.S. 408 [137 L.Ed.2nd 41]; see also ***Ruvalcata v. City of Los Angeles*** (9th Cir. 1995) 64 F.3rd 1323.)

Prior state law was leaning in that direction anyway, allowing drivers and passengers to be ordered out of a vehicle with very little cause:

To corroborate the driver’s identity, and for officer’s safety. (***People v. Maxwell*** (1988) 206 Cal.App.3rd 1004, 1009.)

Where there is a legitimate need to search the vehicle. (***People v. Webster*** (1991) 54 Cal.3rd 411.)

Less justification than is needed for a patdown will warrant the ordering of a passenger out of a vehicle. (***People v. Superior Court [Simon]*** (1972) 7 Cal.3rd 186, 206, fn. 13.)

Citing ***Mimms*** and ***Wilson***, the California Supreme Court has cited with approval “an officer’s authority to order a passenger to exit a vehicle during a traffic stop as a matter of course.” (***People v. Saunders*** (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1129, 1134.)

The California Supreme Court has further held that it is also lawful to continue to detain the passenger for “at least as long as reasonably necessary for the officer to complete the activity the (lawful ordering

out of the car) contemplates.” (*People v. Hoyos* (2007) 41 Cal.4th 872, 892-893.)

Ordering In: A police officer may require the *driver* to remain in his or her vehicle. (*Pennsylvania v. Mimms, supra.*)

Under the same rationale, some federal courts have ruled that an officer may order a *passenger* to remain in the vehicle, at least where the passenger has not expressed an intent to simply leave the scene, or when the passenger is interfering with the officer’s contact with the driver. (*Rogala v. District of Columbia* (D.C. Cir. 1998) 161 F.3rd 44; *United States v. Moorefield* (3rd Cir. 1997) 111 F.3rd 10, 13.)

The Ninth Circuit is in accord, finding that the officer’s safety outweighs the minimal intrusion involved in maintaining the status quo by returning the passenger to where he was in the car. (*United States v. Williams* (9th Cir. 2005) 419 F.3rd 1029.)

See also *Id.*, at p. 1032, fn. 2, for a list of state cases (other than California) that are in accord.

See also *People v. Castellon* (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1369, upholding the officer’s order to a *passenger* to remain in the vehicle: “(W)e will not second-guess (the officer’s) reasonable in-the-field call; it was for the officer to decide whether his personal safety was better preserved by ordering Castellon to stay inside the car or by ordering him out of the vehicle.”

But see *People v. Gonzalez* (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 381, where ordering a passenger back into a vehicle was held to be an unlawful detention.

In light of *Castellon* and *Williams, supra*, it can be argued that *Gonzalez* is a *minority opinion*, and probably not a correct statement of the law.

Gonzalez was also criticized as no longer good law in **People v. Vibanco** (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1, at p. 11, where the court specifically held that: “The possibility of a violent encounter is likely to be even greater still when one or more of the passengers in a stopped car attempts to leave while others stay in the car,” and that “**Wilson** can therefore reasonably be interpreted to allow officers as a matter of course to order a passenger or passengers either to get out of the car or to remain in the car during a lawful traffic stop if the officers deem it necessary for officer safety.”

And see “*To Detain a Passenger*,” above.

Demanding Identification: The above case law, however, does not answer the question whether an officer may “demand” that the passenger identify himself.

An officer may certainly “ask” for identification, so long as he understands that the passenger may refuse. (See **Kolender v. Lawson** (1983) 461 U.S. 352 [75 L.Ed.2nd 903]; **Brown v. Texas** (1979) 443 U.S. 47, 52 [61 L.Ed.2nd 357]; **United States v. Diaz-Castaneda** (9th Cir. 2007) 494 F.3rd 1146, 1152-1153.)

But in light of the case law, above, to the effect that the passenger is in fact detained along with the driver (see **Brendlin v. California** (2007) 551 U.S. 249 [127 S.Ct. 2400; 168 L.Ed.2nd 132].), there’s a viable argument that the officer may also require the passenger to identify himself. (See **Hibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada** (2004) 542 U.S. 177 [159 L.Ed.2nd 292].) There’s just no case directly on point yet.

Query: Is it not also arguable that a person detained based upon a reasonable suspicion that he is involved in criminal activity, per **Terry v. Ohio**, *supra.*, is different than a person detained merely by virtue of being a passenger in a stopped motor vehicle, per **Brendlin v. California**, *supra.*? While the former may be required to identify himself,

the same rule might not apply to the latter. (See *Stufflebeam v. Harris* (8th Cir. 2008) 521 F.3rd 884; finding the arrest of a passenger who refused to identify himself to be illegal; decided after *Brendlin*, but failing to mention the case.)

See “*Demanding identification*,” below.

Flight: While the “*flight*” of the *driver* of a vehicle provides probable cause to arrest for various **Vehicle Code** violations (E.g., **V.C. §§ 2800.1 et seq.**), and a *driver* who is subject to citation may not avoid the citation by fleeing on foot (see **P.C. § 148(a)**), what if *the passenger*, for whom there is no connection with any illegal activity, chooses to exit the vehicle and run?

The long-standing rule has always been that “*flight alone*,” without other suspicious circumstances, is not sufficient justification for a detention. (*People v. Souza* (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224.)

However, the United States Supreme Court recently lowered the bar a little by holding that flight from a so-called “*high narcotics area*” is sufficient in itself to justify a temporary detention. (*Illinois v. Wardlow* (2000) 528 U.S. 119 [145 L.Ed.2nd 570].)

Flight of two people is more suspicious than one. Add to this the fact that there appeared to be drug paraphernalia on a table where the two persons had been sitting, and that the defendant was carrying something in his hand as he fled; the officer had sufficient reasonable suspicion to detain him. (*People v. Britton* (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1118-1119.)

Note: A defendant’s flight may be used as evidence against him at trial, showing an “awareness of guilt.” (See **P.C. § 1127c** and **CALCRIM No. 372**. See also *People v. Price* (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 409, 454-458.)

And see “*Ordering In*,” above.

Search Incident to Citation: Although the issuance of a traffic citation is technically an *arrest and release* on one's promise to appear, it is treated by the courts as a *temporary detention* only. Temporary detentions do not include the power to conduct a search. Therefore, it is not constitutionally permissible to conduct a non-consensual search of a vehicle incident to a citation, even if authorized by statute. (*Knowles v. Iowa* (1998) 525 U.S. 113 [142 L.Ed.2nd 492]; see also *People v. Brisendine* (1975) 13 Cal.3rd 528, 538-552.)

Note: California has no such statute similar to Iowa's.

See *People v. Lopez* (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 815, 822-828, differentiating a limited search for identification and vehicle documentation from a traditional search incident to arrest, and citing *In re Arturo D.* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 60.

A “*search incident to arrest*” (see below) requires the *transportation* of the arrestee as a prerequisite to a search, absent *probable cause* to believe there is something illegal to seize. (*United States v. Robinson* (1973) 414 U.S. 218 [38 L.Ed.2nd 427]; *People v. Brisendine* (1975) 13 Cal.3rd 528; *United States v. Moto* (9th Cir. 1993) 982 F.2nd 1384.) Writing a person a traffic citation, of course, does not normally involve the transportation of the person who is cited. He is therefore not subject to search based upon the writing of a traffic ticket alone.

A traffic stop for an equipment violation in a “*high crime*” (i.e., gang) area at night is *not* reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a detention or patdown for weapons. (*People v. Medina* (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 171.)

But see *People v. McKay* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 601, 607-619, a violation of V.C. § 21650.1, riding a bicycle on the wrong side of the street; and *People v. Gomez* (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 531, 538-539, seat belt violation: U.S. Supreme Court decisions have held that a mere violation of state statutory restrictions on making a custodial arrest for a minor criminal offense (e.g., mere traffic infraction) does not mean that the **Fourth Amendment** was also violated. (See *Atwater v. City of Lago Vista* (2001) 532 U.S. 318 [149 L.Ed.2nd 549]; *People v. Gallardo* (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 234, 239, fn. 1; *People v. Bennett* (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 907, 918.) Absent a constitutional **Fourth**

Amendment violation, evidence that is the product of a state statutory violation is not subject to suppression.

However, “police may not use probable cause for a traffic violation to justify an arrest for an unrelated offense where, under the facts known to police, they have no probable cause supporting the unrelated offense.” (*People v. Espino* (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 746, 765; ruling that just because officers *could have* arrested defendant for speeding, doesn’t mean that that fact justifies an arrest for some other bookable (i.e., a felony) offense for which there was no probable cause. Consent to search obtained without probable cause to justify the arrest for a felony was held to be invalid.)

To Identify a Suspect in a Criminal Offense:

Stopping and detaining a suspect for a felony criminal offense, when balancing law enforcement’s interest in identifying criminal suspects with the suspect’s interest in personal security from government intrusion, is lawful. (*United States v. Hensley* (1985) 469 U.S. 221 [83 L.E.2nd 604]; a robbery.)

The same may not be true in the case of a misdemeanor, noise violation, not occurring in the officer’s presence, at least where there are possible alternative, less intrusive methods of identifying the suspect. Stopping the suspect’s vehicle to identify him held to be illegal. (*United States v. Grigg* (9th Cir. 2007) 498 F.3rd 1070.)

The continuing validity of the *Grigg* decision has been questioned and is probably, if it ever was, no longer a valid rule. (See *United States v. Creek* (U.S. Dist. Ct, Ariz. 2009) 586 F. Supp.2nd 1099, 1102-1108; upholding the traffic stop of a petty theft (gas drive off) suspect.)

Signaling a car to stop at random, and without sufficient cause to believe it contained a theft suspect that the officers were looking for, held to be illegal. The fact that defendant, a passenger in the car, was later determined to be a probationer subject to search and seizure conditions did not retroactively allow for the stop of the vehicle, nor was it an attenuating factor sufficient to justify the resulting search. (*People v. Bates* (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 60, 65-71.)

Detention of a Person to Determine Citizenship:

Unlike making illegal entry, the mere unauthorized presence in the United States is not necessarily a crime. Stopping and detaining individuals based solely on their apparent ethnicity to determine whether they are in the country illegally is an illegal detention. (*de Jesus Ortega Melendres v. Arpaio* (9th Cir. 2012) 695 F.3rd 990, 999-1002; citing *Martinez-Medina v. Holder* (9th Cir. 2011) 673 F.3rd 1029, 1036.)

See also **Gov't. Code §§ 7284-7284.12**; *The "California Values Act,"* limiting law enforcement's ability to participate in enforcing federal immigration laws:

E.g.: **Gov't. Code § 7284.6(a)(1)**: California law enforcement agencies *shall not*: Use agency or department moneys or personnel to investigate, interrogate, detain, detect, or arrest persons for immigration enforcement purposes, including any of the following:

- (A) Inquiring into an individual's immigration status.
- (B) Detaining an individual on the basis of a hold request.
- (C) Providing information regarding a person's release date or responding to requests for notification by providing release dates or other information unless that information is available to the public, or is in response to a notification request from immigration authorities in accordance with **Gov't. Code § 7282.5**. Responses are never required, but are permitted under this subdivision, provided that they do not violate any local law or policy.
- (D) Providing personal information, as defined in **Civ. Code § 1798.3**, about an individual, including, but not limited to, the individual's home address or work address unless that information is available to the public.
- (E) Making or intentionally participating in arrests based on civil immigration warrants.

(F) Assisting immigration authorities in the activities described in **8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3)**.

(G) Performing the functions of an immigration officer, whether pursuant to **8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)** or any other law, regulation, or policy, whether formal or informal.

Pen. Code § 679.015: *Victim and Witnesses' Protection from being Turned over to Immigration Authorities:*

(a) It is the public policy of this state to protect the public from crime and violence by encouraging all persons who are victims of or witnesses to crimes, or who otherwise can give evidence in a criminal investigation, to cooperate with the criminal justice system and not to penalize these persons for being victims or for cooperating with the criminal justice system.

(b) Whenever an individual who is a victim of or witness to a crime, or who otherwise can give evidence in a criminal investigation, is not charged with or convicted of committing any crime under state law, a peace officer may not detain the individual exclusively for any actual or suspected immigration violation or turn the individual over to federal immigration authorities absent a judicial warrant.

See also “*Racial Profiling*,” above.

But see *Muehler v. Mena* (2005) 544 U.S. 93 [161 L.Ed.2nd 299], where the U.S. Supreme Court recently rejected the Ninth Circuit’s unsupported conclusion (see *Mena v. City of Simi Valley* (9th Cir. 2003) 332 F.3rd 1255, 1264-1265; cert. granted.) that, absent “a *particularized reasonable suspicion* that an individual is not a citizen,” it is a **Fourth Amendment** violation to ask him or her about the subject’s citizenship. Based upon *Muehler v. Mena*, while a California law enforcement officer may be violating California statutes by questioning a person’s citizenship, the officer is *not* also violating the **Fourth Amendment** by doing so.

Detentions in a Residence:

Ordering a person out of his house with only a reasonable suspicion to believe that he might be involved in criminal activity, and to walk backwards as he did so, holding onto him (albeit

without handcuffs) with his hands behind his back while asking for his consent to search his person, was held to be illegal. Full probable cause was necessary. (*People v. Lujano* (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 175, 185-189; The subsequent consent to search his person and his house was the product of that illegal detention and invalid.)

See also *Moore v. Pederson* (11th Cir. 2015) 806 F.3rd 1036; detention in plaintiff's home based upon no more than a reasonable suspicion held to be illegal, absent exigent circumstances. The defendant police officer was held to have qualified immunity, however, in that the issue has yet to be settled.

Detention of Residents (or Non-Resident) During the Execution of a Search Warrant:

The occupants of a residence may be detained during the execution of a search warrant even though they did not match the description of the suspects (e.g., Caucasian instead of African-American) believed to be living there at the time. (*Los Angeles County v. Rettele* (2007) 550 U.S. 609 [167 L.Ed.2nd 974]; the court noting that until the rest of the house is checked for the suspects, other occupants may be detained.)

It was further held that with knowledge that one of the sought-for suspects had a firearm registered to him, the detainees could be held at gunpoint until the rest of the house could be checked, even though the detainees were unclothed at the time. It was not necessary to allow the detainees to cover up until officers' safety could be assured. (*Ibid.*)

See also *Muehler v. Mena* (2005) 544 U.S. 93 [161 L.Ed.2nd 299]; detention of a resident held to be lawful while evidence in a gang shooting case was looked for, at least if not "prolonged." (see below)

A non-resident may also be detained when he comes upon the scene during the execution of a search warrant and there is evidence connecting him to the illegal activity at the location of the search. (*United States v. Davis* (9th Cir. 2008) 530 F.3rd 1069, 1080-1081.)

A probation officer may lawfully "briefly" detain a visitor in a house who is present in the house of a juvenile probationer during

a **Fourth** wavier search long enough to determine whether he is an resident of the house or is otherwise connected to illegal activity. (*People v. Rios* (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 584, 593-595; *People v. Matelski* (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 837.)

The Court further determined that a probation officer has the legal authority to detain and patdown a non-probationer pursuant to **P.C. § 830.5(a)(4)** (i.e.; enforcing “violations of any penal provisions of law which are discovered while performing the usual or authorized duties of his or her employment.”) (*People v. Rios, supra*, at p. 600.)

An occupant of a house being subjected to a search pursuant to a *search warrant* may be detained during the search (1) in order to prevent flight, (2) to minimize the risk of harm to the officers, and (3) to facilitate an orderly search through cooperation of the residents. (*Michigan v. Summers* (1981) 452 U.S. 692, 702-703 [69 L.Ed.2nd 340, 349-350].)

But see *Bailey v. United States* (2013) 568 U.S. 186, 192-202 [133 S.Ct. 1031, 1037-1043; 185 L.Ed.2nd 19], restricting such detentions to occupants who are still in the “immediate vicinity” of the residence being searched. The detention of an occupant who had just left the residence, and was already about a mile away, held to be illegal, at least under the rule of *Summers*.

See “*During Execution of a Search or Arrest Warrant, or during a Fourth Waiver Search,*” below.

Detention of Residents (or Non-Resident) During the Execution of an Arrest Warrant:

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal has held that the rule allowing for the detention of an occupant of a residence during the execution of a search warrant does not necessarily apply during the execution of an arrest warrant, without an explanation for the difference. (*Sharp v. County of Orange* (9th Cir. 2017) 871 F.3rd 901, 912-913.) California disagrees. (*People v. Hannah* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1335.)

See “*During Execution of a Search or Arrest Warrant, or during a Fourth Waiver Search,*” below.

Prolonged Detentions: A traffic stop (or any other detention) which is reasonable in its inception may become unreasonable if prolonged beyond that point reasonably necessary for the officer to complete the original purposes of the detention. (*People v. McGaughran* (1979) 25 Cal.3rd 577.)

“However, [a] seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission.’ [citation.] ‘[T]he tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s “mission”—to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop, [citation], and attend to related safety concerns, [citation]. [Citations.] Because addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop, it may “last no longer than is necessary to effectuate th[at] purpose.” [Citations.] Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.’ [citation] These tasks include those incidental to traffic enforcement, such as validating a license and registration, searching for outstanding warrants, and checking for proof of insurance. [citation]” (*People v. Espino* (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 746, 756.)

This will necessarily include the time required to write out the citation and obtain the offender’s promise to appear. It will also include the time it takes to obtain and examine the offender’s driver’s license and registration. “(G)ood police practice” might also include the time it takes to discuss the violation with the motorist and listen to any explanation he may wish to offer. And if the vehicles are exposed to danger, the officer may require the driver to proceed to a safer location before the traffic stop is completed. (*People v. Tully* (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 980-981.)

A person may be detained only as long as is reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose of the original stop, possibly extended by the time needed to investigate any new information justifying a further detention which comes to light during the original detention. (*People v. Russell* (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 96, 101.)

E.g.: A “*reasonable suspicion*” of criminal activity developed during a detention that was initiated for other purposes will justify holding the detainee beyond the time it took to accomplish the original purposes of the stop. (*United States v. Thompson* (9th Cir. 2002) 282 F.3rd 673; a Coast Guard boat safety check developed cause to believe

the subjects were smuggling drugs, justifying a further detention to investigate that possibility; see also *People v. Espino* (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 746, 755-765.)

Detaining the defendant for ten minutes, until a radio check came back that the car was stolen, was not excessive, particularly when symptoms of intoxication were noted during the ten minutes. (*People v. Carter* (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1139-1142.)

Random warrant checks during routine traffic stops are lawful, but the subject must be released when the citation process is completed (*People v. McGaughran*, *supra*; see also *United States v. Lockett* (9th Cir. 1973) 484 F.2nd 89.), or within a reasonable time thereafter. (*People v. Brown* (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 493; one minute delay while awaiting the results of a warrant check was *not* unreasonable, even though the officer never wrote the ticket.)

See also *United States v. Clark* (1st Cir. ME 2018) 879 F.3rd 1, where the one minute it took to ask a vehicle passenger questions in clarification was held not to have unlawfully prolonged a traffic stop in that the questioning was “one of these negligibly burdensome precautions justified by the unique safety threat posed by traffic stops.”

But see *Rodriguez v. United States* (Apr. 21, 2015) ___ U.S. ___ [135 S.Ct. 1609; 191 L.Ed.2nd 4927], below, holding that even a di minimis delay renders the detention illegal.

However, “(n)on-routine record checks and dog sniffs are paradigm examples of ‘unrelated investigations’ that may not be performed if they prolong a roadside detention absent independent reasonable suspicion.” (*United States v. Gorman* (9th Cir. 2017) 859 F.3rd 706, 715; as amended at 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 18610.)

Asking defendant for a consent to search, even without any reason to believe there was anything there to search for, is lawful so long as done within the time it would have taken to write the citation which was the original cause of the stop. (*People v. Gallardo* (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 234.)

Statements taken from a detained criminal suspect held for over 16 hours without probable cause to arrest, are subject to suppression as

the product of an unlawfully prolonged detention. (*People v Jenkins* (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1160, 1174-1178.)

An otherwise lawful “*knock and talk*,” where officers continued to press the defendant for permission to enter his apartment after his denial of any illegal activity, converted the contact into an unlawfully “*extended*” detention, causing the Court to conclude that a later consent-to-search was the product of the illegal detention, and thus invalid. (*United States v. Washington* (9th Cir. 2004) 387 F.3rd 1060.)

Holding onto a suspect (in handcuffs) for over 4½ hours (and maybe as long as 6½ hours) while narcotics officers drove up to a marijuana grow and searched the area to see if there was any evidence connecting him to the grow, was “*diligent and reasonable*” under the circumstances, and not an illegally prolonged detention. (*People v. Williams* (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 949; also finding that the officers had enough to arrest him from the outset had they chosen to do so.)

A sheriff’s investigator was held *not* to be protected by qualified immunity when sued for detaining partygoers for as long as 14 hours after a warrant search for evidence of illegal gaming was executed and completed. Interrogating the participants is not part and parcel of executing a warrant. Also, the detentions could not be justified as *Terry* stops because individualized suspicion was not established by the partygoers’ mere presence in the same large (21,000 sq. ft.) mansion where some limited drug and gaming contraband was discovered, and because detentions as long as 14 hours did not remotely resemble the brief detention authorized by *Terry v. Ohio*. (*Guillory v. Hill* (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 240, 249-256.)

Referencing *Terry v. Ohio* (1968) 392 U.S. 1 [20 L.Ed.2nd 889].)

A police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures. A seizure justified only by a police-observed traffic violation, therefore, becomes unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete the mission of issuing a ticket for the violation. (*Rodriguez v. United States* (Apr. 21, 2015) __ U.S. __ [135 S.Ct. 1609; 191 L.Ed.2nd 492]; finding a dog-sniff of the exterior of the defendant’s car,

conducted some seven to eight minutes after completing the purpose of the traffic stop, was illegal.)

“Beyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer’s mission includes ‘ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop.’ [Citation]. Typically such inquiries involve checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.” (*Id.*, 135 S.Ct. at p. 1615.)

By conducting an ex-felon registration check and a “dog sniff,” both of which were unrelated to the traffic violation for which the officer had stopped defendant, the officer prolonged the traffic stop beyond the time reasonably required to complete his traffic mission, and so violated the **Fourth Amendment** absent some independent reasonable suspicion. (*United States v. Evans* (9th Cir. 2015) 786 F.3rd 779, 784-789.)

While “vehicle records and warrants checks (are) tasks that are ‘ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic stop,’” are lawful, conducting a separate “ex-felon registration check,” done for the purpose of verifying that the detainee lives where he was registered, is not part of the traffic stop, and illegal unless supported by independent reasonable suspicion beyond that of the cause of the traffic stop itself, but is instead “a measure aimed at ‘detect[ing] evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.’” (*Id.* at p. 786.)

Upon remand, no such independent reasonable suspicion was found. (*United States v. Evans* (2015) 122 F.Supp.3rd 1027.)

In an asset forfeiture proceeding dealing with \$167,070 seized from defendant’s motorhome, it was held that the search of defendant’s vehicle following the second half of a “coordinated traffic stop” (i.e., a first stop which itself lasted nearly half an hour, but didn’t reveal any legal cause to search defendant’s motorhome, followed by a second traffic stop set up with a drug-sniffing dog available to conduct a sniff around the exterior of the motorhome) violated the **Fourth Amendment**. Because the dog sniff, which gave the officer in the second stop the necessary probable cause to obtain a search warrant to search defendant’s motorhome followed directly in an unbroken chain from the first prolonged traffic stop, the seized currency was held to be the “fruit of the poisonous tree” and

was properly suppressed by the trial court. (*United States v. Gorman* (9th Cir. 2017) 859 F.3rd 706, 714-719; as amended at 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 18610.)

“When a motorist ‘sees a policeman's lights flashing behind him,’ he expects ‘that he will be obliged to spend a short period of time answering questions and waiting while the officer checks his license and registration, that he may then be given a citation, but that in the end he most likely will be allowed to continue on his way.’” (*United States v. Gorman*, *supra*, at p. 714; as amended at 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 18610; citing *Berkemer v. McCarty*, *supra*, at p. 437; and noting that “less than 10 minutes is acceptable,” citing *Illinois v. Caballas* (2005) 543 U.S. 405, 406, 410 [125 S.Ct. 834; 160 L.Ed.2nd 842].)

Detaining a 75-year old, 4’ 11” female plaintiff in a parking lot for up to two hours, knowing that the plaintiff had urinated in her clothes, and after a search warrant had already been executed and a piece of contraband moonrock, which was the target of the instant investigation, had been seized, was arguably unreasonable, subjecting the agent-defendant to potential civil liability. The Court held that the agent was not entitled to qualified immunity under these circumstances in that a civil jury would have to determine whether the detention was unreasonably prolonged. (*Davis v. United States* (9th Cir. 2017) 854 F.3rd 594, 598-601.)

The Prolonged “De Minimis” Detention:

Old Rule: A number of appellate court decisions have ruled that a “*de minimis*” extension of the time necessary to “complete the mission” of a traffic stop, even if done for the purpose of conducting a criminal investigation unrelated to the purposes of the stop, is not “constitutionally significant,” and will be allowed.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal has held that a minimally prolonged detention (e.g., a couple of minutes), at least when motivated by other newly discovered information even though that new information by itself might not constitute a reasonable suspicion, does not make the prolonging of the detention unreasonable. Under such circumstances, a minimally prolonged detention is not unlawful. (*United States v. Turvin et al.* (9th Cir. 2008) 517 F.3rd 1097.)

See also *People v. Brown* (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 493, where a one minute delay while awaiting the results of a warrant check was held to be reasonable, even though the officer never wrote the ticket.

New Rule: However, the United States Supreme Court, seemingly overruling by inference all “de minimis” traffic cases, has subsequently held that a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures. A seizure justified only by a police-observed traffic violation, therefore, becomes unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete the mission of issuing a ticket or warning for the violation, no matter how minimal that extra time might be . (*Rodriguez v. United States* (Apr. 21, 2015) __ U.S. __ [135 S.Ct. 1609; 191 L.Ed.2nd 4927]; finding a dog-sniff of the exterior of the defendant’s car, conducted some seven to eight minutes after completing the purpose of the traffic stop, was illegal.)

See also at 135 S.Ct. at p. 1616, holding that the test is how long it actually takes the officer to handle the traffic offense, proceeding with reasonable diligence, and that rushing the issuance of a ticket, for instance, does not “earn (the officer) bonus time to pursue an unrelated criminal investigation.”

But see *United States v. Clark* (1st Cir. ME 2018) 879 F.3rd 1, where the one minute it took to ask a vehicle passenger questions in clarification was held not to have unlawfully prolonged a traffic stop in that the questioning was “one of these negligibly burdensome precautions justified by the unique safety threat posed by traffic stops.” *Clark*, being decided after *Rodriguez v. United States*, *supra*, seems to ignore any attempt in *Rodriguez* to condemn any delay, matter how minor.

Over-Detention in Jail:

Another form of illegal detention is when a jail fails to release a prisoner when he is due to be released. Such an act potentially constitutes grounds for a federal civil suit, per **42 U.S.C. § 1983**. However, in order to prove such a constitutional violation, the plaintiff/prisoner must be able to prove that the defendant officers personally participated in his over-detention or that the over-detention was the result of a pattern or custom on their part of the

defendant law enforcement agency. (*Avalos v. Baca* (9th Cir. 2010) 596 F.3rd 583, 587.)

Enlarging the Scope of the Original Detention:

If the person voluntarily consents to having his vehicle searched after he is free to leave, there is no prolonged detention, at least where a reasonable person should have understood that the purposes of the traffic stop were done. The officer is under no obligation to advise him that he is no longer being detained or that he has a right to refuse to allow the officer to search. (*Robinette v. Ohio* (1996) 519 U.S. 33 [136 L.Ed.2nd 347].)

The Federal Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal: Up until recently, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal has had difficulty accepting the idea that a police officer, during an otherwise lawful detention, and so long as that detention is not unlawfully prolonged (see above), may question the detained person about other possible criminal activity absent some “*particularized suspicion*” relevant to that other criminal activity:

See *United States v. Chavez-Valenzuela* (9th Cir. 2001) 268 F.3rd 719, amended at 279 F.3rd 1062, where the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal found a consent search, obtained after the purposes of the traffic stop had been satisfied, was invalid as a product of an illegally prolonged detention, the extended detention being the result of the officer’s unnecessary inquiries made during the traffic stop. *Robinette* was not discussed by the Court. The defendant’s nervousness was held to be irrelevant to the detention issue, per the Court. (See also *People v. Lusardi* (1991) 228 Cal.App.3rd Supp. 1, making a similar argument.)

Note *United States v. Turvin et al.* (9th Cir. 2008) 517 F.3rd 1097, discussing the invalidity of the primary holdings of the *Chavez-Valenzuela* decision, as it related to the issue of prolonged detentions.

See also *United States v. Murillo* (9th Cir. 2001) 255 F.3rd 1169, 1174, where the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal held that an officer must be able to “articulate suspicious factors that are particularized and objective” in order to “broaden the scope of questioning” beyond the purposes of the initial

traffic stop.” (*United States v. Murillo* (9th Cir. 2001) 255 F.3rd 1169, 1174; a questionable rule in light of *Robinette*.)

And see *United States v. Mendez* (9th Cir. 2006) 467 F.3rd 1162 (superseded by *United States v. Mendez* (9th Cir. 2007) 476 F.3rd 1077.), where it was held that questioning a detainee about possible criminal activity not related to the cause of the detention, and without a “*particularized suspicion*” to support a belief that the detainee is involved in that activity, is a **Fourth Amendment** violation. The superceding version of *Mendez*, however, upheld the legality of such questioning so long as the initial detention wasn’t unlawfully prolonged in the process. (*Id.*, at pp. 1079-1081.)

The U.S. Supreme Court finally rejected the Ninth Circuit’s unsupported conclusion that, absent “a *particularized reasonable suspicion* that an individual is not a citizen,” it is a **Fourth Amendment** violation to ask him or her about the subject’s citizenship (see *Mena v. City of Simi Valley* (9th Cir. 2003) 332 F.3rd 1255, 1264-1265; reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court in *Muehler v. Mena* (2005) 544 U.S. 93, 100-101 [161 L.Ed.2nd 299].)

The Ninth Circuit has since overruled its decisions in *Chavez-Valenzuela* and *Murillo*, finally recognizing the Supreme Court’s rulings to the contrary. (*United States v. Mendez* (9th Cir. 2007) 476 F.3rd 1077, 1079-1081.)

Questioning defendant/truck driver and asking for consent to search the vehicle, when the truck was initially stopped for no more than an administrative check of its paperwork, is not unconstitutional. (*United States v. Delgado* (9th Cir. 2008) 545 F.3rd 1195, 1205.)

In other cases, the Supreme Court has held: “Even when law enforcement officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may pose questions, ask for identification, and request consent to search luggage—provided they do not induce cooperation by coercive means.” (*United States v. Drayton* (2002) 536 U.S. 194 [153 L.Ed.2nd 242].); citing *Florida v. Bostic* (1991) 501 U.S. 429, 434-435 [115 L.Ed.2nd 389, 398-399].)

Most recently, in *Illinois v. Caballes* (2005) 543 U.S. 405 [160 L.Ed.2nd 842], the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the argument that

allowing a narcotics-sniffing dog to sniff around the outside of a vehicle that was lawfully stopped for a traffic offense “unjustifiably enlarge(s) the scope of a routine traffic stop into a drug investigation.” Per the Supreme Court: No expectation of privacy is violated by this procedure, and therefore does not implicate the **Fourth Amendment**.

However, if the dog-sniff is conducted after the purposes of the traffic stop are completed, and thus during an unlawfully prolonged detention, then it is illegal and the resulting evidence will be suppressed. (*Rodriguez v. United States* (Apr. 21, 2015) __ U.S. __ [135 S.Ct. 1609; 191 L.Ed.2nd 4927]; the dog’s alert to the presence of drugs being seven to eight minutes after the purposes of the traffic stop had been completed.)

“The seizure remains lawful only ‘so long as [unrelated] inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.’” (*Rodriguez v. United States, supra*, 135 S.Ct. at p. 1615; quoting *Arizona v. Johnson* (2009) 555 U.S. 323, 333 [172 L.Ed.2nd 694].)

Also, the U.S. Supreme Court recently rejected the Ninth Circuit’s unsupported conclusion that, absent “a *particularized reasonable suspicion* that an individual is not a citizen,” it is a **Fourth Amendment** violation to ask him or her about the subject’s citizenship. (See *Mena v. City of Simi Valley* (9th Cir. 2003) 332 F.3rd 1255, 1264-1265; reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court in *Muehler v. Mena* (2005) 544 U.S. 93 [161 L.Ed.2nd 299].)

It is not unlawful to ask about a firearm during a detention even if there is otherwise no evidence of the illegal use of a gun, so long as it does not prolong the detention. (*United States v. Basher* (9th Cir. 2011) 629 F.3rd 1161, 1166, fn. 3.)

California courts seem to be in line with these latest Supreme Court pronouncements on the issue: “Questioning during the routine traffic stop on a subject unrelated to the purpose of the stop is not itself a **Fourth Amendment** violation. Mere questioning is neither a search nor a seizure. [Citation.] While the traffic detainee is under no obligation to answer unrelated questions, the Constitution does not prohibit law enforcement officers from asking. [Citation.]” (*People v. Brown* (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 493, 499-500; see also *People v. Bell* (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 754, 767;

People v. Gallardo (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 234, 238; *People v. Tully* (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 981-982; and *People v. Gallardo* (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 234, 239; asking for consent to search during the time it would have taken to write the citation that was the original cause of the stop is legal, despite the lack of any evidence to believe there was something there to search for.)

Other federal circuit courts are in apparent accord: See *United States v. Cone* (10th Cir. Okla. 2017) 868 F.3rd 1150, where the court recognized that an officer's mission during a stop is not limited to determining whether to issue a ticket. Because traffic stops are potentially dangerous, the Supreme Court has held that officers may run computer checks for warrants and a motorist's criminal history. The court reasoned that if running a computer check of a driver's criminal history is justified, then simply asking the driver about that history is not unreasonable under the **Fourth Amendment**. Here, the court concluded that the information requested by the officer did not exceed the scope of what a computer check would have revealed. The court added that a driver's answer may not be as reliable as a computer check but the time involved is much shorter.

Taking Fingerprints: So long as there is a reasonable suspicion to detain an individual, it is lawful to also fingerprint the suspect on less than probable cause, at least if done at the scene and without transportation to a police station. (*Davis v. Mississippi* (1969) 394 U.S. 721 [22 L.Ed.2nd 676]; *Hayes v. Florida* (1985) 470 U.S. 811 [84 L.Ed.2nd 705]; *Virgle v. Superior Court* (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 572.)

Note: Transporting the subject to the police station for the purposes of taking fingerprints, at least if done without the subject's voluntary consent, will likely convert the contact into an arrest which will be held to be illegal absent full probable cause to arrest him. (See "*Transporting a Detainee*," under "*Detentions vs. Arrests*," above.)

Driving Under the Influence ("DUI") (alcohol and/or drugs) Cases:

Weaving: Observation of the defendant weaving within his traffic lane is sufficient cause to stop him to determine whether he is DUI or the vehicle has some unsafe mechanical defect. (*People v. Bracken* (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, weaving within his lane for half a mile; see also *People v. Perez* (1985) 175 Cal.App.3rd Supp. 8; weaving within his lane for three quarters of a mile.)

But see United States v. Colin (9th Cir. 2002) 314 F.3rd 439, where the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal held that weaving from lane line to lane line for 35 to 45 seconds is neither a violation of the lane straddling statute (V.C. § 21658(a)), nor reasonable suspicion that the driver may be under the influence; a questionable decision, and one that may probably be ignored by state law enforcement officers in light of *Bracken* and *Perez*.

A single pronounced weave within the lane, plus an experienced Highway Patrol officer's observation of the defendant sitting up close to the steering wheel, which the officer recognized as something an impaired driver does, was sufficient to corroborate second-hand information concerning defendant's "erratic driving" from Montana Department of Transportation employees, justifying the stop of the defendant's car. (*United States v. Fernandez-Castillo* (9th Cir. 2003) 324 F.3rd 1114.)

Question: DUI (and Other Regulatory "Special Needs")
Checkpoints: Are they legal?

Answer: Yes, if conducted according to specified criteria, and involve a "special needs," "regulatory" area of the law. (Ingersoll v. Palmer (1987) 43 Cal.3rd 1321; *Michigan State Police Dept. v. Sitz* (1990) 496 U.S. 444 [110 L.Ed.2nd 412].)

Note: See Birchfield v. North Dakota (June 23, 2016) __ U.S. __, __ [136 S.Ct. 2160; 195 L.Ed.2nd 560], for a historical review of the development of DUI statutes and the importance of obtaining a reading of the suspect's "BAC" ("Blood Alcohol Concentration").

Also Note: "DUI," is short for "Driving while Under the Influence" of alcohol and/or drugs. Similarly, "DWI," also commonly used, and used interchangeably, is short for "Driving While Intoxicated."

Reasonableness Requirement: Whether or not a "DUP" (or other regulatory) roadblock or checkpoint is lawful depends upon whether it meets the federal standard for reasonableness.

“*The federal test* for determining whether a detention or seizure is justified balances the public interest served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest and the severity of the interference with individual liberty. (*Brown v. Texas* (1979) 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 [61 L.Ed.2nd 357, 361-362, . . .].)” (*Emphasis added; People v. Banks* (1994) 6 Cal.4th 926; holding that failure to publicize a DUI roadblock was *not* necessarily fatal to its lawfulness, under *Brown v. Texas*.)

Factors Determining Predetermined Specified Criteria:

While standardless and unconstrained discretion on the part of government officers is prohibited; “stops and inspections for regulatory purposes, although without ‘*individualized suspicion,*’ may be permitted if undertaken pursuant to predetermined specified neutral criteria.” (*Italics added; Ingersoll v. Palmer, supra*, at p. 1335.) The factors identified in *Ingersoll* (at pp. 1341-1347) are whether:

- The decision to establish a sobriety checkpoint, the selection of the site, and the procedures for the operation of the checkpoint, are made and established by supervisory law enforcement personnel.
- Motorists are stopped according to a neutral formula, such as every third, fifth or tenth driver.
- Adequate safety precautions are taken, such as proper lighting, warning signs, and signals, and whether clearly identifiable official vehicles and personnel are used.
- The location of the checkpoint was determined by a policy-making official, and was reasonable; i.e., on a road having a high incidence of alcohol-related accidents or arrests.
- The time the checkpoint was conducted and its duration reflect “*good judgment*” on the part of law enforcement officials.

- The checkpoint exhibits indicia of its official nature (to reassure the public of the authorized nature of the stop).
- The average length and nature of the detention is minimized.
- The checkpoint is preceded by publicity.

Case Law:

A DUI checkpoint was upheld where the existence of supervisory control was indicated by documentary evidence that a sobriety checkpoint was planned for that date and by the fact that the checkpoint was staffed by seven police officers. Testimony that an officer was unaware of a neutral formula for stopping vehicles was not affirmative evidence overcoming the presumption of lawfulness. All 519 vehicles passing through the checkpoint were stopped, thus a neutral mathematical formula of 100 percent applied. The fact that the checkpoint was operated at a different location than given in a media advisory was insufficient to overcome the presumption as to decision making at the supervisory level or reasonable location. (*Arthur v. Department of Motor Vehicles* (2010) 184 Cal. App. 4th 1199.)

A DUI checkpoint was struck down where the People failed to sustain their burden of proof as to (i) the role of supervisory personnel in prescribing the procedures to be used at the checkpoint, (ii) the rationale for selecting the particular location used for the checkpoint, (iii) the length of detentions, and (iv) advance publicity. (*People v. Alvarado* (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th Supp. 13.)

Issue; Avoiding a DUI Checkpoint: Is the observed avoidance of a DUI checkpoint sufficient cause to conduct a traffic stop?

The federal Tenth Circuit Court of Appeal is of the opinion that it is not. The Court held that a driver's

decision to use a rural highway exit after passing drug checkpoint signs may be considered as one factor in an officer's reasonable suspicion determination, but it is not a sufficient basis, by itself, to justify a traffic stop. The court noted that an officer must identify additional suspicious circumstances or independently evasive behavior to justify stopping a vehicle that uses an exit after driving past ruse drug-checkpoint signs. (*United States v. Neff* (10th Cir. 2012) 681 F.3rd 1134.)

See also *United States v. Compton* (2nd Cir. 2016) 830 F.3rd 55: Purposely avoiding an immigration checkpoint, plus other suspicious circumstances (i.e., the proximity of the checkpoint to the border and the defendants' peculiar attempt to conceal their avoidance of the checkpoint by purchasing containers of peppers at the vegetable stand) was held to be sufficient to justify a detention.

Other Regulatory Checkpoints: Other than for DUI deterrence, roadblocks, checkpoints, and similar “*administrative, special needs*” searches have been approved in the following cases:

- *License and registration inspection checkpoints.* (*Delaware v. Prouse* (1979) 440 U.S. 648 [59 L.Ed.2nd 660]; *People v. Washburn* (1968) 265 Cal.App.2nd 665; *People v. Alvarez* (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155; *Merrett v. Moore* (11th Cir. 1996) 58 F.3rd 1547; *United States v. McFayden* (D.C. Cir. 1989) 865 F.2nd 1306; *United States v. Diaz-Albertini* (10th Cir. 1985) 772 F.2nd 654; *United States v. Lopez* (10th Cir. 1985) 777 F.2nd 543; *United States v. Obregon* (10th Cir. 1984) 748 F.2nd 1371; *United States v. Prichard* (10th Cir. 1981) 645 F.2nd 854.)
- *Border Patrol checkpoint inspections.* (*United States v. Martinez-Fuerte* (1976) 428 U.S. 543 [49 L.Ed.2nd 1116].)
- *Airport security searches.* (*People v. Hyde* (1974) 12 Cal.3rd 158.)
- *To regulate hunting licenses.* (*People v. Perez* (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1168.)

- *Agricultural inspection checkpoints.* (***People v. Dickinson*** (1980) 104 Cal.App.3rd 505.)
- *Vehicle mechanical inspection checkpoints.* (***People v. De La Torre*** (1967) 257 Cal.App.2nd 162.)
- *Security checkpoints at military bases.* (***United States v. Hawkins*** (9th Cir. 2001) 249 F.3rd 876, Air Force; ***United States v. Hernandez*** (9th Cir. 1984) 739 F.2nd 484, Marines.)
- *Sobriety checkpoints on a federal military base.* (***United States v. Dillon*** (D.Kan. 1997) 983 F.Supp. 1037; ***United States v. Ziegler*** (N.D. Cal. 1993) 831 F.Supp. 771.)
- *A forest service checkpoint for identification and registration, targeting what in the past has been a “uniquely disruptive event,” is not per se illegal.* (***Park v. Forest Service*** (8th Cir. 2000) 205 F.3rd 1034, 1040.)
- *Traffic safety checkpoints.* (***United States v. Trevino*** (7th Cir. 1996) 60 F.3rd 333.)
- *Checkpoint at the entrance to a prison parking lot.* (***Romo v. Champion*** (10th Cir. 1995) 46 F.3rd 1013.)
- *Checkpoint to “thwart an imminent terrorist attack or to catch a dangerous criminal who is likely to flee by way of a particular route.”* (see below; ***City of Indianapolis v. Edmond*** (2000) 531 U.S. 32 [146 L.Ed.2nd 333].)

See “*Drug Interdiction (or ‘Ordinary Criminal Wrongdoing’) Checkpoints,*” below.

- *Checkpoints set up for the purpose of collecting information from the public concerning a prior criminal act (i.e., a fatal “hit and run” in this case), when set up at the location of the prior criminal act, and exactly one week after it occurred. Such a roadblock was differentiated from the attempt to discovery “ordinary criminal wrongdoing,” as condemned in *Indianapolis v. Edmond, supra.* (***Illinois v. Lidster*** (2004) 540 U.S. 419 [157 L.Ed.2nd 843].)*

- An “*information station*” set up to provide park visitors with information concerning the rules of the park and be given a litter bag, where every vehicle was stopped. (*United States v. Faulkner* (9th Cir. 2006) 450 F.3rd 466.)
- A checkpoint set up for the purpose of *preventing illegal hunting in a national park*, justified by a legitimate concern for preservation of park wildlife, when confined to the park gate where visitors would expect to briefly stop anyway. (*United States v. Fraire* (9th Cir. 2009) 575 F.3rd 929.)
- Warrantless *searching of luggage* and other packages at selected entrances to New York’s subway system, in response to the possibility of terrorists entering the system with explosives. (*MacWade v. Kelly* (2nd Cir. 2006) 460 F.3rd 260.)

V.C. § 2814.1(a): A County Board of Supervisors is authorized by statute to establish a vehicle-inspection checkpoint to check for violations of V.C. §§ 27153 and 27153.5 (exhaust and excessive smoke violations).

V.C. § 2814.1(d): Motorcycle-only checkpoints are prohibited by statute.

Dual Purpose Checkpoints: Checkpoints may have a *dual-purpose*, such as the *interdiction of drugs* (but see below) and *enforcement of driver’s license and registration laws*. (*Merrett v. Moore* (11th Cir. 1995) 58 F.3rd 1547.)

Multiple Agency Checkpoints: Checkpoints may be attended by *more than one law enforcement agency*, despite the different interests involved. (*United States v. Barajas-Chavez* (10th Cir. 1999) 162 F.3rd 1285, New Mexico *DUI checkpoint* with Border Patrol present in case the police discovered *illegal aliens*; *United States v. Galindo-Gonzales* (10th Cir. 1998) 142 F.3rd 1217, *aliens found at state driver’s license and vehicle registration roadblock*.)

Drug Interdiction (or ‘Ordinary Criminal Wrongdoing’) Checkpoints:

Rule:

Earlier cases from lower appellate courts upheld the validity of drug interdiction checkpoints upon the

same reasoning as above. (See *Merrett v. Moore* (11th Cir. 1995) 58 F.3rd 1547; and *Missouri v. Damask* (1996) 936 S.W.2nd 565.)

However, the U.S. Supreme Court has since determined that “*drug interdiction*” checkpoints are *not* lawful. The difference is that *drug interdiction checkpoints*, rather than being “*regulatory*,” or involving some “*special need*,” are set up for the purpose of detecting “*ordinary criminal wrongdoing*.” As such, *drug interdiction checkpoints* require the standard **Fourth Amendment** “*individualized*” or “*particularized*” suspicion to be lawful. (*City of Indianapolis v. Edmond* (2000) 531 U.S. 32 [146 L.Ed.2nd 333].)

Exceptions:

The Supreme Court in *Edmond, supra*, intimated strongly that roadblocks in unusual circumstances of criminal wrongdoing might be constitutionally acceptable. “(T)here are circumstances that may justify a law enforcement checkpoint where the primary purpose would otherwise, but for some emergency, relate to ordinary crime control.” (*Id.*, at p. 44.)

For example, as the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted in its reversed decision in *Edmond* (see *Edmond v. Goldsmith* (7th Cir. 1999) 183 F.3rd 659, 662-663.), “the **Fourth Amendment** would almost certainly permit an appropriately tailored roadblock set up to thwart *an imminent terrorist attack* or *to catch a dangerous criminal* who is likely to flee by way of a particular route.” (Italics added; *City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, supra*, at p. 44 [146 L.Ed.2nd at p. 345].)

E.g.: See *United States v. Paetsch* (10th Cir. 2015) 782 F.3rd 1162; where barricading an intersection, thus preventing some 20 vehicles and 29 individuals from leaving the area for up to 30 minutes, was held to be lawful when in response to a bank robbery. The minimal intrusion on defendant’s right to leave

the area was held to be outweighed by the public's interest in apprehending a bank robber.

E.g.: See also *United States v. Arnold* (8th Cir. Ark. 2016) 835 F.3rd 833, where a road block, and the suspicionsless stop of defendant's vehicle, was upheld where officers had reliable information that implicated co-defendant Johnson in two armed bank robberies, indicating that he was fleeing from the second robbery, and where defendant's vehicle was stopped at the same time at a roadblock. Second, the officers knew the roadblock was likely to be effective because they had a description of Johnson's vehicle and knew the route he was travelling. Third, the public interest advanced by the roadblock outweighed defendant's individual *Fourth Amendment* interests. Finally, only five or six minutes elapsed from the time defendant was stopped at the roadblock until the officers identified him as a co-suspect in the second bank robbery, along with Johnson, and discovered the existence of an outstanding warrant for his arrest.

And see *Illinois v. Lidster* (2004) 540 U.S. 419 [157 L.Ed.2nd 843], where the U.S. Supreme Court held that a checkpoint set up for the purpose of collecting information from the public concerning a prior criminal act (i.e., a fatal "hit and run" in this case), when set up at the location of the prior criminal act, and exactly one week after it occurred. Such a roadblock was differentiated from the attempt to discover "*ordinary criminal wrongdoing*," as condemned in *Indianapolis v. Edmond*, *supra*.

Checkpoints on Indian Land by Indian Authorities:

A roadblock set up on a public right-of-way within tribal territory, lawful under Indian law and established on tribal authority, is permissible only to the extent that the suspicionless stop of non-Indians is limited to the amount of time, and the nature of the inquiry, that can establish whether or not the person stopped is an Indian. (*Bressi v. Ford* (9th Cir. 2009) 575 F.3rd 891, 896-897.)

Indian law enforcement officers, when also certified to enforce state laws, may set up DUI or other regulatory roadblocks (as opposed to merely checking other Indians pursuant to Tribal law) on Indian land. But such roadblocks must meet the constitutional requirements set by the Supreme Court (see above). (*Id.*, at p. 897.)

A *Field Interview* (“*F.I.*”) of a person suspected of criminal activity:

General Rule: Temporarily detaining a person for the purpose of verifying (or negating) the person’s possible connection with some criminal activity, based upon an articulable “*reasonable suspicion*” that the person may be involved in criminal activity, is lawful. (*Terry v. Ohio* (1968) 392 U.S. 1 [20 L.Ed.2nd 889]; In *re Tony C.* (1978) 21 Cal.3rd 888.)

Note: A “*field interview*” (or “*F.I.*”) is a standard law enforcement technique used to identify individuals and document their presence at a particular location at a particular time, discourage planned criminal activity, and note companions with whom the person is associating; information which sometimes becomes important and relevant in later investigations or prosecutions. Field interviews may be handled as a *consensual encounter* or, if a reasonable suspicion exists, a *detention*.

Absent the necessary “*reasonable suspicion*,” a detention is unlawful unless the contact is handled, as qualifies, as a “*consensual encounter*.” (See above, Chapter 2)

Examples:

Being in the area of a house for which there is only a speculative belief that it might be involved in drug activity, even when it is known that the person to be detained has a prior drug-related record and that there exists prior untested, unreliable information that the person *might* be involved in the sale of drugs, is *insufficient* cause to detain. (*People v. Pitts* (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 881.)

Spotlighting the defendant in a high narcotics area and then walking up to him “briskly” while asking questions held to be a detention under the circumstances. (*People v. Garry* (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1100.)

But see *People v. Lopez* (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 815, 825-826, holding that merely walking up to defendant and asking if she had any identification was *not* a detention even though defendant was attempting to walk away at the time.

Handcuffing a suspect after he gave an implausible explanation as to why he was in the area of a marijuana grow at 5:30 a.m., and finding clothing in his backpack that smelled like growing marijuana, was a lawful detention even though the detention lasted at least 4½ hours while officers attempted to find physical evidence at the scene connecting him to the marijuana grow. (*People v. Williams* (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 949.)

Gang Membership:

Membership in a street gang (absent evidence that the person has “knowledge that its members engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity, and [that the person] . . . willfully promotes, furthers, or assists in any felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang”) is not in and of itself a crime. (See **P.C. § 186.22(a)**) The practice of stopping, detaining, questioning, and perhaps photographing a suspected gang member, based solely upon the person’s suspected gang membership, is illegal. (*People v. Green* (1991) 227 Cal.App.3rd 692, 699-700; *People v. Rodriguez* (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 232, 239.)

The *Rodriguez* court noted that; “While this policy (of stopping and questioning all suspected gang members) may serve the laudable purpose of preventing crime, it is prohibited by the **Fourth Amendment.**” (*Id.*, at p. 239; citing *Brown v. Texas* (1979) 443 U.S. 47, 52 [61 L.Ed.2nd 357, 363].)

During Execution of a Search or Arrest Warrant, or during a Fourth Waiver Search:

An occupant of a house being subjected to a search pursuant to a *search warrant* may be detained during the search (1) in order to prevent flight, (2) to minimize the risk of harm to the officers, and (3) to facilitate an orderly search through cooperation of the

residents. (*Michigan v. Summers* (1981) 452 U.S. 692, 702-703 [69 L.Ed.2nd 340, 349-350]; *People v. Castillo* (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 414, 421-425.)

This includes those who otherwise are not necessarily involved in the suspected criminal activity. (*Bailey v. United States* (2013) 568 U.S. 186, 192-202 [133 S.Ct. 1031, 1037-1043; 185 L.Ed.2nd 19]; citing *Muehler v. Mena* (2005) 544 U.S. 93 [161 L.Ed.2nd 299].)

In *Muehler v. Mena*, *supra*, at p. 101, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the officers should have released Mena as soon as it became clear that she did not constitute an immediate threat, but noted that the detention "can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission." (See *Guillory v. Hill* (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 240, 250.)

Note, however, *Ybarra v. Illinois* (1979) 444 U.S. 85 [62 L.Ed.2nd 238], condemning the detention and patdown of everyone at the scene absent individualized evidence connecting each person so detained with the illegal activity being investigated.

The time allotted for the detention of the occupants of a residence does not, however, extend beyond the time it takes to execute the search warrant. Questioning the detainees is not part of the detention. Detaining and questioning that takes place beyond the execution of the warrant, therefore, constitutes an unlawfully prolonged detention. (*Guillory v. Hill* (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 240, 249-256.)

And, using an otherwise lawful detention during the execution of a search warrant as a tool with which to coerce the employees of a business to submit to interviews, conditioning their release on answering questions, is unlawful and a violation of the **Fourth Amendment**. (*Ganwich v. Knapp* (9th Cir. 2003) 319 F.3rd 1115.)

Officers acted reasonably by detaining a female occupant of a residence in handcuffs for two to three hours while a search was in progress, even though she was *not* the suspect the officers were looking for, given the fact that the search warrant sought weapons

and evidence of gang membership. (*Muehler v. Mena* (2005) 544 U.S. 93 [161 L.Ed.2nd 299].)

The justifications for detaining the occupants include:

- Preventing flight in the event that incriminating evidence is found;
- Minimizing the risk of harm to the officers; *and*
- Facilitating the orderly completion of the search while avoiding the use of force.
(*Id.*, at p. 98.)

Recognizing the inherent dangerousness in serving narcotics-related search warrants and the common use of weapons, particularly firearms, in such cases, if for no other reason than the officers' safety, anyone present at the scene of the execution of such a warrant who appears to have a "*close physical and functional association*" with the subjects of the search, may be temporarily detained while the person is identified and that possible association is investigated. (*People v. Samples* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1197; defendant driving the car listed in the search warrant, in the company of two people listed in the warrant, lawfully detained.)

The same rules apply to detaining occupants of a residence while serving an *arrest warrant*. (*People v. Hannah* (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1335.)

The Ninth Circuit disagrees with this theory, holding that the detention of an occupant of a house while executing an arrest warrant is unconstitutional. (*Sharp v. County of Orange* (9th Cir. 2017) 871 F.3rd 901, 912-913.)

Also, police may lawfully "briefly" detain visitors to a probationer's home while executing a "*Fourth Waiver*" search for purposes of identifying the visitors (as possible felons) and for the officers' safety. (*People v. Matelski* (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 837; *People v. Rios* (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 584, 593-595.)

A person merely approaching a house being searched, at least in the absence of any indication that the person has some connection with the illegal activity occurring in the house, may *not* be detained. (*People v. Gallant* (1990) 225 Cal.App.3rd 200, 203-204.)

But, a person who approaches a house being searched pursuant to a search warrant under circumstances either indicating some connection with the residence, or when his possible connection cannot be determined without a brief detention, may be detained long enough to investigate his connection with the illegal activity at the house and to ensure police safety during the search. (*People v. Glaser* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 363-374.)

However, once the subject has left the immediate vicinity of the place being searched, he is no longer subject to being detained, at least under the theory of *Michigan v. Summers* (1981) 452 U.S. 692 [69 L.Ed.2nd 340, 349-350] (above). (*Bailey v. United States* (2013) 568 U.S. 186, 192-202 [133 S.Ct. 1031, 1037-1043; 185 L.Ed.2nd 19]; restricting such detentions to occupants who are still in the “*immediate vicinity*” of the residence being searched. The detention of an occupant who had just left the residence, and was already about a mile away, held to be illegal, at least under the rule of *Summers*.)

Pending the Obtaining of a Search Warrant:

Securing a home from the outside, detaining the occupant on his own porch pending the obtaining of a warrant, was upheld by the United States Supreme Court. (*Illinois v. McArthur* (2001) 531 U.S. 326 [148 L.Ed.2nd 838].)

It is proper for the police to temporarily “*detain a residence*” from the outside, preventing people from entering, when there is a *reasonable suspicion* that contraband or evidence of a crime is inside, at least until the officers can determine through their investigation whether to seek a search warrant. (*People v. Bennett* (1998) 17 Cal.4th 373.)

Entering and securing a residence pending the obtaining of a search warrant was supported by exigent circumstances when officers received information that the occupant was about to destroy or remove contraband from the residence. (*United States v. Fowlkes* (9th Cir. 2015) 804 F.3rd 954, 969-971.)

The fact that it took about an hour to coordinate the officers necessary to make the warrantless entry and securing of defendant’s apartment was irrelevant; the exigency still existed. (*Id.*, at p. 971.)

See also *United States v. Dent* (1st Cir. Me. 2017) 867 F.3rd 37, where the court held that pending the obtaining of a search warrant, the securing of the residence, including doing a protective sweep during which illegal contraband was observed, did not affect the legality of the search warrant where there was no evidence that either the warrant or the decision to seek the warrant was based on anything the officers discovered during their warrantless entry. The court found that the process of applying for the search warrant had already been initiated based on other independent sources of information and that drugs observed under an air mattress were not included in the search warrant affidavit.

It is also lawful to *detain packages* and other containers. (*United States v. Hernandez* (9th Cir. 2002) 313 F.3rd 1206.) The rules generally parallel the requirements for detaining a person under *Terry v. Ohio* (1968) 392 U.S. 1 (See *United States v. Place* (1983) 462 U.S. 696 [77 L.Ed.2nd 110].).

When the container is a package that has been mailed, and the personal intrusion upon the intended recipient is less, the length of time the package may be detained is considerably longer than if taken from the defendant's person. In *Place*, for instance, the container was the defendant's luggage taken from him at an airport. The Supreme Court held that 90 minutes was *too long*. In contrast, the *Hernandez* case, where a 22-hour delay was upheld, cites prior authority where holding onto a mailed package for up to six days was approved.

Detentions Away from the Place being Searched:

Reversing the Second Circuit Court of Appeal (See *United States v. Bailey* (2nd Cir. 2011) 652 F.3rd 197.), where the defendant wasn't detained until after driving at least a mile from his home, and resolving a split of authority among other circuits, the United States Supreme Court held that *Michigan v. Summers* (1981) 452 U.S. 692 [69 L.Ed.2nd 340, 349-350], does not permit the detention of occupants beyond the immediate vicinity of the premises which is the subject of a search warrant, at least when the sole reason for the detention is that the person's home was about to be searched. If police officers elect to detain an individual after he leaves the immediate vicinity of the premises being searched, that detention

must be justified by some other rationale. (*Bailey v. United States* (2013) 568 U.S. 186, 192-202 [133 S.Ct. 1031; 185 L.Ed.2nd 19].)

Detention Examples, in General:

After questioning a person at an airport, a detention was held to be lawful where the name given to police was different than that put on checked luggage, with no documentary proof of identity, while traveling to a faraway city known for receiving narcotics, plus other suspicious circumstances. (*People v. Daugherty* (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 275.)

Carrying an ax on a bicycle at 3:00 a.m. is reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justifying a detention for investigation. (*People v. Foranyic* (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 186.)

Detaining a person on school grounds for purposes of investigating the lawfulness of his presence there, as an “*administrative search*,” is lawful. (*In re Joseph F.* (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 501.)

An Anchorage, Alaska, Municipal Code ordinance forbidding any item affixed to the windshield (similar to California’s V.C. § 26708(a)(1); see *People v. White* (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 636.) was not violated by an air freshener dangling from the rear view mirror. A traffic stop was found to be illegal. (*United States v. King* (9th Cir. 2001) 244 F.3rd 736, 740.)

A traffic stop for a violation of V.C. § 26708(a) was held to be *illegal* in *People v. White, supra.*, where insufficient evidence was presented in court of an obstruction of the driver’s view caused by an air freshener dangling from the rearview mirror, but *legal* in *People v. Colbert* (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1068, where the officer was able to testify why he believed the driver’s view was obstructed by the same type of object and the defense failed to present any evidence to the contrary.

Observing defendant break traction for about 20 to 25 feet, lasting about 2 seconds, was sufficient cause to suspect a violation of V.C. § 23109(c), exhibition of speed. (*Brierton v. Department of Motor Vehicles* (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 499, 509-510.)

Seeing three vehicles with four Black male occupants each, one of the occupants who is known to be a gang member, driving as if in military formation at 12:30 at night, hours after a prior gang shooting, the vehicles being in one of the warring Black gang’s territory, held to be *insufficient* to justify a stop and detention. (*People v. Hester* (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 376, 385-392.)

Where the defendant was confronted by six officers, all surrounding him, with five of them in uniform with visible firearms, in an area shielded from public view (an apartment hallway), where his request to shut the door to his room was denied, he was patted down for weapons, he was told three times that he was subject to arrest for failing to register (thus implying a need to cooperate should he wish to avoid the specter of arrest), and where he was never told that he was free to leave, a reasonable person in defendant's position at the time would *not* have believed that he was free to terminate the contact. (*United States v. Washington* (9th Cir. 2004) 387 F.3rd 1060, 1068-1069; finding that defendant's detention was "more intrusive than necessary" and that upon his denial of anything illegal in his room, the detention became illegal.)

A stop and detention based upon stale information concerning a threat, which itself was of questionable veracity, and with little if anything in the way of suspicious circumstances to connect the persons stopped to that threat, is illegal. (*People v. Durazo* (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 728; The threat was purportedly from Mexican gang members, and defendant was a Mexican male who (with his passenger) glanced at the victim's apartment as he drove by four days later, where the officer admittedly was acting on his "gut feeling" that defendant was involved.)

Stopping the plaintiff, an African-American male, a half mile away while driving a gray car in the direction of a witness's house, 30 minutes after the witness called police to report that he had just been warned by a friend that two African-American males were coming to his house to do him harm and that he had just seen two such males driving by in a gray or black car, was held to be a lawful stop based upon a reasonable suspicion that the plaintiff was possibly one of the suspects. (*Flowers v. Fiore* (1st Cir. 2004) 359 F.3rd 24.)

Observation of a truck that matched the description of one that had just been stolen in a carjacking, but with a different license plate that appeared to be recently attached, and with two occupants who generally matched the suspects' description, constituted the necessary reasonable suspicion to justify the defendant's detention. (*United States v. Hartz* (9th Cir. 2006) 458 F.3rd 1011, 1017-1018.)

A search and seizure condition justifies a detention without a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. (*People v. Viers* (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 990, 993-994; defendant stopped and detained in his vehicle.)

A "knock and talk" at the defendant's motel room justified the eventual detention of defendant when (1) the officers had some limited information

from an earlier traffic stop that defendant might be involved in the manufacturing of methamphetamine, including the presence of a pressure cooker which the officer knew could be used in the manufacturing of methamphetamine; (2) a roommate took a full two minutes to open the motel room door while the officers could hear noises like people moving things around inside; (3) when defendant was contacted, he acted extremely nervous, contrary to how he had acted during a previous contact by the same officers; and (4) the roommate admitted to being a methamphetamine user and that other people had visited the room the night before. (*United States v. Crapser* (9th Cir. 2007) 472 F.3rd 1141, 1147-1149.)

Observing defendant sitting in a parked motor vehicle late at night near the exit to a 7-Eleven store parking lot with the engine running, despite prior knowledge of a string of recent robberies at 7-Elevens, held *not* to be sufficient to justify a detention and patdown. (*People v. Perrusquia* (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 228.)

Spotlighting the defendant in a high narcotics area and then walking up to him “briskly” while asking questions held to be an unlawful detention under the circumstances. (*People v. Garry* (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1100.)

Voluntarily going with the police to the police station, where he was interviewed as a possible witness, and not a suspect, where nothing was ever done or said to indicate otherwise at least up until his arrest, was not an unlawful detention. (*People v. Zamudio* (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 341-346.)

Observation by an officer trained as a “drug recognition expert” of defendant apparently asleep in his vehicle in a drugstore parking lot, at 8:00 p.m., with the parking lights on, knowing that people who are under the influence of drugs tend to fall “asleep quickly, inappropriately, and sometimes uncontrollably,” and then noticing that he was breathing faster than usual, and, when awakened, finding defendant to be irritable, aggressive, and overly assertive—all indications of someone under the influence of drugs—held to be sufficient cause to detain him. (*Ramirez v. City of Buena Park* (9th Cir. 2009) 560 F.3rd 1012, 1016-1018, 1020-1021.)

Observing defendant standing near the open trunk of a car, which he immediately shut upon the approach of the officers and walk away, while appearing nervous, when combined with the officer’s plain sight observations of exposed wires in the vehicle where the door panel and the stereo trim had been removed, with tools such as screwdrivers and pliers lying around, was more than enough reasonable suspicion to justify the

defendant's detention. (*People v. Osborne* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1058.)

With personal knowledge that someone had been illegally shooting a firearm and had an illegal campfire in the area of defendant's campsite, contacting and detaining defendant at the campsite the following morning was lawful. (*United States v. Basher* (9th Cir. 2011) 629 F.3rd 1161, 1165-1166.)

Where a robbery had just occurred in the vicinity with the suspect and vehicle description, although not perfect, very close, and with defendant having just parked his car "weirdly," not quite at the curb, with a door left open, and defendant apparently attempting to separate himself from his car, the officers had a reasonable suspicion to detain defendant. (*People v. Leath* (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 344, 354-355.)

Anonymous Information:

Rule: An *anonymous tip*, absent corroborating circumstances, does *not* constitute a "reasonable suspicion" nor justify a detention. (*Alabama v. White* (1990) 496 U.S. 325, 331 [110 L.Ed.2nd 301, 309]; *In re Cody S.* (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 86.)

Patdown for Weapons:

An *anonymous tip* concerning a person carrying a firearm does *not* justify a *patdown* for weapons (nor a *detention* for that purpose). There is no such thing as a "*firearms exception*" to this rule. (*Florida v. J.L.* (2000) 529 U.S. 266 [146 L.Ed.2nd 254]; see also *People v. Jordan* (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 544, 562-564.)

However, being familiar with the tipster's voice, and knowing that he has provided reliable information in the past, *might* be enough. (*People v. Jordan, supra*, at pp. 560-661.)

But note: The U.S. Supreme Court, in dicta, hints that had the anonymous tipster been warning of something more dangerous, such as a bomb, a *patdown* based upon this tip alone might be upheld. The Court also indicated that certain areas where there is a lessened expectation of privacy, such as in an airport or on school grounds, may also be an exception to this rule. (*Florida v. J.L., supra*, at p. 273-274 [146 L.Ed.2nd at p. 262].)

The victim of an assault by a person with a deadly weapon called 911, gave his name (that could not be verified), but claimed to not know the phone number from which he was calling and hesitated to give his

location. Under these circumstances, it was held to be sufficient reasonable suspicion to detain and pat defendant down for weapons. The Court held that this was not “*truly anonymous*” in that he gave a name, called 911 concerning a crime that had just occurred, likening it to a “*spontaneous declaration*,” and reported a crime about which he had obvious firsthand knowledge, all giving the information the “*indicia of reliability*.” (*United States v. Terry-Crespo* (9th Cir. 2004) 356 F.3rd 1170.)

Sufficient corroboration was found, justifying a patdown for weapons, when the anonymous information came from two separate informants, where the tips were close in time, the informants contacted the officer personally (thus putting their anonymity at risk), and the setting was a crowded throng of celebrants at a New Year’s Eve street party, thus increasing the dangerousness of the situation. (*People v. Coulombe* (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 52.)

Detentions in Highly Dangerous Situations:

Noting the U.S. Supreme Court’s reference in *Florida v. J.L.*, *supra*, to exceptions in highly dangerous situations, California’s Fifth District Court of Appeal ruled that officers lawfully stopped defendant on information from an anonymous tipster who reported that defendant was driving to his wife’s house for the purpose of shooting her. The lawfulness of the stop was based upon the dangerousness of the situation when combined with some weak corroboration which, by itself, might not have been enough to justify stopping defendant’s vehicle. (*People v. Castro* (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 486.)

See also *People v. Wells* (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1078, at page 1087, where the California Supreme Court differentiated *J.L.* from a DUI case noting that among other factors: “(A) report of a possibly intoxicated highway driver, ‘weaving all over the roadway,’ poses a far more grave and immediate risk to the public than a report of mere passive gun possession.”

An anonymous call concerning a DUI driver weaving all over the road, the tipster correctly providing a detailed description of the vehicle, its location and direction of travel, given the dangerousness of leaving a drunk driver on the street, held to be sufficient “*reasonable suspicion*” to stop the vehicle and check its driver. (*Id.*, citing *United States v. Wheat* (8th Cir. 2001) 278 F.3rd 722, and noting, among other factors (see below), the exigency involved in a DUI case.)

In *Wells*, the California Supreme Court listed four factors to consider, justifying the stop of a DUI suspect based upon anonymous information:

- The exigency of a DUI driver loose on the road, with all the damage they do, justifies an immediate law enforcement response. “(A) report of a possibly intoxicated highway driver, ‘weaving all over the roadway,’ poses a far more grave and immediate risk to the public than a report of mere passive gun possession (as occurred in *Florida v. J.L.*).”
- A report from a citizen describing a contemporaneous event of reckless driving, presumably viewed by the caller, adds to the reliability of the information and reduces the likelihood that the caller is merely harassing an enemy.

See also *United States v. Avilas-Vega* (1st Cir. 2015) 783 F.3rd 69; where an anonymous tip under circumstances that appeared to be from a concerned citizen reporting a direct observation of a crime concerning two subjects passing around a pistol in a vehicle held to be sufficient reasonable suspicion to justify a traffic stop and a patdown of the subjects.

- The level of intrusion upon one’s personal privacy (in a place with a reduced expectation of privacy) and the inconvenience involved in a brief vehicle stop is considerably less than an “embarrassing police search” on a public street (as occurred in *Florida v. J.L.*).
- Reliability is added by the relatively precise and accurate description given by the tipster regarding the vehicle type, color, location and direction of travel.

A CHP officer stopped defendant shortly after an anonymous 911 caller reported that she had been run off the road by a pickup truck that fit the description of the truck the defendant was driving. He arrested defendant (and his passenger) after smelling marijuana, searched the truck, and found 30 pounds of marijuana in the truck. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the marijuana arguing that the officer who searched his truck lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a stop. The motion was denied. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the traffic stop complied with the **Fourth Amendment** because, under the totality of the circumstances, the

officer had a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was intoxicated. The behavior described by the 911 caller, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amounted to a reasonable suspicion of drunk driving. (*Navarette v. California* (Apr. 22, 2014) 572 U.S. ___ [134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687-1692; 188 L.Ed.2nd 680].)

With the Court assuming for the sake of argument that the 911 call constituted an anonymous tip: “By reporting that she had been run off the road by a specific vehicle—a silver Ford F-150 pickup, license plate 8D94925—the caller necessarily claimed eyewitness knowledge of the alleged dangerous driving. That basis of knowledge lends significant support to the tip’s reliability.” (*Id.*, 134 S. Ct. at p. 1689.)

“[An informant’s] explicit and detailed description of alleged wrongdoing, along with a statement that the event was observed firsthand, entitles his tip to greater weight than might otherwise be the case” (*Ibid*; citing *Illinois v. Gates* (1983) 462 U.S. 213, 234 [76 L.Ed.2nd 527].)

An anonymous tipster describing defendant’s reckless driving, giving a specific location and a detailed description of the car, the driver and the driver’s actions, was held to be sufficient to provide the necessary indicia of reliability to justify a traffic stop. (*Lowry v. Gutierrez* (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 926.)

Note: The Court, however, also noted that the defendant’s potential liability here was no more than a driver’s license suspension, as opposed to a criminal prosecution, allowing for a lesser standard of “*reasonable suspicion*.” It is unknown whether the Court would have applied the same standards had the consequences been a potential criminal prosecution and conviction instead.

A stop and detention of a suspect based upon an anonymous call was held to be justified where the tipster alleged a dangerous or potentially violent situation, the alleged crime had just occurred, the suspect would have left if not detained, and there is no reason to doubt the tipster’s veracity. (*People v. Rodgers* (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1560.)

An anonymous tipster calling in, in an excited state, to report that defendant had just pointed a gun at him, giving detailed information concerning the defendant’s description and his location, was held to be sufficient where the call was recorded, he called back a second time to correct the color of the car in which defendant was sitting, gave a first

name, and stuck around long enough to insure that defendant was still there. The officers responded within 2 to 3 minutes and found the scene as the tipster described it. Defendant's detention and the warrantless search of the vehicle for the gun was upheld. (*People v. Dolly* (2007) 40 Cal.4th 458, 463-471; i.e., "[A] firsthand, contemporaneous description of the crime as well as an accurate and complete description of the perpetrator and his location, the details of which were confirmed within minutes by the police when they arrived." *Id.*, at p. 468.)

Anonymous information reporting a dangerous circumstance involving a gun, then occurring, with an accurate description of the suspect and his location which is quickly verified, constitutes sufficient reasonable suspicion to stop, detain, and patdown the suspect. (*People v. Lindsey* (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1390.)

A late night radio call concerning two specifically described males causing a disturbance, with one possibly armed, in a known gang area at an address where a call concerning a daytime shooting days earlier resulted in the recovery of two firearms, and where the described males are found within minutes of the call, is sufficient to justify a detention. (*In re Richard G.* (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1252, 1257-1258.)

An anonymous tip concerning a man who had been shooting at passing vehicles was held to be sufficient to justify a detention when the officers responded within five minutes of the reported incident, observed defendant who closely matched a detailed description of the suspect, and contacted him with guns drawn. Legitimate safety concerns justified the officers' drawing their weapons, ordering defendant to his knees and handcuffing him. Second, the court held the information provided by the anonymous 911 caller was sufficiently reliable to provide the officers reasonable suspicion to conduct a *Terry* stop on defendant. Although he was anonymous, the caller reported firsthand information concerning an ongoing emergency while providing a detailed description of the suspect and location of the incident. (*United States v. Edwards* (9th Cir. 2014) 761 F.3rd 977, 981-982.)

Detentions with Sufficient Corroboration:

Corroboration of an anonymous tip sufficient to justify a detention and/or patdown for weapons can take various forms, such as:

- An accurate prediction of a suspect's future activity (i.e., "*predictive information*;" see above) by the tipster.

- Seemingly innocent activity when the anonymous tip casts the activity in a suspicious light.
- Presence of the person about whom the tip relates in a “*high crime area*.”
- Verification of details provided by the tipster through police observation or other sources.

(*People v. Ramirez* (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1608, 1613-1620.)

Potential accountability may help to corroborate an informant’s information as well, such “*accountability*” being in the form of:

- The ability of authorities to identify the informant;
- The consequences the informant is likely to experience as a result of providing false information; *and*
- The informant’s perception of these factors.

(*People v. Jordan* (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 544, 561-562.)

An in-person informant, even though unidentified, supplies the necessary indicia of reliability for two reasons:

- An in-person informant risks losing anonymity and being held accountable for a false tip.
- When a tip is made in-person, an officer can observe the informant’s demeanor and determine whether the informant seems credible enough to justify immediate police action without further questioning.

(*United States v. Palos-Marquez* (9th Cir. 2010) 591 F.3rd 1272; with information corroborated by a Border Patrol Agent’s own personal observations and knowledge of the area.)

The Court in *J.L.* also discussed briefly “*predictive information*” which may supply the necessary corroboration, such as being able to correctly describe future actions of the suspect. Also, other unconnected anonymous informants, or anything that would add the element of credibility to the information, might sufficiently corroborate the

anonymous informant. (*Florida v. J.L.*, *supra*, at pp. 271 (concurring opinion), 275-276 [146 L.Ed.2nd 260, 263-264].)

A single pronounced weave within the lane, plus an experienced Highway Patrol officer's observation of the defendant sitting up close to the steering wheel, which the officer recognized as something an impaired driver does, was sufficient to corroborate second-hand information concerning defendant's "erratic driving" from Montana Department of Transportation employees, justifying the stop of the defendant's car. (*United States v. Fernandez-Castillo* (9th Cir. 2003) 324 F.3rd 1114.)

An anonymous tip of drug dealing occurring from a particularly described vehicle at a particular location was corroborated by a trained law enforcement officer's observation of what appeared to be a hand-to-hand drug transaction, justifying a detention of the vehicle's occupant. (*People v. Butler* (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 150, 159-162.)

Even though the original source of the information that defendant intended to shoot the victim was unknown, the tipster himself was known to the police as was the defendant himself. The information was also corroborated by other information that defendant had threatened a high school coach and that the threats were taken seriously by the coaches who all escorted their families out of the stadium after the game. Further, defendant was seen by the police outside the stadium where he was observed attempting to avoid contact with the police. The totality of the circumstances justified the detention (and even the handcuffing) of the defendant. (*People v. Turner* (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 151, 164-170.)

See also *United States v. Edwards* (9th Cir. 2014) 761 F.3rd 977, 981-982; above.

Illegal Detentions; Examples:

An uncorroborated tip concerning contraband in a vehicle without any indication of "*inside personal knowledge*" is insufficient to justify a traffic stop of that vehicle (*United States v. Morales* (9th Cir. 2001) 252 F.3rd 1070.) or a detention of its driver. (*People v. Saldana* (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 170; tip that the driver had a gun and cocaine in the vehicle.)

The fact that the *physical description of a suspect* is very specific, when reported by an anonymous tipster to have a gun in his pocket, but where that physical description would be visible to anyone, does not sufficiently corroborate the tipster's information. Absent at least some suspicious circumstances observed by the responding police officers, finding the person described by the tipster does not create a reasonable suspicion

justifying a detention or a patdown for weapons. (*People v. Jordan* (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 544, 553-652; the quick confirmation of the physical description of the defendant and his location, by itself, is legally insufficient.)

A tip forwarded by FBI agents to a local law enforcement officer “that he ‘might want to pay particular attention to a certain house’ in Tucson because there was ‘suspicion that there was a possibility that there might be some narcotics’ there” did not constitute sufficient reasonable suspicion to justify a stop of a vehicle coming from that house even though the tip had been corroborated by hearing “thumps” from the garage which the officer believed was someone loading something into the vehicle. Neither the source nor the specifics of the FBI’s tip were ever identified or explained. (*United States v. Thomas* (9th Cir. 2000) 211 F.3rd 1186.)

An anonymous tip, even when corroborated by a generally matching (albeit unique) suspect description (i.e., 6’1”, 200-pound black male with the same first name), was found to be *not enough* for a finding in civil court that, “*as a matter of law,*” there was a “*reasonable belief*” a wanted suspect was both a co-resident and was presently at a particular residence. (*Watts et al. v. County of Sacramento et al.* (9th Cir. 2001) 256 F.3rd 886.)

An anonymous 911-hangup call, traceable to a particular motel, but without sufficient information to determine which room the call may have come from, did not allow for the non-consensual entry into the defendant’s room merely because of the suspicious attempts by the person who answered the door to keep the officers from looking inside, and her apparent lies concerning no one else being there. (*United States v. Deemer* (9th Cir. 2004) 354 F.3rd 1130.)

Knock and Talks:

The information motivating an officer to conduct a residential knock and talk may be from an anonymous tipster. There is no requirement that officers corroborate anonymous information before conducting a knock and talk. (*People v. Rivera* (2007) 41 Cal.4th 304.)

To Establish Probable Cause:

Anonymous information demonstrating a knowledge of inside information, describing ongoing criminal activity, and sufficiently corroborated, will justify the issuance of a search warrant. (*United States v. Jennen* (9th Cir. 2010) 596 F.3rd 594, 598-600; where an anonymous tip corroborated by a controlled buy was sufficient to establish probable cause for a search warrant.)

To corroborate the anonymous tip, there must be found to be additional evidence that shows the tip is reliable. For instance:

- The tip must provide a “range of details,” *and*
- The future movements of the suspect must be corroborated by independent police observation. (*Id.*, at p. 598.)

In *Illinois v. Gates* (1983) 462 U.S. 213 [76 L.Ed.2nd 527], anonymous information reflecting inside, predictive behavior, corroborated in numerous respects through a police follow-up investigation, was determined to constitute *probable cause* (referred to as a “*fair probability*”) when considering the “*totality of the circumstances,*” justifying the issuance of a search warrant.

In Prison or Jail:

An anonymous tip that a particular prisoner is in possession of contraband was held to be sufficient cause to do a visual, clothed or unclothed, body cavity search. (*People v. Collins* (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 137.)

California Code of Regulations, Title 15, § 3287(b), allows for a visual search of an inmate, clothed or unclothed, whenever there is a “*substantial reason* to believe the inmate may have unauthorized or dangerous items concealed on his or her person.” (Italics added) Judicial authorization (i.e., a search warrant), and the use of “medical personnel in a medical setting,” is only required in the case of a “*physical* (as opposed to a non-contact *visual*) *body cavity search.*” In *Collins*, a visual inspection of the defendant’s rectal area was intended, for which it is generally accepted that the rigorous requirements of the more intrusive “*physical body cavity search*” is not required.

Detentions Involving Minors:

Minors on Campus:

By School Officials:

School officials have the power to stop a minor/student on campus in order to ask questions or conduct an investigation even in the absence of a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or a violation of school rules, so long as this authority is not exercised in an

arbitrary, capricious, or harassing manner. (*In re Randy G.* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 556.)

California follows the federal rule on this issue, as described in *New Jersey v. T.L.O.* (1985) 469 U.S. 325 [83 L.Ed.2nd 720], when applying the protections of the California Constitution. (*In re William G.* (1985) 40 Cal.3rd 550, 564.)

New Jersey v. T.L.O., *supra*, allows for warrantless searches by school officials so long as the search is “reasonable.” (e.g., a “reasonable suspicion?”)

In re William G., *supra*, at p. 564, specifically defines this standard as a “reasonable suspicion,” holding that searches by school officials are lawful so long as the official has “a reasonable suspicion that the student or students to be searched have engaged, or are engaging, in a proscribed activity (that is, a violation of a school rule or regulation, or a criminal statute).”

The search of a student by a school administrator requires only that there be a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or a violation of school rules. The extent of law enforcement’s involvement, evaluating the totality of the circumstances, must be considered when determining whether law enforcement’s probable cause standards apply. Finding that; “the police role in the search of appellant was at all times clearly subordinate to the role of the vice-principal, who made the decision to search and conducted the search,” a vice principal’s search of a student’s locker was upheld under the *T.L.O.* standard despite the fact that the information came from law enforcement and officers stood by for safety reasons as the vice principal conducted the search. (*In re K.S.* (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 72.)

Random metal detector searches of students, without any individualized suspicion, are justified by the “special needs” of keeping weapons off campuses. The **Fourth Amendment** is not violated by such searches where the government need is great, the intrusion on the individual is limited, and a more rigorous standard of suspicion is unworkable. (*In re Latasha W.* (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1524.)

Detaining a person on school grounds for purposes of investigating the lawfulness of his presence there, as an “administrative search,” is lawful. (*In re Joseph F.* (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 501.)

See *In re Cody S.* (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 86, holding that upon requiring the minor, pursuant to school rules, to vacate his gym locker when pulled out of gym class at the request of the “school safety officer,” the minor lost any expectation of privacy in the gym locker, and that this procedure *did not* constitute a search of that locker. Also, admitting that he had a knife in his backpack supplied the necessary “*reasonable suspicion*” for a warrantless search of his backpack.

The suspicionless search of a student was upheld where it was conducted pursuant to an established policy applying to all students and was consistent with the type of action on the part of a school administrator that fell well within the definition of “*special needs*” of a governmental agency. The search was of a limited nature, being told only to empty out his pockets, as he was not subjected to physical touching of his person nor was he exposed to the intimate process required for a urine sample necessary for drug testing. The purpose of the search was to prevent the introduction of harmful items (weapons and drugs) into the school environment. Given the general application of the policy to all students engaged in a form of rule violation that could easily lend itself to the introduction of drugs or weapons into the school environment (i.e., leaving during the school day without permission and returning later), further individualized suspicion was not required. (*In re Sean A.* (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 182, 186-190.)

But see the dissent (pgs. 191-198) criticizing the decision as a non-particularized, suspicionless search of a student in violation of the principles of *New Jersey v. T.L.O.* (1985) 469 U.S. 325 [83 L.Ed.2nd 720], where the Supreme Court held that a reasonable suspicion is required. (See above)

By School Resource Officers:

A “*school resource officer*,” although employed by a municipal police department, need only comply with the relaxed search and seizure standards applicable to school officials, when working on campus helping to enforce school rules as well as Penal Code violations. (*In re William V.* (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1464; see also *In re Alexander B.* (1990) 220 Cal.App.3rd 1572, 1577-1578.)

A Los Angeles Police Department officer, assigned to a high school, detaining and patting down minors on the school campus who were unable to satisfactorily identify themselves is lawful

despite the lack of even a reasonable suspicion that the minors may be armed. (*In re Jose Y.* (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 748.)

No **Fourth Amendment** violation occurred when defendant, a minor, was detained at school by an officer designated as a school resource officer and a back-up officer. Prior to the detention at issue, the resource officer received a report from a vice principal that a male student had a gun. Having the principal remove defendant from class, and then the officer grabbing defendant's backpack and putting him in handcuffs as a safety measure, was reasonable under the circumstances. A warrantless search of the defendant's person was justified at its inception by an anonymous tip from another student who sent a text to the vice principal, saying that there was "a guy with a loaded gun" on campus, and in response to questions, that a video showed a student sitting in a classroom, displaying a gun and a magazine clip, and that she knew who the suspect was, even though she did not know his name. The vice principal's physical description of him as one of two students, with the tipster identifying defendant as the one with the gun, was sufficient to justify defendant's detention and search. (*In re K.J.* (2018) 18 Cal.App.5th 1123, 1128-1135.)

Other Law Enforcement Officers:

It is an open question whether municipal police officers, called onto a school campus at the request of school administrators, are entitled to adopt the relaxed search and seizure standards applicable to school officials. (*C.B. v. City of Sonora* (9th Cir. 2014) 769 F.3rd 1005, 1023-1024; but see *In re K.S.* (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 72, above.)

As noted in *City of Sonora, supra*, two other federal circuits have held that law enforcement, when called to a school situation, may rely upon the relaxed "reasonableness" standard while on the school's campus. (See *Gray ex rel. Alexander v. Bostic* (11th Cir. 2006) 458 F.3rd 1295, 1303; and *Shade v. City of Farmington* (8th Cir. 2002) 309 F.3rd 1054, 1060-1061.)

Minors Violating Curfew:

Minors violating curfew may be stopped, detained, and transported to a curfew center, the police station, or other facility where the minor can await the arrival of a parent or other responsible adult. A search of the

minor prior to placing him in a curfew center with other children is also reasonable. (*In re Ian C.* (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 856.)

But see discussion, below (“*Minors and Curfew*,” under “*Arrests*” (Chapter 4), below), referring to the taking of a minor into custody for a curfew violation as an “*arrest*.” (*In re Justin B.* (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 879; *In re Charles C.* (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 420.)

Miranda:

People who have been temporarily detained for investigation are generally *not* “*in custody*” for purposes of *Miranda* (*Miranda v. Arizona* (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2nd 694].), at least as a general rule, and do not have to be warned of their constitutional rights prior to questioning. (*People v. Manis* (1969) 268 Cal.App.2nd 653, 669; *People v. Breault* (1990) 223 Cal.App.3rd 125, 135; *People v. Clair* (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 675.)

But see *People v. Pilster* (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1395, at page 1406, where it was noted that “*custody*” for purposes of *Miranda*, under the **Fifth Amendment**, involves a different analysis than “*custody*” for purposes of a detention or arrest under the **Fourth Amendment**. “In contrast (to **Fourth Amendment**, search and seizure issues), **Fifth Amendment Miranda** custody claims do not examine the reasonableness of the officer’s conduct, but instead examine whether a reasonable person (in the defendant’s position) would conclude the restraints used by police were tantamount to a formal arrest.”

Refusal to answer questions during a detention does not, by itself, establish probable cause to arrest, but may be one factor to consider, so long as the refusal to answer questions is not interpreted as a **Fifth Amendment** self-incrimination invocation. (See *People v. Clair* (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 662.)

Note: The not uncommon occurrence on many television shows where an uncooperative witness or victim is threatened by police with being taken to the police station for questioning does not correctly reflect the law. Such a transportation, if unconsented to and absent probable cause, would be illegal as an arrest without probable cause. (See “*Transporting a Detainee*,” under “*Detentions vs. Arrests*,” above)

Use of Force:

Rule: A peace officer may use that amount of force that is reasonably necessary under the circumstances in order to enforce a lawful detention. (*In re Tony C.* (1978) 21 Cal.3rd 888, 895; *In re Gregory S.* (1980) 112 Cal.App.3rd 764, 778.)

Factors:

In determining the reasonableness of using force during a detention, the court must take into consideration the following factors:

- The severity of the suspected crime;
- Whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others;
- Whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade the officers by flight;
- Whether the detention during a search was unnecessarily painful, degrading or prolonged (*Graham v. Connor* (1989) 490 U.S. 386, 395-396 [104 L.Ed.2nd 443, 455-456].), or whether it involved an undue invasion of privacy. (*Franklin v. Foxworth* (9th Cir. 1994) 31 F.3rd 873, 876; see also *Mendoza v. City of West Covina* (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 702, 712.)

The factors considered under Tennessee v. Garner (1985) 471 U.S. 1, 9-12 [85 L.Ed.2nd 1] are:

- The immediacy of the threat;
- Whether force was necessary to safeguard officers or the public; and
- Whether officers administered a warning, assuming it was practicable.

(See also *George v. Morris* (9th Cir. 2013) 736 F.3rd 829, 837.)

Factors to consider when a medical emergency (e.g., plaintiff going into diabetic shock) is the cause of a plaintiff's physical resistance: As determined by the federal Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in *Estate of Hill v. Miracle* (6th Cir. Mich. 2017) 853 F.3rd 306, the following factors apply:

- Was the person experiencing a medical emergency that rendered him incapable of making a rational decision under circumstances that posed an immediate threat of serious harm to himself or others?
- Was some degree of force reasonably necessary to ameliorate the immediate threat?
- Was the force used more than reasonably necessary under the circumstances? (i.e., was it excessive?)

A civil defendant (e.g., police officer) is entitled to qualified immunity if the answer to the first two questions above is “yes,” and to the third is “no.” (*Ibid.*)

Refusal to Submit:

Refusal to submit to a lawful detention constitutes probable cause to arrest, pursuant to **Penal Code § 148(a)(1)** (Interfering with a peace officer in the performance of his or her duties). (*In re Gregory S.* (1980) 112 Cal.App.3rd 764, 780.)

Note, however, that a violation of **P.C. § 148(a)(1)** is not proven in an attempted detention situation absent sufficient evidence that the defendant, when fleeing, knew, or reasonably should have known, that officers were pursuing and attempting to detain him. (*In re Charles G.* (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 945.)

Even when the detention is illegal, every person has a legal duty to submit (*Evans v. City of Bakersfield* (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 321.), although declining to do so is *not* a violation of **P.C. § 148** in that a peace officer is *not* acting in the “*performance of his (or her) duties*” by unlawfully detaining someone.

Whether or not a detention or an arrest is lawful, a suspect is not immunized from prosecution for any new crimes he might commit against the officer in response. A defendant’s violent response to an unlawful detention, such as assaulting a police officer, may still be the source of criminal charges. A suspect has a duty to cooperate with law enforcement whether or not an attempt to detain or arrest him is later held to be in violation of the **Fourth Amendment**. (*In re Richard G.* (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1252, 1260-1263.)

Reasonableness of the Force Used:

Rule:

The force used in effecting a detention or an arrest must be tailored to the circumstances. It must be reasonable under the circumstances. Yanking a person out of his vehicle, pushing him up against his car, and handcuffing him when that person is not attempting to escape nor resisting the officers in anyway other than being “verbally confrontational,” may be excessive. (*Liberal v. Estrada* (9th Cir. 2011) 632 F.3rd 1064, 1078-1079.)

Where plaintiff physically resisted an officer's attempt to effect a detention by using physical force, the trial court was held to have erred by granting judgment as a matter of law in the officer's favor because there was sufficient evidence at trial on which a reasonable jury could have concluded that no probable cause for the arrest existed, based both on evidence that plaintiff did not in fact resist the officer nor did he impede the officer in the exercise of his lawful duties. Also, the trial court's granting of judgment as a matter of law on the lawfulness of the arrest, in conjunction with the court's erroneous instructions on the excessive use of force claim, improperly influenced the jury's consideration of plaintiff's excessive force claim. (*Velazquez v. City of Long Beach* (9th Cir. 2015) 793 F.3rd 1010, 1017-1027.)

The use of *firearms, handcuffs*, putting a person into a *locked patrol car*, or simply a "*show of force*," may, under the circumstances, cause a court to later find that an attempted detention was in fact *an arrest*, and, if made without "probable cause," excessive and illegal. (*United States v. Ramos-Zaragoza* (9th Cir. 1975) 516 F.2nd 141, 144; *New York v. Quarles* (1984) 467 U.S. 649 [81 L.Ed.2nd 550]; handcuffs; *Orozco v. Texas* (1969) 394 U.S. 324 [22 L.Ed.2nd 311]; force; *United States v. Ricardo D.* (9th Cir. 1990) 912 F.2nd 337, 340; "Detention in a patrol car exceeds permissible *Terry (v. Ohio)* (1968) 392 U.S. 1 [20 L.Ed.2nd 889].) limits absent some reasonable justification."

An officer violates the **Fourth Amendment** if he abruptly resorts to overwhelming physical force rather than continuing verbal negotiations with an individual who poses no immediate threat or flight risk, and who engages in, at most, passive (i.e., verbal) resistance, and whom the officer stopped for a minor traffic violation. (*Hanks v. Rogers* (5th Cir. Tex. 2017) 853 F.3rd 738: Officer's use of a "half spear" to the plaintiff's back, forcing him against the car and forcing him to his knees, and handcuffing him, after plaintiff questioned the officer's actions instead of complying, where the original violations included driving too slow and not having proof of insurance, held to be excessive force as a matter of law under the circumstances.

Lesser Degree of Force:

"As for using less intrusive alternatives, the courts have held that given the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a

particular situation, they are not required to use the least intrusive degree of force possible.” (*Lowry v. City of San Diego* (9th 2017) 858 F.3rd 1248, 1259-1260; rejecting plaintiff’s argument that an officer could have kept his service dog on her leash instead of releasing her into a darkened commercial business where the dog found and bit the plaintiff as she slept on a couch.)

The *Lowry* Court cited *Miller v. Clark County* (9th Cir. 2003) 340 F.3rd 959, at 968, where the Court concluded that the use of an off-leash police dog was reasonable and rejecting the alternative proposal of keeping the dog on-leash, because it could have led the officer into an ambush or pulled him “into a dangerous situation with no opportunity to react safely.”

But there are exceptions: See “*Detentions vs. Arrests*,” above.

Narcotics-Related Traffic Stops Using a “Controlled Tire Deflation Device” (“CTDD”):

The use of a “*controlled tire deflation device*” to stop a vehicle suspected of being used to smuggle controlled substances over the US/Mexico border held to be a detention only (thus requiring only a reasonable suspicion) and not excessive force under the circumstances. (*United States v. Guzman-Padilla* (9th Cir. 2009) 573 F.3rd 865, 886-889.)

Note: The “*controlled tire deflation device*,” or “*CTDD*,” is an accordion-like tray containing small, hollow steel tubes that puncture the tires of a passing vehicle and cause a gradual release of air, bringing the vehicle to a halt within a quarter to half a mile.

Deadly Force:

Deadly force (i.e., *force likely to cause death or great bodily injury*) may *not* be used to enforce a detention, unless the officer is attacked and must defend him or herself against the use of deadly force by the suspect. (See *People v. Ceballos* (1974) 12 Cal.3rd 470, 478; *Tennessee v. Garner* (1985) 471 U.S. 1, 12-15 [85 L.Ed.2nd 1, 10-12].)

See “*Deadly Force*,” under “*Arrests*” (Chapter 4), below.

Demanding Identification:

Rule: While it is clear that a person who has been “*consensually encountered*” (see Chapter 2, above) need not identify himself, nor even talk to a police officer

(See *Kolender v. Lawson* (1983) 461 U.S. 352 [75 L.Ed.2nd 903]; *Brown v. Texas* (1979) 443 U.S. 47, 52 [61 L.Ed.2nd 357].), there is nothing improper with a peace officer “demanding” that a detained person properly identify himself. (*United States v. Christian* (9th Cir. 2004) 356 F.3rd 1103; not discussing whether the officer can enforce the demand.)

See also *People v. Leath* (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 344, 350-353: Merely requesting identification from a suspect, or even retaining it, absent more coercive circumstances, does not by itself convert a consensual encounter into a detention.

A passenger in a lawfully stopped vehicle may be “asked” for his identification. (*United States v. Diaz-Castaneda* (9th Cir. 2007) 494 F.3rd 1146, 1152-1153.)

While it is a crime to falsely identify oneself when lawfully detained, per **P.C. § 148.9**, this section is not violated where (1) the person is unlawfully detained, or (2) where he is the target of a consensual encounter only. (*People v. Walker* (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1392.)

The **Fourth Amendment** is not implicated by asking a detained individual for identification, at least so long as the detention is not unnecessarily prolonged in the process. (*People v. Vibanco* (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1, 13-14.)

Issue: The only issue left hanging by *Christian*, *Vibanco*, and the other above cases, is whether a detained suspect *must* properly identify himself, or be subject to arrest for refusing to do so. The courts seem to hint, however, that he *cannot* be forced to identify himself.

The United States Supreme Court ruled in *Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada* (2004) 542 U.S. 177 [159 L.Ed.2nd 292], that a person who is lawfully “detained” may be charged with a criminal violation for refusing to identify himself. Such an identification requirement violates neither the **Fourth** nor **Fifth Amendment** (self-incrimination) rights of the detained person.

Note, however, that the Court, in *Hiibel*, conceded that “a case may arise where there is a substantial allegation that furnishing identity at the time of a stop would have given the police a link in the chain of evidence needed to convict the individual of a separate offense,” thus implicating the **Fifth Amendment** right against self-incrimination. (*Id.*, at p. 191.)

Also note that Nevada has a specific statute making it a misdemeanor to refuse to identify oneself when lawfully detained. California does not have such a specific statute. (See *United States v. Williams* (9th Cir. 2017) 846 F.3rd 303, 310-312, discussing the interplay of Nevada statutes **N.R.S. §§ 171.123** and **199.280**, which, together, make it an arrestable offense for a lawfully detained individual to refuse to identify himself.)

Although the act of providing a false name, as a violation of **P.C. § 148.9**, is an arrestable offense (*People v. Christopher* (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 418, 428.), refusing to provide any identification at all, even while detained, has been held *not* to violate **P.C. § 148(a)(1)**, delaying or obstructing an officer in the performance of his or her duties, at least until the suspect is arrested and the booking process is initiated. (*In re Chase C.* (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 107, 117-118.)

See *People v. Quiroga* (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 961, upholding a **P.C. § 148** conviction for an *arrestee* who refused to identify himself during the booking process

See also *In re Gregory S.* (1980) 112 Cal.App.3rd 764, 776, where the Court “assume(d) for the sake of discussion” that a violation of **Penal Code section 148** may not be premised on a refusal to answer questions, *including a request for identification*. (Italics added) The issue, however, despite the Court’s stated opinion that refusing to identify “probably” is not a **P.C. § 148** violation (pg. 779), was neither analyzed nor even discussed in that other valid grounds for upholding a **P.C. § 148** (delaying the officer in the performance of his duties) was found by the detainee attempting to walk away. Also, *Gregory S.* was decided some 24 years before *Hübel*.

Also decided well before *Hübel* was the case of *Martinelli v. City of Beaumont* (9th Cir. 1987) 820 F.2nd 1491, which held that **P.C. § 148** was not violated by refusing to identify oneself. However, the Court in this case, which cited *Lawson v. Kolender* (9th Cir. 1981) 658 F.2nd 1362 (Cert. granted), as its authority for this conclusion, failed to differentiate between a consensual encounter and a detention.

Note: **Veh. Code § 31** can perhaps be used with the driver of a vehicle makes false statements to a law

enforcement officer who is in the performance of this duties during a traffic stop (see *People v. Morera-Munoz* (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 838; enforcing **section 31** does not violate the **First Amendment**.), but when the passenger does the same, it is unlikely that he has also violated this section in that it is limited to when necessary for the proper enforcement of the **Vehicle Code**. Questioning a passenger will generally have nothing to do with enforcing the provisions of the **Vehicle Code**.

Despite the holding in *Chase, supra*, there is some argument (albeit a weak one) that refusing to identify oneself during a detention is in fact a violation of **P.C. § 148(a)(1)**, at least if such refusal does in fact cause a delay in an officer's investigation:

“[T]he ability to briefly stop [a suspect], ask questions, *or check identification* in the absence of probable cause promotes the strong government interest in solving crimes and bringing offenders to justice.” (Italics added; *United States v. Hensley* (1985) 469 U.S. 211 [83 L.Ed.2nd 604]; see also *Hayes v. Florida* (1985) 470 U.S. 811, 816 [84 L.Ed.2nd 705].)

“The principles of *Terry (v. Ohio)* (1968) 392 U.S. 1) permit a State to require a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a *Terry* stop.” (*Hibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, supra*, at p. 187.)

See *State v. Aloï* (2007) 280 Conn. 824, where the Connecticut Supreme Court found that by refusing to identify himself, the lawfully detained defendant was in fact in violation of a state statute that specifically provided: “A person is guilty of interfering with an officer when such person obstructs, resists, hinders or endangers any peace officer or firefighter in the performance of such peace officer's or firefighter's duties” (**Gen. Statutes (Rev. to 2001) § 53a-167a**; “Because a refusal to provide identification in connection with a *Terry* stop may hamper or impede a police investigation into apparent criminal activity, we see no reason why such conduct would be categorically excluded under the expansive language of **§ 53a-167a**.” (*Id.*, at p. 833.)

Note: A careful reading of *Hiibel*, *Quiroga*, and *Gregory S.* indicates that whether or not P.C. § 148(a)(1) can be charged in a circumstance where a detainee has refused to identify himself is a question that will depend upon the specific circumstances of the individual case at issue. In those cases where refusing to identify oneself does in fact delay the officer in the performance of his duties (i.e., did it unnecessarily extend the time required to complete the detention or otherwise draw the officer away from completing his other lawful duties?), the answer *should be* “yes.” If not, then the answer, based upon the available case law, is clearly “no.”

Also, stopping a suspect in a misdemeanor offense, a noise violation, not occurring in the officer’s presence, at least where there are possible alternative, less intrusive methods, of identifying the suspect, has been held to be unlawful. The Court is to balance law enforcement’s interest in crime prevention with the detainee’s interest in personal security from government intrusion. (See *United States v. Hensley* (1985) 469 U.S. 221, 229 [83 L.E.2nd 604]; declining to decide whether the seriousness of the offense makes a difference.) In a misdemeanor situation, law enforcement’s interest *may* not outweigh the suspect’s, depending upon the circumstances. (*United States v. Grigg* (9th Cir. 2007) 498 F.3rd 1070, 1074-1083.)

The continuing validity of the *Grigg* decision has been questioned and is probably, if it ever was, no longer a valid rule. (See *United States v. Creek* (U.S. Dist. Ct, Ariz. 2009) 586 F. Supp.2nd 1099, 1102-1108; upholding the traffic stop of a petty theft (gas drive off) suspect. See also *Stanton v. Sims* (Nov. 4, 2013) 571 U.S. ___ [134 S.Ct. 3; 187 L.Ed.2nd 341], calling into question, but not deciding, the Ninth Circuit’s sensitivity to apprehending misdemeanor suspects.)

It still follows, however, that a person who is only subject to a “consensual encounter” is *not* required to identify himself. (See *Kolender v. Lawson* (1983) 461 U.S. 352 [75 L.Ed.2nd 903].)

Also Note: There is no authority for arresting a mere witness or victim for refusing to identify him or herself, or for refusing to submit to an interview or otherwise provide any information, such as by then “threatening” to take such an uncooperative victim or witness to the stationhouse for questioning. There is no crime (e.g., such as “obstruction of justice”) that covers such a lack of

cooperation. And even if there were, it would probably be unconstitutional per *Kolender v. Lawson, supra.*)

Detentions of an Employee in the Workplace (or a Student at School):

Problem:

When an employee’s supervisors (or a student’s principal, a military supervisor, or a law enforcement supervisor) *order* the employee (or student, military subordinate, or police officer) to report to the office or remain in the workplace pending an interview at the request or complicity of law enforcement, is the employee “detained” for purposes of the **Fourth Amendment**?

Answer: Not necessarily, but it depends upon the circumstances. (See *Aguilera v. Baca, infra.*)

Case Authority:

Where sheriff’s deputies were ordered to remain at the station pending an interview by Internal Affairs investigators about an alleged excessive force citizen’s complaint when criminal prosecution could result, the deputies were held to be *not* detained for purposes of the **Fourth Amendment** after an evaluation of the following factors:

- The experience level of the subordinate;
- Whether the treatment was consistent with that allowed by department guidelines or general policy;
- The occurrence of physical contact or threats of physical restraint;
- An explicit refusal of permission to depart;
- Isolation of the subordinate officer;
- Permission to use the restroom without accompaniment;
- The subordinate officer’s being informed that he was the subject of a criminal investigation;
- Whether the subordinate officer was spoken to “in a menacing or threatening manner;”
- Whether the subordinate officer was under constant surveillance;
- Whether superior officers denied a request to contact an attorney or union representative;
- The subordinate officer’s ability to retain law enforcement equipment, including weapons and badges;
- The duration of the detention; and
- The subordinate’s receipt of overtime pay.

(Aguilera v. Baca (9th Cir. 2007) 510 F.3rd 1161, 1167-1171, citing *Driebel v. City of Milwaukee* (7th Cir. 2002) 298 F.3rd 622, 638.)

No seizure when an on-duty civilian Air Force employee was ordered to report for an interview with an intelligence officer. (*United States v. Muegge* (11th Cir. 2000) 225 F.3rd 1267, 1270.)

No seizure when an on-duty Coast Guard officer was ordered to report for an interview with an intelligence officer. (*United States v. Baird* (D.C. Cir. 1988) 851 F.2nd 376, 380-382.)

Note: Although there are no cases available describing when a student is ordered to the principal's office at the request of law enforcement for an interview, a situation that often arises, it is arguable that the same analysis could be made. The officer telling the student, however, that he is free to return to class would probably negate any argument that he or she was detained under the circumstances.

Note that *Greene v. Camreta* (9th Cir. 2009) 588 F.3rd 1011, where the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal ruled that interviewing a child victim on a school campus without the parents' consent, as a **Fourth Amendment** seizure, required a search warrant or other court order, or exigent circumstances, was overruled by the United States Supreme Court in *Camreta v. Greene* (2011) 563 U.S. 692 [179 L.Ed.2nd 1118]. The Ninth Circuit's decision, however, was merely vacated, leaving the issue undecided.

See **P.C. § 11174.3(a)**, setting out statutory procedures police officers are to use in interviewing child victims of abuse or neglect while at school.

Statutory Authority for Seizure of Firearms During Detentions:

Gov't. Code § 8571.5 provides that a police officer may not seize or confiscate any firearm or ammunition from an individual who is lawfully carrying or possessing the firearm or ammunition. However, the officer may temporarily disarm an individual if the officer reasonably believes it is immediately necessary for the protection of the officer or another individual. An officer who disarms an individual is to return the firearm before discharging the individual unless the officer arrests the individual or seizes the firearm as evidence of the commission of a crime.

Note: This new section is in the part of the **Government Code** entitled the "**California Emergency Services Act.**" This section is intended to prohibit an executive order disarming individuals who are in lawful

possession of firearms during a state of emergency or crisis, and will conform California law to a new federal law, **Public Law 109-295**, which prohibits the confiscation of otherwise legal firearms from law-abiding citizens during a state of emergency by any agent of the Federal Government or by anyone receiving federal funds. However, it appears to be written broad enough to affect a police officer's contacts with individuals on the street.

P.C. § 833.5, providing a peace officer the authority to detain for investigation anyone who the officer has "*reasonable cause*" to believe illegally has in his or her possession a firearm or other deadly weapon.

P.C. § 25850(b) (formerly **P.C. § 12031(e)**) gives a peace officer the right to inspect a firearm carried by any person on his person or in a vehicle "on any public street in an incorporated city or prohibited area of an unincorporated territory" to determine whether a firearm is loaded in violation of **subd. (a)**. Refusal to allow a peace officer to inspect a firearm is probable cause to arrest the subject for violating **P.C. § 25850(a)** (formerly **P.C. § 12031(a)(1)**); illegally carrying a loaded firearm in the listed public places.

Wel. & Inst. Code § 8102(a) authorizes the "*confiscation*" of firearms or other deadly weapons owned, possessed, or under the control of a detained or apprehended mental patient. However, it has been held that a search warrant must be used in order to lawfully enter the house and/or to search for weapons in those cases where there are no exigent circumstances and the defendant has not given consent. (*People v. Sweig* (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1145 (petition granted, see below); rejecting the People's argument that a warrantless entry to search for and seize the detainee's firearms was justified under law enforcement's "community caretaking" function.)

A petition to the California Supreme Court on *People v. Sweig* was granted, making this case no longer available for citation, with review being dismissed on 10/11/09 when the below amendment to **P.C. § 1524** was enacted as a result.

P.C. § 1524(a)(10) provides authority for the obtaining of a search warrant in the *Sweig* situation; i.e., when dealing with a person with mental issues under the **Welfare and Institutions Code** (see **W&I §§ 5150 & 8102(a)**).

Merchants, Library Employees Theater Owners and Amusement Park Employees:

P.C. § 190.5(f): Detention of a shoplift or theft suspect, or a person illegally recording a movie in a theater, by a merchant, library employee or theater owner, respectively, for the purpose of determining whether the suspect did in fact steal

property belonging to the victim, or illegally record a movie, is authorized by statute.

Once the purpose of the detention is accomplished, the suspect must either be turned over to and arrested by police, or released.

Only *non-deadly force* may be used. (P.C. § 190.5(f)(2))

See *People v. Zelinski* (1979) 24 Cal.3rd 357; and *In re Christopher H.* (1991) 227 Cal.App.3rd 1567.)

P.C. § 490.6(a): A person employed by an amusement park may detain a person for a reasonable time for the purpose of conducting an investigation in a reasonable manner whenever the person employed by the amusement park has probable cause to believe the person to be detained is violating lawful amusement park rules.

(b): It is a violation of P.C. § 602.1 (trespass) for a person to refuse a request to either comply with the park’s rules or leave the premises.

(c): It is a defense to a civil suit if the park employee had “probable cause” to believe that the person was not following lawful amusement park rules and if the employee acted reasonably under all the circumstances.

However, unless shown as a matter of law, it is a jury issue whether the park employee had probable cause and that he acted reasonably under the circumstances. (*Eckar v. Raging Waters Group* (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1320.)

Indefinite Detentions Pursuant to Federal Law:

Pen. Code § 145.5: Effective since 1/1/2014, the California Legislature has dictated that California law enforcement will *not* participate in any manner with federal indefinite detentions.

It is the policy of California to refuse to provide material support for, or to participate in any way with, the implementation of any federal law that authorizes the indefinite detention of a person within California without charge or trial.

State agencies, state employees, and the California National Guard are prohibited from knowingly aiding an agency of the United States Armed Forces in an investigation, prosecution, or detention of a person within California pursuant to the indefinite detention provisions of the **National**

Defense Authorization Act, the federal law known as the **Authorization for Use of Military Force**, or any other federal law if the state agency, employee, or member of the Guard would violate the U.S. Constitution, the California Constitution, or any California law by providing aid.

A local law enforcement agency, a local government, or an employee of a local agency or government is prohibited from using state funds allocated by the state to a local entity on or after January 1, 2013, to engage in any activity that aids an agency of the United States Armed Forces in the detention of a person within California for purposes of implementing the indefinite detention provisions of the **National Defense Authorization Act** or the federal law known as the **Authorization for Use of Military Force**, if the local agency, local government, or employee would violate the U.S. Constitution, the California Constitution, or any California law by providing aid.

Chapter 4:

Arrests:

Defined: The “*taking a person into custody, in a case and in the manner authorized by law.*” (P.C. § 834)

“A person is seized by the police and thus entitled to challenge the government’s action under the **Fourth Amendment** when the officer, ‘by means of physical force or show of authority,’ terminates or restrains his freedom of movement, [citation], ‘through means intentionally applied,’ [citation]. . . . ‘When the actions of the police do not show an unambiguous intent to restrain or when an individual’s submission to a show of governmental authority takes the form of passive acquiescence,’ the test for determining if a seizure occurred is whether, “in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave,” [citation].’ The coercive effect of the encounter can be measured by whether ‘a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter,’ [citations].” (*People v. Kopatz* (2015) 61 Cal.4th 62, 79; quoting *Brendlin v. California* (2007) 551 U.S. 249, 254-255 [168 L.Ed.2nd 132].)

Standard of Proof: Requires “*Probable Cause:*” “(A) police officer may arrest without (a) warrant (a person) . . . believed by the officer upon *reasonable* (or “*probable*”) *cause* to have been guilty of a felony (or misdemeanor).” (Emphasis added; *United States v. Watson* (1976) 423 U.S. 411, 417 [46 L.Ed.2nd 598, 605]; see also *District of Columbia v. Wesby et al.* (Jan. 22, 2018) __ U.S. __ [138 S.Ct. 577; 199 L.Ed.2nd 453], on making a warrantless arrest.)

Defined: Probable (or Reasonable) Cause to Arrest:

“Reasonable or probable cause is shown if a *man of ordinary care* (or *caution*) and *prudence* (or a *reasonable and prudent person*) would be led to believe and conscientiously entertain an *honest and strong suspicion* that the accused is guilty.” (See *People v. Lewis* (1980) 109 Cal.App.3rd 599 608-609; *People v. Campa* (1984) 36 Cal.3rd 870, 879; *People v. Price* (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 410.)

Note: The terms “*reasonable*” and “*probable*” cause are used interchangeably in both the codes (see P.C. § **995(a)(1)(B)**) and case law, but (when properly used) mean the same thing. “*Reasonable cause*” and “*reasonable*

suspicion” (i.e., the standard of proof for a detention), on the other hand, *do not* mean the same thing, and are not to be confused.

“(R)easonable cause”—a synonym for “probable cause” (*Heien v. North Carolina* (Dec. 15, 2014) 574 U.S. __, __ [135 S.Ct. 530; 190 L.Ed.2nd 475, 483].)

Note: Probable cause is more than a “*reasonable suspicion*,” but less than “*clear and convincing evidence*” or “*proof beyond a reasonable doubt*.”

“‘Clear and convincing’ evidence requires a finding of high probability. [Citation.] Such a test requires that the evidence be so clear as to leave no substantial doubt; sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind.’ This standard, which ‘is less commonly used’ [Citation], tends to be seen in civil cases involving ‘interests . . . deemed to be more substantial than mere loss of money.’” (*People v. Mary H.* (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 246, 256; quoting *Lillian F. v. Superior Court* (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 314, 320.)

In “a criminal case, . . . [in which] the interests of the defendant are of such magnitude that historically and without any explicit constitutional requirement they have been protected by standards of proof designed to exclude as nearly as possible the likelihood of an erroneous judgment. In the administration of criminal justice, our society imposes almost the entire risk of error upon itself. This is accomplished by requiring under the **Due Process Clause** that the state prove the guilt of an accused beyond a reasonable doubt.” (*People v. Mary H.*, *supra*; quoting *Addington v. Texas* (1979) 441 U.S. 418, 423 [99 S.Ct. 1804; 60 L.Ed.2nd 323]; *Addington v. Texas* (1979) 441 U.S. 418, 423-424 [60 L. Ed. 2d 323, 99 S. Ct. 1804]; see also **CALCRIM No. 220** [“Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you with an abiding conviction that the charge is true.”].)

“Probable cause to arrest exists if facts known to the arresting officer would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to entertain an honest and strong suspicion that an individual is guilty of a crime.” (*People v. Turner* (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 397, 404, 405; quoting *People v. Kraft* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1037; and upholding an arrest for trespass, per P.C. § 602.1.)

“To determine whether an officer had probable cause for an arrest, ‘we examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide ‘whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to’ probable cause.” (*District of Columbia v. Wesby et al.* (Jan. 22, 2018) __ U.S. __ [138 S.Ct. 577; 199 L.Ed.2nd 453], quoting *Maryland v. Pringle* (2003) 540 U.S. 366, 371 [124 S.Ct. 795; 157 L.Ed.2nd 769]; and *Ornelas v. United States* (1996) 517 U.S. 690, 696 [116 S.Ct. 1657; 134 L.Ed.2nd 911].)

Reasonable Seizures: The U.S. Supreme Court has noted “‘the general rule that **Fourth Amendment** seizures are “reasonable” only if based on probable cause’ to believe that the individual has committed a crime. [Citation]. The standard of probable cause, with ‘roots that are deep in our history,’ [Citation], ‘represent[s] the accumulated wisdom of precedent and experience as to the minimum justification necessary to make the kind of intrusion involved in an arrest “reasonable” under the **Fourth Amendment.**’ [Citation]” (*Bailey v. United States* (2013) 568 U.S. 186, 192-193 [133 S.Ct. 1031, 1037-1043; 185 L.Ed.2nd 19].)

Notes:

While “*probable cause*” is sufficient to justify an arrest, it cannot be forgotten the the legal standard for a prosecutor to convict at trial is “*proof beyond a reasonable doubt.*”

And for minors, “*proof beyond a reasonable doubt* supported by evidence, legally admissible in the trial of criminal cases, must be adduced to support a finding that the minor is a person described by (**Welfare and Institutions Code**) **Section 602**, and a preponderance of evidence, legally admissible in the trial of civil cases must be adduced to support a finding that the minor is a person described by **Section 300** or **601.**” (**W&I Code § 701**)

W&I Code § 601: Persons subject to jurisdiction of court as ward for refusal to obey orders of parents, violation of curfew, or truancy.

W&I Code § 602: Persons subject to jurisdiction of juvenile court and to adjudication as ward for violation of law or ordinance defining crime.

W&I Code § 300: Persons subject to jurisdiction of juvenile court; i.e., child victims.

When Probable Cause Exists: “(P)robable cause” exists if, under the totality of the circumstances known to the arresting officers, a prudent person would have concluded that there was a *fair probability* that the individual had committed a crime.” (Italics added; **United States v. Hernandez** (9th Cir. 2002) 314 F.3rd 430, 434; see also **Dunaway v. New York** (1979) 442 U.S. 200, 208, fn. 9; [60 L.Ed.2nd 824]; **People v. Scott** (2011) 52 Cal.4th 452, 474.) Various courts have used variations of this same definition to define probable cause:

“Probable cause to arrest exists when officers have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to lead a person of reasonable caution to believe an offense has been or is being committed by the person being arrested.” **John v. City of El Monte** (9th Cir. 2008) 515 F.3rd 936, 940; citing **Beck v. Ohio** (1964) 379 U.S. 89, 91 [13 L.Ed.2nd 142]; **Maxwell v. County of San Diego** (9th Cir. 2012) 697 F.3rd 941, 951; **Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton** (9th Cir. 2013) 728 F.3rd 1086, 1097-1098.)

“Probable cause arises when an officer has knowledge based on reasonably trustworthy information that the person arrested has committed a criminal offense. (Citation)” (**McSherry v. City of Long Beach** (9th Cir. 2009) 584 F.3rd 1129, 1135.)

“In California, ‘an officer has probable cause for a warrantless arrest “if the facts known to him would lead a [person] of ordinary care and prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person is guilty of a crime.” [Citations.]” (**Blakenhorn v. City of Orange** (9th Cir. 2007) 485 F.3rd 463, 471; see also **People v. Price** (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 410.)

Except perhaps for a “*specific intent*” element, “an officer need not have probable cause for every element of the offense.” (**Blakenhorn v. City of Orange, supra.**, at p. 472.)

“(T)his rule (however,) must be applied with an eye to the core probable cause requirement; namely, that ‘under the totality of the circumstances, a prudent person would have concluded that there was a fair probability that the suspect had committed a crime.’” (Citation omitted) *Rodis v. City and County of San Francisco* (9th Cir. 2007) 499 F.3rd 1094, 1099.)

“*Probable cause*” merely requires that “the facts and circumstances within [the officers’] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [plaintiff] had committed or was committing an offense. . . . Police must only show that, under the totality of the circumstances, . . . a prudent person would have concluded that there was a fair probability that [the suspect] had committed a crime.” (*Hart v. Parks* (9th Cir. 2006) 450 F.3rd 1059, 1065-1066.)

“Probable cause exists when the facts known to the arresting officer would persuade someone of ‘reasonable caution’ that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. [Citation.] ‘[P]robable cause is a fluid concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts’ [Citation.] It is incapable of precise definition. [Citation.] ‘The substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt,’ and that belief must be ‘particularized with respect to the person to be . . . seized.’ [Citations.] ‘[S]ufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment’” (*Gillan v. City of Marino* (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1044.)

“‘*Reasonable and probable cause*’ may exist although there may be some room for doubt.” (*Lorenson v. Superior Court* (1950) 35 Cal.2nd 49, 57.)

“(T)he probable-cause standard is a practical, nontechnical conception that deals with the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” (Citations and internal quotation marks omitted; *Maryland v. Pringle* (2003) 540 U.S. 366, 370 [157 L.Ed.2nd 769]; probable cause for arrest of all three occupants of a vehicle found where a controlled substance was found within reach of any of them.)

Officers had probable cause to arrest both the passenger and the driver for possession of a billy club seen resting against the driver's door. (*People v. Vermouth* (1971) 20 Cal.App.3rd 746, 756.)

Informing two suspects in a vehicle that they would both be arrested for possession of a concealed firearm, prompting a response from defendant that he'd "take the charge," was not the functional equivalent of an interrogation that required a *Miranda* admonishment. (*United States v. Collins* (6th Cir. 2012) 683 F.3rd 697, 701-703.)

"The substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt, and that belief must be 'particularized with respect to the person to be . . . seized.'" (*People v. Celis* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 673; citing *Maryland v. Pringle*, *supra*.)

"Probable cause is a fluid concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts" (*Illinois v. Gates* (1983) 462 U.S. 213, 231-232 [76 L.Ed.2nd 527, 548]; using the term "fair probability" to describe probable cause. See also *Rodis v. City and County of San Francisco* (9th Cir. 2007) 499 F.3rd 1094, 1098; and *District of Columbia v. Wesby et al.* (Jan. 22, 2018) __ U.S. __ [__ S.Ct. __; 199 L.Ed.2nd 453].)

Probable cause allows for an officer's *reasonable* mistake. It only means that he or she is "probably" right, or in effect, having more evidence for than against. (*Ex Parte Souza* (1923) 65 Cal.App. 9.)

"[P]robable cause means 'fair probability,' not certainty or even a preponderance of the evidence." (*United States v. Gourde* (9th Cir. 2006) 440 F.3rd 1065, 1069.)

"Probable cause to arrests exists when officers have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to lead a person of caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the person being arrested." (Citations omitted; *Ewing v. City of Stockton* (9th Cir. 2009) 588 F.3rd 1218, 1230.)

Under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable officer could believe that the arrestee possessed cocaine in violation of Washington law. The arrestee's husband and 911 callers told the police that the arrestee was high on drugs. She said in her deposition that, given her comments to the police officers, it would

have been reasonable for them to believe she was on drugs. The police officers also had reasonable cause to take her to the hospital for mental evaluation under Washington's mental health evaluation statute. (*Luchtel v. Hagemann* (9th Cir. 2010) 623 F.3rd 975.)

Detectives had probable cause to stop and arrest defendant and his cohorts the officers saw four males running from one street toward another. The officer observed defendant carrying an object which could be used as a deadly weapon. The officer also observed specific behavior that caused him to entertain an honest and strong suspicion that a crime was being committed. He observed a brick in defendant's hand, heard a shout of "he's over there" which he believed to have come from one of the four males, and witnessed a gesture from one of the group directing the others where to go. Viewed collectively, there were clearly facts to suggest the group intended to use their rudimentary weapons to harm someone. The officer's knowledge that defendant was a member of a street gang that "claimed" that particular area reasonably supported this analysis of the facts. At this point, probable cause existed to arrest defendant for possession of a deadly weapon with intent to commit an assault, per P.C. § 12024. (*In re J.G.* (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1501.)

"Probable cause to arrest exists when officers have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to lead a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the person being arrested. (Citation) For information to amount to probable cause, it does not have to be conclusive of guilt, and it does not have to exclude the possibility of innocence. . . . (Citation) . . . (P)olice are not required 'to believe to an absolute certainty, or by clear and convincing evidence, or even by a preponderance of the available evidence' that a suspect has committed a crime. (Citation) All that is required is a 'fair probability,' given the totality of the evidence, that such is the case. (*Garcia v. County of Merced* (9th Cir. 2011) 639 F.3rd 1206, 1209.)

Probable cause was found to exist with the defendant's statements to his girlfriend about his dream concerning the stabbing of the first victim in a series of crimes, even before the murder was reported in the newspapers. Also, defendant was known to be involved in the martial arts and liked to dress as a ninja which was consistent with the suspect information. Defendant told co-workers that he possessed a semiautomatic pistol similar to the weapon used in some of the crimes. Defendant also matched the

physical description of the suspect in the various crimes, being a unique combination of Black and Japanese, with a dark complexion that tended to be lighter than most Blacks. (*People v. Scott* (2011) 52 Cal.4th 452, 474-476.)

Probable cause existed under Nevada law where the arresting agent knew that defendant (1) admitted to gambling at various casinos under a different name, (2) admitted to using identification not issued by a government entity identifying him by that different name, and (3) possessed and had used a credit card issued in that different name. (*Fayer v. Vaughn* (9th Cir. 649 F.3rd 1061, 1064-1065.)

Observing defendant on a public sidewalk (i.e., a “public place”), and then seconds later on his own front porch (not a “public place”), and then seeing a semi-automatic pistol in his hand while standing on his porch, provided the necessary probable cause to believe that he had been in violation of **P.C. § 25850(a)** (formerly **§ 12031(a)**), carrying a loaded firearm in public, while on the sidewalk. The fact that he was carrying it around his house, where it would normally be used for self-defense or defense of habitation, also constituted probable cause to believe it was loaded. (*United States v. Nora* (9th Cir. 2014) 765 F.3rd 1049, 1052-1060; noting that we are only “deal(ing) in probabilities, not certainties.” *Id.*, at p. 1053.)

W&I §§ 601(a) and **625(a)** do not allow for taking a minor into custody for a single instance of disobedience. The authority to take a minor into custody, as provided for under **section 625(a)**, requires that the minor be a person described in **section 601**. However, **section 601(a)** requires that the minor “persistently or habitually refuses to obey” his or her parent or custodian, or is “beyond the control of that person.” A single instance of disobedience does not qualify as “persistently or habitually,” or being “beyond the control.” Under these circumstances, the Court found no legal justification for officers to take an 11-year-old minor into physical custody at his school and remove him from the school grounds in handcuffs despite the school’s administrators reporting him as being “out of control.” (*C.B. v. City of Sonora* (9th Cir. 2014) 769 F.3rd 1005, 1031.)

A deputy sheriff was not entitled to qualified immunity in a false arrest civilsuit brought by a deputy public defender where a court referee ordered the deputy to get the public defender and bring her to court, or to get her supervisor if the public defender refused to

come to court. The deputy sheriff had no reasonable basis for believing that he was authorized to arrest the public defender since the referee's order, by its clear terms, did not authorize the deputy to physically seize the public defender. Also, the deputy public defender's comment to the deputy sheriff that he would have to arrest her if he wanted her to come to court immediately could not reasonably have caused the deputy sheriff to believe that she was volunteering to be handcuffed. (*Demuth v. County of Los Angeles* (9th Cir. 2015) 798 F.3rd 837, 838-840.)

“Probable cause is shown ‘when the facts known to the arresting officer would persuade someone of “reasonable caution” that the person to be arrested has committed a crime.’” (*People v. Zaragoza* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 21, 56-57; quoting *People v. Celis* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 673.)

“‘Under the **Fourth Amendment**, a warrantless arrest requires probable cause,’ which ‘exists when officers have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to lead a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the person being arrested.’ *United States v. Lopez* 482 F.3rd 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007). Whether probable cause exists depends ‘on the totality of facts’ available to the officers, who ‘may not disregard facts tending to dissipate probable cause.’ *Id.* at 1073 (internal quotation marks omitted). ‘In some instances there may initially be probable cause justifying an arrest, but additional information obtained at the scene may indicate that there is less than a fair probability that the [individual] has committed or is committing a crime. In such cases, execution of the arrest or continuation of the arrest is illegal.’ *Id.*” (*Sialoi v. City of San Diego* (9th Cir. 2016) 823 F.3rd 1223, 1232.)

Probable cause may be established by a person's “vagueness and implausibility” of his or her story, leading an officer to reasonably believe that he or she is lying, suggesting a “guilty mind.” (*District of Columbia v. Wesby et al.* (Jan. 22, 2018) __ U.S. __, __ [138 S.Ct. 577; 199 L.Ed.2nd 453], citing *Devenpeck v. Alford* (2004) 543 U.S. 146, 149 [125 S.Ct. 588; 160 L.Ed.2nd 537], noting that the suspect's “untruthful and evasive” answers to police questioning could support probable cause.)

The Supreme Court also criticized the lower courts' dissection of the various factors, considering them individually rather than following the “totality of the circumstances” rule, in determining the existence of

probable cause. (*District of Columbia v. Wesby et al.*, *Id.*, at pp. __.)

The Court further criticized the appellate court’s rejection of various factors merely because there might be some “innocent explanation” for them, noting that “the relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is ‘innocent’ or ‘guilty,’ but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of noncriminal acts.” Per the Court: “(T)he panel majority should have asked whether a reasonable officer could conclude—considering all of the surrounding circumstances, including the plausibility of the explanation itself—that there was a ‘substantial chance of criminal activity.’” (*Id.*, at p. __; citing *Illinois v. Gates* (1983) 462 U.S. 213, 244, fn. 13 [103 S.Ct. 2317; 76 L.Ed.2nd 527].)

First Amendment Issues; Arresting an Individual for being Verbally Uncooperative:

Arresting a person in retaliation for the defendant having made certain statements to the officer accusing the officer of being racially motivated, even where the officer had probable cause to make the arrest (but also had the option of releasing him on a citation), is a **First Amendment** violation of the defendant’s freedom of speech, subjecting the officer to potential civil liability. (*Ford v. City of Yakima* (9th Cir. 2013) 706 F.3rd 1188, 1192-1196.)

Exhorting a friend not to cooperate with law enforcement that does not cause any violent resistance to officers attempting to detain and question the friend is protected speech under the **First Amendment** (freedom of expression) and does not provide the necessary probable cause to arrest the defendant for a violation of **P.C. § 148(a)(1)**; interfering with an officer in the performance of his duties. (*In re Chase C.* (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 107, 114-116.)

Where plaintiff in a civil suit claimed that officers retaliated against him for being verbally uncooperative, he must prove two things: I.e., that (1) the officer’s conduct “would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future **First Amendment** activities,” and (2) the officer’s desire to chill speech was a “but-for cause” of the adverse action. In this case, after plaintiff was arrested (falsely, as it turned out, due to mistaken identity), the evidence showed that he was visibly angry at the deputies, swore at them, and threatened to sue them. In response, a deputy told him:

“If you weren’t being so argumentative, I’d probably just put you on the curb.” The Court concluded that plaintiff suffered unconstitutional (**First Amendment**) retaliation that was clearly proscribed by established law. (*Sharp v. County of Orange* (9th Cir. 2017) 871 F.3rd 901, 919-920.)

The “Collective Knowledge” Doctrine:

Probable cause can be established by the “*collective knowledge*” of other officers. The officer making a stop, search or arrest need not personally know all the precise information relied upon by other officers. (*People v. Ramirez* (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1548; *United States v. Sandoval-Venegas* (9th Cir. 2002) 292 F.3rd 1101; *United States v. Butler* (9th Cir. 1996) 74 F.3rd 916, 921; *People v. Gomez* (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 531, 541; *United States v. Mayo* (9th Cir. 2005) 394 F.3rd 1271, 1276, fn. 7.)

“[W]here law enforcement authorities are cooperating in an investigation . . . , the knowledge of one is presumed shared by all.” (*Illinois v. Andreas* (1983) 463 U.S. 765, 722, fn. 5 [77 L.Ed.2nd 1003].)

“[W]hen police officers work together to build ‘collective knowledge’ of probable cause, the important question is not what each officer knew about probable cause, but how valid and reasonable the probable cause was that developed in the officers’ collective knowledge.” (*People v. Gomez, supra*, quoting *People Ramirez, supra*, at p. 1555.)

A law enforcement dispatcher’s knowledge of specific facts not passed onto the officers in the field may also be considered as a part of the “*collective knowledge*” needed to substantiate a finding of a “*reasonable suspicion*” justifying a traffic stop. (*United States v. Fernandez-Castillo* (9th Cir. 2003) 324 F.3rd 1114, 1124.)

Information known to three separate officers, involving informant information from three informants of varying degrees of reliability, held to be sufficient to justify defendant’s arrest and the impounding, and searching, of his vehicle even though the arresting officer, himself, did not have enough personal knowledge upon which to justify a finding of probable cause. (*United States v. Jensen* (9th Cir. 2005) 425 F.3rd 698.)

The collective knowledge doctrine is of two types: (1) When a number of law enforcement officers are all working together with

bits and pieces of information spread out among the individual officers, but which when all added altogether, amounts to reasonable suspicion or probable cause. (2) When one or more officers with information amounting to reasonable suspicion or probable cause command a separate officer, who may know nothing about the nature of the investigation, to detain, arrest, and/or search. There is some difference of opinion as to whether the first category is sufficient unless there is shown to be some communication among the officers involved. The second category is universally accepted as coming within the rule. (*United States v. Ramirez* (9th Cir. 2007) 473 F.3rd 1026; narcotics officers commanding a patrol officer to make a traffic stop: The stop, detention, arrest and search all upheld.)

The “*collective knowledge doctrine*” does not apply unless (1) the separate law enforcement agents are working together in an investigation even though they may not have explicitly communicated to the other the facts that each has independently learned, or (2) unless one officer, with direct personal knowledge of all the facts necessary to give rise to a reasonable suspicion or probable cause, directs or requests another officer to conduct a stop, search, or arrest. Some cases suggest that for the first rule to apply, there must also have been some communication between the two agents. (*United States v. Villasenor* (9th Cir. 2010) 608 F.3rd 467, 475-476.)

See, however, *United States v. Evans* (2015) 122 F.Supp.3rd 1027, at p. 1035, where a federal district court judge rejected the use of the Collective Knowledge Doctrine to justify a prolonged traffic stop, citing no authority for why this theory might apply to the facts of this case (i.e., where a detective was working with a patrol deputy on a drug investigation).

Problem; With Multiple Suspects: Where evidence is found in a vehicle within reach of more than one of the occupants, but no one admits ownership, who is subject to arrest?

Where a large amount of money is found rolled up in a vehicle’s glove compartment, and five plastic glassine baggies of cocaine are found behind the center armrest of the backseat, with the armrest pushed up into the closed position to hide the contraband, such contraband being accessible to all the occupants of the vehicle, the arrest of all three subjects in the vehicle (driver, right front and rear seat passengers) was supported by probable cause. (*Maryland v. Pringle* (2003) 540 U.S. 366 [157 L.Ed.2nd 769].)

Officers had probable cause to arrest both the passenger and the driver for possession of a billy club seen resting against the driver's door. (*People v. Vermouth* (1971) 20 Cal. App. 3d 746, 756.)

Informing two suspects in a vehicle that they would both be arrested for possession of a concealed firearm, prompting a response from defendant that he'd "take the charge," was not the functional equivalent of an interrogation that required a *Miranda* admonishment. (*United States v. Collins* (6th Cir. 2012) 683 F.3rd 697, 701-703.)

Note: However, absent sufficient evidence to connect contraband found in the vehicle to one person or the other "beyond a reasonable doubt," the case is unlikely to be filed by a prosecutor.

Dissipation of Probable Cause:

After receiving information about an apartment manager's 9-1-1 call regarding two black adult males, officers did not have probable cause to arrest three Samoan teenagers after it was determined almost immediately that a suspected gun was only a toy. At that point, any suspicion that the teenagers were engaged in a crime had dissipated. The officers, having detained numerous family members, many of them through the use of handcuffs, therefore violated the **Fourth Amendment** by continuing the seizure beyond that point, as well as the search of everyone present. They were also not entitled to qualified immunity for the warrantless entry and search of the family's apartment. (*Sialoi v. City of San Diego* (9th Cir. 2016) 823 F.3rd 1223, 1232-1233.)

Miscellaneous Rules:

Information used to establish probable cause need not be admissible in court: E.g., "hearsay," or even "double hearsay." (*People v. Superior Court (Bingham)* (1979) 91 Cal.App.3rd 463, 469; see also *Hart v. Parks* (9th Cir. 2006) 450 F.3rd 1059, 1066-1067.)

The fact that the information available to police officers "gave rise to a variety of 'inferences,' some of which support (the suspect's) innocence," is also irrelevant. "(O)fficers may 'draw on their own experiences and specialized training to make inferences from and

deductions about the cumulative information available to them that might well elude an untrained person.” (*Hart v. Parks*, *supra*, at p. 1067.)

Similarly, the fact that if viewed in isolation, any single fact, independently, might not be enough to establish probable cause is unimportant. Probable cause is a determination made based upon “*cumulative information*” (often referred to as the “*totality of the circumstances*”). (*Ibid.*)

The information used to establish probable cause may be from the defendant’s own admissions which, without independent evidence of the corpus of the crime, will not be admissible in court. However, the likelihood of conviction is not relevant in establishing probable cause to arrest. (*People v. Rios* (1956) 46 Cal.2nd 297; defendant’s admission that he had injected drugs two weeks earlier sufficient to establish probable cause for the past possession of a controlled substance. Search incident to the arrest was therefore lawful.)

“Police officers ‘must be given some latitude in determining when to credit witnesses’ denials and when to discount them, and we’re not aware of any federal law . . . that indicates precisely where the line must be drawn.’ (Citation)” “Probable cause arises when an officer has knowledge based on reasonably trustworthy information that the person arrested has committed a criminal offense. (Citation)” (*McSherry v. City of Long Beach* (9th Cir. 2009) 584 F.3rd 1129, 1135-1136.)

Mistaken Identity:

“In a case of mistaken identity, ‘the question is whether the arresting officers had a good faith, reasonable belief that the arrestee was the subject of the warrant.’” Where the suspect deputies were looking for was wearing different clothing than the plaintiff who came out of the house, and where the deputies admitted that they did not know if plaintiff was the subject they were looking for, arresting plaintiff was held to be unreasonable. (*Sharp v. County of Orange* (9th Cir. 2017) 871 F.3rd 901, 910; citing *Rivera v. Cty. of Los Angeles* (9th Cir. 2014) 745 F.3rd 384, 389; and *Hill v. California* (1971) 401 U.S. 797, 802 [91 S.Ct. 1106, 28 L.Ed.2nd 484].)

Other Examples:

Probable cause to believe defendant had been in possession of narcotics found from the defendant's own admissions which, without independent evidence of the corpus of the crime, would not be admissible in court. However, the likelihood of conviction is not relevant in establishing probable cause to arrest. (*People v. Rios* (1956) 46 Cal.2nd 297; defendant's admission that he had injected drugs two weeks earlier [along with the arresting officer's prior knowledge that defendant was a narcotics user and visible puncture marks on his arms] held to be sufficient to establish probable cause to arrest him for the past possession of a controlled substance. A subsequent search incident to the arrest was therefore lawful.)

Probable cause was found where the defendant was in the presence of a commercial quantity of drugs while in a vehicle coming over the International Border from Mexico, defendant was the sole passenger (other than the driver), there was a strong odor of gasoline in the vehicle (with the drugs being discovered in the gas tank), hiding drugs in a vehicle's gas tank was known as a common method used by drug smugglers, and the driver lied about his immigration status. (*United States v. Carranza* (9th Cir. 2002) 289 F.3rd 634.)

Probable cause found where defendant was the backseat passenger in a minivan in which a commercial quantity of marijuana was found, and defendant acted nervously and avoided eye contact with a Customs Inspector. (*United States v. Hernandez* (9th Cir. 2002) 314 F.3rd 340.)

As the passenger in a vehicle crossing the U.S./Mexican border, ignoring a border inspector until another passenger was asked to move from a spot where contraband was later found to be hidden, at which time defendant attempted to distract the inspector by inviting him to a party, was sufficient to constitute probable cause for arrest as soon as the contraband was found. (*United States v. Juvenile (RRA-A)* (9th Cir. 2000) 229 F.3rd 737, 743.)

Where a large amount of money is found rolled up in a vehicle's glove compartment, and five plastic glassine baggies of cocaine are found behind the center armrest of the backseat, with the armrest pushed up into the closed position to hide the contraband, such contraband being accessible to all the occupants of the vehicle, the arrest of all three subjects in the vehicle (driver, right front and rear

seat passengers) was supported by probable cause. (*Maryland v. Pringle* (2003) 540 U.S. 366 [157 L.Ed.2nd 769].)

Conceding that most other circuits have ruled that the mere passing of a counterfeit note (a \$100 bill in this case), when coupled with an identification of the person who passed the note, furnishes probable cause to arrest the individual identified as passing the note (Citations at pg. 970, *infra.*), the Ninth Circuit declined to decide the issue, finding that whether or not the arrest was illegal, the arresting officers were entitled to qualified immunity from civil liability. (*Rodis v. City and County of San Francisco* (9th Cir. 2009), 558 F.3rd 964; reversing its prior finding (499 F.3rd 1094.) that the officers lacked probable cause to make the arrest.)

A minor (14 years old) was seized without sufficient probable cause when a detective interviewed him at school concerning a four-year-old's allegations of child molest, when the victim's account of the facts were inconsistent and conflicting. Further investigation should have been conducted given the problems with the minor's story. (*Stoot v. City of Everett* (9th Cir. 2009) 582 F.3rd 910, 918-921; but qualified immunity supported summary judgment in the officer's favor.)

Probable cause found where the six-year-old victim, on two occasions, positively identified defendant as her attacker, and then a third time in court under oath. She also identified the defendant's father's car as the vehicle used. A crime lab analysis of semen taken from the victim could not eliminate defendant (pre-DNA). Also, defendant's modus operandi known to police from prior similar assaults matched. The fact that the victim's initial description of the assailant varied from how defendant actually appeared did not mean that the officer did not have probable cause to arrest defendant. (*McSherry v. City of Long Beach* (9th Cir. 2009) 584 F.3rd 1129, 1135.)

“Mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity . . . does not, without more, give rise to probable cause.” (*United States v. Collins* (9th Cir. 2005) 427 F.3rd 688, quoting *Ybarra v. Illinois* (1979) 444 U.S. 85, 91 [62 L.Ed.2nd 238].)

Probable cause to arrest and prosecute the plaintiff for assault and elder abuse was found where a police officer found an elderly and infirm man bleeding profusely from a head wound admittedly inflicted by the plaintiff who himself was without significant injuries. Also, the victim and his wife both told the officers at the

scene that plaintiff had attacked him without provocation. The fact that the reporting officer began a romantic relationship with the plaintiff's wife *after* all of the evidence relating to the altercation had been collected and documented in official reports was irrelevant. His later misconduct does nothing to undermine the existence of probable cause that existed at the time of plaintiff's arrest. (*Yousefian v. City of Glendale* (9th Cir. 2015) 779 F.3rd 1010, 1014.)

Also, the fact that it was the plaintiff who originally called the police to the scene of the altercation, and that he himself claimed to have been assaulted by the victim, did not overcome the other evidence establishing probable cause to believe that plaintiff had attacked the elderly victim. "(P)robable cause requires only that those 'facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge are sufficient to warrant a prudent person to believe 'that the suspect has committed . . . an offense.'"" (*Ibid.*, citing *Barry v. Fowler* (9th Cir. 1990) 902 F.2nd 770, 773; and *Michigan v. DeFillippo* (1979) 443 U.S. 31, 37 [61 L.Ed.2nd 343].)

Also, while exculpatory evidence that could negate probable cause cannot be ignored, or the fact that a criminal jury later determines that there was insufficient evidence to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt, does not mean that an officer at the scene could not reasonably have concluded that probable cause to arrest the plaintiff existed at the time. (*Yousefian v. City of Glendale*, *supra*, at pp. 1014-1015.)

Test: Whether or not a person has been "*arrested*," (i.e., "*seized*,"), under the **Fourth Amendment**, is determined by considering whether, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave and/or was about to go to jail. (See *In re James D.* (1987) 43 Cal.3rd 903, 913.)

"The standard for determining whether a person is under arrest is not simply whether a person believes that he is free to leave, *see United States v. Mendenhall*, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 64 L.Ed.2nd 497, 100 S. Ct. 1870 (1980), but rather whether a reasonable person would believe that he or she is being subjected to more than 'temporary detention occasioned by border-crossing formalities.' *United States v. Butler*, 249 F.3rd 1094, 1100 (9th Cir. 2001)." (*United States v. Hernandez* (9th Cir. 2002) 314 F.3rd 430, 436; a border arrest and search case.)

There was no arrest where Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) agents did not tell defendant that he had the right to refuse to accompany them to the FBI office, but neither did they tell him that he had to go. The agents used no tools of coercion to force defendant to go with them; i.e., they asked him if he would come in to talk because they were investigating cases, and he agreed to do so. Defendant was not in custody during the questioning until he confessed to the sexual assault and murder. In the time leading to the confession, a reasonable person in defendant's shoes would have thought that he or she could get up and go if declining to take part in further investigative questioning. (*United States v. Redlightning* (9th Cir. 2010) 624 F.3rd 1090.)

Unlawful Arrests: An arrest, if done *without probable cause*, is a violation of the **Fourth Amendment** as an unlawful *seizure*, and therefore unconstitutional. Any evidence recovered as a direct product of such an unlawful arrest will be subject to suppression. (See *Smith v. Ohio* (1990) 494 U.S. 541 [108 L.Ed.2nd 464].)

Confession obtained as the product of an illegal arrest is subject to suppression, absent attenuating circumstances. (*Brown v. Illinois* (1975) 422 U.S. 590, 603 [45 L.Ed.2nd 416, 427]; *Kaupp v. Texas* (2003) 538 U.S. 626 [155 L.Ed.2nd 814].)

However, when probable cause exists, but the defendant is later exonerated, there is no basis for the officers' civil liability for an illegal arrest. "Probable cause arises when an officer has knowledge based on reasonably trustworthy information that the person arrested has committed a criminal offense. . . . 'Because many situations which confront officers in the course of executing their duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes on their part.'" (*McSherry v. City of Long Beach* (2009) 584 F.3rd 1129, quoting, at p. 1135, *Gausvik v. Perez* (9th Cir. 2003) 345 F.3rd 813, 818.)

See also *Yousefian v. City of Glendale* (9th Cir. 2015) 779 F.3rd 1010, 1014: The fact that it was the plaintiff who originally called the police to the scene of the altercation, and that he himself claimed to have been assaulted by the victim, did not overcome the other evidence establishing probable cause to believe that plaintiff had attacked the elderly victim. "(P)robable cause requires only that those 'facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge are sufficient to warrant a prudent person to believe 'that the suspect has committed . . . an offense.'" (Citing *Barry v. Fowler* (9th Cir. 1990) 902 F.2nd 770, 773; and *Michigan v. DeFillippo* (1979) 443 U.S. 31, 37 [61 L.Ed.2nd 343].)

Also, while exculpatory evidence that could negate probable cause cannot be ignored, or the fact that a criminal jury later determines that there was insufficient evidence to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt, does not mean that an officer at the scene could not reasonably have concluded that probable cause to arrest the plaintiff existed at the time. (*Yousefian v. City of Glendale*, *supra*, at pp. 1014-1015.)

An accusation of stalking that resulted in a warrantless arrest, where it turned out to be a false accusation, does not support a later civil claim of malicious prosecution alleged against the person making the accusation, even though the district attorney's office ultimately declines to prosecute. A cause of action for malicious prosecution cannot be premised on an arrest that does not result in formal charges, at least when the arrest is not pursuant to a warrant. (*Van Audenhove v. Perry* (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 915.)

Also, evidence *will not* be suppressed when an arrest is in violation of a statute only (e.g., misdemeanor arrest not in the officer's presence), not involving a constitutional violation, and where the statute violated does not specifically mandate suppression of the resulting evidence. (*People v. Donaldson* (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 532; *People v. Trapani* (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th Supp. 10; *People v. McKay* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 601, 607-619, a violation of V.C. § 21650.1 (riding a bicycle in the wrong direction); and *People v. Gomez* (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 531, 538-539, seat belt violation, citing *Atwater v. City of Lago Vista* (2001) 532 U.S. 318 [149 L.Ed.2nd 549] see also *People v. Gallardo* (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 234, 239, fn. 1; *People v. Bennett* (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 907, 918.)

A violation by a police officer of a state statute, such statute limiting the officer's right to make a custodial arrest or a search, so long as not also in violation of the **Fourth Amendment**, does not result in the suppression of the resulting evidence unless mandated by the terms of the statute. While a state is empowered to enact more restrictive search and seizure rules, violation of those rules that are not also a **Fourth Amendment** violation, does not invoke the **Fourth Amendment's** exclusionary rule. (*Virginia v. Moore* (2008) 553 U.S. 164 [170 L.Ed.2nd 559]; *People v. Xinos* (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 637, 653.)

However, "police may not use probable cause for a traffic violation to justify an arrest for an unrelated offense where, under the facts known to police, they have no probable cause supporting the unrelated offense." (*People v. Espino* (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 746, 765; ruling that just because officers *could have* arrested defendant

for speeding, doesn't mean that that fact justifies an arrest for some other bookable (i.e., a felony) offense for which there was no probable cause. Consent to search obtained without probable cause to justify the arrest for a felony was held to be invalid.)

Also, prosecution of a defendant is not precluded merely because a defendant is abducted abroad for the purpose of prosecution, even if done in violation of an extradition treaty, such as when U.S. law enforcement agents forcibly abduct a foreign national in Mexico and bring him to the United States for prosecution. (*Alvarez-Machain* (1992) 504 U.S. 655 [119 L.Ed.2nd 441]; see also *Ker v. Illinois* (1886) 119 U.S. 436 [30 L.Ed. 421]; *Frisbie v. Collins* (1952) 342 U.S. 519, 522 [96 L.Ed.2nd 541]; *People v. Salcido* (2008) 44 Cal.4th 93, 119-126.)

General Rule: “(T)he manner by which a defendant is brought to trial does not affect the government’s ability to try him.” (*United States v. Matta-Ballesteros* (9th Cir. 1995) 71 F.3rd 754, 762.)

Exceptions: Where (1) the transfer of the defendant violated the applicable extradition treaty; or (2) the government engaged in misconduct of the most shocking and outrageous kind to obtain the defendant’s presence. (*United States v. Anderson* (9th Cir. 2006) 472 F.3rd 662, 666.)

Because defendant had not been extradited, his argument that his removal from Panama to the United States was not in compliance with the **Extradition Treaty, U.S.-Pan., May 25, 1904, 34 Stat. 2851** failed. Moreover, the treaty did not prohibit the use of means besides extradition to obtain a defendant's presence in the United States. The Government had not engaged in shocking and outrageous conduct so as to warrant dismissal of the criminal case against him. The lies that an embassy official told Panamanian officials came after Panama had already decided to cooperate in returning defendant to the United States. Moreover, defendant was deported after his passport was revoked. The trial court properly denied dismissal based on its supervisory powers. There was no evidence that defendant’s right to counsel was violated, and he had not developed his argument that international law was violated. Finally, even assuming the indictment process was deficient for its reliance on unlawfully obtained evidence, that deficiency was cured when defendant was convicted by a jury after a trial that excluded all of the suppressed evidence. (*United States v. Struckman* (9th Cir. 2010) 611 F.3rd 560, 569-575.)

While a state may impose stricter standards on law enforcement in interpreting its own state constitution (i.e., “*independent state grounds*”), a prosecution in federal court is guided by the federal interpretation of the **Fourth Amendment** and is not required to use the state’s stricter standards. (*United States v. Brobst* (9th Cir. 2009) 558 F.3rd 982, 989-991, 997.)

California’s Exclusionary Rule: Cal. Const., Art I, § 28(d), the “*Truth in Evidence*” provisions of **Proposition 8** (passed in June, 1982), abrogated California’s “*independent state grounds*” theory of exclusion, leaving the **United States Constitution** and its amendments as the sole basis for imposing an “*Exclusionary Rule*” on the admissibility of evidence. (*In re Lance W.* (1985) 37 Cal.3rd 873; *People v. Gutierrez* (1984) 163 Cal.App.3rd 332, 334.)

Until passage of **Proposition 8**, California Courts were obligated to follow California’s rules that in some circumstances may (and lawfully were allowed to) have been stricter than the federal standards. (See *American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 307, 327-328; *Raven v. Deukmejian* (1990) 52 Cal.3rd 336, 353.)

Since passage of **Proposition 8**, California state courts now determine the reasonableness of a search or seizure by federal constitutional standards. (*People v. Schmitz* (2012) 55 Cal.4th 909, 916; *People v. Steele* (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1114-1115.)

It is “doubtful,” however, whether **Proposition 8’s** “truth-in-evidence provision applies where the requested remedy is not suppression of evidence, but dismissal of all charges based on the state’s violation of a defendant’s (**Sixth Amendment**, speedy trial, delay in filing charges) due process rights.” (*People v. Lazarus* (2015) 238 Cal.App. 4th 734, 756.)

“The absence of probable cause is a necessary element of (a **42 U.S.C.**) § **1983** false arrest and malicious prosecution claims.” (*Yousefian v. City of Glendale* (9th Cir. 2015) 779 F.3rd 1010, 1014; citing *Barry v. Fowler* (9th Cir. 1990) 901 F.2nd 770, 772-773; and *Awabdy v. City of Adelanto* (9th Cir.2004) 368 F.3rd 1062, 1066.)

An officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a civil allegation of unlawful arrest so long as at the time of the arrest (1) there was probable cause for the arrest, or (2) “it is *reasonably arguable* that there was probable cause for arrest—that is, whether reasonable officers could disagree as to the legality of the arrest such that the arresting officer is

entitled to qualified immunity.” (*Rosenbaum v. Washoe County* (9th Cir. 2011) 663 F.3rd 1071, 1076; finding that because no Nevada statute applied to the plaintiff’s “scalping” of tickets to a fair, his arrest was unlawful and because no reasonable officer would have believed so, the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity.)

Arresting a person in retaliation for the defendant having made certain statements to the officer accusing the officer of being racially motivated, even where the officer had probable cause to make the arrest (but also had the option of releasing him on a citation), is a **First Amendment** violation of the defendant’s freedom of speech, subjecting the officer to potential civil liability. (*Ford v. City of Yakima* (9th Cir. Feb. 8, 2013) 706 F.3rd 1188, 1192-1196.)

Statutory Elements of an Arrest:

P.C. § 834: The arrested person must be taken into custody in a case and in the manner authorized by law.

P.C. § 835: The arrest may be made by actual restraint of the person or the arrested person’s submission to authority.

P.C. § 835a: Reasonable force may be used to affect an arrest, prevent escape or overcome resistance. (See below)

P.C. §§ 834, 836, 837: An arrest may be made by a peace officer or a private person. (See below)

W&I § 625: Taking a minor “*into temporary custody*,” as authorized by **W&I § 625**, is the functional equivalent of an *arrest*. (*In re Charles C.* (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 420, 425; see also *In re Thierry S.* (1977) 19 Cal.3rd 727, 734, fn. 6.)

Legal Authority for Arrests:

Arrests by a Peace Officer:

P.C. §§ 834, 836: A *peace officer* “*may*” make an arrest under the following circumstances:

- Pursuant to an *arrest warrant*; or
- Whenever the officer has *reasonable* (or *probable*) *cause* to believe the suspect has committed a crime; *and*
- Whenever the officer has *reasonable* (or *probable*) *cause* to believe a crime has in fact been committed.

Note that only “reasonable” or “probable” cause is needed: The fact that the officer may be mistaken as to defendant’s guilt, of that a crime even occurred, is irrelevant so long as the arrest is made with probable cause to believe he is guilty and that a crime occurred. The arrest would still be lawful.

Note: The terms “reasonable” and “probable” cause are used interchangeably in both the codes (See P.C. § 995(a)(1)(B)) and case law, but (when properly used) mean the same thing. “Reasonable cause” and “reasonable suspicion” (i.e., the standard of proof for a detention) *do not* mean the same thing and are not to be confused.

The use of the word “may” in the statute indicates that the officer is under no obligation to make an arrest. It is a matter of discretion whether or not, despite the existence of “probable cause,” an arrest will be made. An officer is not generally (absent a command to do so in a particular, applicable statute) required to arrest an individual despite the officer’s determination that an arrest could legally be made. (*Michenfelder v. City of Torrance* (1972) 28 Cal.App.3rd 202, 206-207; *Tomlinson v. Pierce* (1960) 178 Cal.app.2nd 112, 116.)

P.C. § 150; “*Posse Comitatus*.” A uniformed peace officer, or any peace officer described in P.C. §§ 830.1, 830.2(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), or (f), or 830.33(a), has statutory authority to command any “able-bodied” individual over the age of 18 to assist in an arrest. Refusing such a command is punishable by a fine of from \$50 to \$1,000.

In a domestic violence case (see P.C. §§ 13700 et seq.), a peace officer should be aware of the following:

- When a peace officer makes an arrest for a violation of P.C. § 243(e)(1) (domestic violence battery), the peace officer is no longer required to inform the victim of his or her right to make a citizen’s arrest; this requirement having been eliminated as of 1/1/2013: (P.C. §§ 243(e)(5) & 836(b))

- Also, when a peace officer makes an arrest for a violation of **P.C. § 273.5(a)** (domestic violence involving corporal injury), the peace officer is no longer required to inform the victim of his or her right to make a citizen’s arrest; this requirement having been eliminated as of 1/1/2013. (**P.C. §§ 273.5(j) & 836(b)**)
- When responding to a situation involving the violation of a domestic violence restraining or protective order (per **Fam. Code, §§ 2040 et seq., 6200 et seq., or 7700 et seq.**), or of a protective order issued pursuant to **P.C. § 136.2** (Victim or Witness Intimidation), the peace officer him or herself *must*, absent exigent circumstances, make the arrest if, under the circumstances, it is lawful to do so. (**P.C. §§ 836(c)(1), 13701(b)**)

(See “*Misdemeanor ‘In The Presence’ Requirement,*” below.)

Note: The respondent need not be physically in the jurisdiction (i.e., California) to violate a domestic violence restraining order. (See *Hogue v. Hogue* (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 833; respondent sent faked suicide video from Georgia to plaintiff in California via social media, triggering the legal authority of the court to issue a restraining order pursuant to **Fam. Code §§ 6200 et seq.**)

Arrests by a Private Person:

P.C. §§ 834, 837: A *private person* may make an arrest under the following circumstances:

- Whenever the person has *reasonable (or probable) cause* to believe the suspect has committed a crime, *and*
- Whenever a criminal offense *has in fact* been committed.

Per the above, while a private person may be mistaken as to who committed a particular crime, there is no room for error as to whether a crime actually occurred.

Exception: P.C. § 490(f)(1): A merchant, library employee, or theater owner may act upon *probable cause* that an offense is occurring in detaining a *shoplifter, book*

thief, or someone who is attempting to *operate a video recording device* in a theater, respectively.

Note; the section refers to such a contact as a “*detention*,” as opposed to an arrest.

Private persons, like police officers, may summon others to assist in an arrest. (**P.C. § 839**) However, there is no penalty for a person refusing to help.

The private person may delegate to a peace officer his or her authority to actually perform the arrest for the person. (***People v. Sjosten*** (1968) 262 Cal.App.2nd 539.)

A police dispatcher, being subjected to defendant’s numerous harassing telephone calls, may delegate to a police officer the responsibility to arrest the defendant for her. The offense, over the phone, was held to be in her presence. The arrest was timely in that officers responded immediately to where defendant was calling from and took him into custody. The arrest was held to be a lawful citizen’s arrest. (***People v. Bloom*** (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1496.)

A private person making an arrest must, without unnecessary delay, take the person arrested before a magistrate or deliver him or her to a peace officer. (**P.C. § 847**)

In a *domestic violence* situation (see **P.C. §§ 13700 et seq.**), a peace officer is no longer required to make a good faith effort to explain to the victim/witness of his or her right to make a private person’s arrest; this requirement having been eliminated as of 1/1/13. (**P.C. § 836(b)**)

The provision that a peace officer commits a felony should he or she refuse to take a subject who was arrested by a private citizen, even when the officer determines that the arrest was made without probable cause (**P.C. § 142**), was amended with the addition of **subd. (c)** which states that; “This section shall not apply to arrests made pursuant to **Section 837**,” i.e., a *private person’s arrest*.

Law prior to enactment of **subd. (c)**: Although taking a citizen’s arrestee when not supported by probable cause, as it was widely believed **P.C. § 142** as previously written required, would *not* subject the officer to any civil liability in state court (***Kinney v. County of Contra Costa*** (1970) 8 Cal.App.3rd 761, 767-769;

Hamburg v. Wal-Mart Stores (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 497, 503-504.), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal was of the opinion that the officer in such a situation would be subject to federal civil liability. (**Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transportation Agency** (9th Cir. 2001) 261 F.3rd 912, 924-925.) The addition of **subdivision (c)**, eliminating the requirement that an officer accept a prisoner arrested by a private citizen, avoids the dilemma of incurring federal civil liability while attempting to follow the dictates of a state statute.

But the rule remains that for an officer to allow a private citizen to make a citizen's arrest and then to take the suspect into custody when there is insufficient probable cause to justify the arrest, the officer subjects himself to potential federal civil liability. (**Hopkins v. Bonvicino** (9th Cir. 2009) 573 F.3rd 752, 774-776.)

Federal civil liability still existed despite the fact that the officers were exempt from state civil liability in a citizen's arrest situation. (*Ibid.*; and see **P.C. § 847.**)

The *Stale Misdemeanor Rule* applies to private person's arrests as well. (See **Green v. Department of Motor Vehicles** (1977) 68 Cal.App.3rd 536; arrest made some 35 to 40 minutes after observation of the crime held to be lawful; see also **Ogulin v. Jeffries** (1953) 121 Cal.App.2nd 211; 20 minute delay; arrest lawful.) (See below)

"In the Presence" requirement: Misdemeanors (and infractions) must have occurred in the private person's (in the case of a private person's arrest) presence. (**P.C. §§ 836(a)(1), 837.1; Jackson v. Superior Court** (1950) 98 Cal.App.2nd 183; see also **V.C. § 40300.**)

A police dispatcher, being subjected to defendant's numerous harassing telephone calls, may delegate to a police officer the responsibility to arrest the defendant for her. The offense, over the phone, was held to be in her presence. The arrest was timely in that officers responded immediately to where defendant was calling from and took him into custody. The arrest was held to be a lawful citizen's arrest. (**People v. Bloom** (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1496.)

Note: **P.C. § 836** is *not* restricted by its terms to adults. There is no authority for the argument that minors cannot also make citizen’s arrests, or that the phrase “*private persons*” is restricted to adults.

Out-of-State Officers in “Fresh Pursuit:”

P.C. § 852.2: “Any peace officer of another State, who enters this State in fresh pursuit, and continues within this State in fresh pursuit, of a person in order to arrest him on the ground that he has committed a felony in the other State, has the same authority to arrest and hold the person in custody, as peace officers of this State have to arrest and hold a person in custody on the ground that he has committed a felony in this State.”

P.C. § 852.3: The arresting officer is then to take the arrestee “*immediately before a magistrate*” of the county in which the arrest is made. The magistrate is to determine whether the person had been lawfully arrested. If so, the arrestee is to be held for extradition. If not, he is to be “discharge(d).”

Federal Officers:

P.C. 830.8(a): Federal criminal investigators and federal law enforcement officers *are not* California peace officers. However, after having been certified by their agency heads as having satisfied the training requirements of **P.C. § 832**, or the equivalent thereof, they may exercise the powers of arrest of a California peace officer under the following circumstances:

- Any circumstance specified in **P.C. § 836** (see above) or **W&I § 5150** (Mental patients who are a danger to themselves, others, or who are gravely disabled).
- When incidental to the performance of their federal law enforcement duties.
- When requested by a California law enforcement agency to be involved in a joint task force or criminal investigation.
- When probable cause exists to believe that a public offense that involves immediate danger to persons or property has just occurred or is being committed.

See also **subd. (b)**: “Duly authorized federal employees who comply with the training requirements set forth in **Section 832** are peace officers when they are engaged in

enforcing applicable state or local laws on property owned or possessed by the United States government, or on any street, sidewalk, or property adjacent thereto, with the written consent of the sheriff or the chief of police, respectively, in whose jurisdiction the property is situated.” (see *People v. Redd* (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 703-704, 711-722.)

When arresting pursuant to **P.C. § 830.8**, an arrestee must be taken immediately before a magistrate or delivered to a peace officer, as specified in **P.C. § 847**.

Federal officers of the Bureau of Land Management and the Forest Service of the Department of Agriculture have no authority to enforce California statutes without the written consent of the sheriff or the chief of police in whose jurisdiction they are assigned.

See also **subd. (d)** providing these officers with similar powers during a “state of war emergency or a state of emergency,” as defined in **Gov’t. Code § 8558**.

P.C. § 830.8(b): Federal employees who have met the training requirements of **P.C. § 832** are peace officers when they are engaged in enforcing applicable state or local laws on property owned or possessed by the United States government, or on any street, sidewalk, or property adjacent thereto, so long as they have the written consent of the sheriff or the chief of police respectfully, in whose jurisdiction the property is situated.

P.C. § 830.8(c): National Park Rangers are *not* California peace officers. However, after having been certified by their agency heads as having satisfied the training requirements of **P.C. § 832.3**, or the equivalent thereof, they may exercise the powers of a California peace officer under any circumstance specified in **P.C. § 836** (see above) or **W&I § 5150** (Mental patients who are a danger to themselves, others, or who are gravely disabled), for violations of state or local laws, but only:

- When incidental to the performance of their federal duties;
or
- When requested by a California State Park Ranger to assist in preserving the peace and protecting state parks and other property for which California State Park Rangers are responsible.

(*People v. Redd* (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 703-704, 711-722.)

P.C. § 830.8(e) further provides for limited law enforcement powers for a qualified person who is appointed as a Washoe tribal law enforcement officer.

The San Ysidro Port of Entry, in San Diego, is state land and not federal, although the attached facilities belong to the federal government. A federal Immigration and Naturalization Agent at that location may therefore lawfully make a citizen's arrest for a state criminal violation (e.g., driving while under the influence) and turn him over to state and local law enforcement officers. (*People v. Crusilla* (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 141.)

Where a federal officer arrested an obviously intoxicated driver just outside a federal enclave and beyond the officer's territorial jurisdiction after a lawful traffic stop, the **Fourth Amendment** does not require the exclusion of the evidence obtained in a search incident to the arrest because the arrest was supported by probable cause. Therefore, it was not an unreasonable seizure within the meaning of the **Fourth Amendment** despite the lack of any statutory authority for making the arrest. (*United States v. Ryan* (1st Cir. 2013) 731 F.3rd 66.)

Pen. Code § 830.85: "Notwithstanding any other law, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers and United States Customs and Border Protection officers *are not* California peace officers."

Bounty Hunters or Bail Enforcement Agents have long exercised a *Common Law* power to locate, arrest, and return to custody persons released from custody on bail provided by a bail-bondsman, when the person fails to make a necessary court appearance. (*Taylor v. Taintor* (1872) 83 U.S. 366 [21 L.Ed. 287].)

General Rules:

Because state courts have found that a bounty hunter's broad authority comes from the implied terms of a private agreement between the bondsman (i.e., a private citizen) and the defendant, bounty hunters are unburdened by many of the constitutional and statutory restrictions which control the conduct of state law enforcement officers. (*Reese v. United States* (1969) 76 U.S. 13, 22 [19 L.Ed. 541, 544].)

Generally, “the common-law right of recapture is (only) limited by the reasonable means necessary to affect the arrest.” (*Lopez v. Cotter* (10th Cir. 1989) 875 F.2nd 273, 277.)

Bounty hunters “enjoy extraordinary powers to capture and use force” in tracking down and arresting fugitives. (*Kear v. Hilton* (4th Cir. 1983) 699 F.2nd 181, 182.)

Not being agents of the state, bounty hunters are not restricted by the usual constitutional constraints that apply to law enforcement. (See *People v. Johnson* (1947) 153 Cal.App.2nd 870, 873; *Landry v. A-Able Bonding, Inc.* (5th Cir. 1996) 75 F.3rd 200, 203-205; *United States v. Rhodes* (9th Cir. 1983) 731 F.2nd 463, 467.)

E.g.: The “*Exclusionary Rule*” does not apply to the actions of a bounty hunter. (*People v. Houle* (1970) 13 Cal.App.3rd 892, 895.)

California has only recently sought to regulate the licensing and training requirements for bounty hunters. (See **P.C. §§ 1299 et seq.** (see below) and **Ins. Code § 1810.7.**)

Other provisions provide for the arrest of a bail jumper by the bounty hunter when the bounty hunter’s authority is in writing upon a certified copy of either the undertaking of bail or the certificate of a bail deposited with the court. (**P.C. §§ 1300, 1301**)

P.C. § 1301 also requires the bondsman or bounty hunter to bring the bail jumper before a magistrate, or deliver him to the custody of a sheriff or police department, within 48 hours after arrest or after being brought into this state, excluding weekends and holidays. It is a misdemeanor to violate this section.

P.C. § 847.5 provides that an *out-of-state bounty hunter* must first seek an arrest warrant from a local magistrate, filing with the court an affidavit listing the name and whereabouts of the fugitive, certain particulars of the fugitive’s offense, and the circumstances of the fugitive’s violation of the terms of his bail. The bounty hunter is also required to bring the fugitive before the magistrate after

which a hearing is held. The magistrate may then authorize the bounty hunter to remove the fugitive from the state.

However, a bounty hunter who ignores the requirements of **section 847.5**, because he acts outside California's statutory regulations, is *not* acting "*under color of state law*," and, therefore, is not civilly liable, at least in a Title **42 U.S.C. § 1983** federal civil rights suit. (*Ouzts v. Maryland National Insurance Co.* (9th Cir. 1974) 505 F.2nd 547.)

The Bail Fugitive Recovery Persons Act:

Pen. Code § 1299: Designates this article as the "***Bail Fugitive Recovery Persons Act***."

Pen. Code § 1299.01: Definitions:

For purposes of this article, the following definitions apply:

Subd. (a): "*Bail Fugitive*" is defined as a defendant in a pending criminal case who has been released from custody under a financially secured appearance, cash, or other bond and has had that bond declared forfeited, or a defendant in a pending criminal case who has violated a bond condition whereby apprehension and reincarceration are permitted.

Subd. (b): "*Bail*" is defined as a person licensed by the Department of Insurance pursuant to **Ins. Code § 1800**.

Subd. (c): "*Depositor of Bail*" is defined as a person who or entity that has deposited money or bonds to secure the release of a person charged with a crime or offense.

Subd. (d): "*Bail Fugitive Recovery Person*" is defined as a person who is provided written authorization pursuant to **P.C. §§ 1300 and 1301** by the bail or depositor of bail, and is contracted to investigate, surveil,

locate, and arrest a bail fugitive for surrender to the appropriate court, jail, or police department, and any person who is employed to assist a bail or depositor of bail to investigate, surveil, locate, and arrest a bail fugitive for surrender to the appropriate court, jail, or police department.

Pen. Code § 1299.02: *Persons Authorized to Arrest Bail Fugitives:*

Subd(a): No person, other than a certified law enforcement officer, shall be authorized to apprehend, detain, or arrest a bail fugitive unless that person meets *one* of the following conditions:

(1) Is a “*bail*” as defined in **P.C. § 1299.01(b)** or a “*depositor of bail*” as defined in **P.C. § 1299.01(c)**.

(2) Is a “*bail fugitive recovery person*” as defined in **P.C. § 1299.01(d)**.

(3) Holds a bail license issued by a state other than California or is authorized by another state to transact and post bail and is in compliance with the provisions of **P.C. § 847.5** with respect to the arrest of a bail fugitive.

(4) Is licensed as a private investigator as provided in **Chapter 11.3** (commencing with **B&P Code § 7512**) of **Division 3** of the **Business and Professions Code**.

(5) Holds a private investigator license issued by another state, is authorized by the bail or depositor of bail to apprehend a bail fugitive, and is in compliance with the provisions of **P.C. § 847.5** with respect to the arrest of a bail fugitive.

Subd. (b): This article shall not prohibit an arrest pursuant to **P.C. §§ 837, 838, and 839**.

Pen. Code § 1299.04: Qualifications of a Bail Fugitive Recovery Person:

Subd. (a): A bail fugitive recovery person, a bail agent, bail permittee, or bail solicitor who contracts his or her services to another bail agent or surety as a bail fugitive recovery person for the purposes specified in subdivision **P.C. § 1200.01(d)**, and any bail agent, bail permittee, or bail solicitor who obtains licensing after January 1, 2000, and who engages in the arrest of a defendant pursuant to **P.C. § 1301** shall comply with the following requirements:

- (1) The person shall be at least 18 years of age.
- (2) The person shall have completed a 40-hour power of arrest course certified by the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training pursuant to **P.C. § 832**. Completion of the course shall be for educational purposes only and not intended to confer the power of arrest of a peace officer or public officer, or agent of any federal, state, or local government, unless the person is so employed by a governmental agency.
- (3) The person shall have completed a minimum of 20 hours of classroom education certified pursuant to **Ins. Code § 1801.7**.
- (4) The person shall not have been convicted of a felony, unless the person is licensed by the Department of Insurance pursuant to **Ins. Code § 1800**.

Subd. (b): Upon completion of any course or training program required by this section, an individual authorized by **P.C. § 1299.02** to apprehend a bail fugitive shall carry certificates of completion with him or her at all times in the course

of performing his or her duties under this article.

Pen. Code § 1299.05: Bail Fugitive Apprehensions:

In performing a bail fugitive apprehension, an individual authorized by **P.C. § 1299.01** to apprehend a bail fugitive shall comply with all laws applicable to that apprehension.

Pen. Code § 1299.06: Required Apprehension Documentation:

An individual authorized by **P.C. § 1299.02** to apprehend a bail fugitive shall have in his or her possession proper documentation of authority to apprehend issued by the bail or depositor of bail as prescribed in **P.C. §§ 1300** and **1301** before making any apprehension. The authority to apprehend document shall include all of the following information:

- (1) The name of the individual authorized by **P.C. § 1299.02** to apprehend a bail fugitive and any fictitious name, if applicable;
- (2) The address of the principal office of the individual authorized by **P.C. § 1299.02** to apprehend a bail fugitive; *and*
- (3) The name and principal business address of the bail agency, surety company, or other party contracting with the individual authorized by **P.C. § 1299.02** to apprehend a bail fugitive.

Pen. Code § 1299.07: Representing Oneself to be a Sworn Law Enforcement Officer:

Subd. (a): An individual authorized by **P.C. § 1299.02** to apprehend a bail fugitive shall not represent himself or herself in any manner as being a sworn law enforcement officer.

Subd. (b): An individual authorized by **P.C. § 1299.02** to apprehend a bail fugitive shall not wear any uniform that represents himself or herself as belonging to any part or department of a federal,

state, or local government. Any uniform shall not display the words United States, Bureau, Task Force, Federal, or other substantially similar words that a reasonable person may mistake for a government agency.

Subd. (c): An individual authorized by **P.C. § 1299.02** to apprehend a bail fugitive shall not wear or otherwise use a badge that represents himself or herself as belonging to any part or department of the federal, state, or local government.

Subd. (d): An individual authorized by **P.C. § 1299.02** to apprehend a bail fugitive shall not use a fictitious name that represents himself or herself as belonging to any federal, state, or local government.

Subd. (e): An individual authorized by **P.C. § 1299.02** to apprehend a bail fugitive may wear a jacket, shirt, or vest with the words "BAIL BOND RECOVERY AGENT," "BAIL ENFORCEMENT," or "BAIL ENFORCEMENT AGENT" displayed in letters at least two inches high across the front or back of the jacket, shirt, or vest and in a contrasting color to that of the jacket, shirt, or vest.

Pen. Code § 1299.08: Procedural Requirements in Making Arrests:

Subd. (a): Except under exigent circumstances, an individual authorized by **P.C. § 1299.02** to apprehend a bail fugitive shall, prior to and no more than six hours before attempting to apprehend the bail fugitive, notify the local police department or sheriff's department of the intent to apprehend a bail fugitive in that jurisdiction by doing all of the following:

(1): Indicating the name of an individual authorized by **P.C. § 1299.02** to apprehend a bail fugitive entering the jurisdiction.

(2): Stating the approximate time an individual authorized by **P.C. § 1299.02** to apprehend a bail fugitive will be entering the

jurisdiction and the approximate length of the stay.

(3): Stating the name and approximate location of the bail fugitive.

Subd. (b): If an exigent circumstance does arise and prior notification is not given as provided in **subd. (a)**, an individual authorized by **P.C. § 1299.02** to apprehend a bail fugitive shall notify the local police department or sheriff's department immediately after the apprehension, and upon request of the local jurisdiction, shall submit a detailed explanation of those exigent circumstances within three working days after the apprehension is made.

Subd. (c): This section shall not preclude an individual authorized by **P.C. § 1299.02** to apprehend a bail fugitive from making or attempting to make a lawful arrest of a bail fugitive on bond pursuant to **P.C. §§ 1300 and 1301**. The fact that a bench warrant is not located or entered into a warrant depository or system shall not affect a lawful arrest of the bail fugitive.

Subd. (d): For the purposes of this section, notice may be provided to a local law enforcement agency by telephone prior to the arrest or, after the arrest has taken place, if exigent circumstances exist. In that case the name or operator number of the employee receiving the notice information shall be obtained and retained by the bail, depositor of bail, or bail fugitive recovery person.

Pen. Code § 1299.09: Forcible Entries:

An individual, authorized by **P.C. § 1299.02** to apprehend a bail fugitive shall not forcibly enter a premises except as provided for in **P.C. § 844** (i.e., “*knock and notice*” requirements).

Pen. Code § 1299.10: Use of Firearms or Other Weapons:

An individual authorized by **P.C. § 1299.02** to apprehend a bail fugitive shall not carry a firearm or other weapon unless in compliance with the laws of the state.

A bail agent may, upon request of the surety liable for the undertaking, arrest a defendant and transport him to a court, magistrate, sheriff, or police, as directed; although a bail agent has no explicit statutory authority to carry a loaded firearm when performing his duties, like any person who does not have a permit to carry a firearm, he may carry a loaded firearm while engaged in the act of making or attempting to make a lawful arrest of the defendant. (81 *Op.Cal.Atty.Gen.* 257, 7/29/1998.)

A bail recovery agent was not “attempting to make a lawful arrest” when stopped by police officers, and thus the California statute providing that a person attempting to make lawful arrest may carry loaded handgun (i.e., formerly **P.C. § 12031(k)**; now **P.C. § 26050**) was inapplicable. The officers had probable cause to arrest the agent for carrying loaded firearm when the agent was arrested because he was in his car half block away from fugitive. (*Golt v. City of Signal Hill* (C.D.Cal. 2001) 132 F.Supp.2nd 1271.)

Pen. Code § 1299.11: Violating the Bail Fugitive Recovery Persons Act:

It is a misdemeanor to violate or conspire to violate any provision of the **Bail Fugitive Recovery Persons Act**, or to hire an individual to apprehend a bail fugitive, knowing that the individual is not authorized by **P.C. § 1299.02** to apprehend a bail fugitive.

Punishment: Misdemeanor: Up to one year in county jail and/or a \$5,000 fine.

Pen. Code § 1299.12: Licensing Private Investigators:

The above is specifically *not* intended to exempt from licensure persons otherwise required to be licensed as private investigators pursuant to **B&P §§ 7512 et seq.**

Arrest Options: A peace officer has *five options* when he or she makes an arrest pursuant to **P.C. § 836** or takes custody of a prisoner from a private person, arrested pursuant to **P.C. § 837**:

- **Release Without Charges:** If, after a subject has been arrested, the officer feels that based upon additional information collected, the arrest is not justified (i.e., there is insufficient probable cause), he or she may unconditionally release the prisoner pursuant to authority described in **P.C. § 849(b)(1)**.

If, when arrested by a private person, the person changes his or her mind about wanting to arrest the subject, the prisoner may simply be released without any further action.

Otherwise, any such arrest and release must be documented pursuant to **P.C. § 851.6**, with a certificate issued to the arrested person by the arresting agency describing such action as a detention only.

The legal status of anyone so released shall be deemed a detention only; not an arrest. (**P.C. § 849(c)**)

P.C. § 849.5 provides that if a person is arrested and released and no accusatory pleading is filed, the arrest shall be deemed a detention *only*. **Subdivision (b)** of **P.C. § 851.6** provides that the arresting agency shall issue the arrestee a certificate describing the action as a detention, and **subdivision (d)** provides that the official criminal records shall delete any reference to an arrest and refer to the action as a detention.

Plaintiff in a class action suit against the CHP asked the court to require it to comply, and won. The Court on appeal affirmed, holding that Plaintiff “is entitled to have his arrest deemed a detention; entitled to a certificate from the CHP describing the action as a detention; and entitled to have his arrest deleted from the records of the CHP and the Department of Justice and have any such record refer to it

as a detention.” (*Schmidt v. California Highway Patrol* (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1287.)

Note: Pursuant to **P.C. § 853.6(e)(3)**, a prosecutorial agency has 25 days to decide to file. After that, the prosecutor can only proceed following a new arrest or the issuance of an arrest warrant. It therefore follows that a law enforcement agency has at least 25 days, or until there is a formal and permanent (i.e., not being held for further investigation) reject from the prosecutor (whichever occurs first) before the arresting agency has to worry about complying with the **section 849.5** and **851.6** requirements. Upon the occurrence of one of these events (formal reject or 25 days), it is suggested that **sections 849.5 and 851.6** be complied with “without delay.”

Subd. (b)(4) adds (effective 1/1/2016) as a legal basis for releasing a prisoner prior to booking or without citation when; “(t)he person was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs and the person is delivered to a hospital for medical treatment that prohibits immediate delivery before a magistrate.”

Subd. (b)(5) adds (effective 1/1/2018) as a legal basis for releasing a prisoner prior to booking and without a citation when; “(t)he person was arrested and subsequently delivered to a hospital or other urgent care facility, including, but not limited to, a facility for the treatment of co-occurring substance use disorders, for mental health evaluation and treatment, and no further proceedings are desirable.

Note: It is also arguable that a law enforcement officer may choose to release a subject for whom probable cause *does* exist. There is nothing in the case or statutory law that says that **P.C. § 849(b)** is the exclusive authority for releasing an arrested prisoner.

Note, however, **P.C. § 4011.10(b)** prohibiting law enforcement from releasing a jail inmate for the purpose of allowing the inmate to seek medical care at a hospital, and then immediately re-arresting the same individual upon discharge from the hospital, unless the hospital determines this action would enable it to bill and collect from a third-party payment source.

Subd. (a): “It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this section to provide county sheriffs,

chiefs of police, and directors or administrators of local detention facilities with an incentive to not engage in practices designed to avoid payment of legitimate health care costs for the treatment or examination of persons lawfully in their custody, and to promptly pay those costs as requested by the provider of services. Further, it is the intent of the Legislature to encourage county sheriffs, chiefs of police, and directors or administrators of local detention facilities to bargain in good faith when negotiating a service contract with hospitals providing health care services.”

- *Seek an Arrest Warrant:* (I.e., a “*Notify Warrant.*”) Should the peace officer determine that, although probable cause for an arrest exists, the person may not be lawfully arrested (e.g., a misdemeanor *not* in the officer’s presence or the private person’s presence, or a “*stale misdemeanor,*” (see below; “*Legal Requirements of an Arrest*”), or as a discretionary option to taking the subject into custody or writing a misdemeanor citation, an arrest report may be filled out with the appropriate notation made (or box, e.g., “ notify warrant,” checked).

This is *not* an arrest and requires (after a “*detention for investigation*” during which identification information is collected and a brief investigation is conducted) the immediate release of the subject. The local prosecuting agency to which the reports are forwarded will then notify the subject of when and where to appear in court to answer to any charges filed in court. Should the person fail to respond to this notification, an arrest warrant will be sought.

Stopping a suspect in a misdemeanor offense, a noise violation, not occurring in the officer’s presence, at least where there are possible alternative less intrusive methods of identifying the suspect, may be unconstitutional. The Court is to balance law enforcement’s interest in crime prevention with the detainee’s interest in personal security from government intrusion. (See *United States v. Hensley* (1985) 469 U.S. 221 [83 L.E.2nd 604]; declining to decide the issue.) In a misdemeanor situation, law enforcement’s interest *may* not outweigh the suspect’s. (*United States v. Grigg* (9th Cir. 2007) 498 F.3rd 1070, 1074-1083.)

The continuing validity of the *Grigg* decision has been questioned and is probably, if it ever was, no longer a valid rule. (See *United States v. Creek* (U.S. Dist. Ct, Ariz. 2009) 586 F. Supp.2nd 1099, 1102-1108; upholding the

traffic stop of a petty theft (gas drive off) suspect. See also *Stanton v. Sims* (Nov. 4, 2013) 571 U.S. __ [134 S.Ct. 3; 187 L.Ed.2nd 341], calling into question, but not deciding, the Ninth Circuit's sensitivity to apprehending misdemeanor suspects.)

- *Issuance of a Misdemeanor Citation:* A misdemeanor arrest for an offense which is not “stale” and which did occur in the officer’s (or a private citizen’s) presence, but when booking is either not legal or not appropriate under the circumstances, may result in the subject being cited and released at the scene.

Misdemeanor citations are in fact an *arrest*, although the subject is released without booking, and must therefore be conducted according to the rules on misdemeanor crimes occurring in the officer’s presence, etc. (See below; “*Legal Requirements of an Arrest.*”)

Misdemeanor arrestees are, as a general rule, to be cited and released unless one of the exceptions listed in **P.C. § 853.6(i)** applies. (**P.C. § 853.6(a)**)

Note also that all persons released on a misdemeanor citation must be booked and fingerprinted either at the scene or at the arresting agency at some point prior to appearing in court, but that if released prior to doing so, should be so notified of their responsibility to comply. (**P.C. § 853.6(g)**)

Note: Booking at the scene requires the officer to use a mobile fingerprint device to take all fingerprints instead of merely a thumbprint.

- *Booking into Jail:* When one or more of the circumstances listed in **P.C. § 853.6(i)** does exist, and the subject is otherwise lawfully arrested (e.g., a felony arrest, or a misdemeanor in the officer or private person’s presence which is not “stale.”), the arrested person may be subjected to a custodial arrest and transported to county jail for booking.

P.C. § 7, subd. (21): To “book” signifies the recordation of an arrest in official police records, and the taking by the police of fingerprints and photographs of the person arrested, or any of these acts following an arrest.

P.C. § 853.5 has been held to provide the exclusive grounds for a custodial arrest for an infraction, and that **853.6** applies to

misdemeanors only. (*Edgerly v. City and County of San Francisco* (9th Cir. 2013) 713 F.3rd 976, 981-985; citing *In re Rottanak K.* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 260, and *People v. Williams* (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1100.)

- *Take the Subject Directly Before a Magistrate:* When court is in session, and a judge is available, a subject may be transported directly to the judge.

The offense must be a felony, or the conditions for a lawful misdemeanor arrest must be present (i.e., in the presence of the officer or private person making the arrest and not stale).

See also **P.C. § 853.5** and **V.C. §§ 40300.5, 40302, 40303, 40304, and 40305** (below), for conditions under which persons arrested for certain infractions or misdemeanors may be taken immediately before a magistrate.

Legal Requirements of an Arrest:

Felonies: A peace officer may make an arrest for a felony, with or without a warrant, at any time, day or night, at any location, whether or not the felony has occurred in the officer's presence, so long as such arrest is supported by "probable cause." (**P.C. § 836(a)(2), (3)**)

Exception: Warrantless arrests in a person's home. (See below)

See also **V.C. § 40301:** When probable cause exists to believe that a particular person has violated a **Vehicle Code** felony, the subject "shall be dealt with in like manner as upon arrest for the commission of any other felony," according to the general provisions of the Penal Code on felony arrests. (See *People v. Superior Court (Simon)* (1972) 7 Cal.3rd 186, 199.)

Misdemeanors and Infractions:

"In the Presence" requirement: Misdemeanors (and infractions) must have occurred in the officer's (or private person's, in the case of a private person's arrest) presence. (**P.C. §§ 836(a)(1), 837.1; Jackson v. Superior Court** (1950) 98 Cal.App.2nd 183; see also **V.C. § 40300.**)

V.C. § 40300: "The provisions of this chapter shall govern all peace officers in making arrests for violations of this code without a warrant for offenses *committed in their presence*, but the procedure prescribed herein shall not

otherwise be exclusive of any other method prescribed by law for the arrest and prosecution of a person for an offense of like grade.” (Italics added)

“In the Presence,” Defined: “*In the presence*” is commonly interpreted to refer to having personal knowledge that the offense in question has been committed, made known to the officer through *any* of the officer’s five senses. (See *People v. Burgess* (1959) 170 Cal.App.2nd 36, 41.)

The crime of making annoying or harassing telephone calls, per **P.C. § 653x**, is done in the listener’s presence. (*People v. Bloom* (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1496; harassing phone calls to a police dispatcher.)

Exceptions: A peace officer has statutory authorization to affect a warrantless arrest for misdemeanors which *did not* occur in the officer’s presence under limited circumstances:

1. *Juvenile Arrests:* (**W&I Code § 625(a)**); *In re Samuel V.* (1990) 225 Cal.App.3rd 511; *In re Gregory S.* (1980) 112 Cal.App.3rd 764.)

2. *Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs*, when any of the following circumstances exist (**V.C. § 40300.5**):

- **(a)** The person was involved in a traffic accident.
- **(b)** The person is observed in or about a vehicle that is obstructing a roadway.
- **(c)** The person will not be apprehended unless immediately arrested.
- **(d)** The person may cause injury to himself or herself or damage property unless immediately arrested.
- **(e)** The person may destroy or conceal evidence of the crime unless immediately arrested.

(*People v. Schofield* (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 968; the metabolic destruction of alcohol in a DUI suspect’s body (i.e., the “*burn off*”

rate) qualifies as the “*destruction of evidence*” for purposes of this exception.)

See also *Troppman v. Gourley* (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 755, at pp. 760-761, where it was noted that the prior Supreme Court case of *Mercer v. Department of Motor Vehicles* (1991) 53 Cal.3rd 753, 768-769, requiring some observation of the vehicle’s movement by the arresting officer, was no longer valid case law in light of the amendment to this statute.

Even though the officer did not observe defendant’s vehicle moving, where the police officer discovered defendant asleep behind wheel with his foot on the brake, the engine running, and the gear in drive, in the middle of interstate highway, defendant’s arrest for driving while under the influence was lawful based upon the circumstantial evidence that defendant had driven there while under the influence. (*Villalobos v. Zolin* (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 556.)

The old California rule of requiring a valid arrest, even of an unconscious suspect, prior to the extraction of a blood sample (See *People v. Superior Court [Hawkins]* (1972) 6 Cal.3rd 757, 762.), was abrogated by passage of **Proposition 8**, in 1982. Now, so long as probable cause exists to believe that the defendant was driving while intoxicated, a formal arrest is not a prerequisite to a warrantless seizure of a blood sample. (*People v. Trotman* (1989) 214 Cal.App.3rd 430, 435; *People v. Deltoro* (1989) 214 Cal.App.3rd 1417, 1422, 1425.)

But see *Missouri v. McNeely* (2013) 569 U.S. 141 [133 S.Ct. 1552; 185 L.Ed.2nd 696]; requiring a search warrant absent exigent circumstances or consent.

The implied consent provisions under **V.C. § 23612(a)(5)**, where, by statute, blood may be drawn from an unconscious or dead DUI suspect, does not overcome the need for a search warrant without a showing of exigent circumstances. (*People v. Arredondo* (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 186, 193-205; no exigency found, pp. 205-206.

Note: Petition for Review was granted by the California Supreme Court in *People v. Arredondo* on June 8, 2016, making this case unavailable for citation.

V.C. § 40300.5, allowing for the arrest of someone who had been driving while under the influence under certain circumstances even though not in the officer's presence, does not violate the **Fourth Amendment**. (*People v. Burton* (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th Supp. 9.)

3. *Battery on School Grounds* during school hours. (**P.C. § 243.5**)

4. *Carrying a Loaded Firearm*, in violation of **P.C. § 25850(a)** (formerly **P.C. § 12031(a)(1)**). (**P.C. § 25850(g)**, formerly **P.C. § 12031(a)(5)(A)**)

5. *Assault or Battery Against the Person of a Firefighter, Emergency Medical Technician, or Paramedic*, per **P.C. §§ 241(b) or 243(b)**. (**P.C. § 836.1**)

6. *Persons Violating a Domestic Violence Protective or Restraining Order* issued under authority of:

- **CCP § 527.6** (*Harassment Orders*);
- **Fam. Code, §§ 6200 et seq.** (*Domestic Violence*);
- **P.C. § 136.2** (*Victim or Witness Intimidation*);

- **P.C. § 646.91** (*Stalking*);
- **P.C. § 1203.097(a)(2)** (*Acts of violence, threats, stalking, sexual abuse, and harassment, in Domestic Violence*);
- **W&I § 213.5** (*During Child Dependency Proceedings*);
- **W&I § 15657.03**, (*Elder or Dependent Adult Abuse*) or
- *Similar orders* from another state, tribe, or territory;

. . . where the officer has *probable cause* to believe the suspect has knowledge of the order and has committed an act in violation of the order. (**P.C. § 836(c)(1)**)

Note: This section, and **P.C. § 13701(b)**, at least when “*domestic violence*” (per **Fam. Code §§ 2040 et seq., 6200 et seq., or 7700 et seq.**) is involved, or when *victim or witness intimidation* (per **P.C. § 136.2**) is involved, make this arrest *mandatory* upon the officer, absent “*exigent circumstances*” excusing the lack of an arrest.

7. *Assaults or Batteries* upon the suspect’s current or former spouse, fiancé, fiancée, a current or former cohabitant (per **Fam. Code, § 6209**), a person with whom the suspect currently is having or has previously had an engagement or dating relationship (per **P.C. § 243(f)(10)**), a person with whom the suspect has parented a child, or is presumed to have parented a child (per the **Uniform Parentage Act; Fam. Code, §§ 7600 et seq.**), a child of the suspect, a child whose parentage by the suspect is the subject of an action under the **Uniform Parentage Act**, a child of a person in one of the above categories, or any other person related to the suspect by consanguinity or affinity within the second degree, when the officer has probable cause and the arrest is made as soon as probable cause arises. (**P.C. § 836(d)**)

P.C. § 13700(b): “*Cohabitant*” is defined in the **Penal Code** as “two unrelated adult persons living together for a substantial period of time, resulting in some permanency of relationship. Factors that may determine whether persons are cohabiting include, but are not limited to,

- (1) sexual relations between the parties while sharing the same living quarters,
- (2) sharing of income or expenses,
- (3) joint use or ownership of property,
- (4) whether the parties hold themselves out as husband and wife,
- (5) the continuity of the relationship,
and
- (6) the length of the relationship.”

Fam. Code, § 6209: “*Cohabitant*” is defined in the **Family Code** as a person who regularly resides in the household. “*Former Cohabitant*” is defined as a person who formerly regularly resided in the household.

P.C. § 243(f)(10): “*Dating Relationship*” is defined as frequent, intimate associations primarily characterized by the expectation of affection or sexual involvement independent of financial considerations.

E.C. § 215: “*Spouse*” is defined to include a “*registered domestic partner*” pursuant to **Fam. Code § 297.5**. (**Fam. Code § 297.5** provides that a registered domestic partner has the same rights, protections, benefits, responsibilities, and duties as are granted to and imposed on spouses.)

8. *Elder Abuse:* Assaults or batteries upon any person who is 65 years of age or older and who is related to the suspect by blood or legal guardianship, when the officer has probable cause

and the arrest is made as soon as probable cause arises. (**P.C. § 836(d)**)

9. *Carrying a Concealed Firearm*, per **P.C. § 25400** (formerly **P.C. § 12025**), when a peace officer has reasonable (or probable) cause to believe a violation has occurred within the area of an airport (as “*airport*” is defined by the **Pub. Utilities Code, § 21013**) to which access is controlled by the inspection of persons and property, and when the arrest is made as soon as reasonable (or probable) cause arises. (**P.C. § 836(e)**)

10. *Operating a Vessel or Recreational Vessel, or Manipulation of Water Skis, Aquaplane or Similar Device*, while under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol, or addicted to the use of drugs. (**Har. & Nav. Code, § 655(b), (c), (d) or (e)**) Upon information from a commissioned, warrant or petty officer of the United States Coast Guard establishing “*reasonable cause*,” a peace officer may arrest for a violation of any the above offenses. (**Subd. (g)**)

11. *Operating a Vessel While Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs*, when the person is involved in an accident on the waters of this state, with “*reasonable cause*,” any peace officer may arrest. (**Har. & Nav. Code, § 663.1**)

Vehicle Code Violations; Exceptions: The **Vehicle Code** contains limited exceptions for citing a person for a misdemeanor or infraction even though the offense cited for *did not* occur in the peace officer’s presence:

V.C. § 16028(c): A peace officer, or a regularly employed and salaried employee of a city or county who has been trained as a traffic collision investigator upon review by a peace officer, at the scene of an accident, may cite any driver involved in the traffic collision who is unable to provide *evidence of financial responsibility*.

V.C. § 40600(a): A peace officer who has successfully completed a course or courses of instruction, approved by the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training

(i.e., P.O.S.T.) in the investigation of traffic accidents may cite any person involved in a traffic accident when the officer has probable cause to believe the person violated a provision of the Vehicle Code not declared to be a felony or a local ordinance and when *the offense cited for was a factor in the occurrence of the traffic accident*. **Subd. (d)** provides that the offense need not occur in the officer's presence. However, **subd. (c)** provides that such a citation is *not* considered as an "arrest."

V.C. § 14602.6(a)(1): This section *may* authorize the immediate arrest (i.e., or cite) of a person "driving while his or her driving privilege was suspended or revoked, driving a vehicle while his or her driving privilege is restricted pursuant to **Section 13352** or **23575** and the vehicle is not equipped with a functioning, certified interlock device, or driving a vehicle without ever having been issued a driver's license," even though the driving occurred other than in the officer's presence. However, no known case has yet to discuss the lawfulness of such an arrest or citation.

Vehicle Code Parking Citations: Parking violations are "civil infractions" only, enforceable under a separate civil administrative scheme, and subject to civil penalties. (**V.C. §§ 40200 et seq.**) (See *Tyler v. County of Alameda* (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 777; *United States v. Choudhry* (9th Cir. 2006) 461 F.3rd 1097, 1101; 82 *Op.Att'y.Gen.Cal.* 47 (1999).)

California peace officers are specifically authorized under the **Vehicle Code** to enforce parking citations. (**V.C. §40202(a)**; *People v. Hart* (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 479; *United States v. Choudhry*, *supra*.)

A parking violation, even though civil, is cause for a police officer to stop and detain a vehicle's driver despite the fact that such a violation is but a "pretext" for detaining the driver to investigate some other offense for which the officer does not have a reasonable suspicion, per the rule of *Whren v. United States* (1996) 517 U.S. 806 [135 L.Ed.2nd 89]. (*United States v. Choudhry*, *supra*.)

"*Stale Misdemeanor Rule*:" The arrest for a misdemeanor must occur at the time, or shortly after, the commission of the offense. (*People v. Hampton* (1985) 164 Cal.App.3rd 27.) If not, it is a

“*stale misdemeanor*” for which the defendant may *not* be arrested even if it had occurred in the officer’s presence. (*People v. Craig* (1907) 152 Cal. 42, 47.) What is and what is not stale depends upon the circumstances:

“No hard and fast rule can, however, be laid down which will fit every case respecting what constitutes a reasonable time. What may be so in one case under particular circumstances may not be so in another case under different circumstances. All that can be affirmed with safety is that the officer must act promptly in making the arrest, and as soon as possible under the circumstances, and before he transacts other business.’ . . . ‘(W)e hold that in order to justify an arrest without warrant the arrestor must proceed as soon as may be to make the arrest. And if instead of doing that he goes about other matters unconnected with the arrest, the right to make the arrest without a warrant ceases, and in order to make a valid arrest he must then obtain a warrant therefor (sic).” (*Oleson v. Pincock* (1926) 68 Utah 507, 515-516 [251 P. 23, 26].)

“In order to justify a delay, there should be a continued attempt on the part of the officer or person apprehending the offender to make the arrest; he cannot delay for any purpose which is foreign to the accomplishment of the arrest.” (*Jackson v. Superior Court* (1950) 98 Cal.App.2nd 183, 187; next day, arrest illegal.)

The *stale misdemeanor* rule applies to arrests by private citizens, under authority of P.C. § 837, as well. (*Green v. Department of Motor Vehicles* (1977) 68 Cal.App.3rd 536; arrest made some 35 to 40 minutes after the observation held to be lawful; see also *Ogulin v. Jeffries* (1953) 121 Cal.App.2nd 211; 20 minute delay, arrest lawful.)

A police dispatcher, being subjected to defendant’s numerous harassing telephone calls, may delegate to a police officer the responsibility to arrest the defendant for her. The offense, over the phone, was held to be in her presence. Also, the arrest was timely in that officers responded immediately to where defendant was calling from and took him into custody. The arrest was held to be a lawful citizen’s arrest. (*People v. Bloom* (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1496.)

Sanctions for Violations: A violation by a peace officer of either the “*in the presence*,” and, arguably, the “*stale misdemeanor*” rule, or any other statutory (as opposed to constitutional) limitation on taking someone into physical custody, *does not* require the suppression of any evidence, in that these rules are statutory, or non-constitutionally based case law, only, and evidence is suppressed only when it’s discovery is the direct product of a *constitutional violation* (or a statute that specifically provides for the suppression of any resulting evidence). (*Barry v. Fowler* (9th Cir. 1990) 902 F.2nd 770, 772; *People v. Donaldson* (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 532; *People v. Trapane* (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th Supp. 10; see also *Jackson v. Superior Court* (1950) 98 Cal.App.2nd 183; and *People v. McKay* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 601, 607-619, a violation of V.C. § 21650.1 (riding a bicycle in the wrong direction); and *People v. Gomez* (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 531, 539, seat belt violation, citing *Atwater v. City of Lago Vista* (2001) 532 U.S. 318 [149 L.Ed.2nd 549]; *United States v. Miranda-Guerena* (9th Cir. 2006) 445 F.3rd 1233; *People v. Bennett* (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 907, 918.)

However, “police may not use probable cause for a traffic violation to justify an arrest for an unrelated offense where, under the facts known to police, they have no probable cause supporting the unrelated offense.” (*People v. Espino* (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 746, 765; ruling that just because officers *could have* arrested defendant for speeding, doesn’t mean that that fact justifies an arrest for some other bookable (i.e., a felony) offense for which there was no probable cause. Consent to search obtained without probable cause to justify the arrest for a felony was held to be invalid.)

“(T)he requirement that a misdemeanor must have occurred in the officer’s presence to justify a warrantless arrest is not grounded in the **Fourth Amendment**.” (*Welsh v. Wisconsin* (1984) 466 U.S. 740, 756 [80 L.Ed.2nd 732]; opinion of Justice White, citing *Street v. Surdyka* (4th Cir. 1974) 492 F.2nd 368, 371-272.)

A violation by a police officer of a state statute, such statute limiting the officer’s right to make a custodial arrest or a search, so long as not also in violation of the **Fourth Amendment**, does not result in the suppression of the resulting evidence unless mandated by the terms of the statute. While a state is empowered to enact more

restrictive search and seizure rules, violation of those rules that are not also a **Fourth Amendment** violation, does not invoke the **Fourth Amendment's** exclusionary rule. (*Virginia v. Moore* (2008) 553 U.S. 164 [170 L.Ed.2nd 559]; *People v. Xinos* (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 637, 653.)

“The violation of a state statute, standing alone, does not form the basis for suppression under the **Fourth Amendment.**” (*People v. Hardacre* (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1292, 1301; *United States v. Miranda-Guerena* (9th Cir. 2006) 445 F.3rd 1233.)

“It is elemental that the illegality tainting evidence and rendering it inadmissible is illegality flowing from the violation of a defendant’s constitutional rights—primarily those involving unlawful searches and seizures in violation of the **Fourth Amendment** to the **United States Constitution** and the essentially identical guarantee of personal privacy set forth in **Article I, § 19**, of the **California Constitution**. [Citations.] Evidence obtained in violation of a statute is not inadmissible per se unless the statutory violation also has a constitutional dimension.” (*People v. Brannon* (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 971, 975; *People v. Pifer* (1989) 216 Cal.App.3rd 956, 962-963.)

See also the same reasoning being used in *Rodriguez v. Superior Court* (1988) 199 Cal.App.3rd 1453, 1470; suggesting that because a “nighttime” search does not violate any constitutional principles, evidence discovered during a nighttime search without judicial authorization, in violation of the requirements of **P.C. § 1533**, should *not* result in suppression of any evidence.

And see *People v. Collins* (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 137: Violation of the administrative provisions for the searching of prisoners in a prison, absent a constitutional violation, does not require the suppression of any resulting evidence.

The use of a “Phlebotomist” to draw blood from a “Driving while Under the Influence” (i.e., “DUI”) suspect, as opposed to using one of the medical professionals authorized by **V.C. § 23158**, not being a constitutional violation merely due to the violation of the statute, does *not* result in the suppression of any evidence. (*People v. Esayian* (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1031; *People v. McHugh*

(2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 202; *People v. Mateljan* (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 367, 376-377.)

A violation of the “*implied consent law*,” forcing a “DUI” (Driving While Under the Influence”) suspect to submit to a blood test instead of a breath test, being a violation of state statutory law only, does not expose the officer to any civil liability. (*Ritschel v. City of Fountain Valley* (2005) 137 Cal.App.4th 107.)

California’s “*implied consent law*” is contained in **Veh. Code § 23612**.

Note *People v. Ling* (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1, at page 10, where the Court noted that; “although the actions of the arresting officer failed to comply with the requirements of the implied consent law, no court has held that such a failure rises to the level of a constitutional violation, and we do not so hold now.”

But, telling a DUI arrestee, who was arrested on federal property (i.e., in a national park) that refusing to submit to a blood test is not a criminal violation in itself, which is the California rule, constitutes a **Fifth Amendment** “due process” violation when the federal rule, which governed the arrest in this case, is that it *is* a criminal violation to refuse a blood test (**16 U.S.C. § 3**), causing a reversal of the defendant’s federal conviction. (*United States v. Harrington* (9th Cir. 2014) 749 F.3rd 825, 828-830.)

While a state may impose stricter standards on law enforcement in interpreting its own state constitution (i.e., “*independent state grounds*”), a prosecution in federal court is guided by the federal interpretation of the **Fourth Amendment** and is not required to use the state’s stricter standards. (*United States v. Brobst* (9th Cir. 2009) 558 F.3rd 982, 989-991, 997.)

Until passage of **Proposition 8**, California Courts were obligated to follow California’s rules that in some circumstances may (and lawfully were allowed to) have been stricter than the federal

standards. (See *American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren* (1997) 16 Cal.4th 307, 327-328; *Raven v. Deukmejian* (1990) 52 Cal.3rd 336, 353.)

Since passage of **Proposition 8**, California state courts now determine the reasonableness of a search or seizure by federal constitutional standards. (*People v. Schmitz* (2012) 55 Cal.4th 909, 916; *People v. Steele* (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1114-1115.)

Mistakenly collecting blood samples for inclusion into California's DNA data base (See **P.C. § 296**), when the defendant did not actually have a qualifying prior conviction, does not require the suppression of the mistakenly collected blood samples, nor is it grounds to suppress the resulting match of the defendant's DNA with that left at a crime scene. (*People v. Robinson* (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1104, 1116-1129.)

Arrest for an Infraction or Misdemeanor:

Release Requirement: Persons subject to citation for the violation of a crime deemed to be an "infraction" must be released on a citation, except in limited circumstances. If the person to be cited does not have a driver's license or other satisfactory evidence of identification, the officer may (in lieu of a custodial arrest, at the officer's discretion) require the arrestee to place a right thumbprint, or left thumbprint or fingerprint if the person has a missing or disfigured right thumb, on the promise to appear. (**P.C. § 853.5**)

P.C. § 853.5 has been held to provide the exclusive grounds for a custodial arrest for an infraction. (*Edgerly v. City and County of San Francisco* (9th Cir. 2013) 713 F.3rd 976, 981-985; citing *In re Rottanak K.* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 260, and *People v. Williams* (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1100.)

See "Exceptions," below.

See also **Public Resources Code § 5786.17**, for the authority for uniformed employees of a Parks and Recreation District to issue misdemeanor and infraction citations for violations of state law, city or county ordinances, or district rules, regulations, or ordinances

when the violation is committed within a recreation facility and in the presence of the employee issuing the citation.

Exceptions: The exceptions to the requirement that the subject be released on his written promise to appear when arrested for an infraction, as listed in **P.C. § 853.5(a)**, are:

- As specified in **V.C. §§ 40302, 40303, 40305 and 40305.5** (see below); *or*
- The arrestee refuses to sign a written promise to appear; *or*
- The arrestee has no satisfactory identification *and* refuses to provide an unobstructed view of his or her full face for examination; *or*
- The arrestee, without satisfactory identification, refuses to provide a thumbprint or fingerprint.

Because the section is written in the disjunctive, it is the opinion of the State Attorney General that if the person does not have satisfactory evidence of identification, the officer has the discretion to take the person into physical custody despite the fact that the person is willing to sign a written promise to appear and to provide a thumbprint. (2005, *Opn.Cal.Atty.Gen.*, #05-206)

Officers were entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's false arrest claim failed because it was undisputed that plaintiff refused to sign a notice to appear, and **P.C. § 835.5(a)** authorized plaintiff's arrest and detention for failing to sign the notice to appear. (*Agha v. Rosengren* (9th Cir. 2008) 276 Fed.Approx. 579; 2008 U.S.App. LEXIS 9934; an unpublished decision.)

See *United States v. Mota* (9th Cir. 1993) 982 F.2nd 1384, where it was held that a physical arrest of a person committing a business license infraction was a constitutional violation requiring the suppression of evidence: Questionable authority after *Virginia v. Moore* (2008) 553 U.S. 164 [170 L.Ed.2nd 559], holding that booking a suspect for a non-bookable criminal violation is not a **Fourth Amendment** violation. (See "*Sanctions for Violations*," above.)

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V.C. § 40302: Mandatory Custodial Arrests: Persons who would otherwise be cited and released for a **Vehicle Code** infraction or misdemeanor *shall* be arrested and taken immediately before a magistrate when the person:

- Fails to present his driver’s license or other satisfactory evidence of his identity for examination *and* refuses to provide an unobstructed view of his or her full face for examination; *or*
- Refuses to give his written promise to appear; *or*
- Demands an immediate appearance before a magistrate; *or*
- Is charged with violating **V.C. § 23152** (i.e., “*driving while under the influence.*”).

“*Other Satisfactory Evidence of Identity:*” The arresting officer has the discretion to determine what constitutes “*other satisfactory evidence of identity,*” when the subject fails to provide a driver’s license as required by the section. (*People v. Monroe* (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1182; *People v. McKay* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 601, 619-625.)

However, that discretion is not unlimited. Identification documents which are an “*effective equivalent*” are *presumptively* (i.e., in the absence of contrary evidence) sufficient. This would include a California identity card (issued per **V.C. § 13000**) or any current written identification which contains at a minimum a photograph and description of the person named on it, a current mailing address, a signature of the person, and a serial or other identifying number. (*People v. Monroe, supra*, at p. 1186.)

The officer is not legally obligated to make radio or other inquires in an attempt to verify the person’s oral assertions of identity. (*Id.*, at p. 1189; *People v. McKay, supra*.)

An officer’s refusal to accept oral statements as sufficient evidence of identity will be upheld on appeal. (*People v. McKay, supra*; *People v. Grant* (1990) 217 Cal.App.3rd

1451, 1455; see also *People v. Anderson* (1968) 266 Cal.App.2nd 125, 128.)

An officer's refusal to accept a Social Security card upheld on appeal. (*People v. Farley* (1971) 20 Cal.App.3rd 1032, 1036, fn. 2.)

See **B&P Code § 25660**, describing what is considered to be "*bona fide evidence of age*" for purposes of purchasing alcoholic beverages:

- (1) A valid vehicle operator's license containing the person's name, date of birth, physical description and picture.
- (2) A valid passport issued by the United States or a foreign government.
- (3) A valid military identification card that includes a date of birth and picture of the person.

V.C. § 40303; Arrestable Offenses: This section lists 17 different circumstances in which an arresting officer has the option of either taking a person "*without unnecessary delay*" before a magistrate, or releasing the person with a 10-days' written notice to appear:

- Violation of **V.C. §§ 10852 or 10853**, relating to injuring or tampering with a vehicle.
- Violation of **V.C. §§ 23103 or 23104**, relating to reckless driving.
- Violation of **V.C. § 2800(a)**, relating to failure to stop and submit to an inspection or test of a vehicle's lights per **V.C. § 2804**.
- Violation of **V.C. § 2800(a)**, relating to failure to stop and submit to a brake test.
- Violation of **V.C. § 2800(a)**, relating to failure to stop and submit to a vehicle inspection, measurement, or weighing, per **V.C. § 2802**, or a refusal to adjust the load or obtain a permit, per **V.C. § 2803**.
- Violation of **V.C. § 2800(a)**, relating to continuing to drive after being lawfully ordered not to drive by a member of the California Highway Patrol for violating the driver's hours of service or driver's log regulations, per **V.C. § 34501(a)**.
- Violation of **V.C. § 2800(b), (c) or (d)**, relating to failure or refusal to comply with any lawful out-of-service order.

- Violation of V.C. §§ 20002 or 20003, relating to duties in the event of an accident.
- Violation of V.C. § 23109, relating to participating in a speed contest or exhibition of speed.
- Violation of V.C. §§ 14601, 14601.1, 14601.2, or 14601.5, relating to driving on a suspended or revoked license.
- When the person arrested has attempted to evade arrest.
- Violation of V.C. § 23332, relating to persons upon vehicular crossings.
- Violation of V.C. § 2813, relating to the refusal to stop and submit a vehicle to an inspection of its size, weight, and equipment.
- Violation of V.C. § 21461.5, relating to being found on a freeway within 24 hours of being cited for same, and refusing to leave when lawfully ordered to do so by a peace officer after having been informed that he is subject to arrest.
- Violation of V.C. § 2800(a) relating to being found on a bridge or overpass within 24 hours of being cited for same, and refusing to leave when lawfully ordered to do so by a peace officer pursuant to V.C. § 21962, after having been informed that he is subject to arrest.
- Violation of V.C. § 21200.5, relating to riding a bicycle while under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs.
- Violation of V.C. § 21221.5, relating to operating a motorized scooter while under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs.

V.C. § 12801.5(e): *The Unlicensed Driver*: “Notwithstanding (V.C.) Section 40300 or any other provision of law, a peace officer may not detain or arrest a person solely on the belief that the person is an *unlicensed driver*, unless the officer has reasonable cause to believe the person is under the age of 16 years.”

See *Bingham v. City of Manhattan Beach* (9th Cir. 2003) 341 F.3rd 939, 944; arrest for driving with an expired driver’s license, in contravention of this statute, may subject the offending officer to federal civil liability.

Note: This is questionable authority after *Virginia v. Moore* (2008) 553 U.S. 164 [170 L.Ed.2nd 559], holding that booking a suspect for a non-bookable criminal violation is not a **Fourth Amendment** violation. (See “*Sanctions for Violations*,” above;

and see *Harvey v. Coronado* (9th Cir. 2012) 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187471; where an arrest for V.C. § 12500 was held to be a lawful arrest.)

V.C. § 40305: *Non-Residents:* A *nonresident* who is arrested for any violation of the **Vehicle Code** and who fails to provide satisfactory evidence of identity *and* an address within this State at which he can be located *may* be taken immediately before a magistrate.

V.C. § 40305.5: *Traffic Arrest Bail Bond Certificate:* Provisions for the arresting officer to receive a guaranteed traffic arrest bail bond certificate (with the requirements for such a certificate listed) when a nonresident driver of a commercial vehicle of 7,000 pounds or more (excluding house cars) is arrested for violating any provision of the **Vehicle Code** and fails to provide satisfactory evidence of identification *and* an address within the State at which he can be located.

P.C. § 853.6(i): *Misdemeanor Citations:* A person arrested for a *misdemeanor* must also be cited (on a “*misdemeanor citation form*”) and released *unless* one of the following statutory exceptions applies:

- The person is intoxicated.
- The person requires medical treatment.
- The person was arrested for one or more of the offenses listed in V.C. §§ 40302 or 40303 (see above).
- The person has outstanding warrants.
- The person is unable to provide “*satisfactory evidence of identification*” (see above).
- Prosecution would be jeopardized by immediate release.
- Reasonable likelihood that the offense would continue or that persons or property would be imminently endangered by the release of the person.
- The person demands to be taken before a magistrate or refuses to sign the notice to appear.
- There is reason to believe that the person would not appear on the citation.
- The person was subject to P.C. § 1270.1.

P.C. § 1270.1 prohibits the release of a person for a specified crime on his or her own recognizance, or on bail in an amount that is either more or less than

the amount that is contained in the bail schedule for that offense. This includes the following offenses:

- Serious felonies, per **P.C. § 1192.7(c)**.
- Violent felonies, per **P.C. § 667.5(c)**.
- Domestic violence with corporal injury, per **P.C. § 273.5**.
- Witness intimidation, per **P.C. § 136.1(c)**.
- Spousal rape, per **P.C. § 262**.
- Stalking, per **P.C. § 646.9**.
- Felony criminal threats, per **P.C. § 422**.
- Misdemeanor domestic violence, per **P.C. § 243(e)(1)**.
- Restraining order violations, per **P.C. § 273.6**, if the detained person made threats to kill or harm, engaged in violence against, or went to the residence or workplace of, the protected party.

It is not unconstitutional to make a custodial arrest (i.e., transporting to jail or court) of a person arrested for a minor misdemeanor (*Atwater v. City of Lago Vista* (2001) 532 U.S. 318 [149 L.Ed.2nd 549].), or even for a fine-only, infraction. (*People v. McKay* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 601, 607; see also *United States v. McFadden* (2nd Cir. 2001) 238 F.3rd 198, 204.)

California's statutory provisions require the release of misdemeanor arrestees in most circumstances. (e.g., see **P.C. §§ 853.5, 853.6, V.C. §§ 40303, 40500**) However, violation of these statutory requirements is not a constitutional violation and, therefore, *should not* result in suppression of any evidence recovered as a result of such an arrest. (*People v. McKay, supra*, at pp. 607-619, a violation of **V.C. § 21650.1** (riding a bicycle in the wrong direction); *People v. Gomez* (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 531, 539, seat belt violation (**V.C. § 27315(d)(1)**), citing *Atwater v. City of Lago Vista* (2001) 532 U.S. 318 [149 L.Ed.2nd 549]; *People v. Bennett* (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 907, 918.)

The United States Supreme Court has recently affirmed this principle:

A violation by a police officer of a state statute, such statute limiting the officer's right to make a custodial arrest or a search, so long as not also in violation of the **Fourth Amendment**, does not result in the suppression of the resulting evidence unless mandated by the terms of the statute. While a state is empowered to enact more restrictive search and seizure rules, violation of those rules that are not also a **Fourth Amendment** violation, does not invoke the **Fourth Amendment's** exclusionary rule. (*Virginia v. Moore* (2008) 553 U.S. 164 [170 L.Ed.2nd 559].)

An otherwise lawful arrest, done without statutory authority, has been upheld in other circumstances:

Where a federal officer arrested an obviously intoxicated driver just outside a federal enclave and beyond the officer's territorial jurisdiction after a lawful traffic stop, the **Fourth Amendment** does not require the exclusion of the evidence obtained in a search incident to the arrest because the arrest was supported by probable cause. Therefore, it was not an unreasonable seizure within the meaning of the **Fourth Amendment** despite the lack of any statutory authority for making the arrest. (*United States v. Ryan* (1st Cir. 2013) 731 F.3rd 66.)

However, "police may not use probable cause for a traffic violation to justify an arrest for an unrelated offense where, under the facts known to police, they have no probable cause supporting the unrelated offense." (*People v. Espino* (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 746, 765; ruling that just because officers *could have* arrested defendant for speeding, doesn't mean that that fact justifies an arrest for some other bookable (i.e., a felony) offense for which there was no probable cause. Consent to search obtained without probable cause to justify the arrest for a felony was held to be invalid.)

With an Existing Warrant of Arrest:

P.C. § 818: A peace officer serving upon a person a warrant of arrest for a misdemeanor offense under the **Vehicle Code** or under any local ordinance relating to stopping, standing, parking, or operation of a motor vehicle and where no written promise to appear has been filed and the warrant states on its face that a citation may be used in lieu of physical arrest, may, instead of taking the person before a magistrate, prepare a notice to appear and release the person on his or her promise to appear. In such a case, issuing a citation is deemed to be compliance with directions of the warrant. The officer shall endorse on the warrant; “**Section 818, Penal Code**, complied with,” and return the warrant to the magistrate who issued it.

P.C. § 827.1: A person for whom an arrest warrant has been issued for a misdemeanor offense *may* be released upon the issuance of a citation, issued per **P.C. §§ 853.6 to 853.8**, in lieu of physical arrest, *unless* one of the following conditions exists:

- The misdemeanor cited in the warrant involves violence.
- The misdemeanor cited in the warrant involves a firearm.
- The misdemeanor cited in the warrant involves resisting arrest.
- The misdemeanor cited in the warrant involves giving false information to a peace officer.
- The person arrested is a danger to himself or herself or others due to intoxication or being under the influence of drugs or narcotics.
- The person requires medical examination or medical care or was otherwise unable to care for his or her own safety.
- The person has other ineligible charged pending against him or her.
- There is reasonable likelihood that the offense or offenses would continue to resume, or that the safety of persons or property would be immediately endangered by the release of the person.
- The person refuses to sign the notice to appear.

- The person cannot provide satisfactory evidence of personal identification.
- The warrant of arrest indicates that the person is not eligible to be released on a citation.

Arrest Warrants:

Defined: A warrant of arrest is a written order, signed by a magistrate, and generally directed to a peace officer, commanding the arrest of the defendant. (P.C. §§ 813, 814, & 815)

A warrant will issue “*if, and only if*, the magistrate is satisfied from the complaint that the offense complained of has been committed and that there is reasonable ground to believe that the defendant has committed it, . . .” (*Emphasis added*; P.C. § 813(a))

“A warrant is a judicial mandate to an officer to conduct a search or make an arrest, and the officer has a sworn duty to carry out its provisions.” (*United States v. Leon* (1984) 468 U. S. 897, 920, fn. 21 [82 L. Ed.2nd 677].)

The warrant must be supported by a sworn statement made in writing, reflecting the probable cause for the arrest. (P.C. § 817(b))

Content: An arrest warrant is directed to “*any peace officer, or any public officer or employee authorized to serve process where the warrant is for a violation of a statute or ordinance which such person has the duty to enforce*” (*Emphasis added*), and states the following (P.C. § 816):

- The crime, designated in general terms.
- The defendant’s name, or, if this is unknown, any name. (E.g., “John Doe.”)
- The date and time of issuance.
- Bail.
- The city or county where it is issued.
- The duty of the arresting officer to bring the defendant before the magistrate.
- The judge’s signature.
- The court.

Case Law:

An arrest warrant issued solely upon the complainant’s “information and belief” cannot stand if the complaint or an accompanying affidavit does

not allege underlying facts upon which the magistrate can independently find probable cause to arrest the accused. P.C. §§ 806, 813, and 952 do not authorize the issuance of warrants of arrest based solely upon complaints couched in the language of the charged offense and therefore do not violate the **Fourth Amendment**; (See *People v. Sesslin* (1968) 68 Cal.2nd 418.)

In a case of mistaken identity, the county did not violate the **Fourth Amendment** by issuing a warrant without including a number corresponding to the true subject's fingerprints in that the warrant satisfied the particularity requirement as it contained both the subject's name and a detailed physical description. Even if the **Fourth Amendment** does require the county to include more detailed information in a warrant, the plaintiff failed to show that the county had a policy or custom of failing to do so. Also, the sheriff's deputies were not unreasonable in believing that the plaintiff was the subject of the warrant at the time of arrest given the name and date of birth on the warrant matched the plaintiff's, and the height and weight descriptors associated with the warrant were within one inch and 10 pounds of the plaintiff's true size. (*Rivera v. County of Los Angeles* (2014) 745 F.3rd 384, 388-389.)

The *Rivera* Court also found that the mistaken incarceration did not violate defendant's **Fourteenth Amendment** due process rights absent evidence showing that the civil defendants should have known the plaintiff was entitled to release because: (1) the circumstances indicated to the defendants that further investigation was warranted, *or* (2) the defendants denied the plaintiff access to the courts for an extended period of time. Neither circumstance applied in this case. (*Id.*, at pp. 389-392.)

A detention pursuant to a valid warrant but in the face of repeated protests of innocence may, *after the lapse of a certain amount of time*, be held to have deprived the accused of his liberty without due process of law, a **Fifth** or **Fourteenth Amendment** violation. A wrongful detention can ripen into a due process violation, but it is the plaintiff's burden to show that "it was or should have been known [by the defendant] that the [plaintiff] was entitled to release." (*Gant v. County of Los Angeles* (9th Cir. 2014) 772 F.3rd 608, 619-623.)

And where the circumstances should have prompted verification of an arrestee's identity (e.g., a different middle name and a significant different physical description), a **Fourteenth Amendment** due process violation may be found. (*Garcia v. County of Riverside* (9th Cir. 2016) 817 F.3rd 635.)

Other Types of Arrest Warrants:

Bench Warrant: An arrest warrant for a defendant who has been discharged on bail and subsequently fails to appear in court. (P.C. §§ 979 et seq.)

A bench warrant, issued by a neutral and detached magistrate upon a defendant's failure to appear, is legal justification for making entry into a residence in which there is probable cause to believe the subject of the warrant is hiding, despite the fact that such a warrant is issued without a finding of probable cause. (*United States v. Gooch* (9th Cir. 2007) 506 F.3rd 1156.)

Telephonic Arrest Warrant: An arrest warrant utilizing telephonic communication between the magistrate and the affiant, and facsimile (i.e., "fax") transmission equipment or computer e-mail, to send the necessary documents to the magistrate for signature and return of the warrant to the affiant. (P.C. § 817(c), (d), (e) & (f))

A peace officer's oath in support of an arrest warrant may be made by telephone and computer server, in addition to the already-existing authority to make such an oath in writing, by telephone and facsimile, by telephone and electronic mail, or by recording and transcription. (P.C. § 817(c))

The signature of a magistrate on an arrest warrant may also be digital or electronic. (P.C. § 817(c))

See P.C. § 817(f) for the suggested warrant format.

"Ramey Warrant:" A term of art used to describe an arrest warrant issued prior to the court filing of a criminal case against a specific defendant. (See *People v. Ramey* (1976) 16 Cal.3rd 263.)

Note: Ordinarily, a prerequisite to the issuance of an arrest warrant is the filing of a complaint with the magistrate, charging a felony originally triable in the superior court of the county, or where the complaint is presented to a judge in a misdemeanor or infraction case, charging an offense triable in that judge's court.

However, the formal filing of a written complaint is not a condition precedent to issuance of an arrest warrant. (*People v. Case* (1980) 105 Cal.App.3rd 826, 832.)

Long approved by case law (*People v. Case, supra*; and *People v. Bittaker* (1989) 48 Cal.3rd 1046, 1070-1072.), pre-filing arrest warrants are now authorized by statute. (**P.C. § 817(a)**)

A “DNA, John Doe” Warrant:

An arrest warrant must identify the subject of the subject of the warrant with reasonable certainty. Describing the subject of an arrest warrant as merely “John Doe” with a description of a particular DNA profile is sufficient to meet this constitutional requirement. (*State of Wisconsin v. Dabney* (2003) 254 Wis.2nd 43 [663 N.W.2nd 366].)

The California Supreme Court is in agreement, holding that a DNA profile is an accurate, reliable, and valid method of identifying a defendant in an arrest warrant because it is particular in its description. It neither violates the **Fourth Amendment**, California’s statutes authorizing arrest warrants (see **P.C. §§ 813, 815, 859, 860**), nor a defendant’s due process rights. (*People v. Robinson* (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1104, 1129-1143.)

P.C. § 3455(b): Postrelease Supervision Warrant:

Subd. (1): With probable cause to believe that a subject on “postrelease supervision” is violating any term or condition of his or her release, a peace officer may arrest, *with or without a warrant*, the person and bring him or her before the supervising county agency established by the county board of supervisors pursuant to **P.C. § 3451(a)**. (See *People v. Young* (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 972, 979-980.)

Also, an officer employed by the supervising county agency may seek a warrant and a court or its designated hearing officer appointed pursuant to **Govt. Code § 71622.5** shall have the authority to issue a warrant for that person’s arrest.

Subd. (2): The court or its designated hearing officer has the authority to issue a warrant for any person who is the subject of a petition filed under this section who has failed to appear for a hearing on the petition or for any reason in the interest of justice, or to remand to custody a person who does appear at a hearing on the petition for any reason in the interest of justice.

A Federal “Administrative Warrant:”

Issued pursuant to **18 U.S.C. § 4213(a)** for the retaking of an alleged parole violator, this type of warrant is *not* subject to the oath or affirmation requirement of the **Fourth Amendment**. (*United States v. Sherman* (9th Cir. 2007) 502 F.3rd 869; noting that the rule is to the contrary when the warrant is for a supervised release violation, per **18 U.S.C. § 3583(i)**, as held by *United States v. Vargas-Amaya* (9th Cir. 2004) 389 F.3rd 901.)

Necessity of an Arrest Warrant:

Warrantless arrests, at least at any location other than within one’s private home or other area to which the public does not have ready access (see below), have been held by the United States Supreme Court to be lawful, at least when the offense is a felony (whether or not it occurred in the officer’s presence), or for any offense (felony or misdemeanor) which occurs in the officer’s presence (see below). (*United States v. Watson* (1976) 423 U.S. 411 [46 L.Ed.2nd 598].)

Surrounding a barricaded suspect in his home is in effect a warrantless arrest, justified by the exigent circumstances. The passage of time during the ensuing standoff does *not* dissipate that exigency to where officers are expected to seek the authorization of a judge to take the suspect into physical custody. (*Fisher v. City of San Jose* (9th Cir. 2009) 558 F.3rd 1069; overruling its own prior holding (at 509 F.3rd 952) that failure to obtain an arrest warrant during a 12 hour standoff resulted in an illegal arrest of the barricaded suspect.)

Armed police officers surrounding defendant’s home and then ordering him out via a public address system is in effect an arrest within the home, and absent a warrant or exigent circumstances, is illegal. The fact that defendant had just fled into his home, avoiding being arrested on his front porch for a misdemeanor, was held *not* to be an exigent circumstance. (*United States v. Nora* (9th Cir. 2014) 765 F.3rd 1049, 1052-1060.)

See *United States v. Mallory* (3rd Cir. 2014) 765 F.3rd 373, for the exact opposite conclusion on the lawfulness of entering a residence in hot pursuit under the exact same circumstances, although the firearm should have been suppressed as a product of an unlawful warrantless search after the residence was secured.

Service and Return:

Felony arrest warrants may be executed anytime, anywhere, day or night. (P.C. §§ 836(a), 840)

But see Steagald v. United States (1981) 451 U.S. 204 [68 L.Ed.2nd 38], below, mandating a search warrant to execute an arrest warrant in a *third party's* home.

Misdemeanor arrest warrants may be served anytime, anywhere, day or night, *except* that when the suspect is *not* in public but *not* already in custody (e.g., in his residence), the warrant may not be served between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. unless the warrant is “*endorsed*” for “*night service*” in which case it may be served at any time. (P.C. § 840(4))

“*Night Service*” must be justified in the warrant affidavit, describing the need to make the arrest in other than the daytime. (See *People v. Kimble* (1988) 44 Cal.3rd 480, 494; discussing the “*greater intrusiveness*” of a nighttime search and the need for justifying nighttime service for a search warrant.)

Query: If an officer is already lawfully in the house, may a misdemeanor arrest warrant be executed despite the lack of a nighttime endorsement? *Unknown.* P.C. § 840 itself does not provide for any such exception. But since this limitation on arrests has been held to be statutory only, and not of constitutional origins (*People v. Whitted* (1976) 60 Cal.App.3rd 569.), no evidence would be suppressed anyway, making this question moot.

Necessity of Having a Copy of The Arrest Warrant: The law contemplates that when an arrest is made, the officer *should* have a copy of the warrant in his possession. (*People v. Thomas* (1957) 156 Cal.App.2nd 117, 120.) However, it has been held that there is no constitutional violation even though he does not. (P.C. § 842; *People v. Miller* (1961) 193 Cal.App.2nd 838, 839.)

However, if requested, the arrestee *shall* be shown a copy of the warrant as soon as it is practicable to do so. (P.C. § 842)

Pursuant to P.C. § 817(g): “An original warrant of probable cause for arrest or the duplicate original warrant of probable cause for arrest shall be sufficient for booking a defendant into custody.”

Knock and Notice: The “knock and notice” rules (see “*Search Warrants*,” below) apply as well to the execution of an arrest warrant, and for warrantless arrests within a residence. (P.C. § 844.)

The rule that evidence will not be suppressed as a result of a knock and notice violation, as dictated by *Hudson v. Michigan* (2006) 547 U.S. 586 [165 L.Ed.2nd 56] (a search warrant case), is applicable as well as in a warrantless, yet lawful, arrest case, pursuant to P.C. § 844. (*In re Frank S.* (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 145.)

However, see *United States v. Weaver* (D.C. Cir. 2015) 808 F.3rd 26, where the D.C. Court of Appeal rejected the applicability of *Hudson v. Michigan*, *supra*, in an arrest warrant service situation, and held that federal agents violated the knock-and-announce rule by failing to announce their purpose before entering defendant’s apartment. By knocking but failing to announce their purpose, the agents gave defendant no opportunity to protect the privacy of his home. The exclusionary rule was the appropriate remedy for knock-and-announce violations in the execution of arrest warrants at a person’s home.

Procedure After Arrest:

Disposition of Prisoner: An officer making an arrest in obedience to a warrant must proceed with the arrestee as commanded by the warrant, or as provided by law. (P.C. § 848)

In-County Arrest Warrants: If the offense is for a felony, and the arrest occurs in the county in which the warrant was issued, the officer making the arrest must take the defendant before the magistrate who issued the warrant or some other magistrate of the same county. (P.C. § 821)

Note: In reality, an arrestee is typically taken to jail where he or she will await the availability of a magistrate.

Out-of-County Arrest Warrants: If the defendant is arrested in another county on either a felony (P.C. § 821) or a misdemeanor (P.C. § 822) warrant, the officer must, without unnecessary delay:

- Inform the defendant in writing of his right to be taken before a magistrate in that county; *and*

- Note on the warrant that he has so informed defendant; *and*
- Upon being requested by the defendant, take him before a magistrate in that county.

That magistrate is to admit the defendant to the bail specified on the warrant, if any. (P.C. §§ 821, 822) If the offense is a misdemeanor, and no bail is specified on the warrant, the magistrate may set the bail. (P.C. § 822)

If the defendant does not bail out for any reason, law enforcement officers from the county where the warrant was issued have five (5) days (or five (5) *court days* if the offense is a felony and the law enforcement agency is more than 400 miles from the county where the defendant is being held) to take custody of the defendant. (P.C. §§ 821, 822) (See 62 *Op.Cal.Atty.Gen.* 78, 2/16/1979)

Note: There are no similar statutory requirements for an out-of-county arrest made *without* an arrest warrant (i.e., a “probable cause” arrest), except under P.C. § 849(a), below.

Arrests without a Warrant; P.C. § 849(a): An officer (or private person) making an arrest *without a warrant shall*, without unnecessary delay, take the prisoner not otherwise released before the nearest or most accessible magistrate in the county in which the offense is triable, and a complaint stating the charge against the arrested person shall be laid before such magistrate.

Necessity of Having Probable Cause or Reasonable Suspicion: Until recently, it has been held that before a police officer may enter a home, absent consent to enter, the officer must have “*probable cause*” to believe the person who is the subject of the arrest warrant is actually inside at the time. (See *People v. Jacobs* (1987) 43 Cal.3rd 472; *United States v. Gorman* (9th Cir. 2002) 314 F.3rd 1105; *United States v. Diaz* (9th Cir. 2007) 491 F.3rd 1074; *United States v. Phillips* (9th Cir. 1974) 497 F.2nd 1131; *United States v. Gooch* (9th Cir. 2007) 506 F.3rd 1156, 1159, fn. 2; *Cuevas v. De Roco* (9th Cir. 2008) 531 F.3rd 726; *United States v. Mayer* (9th Cir. 2008) 530 F.3rd 1099, 1103-1104.)

“It is not disputed that until the point of Buie's arrest the police had the right, based on the authority of the arrest warrant, to search anywhere in the house that Buie might have been found, . . .” (*Maryland v. Buie* (1990) 494 U.S. 325, 330 [108 L.Ed.2nd 276, 283].)

An arrest warrant constitutes legal authority to enter the suspect's residence and search for him. (*People v. LeBlanc* (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 157, 164; entry lawful while executing a misdemeanor arrest warrant.)

“Because an arrest warrant authorizes the police to deprive a person of his liberty, it necessarily also authorizes a limited invasion of that person's privacy interest when it is necessary to arrest him in his home.” (*Steagald v. United States* (1981) 451 U.S. 204, 214-215, fn. 7 [68 L.Ed.2nd 38, 46].)

“Thus, for **Fourth Amendment** purposes, an arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is *reason to believe* the suspect is within.” (Italics added; *Payton v. New York* (1980) 445 U.S. 573, 603 [63 L.Ed.2nd 639, 661].)

This “*reason to believe*” language, in making reference to the likelihood that the subject is home at the time the arrest warrant is served, has until recently been interpreted by both state and federal authority to require full-blown “*probable cause*” to believe the suspect is there at that time. (See *People v. Jacobs, supra*; *United States v. Gorman, supra*; and *United States v. Phillips, supra*; *Motley v. Parks* (9th Cir. 2005) 432 F.3rd 1072, 1070; and see “*Sufficiency of Evidence to Believe the Suspect is Inside,*” below.)

Noting that five other federal circuits have ruled that something less than probable cause is required, and that the Ninth Circuit is a minority opinion (see *United States v. Gorman, supra*), the Fourth District Court of Appeal (Div. 2) found instead that an officer executing an arrest warrant *or* conducting a probation or parole search may enter a dwelling if he or she has only a *reasonable belief*, falling short of probable cause to believe, the suspect both lives there and is present at the time. Employing that standard, the entry into defendant's apartment to conduct a probation search was lawful based on all of the information known to the officers. Accordingly, the court upheld the trial court's conclusion that the officers had objectively reasonable grounds to conclude the

defendant/probationer lived at the subject apartment, and therefore the officers had the right to enter the apartment to conduct a warrantless probation search. (*People v. Downey* (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 652, 657-662.)

Also noting that the California Supreme Court, in *People v. Jacobs*, *supra*, when read correctly (see pg. 479, fn. 4), did *not* find that probable cause was required, contrary to popular belief. (*Id.*, at p. 662.)

The Ninth Circuit, in subsequent cases dealing with whether the subject of a **Fourth** wavier search in fact lives at the place to be searched, stands by the probable cause standard. (*United States v. Bolivar* (9th Cir. 2012) 670 F.3rd 1091, 1093-1095; *United States v. Grandberry* (9th Cir. 2013) 730 F.3rd 968, 973-980.)

Defendant having an outstanding arrest warrant issued approximately five-weeks earlier and listing the address in question, postal records indicated that defendant received mail at that address, and several public databases connecting defendant with the address, held to be sufficient to give the officers a reasonable belief that defendant lived at that address. It was also reasonable for them to believe that he would be home at 6:00 a.m. (*United States v. Hamilton* (1st Cir. 2016) 819 F.3rd 503.)

See “*Sufficiency of Evidence that the Suspect is Inside*,” below.

The “Steagald Warrant:” If the person is in a *third party’s home*, absent consent to enter, a *search warrant* for the residence must be obtained in addition to the arrest warrant. (*Steagald v. United States*, *supra*, at pp. 211-222 [68 L.Ed.2nd at pp. 45-52]; *People v. Codinha* (1982) 138 Cal.App.3rd 167; see **P.C. § 1524(a)(6)**.)

Failure, however, to obtain a search warrant will not benefit the subject with the outstanding arrest warrant, but serves only to protect the homeowner (i.e., the “third party”) should evidence of criminal activity be discovered during the entry of his residence. The person with the outstanding arrest warrant will generally be without standing to contest the entry of the warrantless entry of the residence. (*United States v. Bohannon* (2nd Cir. 2016) 824 F.3rd 242.)

Note: Securing such a search warrant will, of course, require “probable cause” to believe that the subject of the arrest warrant is in the place to be searched.

Statute of Limitations: Obtaining an arrest warrant will “toll” (i.e., “stop”) the running of the statute of limitations for the charged offense(s). (**P.C. §§ 803, 804; *People v. Lee*** (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1352.)

Expiration: There is no statutory requirement that an arrest warrant be executed within any particular time limit. Therefore, arrest warrants do not expire and do not need to be renewed or extended. They will remain in the system until purged, served, or recalled by the court.

Civil Liability:

Sheriff’s deputies who allegedly made defamatory statements and unlawfully entered a residence while attempting to execute a bench warrant that had been recalled were not acting in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition under **Code of Civ. Proc. § 425.16(e)(4) (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation, or “Anti-SLAPP”)** with regard to executing the warrant, nor was any connection with an issue of public interest shown. Also, the alleged defamatory statements were not protected under **Code of Civ. Proc. § 425.16(e)(1)** because they were not made in a judicial proceeding or in preparation for litigation. Accordingly, the deputies did not meet their burden to show that the claims arose from protected activity, the burden never shifted to the claimant to establish a probability of prevailing on the merits, and the deputies’ anti-SLAPP motion was properly denied. (*Anderson v. Geist* (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 79, 84-90.)

Detention of Other Occupants of a Home While Executing an Arrest Warrant:

Applying the theory of *Michigan v. Summers* (1981) 452 U.S. 692, 702-703 [69 L.Ed.2nd 340, 349-350], where the detention of occupants of a residence was held to be lawful during the execution of a search warrant, California has held that the same rule applies to detaining occupants of a residence while serving an *arrest warrant*. (***People v. Hannah*** (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1335.)

The Ninth Circuit disagrees with this theory, holding that the detention of an occupant of a house while executing an arrest warrant is unconstitutional. (***Sharp v. County of Orange*** (9th Cir. 2017) 871 F.3rd 901, 912-913.)

Use of a Motorized Battering Ram: The California Supreme Court has determined in a case that has never been overruled that at least where a “motorized battering ram” is used to force entry into a building, prior judicial authorization in the search or arrest warrant is necessary. Failure to obtain such authorization is both a violation of the **California Constitution** and the **Fourth Amendment**. (*Langford v. Superior Court* (1987) 43 Cal.3rd 21.)

See “*Use of a Motorized Battering Ram*,” under “*Searches With a Search Warrant*,” (Chapter 6), below.

Effect of an Arrest Warrant on the Exclusion of Evidence after an Illegal Detention:

The fact that the defendant had an outstanding arrest warrant may, depending upon the circumstances, be sufficient of an intervening circumstance to allow for the admissibility of the evidence seized incident to arrest despite the fact that the original detention was illegal. (*People v. Brendlin* (2008) 45 Cal.4th 262, an illegal traffic stop; and *Utah v. Strieff* (June 20, 2016) __ U.S. __, __ [136 S.Ct. 2056, 2060-2064; 195 L.Ed.2nd 400], an illegal detention.)

The circumstances to be considered are:

- The temporal proximity of the **Fourth Amendment** violation to the procurement of the challenged evidence;
- The presence of intervening circumstances (e.g., an arrest warrant);
- The flagrancy of the official misconduct.

(*People v. Brendlin, supra*, at pp. 269-272; citing *Brown v. Illinois* (1975) 422 U.S. 590 [45 L.Ed.2nd 416].)

Defendant, the passenger in a motor vehicle stopped for illegally tinted windows (**V.C. § 26708(a)**), was arrested on an outstanding arrest warrant. Even had the traffic stop been illegal, the discovery of the arrest warrant was sufficient to attenuate any possible taint of an illegal traffic stop. (*People v. Carter* (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 522, 529-530.)

See *People v. Durant* (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 57, finding that a suspect’s **Fourth** waiver (subjecting him to warrantless search and seizures) attenuated the taint of an illegal traffic stop.

But see *People v. Bates* (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 60, 69-71, ruling to the contrary. The *Bates* Court both declined to

adopt the *Durant* Court’s reasoning, and differentiated the cases on their respective facts.

A Defective Arrest Warrant:

Arresting a subject with the good faith belief that there was an outstanding arrest warrant, only to discover after the fact that the arrest warrant had been recalled, does not require the suppression of any resulting evidence where the mistake is the result of negligence only, and was not reckless or deliberate. (*Herring v. United States* (2009) 555 U.S. 135 [172 L.Ed.2nd 496].)

If officers making an arrest have probable cause to arrest him and the arrest is otherwise lawful (e.g., in public), then it is irrelevant whether the arrest warrant is invalid. (*United States v. Jennings* (9th Cir. 2008) 515 F.3rd 980, 985.)

Statutory Limitations:

Daytime and Nighttime Arrests (P.C. § 840):

Felony Arrests: An arrest for the commission of a felony may be made:

Without an Arrest Warrant: Any time of the day or night, in any public place or while already in custody on another charge, whether or not the offense occurred in the officer’s presence. (P.C. § 836(a)(2))

Exception: A police officer cannot make a warrantless arrest within the subject’s own home (*People v. Ramey* (1976) 16 Cal.3rd 263, 276; *Payton v. New York* (1980) 445 U.S. 573 [63 L.Ed.2nd 639].), or the home of another person (*Steagald v. United States* (1981) 451 U.S. 204 [68 L.Ed.2nd 38.]; see below.), absent an exception.

Exceptions to Exception: When the officer is already and/or otherwise lawfully in the home, exigent circumstances exist, or defendant is standing in the threshold. (See examples, below.)

With an Arrest Warrant: Any time of the day or night, in any place, including the subject’s own home. (P.C. § 836(a)):

Exception #1: Cannot make a felony warrant arrest within a third person’s home, unless the officer also first obtains a

search warrant for the third person's home (See *Steagald v. United States*, *supra*, and below.) or is already and otherwise lawfully in the third person's home.

Exception #2: Private persons may not serve arrest warrants. (P.C. §§ 813, 816)

Misdemeanor (and Infraction) Arrests:

Without an Arrest Warrant: Any time of the day or night, in any public place or while already in custody. (P.C. § 836(a)(1))

Exception #1: Cannot make a warrantless arrest within the subject's own home (*People v. Ramey. Supra: Payton v. New York, supra.*), or the home of another person (*Steagald v. New York, supra*, and below.), absent an exception.

Exception to Exception: Misdemeanor or infraction committed in the officer's presence or the presence of a private citizen (in the case of a private person's arrest), while already and/or otherwise lawfully in the home. (*People v. Graves* (1968) 263 Cal.App.2nd 719; see also examples, below, under "Case Law Limitations," "*Ramey.*")

Query: If an officer is already lawfully in the house, may a misdemeanor arrest warrant be executed despite the lack of a nighttime endorsement? Unknown. P.C. § 840 itself does not provide for any such exception. But since this limitation on arrests has been held to be statutory only, and not of constitutional origins (*People v. Whitted* (1976) 60 Cal.App.3rd 569.), no evidence will be suppressed anyway, making this question moot.

Exception #2: Cannot make a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor or infraction not committed in the officer's presence, or the presence of the private person (in the case of a private person's arrest).

But see exceptions, above.

Exception #3: Cannot make a warrantless arrest for a “*stale misdemeanor (or infraction).*” (*Jackson v. Superior Court* (1950) 98 Cal.App.2nd 183, 187; see above.)

With an Arrest Warrant: Any time of the day or night, in any place, including the subject’s own home. (P.C. § 836(a))

Exception #1: Cannot make a misdemeanor warrant arrest at night within the subject’s home unless the warrant is “*endorsed for night service*” by a judge. (P.C. § 840(4)) (See above)

“*Nighttime*” for purposes of an arrest warrant is 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.

The need for a nighttime endorsement must be justified before a judge will approve it; i.e.: Why does this defendant need to be arrested at night? (See *People v. Kimble* (1988) 44 Cal.3rd 480, 494; discussing the need for justifying nighttime service for a search warrant.)

Exception #2: Cannot make a misdemeanor warrant arrest within a third person’s home, unless the officer also first obtains a search warrant for the third person’s home (See *Steagald v. United States, supra.*) or is already and otherwise lawfully in the third person’s home.

Exception #3: Private citizens may not serve arrest warrants. (P.C. §§ 813, 816)

Penal Code § 964: Victim and Witness Confidential Information: Requires the establishment of procedures to protect the confidentiality of “*confidential personal information*” of victims and witnesses. The section is directed primarily at prosecutors and the courts, but also contains a provision for documents filed by law enforcement with a court in support of search and arrest warrants; i.e., *an affidavit.*

Subd. (b): “*Confidential personal information*” includes, *but is not limited to*, addresses, telephone numbers, driver’s license and California identification card numbers, social security numbers, date of birth, place of employment, employee identification numbers, mother’s maiden name, demand deposit account numbers, savings or checking account numbers, and credit card numbers.

Live Lineups: An ex parte court order requiring an un-charged criminal suspect to submit to a live lineup, even though there is probable cause to arrest him, is unenforceable. There is no statutory procedure for accomplishing such a procedure. (*Goodwin v. Superior Court* (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 215.)

Case Law Limitations:

Ramey: *Within One's Own Residence*: Warrantless arrests within a private residence are restricted because of the constitutional right to privacy interests a person, even a criminal suspect, has within their own home. (See below)

General Rule: Arrests in one's home for a felony or misdemeanor may only be made with prior judicial authorization in the form of an arrest warrant. (*People v. Ramey* (1976) 16 Cal.3rd 263, 276; *Payton v. New York* (1980) 445 U.S. 573 [63 L.Ed.2nd 639].)

Police officers need either (1) an arrest warrant or (2) probable and exigent circumstances to lawfully enter a person's home to arrest its occupant. (*Kirk v. Louisiana* (2002) 536 U.S. 635 [153 L.Ed.2nd 599].)

However, surrounding a barricaded suspect in his home is in effect a warrantless arrest, justified by the exigent circumstances. The passage of time during the ensuing standoff does not dissipate that exigency to where officers are expected to seek the authorization of a judge to take the suspect into physical custody. (*Fisher v. City of San Jose* (9th Cir. 2009) 558 F.3rd 1069; overruling its prior holding (at 509 F.3rd 952) that failure to obtain an arrest warrant during a 12-hour standoff resulted in an illegal arrest of the barricaded suspect.)

Armed police officers surrounding defendant's home and then ordering him out via a public address system is in effect an arrest within the home, and absent a warrant or exigent circumstances, is illegal. The fact that defendant had just fled into his home, avoiding being arrested on his front porch for a misdemeanor, is not an exigent circumstance. (*United States v. Nora* (9th Cir. 2014) 765 F.3rd 1049, 1052-1060.)

See *United States v. Mallory* (3rd Cir. 2014) 765 F.3rd 373, for the exact opposite conclusion on the lawfulness of entering a residence in hot pursuit under the exact same circumstances, although the firearm should have been suppressed as a product of an unlawful warrantless search after the residence was secured.

Exceptions: There are numerous *exceptions* to this rule:

- *Consent:* When the occupant of a house *consents* to the police officers' entry of his or her home. (*People v. Superior Court [Kenner]* (1977) 73 Cal.App.3rd 65, 68; *People v. Peterson* (1978) 85 Cal.App.3rd 163, 171; see also *People v. Ramey, supra*, at p. 275; and *Payton v. New York, supra*, at p. 583 [63 L.Ed.2nd at p. 649]; and *People v. Newton* (1980) 107 Cal.App.3rd 568, 578.)

But, "an alleged consentor must be aware of the purpose of the requested entry and a consent obtained trickery or subterfuge renders a subsequent search and seizure invalid." (*People v. Superior Court [Kenner]*, *supra.*, at p. 69; merely asking for permission to enter "to talk to" the suspect does not justify the warrantless entry and arrest; see also *In re Johnny V.* (1978) 85 Cal.App.3rd 120, 132.)

Permission to enter need not be an express consent. Asking the homeowner for defendant and for permission to "come in and look around" when it was denied that he was present was reasonably interpreted by the police as consent to enter to find defendant for any purpose that they desired, including arrest. (*People v. Newton, supra.*)

For the officers to validly rely upon consent, they must reasonably and in good faith believe that the person giving consent had the authority to consent to their entry into the residence. (*People v. Escudero* (1979) 23 Cal.3rd 800, 806.)

Undercover Entries: Consent obtained by officers working undercover, for the purpose of continuing an investigation, is valid. It is the "intrusion into," not the arrest while inside, which offends the constitutional standards under *Ramey*. Arresting the defendant after having gained lawful entry is not a *Ramey* violation. (*People v. Evans* (1980) 108 Cal.App.3rd 193, 196.)

"The **Fourth Amendment** does not protect 'a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it.'" (*Toubus v. Superior Court* (1981) 114 Cal.App.3rd 378, 383.)

And just because the undercover officer has momentarily left the residence, such action followed immediately by the reentry of the arresting officers, does not violate *Ramey* or *Payton*. (*People v. Cespedes* (1987) 191 Cal.App.3rd 768.)

But the reentry must be simultaneous with, or immediately after, the undercover officer's exit. (*People v. Ellers* (1980) 108 Cal.App.3rd 943; arrest unlawful when after the "buy," during an undercover narcotics investigation, the police drove to a parking lot one mile away, spent ten to twenty minutes formulating a plan to arrest the defendant, and then returned and reentered the house to make the arrest.)

Evidence observed in plain view by officers entering a residence with the suspect's consent and with exigent circumstances, while the officers did a protective sweep and check for victims of a shooting, justified a later warrantless entry to seize and process that evidence so long as the police did not give up control of the premises. (*People v. Superior Court [Chapman]* (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1014-1021; officers left one officer inside to secure the scene and the deceased victim while awaiting investigators, criminologists, and the coroner.)

- *Exigent circumstances*: "(A) warrantless intrusion may be justified by *hot pursuit* of a fleeing felon, or *imminent destruction* of evidence [citation], or the need to prevent a suspect's *escape*, or the *risk of danger* to the police or to other persons inside or outside the dwelling.' [citations]" (Italics added; *Minnesota v. Olson* (1990) 495 U.S. 91, 100 [109 L.Ed.2nd 85, 95].)

"The exigency exception permits warrantless entry where officers 'have both probable cause to believe that a crime has been or is being committed and a reasonable belief that their entry is necessary to prevent . . . the destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some other consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts.'" (*Sandoval v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't.* (9th Cir. 2014) 756 F.3rd 1154, 1161; quoting *Hopkins v. Bonvicino* (9th Cir. 2009) 573 F.3rd 752, 763.)

In *Sandoval*, it was held that because the officers lacked probable cause to believe that a residential burglary was occurring, there was no exigency allowing for the warrantless entry into the residence. (*Id.*, at pp. 1161-1163.)

A warrantless entry into defendant's residence based upon witness information that defendant, an armed robber, had entered the home minutes earlier, was lawful. (*Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden* (1967) 387 U.S. 294 [18 L.Ed.2nd 782].)

Where defendant, the suspect in an ongoing drug transaction, had been standing in the doorway with a brown paper bag in her hand, retreated into the vestibule of her home as police officers pulled up to her house shouting "police," following her into the house was lawful. (*United States v. Santana* (1976) 427 U.S. 38 [49 L.Ed.2nd 300].)

- "Fresh or Hot Pursuit," or at the end of a "substantially continuous investigation:" A continuous investigation from crime to arrest of the subject in his home, within a limited time period (e.g., within hours), and without an opportunity to stop and obtain an arrest warrant, is "fresh pursuit." It is *not* necessary that the suspect be physically in view during the "pursuit." (*People v. Escudero* (1979) 23 Cal.3rd 800, 809-810; *In re Lavoyne M.* (1990) 221 Cal.App.3rd 154; *People v. Gilbert* (1965) 63 Cal.2nd 690; *United States v. Johnson* (9th Cir. 2000) 207 F.3rd 538.)

Where there was a two and a half hour investigation between a robbery-murder and the location of the defendant's home, the officers were found to be in "fresh pursuit," justifying a warrantless entry to look for the suspect. (*People v. Gilbert* (1965) 63 Cal.2nd 690, 706.)

When officers contact a rape victim half a block from the crime scene, less than an hour after the rape (*People v. White* (1986) 183 Cal.App.3^r 1199, 1203-1204.), or immediately across the street minutes after she escaped from the sleeping suspect (*People v. Kilpatrick* (1980) 105 Cal.App.3rd 401, 409-411.), it is "fresh pursuit" when the officers go to the respective suspects' homes, make a warrantless entry, and arrest the suspects. This was found to be necessary to prevent the escape of the suspect and the destruction of evidence.

Tracing an armed robbery suspect by the vehicle description and license number to a particular residence, justifies a warrantless entry. (*People v. Daughhetee* (1985) 165 Cal.App.3rd 574.)

Exigent circumstances were found where the defendant refused commands to exit his home a short time after he threatened to shoot his neighbor, to light his neighbor's trailer on fire, and to "blow up" the entire trailer park in which the two lived if the neighbor bothered the defendant's family again. Officers were also told that the defendant had also threatened the neighbor with a pistol the day before and had been seen in possession of hand grenades and automatic weapons a few days earlier. However, the Court found the exigency question to be "close." (*United States v. Al-Azzawy* (9th Cir. 1985) 784 F.2nd 890, 891-893.)

The entry and securing of a home pending the obtaining of a search warrant, immediately following a gang shooting, was justified when it was believed that a second shooter and the firearms used were likely in the house. (*In re Elizabeth G.* (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 496.)

Presence of an armed suspect, who had committed a vicious murder who was likely to flee, with the possibility that defendant would dispose of evidence; warrantless entry and arrest was lawful. (*People v. Williams* (1989) 48 Cal.3rd 1112, 1138-1139.)

A strong reason to believe that defendant was the killer in the murder of two men, that he was probably armed and at a particular apartment, and that he was likely to flee if not immediately arrested, justified the warrantless entry. (*People v. Bacigalupo* (1991) 1 Cal.4th 103, 122-123.)

Officers may even pursue a person into his home upon attempting to cite him for an infraction where the suspect flees into his home. The defendant's resistance converts the offense into a misdemeanor "resisting arrest" (i.e., **P.C. § 148(a)**), and allows for a "hot pursuit" into the suspect's house to arrest him on that charge. (*People v. Lloyd* (1989) 216 Cal.App.3rd 1425, 1428-1430; citing *United States v.*

Santana (1976) 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 [49 L.Ed.2nd 300]; see also *In re Lavoyne M.* (1990) 221 Cal.App.3rd 154, 159.)

But see *United States v. Johnson* (9th Cir. 2001) 256 F.3rd 895, 908, fn. 6; where it was held that “*hot pursuit*” does *not* allow for the chasing of a suspect into a private residence except where the underlying offense is a felony, or in other identified “rare circumstances.”

However, the Ninth Circuit held in *United States v. Lundin* (9th Cir. 2016) 817 F.3rd 1151, that officers going to defendant’s home 3½ hours after the victim reported that she had been kidnapped and assaulted by defendant was done so without an exigency. Entering the curtilage of defendant’s home (i.e., the front porch) at 4:00 a.m., with the intent to make a warrantless arrest, was therefore unlawful. Any exigency created by such an unlawful act (i.e., defendant attempting to escape from the back of the house) did not justify his warrantless arrest in the backyard or the warrantless entry into the house itself.

In *Sims v. Stanton* (9th Cir. 2013) 706 F.3rd 954, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal held that entering the curtilage of a home in pursuit of a suspect with the intent to detain him when the subject is ignoring the officer’s demands to stop, at worst a misdemeanor violation of P.C. § 148, is illegal. The warrantless fresh or hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect into a residence (or the curtilage of a residence) is limited to felony suspects only. The United States Supreme Court, however, reversed this decision in *Stanton v. Sims* (Nov. 4, 2013) 571 U.S. __ [134 S.Ct. 3; 187 L.Ed.2nd 341].

The Ninth Circuit’s decision is based upon that Court’s interpretation of the United States Supreme Court decision in *Welsh v Wisconsin* (1984) 466 U.S. 740 [80 L.Ed.2nd 732], and conflicts with the California Supreme Court’s reasoning in *People v. Thompson* (2006) 38 Cal.4th 811 (see “Warrantless entry to arrest a DUI (i.e., “*Driving while Under the Influence*”) suspect,” above).

However, the United States Supreme Court, in interpreting its own decision on *Welsh*, noted that they only held there that a warrantless entry into a

residence for a minor offense *not involving hot pursuit* was an exception to the normal rule that a warrant is “usually” going to be required. Per the Court, there is no rule that residential entries involving hot pursuit are limited to felony cases. In this case, there was a “*hot pursuit*.” (*Stanton v. Sims*, *supra*, citing *Welsh*, at p. 750.)

However, observation of defendant holding onto a handgun while on his own front porch, when he’d been observed moments earlier on the sidewalk in front of his house, constituted probable cause of a misdemeanor violation of carrying a loaded firearm in a public place, per P.C. § 25850(a) (i.e., the sidewalk). But by ignoring the officers’ orders to remain outside, entering the house did *not* constitute an exigent circumstance that allowed for the officers to arrest defendant inside his house. (*United States v. Nora* (9th Cir. 2014) 765 F.3rd 1049, 1052-1060; suppressing evidence found on his person and as the result of a search warrant obtained for the house after defendant’s arrest.)

The officers used a public address system to order defendant out of the house. This, the Court ruled, was in effect an arrest within his house although the officers did not enter the house. (*Id.*, at p. 1054.)

Note: The Court made no mention of *Stanton v. Sims*, *supra*, or of the doctrine of “*hot pursuit*,” making the validity of this decision questionable.

See *United States v. Mallory* (3rd Cir. 2014) 765 F.3rd 373, for the exact opposite conclusion on the lawfulness of entering a residence in hot pursuit under the exact same circumstances, although the firearm should have been suppressed as a product of an unlawful warrantless search after the residence was secured.

Having used a tracking device to follow defendants with stolen stereo speakers to a particular house, the immediate warrantless entry and search was justified by the reasonable fear that defendants would disassemble, destroy or hide the speakers, and wash off identifying fluorescent powder if

they waited for a warrant. (*People v. Hull* (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1448, 1455.)

Warrantless entry to arrest a misdemeanor DUI (i.e., “Driving while Under the Influence”) suspect:

Illegal: Welsh v. Wisconsin (1984) 466 U.S. 740 [80 L.Ed.2nd 732], where the state treated a person’s first DUI offense as a non-criminal offense, subjecting the suspect to civil forfeiture only.

Legal: People v. Hampton (1985) 164 Cal.App.3rd 27, 34, where a warrantless entry was upheld to prevent the destruction of evidence (the blood/alcohol level) and there was reason to believe defendant intended to resume driving. *Welsh* can be distinguished by the simple fact that California treats DUI cases as serious misdemeanors.

Legal: Entering a house without consent or a warrant to take a suspected DUI driver into custody and to remove him from the house for identification and arrest by a private citizen who saw defendant’s driving, held to be legal. The fact that the defendant’s blood/alcohol level might dissipate to some degree pending the obtaining of a telephonic arrest warrant, plus the fact that the suspect might leave and drive again, was sufficient cause to establish an exigent circumstance. (*People v. Thompson* (2006) 38 Cal.4th 811.)

Note: The Court differentiated on its facts *Welsh v Wisconsin* (1984) 466 U.S. 740 [80 L.Ed.2nd 732], where it was held that a first time DUI, being no more than a civil offense with a \$200 fine under Wisconsin law, was not aggravated enough to allow for a warrantless entry into a residence to arrest the perpetrator. The cut off between a minor and a serious offense seems to be whether or not the offense is one for which incarceration is a potential punishment. (*People v. Thompson, supra*, at pp. 821-824, citing *Illinois v. McArthur* (2001) 531 U.S. 326, 336, 337 [148 L.Ed.2nd 838]; and

noting (at pp. 822-823) that the Ninth Circuit’s opinion on this issue is a minority opinion.)

Illegal: The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal, arguing the continuing validity of, *Welsh*, held that California’s interpretation under *Thompson* is wrong, and that a warrantless entry into a home to arrest a misdemeanor driving–while–under–the–influence suspect is a **Fourth Amendment** violation. (*Hopkins v. Bonvicino* (9th Cir. 2009) 573 F.3rd 752, 768-769; finding that warrantless entries into residences in misdemeanor cases “will seldom, if ever, justify a warrantless entry into the home.”)

Note: See *Birchfield v. North Dakota* (June 23, 2016) __ U.S. __, __ [136 S.Ct. 2160;195 L.Ed.2nd 560], for a historical review of the development of DUI statutes and the importance of obtaining a reading of the suspect’s “BAC” (“Blood Alcohol Concentration”).

But note the authority authorizing entries into residences to execute misdemeanor arrest warrants from both state (*People v. Leblanc* (1997) 60 Cal. App.4th 157, 164.) and federal (*United States v. Spencer* (2nd Cir. 1982) 684 F.2nd 220, 223-224.) courts.

Entering a residence with probable cause to believe only that the non-bookable offense of possession of less than an ounce of marijuana is occurring (**H&S § 11357(b)**), is closer to the *Welsh* situation, being a “nonjailable offense,” and a violation of the **Fourth Amendment** when entry is made without consent. (*People v. Hua* (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1027; *People v. Torres et al.* (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 989, 993-998; see also *United States v. Mongold* (10th Cir. 2013) 528 F.3rd 944.)

The *Torres* Court also rejected as “speculation” the People’s argument that there being four people in the defendants’ hotel room indicted that a “marijuana-smoking party” was occurring, which

probably involved a bookable amount of marijuana. (*People v. Torres et al.*, *supra*, at p. 996.)

But see *People v. Waxler* (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 712, 724-725; rejecting the *Hua* and *Torres* argument when the place being searched is a motor vehicle as opposed to a residence.

A reasonable belief in the imminent threat to life or the welfare of a person within the home, with probable cause to believe a missing person was inside, and a reasonable belief that the person inside needed aid, justified a warrantless entry. (*People v. Coddington* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 580.)

Exigent Circumstances, justifying a warrantless residential arrest, include an evaluation of the following circumstances:

- The gravity of the offense;
- Whether the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed;
- Whether probable cause is clear;
- Whether the suspect is likely to be found on the premises; and
- The likelihood that the suspect will escape if not promptly arrested.

(*People v. Williams* (1989) 48 Cal.3rd 1112, 1138-1139.)

Entering and securing a residence pending the obtaining of a search warrant was supported by exigent circumstances when officers received information that the occupant was about to destroy or remove contraband from the residence. (*United States v. Fowlkes* (9th Cir. 2015) 804 F.3rd 954, 969-971.)

The fact that it took about an hour to coordinate the officers necessary to make the warrantless entry and securing of defendant's apartment was irrelevant; the exigency still existed. (*Id.*, at p. 971.)

See "*Exigent Circumstances*," under "*Warrantless Searches*," below.

- Officers are *already lawfully inside* when probable cause develops. (*People v. Ramey*, *supra*; *People v. Dyke* (1990) 224 Cal.App.3rd 648, 657-659, 661.)

See *United States v. Brobst* (9th Cir. 2009) 558 F.3rd 982, 997; and *People v. McCarter* (1981) 117 Cal.App.3rd 894, 908; both cases with officers inside executing search warrants.

- Defendant is *standing in the threshold*: Case law has consistently held that an arrest without a warrant, either outside or *even with the suspect standing in the threshold* of his own home, is lawful. For example:

A warrantless arrest at the threshold of defendant’s motel room, where defendant opened the door in response to the officers’ knock and after having looked outside and seeing the officers standing at the door, is lawful. *Payton* draws a “*bright line*” at the threshold. So long as the officers did not misidentify themselves or use coercion to get defendant to open the door, and defendant acquiesced in the procedure, he is subject to a warrantless arrest. The fact that defendant was physically inside the door is also irrelevant so long as the officers are outside at the time the arrest is made. (*United States v. Vaneaton* (9th Cir. 1995) 49 F.3rd 1423, 1426-1427: Where officers use no force, threats, or subterfuge, a suspect’s decision to open the door exposes him to a public place, and the privacy interests protected by *Payton* are not violated.)

Without overruling *Vaneaton* (leaving the continuing validity of this case “for another case and another day”), the Ninth Circuit noted that its decision here “may be on infirm ground” after deciding *United States v. Lundin* (9th Cir. Mar. 22, 2016) (9th Cir. 2016) 817 F.3rd 1151. In *Lundin*, it was held that officers going onto defendant’s front porch at 4:00 a.m., without a warrant or exigent circumstances, and for the subjective purpose of arresting him, is illegal, and that any exigent circumstances provoked by that illegal act do not justify the entry of defendant’s back yard and the seizure of evidence. However, it was also noted that in *Vaneaton*, the officers were standing in a

“common space” of a motel when they knocked, as opposed to a suspect’s front porch.

Defendant, standing in her doorway as officers approached, is in public. Further, she may not defeat an arrest which has been set in motion by attempting to escape into a private place. (*United States v. Santana* (1976) 427 U.S. 38 [49 L.Ed.2nd 300].)

When the officer attempted to arrest defendant in the threshold of her apartment door, only to have her pull away and into the apartment, the officer may follow her in to complete the arrest he had set in motion on her doorstep. (*People v. Hampton* (1985) 164 Cal.App.3rd 27, 35-36.)

However, arresting defendant who was still in bed, even though he could (and did) reach the door and open it from his bed, was a violation of *Payton*. It is irrelevant that the officer was still outside the residence when he pronounced defendant under arrest in that it is the defendant’s location, and not the officer’s, that is important. (*United States v. Quaempts* (9th Cir. 2005) 411 F.3rd 1046.)

Also, telling defendant, who was standing just inside the threshold of his home, that he was under arrest, to which defendant then submitted, was held to be a violation of *Payton v. New York* in that when officers engage in actions to coerce an occupant outside of the home, they accomplish the same effect as an actual entry into the home, which triggers the requirements of *Payton*. (*United States v. Allen* (2nd Cir. 2016) 813 F.3rd 76.)

- A *parolee* (and, therefore, presumably, a *probationer* who is on search and seizure **Fourth Amendment** waiver conditions) may be arrested in his home without the necessity of a warrant. Police are authorized to enter a house without a warrant where the suspect is a parolee who had no legitimate expectation of privacy against warrantless arrests. (*People v. Lewis* (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 662, 665-673; *In re Frank S.* (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 145, 151.)
- *Inviting Defendant Outside*: The defendant *may* even be “*invited*” outside, even though the officer’s intent to arrest is not disclosed. When the defendant leaves the protection of his home, at least if he does so voluntarily, *Ramey* does not apply and the arrest outside is lawful. (*People v. Tillery* (1979) 99 Cal.App.3rd 975, 979-980;

People v. Green (1983) 146 Cal.App.3rd 369, 377; *People v. Jackson* (1986) 187 Cal.App.3rd 499, 505; *Hart v. Parks* (9th Cir. 2006) 450 F.3rd 1059, 1065.)

A suspect may be arrested without a warrant when he is in public. Case law tells us that anywhere, “whether it be the driveway, lawn, or front porch,” which are “open to ‘common’ or ‘general use’” by those wishing to contact the resident of a house, are “*public places*.” (*People v. Olson* (1971) 18 Cal.App.3rd 592, 598.)

See *In re Danny H.* (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 92, for a thorough discussion of the law on “*public places*” as it relates to the 24 separate statutes where such is an element.

And while it is illegal for a police officer to use a ruse to make a warrantless entry into a suspect’s home, it has been held that it is *not* illegal to trick the suspect out. (*People v. Rand* (1972) 23 Cal.App.3rd 579, 583.) For example:

Calling the suspect’s house and falsely telling him the police are coming with a warrant, causing defendant, by his own choice, to attempt to flee his residence with the contraband, is lawful. There is no constitutional violation in arresting him when he comes outside. (*Ibid.*; *People Porras* (1979) 99 Cal.App.3rd 874; but note this Court’s invitation to the California Supreme Court to review the lawfulness of purposely evading *Ramey* in this manner (pp. 879-880) and the Supreme Court’s refusal to do so by denying appellant’s petition for a hearing.)

These cases, however, are when an officer has probable cause to arrest the suspect. Where there is no pre-existing probable cause, using a ruse to trick people outside during a narcotics investigation at an apartment complex, for the purpose of confronting as many people as they could lure outside (resulting in the defendant’s illegal detention when he was surrounded by a team of officers all dressed in raid gear) is illegal. “A deception used to gain entry into a home and a ruse that lures a suspect out of a residence is a distinction without much difference. .

. . .” (*People v. Reyes* (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 7, 12-13.)

But see *In re R.K.* (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1615, where the Court criticized the police tactic of inviting a drunk suspect out from a non-public location onto the public street and then arresting him for being “drunk in public,” ruling that such a tactic is illegal even though he “voluntarily acquiesced” to go to a public place. It is unknown if this ruling can be applied to a *Ramey* situation as well.

However, there is even some authority allowing a police officer to *order* the defendant out of his house, after which he is arrested. *Ramey* forbids warrantless entries only, and is not a relevant issue when the defendant is arrested in public no matter how he came to be in public. (*People v. Trudell* (1985) 173 Cal.App.3rd 1221, 1228-1230.)

But the majority rule indicates that ordering a person to come out of his house is the equivalent of having arrested him while in the house, and illegal:

When officers are outside with guns drawn, ordering defendant to come out, he has in effect been seized (i.e., arrested) while in his house. Leaving the house under such coercive circumstances is *not* an exception to *Ramey/Payton*. (*United States v. Al-Azzaway* (9th Cir. 1985) 784 F.2nd 890, 893-895; *Fisher v. City of San Jose* (9th Cir. 2009) 558 F.3rd 1069, 1074-1075.)

Also, calling inside the residence through a partially open door, “commanding” any occupants to show themselves, and then ordering defendant to back out of the residence when he did show himself, was held to be an illegal detention effected *inside* the residence in that the warrantless intrusion into the residence was not supported by probable cause. (*People v. Lujano* (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 175, 185-189.)

However, it was also noted that “(i)f (the officer) had *invited* defendant to step outside of his home to talk, and defendant did so voluntarily, then any detention would be

treated as if it occurred outside the home, and our analysis would be quite different.” (Italics added) (*Id.*, at p. 188.)

Armed police officers surrounding defendant’s home and then ordering him out via a public address system is in effect an arrest within the home, and absent a warrant or exigent circumstances, is illegal. The fact that defendant had just fled into his home, avoiding being arrested on his front porch for a misdemeanor, is *not* an exigent circumstance, per the Ninth Circuit. (*United States v. Nora* (9th Cir. 2014) 765 F.3rd 1049, 1052-1060.)

Also, telling defendant, who was standing just inside the threshold of his home, that he was under arrest, to which defendant then submitted, was held to be a violation of *Payton v. New York* in that when officers engage in actions to coerce an occupant outside of the home, they accomplish the same effect as an actual entry into the home, which triggers the requirements of *Payton*. (*United States v. Allen* (2nd Cir. 2016) 813 F.3rd 76; citing the Ninth Circuit’s rule on this issue with approval.)

Sufficiency of Evidence to Believe the Suspect is Inside: The amount of evidence a law enforcement officer must have indicating that a criminal suspect is in fact presently inside his own residence in order to justify a non-consensual entry, with or without an arrest warrant, has been debated over the years:

The United States Supreme Court, in *Payton v. New York* (1980) 445 U.S. 573 [63 L.Ed.2nd 639], merely states that a police officer must have a “*reason to believe*” the suspect is inside his residence, without defining the phrase.

A California lower appellate court found that the officers needed a “*reasonable belief*,” or “*strong reason to believe*,” the suspect was home. (*People v. White* (1986) 183 Cal.App.3rd 1199, 1204-1209; rejecting the defense argument that full “*probable cause*” to believe the subject was inside is required; see also *United States v. Magluta* (11th Cir. 1995) 44 F.3rd 1530, 1535, using a “*reasonable belief*” standard.)

Other authority, most notably from the federal Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal, indicates that a full measure of “*probable cause*” is

required. (See *Dorman v. United States* (D.C. Cir. 1970) 435 F.2nd 385, 393; see also *United States v. Phillips* (9th Cir. 1974) 497 F.2nd 1131; a locked commercial establishment, at night; *United States v. Gorman* (9th Cir. 2002) 314 F.3rd 1105; defendant in his girlfriend's house with whom he was living; and *United States v. Diaz* (9th Cir. 2007) 491 F.3rd 1074; and *United States v. Gooch* (9th Cir. 2007) 506 F.3rd 1156, 1159, fn. 2.)

It has been argued that the California Supreme Court, interpreting the language of P.C. § 844 (i.e., “reasonable grounds for believing him to be (inside)”), has found that any arrest, with or without an arrest warrant, requires *probable cause* to believe the subject is inside in order to justify a non-consensual entry into a residence. (*People v. Jacobs* (1987) 43 Cal.3rd 472, 478-479.)

Noting that five other federal circuits have ruled that something less than probable cause is required, and that the Ninth Circuit is a minority opinion (see *United States v. Gorman, supra.*), the Fourth District Court of Appeal (Div. 2) found instead that an officer executing an arrest warrant or conducting a probation or parole search may enter a dwelling if he or she has only a *reasonable belief*, falling short of probable cause to believe, the suspect lives there and is present at the time. Employing that standard, the entry into defendant's apartment to conduct a probation search was lawful based on all of the information known to the officers. Accordingly, the court upheld the trial court's conclusion that the officers had objectively reasonable grounds to conclude the defendant/probationer lived at the subject apartment and was present at the time, and therefore the officers had the right to enter the apartment to conduct a warrantless probation search. (*People v. Downey* (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 652, 657-662.)

Also noting that the California Supreme Court, in *People v. Jacobs, supra* (pg. 479, fn. 4), did *not* find that probable cause was required, contrary to popular belief. (*Id.*, at p. 662.)

The Ninth Circuit, in a case dealing with whether the subject of a **Fourth** wavier search in fact lives at the place to be searched, continues to hold by the probable cause standard. (*United States v. Bolivar* (9th Cir. 2012) 670 F.3rd 1091, 1093-1095.)

With evidence giving officers “a reasonable belief” that the home entered with an arrest warrant was where defendant lived, it was

also reasonable for them to believe that he would be home at 6:00 a.m. (*United States v. Hamilton* (1st Cir. 2016) 819 F.3rd 503.)

Within a Third Person's Home: Probable cause justifying an arrest warrant for one person does not authorize entry into to a third person's home to look for the subject of the arrest warrant. To do so violates the privacy interests of the third party. Therefore, a *search warrant*, based upon probable cause to believe the wanted subject is in fact in the home of the third party (absent exigent circumstances), is necessary. (*Steagald v. United States* (1981) 451 U.S. 204 [68 L.Ed.2nd 38]; *People v. Codinha* (1982) 138 Cal.App.3rd 167; sometimes referred to as a "*Steagald Warrant*." See also **P.C. 1524(a)(6)**; legal authorization for obtaining such a search warrant.)

The arrestee, if doing no more than merely visiting the lawful resident, probably has no standing to contest the unlawful entry of another's house. (*United States v. Underwood* (9th Cir. 1983) 717 F.2nd 482.) It is when a police officer obtains evidence against the third party homeowner, while looking for the subject of the arrest, that *Steagald* becomes an issue. The homeowner, in such a case, has standing to contest the warrantless entry of his house in defense at his own prosecution. (*Steagald v. United States, supra*, at pp. 212, 216 [68 L.Ed.2nd at pp. 45, 48].) The person with the outstanding arrest warrant does not. (*United States v. Bohannon* (2nd Cir. 2016) 824 F.3rd 242.)

But, there is some authority that, as an overnight guest in another's apartment, defendant with an outstanding arrest warrant *does* have standing to contest the entry of the bedroom in which he is staying when done without a search warrant. (*People v. Hamilton* (1985) 168 Cal.App.3rd 1058.)

A frequent visitor, with free reign of the house despite the fact that he did not stay overnight, might also have standing to contest an allegedly illegal entry of a third person's home. (*People v. Stewart* (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 242.)

Hamilton and *Stewart* have some support in *Minnesota v. Olson* (1990) 495 U.S. 91 [109 L.Ed.2nd 85]; and *People v. Tillery* (1979) 99 Cal.App.3rd 975, 978-979.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal has interpreted *Payton's* "reason to believe" requirement (See also *United States v. Underwood* (9th Cir. 1983) 717 F.2nd 482.) as necessitating "probable cause" to believe a suspect is inside a third person's

home before a non-consensual entry may be made. (*United States v. Gorman* (9th Cir. 2002) 314 F.3rd 1105; attempt to serve an arrest warrant requires “*probable cause*” to believe the subject of the warrant is inside.)

California’s Fourth District Court of Appeal has held otherwise, finding that only a *reasonable belief*, falling short of probable cause to believe, that the suspect lives there and is present at the time, is necessary to justify a non-consensual entry. (*People v. Downey* (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 652, 657-662.)

Also noting that the California Supreme Court, in *People v. Jacobs*, *supra* (pg. 479, fn. 4), did *not* find that probable cause was required, contrary to popular belief. (*Id.*, at p. 662.)

Note: The “*present at the time*” requirement apparently only applies to executing an arrest warrant. It has never been required that a person on a **Fourth** waiver be home at the time of a warrantless entry and search. (See *People v. Lilienthal* (1978) 22 Cal.3rd 891, 900.)

Neither an evicted former tenant, nor her “overnight house guest,” have standing to contest the warrantless entry of law enforcement officers who were there checking on a report of trespassers in the vacant apartment. (*Woodward v. City of Tucson* (9th Cir. 2017) 870 F.3rd 1154, 1159-1161.)

Consequences of a Ramey/Payton Violation:

A warrantless arrest in the home, in violation of *Payton v. New York*, *supra*, and *People v. Ramey*, *supra*, does not invalidate a later statement made to police which was not “*an exploitation of the illegal entry.*” (*New York v. Harris* (1990) 495 U.S. 14 [109 L.Ed.2nd 13]; *People v. Watkins* (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 19, 29-31; *United States v. Manuel* (9th Cir. 1983) 706 F.2nd 908, 911-912.)

An FBI agent made a warrantless entry into defendant’s hotel room in violation of the **Fourth Amendment** and arrested him with probable cause, but then did not question him until he was taken to a law enforcement interrogation room where he waived his *Miranda* rights and made incriminating statements. The statements were held to be admissible under the rule of *New York v. Harris*, *supra*.

(*United States v. Slaughter* (11th Cir. Feb. 11, 2013) 708 F.3rd 1208, 1212-1213.)

See also *People v. Marquez* (1992) 1 Cal.4th 553, 569; *Harris* rule applies to an arrest made with probable cause but in violation of the California Constitution and *People v. Ramey*, *supra*.

Even where *Ramey* and *Payton* are violated, so long as the police have probable cause to make the arrest, only evidence secured in the home is subject to suppression. Defendant's arrest is not suppressed, nor are his statements later (after leaving the house) made to police as a product of that arrest. (*People v. Watkins*, *supra*.)

Conducting an illegal parole search within a home where there exists probable cause to arrest the subject (even though he was only detained) will not cause the suppression of a confession obtained after the subject comes to the law enforcement officer's office where he is interrogated. (*United States v. Crawford* (9th Cir. 2004) 372 F.3rd 1048, 1054-1059.)

Similarly, *physical evidence* recovered from the defendant's person upon searching him at the police station, should also be admissible. (*People v. Watkins*, *supra*, at p. 31, fn. 8; citing out-of-state authority.)

This is supported by dicta in *People v. Marquez*, *supra*, at p. 569, where the Court noted that a *Ramey* violation, "would require suppression solely of evidence obtained from searching the home at the time of the arrest."

Note: What this means is that should a court rule that *Ramey/Payton* has been violated, any oral or physical evidence seized from the defendant *after* removing him from the home will not be suppressed, being the product of a lawful arrest and *not* the product of the illegal entry into the residence. In other words, don't question or search the individual until he has been removed from the home in any case where the entry is questionable.

But Note: Earlier case authority has indicated that a *Ramey* violation is but one factor for the court to consider in determining whether the defendant's subsequent confession

is a product of his free will. (*People v. Trudell* (1985) 173 Cal.App.3rd 1221, 1231-1232.)

Knock and Notice:

Statutory Rule: “To make an arrest, a private person, if the offense is a felony, and in all cases a peace officer, may break open the door or window of the home in which the person to be arrested is, or in which they have reasonable grounds for believing the person to be, after having demanded admittance and explained the purpose for which admittance is desired.” (P.C. § 844)

Suppression of Resulting Evidence:

The rule that evidence will *not necessarily* be suppressed as a result of a knock and notice violation, as dictated by *Hudson v. Michigan* (2006) 547 U.S. 586 [165 L.Ed.2nd 56] (a search warrant case.), is applicable as well in a warrantless, yet otherwise lawful, arrest situation, pursuant to P.C. § 844. (*In re Frank S.* (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 145; defendant, a parolee, was subject to warrantless searches and seizures.)

See “*Knock and Notice;*” under “*Searches With a Search Warrant*” (Chapter 6), below.

However, see *United States v. Weaver* (D.C. Cir. 2015) 808 F.3rd 26, where a divided panel of the D.C. Court of Appeal rejected the applicability of *Hudson v. Michigan*, *supra*, in an arrest warrant service situation, and held that federal agents violated the “knock-and-announce” rule by failing to announce their purpose before entering defendant’s apartment. By knocking but failing to announce their purpose, the agents gave defendant no opportunity to protect the privacy of his home. Per this court, the exclusionary rule is the appropriate remedy for knock-and-announce violations in the execution of arrest warrants at a person’s home, *Hudson v. Michigan* not being applicable to the arrest warrant situation.

Note: Nothing in *Hudson v. Michigan* indicates that the rule of non-exclusion of the evidence discovered after a knock and notice violation is limited to search warrant cases. Whether or not *Weaver* is a correct limitation of the rule of *Hudson v. Michigan* remains to be seen.

Arrest Issues:

Arresting for the Wrong Offense:

As long as, when arrested, probable cause to arrest for *some* offense was present, it is *irrelevant* that defendant was arrested for, and/or charged with, the wrong offense. (*People v. Lewis* (1980) 109 Cal.App.3rd 599, 608-609; *In re Donald L.* (1978) 81 Cal.App.3rd 770, 775; see also *People v. Richardson* (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 988-990; and *People v. Carmona* (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1385, 1391.) No sanctions will be imposed for having selected the wrong charge.

“Subjective intentions (of the arresting officer) play no role in ordinary, probable-cause **Fourth Amendment** analysis.” (*Whren v. United States* (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 814 [135 L.Ed.2nd 89, 98].)

“(A)n officer’s reliance on the wrong statute does not render his actions unlawful if there is a right statute that applies to the defendant’s conduct.” (*In re Justin K.* (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 695; Stopping defendant for his third (rear window) brake light out despite not knowing the correct legal justification for finding that the inoperable light was in violation of the **Vehicle Code**.)

See also *People v. Rodriguez* (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1250; defendant arrested for homicide for which there was no probable cause, while the officer did have probable cause to believe defendant had in fact committed another homicide; arrest lawful.

Arresting defendant for “littering” (per **P.C. § 374.4**) for urinating in public was a lawful arrest even though the officer used the wrong offense. Defendant’s actions were in fact a violation of **P.C. §§ 370, 372**, for having created a public nuisance. (*People v. McDonald* (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 521, 530.)

The United States Supreme Court has ruled that so long as a police officer has probable cause to arrest for *some* offense, it matters not that, subjectively, the officer erroneously believed that he only had probable cause for another offense. (*Devenpeck v. Alford* (2004) 543 U.S. 146 [160 L.Ed.2nd 537]; rejecting the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ opinion (e.g., see *Alford v. Haner* (9th Cir. 2003) 333 F.3rd 972; petition for certiorari granted.) that arresting for the wrong offense was only lawful if the two offenses were “*closely* (or ‘*factually*’) *related*,” as described in *Gasho v. United States* (9th Cir. 1994) 39 F.3rd 1420, 1428.)

See also *District of Columbia v. Wesby et al.* (Jan. 22, 2018) ___ U.S. ___, fn. 2 [138 S.Ct. 577; 199 L.Ed.2nd 453].) “Because probable cause is an objective standard, an arrest is lawful if the officer had probable cause to arrest for any offense, not just the offense cited at the time of arrest or booking.”

The Ninth Circuit was virtually alone on this issue, with other federal circuits following the U.S. Supreme Court’s lead. (See *United States v. Pulvano* (5th Cir. 1980) 629 F.2nd 1151; *United States v. Saunders* (5th Cir. 1973) 476 F.2nd 5; *Klingler v. United States* (8th Cir. 1969) 409 F.2nd 299; *United States ex rel LaBelle v. LaVallee* (2nd Cir. 1975) 517 F.2nd 750; *Richardson v. Bonds* (7th Cir. 1988) 860 F.2nd 1427; *Knight v. Jacobson* (11th Cir. 2002) 300 F.3rd 1272.)

However; an arrest for what the officer believes to be a felony, and which did not occur in the officer’s presence, but which is in fact only a misdemeanor, may be an illegal arrest, per **P.C. § 836(a)(1)** (i.e., misdemeanor not in the officer’s presence.), and/or the “stale misdemeanor” rule (see above).

Post-Arrest, Pre-Trial Detentions:

A pretrial detainee’s claim that he was unlawfully detained in jail after his arrest, based upon a probable cause finding that relied upon fabricated evidence, was properly brought under the **Fourth Amendment** rather than the **Due Process Clause**. Pretrial detentions that follows the start of legal process (a magistrate’s finding of probable cause, in this case) in a criminal case may violate the **Fourth Amendment**, depending upon the circumstances. It is only after a trial has occurred that the **Fourth Amendment** drops out, and a person challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support both a conviction and any ensuing incarceration does so under the Due Process Clause of the **Fourteenth Amendment**.

The question was left to the court below to decide whether the detainee’s **42 U.S.C. § 1983** civil claim accrued for statute of limitations purposes on the date legal process was initiated or on the date the criminal charges were dismissed. (*Manuel v. City of Joliet* (Mar. 21, 2017) ___ U.S. __ [137 S.Ct. 911; 187 L.Ed.2nd 312].)

Mistaken Belief in Existence of Probable Cause to Arrest or Search, an Arrest Warrant, or that a Fourth Waiver Exists, Based upon Erroneous Information Received from Various Sources:

The Problem: An officer arrests and/or searches a person under the mistaken belief that there is an arrest warrant outstanding for the person,

the person is subject to a “**Fourth Waiver**” (i.e., he has previously waived his **Fourth Amendment** search and seizure rights), *or* the officer is given other erroneous information through either court, law enforcement, or other official channels.

Generally, a police officer’s good faith belief that he has probable cause to arrest will save what is later determined to be an illegal arrest, having been made without sufficient probable cause. However, where a reasonably well-trained officer would, or should, have known that an arrest or search was unlawful, good faith will not save any subsequently discovered evidence. (*People v. Macabeo* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1219-1226; officer should have known that a search of defendant’s cellphone could not be justified under the “search incident to arrest” theory in that defendant had not yet been arrested until after the cellphone was searched.)

The Rule: The United States Supreme Court initially held that an officer’s “good faith” will validate the resulting arrest and/or search, at least in those cases where the erroneous information came from a “court source.” (*Arizona v. Evans* (1995) 514 U.S. 1 [131 L.Ed.2nd 34]; see also *People v. Downing* (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1641.)

Extension of the Rule: The United States Supreme Court subsequently ruled (in a 5-to-4 decision) that an officer’s good faith reliance on erroneous information will not invalidate an arrest even when that information comes from a law enforcement source, so long as the error was based upon non-reoccurring negligence only. Deliberate illegal acts, or a reckless disregard for constitutional requirements, or reoccurring or systematic negligence, will not excuse the resulting unlawful arrest. (*Herring v. United States* (2009) 555 U.S. 135 [172 L.Ed.2nd 496].)

However, “good faith” has never been held to excuse an illegal search where erroneous information did not come from another source, where the negligence was the fault of the searching officer, and just because the searching officer did not act recklessly or intentionally. (*United States v. Camou* (9th Cir. 2014) 773 F.3rd 932, 944-945.)

E.g.: The Appellate Department of the San Diego Superior Court has held that the practice of sending blood results to a drug lab in those “driving while under the influence” cases where testing for alcohol failed to show sufficient alcohol to account for the degree that the suspect appeared to be under the influence, and where the defendant had consented only to have her blood tested for alcohol as opposed to drugs, constituted “a procedural recurring or

systematic failure by the law enforcement agency’s personnel to abide by the **Fourth Amendment**.” As a result, good faith did not prevent a court from suppressing the test result for drugs as being beyond the scope of the consent given where the defendant is told only that her blood will be tested for alcohol. (*People v. Pickard* (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th Supp. 12, 16-17.)

The Reasoning: This is because the “*Exclusionary Rule*” was implemented primarily to deter intentional or reckless *police misconduct*; not misconduct by the courts or other non-law enforcement sources, or even law enforcement when their error was simply non-reoccurring negligence. It is not necessary to suppress the resulting evidence when to do so does not further the purposes of the *Exclusionary Rule*. (*Arizona v. Evans*, *supra*. At pp. 15-16 [131 L.Ed.2nd at pp. 47-48]; *United States v. Leon* (1984) 468 U.S. 897, 920-921 [82 L.Ed.2nd 677, 697]; *People v. Willis* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 22; *People v. Tellez* (1982) 128 Cal.App.3rd 876, 880; *Illinois v. Krull* (1987) 480 U.S. 340 [94 L.Ed.2nd 364].)

“(E)vidence should be suppressed ‘only if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the **Fourth Amendment**.’” (*Illinois v. Krull*, *supra*., at pp. 348-349.)

“To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.” (*Herring v. United States*, *supra*., at p. 144.)

Law Enforcement vs. Non-Law Enforcement Source: After the decision in *Arizona v. Evans* (1995), and before *Herring v. United States*, *supra*, California courts debated what was a law enforcement source, and what was not, interpreting *Evans* as establishing a bright line test for the issue. These cases will likely still be relevant in those cases where it is determined to be a law enforcement source and involves deliberate illegal acts, reckless disregard for constitutional requirements, or reoccurring or systematic negligence.

Law enforcement source cases where the resulting evidence was suppressed:

Police Computer Records: Arrest based upon an arrest warrant which was supposed to have been recalled six months earlier, but which was still reflected as outstanding in the police department’s computer system. (*People v.*

Ramirez (1983) 34 Cal.3rd 541, 543-544; *People v. Armstrong* (1991) 232 Cal.App.3rd 228, 241; *Miranda v. Superior Court* (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1628.)

Parole is a law enforcement source. Erroneous information from a state Department of Corrections parole officer resulted in a belief that the defendant was subject to a **Fourth** Wavier. The resulting warrantless search was held to be illegal. (*People v. Willis* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 22.)

But see *People v. Tellez* (1982) 128 Cal.App.3rd 876, where erroneous information from Parole did *not* preclude the use of the “*Good Faith*” exception to the exclusionary rule. This case is of questionable validity given the rule in *Willis*.

Exception: Where an officer is erroneously told that the defendant is on *parole*, only to find out later that he was subject to a *probationary Fourth* waiver instead, the search will be upheld. It is not relevant what type of **Fourth** wavier applies to the defendant, the officer acting in “*good faith*.” (*People v. Hill* (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1344.)

Probation: Based upon the reasoning of *People v. Willis* (2002) 28 Cal.4th 22, it was held that an adult Probation Department, even when the error was made by a clerk, is a *law enforcement source*. This Court questioned the continuing validity of *In re Arron C.* (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1365 (finding Juvenile Probation to be a court source), but noted that *Arron C.* dealt with “Juvenile Probation,” which works closer with the courts than does adult probation departments. (*People v. Ferguson* (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 367.)

See *In re Arron* (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1365, below.

Exception: Although evidence of a driving under the influence violation is subject to suppression in a criminal prosecution when it is discovered as a product of a traffic stop based upon outdated police records that the vehicle defendant was driving was stolen, that same evidence will *not* be suppressed in *Department of Motor Vehicles administrative proceedings* involving the suspension of defendant’s driver’s license. (*Park v. Valverde* (2007) 152

Cal.App.4th 877; see also *People v. Arredondo* (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 186, 201; *People v. Mason* (2016) 8 Cal.App.5th Supp. 11, 29.)

Note: Petition for Review was granted by the California Supreme Court in *People v. Arredondo* on June 8, 2016, making this case unavailable for citation.

Non-law enforcement source cases where the resulting evidence was not suppressed:

Fourth Wavier Information from the Courts: Erroneous information concerning whether defendant was still on probation and subject to a **Fourth** Waiver, the error created by a *court clerk*, is a “*court source*.” (*People v. Downing* (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1641.)

However, the Court in *Downing* noted that once law enforcement is on notice of the defects in the court system, “*good faith*” may not apply the next time. (*People v. Downing, supra*, at p. 1657, fn. 26; “We caution, however, that where the police department has knowledge of flaws in a record or data base system, it would not seem ‘*objectively reasonable*’ to rely solely on it without taking additional steps to ensure its accuracy.”)

Reversed Prior Conviction: A probationary **Fourth** Waiver condition from a prior case that was legally in effect at the time of the search in issue justifies the search. The fact that the prior conviction is subsequently vacated, thus nullifying the search condition, does not retroactively make the search in issue illegal. (*People v. Miller* (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 216.)

Where defendant’s prior conviction was overturned on appeal, but only after officers conducted a probationary search based upon that conviction. Same result as in *Miller*. “(T)he integrity of the process is best served . . . by a rule which determines the validity of the search on the basis of the legal situation which exists at the time the search is made.” (*People v. Fields* (1981) 119 Cal.App.3rd 386, 390.)

Legislative Sources: Relying upon a statute authorizing a warrantless administrative search, after which that statute is later declared to be unconstitutional, is lawful as having come from a “*legislative source*” (*Illinois v. Krull* (1987) 480 U.S. 340 [94 L.Ed.2nd 364].), in that the exclusionary rule was not created to punish the Legislature any more than it was created to punish the courts.

See also; Michigan v. DeFillippo (1979) 443 U.S. 31, 37-38 [61 L.Ed.2nd 343, 439-350]; good faith reliance on an ordinance that was later declared to be unconstitutional.

The alleged unconstitutionality of a statute, the violation for which serves as the basis for a search warrant, is irrelevant so long as officers reasonably relied upon the statute’s validity at the time of the obtaining of the search warrant. (*United States v. Meek* (9th Cir. 2004) 366 F.3rd 705, 714.)

Good faith reliance upon the validity of the implied consent provisions of **V.C. § 23612(a)(5)**, for an unconscious or deceased DUI suspect to provide a blood sample, makes admissible defendant’s blood/alcohol test results in this case although a search warrant should have been obtained under the **Fourth Amendment**. (*People v. Arredondo* (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 186, 206-210.)

Note: Petition for Review was granted by the California Supreme Court in *People v. Arredondo* on June 8, 2016, making this case unavailable for citation.

Department of Motor Vehicles Sources: Invalid information concerning the status of a vehicle’s registration, entered into the system by a non-law enforcement “*data entry clerk*,” is a non-law enforcement source. The officer’s arrest and search in reasonable reliance upon records showing that the defendant’s vehicle’s registration was expired and that a fraudulent tab had been placed on the license plate (displaying false registration tabs, per **V.C. §§ 20, 31, 4601 and 40000.1**),

was upheld under the “*good faith*” exception. (*People v. Hamilton* (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1311.)

Juvenile Probation: At least within the Juvenile Court, probation is more aligned with the courts than law enforcement, and is therefore a “*court source*.” Erroneous information from Juvenile Probation does not preclude application of *good faith* to save the resulting search. (*In re Arron C.* (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1365.)

Reliance upon a juvenile’s **Fourth** Wavier, valid at the time, justifies a search irrespective of whether the wavier was lawfully imposed. (*People v. Rios* (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 584, 597-598.)

But see People v. Howard (1984) 162 Cal.App.3rd 8, at pp. 19-21, where Probation merely failed to inform a police officer of the correct limits of a particular probation search condition. The Court held the resulting search to be illegal. *Howard*, however, is criticized by both *Downing, supra*, at p. 1652, fn. 17, and *Arron C., supra*, at p. 1372.

Arresting and Searching in Ignorance of an Existing Warrant of Arrest: An arrest and search of a person without probable cause cannot be validated after the fact when it is belatedly discovered that an arrest warrant exists for that person. (*Moreno v. Baca* (9th Cir. 2005) 431 F.3rd 633, 638-641.)

This may no longer be valid authority in light of the decision in *Herring v. United States* (2009) 555 U.S. 135 [172 L.Ed.2nd 496]; see above.

See “*Searching While In Ignorance of a Search Condition*,” under “**Fourth Waiver Searches**” (Chapter 15), below.

Minors:

Curfew Violations: There is a split of authority on the legality of “*arresting*” a minor for a curfew violation:

Minors violating curfew may be *stopped, detained, and transported* to a curfew center, the police station, or other facility where the minor can await the arrival of a parent or other responsible adult. A search of the minor prior to placing him in a curfew center with other children is also reasonable. (*In re Ian C.* (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 856.)

Before *Ian C.*, it was held that a curfew violation *did not* justify the transportation of a minor to a police station for interrogation, such a custodial arrest not being one of the alternatives allowed under the Welfare and Institutions Code, referring to **W&I §§ 601, 626, 626 and 626.5**. The Court further held that such a transportation, as an illegal arrest, was also a violation of the **Fourth Amendment**. (*In re Justin B.* (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 879.)

In re Justin B. was criticized in the later decision of *In re Charles C.* (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 420. The Court in *Charles C.* held that the *arrest* and transportation of a minor to a police station for a violation of curfew, at least where the minor's parents could not be located while still in the field, was *not* improper. Under such circumstances, taking the minor to a police station is the least intrusive alternative left to the officer. (**W&I § 626**) Further **W&I § 207(b)(2)** provides that a minor as described by **W&I § 601** (which includes curfew violators) may be taken into custody and held in a "*secure facility*," which includes a police station, so long as not confined with adults, for up to 24 hours while the minor's parents are located. Lastly, the Court held that even if in violation of the **Welfare and Institutions Code**, the **Fourth Amendment** is *not* violated by transporting a curfew violator to a police station, so suppression of any resulting evidence is not required.

The Court further noted that taking a minor "*into temporary custody*," as authorized by **W&I § 625**, is the functional equivalent of an *arrest*. (*In re Charles C.*, *supra*, at p. 425, fn. 3; see also *In re Thierry S.* (1977) 19 Cal.3rd 727, 734, fn. 6; and *In re Justin B.*, *supra*, at p. 889.)

Note: In re Charles C., *supra*, is the better rule. *In re Justin B.*, *supra*, criticized by both *Charles C.* (at pp. 426-427.) and *In re Ian C.*, *supra*, at p. 860, is a strained decision at best, and of questionable validity.

Truancy Violations:

Observation of a minor carrying a backpack on the street during school hours within several miles of a high school was sufficient cause to stop and detain the minor and inquire as to his status as a student. When defendant was unable to provide a satisfactory reason for why he was out of school, and had identification in

someone else's name, he was properly arrested for being truant (Ed. Code, § 48264) and searched incident to arrest. (*In re Humberto O.* (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 237; recovery of a dagger from his backpack was lawful.)

The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA):

The Issue: The Americans with Disabilities Act has been held by some authorities (including the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal) to apply to arrests, creating the potential for civil liability should law enforcement violate the Act in making an arrest. (*Sheehan v. City & County of San Francisco* (9th Cir. 2014) 743 F.3rd 1211, 1231-1233; certiorari granted.)

The U.S. Supreme Court, after granting certiorari in this case, dismissed this issue as “improvidently granted” in that the parties changed the issue from whether or not the ADA applies to arrests to whether a mentally ill person being arrested qualified in the first place for the protections of the Act, without this later issue being properly raised and debated below. (*City & County of San Francisco v. Sheehan* (May 18, 2015) ___ U.S. ___ [135 S.Ct. 1765; 191 L.Ed.2nd 856].) So the issue was left undecided.

Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” (42 U.S.C. § 12132)

At least two types of **Title II** claims may be applicable to arrests:

- *Wrongful arrest*, where police wrongly arrest someone with a disability because they misperceive the effects of that disability as criminal activity; *and*
- *Unreasonable accommodation*, where, although police properly investigate and arrest a person with a disability for a crime unrelated to that disability, they fail to reasonably accommodate the person's disability in the course of investigation or arrest, causing the person to suffer greater injury or indignity in that process than other arrestees.

(*Sheehan v. City & County of San Francisco, supra.*, at p. 1232; certiorari granted.)

The U.S. Supreme Court, after granting certiorari in this case, dismissed this issue as “improvidently granted” in that the parties changed the issue from whether or not the

ADA applies to arrests to whether a mentally ill person being arrested qualified in the first place for the protections of the **Act**, without this later issue being properly raised below. (*City & County of San Francisco v. Sheehan* (May 18, 2015) __ U.S. __ [135 S.Ct. 1765; 191 L.Ed.2nd 856].) So the issue is left undecided.

Information Provided to an Arrested Person:

P.C. § 841: Information to be Provided: The person making the arrest must inform the person being arrested of the following:

- The intention to arrest him;
- The cause of the arrest (i.e., the charges); and
- The authority to make it.

(See *People v. Superior Court (Logue)* (1973) 35 Cal.App.3rd 1, 5.)

Exceptions: There is no need to comply with the above when:

- The person making the arrest has reasonable cause to believe that the person to be arrested is actually engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, an offense (See *People v. Darnell* (1951) 107 Cal.App.2nd 541 545; *People v. Thomas* (1957) 156 Cal.App.2nd 117, 130; *People v. Valenzuela* (1959) 171 Cal.App.2nd 331, 333.); *or*
- The person to be arrested is pursued immediately after commission of the offense, or after an escape. (See *People v. Pool* (1865) 27 Cal. 572, 576; *Allen v. McCoy* (1933) 135 Cal.App. 500, 508; *People v. Campbell* (1972) 27 Cal.App.3rd 849, 854; and *Johanson v. Department of Motor Vehicles* (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1209, 1218.)

Even where an exception applies, if the arrestee asks what he or she is being arrested for, he or she must be told. (**P.C. § 841**)

Foreign Nationals; P.C. § 834c(a)(1):

Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: **P.C. § 834c(a)(1)** is a statutory enactment of the 1963 **Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Article 36**; a Treaty signed by the United States and 169 other countries.

Note: If the subject is a foreign “diplomat,” entitled by “diplomatic immunity” from arrest and prosecution, then the “**Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations**” (22 U.S.C. § 245) is the controlling document.

(See <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/150546.pdf>, and https://travel.state.gov/content/dam/travel/CNAtrainingresources/CNA_Manual_4th_Edition_August2016.pdf.)

Advisal to Arrestee/Detainee: Upon the arrest and booking or detention for more than two (2) hours of a known or suspected foreign national, the arrestee/detainee shall be advised “*without delay*” that he or she has a right to communicate with an official from the consulate of his or her native country. If the arrestee/detainee chooses to exercise that right, the peace officer shall notify the pertinent official in his or her agency or department of the arrest or detention and that the foreign national wants his or her consulate notified. (*People v. Enraca* (2012) 53 Cal.4th 735, 756-758; *People v. Mendoza* (2007) 42 Cal.4th 686, 709.)

The officer’s department is responsible for making the requested notification. (**P.C. § 834c(a)(2)**)

The law enforcement official in charge of a custodial facility where a foreign national is housed shall ensure that the arrestee is allowed to communicate with, correspond with, and be visited by, a consular officer of his or her country. (**P.C. § 834c(a)(3)**)

Local law enforcement agencies are to incorporate these requirements into their respective policies and procedures. (**P.C. § 834c(c)**)

The **Vienna Convention** also provides that any communication addressed to the consular post by the person arrested, in prison, custody or detention *shall* be forwarded by the authorities “*without delay.*” (**Art. 36(1)(b)**)

Standing:

Although there is some disagreement, it is generally accepted that a foreign national has the “*standing*” necessary to invoke the provisions of the **Vienna Convention** in so far as they require notice to an arrestee/detainee of his right to contact his consulate. (See *United States v. Superville* (Vir. Islands, 1999) 40 F.Supp.2nd 672, 676-678.)

The United States Supreme Court, until recently (see below), declined to decide whether a foreign national who had not been advised of his rights under the **Vienna Convention** had an enforceable right in U.S. courts. (*Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon* (2006) 548 U.S. 331, 343 [165 L.Ed.2nd 557]; assuming for the sake of argument that they did, while specifically declining to decide the issue. Four dissenting opinions would have held that the defendants had a right to raise these issues. (At pp. 369-378.)

Automatic Notice to Foreign Country: Fifty-six (56) countries are listed in **subdivision (d)** which *must* be notified of the arrest or detention (pursuant to **subd. (a)(1)**; i.e., more than 2 hours) of one of their foreign nationals “without regard to an arrested or detained foreign national’s request to the contrary.”

Note: Although Mexico is one of the 170 (which includes the United States) countries that signed the Convention, it is *not* one of the countries listed that must be *automatically* notified of the arrest, booking or detention of a foreign national.

Sanctions for Violations: It has been generally accepted that a violation of the provisions of the **Vienna Convention** and, presumably, this statute, *will not* result in the suppression of any evidence. (*United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga* (9th Cir. 2000) 206 F.3rd 882; *People v. Corona* (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1426; *United States v. Rodriguez-Preciado* (9th Cir. 2005) 399 F.3rd 1118, 1130.)

Not informing a Japanese national of his right to contact the Japanese consulate upon his arrest is not a violation of the **Japan Convention, Article 16(1)**. Even if **Article 16(1)** could be interpreted as requiring such notification, a violation would *not* result in the suppression of the defendant’s later statements nor any physical evidence recovered as the result of a consensual search. (*United States v. Amano* (9th Cir. 2000) 229 F.3rd 801, 804.)

Japan, although a signatory to the **Vienna Convention**, is *not* one of the 56 countries listed in **P.C. 834c** that must be notified upon the arrest or detention of one of their citizens.

The United States Supreme Court, until recently, has rejected appeals on this issue on *procedural* grounds, declining to decide this issue on its merits. (See *Breard v. Greene* (1998) 523 U.S. 371 [140 L.Ed.2nd 529].)

However, a number of justices have expressed dissatisfaction with avoiding the issue, in general, and not sanctioning states for violating the **Convention**, in particular. (See also *Torres v. Mullin* (2003) 540 U.S. 1035 [157 L.Ed.2nd 454].)

The “*International Court of Justice*” (ICJ), in a lawsuit brought against the United States by Mexico and decided on March 31, 2004, found that there are 54 death row inmates (27 of which are in California) who were *not* provided with a notification of their consular rights, in violation of the **Vienna Convention**. The Court concluded that the offending state and local jurisdictions violating these requirements were “*obligated*” to review and reconsider these cases. (See *Mexico v. United States of America [Avena]* (2004) 2004 I.C.J. No. 128.)

The United States Supreme Court, in *Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon* (2006) 548 U.S. 331, 351-356 [165 L.Ed.2nd 557], while finding that the rulings of the ICJ deserved “*respectful consideration*,” held that they were not binding upon U.S. courts and declined to follow their guidance on this issue.

In May, 2005, the United States Supreme Court dismissed as improvidently granted a writ of certiorari in a Texas case challenging state law enforcement officers’ failure to provide a capital defendant, and Mexican national, with a **Vienna Convention** notification. (*Medellin v. Dretke* (2005) 544 U.S. 660 [161 L.Ed.2nd 982].)

The Court in *Medellin v. Dretke* did not dismiss the writ out of a lack of interest, however, but rather because the defendant initiated new proceedings in the Texas’ courts, based upon the ICJ’s latest pronouncement (*Mexico v. United States of America [Avena]*, *supra.*) and an executive order issued by President Bush for American courts to review violations of the **Vienna Convention** (see *International Herald Tribune* (3/4/05)), that might well resolve the issues.

Even so, four U.S. Supreme Court justices dissented, noting that “(n)oncompliance with our treaty obligations is especially worrisome in capital cases,” and that the defendant in this case had raised some “debatable” issues that “suggest the very real possibility of his victory in state court.” (*Medellin v. Dretke*, *supra.*)

Both the U.S. and the California Supreme Courts have noted that “neither *Avena* nor the President’s Memorandum constitutes directly enforceable federal law’ binding on state courts.” (*People v. Maciel* (2013) 57 Cal.4th 482, 505; see also *In re Martinez* (2009) 46 Cal.4th 945, 949-950; and citing *Medellin v. Texas* (2008) 552 U.S. 491 [170 L.Ed.2nd 190].)

The United States Supreme Court finally ruled on the issues of (1) the proper remedy for an **Article 36** violation and (2) whether failing to raise the issue at the trial court level precluded the raising of the issue post-conviction. (*Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon* (2006) 548 U.S. 331 [165 L.Ed.2nd 557] (joined with *Bustillo v. Johnson* (#05-51), a case from the Virginia Supreme Court). In these two cases, the Court held that a violation of the **Vienna Convention** does not warrant the suppression of evidence, including a defendant’s statements. The Court also held (in the *Bustillo v. Johnson* portion of the decision) that failing to raise the issue

in the state courts will preclude, procedurally, the defendant from litigating the issue by way of a federal writ of habeas corpus.

Not decided was whether the **Vienna Convention** grants individuals enforceable rights in a state court, or whether the provisions of the **Convention** are something to be enforced via political channels between countries, the Court assuming, for the sake of argument, that such rights were enforceable without deciding the issue. (*Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, supra.*, a p. 343.) Four dissenting opinions would have specifically held that the defendants had a right to raise these issues. (*Id.*, at pp. 369-378.)

But note: An extradited defendant has standing to seek enforcement of an extradition treaty's restrictions on the potential punishment to which he may be subjected. (*Benitez v. Garcia* (9th Cir. 2007) 476 F.3rd 676; extradited from Venezuela under the understanding that he would not be subjected to the death penalty or a life sentence.)

The **Vienna Convention** does *not* provide a foreign national any rights that are enforceable in a **42 U.S.C. § 1983** civil rights suit against law enforcement for violating the person's rights provided for under the **Convention**. (*Cornejo v. County of San Diego* (9th Cir. 2007) 504 F.3rd 853.)

In November, 2006, the Texas appellate court refused to comply with the president's command to provide defendants whose **Vienna Convention** rights were violated with a hearing on the issue, deciding that it would not allow Jose Ernesto Medellin to file a second habeas petition seeking relief. (*Medellin v. Texas*, 06-984.)

The United States Supreme Court upheld Texas on this issue, finding that the terms of the **Vienna Convention** are not "self-executing," did not have the force of domestic law, and were not binding on U.S. Courts. The Court also held that the President had no authority to dictate the procedures to be used in state court and therefore could not legally order state courts to give prisoners hearings on this issue. (*Medellin v. Texas* (2008) 552 U.S. 491 [170 L.Ed.2nd 190].)

See also *In re Martinez* (2009) 46 Cal.4th 945, where the California Supreme Court concluded that petitioner was precluded from renewing his **Vienna Convention** claim because he had previously raised the issue and the court had denied relief on its merits. Therefore, his petition was successive, and he failed to demonstrate any change of circumstance or the applicability of any

exception to the procedural bar of successiveness to warrant reconsideration of his claim.

The California Supreme Court has held that even assuming a defendant is not advised of his consular rights in violation of the **Vienna Convention**, relief will not be granted absent a showing of prejudice. (*People v. Mendoza* (2007) 42 Cal.4th 686, 709-711.)

Failing to advise an arrested Filipino murder suspect of his right to have his consulate notified of his arrest does not, by itself, render a confession inadmissible. (*People v. Enraca* (2012) 53 Cal.4th 735, 756-758.)

Using the same reasoning, defendant's claim under the United States bilateral consular convention with the Philippines also failed. (*Id.* at p. 758.)

Defendant, a Mexican national, was convicted of murder and sentenced to death by a Texas court. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that the United States had violated the **Vienna Convention** by failing to notify him of his right to consular assistance. The Mexican national and the United States sought to stay the execution so that Congress could consider whether to enact legislation implementing the ICJ decision. The Supreme Court determined that a stay of execution was not warranted because (1) neither the ICJ decision nor the President's Memorandum purporting to implement that decision constituted directly enforceable federal law, (2) the **Due Process Clause** did not prohibit Texas from carrying out a lawful judgment and executing him in light of un-enacted legislation that might someday authorize a collateral attack on that judgment, (3) it had been seven years since the ICJ ruling and three years since the Supreme Court's previous decision, making a stay based on the bare introduction of a bill in a single house of Congress even less justified, and (4) the United States studiously refused to argue that he was prejudiced by the Vienna Convention violation. (*Garcia v. Texas* (2011) 564 U.S. 940 [180 L.Ed.2nd 872].)

A foreign national claiming relief pursuant to the provisions of the **Vienna Convention** is not entitled to relief via a direct appeal. He must proceed by way of a habeas corpus petition even though he will be required to establish prejudice under such a petition where the standard in a direct appeal is considerably less. (*People v. Maciel* (2013) 57 Cal.4th 482, 504-506.)

Miranda:

Rule: Any person who is arrested, or who is subjected to a contact with law enforcement which has the formal attributes of an arrest, and is questioned, must first be advised of, acknowledge his understanding of, and freely and voluntarily waive, his **Fifth Amendment** right against self-incrimination, pursuant to *Miranda v. Arizona* (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2nd 694]: See “*Miranda and the Law*,” Third Edition.

Real and Physical Evidence:

The **Fifth Amendment** right “does not protect a suspect from being compelled by the State to produce ‘real or physical evidence.’” (*Pennsylvania v. Muniz* (1990) 496 U.S. 582, 589 [110 L.Ed.2nd 528]; see also *Schmerber v. California* (1966) 384 U.S. 757, 766 [16 L.Ed.2nd 908, 917]; *People v. Elizalde et al.* (2015) 61 Cal.4th 523, 532; *People v. Sudduth* (1966) 65 Cal.2nd 543, 546; blood or breath in a DUI case.)

Examples of “*real or physical evidence*” include fingerprints, photographs, handwriting exemplars, blood samples, standing in a lineup, or speaking for voice identification. (*People v. Elizalde et al.*, *supra*; citing *Pennsylvania v. Muniz*, *supra*, at pp. 591–592.)

Arrested Minors: A minor who is taken “*into temporary custody*,” as authorized by **W&I § 625**, has been *arrested*. (*In re Charles C.* (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 420, 425; see also *In re Thierry S.* (1977) 19 Cal.3rd 727, 734, fn. 6.)

Wel. & Inst. Code § 625(c): In any case where a *minor* (person under the age of 18) is taken “*into temporary custody*” with probable cause to believe he or she is in violation of **W&I §§ 601 or 602** (i.e., delinquent or status offender), or that he or she has violated an order of the juvenile court or escaped from any commitment ordered by the juvenile court, the officer *shall* advise such minor that anything he says can be used against him or her, and *shall* advise the minor of his or her constitutional rights including the right to remain silent, the right to have counsel present during any interrogation, and the right to have appointed counsel if he or she is unable to afford counsel.

A *Miranda*-style admonishment obviously covers these requirements. (See *Miranda v. Arizona* (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2nd 694].)

This admonishment, under the terms of the statute (**W&I 625(c)**), is to be made whether or not the minor is to be subjected to a custodial interrogation. However, there is no sanction for a failure

to comply with the requirements of this statute, unless, of course, the minor is in fact interrogated in which case the standard *Miranda* rules apply.

Note: The statute does *not* require that this admonishment be made “*immediately*” upon arrest, and in fact, does not specify when between the arrest and the minor’s release such admonishment must be performed, so long as done before the initiation of any custodial interrogation .

Wel. & Inst. Code § 627.5: Minor Taken Before a Probation Officer:

When a minor taken before a probation officer pursuant to **W&I § 626** (Alternative Dispositions for Minors in Temporary Custody When Juvenile Court Proceedings are not Required), and it is alleged that the minor is a person described in **W&I §§ 601** (Status Offender) or **602** (Delinquent), the probation officer “*shall*” immediately advise the minor *and* his parent or guardian of rights equivalent to those provided in the *Miranda* decision.

See also **18 U.S.C. § 5033**, for a similar federal requirement.

Section 5033 requires that federal law enforcement agents also notify the parents of a juvenile’s rights, and that it be done “*immediately*” after the child is taken into custody.

A one-hour delay in notifying the parents of the juvenile’s *Miranda* rights was not unreasonable given the fact that it was done as soon as it was discovered that the arrested subject was a juvenile. (*United States v. Wendy G.* (9th Cir. 2001) 255 F.3rd 761.)

W&I § 625.6: Minors Age 15 and Younger, and Mandatory Attorney Consultations: Effective January 1, 2018, section **625.6** was added to the **Welfare and Institutions Code** providing the following protections for minors under the age of 16 from coercive interrogations by requiring the following:

(a) Prior to a custodial interrogation, and before the waiver of any *Miranda* rights, a youth 15 years of age or younger shall consult with legal counsel in person, by telephone, or by video conference. The consultation may not be waived.

(b) The court shall, in adjudicating the admissibility of statements of a youth 15 years of age or younger made during or after a

custodial interrogation, consider the effect of failure to comply with **subdivision (a)**.

(c) This section does not apply to the admissibility of statements of a youth 15 years of age or younger if both of the following criteria are met:

(1) The officer who questioned the youth reasonably believed the information he or she sought was necessary to protect life or property from an imminent threat.

(2) The officer's questions were limited to those questions that were reasonably necessary to obtain that information.

(d) This section does not require a probation officer to comply with **subdivision (a)** in the normal performance of his or her duties under **W&I §§ 625, 627.5, or 628**.

(e)

(1) The Governor, or his or her designee, shall convene a panel of at least seven experts, including all of the following:

(A) A representative of the California Public Defenders Association.

(B) A representative of the California District Attorneys Association.

(C) A representative of a statewide association representing law enforcement.

(D) A representative of the judiciary.

(E) A member of the public possessing expertise and experience in any or all of the following:

(i) The juvenile delinquency or dependency systems.

(ii) Child development or special needs children.

(iii) The representation of children in juvenile court.

(F) A member of the public who, as a youth, was involved in the criminal justice system.

(G) A criminologist with experience in interpreting crime data.

(2)

(A) The panel shall be convened no later than January 1, 2023, and shall review the implementation of this section and examine the effects and outcomes related to the implementation of this section, including, but not limited to, the appropriate age of youth to whom this section should apply.

(B) No later than April 1, 2024, the panel shall provide information to the Legislature and the Governor, including, but not limited to, relevant data on the effects and outcomes associated with the implementation of this section. A report submitted to the Legislature pursuant to this subparagraph shall be submitted in compliance with **Gov't. Code § 9795**.

(3) Members of the panel shall serve without compensation, but may be reimbursed for actual and necessary expenses incurred in the performance of their duties on the panel.

(f) This section shall remain in effect only until January 1, 2025, and as of that date is repealed.

Follow-Up Requirements After Arrest:

Other Rights of the Arrestee:

Right to Access to an Attorney, per P.C. § 825(b): Any attorney entitled to practice in the courts of record of California may, at the request of the prisoner or any relative of the prisoner, visit the prisoner.

Any officer having charge of the prisoner who willfully refuses or neglects to allow that attorney to visit a prisoner is guilty of a *misdemeanor*, and “shall forfeit and pay to the party aggrieved the sum of \$500, to be recovered by action in any court of competent jurisdiction.” (*Ibid.*)

While the section does not specify *when* an attorney, at the request of the prisoner or a relative, should be allowed to see the prisoner, it is suggested the request be honored as soon as is practical. The courts tend to be critical of any purposeful delay in allowing an in-custody suspect to consult with his attorney. (See *People v. Stroble* (1951) 36 Cal.2nd 615, 625-626; “The conduct of the officers (refusing to allow defendant’s attorney access to him while officers obtained a confession) . . . was *patently illegal*.”)

It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court judge to order that confidential attorney-client contact visits be allowed at the county jail absent circumstances justifying a suspension of such visits in individual cases. In this case, there was substantial evidence that the partitioned rooms limited or prevented an inmate from privately confiding facts that might incriminate or embarrass the inmate and create an impermissible chilling effect on the **Sixth Amendment** constitutional right to counsel. There was also evidence that additional locks, cameras, and training could address the county’s security concerns. Lastly, the record showed that the jail allowed ministers and teachers to meet with inmates in non-partitioned rooms, indicating that the jail’s restrictions for visits by counsel were an exaggerated response the county’s legitimate security concerns (*County of Nevada v. Superior Court* (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1007-1011.)

However, see People v. Ledesma (1988) 204 Cal.App.3rd 682, 695-696, and fn. 8: Violating **P.C. § 825(b)** is not a constitutional violation requiring the suppression of the defendant’s statements where the defendant had otherwise waived his rights under *Miranda*.

Right to Access to a Physician or Psychiatrist: P.C. § 825.5: Any *physician* or *surgeon*, including a *psychiatrist*, or *psychologist* with a doctoral degree and two years’ experience, licensed to practice in this state, employed by the prisoner or his attorney, *shall* be permitted to visit the prisoner while he or she is in custody.

Note: The statute provides no sanction for failing to comply with this provision.

Right to Telephone Calls, per P.C. § 851.5(a):

Rule: An arrested person has the right, immediately after booking and, except when physically impossible, no later than *three (3) hours* after arrest, to make at least *three (3)* completed telephone calls. The calls are to be free if completed in the local calling area, and are at the arrestee's expense if outside the local area. The calls must be allowed immediately on request, or as soon as practicable. The calls may be made to:

- An attorney of the arrestee's choice, public defender, or other attorney assigned to assist indigents (which may not be monitored).
- A bail bondsman.
- A relative or other person.

This information, including the phone number of the public defender or other attorney assigned to assist indigent defendants, must be posted. **(Subd. (b))**

An arresting or booking officer is also required to inquire as to whether an arrested person is a custodial parent with responsibility for a minor child and if so, to notify the arrestee that he or she is entitled to make two additional telephone calls (for a total of 5) to arrange child care. **(Subd. (c))**

Police facilities and places of detention shall post a sign stating that a custodial parent with responsibility for a minor child has the right to two additional telephone calls. **(Subd. (d))**

If the arrestee so requests, the three telephone calls shall be allowed "*immediately,*" or as soon as is practicable. **(Subd. (e))**

The signs posted pursuant to the above shall make the specified notifications in English and any non-English language spoken by a substantial number of the public, as specified in **Gov't. Code § 7296.2**, who are served by the police facility or place of detainment. **(Subd. (f))**

The rights and duties set forth in this section shall be enforced regardless of the arrestee's immigration status. **(Subd. (g))**

This section is not intended to “abrogate a law enforcement officer’s duty to advise a suspect of his or her right to counsel or of any other right.” **(Subd. (h))**

It is a *misdemeanor* to willfully deprive an arrested person of these rights. **(Subd. (i))**

Case Law:

The only recognized exception to this rule is “*physical impossibility*.” (*Carlo v. City of Chino* (9th Cir. 1997) 105 F.3rd 493.)

Plaintiff’s civil rights were violated by denying her access to a telephone while she was jailed after her arrest on charges of driving while under the influence of alcohol. The state right to a post-booking telephone call (**P.C. § 851.5**) creates a liberty interest protected by the **Fourteenth Amendment** of the United States Constitution; and *due process* protections of prisoners’ liberty rights were clearly established long before plaintiff was arrested in 1991. (*Ibid.*)

The alleged fact that defendants were denied right to call an attorney immediately after they were booked had no bearing on admissibility of any extrajudicial statements made prior to time when defendants were booked. (*People v. Stout* (1967) 66 Cal.2nd 184.)

Withholding permission to a motorist, arrested for driving a motor vehicle on a public highway while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, from telephoning an attorney within the statutory three-hour period after his arrest (**P.C. § 851.5**), was *not* a denial of due process where booking procedures commenced approximately two hours and twenty-five minutes from the time of arrest and where, if defendant had been permitted to make the call then, and as a result of legal advice consented to submit to a chemical test, the results of such test would have little or no probative value. (*Lacy v Orr* (1969) 276 Cal App 2nd 198.)

Police may require arrestee first to disclose telephone number of person to whom call is being placed, and then place the call and overtly listen to defendant's side of any non-attorney-client conversation without invading defendant's right to privacy and without implicating his privilege against self-incrimination. (*People v. Siripongs* (1988) 45 Cal.3rd 548.)

Denial of arrested person's right to make telephone call to bail bondsman did not prejudice him where there was no sufficient showing that such a denial resulted in denial of fair trial in the matter or prevented him from obtaining and presenting evidence of his innocence. (*In re Newbern* (1961) 55 Cal 2nd 508.)

Phone access may be restricted under unusual circumstances, such as to preclude a defendant and a potential witness (i.e., defendant's attorney) from fabricating evidence. (See *People v. Clark* (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 549-550; "Not every restriction on counsel's time or opportunity . . . to consult with his client or otherwise to prepare for trial violates a defendant's **Sixth Amendment** right to counsel;" citing *Morris v. Slappy* (1983) 461 U.S. 1, 11 [75 L. Ed.2nd 610].)

Minors; W&I § 627(b): Arrested juveniles shall be advised of, and have the right to make *two* (2) completed telephone calls upon being taken to a place of confinement and, except when physically impossible, within *one* (1) *hour* after being taken into custody.

The calls are to be to a parent or guardian, a responsible relative, or to the minor's employer, and the second call to an attorney.

The calls are to be at public expense, if local, and made in the presence of a public officer or employee.

Willfully depriving a minor of his or her right to make these calls is a misdemeanor.

Violating this section is *not* grounds, however, for excluding evidence. (*People v. Castille* (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 469, 489-490; vacated and remanded on other

grounds. See also *People v. Lessie* (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1152, 1161, fn. 2, and 1169-1170.)

Subd. (a) requires an officer to “*take immediate steps*” to notify a parent, guardian or responsible adult of the fact and location of a minor taken to juvenile hall (i.e., to a probation officer) or other place of confinement.

Other Statutory Obligations of the Arresting Officer:

P.C. § 848: *Arrests by Warrant:* An officer making an arrest *in obedience to a warrant must* proceed with the arrestee as commanded by the warrant, or as provided by law.

P.C. § 849(a): *Arrests Without a Warrant:* An officer (or private person) making an arrest *without a warrant shall*, without unnecessary delay, take the prisoner not otherwise released before the nearest or most accessible magistrate in the county in which the offense is triable, and a complaint stating the charge against the arrested person shall be laid before such magistrate.

P.C. § 849(b): *Release From Custody:* Any peace officer may *release from custody*, instead of taking such person before a magistrate, any person arrested without a warrant whenever:

The officer is satisfied that there are insufficient grounds for making a criminal complaint against the person. **(Subd. (b)(1))**

The person arrested was arrested for intoxication only, and no further proceedings are desirable. **(Subd. (b)(2))**

The person was arrested only for being under the influence of a controlled substance or drug and such person is delivered to a facility or hospital for treatment and no further proceedings are desirable. **(Subd. (b)(3))**

“The person was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs and the person is delivered to a hospital for medical treatment that prohibits immediate delivery before a magistrate.” **(Subd. (b)(4))**

“The person was arrested and subsequently delivered to a hospital or other urgent care facility, including, but not limited to, a facility for the treatment of co-occurring substance use disorders, for

mental health evaluation and treatment, and no further proceedings are desirable.” (Subd. (b)(5))

A release under (b)(1), (3), and (5) is to be deemed a detention only.

See also P.C. § 851.6, requiring the releasing officer to issue to the arrestee a certificate describing the contact as a detention only.

Note: It is also arguable that a law enforcement officer may choose to release a subject for whom probable cause *does* exist. There is nothing in the case or statutory law that says that P.C. § 849(b) is the exclusive authority for releasing an arrested prisoner.

Note, however, P.C. § 4011.10, prohibiting law enforcement from releasing a jail inmate for the purpose of allowing the inmate to seek medical care at a hospital, and then immediately re-arresting the same individual upon discharge from the hospital, unless the hospital determines this action would enable it to bill and collect from a third-party payment source.

P.C. § 849(c): Any record of arrest of a person released pursuant to P.C. § 849(b)(1) or (3) shall include a record of release, and shall thereafter be deemed a detention only.

Undocumented Aliens:

Gov’t. Code §§ 7283, 7283.1, & 7283.2: The “Transparent Review of Unjust Transfers and Holds” Act (TRUTH):

The so-call “**TRUTH Act**” limits Immigration & Customs Enforcement (ICE) access to criminals in jail by imposing new (effective 1/1/2017) duties on local law enforcement, including requiring that local law enforcement provide a written consent form to an inmate before an ICE interview that explains the purpose of the interview, that it is voluntary, that the interview may be declined, and that the inmate can choose to be interviewed with an attorney present.

Also, a local law enforcement agency that receives an ICE hold, ICE notification, or ICE transfer request, must provide a copy of it to the inmate and to tell the inmate whether the local law enforcement agency intends to comply with the request.

If a local law enforcement agency is to provide ICE with a release date for an inmate, the agency must also provide notice of the release date to the inmate in writing and to the inmate's attorney.

All records relating to ICE access provided by a local law enforcement agency, including all communication with ICE, are public records for purposes of the **California Public Records Act (Gov't. Code §§ 6250–6276.48)**, “including the exemptions provided by that act,” and including the number of inmates to whom the agency provided ICE access, the date ICE access was provided, and whether ICE access was provided through a hold, transfer, or notification request.

Beginning January 1, 2018, the local governing body of a local law enforcement agency that provides ICE access to at least one individual in the previous year is to hold a community forum in order to provide information to the public about ICE's access to inmates and to receive and consider public comment.

Gov't. Code § 7283.2 provides: “Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to provide, expand, or ratify the legal authority of any state or local law enforcement agency to detain an individual based upon an ICE hold request.”

Civil Code § 1670.9: Detentions of Noncitizens for Purposes of Civil Immigration Custody:

Any city, county, city and county, or local law enforcement agency that, as of January 1, 2018, does not yet have an existing contract with the federal government or any federal agency or a private corporation, to house or detain “*noncitizens*” for the purposes of civil immigration custody, shall not hereafter enter into any such contract. Nor shall such a contract, if already existing, be renewed or expanded.

Nor shall any such entity approve or sign a deed, instrument, or other document conveying land, or issuing permits to build or reuse existing buildings by any private corporation, contractor, or venter, for the purpose of housing or detaining such noncitizens for purposes of civil immigration proceeding unless public hearings, as described in the section, are first held.

Gov't. Code § 7282.5: Limitations On Law Enforcement's Cooperation with Immigration Authorities:

Law enforcement's cooperation with federal immigration authorities is limited to that which is permitted by the “**California Values Act**” (i.e.,

Gov't. Code §§ 7284-7284.12; see below). Such cooperation that is prohibited by **Gov't. Code § 7284.6(a)(1)(C)** (providing information regarding a non-citizen's release date or responding to requests for notification by providing release dates not available to the public) and **Gov't. Code § 7284.6(a)(4)** (transferring a non-citizen to immigration authorities without judicial warrant or judicial probable cause determination) *is permitted* with respect to the crimes listed in **Gov't. Code § 7282.5**.

See **Gov't. Code § 7282.5(a) & (b)** for the referenced list of crimes.

In no case shall cooperation with immigration authorities occur for individuals arrested, detained, or convicted of misdemeanors that were felonies (or felony-wobblers) prior to the passage of **Proposition 47** (the "**Safe Neighborhood and Schools Act of 2014**")

See also **Gov't. Code § 7282** (Amended) for definitions of "*hold request*," "*notification request*," and "*transfer request*," replacing "*immigration hold*," making reference to **Gov't. Code § 7283**, noting that these "*requests*" include requests made by U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Customs, and Border Protection, or by any other immigration authorities.

Gov't. Code §§ 7284-7284.12: The "California Values Act:"

Gov't. Code § 7284: Title of Chapter:

This chapter (i.e., **Title 1, Division 7, Chapter 17.25**) shall be known, and may be cited, as the **California Values Act**.

Note: Also, as a part of **SB 54**, known as the "Sanctuary State" bill.

Gov't. Code § 7284.2: Legislative Findings and Declarations:

The Legislature finds and declares the following:

(a) Immigrants are valuable and essential members of the California community. Almost one in three Californians is foreign born and one in two children in California has at least one immigrant parent.

(b) A relationship of trust between California’s immigrant community and state and local agencies is central to the public safety of the people of California.

(c) This trust is threatened when state and local agencies are entangled with federal immigration enforcement, with the result that immigrant community members fear approaching police when they are victims of, and witnesses to, crimes, seeking basic health services, or attending school, to the detriment of public safety and the well-being of all Californians.

(d) Entangling state and local agencies with federal immigration enforcement programs diverts already limited resources and blurs the lines of accountability between local, state, and federal governments.

(e) State and local participation in federal immigration enforcement programs also raises constitutional concerns, including the prospect that California residents could be detained in violation of the **Fourth Amendment** to the United States Constitution, targeted on the basis of race or ethnicity in violation of the **Equal Protection Clause**, or denied access to education based on immigration status. See *Sanchez Ochoa v. Campbell, et al.* (E.D. Wash. 2017) 2017 WL 3476777; *Trujillo Santoya v. United States, et al.* (W.D. Tex. 2017) 2017 WL 2896021; *Moreno v. Napolitano* (N.D. Ill. 2016) 213 F. Supp. 3rd 999; *Morales v. Chadbourne* (1st Cir. 2015) 793 F.3d 208; *Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas County* (D. Or. 2014) 2014 WL 1414305; *Galarza v. Szalczyk* (3rd Cir. 2014) 745 F.3d 634.

(f) This chapter seeks to ensure effective policing, to protect the safety, well-being, and constitutional rights of the people of California, and to direct the state’s limited resources to matters of greatest concern to state and local governments.

(g) It is the intent of the Legislature that this chapter shall not be construed as providing, expanding, or ratifying any legal authority for any state or local law enforcement agency to participate in immigration enforcement.

Gov't. Code § 7284.4: Definitions:

For purposes of this chapter, the following terms have the following meanings:

(a) “*California law enforcement agency*” means a state or local law enforcement agency, including school police or security departments. “*California law enforcement agency*” does *not* include the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

(b) “*Civil immigration warrant*” means any warrant for a violation of federal civil immigration law, and includes civil immigration warrants entered in the National Crime Information Center database.

(c) “*Immigration authority*” means any federal, state, or local officer, employee, or person performing immigration enforcement functions.

(d) “*Health facility*” includes health facilities as defined in **H&S Code § 1250**, clinics as defined in **H&S Code §§ 1200 and 1200.1**, and substance abuse treatment facilities.

(e) “*Hold request*,” “*notification request*,” “*transfer request*,” and “*local law enforcement agency*” have the same meaning as provided in **Gov't. Code § 7283**. Hold, notification, and transfer requests include requests issued by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement or United States Customs and Border Protection as well as any other immigration authorities.

(f) “*Immigration enforcement*” includes any and all efforts to investigate, enforce, or assist in the investigation or enforcement of any federal civil immigration law, and also includes any and all efforts to investigate, enforce, or assist in the investigation or enforcement of any federal criminal immigration law that penalizes a person’s presence in, entry, or reentry to, or employment in, the United States.

(g) “*Joint law enforcement task force*” means at least one California law enforcement agency collaborating, engaging, or partnering with at least one federal law enforcement agency in investigating federal or state crimes.

(h) “*Judicial probable cause determination*” means a determination made by a federal judge or federal magistrate judge that probable cause exists that an individual has violated federal criminal immigration law and that authorizes a law enforcement officer to arrest and take into custody the individual.

(i) “*Judicial warrant*” means a warrant based on probable cause for a violation of federal criminal immigration law and issued by a federal judge or a federal magistrate judge that authorizes a law enforcement officer to arrest and take into custody the person who is the subject of the warrant.

(j) “*Public schools*” means all public elementary and secondary schools under the jurisdiction of local governing boards or a charter school board, the California State University, and the California Community Colleges.

(k) “*School police and security departments*” includes police and security departments of the California State University, the California Community Colleges, charter schools, county offices of education, schools, and school districts.

Gov’t. Code § 7284.6: Prohibited Activities; Exceptions; Annual Report; Information Exchange; Jurisdiction:

(a) California law enforcement agencies *shall not*:

(1) Use agency or department moneys or personnel to investigate, interrogate, detain, detect, or arrest persons for immigration enforcement purposes, including any of the following:

(A) Inquiring into an individual’s immigration status.

(B) Detaining an individual on the basis of a hold request.

(C) Providing information regarding a person’s release date or responding to requests for notification by providing release dates or other information unless that information is available to the public, or is in response to a notification request

from immigration authorities in accordance with **Gov't. Code § 7282.5**. Responses are never required, but are permitted under this subdivision, provided that they do not violate any local law or policy.

(D) Providing personal information, as defined in **Civ. Code § 1798.3**, about an individual, including, but not limited to, the individual's home address or work address unless that information is available to the public.

(E) Making or intentionally participating in arrests based on civil immigration warrants.

(F) Assisting immigration authorities in the activities described in **8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3)**.

(G) Performing the functions of an immigration officer, whether pursuant to **8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)** or any other law, regulation, or policy, whether formal or informal.

(2) Place peace officers under the supervision of federal agencies or employ peace officers deputized as special federal officers or special federal deputies for purposes of immigration enforcement. All peace officers remain subject to California law governing conduct of peace officers and the policies of the employing agency.

(3) Use immigration authorities as interpreters for law enforcement matters relating to individuals in agency or department custody.

(4) Transfer an individual to immigration authorities unless authorized by a judicial warrant or judicial probable cause determination, or in accordance with **Gov't. Code § 7282.5**.

(5) Provide office space exclusively dedicated for immigration authorities for use within a city or county law enforcement facility.

(6) Contract with the federal government for use of California law enforcement agency facilities to house

individuals as federal detainees, except pursuant to **Gov't. Code §§ 7310 et seq. (Chapter 17.8)**.

(b) Notwithstanding the limitations in **subdivision (a)**, this section does not prevent any California law enforcement agency from doing any of the following that does not violate any policy of the law enforcement agency or any local law or policy of the jurisdiction in which the agency is operating:

(1) Investigating, enforcing, or detaining upon reasonable suspicion of, or arresting for a violation of, **8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)** that may be subject to the enhancement specified in **8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2)** and that is detected during an unrelated law enforcement activity. Transfers to immigration authorities are permitted under this subsection only in accordance with **subdivision (a)(4)**.

(2) Responding to a request from immigration authorities for information about a specific person's criminal history, including previous criminal arrests, convictions, or similar criminal history information accessed through the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS), where otherwise permitted by state law.

(3) Conducting enforcement or investigative duties associated with a joint law enforcement task force, including the sharing of confidential information with other law enforcement agencies for purposes of task force investigations, so long as the following conditions are met:

(A) The primary purpose of the joint law enforcement task force is not immigration enforcement, as defined in **Gov't. Code § 7284.4(f)**.

(B) The enforcement or investigative duties are primarily related to a violation of state or federal law unrelated to immigration enforcement.

(C) Participation in the task force by a California law enforcement agency does not violate any local law or policy to which it is otherwise subject.

(4) Making inquiries into information necessary to certify an individual who has been identified as a potential crime

or trafficking victim for a T or U Visa pursuant to **8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15)(T) or 1101(a)(15)(U)** or to comply with **18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(5)**.

(5) Giving immigration authorities access to interview an individual in agency or department custody. All interview access shall comply with requirements of the **TRUTH Act (Gov't. Code §§ 7283 et seq. (Chapter 17.2))**.

(c)

(1) If a California law enforcement agency chooses to participate in a joint law enforcement task force, for which a California law enforcement agency has agreed to dedicate personnel or resources on an ongoing basis, it shall submit a report annually to the Department of Justice, as specified by the Attorney General. The law enforcement agency shall report the following information, if known, for each task force of which it is a member:

(A) The purpose of the task force.

(B) The federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies involved.

(C) The total number of arrests made during the reporting period.

(D) The number of people arrested for immigration enforcement purposes.

(2) All law enforcement agencies shall report annually to the Department of Justice, in a manner specified by the Attorney General, the number of transfers pursuant to **subdivision (a)(4)**, and the offense that allowed for the transfer, pursuant to **subdivision (a)(4)**.

(3) All records described in this subdivision shall be public records for purposes of the **California Public Records Act (Gov't. Code §§ et seq. 6250; Chapter 3.5)**, including the exemptions provided by that act and, as permitted under that act, personal identifying information may be redacted prior to public disclosure. To the extent that disclosure of a particular item of information would endanger the safety of a person involved in an investigation, or would endanger

the successful completion of the investigation or a related investigation, that information shall not be disclosed.

(4) If more than one California law enforcement agency is participating in a joint task force that meets the reporting requirement pursuant to this section, the joint task force shall designate a local or state agency responsible for completing the reporting requirement.

(d) The Attorney General, by March 1, 2019, and annually thereafter, shall report on the total number of arrests made by joint law enforcement task forces, and the total number of arrests made for the purpose of immigration enforcement by all task force participants, including federal law enforcement agencies. To the extent that disclosure of a particular item of information would endanger the safety of a person involved in an investigation, or would endanger the successful completion of the investigation or a related investigation, that information shall not be included in the Attorney General's report. The Attorney General shall post the reports required by this subdivision on the Attorney General's Internet Web site.

(e) This section does not prohibit or restrict any government entity or official from sending to, or receiving from, federal immigration authorities, information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of an individual, or from requesting from federal immigration authorities immigration status information, lawful or unlawful, of any individual, or maintaining or exchanging that information with any other federal, state, or local government entity, pursuant to **8 U.S.C. §§1373 and 1644**.

(f) Nothing in this section shall prohibit a California law enforcement agency from asserting its own jurisdiction over criminal law enforcement matters.

Gov't. Code § 7284.8: Model Policies for Other Governmental Entities; Database Use Guidance:

(a) The Attorney General, by October 1, 2018, in consultation with the appropriate stakeholders, shall publish model policies limiting assistance with immigration enforcement to the fullest extent possible consistent with federal and state law at public schools, public libraries, health facilities operated by the state or a political subdivision of the state, courthouses, Division of Labor Standards Enforcement facilities, the Agricultural Labor Relations Board, the

Division of Workers Compensation, and shelters, and ensuring that they remain safe and accessible to all California residents, regardless of immigration status. All public schools, health facilities operated by the state or a political subdivision of the state, and courthouses shall implement the model policy, or an equivalent policy. The Agricultural Labor Relations Board, the Division of Workers' Compensation, the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement, shelters, libraries, and all other organizations and entities that provide services related to physical or mental health and wellness, education, or access to justice, including the University of California, are encouraged to adopt the model policy.

(b) For any databases operated by state and local law enforcement agencies, including databases maintained for the agency by private vendors, the Attorney General shall, by October 1, 2018, in consultation with appropriate stakeholders, publish guidance, audit criteria, and training recommendations aimed at ensuring that those databases are governed in a manner that limits the availability of information therein to the fullest extent practicable and consistent with federal and state law, to anyone or any entity for the purpose of immigration enforcement. All state and local law enforcement agencies are encouraged to adopt necessary changes to database governance policies consistent with that guidance.

(c) Notwithstanding the rulemaking provisions of the **Administrative Procedure Act (Gov't. Code §§ 11340 et seq.; Title 2, Division 3, Part 1, Chapter 3.4)**, the Department of Justice may implement, interpret, or make specific this chapter without taking any regulatory action.

Gov't. Code § 7284.10: Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Duties and Responsibilities:

(a) The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation *shall*:

(1) In advance of any interview between the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and an individual in department custody regarding civil immigration violations, provide the individual with a written consent form that explains the purpose of the interview, that the interview is voluntary, and that he or she may decline to be interviewed or may choose to be interviewed only with his or her attorney present. The

written consent form shall be available in English, Spanish, Chinese, Tagalog, Vietnamese, and Korean.

(2) Upon receiving any ICE hold, notification, or transfer request, provide a copy of the request to the individual and inform him or her whether the department intends to comply with the request.

(b) The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation *shall not*:

(1) Restrict access to any in-prison educational or rehabilitative programming, or credit-earning opportunity on the sole basis of citizenship or immigration status, including, but not limited to, whether the person is in removal proceedings, or immigration authorities have issued a hold request, transfer request, notification request, or civil immigration warrant against the individual.

(2) Consider citizenship and immigration status as a factor in determining a person's custodial classification level, including, but not limited to, whether the person is in removal proceedings, or whether immigration authorities have issued a hold request, transfer request, notification request, or civil immigration warrant against the individual.

Gov't. Code § 7284.12: Severability:

The provisions of this act are severable. If any provision of this act or its application is held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application.

Gov't. Code § 7310: Contracts with Federal Government to Detain Non-Citizens:

(a) A city, county, city and county, or local law enforcement agency that does not, as of June 15, 2017, have a contract with the federal government or any federal agency to detain adult noncitizens for purposes of civil immigration custody, is prohibited from entering into a contract with the federal government or any federal agency, to house or detain in a locked detention facility owned and operated by a local entity, noncitizens for purposes of civil immigration custody.

(b) A city, county, city and county, or local law enforcement agency that, as of June 15, 2017, has an existing contract with the federal government or any federal agency to detain adult noncitizens for purposes of civil

immigration custody, shall not renew or modify that contract in such a way as to expand the maximum number of contract beds that may be utilized to house or detain in a locked detention facility noncitizens for purposes of civil immigration custody.

Gov't. Code § 7311: Contracts with Federal Government to House or Detain Non-Citizen Minors:

(a) A city, county, city and county, or local law enforcement agency that does not, as of June 15, 2017, have a contract with the federal government or any federal agency to house or detain any accompanied or unaccompanied minor in the custody of or detained by the federal Office of Refugee Resettlement or the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement is prohibited from entering into a contract with the federal government or any federal agency to house minors in a locked detention facility.

(b) A city, county, city and county, or local law enforcement agency that, as of June 15, 2017, has an existing contract with the federal government or any federal agency to house or detain any accompanied or unaccompanied minor in the custody of or detained by the federal Office of Refugee Resettlement or the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement shall not renew or modify that contract in such a way as to expand the maximum number of contract beds that may be utilized to house minors in a locked detention facility.

(c) This section does not apply to temporary housing of any accompanied or unaccompanied minor in less restrictive settings when the State Department of Social Services certifies a necessity for a contract based on changing conditions of the population in need and if the housing contract meets the following requirements:

(1) It is temporary in nature and nonrenewable on a long-term or permanent basis.

(2) It meets all applicable federal and state standards for that housing.

Gov't. Code § 12532: Review of Detention Facilities:

Subd. (a) & (b)(2): The California Attorney General is required to “engage in reviews” of county, local, and private detention facilities in which “non-citizens,” (including minors) are housed or detained for purposes of immigration proceedings, and report its findings to the Legislature and the Governor by March 1, 2019.

Sub. (b)(1): This review shall include, but not be limited to, the following:

(A) A review of the conditions of confinement.

(B) A review of the standard of care and due process provided to the individuals described in **subdivision (a)**.

(C) A review of the circumstances around their apprehension and transfer to the facility.

Subd. (c): The Attorney General, or his or her designee, shall be provided all necessary access for the observations necessary to effectuate reviews required pursuant to this section, including, but not limited to, access to detainees, officials, personnel, and records.

Pen. Code § 679.015: Victim and Witnesses' Protection from being Turned over to Immigration Authorities:

(a) It is the public policy of this state to protect the public from crime and violence by encouraging all persons who are victims of or witnesses to crimes, or who otherwise can give evidence in a criminal investigation, to cooperate with the criminal justice system and not to penalize these persons for being victims or for cooperating with the criminal justice system.

(b) Whenever an individual who is a victim of or witness to a crime, or who otherwise can give evidence in a criminal investigation, is not charged with or convicted of committing any crime under state law, a peace officer may not detain the individual exclusively for any actual or suspected immigration violation or turn the individual over to federal immigration authorities absent a judicial warrant.

Use of Force:

Reasonable Force: Only that amount of *force* that is *reasonably necessary* under the circumstances may be used to affect an arrest, prevent escape, or overcome resistance. (*Headwaters Forest Defense v. County of Humboldt* (9th Cir. 2002) 276 F.3rd 1125.)

“The **Fourth Amendment** prohibition against *unreasonable seizures* permits law enforcement officers to use only such force to effect an arrest as is ‘*objectively reasonable*’ under the circumstances.” (*Emphasis added; Id.*, at p. 1130.)

“When police officers are sued for their conduct in the line of duty, courts must balance two competing needs: ‘the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.’” (*Johnson v. Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist.* (9th Cir. 2013) 724 F.3rd 1159, 1168; citing *Pearson v. Callahan* (2009) 555 U.S. 223, 231 [172 L.Ed.2nd 565].)

While non-government employees are not held accountable under the Fourth Amendment or other constitutional standards, a civil rights action pursuant to **42 U.S.C. § 1983** was held to be proper against non-law enforcement employees of a private corporation that operated a federal prison under contract. (*Pollard v. GEO Group, Inc.* (9th Cir. 2010) 607 F.3rd 583.)

Note: The use of excessive force under the **Fourth** (seizure), **Fifth** and **Fourteenth** (due process violations) and **Eighth** (cruel and unusual punishment) **Amendments** all involve the possibility of the suppression of any resulting evidence in a criminal case, as well as the spectre of civil liability in a civil suit. The issue of excessive force is, for the most part, the same in both criminal and civil cases. The cases, therefore, and considered interchangeably below.

Factors to consider in determining the amount of force that may be used include:

- The severity of the crime at issue;
- Whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others;
- Whether the suspect was actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight; *and*
- Any other exigent circumstances present at the time.

(*Bell v. Wolfish* (1979) 441 U.S. 520 [60 L.Ed.2nd 447]; *Chew v. Gates* (9th Cir. 1994) 27 F.3rd 1432, 1440-1441, fn. 5; *Bryan v. MacPherson* (9th Cir. 2010) 630 F.3rd 805; *Espinosa v. City and County of San Francisco* (9th Cir. 2010) 598 F.3rd 528, 537; *Mattos v. Agarano* (9th Cir. 2011) 661 F.3rd 433, 441; *Young v. County of Los Angeles* (9th Cir. 2011) 655 F.3rd 1156, 1163; *Mendoza v. City of West Covina* (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 702, 712; *Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton* (9th Cir. 2013) 728 F.3rd 1086, 1090-1091; *Green v. City & County of San Francisco* (9th Cir. 2014) 751 F.3rd

1039, 1049-1051; *Velazquez v. City of Long Beach* (9th Cir. 2015) 793 F.3rd 1010, 1024.)

- Warning before force is used.

The Ninth Circuit has also found that whether or not officers provided a warning prior to the use of force is a factor to consider when determining the reasonableness of the force used. (*Nelson v. City of Davis* (9th Cir. 2012) 685 F.3rd 867, 882; citing *Deorle v. Rutherford* (9th Cir. 2001) 242 F.3rd 1119, 1284; and *Forrester v. City of San Diego* (9th Cir. 1994) 25 F.3rd 804.)

See also *Tennessee v. Garner* (1985) 471 U.S. 1, 11-12 [85 L.Ed.2nd 1]; “(I)f the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force may be used if necessary to prevent escape, *and if, where feasible, some warning has been given.*” (Italics added)

However, where an officer arrives late at an ongoing police action and witnesses shots being fired by one of several individuals in a house surrounded by other officers, and that officer then shoots and kills an armed occupant of the house without first giving a warning, the officer did not violate clearly established law based on his failure to provide a verbal warning before utilizing deadly force: “No settled **Fourth Amendment** principle requires that officer to second-guess the earlier steps already taken by his or her fellow officers in instances like the one [the officer] confronted here.” (*White v. Pauly* (Jan. 9, 2017) __ U.S. __ [137 S.Ct. 548; 196 L.Ed.2nd 463].)

See “*Duty to Warn*,” below.

The factors considered under *Tennessee v. Garner* (1985) 471 U.S. 1, 9-12 [85 L.Ed.2nd 1] are:

- The immediacy of the threat;
- Whether force was necessary to safeguard officers or the public; *and*
- Whether officers administered a warning, assuming it was practicable.

(See also *George v. Morris* (9th Cir. 2013) 736 F.3rd 829, 837.)

General Principles; Fourth Amendment Issues:

See *Tatum v. City and County of San Francisco* (9th Cir. 2006) 441 F.3rd 1090, where the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal meticulously discussed the issue of law enforcement's use of force:

When a court analyzes excessive force claims, the initial inquiry is whether the police officer's actions were objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him. A police officer had probable cause to arrest a suspect for being under the influence of a controlled substance or for disorderly conduct where the officer observed the suspect kicking the door to a police station for no apparent reason, the suspect disobeyed commands to stop, and when he was verbally unresponsive, perspiring heavily, and had bloodshot eyes. Whether a particular use of force was objectively reasonable depends on several factors including the severity of the crime that prompted the use of force, the threat posed by a suspect to the police or to others, and whether the suspect was resisting arrest. An arresting officer's use of a control hold on an arrestee in order to place him in handcuffs was held to be objectively reasonable in this case and thus did not support an excessive force claim; the officer had probable cause to arrest, the arrestee was behaving erratically, and the arrestee spun away from the officer and continued to struggle after officer told him to calm down. Detention of the arrestee after the arrest did not rise to the level of excessive force even though the officers positioned the arrestee on his stomach for approximately 90 seconds, then positioned him on his side, and failed to perform emergency resuscitation on the arrestee after the arrestee kicked and struggled so that the brief restraint on his stomach was necessary to protect the officers and the arrestee himself, the officers monitored the arrestee, and they called for an ambulance as soon as they noticed that arrestee was breathing heavily. Just as the **Fourth Amendment** does not require a police officer to use the least intrusive method of arrest, neither does it require an officer to provide what hindsight reveals to be the most effective medical care for an arrested suspect. (*Id.*, at pp. 1095-1100.)

The use of force to affect an arrest is evaluated in light of the **Fourth Amendment's** prohibition on *unreasonable seizures*. (*Graham v. Connor* (1989) 490 U.S. 386 [104 L.Ed.2nd 443].)

A seizure is a "governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied." (*Jensen v. City of Oxnard* (9th Cir. 1998) 145 F.3rd 1078, 1083.)

This includes the accidental use of the wrong weapon; e.g., accidentally using a firearm when the officer intended to use a Taser. (*Torres v. City of Madera* (9th Cir. 2008) 524 F.3rd 1053.)

“A police officer may use force, including blocking a vehicle and displaying his or her weapon, to accomplish an otherwise lawful stop or detention as long as the force used is reasonable under the circumstances to protect the officer or members of the public or to maintain the status quo.” (*People v. McHugh* (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 202, 211.)

The reasonableness of the force used to affect a particular seizure of a person is determined by a “careful balancing of ‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s **Fourth Amendment** interests’ against the countervailing governmental interest at stake.” (*Graham v. Connor*, *supra*, at p. 396 [104 L.Ed.2nd at p. 455], quoting *Tennessee v. Garner* (1985) 471 U.S. 1, 8 [85 L.Ed.2nd 1, 7]; *Jackson v. City of Bremerton* (9th Cir. 2001) 268 F.3rd 646; *Plumhoff v. Rickard* (May 27, 2014) 572 U.S. ____ [134 S. Ct. 2012; 188 L. Ed. 2nd 1056, 1066-1068].)

The use of a reasonable amount of force necessary in handcuffing and searching the plaintiff during a lawful arrest is not a battery. (*Fayer v. Vaughn* (9th Cir. 649 F.3rd 1061, 1065.)

Taking an otherwise compliant 11-year-old juvenile into physical custody (i.e., a “seizure”) and handcuffing him while transporting him from his school to a relative (unreasonable “use of force”), based upon no more than an unsubstantiated report from school officials that he was “out of control” and off his meds, violates the juvenile’s **Fourth Amendment** rights. (*C.B. v. City of Sonora* (9th Cir. 2014) 769 F.3rd 1005, 1022-1040.)

The officers under these circumstances were held (by a 7-to-5 majority) to be entitled to qualified immunity on the first issue (illegal seizure), it not being a settled issue of law, but *not* as to the reasonableness of handcuffing the minor. (*Id.*, at pp. 1026-1031, 1038-1040.)

The use of reasonable force in extracting blood, when done in a medically approved manner, is lawful. (*Ritschel v. City of Fountain Valley* (2005) 137 Cal.App.4th 107; a misdemeanor case.)

Officers had reasonable cause under the Washington statutes to take plaintiff for a mental evaluation on the basis of her paranoid comments to the officers and the 911 reports that she had been hiding under a car with her son, screaming that someone was trying to kill her and that she would

kill herself. The officers' use of force in arresting and detaining her was reasonable. There was no genuine dispute from the evidence that she posed a threat to herself, her neighbors, and the officers. The evidence was undisputed that she was actively resisting arrest. (*Luchtel v. Hagemann* (9th Cir. 2010) 623 F.3rd 975.)

Thomas and Rosalie Avina sued the United States under the **Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)** for assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress after agents from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) executed a search warrant at their mobile home. Upon entering the home, the agents pointed guns at Thomas and Rosalie, handcuffed them and forcefully pushed Thomas to the floor. The agents handcuffed the Avina's fourteen-year-old daughter on the floor and then handcuffed their eleven-year-old daughter on the floor and pointed their guns at her head. The agents removed the handcuffs from the children approximately thirty minutes after they entered. The court held that the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the United States as to Thomas and Rosalie because the agents' use of force against them was reasonable. The agents were executing a search warrant at the residence of a suspected drug trafficker. This presented a dangerous situation for the agents and the use of handcuffs on the adult members of the family was reasonable to minimize the risk of harm to the officers and the Avinas. In addition, the agents did not act unreasonably when they forcefully pushed Thomas Avina to the floor. At the time of the push, Avina was refusing the agents' commands to get down on the ground. Because this refusal occurred during the initial entry, the agents had no way of knowing whether Avina was associated with the suspected drug trafficker, whom they thought lived there. The court however, found that the district court improperly granted summary judgment to the United States concerning the agents' conduct toward the Avinas' minor daughters. The court held that a jury could find that when the agents pointed their guns at the eleven-year-old daughter's head, while she was handcuffed on the floor, that this conduct amounted to excessive force. Similarly, the court held that a jury could find that the agents' decision to force the two girls to lie face down on the floor, with their hands cuffed behind their backs, was unreasonable. Genuine issues of fact existed as to whether the actions of the agents were excessive in light of girls' ages and the limited threats they posed. (*Avina v. United States* (9th Cir. 2012) 681 F.3rd 1127, 1130-1134.)

Whether four to six officers pointing guns (and one shotgun) at the plaintiff during a felony "high risk" traffic stop, after an "automated license plate reader" had misidentified the plaintiff's car as being stolen, when the plaintiff was compliant and posed no threat to the officers, constituted excessive force is a jury question. (*Green v. City & County of San Francisco* (9th Cir. 2014) 751 F.3rd 1039, 1049-1051.)

The degree of force used under any particular set of circumstances includes a consideration of the lawfulness of the arrest in the first place. “(T)he facts that gave rise to an unlawful detention or arrest can factor into the determination whether the force used to make the arrest was excessive.” However, the fact that a particular arrest may have been unlawful (i.e., without probable cause) does not mean that any amount of force used in making that arrest is necessarily excessive. (*Velazquez v. City of Long Beach* (9th Cir. 2015) 793 F.3rd 1010, 1023-1027.)

Responding to a *domestic violence* radio call, given the fact that more officers are killed at such situations than any other, is a factor a court can consider in determining the reasonableness of the use of deadly force. (*George v. Morris* (9th Cir. 2013) 736 F.3rd 829, 839, 844; *Mattos v. Agarano* (9th Cir. 2011) 661 F.3rd 433, 450; *United States v. Martinez* (9th Cir. 2005) 406 F.3rd 1160, 1164.)

The use of expert testimony (pursuant to **Evid. Code § 801**) regarding police tactics and training and whether the officers, under the circumstances, used excessive force, is generally permissible, at least where the evidence offered relates to issues outside the scope of a lay juror’s knowledge. (*People v. Sibrian* (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 127.)

Upon plaintiff calling 9-1-1 to summon an ambulance for her son’s apparent suicide attempt, plaintiff refused to allow a deputy sheriff into her house with the emergency rescue crew. As a result, the deputy handcuffed plaintiff as she attempted to drive her son to the hospital. The deputy sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity as to plaintiff’s **Fourth Amendment** excessive force claim because it was objectively reasonable for the deputy to execute three head slams and to use her knee to pin plaintiff to the ground since the deputy was acting in her community caretaking capacity, plaintiff presented an immediate danger to the deputy and others, and plaintiff was actively interfering with her son’s medical treatment. Deputies were also entitled to qualified immunity as to plaintiff’s unlawful search claim because they searched her truck in furtherance of their duties to assist in resolving an active medical emergency; i.e., an apparent overdose. (*Ames v. King County* (9th Cir. 2017) 846 F.3rd 340.)

Where a sheriff’s deputy was alleged to have aggressively grabbed plaintiff by the arm and pull him toward the curb, swinging him around, and then kick his feet out from under him causing him to fall to the pavement, after which a knee went into his back and a boot pushed his head into the pavement before being handcuffed, a jury found the force to be unreasonable under the circumstances. However, citing the United

States Supreme Court’s decision in *White v. Pauly* (Jan. 9, 2017) __ U.S. __ [137 S.Ct. 548; 196 L.Ed.2nd 463], the Court held that where no case could be identified that would have put the sheriff’s deputy on notice that the force he used was unreasonable, entitling the deputy to qualified immunity, the jury’s verdict and damage award was set aside. (*Shafer v. County of Santa Barbara (Padilla)* (9th Cir. 2017) 868 F.3rd 1110, 1115-1118.)

In being arrested, plaintiff argued that deputies violated the **Fourth Amendment** by using excessive force by yanking his left arm behind his back—thereby causing a rotator-cuff tear which required surgery—and then applying handcuffs that were tight enough to break the skin. While the degree of force here was held to be significant, the Court held that the deputy sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity because Plaintiff failed to offer not offer anything other than general legal propositions which cannot clearly establish that the deputy’s particular conduct was unlawful. (*Sharp v. County of Orange* (9th Cir. 2017) 871 F.3rd 901, 916-917.)

Provocation Rule:

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal invented a so-called “*provocation rule*,” holding that even when it is held that reasonable force is used by law enforcement, the officers using that force may still be civilly liable if they provoked the need to use force by violating some other constitutional principle, at least when that earlier violation was done intentionally or recklessly. (See *Billington v. Smith* (9th Cir. 2001) 292 F.3rd 1177.)

The provocation rule permitted a civil claim for excessive force under the **Fourth Amendment** where an officer intentionally or recklessly provoked a violent confrontation, so long as the provocation is an independent **Fourth Amendment** violation. (See *Mendez v. County of Los Angeles* (9th Cir. 2016) 815 F.3rd 1178; certiorari granted, reversed and remanded.)

The U.S. Supreme Court overruled the Ninth Circuit on this issue in *County of Los Angeles v. Mendez* (May 30, 2017) __ U.S. __, __ [137 S.Ct. 1539; 198 L.Ed.2nd 52], finding that there is no basis for such a rule.

Even prior to *Mendez*, it had been noted by the U.S. Supreme Court that this rule has been “sharply questioned” outside the Ninth Circuit. (*County of Los Angeles v. Mendez*, *supra*, at p. __; citing *City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan* (2015) __ U.S. __, __ fn. 4 [135 S.Ct. 1765; 191 L.Ed.2nd 856, 869]; which in turn cites *Livermore v. Lubelan* (6th Cir. 2007) 476 F.3rd 397, 406-407; and *Hector v. Watt* (3rd Cir. 2001) 235 F.3rd 154, 160: “[I]f the officers’ use of force was reasonable given the

plaintiff's acts, then despite the illegal entry, the plaintiff's own conduct would be an intervening cause".)

Cruel and Unusual Punishment; Eighth Amendment Issues:

“(A)cts by which cruel and sadistic purpose to harm another would be manifest” may also be a violation of the **Eighth Amendment’s** proscription on “*cruel and unusual*” punishment. (*Watts v. McKinney* (9th Cir. 2005) 394 F.3rd 170; kicking a prisoner in the genitals.)

The use of excessive force on a prison or jail inmate is an **Eighth Amendment** “*cruel and unusual punishment*” issue. Also, relevant inquiry is *not* the extent of the injury that results, but rather the degree of force used. (*Wilkins v. Gaddy* (2010) 559 U.S. 34 [175 L.Ed.2nd 995]; citing *Hudson v. McMillian* (1992) 503 U.S. 1, 4 [117 L.Ed.2nd 156].)

The Supreme Court identified five factors to consider in evaluating the lawfulness in the degree of force used:

- (1) The extent of injury suffered by an inmate;
- (2) The need for application of force;
- (3) The relationship between that need and the amount of force used;
- (4) The threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials;
- and*
- (5) Any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.

(*Hudson v. McMillian, supra.*, at p. 6.)

Officers are not entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity as to an inmate’s **Eighth Amendment** excessive force claim because, under the *Hudson* factors (citing *Hudson v. McMillian* (1992) 503 U.S. 1, 4 [117 L.Ed.2nd 156].), a significant amount of force was employed without significant provocation from the inmate or warning from the officers since (1) his injuries caused by the pepper spray were moderate, though relatively enduring, (2) it was not clear that the application of force was required under his version of the facts, and (3) the force used seemed quite extensive and disproportionate relative to the disturbance posed by his fingertips on the food port, and (4) it remained a disputed fact whether he posed a threat to the officers. (*Furnace v. Sullivan* (9th Cir. 2013) 705 F.3rd 1021, 1026-1030.)

A summary judgment record in defendant prison guards’ favor indicated that a genuine dispute of material fact existed regarding whether prison officials’ use of force during a cell extraction resulted in the unnecessary

and wanton infliction of pain and suffering, requiring reversal for further hearings. Plaintiff inmate alleged that he was punched, kicked, and stomped while he was restrained in handcuffs and leg irons during the cell extraction necessitated by a fight in plaintiff's cell, but that a video of the extraction panned away from plaintiff when the force was allegedly used. The district court, however, correctly entered summary judgment on the inmate's deliberate indifference claim because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies first, as required by the **Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e)** of 1996. (*Manley v. Rowley* (9th Cir. 2017) 847 F.3rd 705.)

Due Process; Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Issues:

Five deputies holding down a resisting criminal defendant for the purpose of obtaining his fingerprints, in a courtroom (but out of the jury's presence), where there were found to be less violent alternatives to obtaining the same evidence, is force that "shocks the conscience" and a violation of the defendant's **Fourteenth Amendment** due process rights. (*People v. Herndon* (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 274; held to be "harmless error" in light of other evidence and because defendant created the situation causing the force to be used.)

A police officer violates the **Fourteenth Amendment** due process clause if he kills a suspect when acting with the purpose to harm, unrelated to a legitimate law enforcement objective. An officer was properly found to be civilly liable after shooting and killing the decedent (plaintiffs' mother) at the end of a high speed chase, but where the decedent was blocked in without a means of escape, and where no weapons were observed. (*A. D. v. State of California Highway Patrol* (9th Cir. 2013) 712 F.3rd 446, 452-454, 456-460; the officer held not to be entitled to qualified immunity, *Id.*, at pp. 454-455.)

A **Fourteenth Amendment** due process violation occurs only if a police officer's actions deprive the decedent's children of a "liberty interest;" i.e., their "right to familial association." Per prior case law, all children have a **Fourteenth Amendment** due process "liberty interest" in the "companionship and society" of a parent. The due process clause is implicated if an officer's actions "shock the conscience." Conscience-shocking actions are those taken with (1) "deliberate indifference" or (2) a "purpose to harm . . . unrelated to legitimate law enforcement objectives." The former involves those circumstances where the officer has the opportunity to deliberate; i.e., think about what he is doing. The latter involves those circumstances where an officer cannot practically deliberate, such as where he has to make a "snap judgment because of an

escalating situation.” (A. D. v. State of California Highway Patrol, supra; where a CHP officer shot and killed the plaintiffs’ mother following a high-speed chase after she was boxed in and had no means of escape, but was continuing to ram a CHP vehicle with her car. A jury verdict for the plaintiffs was upheld. The officer was determined not to be protected by qualified immunity. (Id., at pp. 453-460.)

Where a pretrial detainee alleged that jail officers used excessive force in violation of the **Fourteenth Amendment’s** Due Process Clause in tasing him while removing him from his jail cell, the detainee need only show that the force purposely and knowingly used against him was *objectively unreasonable*. Remand was warranted in this case regarding the jury’s finding for the officers in a **42 U.S.C. § 1983** excessive force claim because the jury instructions were erroneous, having suggested to the jury that they should weigh the officers’ *subjective* reasons (i.e., whether “the officers were *subjectively* aware that their use of force was unreasonable”) for using force. (*Kingsley v. Hendrickson* (June 22, 2015) ___ U.S. ___ [135 S.Ct. 2466; 192 L.Ed.2nd 416].)

A child of a decedent has a constitutionally protected liberty interest under the **Fourteenth Amendment** due process clause in the “companionship and society” of her father or mother. “Official conduct that shocks the conscience” in depriving [a child] of that interest is cognizable as a violation of due process.” (*Hayes v. County of San Diego* (9th Cir. 2013) 736 F.3rd 1223, 1229-1231; quoting *Wilkinson v. Torres* (9th Cir. 2010) 610 F.3rd 546, 544; *A. D. v. State of California Highway Patrol* (9th Cir. 2013) 712 F.3rd 446, 453.)

In *Hayes*, it was discussed how where actual deliberation by the officer using deadly force is practical, an officer’s “deliberate indifference” may suffice to shock the conscience. Where, on the other hand, the officer must make a “snap judgment” due to a rapidly escalating situation, then his conduct may be found to shock the conscience only if the officer acts with a purpose to harm unrelated to legitimate law enforcement objectives. (*Ibid*; where decedent came at the officer from about 8 feet away with a knife in hand, giving the officer only 4 seconds to react, was determined to be a “snap judgment” situation.)

However, separating father and son for a limited amount of time (i.e., 40 minutes), they both being detained, is not sufficient to constitute a **Fourteenth Amendment** due process “*fundamental liberty interest*” violation. (*Sandoval v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t.* (9th Cir. 2014) 756 F.3rd 1154, 1167.)

It was also noted that shooting the family dog, “albeit sad and unfortunate, does not fall within the ambit of deprivation of a familial relationship.” (*Ibid.*)

A detention pursuant to a valid warrant but in the face of repeated protests of innocence may, “*after the lapse of a certain amount of time,*” was held to have deprived the accused of his liberty without due process of law, a **Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment** violation. A wrongful detention can ripen into a due process violation, but it is the plaintiff’s burden to show that “it was or should have been known [by the defendant] that the [plaintiff] was entitled to release.” (*Gant v. County of Los Angeles* (9th Cir. 2014) 772 F.3rd 608, 619-623.)

See *Jones v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Department* (9th Cir. 2017) 873 F.3rd 1123, 1132-1133: Although continually tasing a subject for over 90 seconds, even after he was on the ground and had gone limp, while being subdued by five officers, actions which contributed to the subject’s death, was held to present a triable issue in a subsequent civil suit brought by the decedent’s parents, the Court also held that the decedent’s parents, in this case, did *not* have a valid **Fourteenth Amendment** due process claim. Citing *Johnson v. Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist.* (9th Cir. 2013) 724 F.3rd 1159, 1169, where the Court noted that: “[W]e have recognized a parent’s right to a child’s companionship without regard to the child’s age,” citing the case law. However, officers’ actions in this regard do not constitute a **Fourteenth Amendment** due process violation unless the “[o]fficial conduct . . . ‘shocks the conscience’ in depriving parents of that interest” (*Wilkinson v. Torres* (9th Cir. 2010) 610 F.3rd 546, 554.) In this (the *Jones*) case, “where officers must react quickly to a rapidly changing situation, the test is whether the officers acted with a purpose of causing harm unconnected to any legitimate law enforcement objective.” (See also *Porter v. Osborn* (9th Cir. 2008) 546 F.3rd 1131, 1137, 1140.) The Court failed to find evidence of such a purpose in this case.

Aside from an **Fourth Amendment** excessive force issues, conduct that “shocks the conscious” violates due process. In using force, an officer violates a person’s due process rights if he acted with “a purpose to harm without regard to legitimate law enforcement objectives.” In this case, it was held that the officer did not violate the plaintiffs’ due process rights when he shot their son 18 times in two nine-round volleys. The two volleys came in

rapid succession, without time for reflection. Whether excessive or not, the shootings served the legitimate purpose of stopping a dangerous suspect. However, stomping the then comatose decedent in the head three times is different. After the two volleys, a video from a police patrol car shows the deputy walking around in a circle for several seconds before returning for the head strikes. He even takes a running start before each strike. A reasonable jury could conclude that the deputy was acting out of anger or emotion rather than any legitimate law enforcement purpose. (*Zion v. County of Orange* (9th Cir. 2017) 874 F.3rd 1072, 1076-1077.)

Qualified Immunity from Civil Liability:

“Qualified immunity attaches when an official’s conduct ““does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”” *Mullenix v. Luna*, 577 U.S. at ___, 136 S.Ct. 305; 193 L.Ed.2nd 255, 257. While this Court’s case law ““do[es] not require a case directly on point”” for a right to be clearly established, ““existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.”” *Id.*, at ___, 136 S.Ct. 305; 193 L.Ed.2nd 255, 257. In other words, immunity protects ““all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”” *Ibid.* (*White v. Pauly* (Jan. 9, 2017) ___ U.S. ___ 137 S.Ct. 548, 551; 196 L.Ed.2nd 463, 468].)

In *White, supra*, the Court “again . . . reiterate(d), the longstanding principle that “‘clearly established law’ should not be defined “‘at a high level of generality.’” *Ashcroft v. al-Kidd*, 563 U.S. 731, 742, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2nd 1149 (2011). As this Court explained decades ago, the clearly established law must be “‘particularized’” to the facts of the case. *Anderson v. Creighton*, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed. 2nd 523 (1987). Otherwise, “[p]laintiffs would be able to convert the rule of qualified immunity . . . into a rule of virtually unqualified liability simply by alleging violation of extremely abstract rights.” *Id.*, at 639, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed. 2nd 523.” (*White v. Pauly, supra.*)

Qualified immunity from civil liability for using excessive force was denied where defendant police detective executed a search warrant on the plaintiff’s apartment to look for property allegedly purchased with another deputy’s stolen credit card, the detective and victim deputy were close friends, the detective purposely executed the warrant when he knew the plaintiff’s children (by the deputy) were in her apartment, an excessive number of officers were used to execute the warrant, and plaintiff was handcuffed so tightly as to cause bruises. (*Cameron v. Craig* (9th Cir.

2013) 713 F.3rd 1012, 1018-1022; summary judgment in defendant's favor was upheld on allegation that the search was conducted without probable cause.)

Where a court marshal "shoved" the disruptive plaintiff out of a courtroom upon the order of the judge, the marshal is not entitled to absolute immunity when sued for using excessive force. However, the marshal is entitled to qualified immunity where a reasonable marshal under the circumstances could have believed that the **Fourth Amendment** permitted him to use the amount of force the plaintiff claimed the marshal used. (*Brooks v. Clark County* (9th Cir. 2016) 828 F.3rd 910.)

Even where the force used is held to be unreasonable, an officer may still be protected from civil liability under the doctrine of "*qualified immunity*." "The qualified immunity rule shields public officers from (**42 U.S.C.) 1983** actions unless the officer has violated a clearly established constitutional right. This turns on a determination of whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful under the circumstances he confronted." (*Mendoza v. City of West Covina* (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 702, 711; citing *Saucier v. Katz* (2001) 533 U.S. 194, 202 [150 L.E.2nd 272].)

"To be clearly established, a right must be sufficiently clear 'that every "reasonable official would [have understood] that what he is doing violates that right.'" (Citations omitted; *Reichle v. Howards* (2012) 566 U.S. 658, 664 [132 S.Ct. 2088; 182 L.Ed.2nd 985].)

In *Reichle v. Howards*, the Supreme Court held that it was *not* clearly established that when an arrest is made with probable cause, a law enforcement officer might still be violating the arrestee's **First Amendment** freedom of speech where the arrestee had criticized the Vice President. (*Id.*, at pp. 662-670.)

Where a sheriff's deputy was alleged to have aggressively grabbed plaintiff by the arm and pull him toward the curb, swinging him around, and then kick his feet out from under him causing him to fall to the pavement, after which a knee went into his back and a boot pushed his head into the pavement before being handcuffed, a jury found the force to be unreasonable under the circumstances. However, citing *White v. Pauly, supra*, the Court held that where no case could be identified that would have put the sheriff's deputy on notice that the force he used was unreasonable, entitling the deputy to qualified immunity, the jury's verdict and damage award was set aside. (*Shafer v. County of Santa Barbara (Padilla)* (9th Cir. 2017) 868 F.3rd 1110, 1115-1118.)

California Civil Code § 52.1; the “Bane Act.”

California’s **Civil Code § 52.1**, the so-called “**Bane Act**” (the state equivalent to a federal **42 U.S.C. § 1983** civil suit), authorizes a civil action “against anyone who interferes, or tries to do so, by threats, intimidation, or coercion, with an individual’s exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by federal or state law.” (See *Jones v. Kmart Corp.* (1998) 17 Cal.4th 329, 331.) The **Bane Act** applies whenever there is a **Fourth Amendment** use of force violation. An illegal arrest (i.e., without probable cause) accompanied by the use of excessive force constitutes a **Bane Act** violation. It does not require a showing that the conduct also caused a violation of a separate and distinct constitutional right. (*Bender v. County of Los Angeles* (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 968, 976-981.)

“The **Bane Act** permits an individual to pursue a civil action for damages where another person ‘interferes by threat, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threat, intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state.’ (**Civ. Code, § 52.1, subd. (a).**) ‘The essence of a Bane Act claim is that the defendant, by the specified improper means (i.e., “threat[], intimidation or coercion”), tried to or did prevent the plaintiff from doing something he or she had the right to do under the law or to force the plaintiff to do something that he or she was not required to do under the law.’ (Citation)” (*King v. State of California* (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 265, 294.)

Evidence as presented in a civil rights action was held to be insufficient to support a **Bane Act** claim because the driver did not testify that the officer’s threat made during a frisk caused him to do anything or refrain from doing anything; only that it caused him fear. The driver had no right to resist the unconstitutional frisk and thus the threat did not interfere with the exercise of his constitutional rights. (*Id.*, at pp. 293-295.)

Specific Weapons or Techniques:

The Taser (or “Electronic Control Weapon” [“ECW”]):

Note: “TASER” is an acronym for “Thomas A. Swift’s Electric Rifle.” (Marquez v. City of Phoenix (9th Cir. 2012) 693 F.3rd 1167, 1170, fn. 1.)

An officer used a Taser to subdue the plaintiff after he was stopped for a seat belt violation. The Taser, model X26, using compressed

nitrogen to propel a pair of “probes” (i.e., aluminum darts tipped with stainless steel barbs connected to the X26 by insulated wires) at its target, was held to be a form of “non-lethal force,” constituting an “intermediate or medium, though not insignificant, quantum of force.” (*Bryan v. MacPherson* (9th Cir. 2010) 630 F.3rd 805, 823-833.)

Plaintiff was obviously irate, yelling expletives and other “gibberish,” and hitting his thighs, while dressed only in boxer shorts and tennis shoes. Plaintiff got out of his car after being ordered to stay in it. He also may have taken a step towards the officer although he was still 15 to 25 feet away from him. Use of the Taser on the plaintiff, who never verbally threatened the officer nor made any attempt to flee, was held to be excessive under these circumstances. (*Ibid.*)

The use of a Taser to subdue non-threatening, although uncooperative, suspects, depending upon the circumstances, absent a threat to the safety of the officers or others, may constitute excessive force and a **Fourth Amendment** violation. (*Mattos v. Agarano* (9th Cir. 2011) 661 F.3rd 433: Two cases; one involving the Tasing of the victim in a domestic violence situation where she was the victim, and the other being of an uncooperative driver who refused to sign a traffic citation. Both cases resulted in a finding of a **Fourth Amendment** excessive force violation, but with qualified immunity for the officers, the incidents happening before there was any relevant case law.)

The Court cited three prior cases, being the only federal cases on the issue, where it had been held that the use of a Taser was *not* a **Fourth Amendment** violation; i.e., *Russo v. City of Cincinnati* (6th Cir. 1992) 953 F.2nd 1036; *Hinton v. City of Elwood* (10th Cir. 1993) 997 F.2nd 774; and *Draper v. Reynolds* (11th Cir. 2004) 369 F.3rd 1270. These three cases, respectively, involved officers being attacked by a suicidal, homicidal, mental patient who was armed with two knives, a violently resisting suspect who was flailing at, kicking, and biting the arresting officers, and a lone officer being confronted by an angry, confrontational, and agitated truck driver who refused five times to produce certain documents as he paced back and forth, yelling at the officer. (*Id.*, at pp. 446-448.)

Punching and Tasing a non-resisting and compliant arrestee who the officer knew was emotionally troubled and physically ill, and continued to do so when the arrestee did no more than flinch from the pain and cry for help, and then asphyxiating him by sitting on his chest, was unreasonable force. The officer also was not entitled to qualified immunity under the circumstances. (*Mendoza v. City of West Covina* (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 702, 714-720.)

Using a Taser in nine five-second cycles, two while it was ineffectively deployed in probe mode and seven when it was deployed in drive-stun mode, was held to be reasonable where officers were attempting to rescue a three-year-old child from a suspect's grasp (a "choke hold"), and to subdue the violently resisting suspect who died as a result. (*Marquez v. City of Phoenix* (9th Cir. 2012) 693 F.3rd 1167, 1173-1177.)

The Court further determined that the warnings provided on the Taser itself, which included the possibility of death, were sufficient as a matter of law, at least in so far as required under Arizona statutory law. (*Id.*, at pp. 1172-1173.)

An officer was held not to be entitled to qualified immunity from **Fourth Amendment** claims in a federal civil rights lawsuit arising out of a detention of individuals during an investigation of a completed misdemeanor because there was no likelihood for repeated danger and there was a dispute as to whether it was reasonable to threaten to use a Taser under the circumstances. (*Johnson v. Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist.* (9th Cir. 2013) 724 F.3rd 1159, 1168-1170.)

Use of a Taser in dart mode "(involves) an intermediate level of force with 'physiological effects, high levels of pain, and foreseeable risks of physical injury.' (Citation omitted)" Using a Taser on a subject who was standing up to 37 feet away, and who hadn't reacted quickly enough when told to "back away," held to be excessive force under the circumstances. (*Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton* (9th Cir. 2013) 728 F.3rd 1086, 1090-1092.)

The Court further noted that the officer in this case was not entitled to qualified immunity in that the rules on the use of Tasers is now well-established in the law. (*Id.*, pp. 1092-1096; describing the many cases on this issue.)

Use of a Taser on a jail prisoner in order to subdue him preparatory to an extraction of a baggie from his rectum during a visual body cavity search held to be unreasonable. (*United States v. Fowlkes* (9th Cir. 2015) 804 F.3rd 954, 967-968.)

Using a Taser to remove a non-threatening mental patient from his grip onto a pole held to be excessive. The Court held that a Taser, being a “serious use of force,” like a gun, a baton, or other weapon, is expected to inflict pain or injury when deployed. It, therefore, may only be deployed when a police officer is confronted with an exigency that creates an immediate safety risk and that is reasonably likely to be cured by using the Taser. The subject of a seizure does not create such a risk simply because he is doing something that can be characterized as resistance, even when that resistance includes physically preventing an officer’s manipulations of his body. Erratic behavior and mental illness do not necessarily create a safety risk either. To the contrary, when a seizure is intended solely to prevent a mentally ill individual from harming himself, the officer effecting the seizure has a lessened interest in deploying potentially harmful force. (*Estate of Armstrong v. Village of Pinehurst* (4th Cir. 2016) 810 F.3rd 892; Officers held to have qualified immunity, however, in that the true was not yet well-settled in the law.)

“Using a Taser in dart mode constitutes an “intermediate, significant level of force.” (Citation). ¶ The pain is intense, is felt throughout the body, and is administered by effectively commandeering the victim’s muscles and nerves. Beyond the experience of pain, tasers result in immobilization, disorientation, loss of balance, and weakness, even after the electrical current has ended. Moreover, tasering a person may result in serious injuries when intense pain and loss of muscle control cause a sudden and uncontrolled fall. (Citation) The experience of being shot with a Taser is a “painful and frightening blow.” (*Thomas v. Dillard* (9th Cir. 2016) 818 F.3rd 864, 889-991; holding that the use of a Taser on an uncooperative, but illegally detained suspect, even though the suspected crime might have been domestic violence-related, was excessive.)

In confronting a very large man (more than six feet tall and over 250 pounds) who was likely under the influence of drugs and was violently resisting arrest, the officer, in the resulting civil suit, was entitled to qualified immunity for his use of a Taser even under plaintiff’s version of the facts, particularly where the officer used the Taser only once and in the less incapacitating drive-stun mode.

(Isayeva v. Sacramento Sheriff's Department (9th Cir. 2017) 872 F.3rd 938, 947-950.)

Continually tasing a subject for over 90 seconds, even after he was on the ground and had gone limp, while being subdued by five officers, actions which contributed to the subject's death, was held to present a triable issue in a subsequent civil suit brought by the decedent's parents. (*Jones v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Department* (9th Cir. 2017) 873 F.3rd 1123, 1128-1132.)

Chemical Irritants; Pepper Spray, Pepperball Guns and Tear Gas:

The use of pepper spray on non-violent demonstrators was determined to be excessive where there were less intrusive alternatives. (*Headwaters Forest Defense v. County of Humboldt* (9th Cir. 2002) 276 F.3rd 1125.)

It has been held that squirting pepper spray randomly into a crowd of demonstrators where there was insufficient cause to believe the demonstrators posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others might be excessive and expose the offending police officers to civil liability. (*Lamb v. Decatur* (C.D.Ill. 1996) 947 F.Supp. 1261.)

However, the use of a "chemical irritant" against party-goers who are impeding a lawful arrest and fighting with law enforcement officers, particularly after a warning, was *not* improper, or excessive. (*Jackson v. City of Bremerton* (9th Cir. 2001) 268 F.3rd 646, 651-653.)

The use of *pepper spray* on fighting prison inmates in a maximum security prison, in an attempt to stop the fight, was held to be reasonable, although the failure to provide medical attention to other inmates who might also have been affected by the pepper spray vapors, showing a "deliberate indifference" to their health, will subject correctional authorities to potential civil liability. (*Clement v. Gomez* (9th Cir. 2002) 298 F.3rd 898.)

The use of pepper spray and a baton on a non-combative, albeit uncooperative, citizen during a traffic stop is excessive force and a **Fourth Amendment** violation. (*Young v. County of Los Angeles* (9th Cir. 2011) 655 F.3rd 1156.)

In an appeal of a denial of a summary judgment motion, it was ruled that intentionally firing a pepperball projectile at a group of

demonstrators, hitting plaintiff in the eye, was a seizure of the plaintiff despite the fact that he was not specifically targeted. Also, absent evidence that the crowd was violent, committing a crime, threatening the officers, or actively avoiding arrest, the use of force by firing pepperballs into a crowd of party goers was excessive. (*Nelson v. City of Davis* (9th Cir. 2012) 685 F.3rd 867.)

Pepperball guns are similar to paintball guns that fire rounds containing oleoresin capsicum ("OC") powder, also known as pepper spray. These rounds are fired at a velocity of 350 to 380 feet per second, with the capacity to fire seven rounds per second. They break open on impact and release OC powder into the air, which has an effect similar to mace or pepper spray. Pepperballs therefore combine the kinetic impact of a projectile with the sensory discomfort of pepper spray. (*Id.*, at p. 873.)

Officers are not entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity as to an inmate's **Eighth Amendment** excessive force claim because, under the *Hudson* factors (citing *Hudson v. McMillian* (1992) 503 U.S. 1, 4 [117 L.Ed.2nd 156].), a significant amount of force was employed without significant provocation from the inmate or warning from the officers since (1) his injuries caused by the pepper spray were moderate, though relatively enduring, (2) it was not clear that the application of force was required under his version of the facts, and (3) the force used seemed quite extensive and disproportionate relative to the disturbance posed by his fingertips on the food port, and (4) it remained a disputed fact whether he posed a threat to the officers. (*Furnace v. Sullivan* (9th Cir. 2013) 705 F.3rd 1021, 1026-1030.)

The "*Hudson Factors*" mentioned are listed as follows" (1) the extent of injury suffered by an inmate; (2) the need for application of force; (3) the relationship between that need and the amount of force used; (4) the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials; and (5) any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response. (*Hudson v. McMillian, supra.*, at p. 6.)

Officers were not entitled to qualified immunity from civil liability for using a chokehold and pepper spray on a non-resisting subject. (*Barnard v. Theobald* (9th Cir. 2013) 721 F.3rd 1069, 1075-1076.)

Under the circumstances of this case, the defendant county of Tuolumne was immune from civil liability for the conduct of its

officers. Once officers decided to arrest plaintiff's son, they were vested with the discretion in determining the best way to accomplish that goal, using personal deliberation, decision, and professional judgment. This discretion included the possible use of tear gas as a way to determine whether plaintiff's son was in plaintiff's mobile home. Given the potential impact of liability on such decisions, **Gov't. Code § 820.2** provided immunity for the officers' actions. (*Conway v. County of Tuolumne* (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1005, 1013-1021.)

Gov't. Code § 820.2: "Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public employee is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be abused."

Two police officers attempted to arrest plaintiff for disorderly conduct. After plaintiff refused to place her hands behind her back to be handcuffed, one of the officers kicked her legs out from under her, causing her to fall to the ground. While plaintiff was on the ground, one of the officers used his hand to push her face onto the pavement as she continued to struggle with the officers. After the officer twice administered a burst of pepper spray directly into plaintiff's face, the officers were able to handcuff her. The officer warned plaintiff before each application of the pepper spray. The Second Circuit Court of Appeal held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. Following the guidance provided by the Supreme Court, the court held that no precedential decision of the Supreme Court or the Second Circuit Court of Appeal clearly established that the officers' use of force, viewed in the circumstances in which they were taken, violated the **Fourth Amendment**. (*Brown v. City of New York* (2nd Cir. N.Y. 2017) 862 F.3rd 182.)

Flashbang Devices:

While officers were executing a search warrant for stolen goods by an armed robber, one officer, without looking, tossed a flashbang device near the front of the door where the resident was sleeping, resulting in an injury to the resident when the device exploded. The resident sued and the trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant officers. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal ruled that for summary judgment purposes, the use of the device was excessive force because the officers knew that up to eight people were asleep in the apartment. However, because the

few cases dealing with the use of such devices are conflicting as to whether the use of a flashbang device constitutes excessive force, the resident's rights with respect to those devices was not clearly established. Thus, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. Also, because there was no evidence that the city deliberately failed to train its officers in the use of a flashbang device, the city also had immunity. (*Boyd v. Benton County* (9th Cir. 2004) 374 F.3rd 773, 778-784.)

See also *Dukes v. Deaton* (11th Cir. Ga. 2017) 852 F.3rd 1035; failing to look before throwing the device constitutes an unreasonable use of force, but the officers were entitled to qualified immunity from civil liability.

Batons:

The use of pepper spray and a baton on a non-combative, albeit uncooperative, citizen during a traffic stop is excessive force and a **Fourth Amendment** violation. (*Young v. County of Los Angeles* (9th Cir. 2011) 655 F.3rd 1156.)

Where the facts are in dispute, a police officer does not have qualified immunity for using his baton to break the plaintiff's car window and pulling him out of the car through the window. Such force may be excessive. (*Coles v. Eagle* (9th Cir. 2012) 704 F.3rd 624, 627-631.)

Use of a baton in subduing a resisting subject, striking him eleven times, may have been excessive despite a civil jury's finding to the contrary. The jury verdict was overturned in that the trial court improperly removed from consideration an unlawful arrest allegation, precluding the jury from considering whether the force used was excessive under the circumstances; the lawfulness of the arrest being one of the factors necessarily relevant to the excessive force claim. (*Velazquez v. City of Long Beach* (9th Cir. 2015) 793 F.3rd 1010, 1023-1027.)

Bean Bag Firearms:

Use of "less-lethal" cloth-cased beanbag shot against an unarmed, mentally deranged suspect, particularly when not warned first, may be excessive. (*Deorle v. Rutherford* (9th Cir. 2001) 242 F.3rd 1119.)

As a “less lethal” weapon, the lawfulness of the use of a beanbag shotgun is dependent upon a determination that its use was reasonable under the circumstances. In this case, where the out-of-control subject wasn’t threatening anyone but himself, its use was unjustified. (*Glenn v. Washington County* (9th Cir. 2011) 673 F.3rd 864, 878-880.)

Firearms:

Pointing a gun at close range at an unarmed, unresisting suspect who is only being detained, is probably excessive, and could result in civil liability. (*Robinson v. Solano County* (9th Cir. 2002) 278 F.3rd 1007.)

“(P)ointing a loaded gun at a suspect, employing the threat of deadly force, is use of a high level of force.” *Espinosa v. City and County of San Francisco* (9th Cir. 2010) 598 F.3rd 528, 538.)

Similarly, pointing a firearm at a suspect while he’s being arrested when it is apparent that the arrestee is not a threat to officer safety is excessive force sufficient to create civil liability. (*Hopkins v. Bonvicino* (9th Cir. 2009) 573 F.3rd 752, 776-777.)

See also *Stamps v. Town of Framingham* (1st Cir. 2016) 813 F.3rd 27: A reasonable officer would have understood that pointing a loaded rifle at the head of a prone, non-resistant individual, with the safety off and a finger on the trigger, constituted excessive force in violation of the **Fourth Amendment**. Consequently, when the officer accidentally shoots and kills the suspect, the officer is not entitled to qualified immunity in the resulting civil action.

A SWAT team holding children at gunpoint after officers gained control of a situation is unreasonable, and could result in civil liability. (*Holland v. Harrington* (10th Cir. 2001) 268 F.3rd 1179.)

Pointing and “training” a firearm at a five-week-old infant while conducting a **Fourth** Waiver search is excessive, and a **Fourth Amendment** violation. (*Motley v. Parks* (9th Cir. 2005) 432 F.3rd 1072, 1088-1089.)

Recognizing that even lawful arrests may be unreasonably executed, such as when excessive force is applied, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal found that plaintiff may have a valid claim that using “SWAT-like” tactics, with guns drawn and pointed at her, was excessive given that only a non-violent credit card offense

was alleged. Whether or not the victim's claims that plaintiff was "violent and unstable" were sufficient to justify the force used is something a civil jury should be allowed to determine. (*Cameron v. Craig* (9th Cir. 2013) 713 F.3rd 1012, 1020-1022.)

If deputy sheriffs did indeed shoot the sixty-four-year-old decedent without objective provocation, as the decedent was holding onto his walker with his gun trained on the ground, as plaintiff alleged, then a reasonable jury could determine that the officers violated the **Fourth Amendment** by shooting and killing him. The officers were therefore not entitled to qualified immunity. (*George v. Morris* (9th Cir. 2013) 736 F.3rd 829, 836-839.)

Where it is shown, however, that the suspect did in fact point a firearm at officers, the use of deadly force is justified. (*Id.*, at p. 838; "When an individual points his gun 'in the officers' direction,' the Constitution undoubtedly entitles the officer to respond with deadly force."

The use of deadly force by shooting into a subject's vehicle in a dangerous high-speed chase situation is lawful so long as the danger continues to exist (*Plumhoff v. Rickard* (May 27, 2014) 572 U.S. ___ [134 S. Ct. 2012; 188 L.Ed.2nd 1056].), but not so when the subject is surrounded and poses no immediate danger to others. (*A.D. v. State of California Highway Patrol* (9th Cir. 2013) 712 F.3rd 446.)

A police officer violates the **Fourteenth Amendment** due process clause if he kills a suspect when acting with the purpose to harm, unrelated to a legitimate law enforcement objective. An officer was properly found to be civilly liable after shooting and killing the decedent (plaintiffs' mother) at the end of a high speed chase, but where the decedent was blocked in without a means of escape, and where no weapons were observed. (*Id.*, at pp. 452-454, 456-460.)

The officer held *not* to be entitled to qualified immunity. (*Id.*, at pp. 454-455.)

Where officers shot and killed the plaintiff's father, there was no violation of the plaintiff/minor's **Fourteenth Amendment** rights because there was no evidence that the deputies acted with a purpose to harm unrelated to the legitimate law enforcement objective of defending themselves when the decedent approached

with a knife in his hand. However, remand of the plaintiff/minor's negligent wrongful death claim was required because a reasonable jury could conclude that the use of deadly force was not objectively reasonable under the circumstances. (*Hayes v. County of San Diego* (9th Cir. 2013) 736 F.3rd 1223, 1229-1235; a negligence civil action.)

An officer's pre-shooting conduct is properly included in the totality of the circumstances surrounding his use of deadly force. The officer's duty to act reasonably when using deadly force extends to pre-shooting conduct when officers shot a suicidal person who approached them with a knife in hand. (*Id.*, at pp. 1235-1236.)

A police officer who shoots a person is not entitled to qualified immunity from a father's **Fourteenth Amendment** claim for deprivation of a familial relationship where the evidence shows that the decedent was already subdued, creating a genuine issue as to whether the officer's actions were required by a legitimate law enforcement purpose. (*Johnson v. Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist.* (9th Cir. 2013) 724 F.3rd 1159, 1168-1170.)

Shooting a mentally ill, mid-50's year-old-woman who threatened to kill the officers as she aggressively moved towards them (coming to within two to four feet) while wielding a knife, held to be legally justified as a matter of law under the circumstances. (*City & County of San Francisco v. Sheehan* (May 18, 2015) __ U.S. __, __ [135 S.Ct. 1765; 191 L.Ed.2nd 856].)

The Court declined to decide whether making a second entry of plaintiff's room, having initially backed out when confronted by the knife-wielding plaintiff, was constitutional under the circumstances, it not having been briefed on appeal, but rather (in overruling the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal) found that the officers had qualified immunity from civil liability in that the officers' choice to reenter the room without waiting for backup or otherwise planning a strategy did not violate clearly established law. (135 S.Ct. at pp. 1174-1178.)

Pointing a gun at the head of an 18-year-old occupant of a residence where there was no probable cause to support the officer's belief that he was committing a burglary held to be in violation of clearly established law. (*Sandoval v. Las Vegas*

Metro. Police Dep't. (9th Cir. 2014) 756 F.3rd 1154, 1165; citing *Robinson v. Solano County*, *supra.*)

Where a **42 U.S.C. § 1983** action requires a jury to sift through various disputed factual contentions, including whether officers were telling the truth about when, why, and how one officer shot the decedent, summary judgment was inappropriate. Specifically, the report from the autopsy performed on decedent's body conflicted with the officer's version of the events. A video taken by the sergeant's dashboard camera was inconsistent with the officer's version of the events. And the officer's and sergeant's statements were inconsistent with one another. (*Newmaker v. City of Fortuna* (9th Cir. 2016) 842 F.3rd 1108, 1115-1117.)

Where an officer arrives late at an ongoing police action and witnesses shots being fired by one of several individuals in a house surrounded by other officers, and that officer then shoots and kills an armed occupant of the house without first giving a warning, the officer did not violate clearly established law based on his failure to provide a verbal warning before utilizing deadly force: "No settled **Fourth Amendment** principle requires that officer to second-guess the earlier steps already taken by his or her fellow officers in instances like the one [the officer] confronted here." (*White v. Pauly* (Jan. 9, 2017) __ U.S. __ [137 S.Ct. 548; 196 L.Ed.2nd 463].)

Whether four to six officers pointing guns (and one shotgun) at the plaintiff during a felony "high risk" traffic stop, after an "automated license plate reader" had misidentified the plaintiff's car as being stolen, when the plaintiff was compliant and posed no threat to the officers, constituted excessive force is a jury question. (*Green v. City & County of San Francisco* (9th Cir. 2014) 751 F.3rd 1039, 1049-1051.)

See "*High Speed Pursuits*," under *Use of Deadly Force by Police Officers*," below.

An officer observing a thirteen-year-old boy walking down the street carrying what appeared to be an AK-47 rifle, shot and killed the victim after he ignored the officer's command to drop the weapon. The rifle turned out to be a toy with the bright orange tip removed. The officer was not entitled to qualified immunity where the plaintiff's evidence showed that the officer failed to warn the victim that he might get shot, the rifle was pointed towards the ground at all times, and the victim made no

aggressive moves toward the officer. (*Estate of Lopez v. Gelhaus* (9th Cir. 2017) 871 F.3rd 998, 1005-1017.)

An officer was held to be entitled to qualified immunity when he fatally shot a male suspect to death, where the male was over six feet tall and 250 pounds and apparently on drugs and violently resisting arrest, and where using a Taser merely aggravated him, prompting the decedent to knock the officer into a wall and then come at him, hitting him on the head, neck and back with his fists. Under these circumstances, where the decedent “clearly had the upper hand in the fight,” the Court found that “there are strong reasons to believe that (the decedent) posed a risk of death or serious injury to the officers or to the family members in the home.” (*Isayeva v. Sacramento Sheriff’s Department* (9th Cir. 2017) 872 F.3rd 938, 950-953.)

A sheriff’s deputy was not entitled to qualified immunity where he shot a violent knife-wielding suspect 18 times (and then, because he was still moving, stomped him in the head three times), killing him. A jury could determine that the decedent no longer posed an immediate threat before shooting him the last 9 times, and that any deadly force used after that point violated the **Fourth Amendment**. Although it is not necessary that a police officer cease shooting until the threat is over, a jury could reasonably conclude that the deputy in this case could have sufficiently protected himself and others after the decedent had fallen by pointing his gun at him and pulling the trigger only if he attempted to flee or attack. (*Zion v. County of Orange* (9th Cir. 2017) 874 F.3rd 1072, 1075-1076.)

Pain Compliance:

The use of “*pain compliance*” to arrest passively resistant demonstrators was upheld as reasonable in that it was used only after a warning, was not applied any more than necessary to gain compliance, and was something that could be ended instantaneously when the protestor submitted. (*Forrester v. City of San Diego* (9th Cir. 1994) 25 F.3rd 804.)

Handcuffs:

An IRS agent was not entitled to qualified immunity where he handcuffed a nonviolent resident of a house during an IRS search of the premises, and further that he was not entitled to qualified immunity where there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether he

handcuffed the resident in a manner that caused her pain. “(H)andcuffing substantially aggravates the intrusiveness of a detention.” The use of handcuffs must be “justified by the totality of the circumstances.” (*Meredith v. Erath* (9th Cir. 2003) 342 F.3rd 1057, 1061-1063.)

The lawfulness of the use of any type of force, including handcuffs to secure criminal suspects, requires a balancing of the “nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Handcuffing individuals without any probable cause to believe they have committed a crime may be excessive, giving rise to potential civil liability. And even if lawful, the handcuffing of a detainee may be found to be unreasonable if it is unnecessarily painful. (*Sandoval v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t.* (9th Cir. 2014) 756 F.3rd 1154, 1165-1167.)

Handcuffing an otherwise compliant 11-year-old minor (even though reported to be out of control, uncooperative, and “off his meds” by school officials) and transporting him from his school to a relative held to be an excessive use of force under the circumstances, and an unlawful seizure. Officers were not entitled to qualified immunity. (*C.B. v. City of Sonora* (9th Cir. 2014) 769 F.3rd 1005, 1029-1031, 1039-1040.)

Thomas and Rosalie Avina sued the United States under the **Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)** for assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress after agents from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) executed a search warrant at their mobile home. Upon entering the home, the agents pointed guns at Thomas and Rosalie, handcuffed them and forcefully pushed Thomas to the floor. The agents handcuffed the Avina’s fourteen-year-old daughter on the floor and then handcuffed their eleven-year-old daughter on the floor and pointed their guns at her head. The agents removed the handcuffs from the children approximately thirty minutes after they entered. The court held that the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the United States as to Thomas and Rosalie because the agents’ use of force against them was reasonable. The agents were executing a search warrant at the residence of a suspected drug trafficker. This presented a dangerous situation for the agents and the use of handcuffs on the adult members of the family was reasonable to minimize the risk of harm to the officers and the Avinas. In addition, the agents did not act unreasonably when they forcefully pushed Thomas Avina to the floor. At the

time of the push, Avina was refusing the agents' commands to get down on the ground. Because this refusal occurred during the initial entry, the agents had no way of knowing whether Avina was associated with the suspected drug trafficker, whom they thought lived there. The court however, found that the district court improperly granted summary judgment to the United States concerning the agents' conduct toward the Avinas' minor daughters. The court held that a jury could find that when the agents pointed their guns at the eleven-year-old daughter's head, while she was handcuffed on the floor, that this conduct amounted to excessive force. Similarly, the court held that a jury could find that the agents' decision to force the two girls to lie face down on the floor, with their hands cuffed behind their backs, was unreasonable. Genuine issues of fact existed as to whether the actions of the agents were excessive in light of girls' ages and the limited threats they posed. (*Avina v. United States* (9th Cir. 2012) 681 F.3rd 1127, 1130-1134.)

Duty to Warn:

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal has held a number of times that where it is possible to do so, the officer must warn a person before applying force, at least when the force is likely to cause injury. (*Deorle v. Rutherford* (9th Cir. 2001) 242 F.3rd 1119, 1284, beanbag; *Bryan v. MacPherson* (9th Cir. 2010) 630 F.3rd 805; Taser; *Hayes v. County of San Diego* (9th Cir. 2013) 736 F.3rd 1223, 1234-1235, firearm.)

See also *Nelson v. City of Davis* (9th Cir. 2012) 685 F.3rd 867, 882; and *Forrester v. City of San Diego* (9th Cir. 1994) 25 F.3rd 804.)

See also *Tennessee v. Garner* (1985) 471 U.S. 1, 11-12 [85 L.Ed.2nd 1]; "(I)f the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force may be used if necessary to prevent escape, *and if, where feasible, some warning has been given.*" (Italics added)

However, where an officer arrives late at an ongoing police action and witnesses shots being fired by one of several individuals in a house surrounded by other officers, and that officer then shoots and kills an armed occupant of the house without first giving a warning, the officer did not violate clearly established law based on his failure to provide a verbal warning before utilizing deadly force: "No settled **Fourth Amendment** principle requires that officer to second-guess the earlier steps already taken by his or her fellow officers in instances like the one [the officer]

confronted here.” (*White v. Pauly* (Jan. 9, 2017) __ U.S. __ 137 S.Ct. 548; 196 L.Ed.2nd 463].)

“(A)n important consideration in evaluating the City’s interest in the use of force is ‘whether officers gave a warning before employing the force.’” (*Lowry v. City of San Diego* (9th 2017) 858 F.3rd 1248, 1259; quoting *Glenn v. Washington County* (9th Cir. 2011) 673 F.3rd 864, 876.)

In *Lowry*, an officer did in fact give a warning that he was about to deploy a service dog although plaintiff, who was asleep inside a darkened commercial business, was asleep and did not hear it.

The officers’ failure to warn a subject carrying a firearm before shooting him, when the subject, as he approached the officers, was pointing it at the ground, even though the officers had already seen the subject hit his daughter with it moments earlier, was held to be unreasonable, requiring a reversal of the trial court’s summary judgment motion granted in favor of the defendant officers. (*Hensley v. Price* (4th Cir. 2017) 876 F.3rd 573.)

The failure to warn a thirteen-year-old boy who was observed carrying what appeared to be an AK-47 (but turned out to be a toy with the bright orange tip removed), and who failed to drop the weapon when ordered but who did not act aggressively toward the officer or ever point the weapon at the officer, was a factor in denying the officer qualified immunity in a resulting civil suit for having shot and killed the victim. (*Estate of Lopez v. Gelhaus* (9th Cir. 2017) 871 F.3rd 998, 1011.)

Applicable Statutes:

P.C. § 692: *Lawful resistance* to the commission of a public offense may be made:

1. By the party about to be injured;
2. By other parties.

See also **CALCRIM, # 3470**, “*Self-Defense and Defense of Another.*”

“A defendant is not required to retreat. He or she is entitled to stand his or her ground and defend himself or herself, and if reasonably necessary, to pursue an assailant until the danger of (death/bodily injury/insert crime) has passed. This is so even if safety could have been achieved by retreating.”

A defendant has a right of self-defense if he “reasonably believed that he was in imminent danger of suffering bodily injury” through the application of unreasonable force applied by a person attempting to make a citizen’s arrest. (*People v. Adams* (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 946.)

“Self-defense” does not justify an assault absent a “an immediate threat of unlawful force, and the need for the action to be commensurate with the threat, with no more force used than reasonably necessary to meet it.” Harsh, insulting, nor demeaning words alone are insufficient to trigger the right to use self-defense in return. (*United States v. Urena* (9th Cir. 2011) 659 F.3rd 903, 906-907; being called a “*bitch*” hours earlier did not justify a preemptive strike by defendant.)

After defendant shot and killed his father and three other men who he believed were plotting to kill him, he was charged with multiple counts of special circumstance murder. He pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity and claimed that his delusional state caused him to believe that he was acting in self-defense. The Court held that an instruction on self-defense in the sanity phase must inform the jury that a defendant’s delusion caused *him* to believe that he was in danger of great bodily injury or death that required the use of deadly force and that he would be legally justified in doing so. The trial court erred when it instructed the jury that defendant’s beliefs also had to be reasonable; an “*objective*” standard. (*People v. Leeds* (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 822, 829-833.)

A trial court abused its discretion and deprived defendant, who was homeless, of his constitutional right to present a complete defense by excluding expert testimony concerning chronic homelessness during defendant’s first degree murder trial, including a homeless man’s “heightened perception” of a deadly threat. The expert’s proposed opinion was relevant to defendant’s actual belief, as well as the reasonableness of his belief, in the need to use lethal force to defend himself. The expert’s opinion was relevant to defendant’s credibility. Because the subject of the expert opinion was sufficiently beyond common experience that it would have assisted the jury, and a reasonable probability existed that if presented with the expert’s testimony on chronic homelessness the jury would have found defendant guilty of a lesser included offense, the error was prejudicial. (*People v. Sotelo-Urena* (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 732.)

P.C. § 693: *Party about to be injured*; circumstances in which force is authorized: By the party, in what cases and to what extent:

1. To prevent an offense against his person, or his family, or some member thereof.
2. To prevent an illegal attempt by force to take or injure property in his lawful possession.

See also **CALCRIM, # 3470**, “*Self-Defense and Defense of Another.*”

P.C. § 694: *Other Parties*; circumstances in which force is authorized: Any other person, in aid or defense of the person about to be injured, may make resistance sufficient to prevent the offense.

See also **CALCRIM, # 3470**, “*Self-Defense and Defense of Another.*”

P.C. § 834a: *Resisting Arrest*: “If a person has knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable care, should have knowledge, that he is being arrested by a peace officer, it is the duty of such person to refrain from using force or any weapon to resist such arrest.”

It is illegal to resist any arrest or detention by a peace officer, even if it is determined to be an *illegal* arrest or detention. (*Evans v. City of Bakersfield* (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 321; and *In re Richard G.* (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1252, 1260-1263.) The person illegally arrested or detained has a civil remedy against the offending officer(s). (See **42 U.S.C. § 1983**, and California’s “**Bane Act**” [Civil Code § 52.1].)

P.C. § 835: *Restraint of Detained or Arrested Person*: “The person arrested may be subjected to such restraint as is reasonable for his arrest and detention.”

P.C. § 835a: *Use of Reasonable Force*: “Any peace officer who has reasonable cause to believe a person to be arrested has committed a public offense may use reasonable force to affect the arrest, to prevent escape, or to overcome resistance.”

An officer is not required to desist in his or her efforts merely because the accused offers some resistance. (*People v. Hardwick* (1928) 204 Cal. 582, 587.)

Use of excessive force by an officer gives the arrestee the right to use self-defense, and negates the element of “*acting in the performance of his or her duties*” for any potential charge where this element must be proved. (E.g.; **P.C. §§ 148(a), 243(b) & (c), and 245(c) & (d)**)

An officer who uses excessive force is subject to prosecution for a felony (**P.C. § 149**) and/or, if the victim is a prisoner and the officer is guilty of “willful inhumanity or oppression towards (the) prisoner,” a \$4,000 fine and removal from office (**P.C. § 147**), in addition to any other applicable assault or battery violations.

P.C. § 843: *Arrest by Warrant; Use of Force*: “When the arrest is being made by an officer under the authority of a warrant, after information of the intention to make the arrest, if the person to be arrested either flees or forcibly resists, the officer may use all necessary means to effect the arrest.”

P.C. § 844: *Knock and Notice*: “To make an arrest, a private person, if the offense is a felony, and in all cases a peace officer, may break open the door or window of the house in which the person to be arrested is, or in which they have reasonable grounds for believing the person to be, after having demanded admittance and explained the purpose for which admittance is desired.”

Note: This is California’s “*knock and notice*” statute, for making arrests. (See “*Knock and Notice*,” above)

P.C. § 845: *Use of Force to Exit a House*: “Any person who has lawfully entered a house for the purpose of making an arrest, may break open the door or window thereof if detained therein, when necessary for the purpose of liberating himself, and an officer may do the same, when necessary for the purpose of liberating a person who, acting in his aid, lawfully entered for the purpose of making an arrest, and is detained therein.”

P.C. § 846: *Securing Weapons*: “Any person making an arrest may take from the person arrested all offensive weapons which he may have about his person, and must deliver them to the magistrate before whom he is taken.”

P.C. § 490.5(f)(2): *Use of Force by Merchant, Library Employee or Theater Owner*: A merchant, library employee or theater owner may use a reasonable amount of non-deadly force necessary to protect himself and to prevent escape or prevent loss of tangible or intangible property.

Use of Force in Making a Blood Draw:

Rule: Where otherwise lawful (see *McNeely*, below), using physical force to effect a blood draw, so long as the officers “act reasonably and use only that degree of force which is necessary to overcome a defendant’s resistance in taking a blood sample,” is lawful. (*People v. Rossetti* (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1070, 1077-1079; quoting *Carlton v. Superior Court* (1985)170 Cal.App.3rd 1182, 1187-1191.)

In *Rossetti*, four officers held a handcuffed defendant on the floor when defendant was “kicking around and not doing what [he was] told to do” while a licensed phlebotomist drew blood. The use of force was upheld as reasonable. (*People v. Rossetti, supra.*)

Also, in *Carlton*, a struggling defendant was held by six officers to the floor in a “temporary carotid restraint” position, with his face to the floor, as blood was withdrawn by a registered nurse. The force used was upheld as reasonable. (*Carlton v. Superior Court, supra.*)

Examples:

The force used was upheld as reasonable when a resisting defendant was restrained by five police officers as a technician removed the blood sample from his left arm, without any showing that the officers “introduced any wantonness, violence or beatings.” (*People v. Ryan* (1981) 116 Cal.App.3rd 168.)

But see *People v Kraft* (1970) 3 Cal.App.3rd 890, where defendant refused to submit to a blood test. Taken to a hospital, defendant resisted being taken inside, resulting in an officer striking him in the cheek with a closed fist. While being carried to a bed in an examination room, defendant fell or was pushed to the floor. While on the floor, police immobilized him while a physician withdrew blood. One officer held defendant’s arm while also holding a scissor lock on his legs. It was acknowledged in testimony that defendant’s behavior had not been aggressive but was “defensive.” The court concluded that the officers’ “strong arm” tactics were “aggressive beyond all need” and exceeded the limits of permissible force. (*Id.*, at pp. 895-899.)

McNeely Limitation: The Supreme Court has held that being arrested for driving while under the influence does not allow for a non-consensual warrantless blood test absent exigent circumstances beyond the fact that

the blood was metabolizing at a normal rate. (*Missouri v. McNeely* (2013) 569 U.S. 141 [133 S.Ct. 1552; 185 L.Ed.2nd 696].)

See “*Searches of Persons*” (Chapter 8), below.

History: See *Birchfield v. North Dakota* (June 23, 2016) __ U.S. __, __ [136 S.Ct. 2160;195 L.Ed.2nd 560], for a historical review of the development of DUI statutes and the importance of obtaining a reading of the suspect’s “BAC” (“Blood Alcohol Concentration”).

Use of Deadly Force:

Causing Death: When the use of force results in the death of another person, a “homicide,” or a “killing of a human being by another human being,” has occurred. (*People v. Antick* (1975) 15 Cal.3rd 79, 87.)

See CALCRIM, # 500, “*Homicide: General Principles.*”

Note: To be classified as “*deadly force,*” it is not necessary that death actually occur. See below.

“*Deadly Force Defined:*” “Force that the actor uses with the purpose of causing or that he knows to create a substantial risk of causing *death* or *serious bodily injury.*” (*Emphasis added;* See **Model Penal Code § 3.11(2)** (1962))

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal had previously held that “*deadly force,*” when evaluating the use of force by a law enforcement agency through the use of a police dog, should be defined as: “*Force which is reasonably likely to cause (or which ‘had a reasonable probability of causing’) death.*” (*Vera Cruz v. City of Escondido* (9th Cir. 1997) 139 F.3rd 659, 663; use of a police dog is *not* deadly force.)

E.g.: Use of a police dog to bite and hold a potentially dangerous fleeing felon for up to a minute, until the arresting officer could insure that the situation was safe, did not constitute the use of “*deadly force,*” and was therefore not a violation of the **Fourth Amendment** (seizure), despite the fact that the suspect’s arm was severely injured by the dog. (*Miller v. Clark County* (9th Cir. 2003) 340 F.3rd 959.)

The above, however, was a minority opinion. As a result, the Ninth Circuit has recently changed its mind, adopting the majority

rule, agreeing that even in the use of a police dog, “*deadly force*” should be defined as “*force that creates a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury.*” (*Smith v. City of Hemet* (9th Cir. 2005) 394 F.3rd 689.)

Note: The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal further held in *Smith* that the defendant pleading guilty to resisting arrest, per **P.C. § 148(a)(1)**, does not preclude him from suing the officers for using unreasonable force so long as the officer’s legal actions can be separated from his use of unreasonable force. The California Supreme Court later ruled in *Yount v. City of Sacramento* (2008) 43 Cal.4th 885, that it is not necessary to find the officers’ lawful actions divisible from their use of unreasonable use of force in order for the criminal defendant to be guilty of resisting arrest and still sue. Based upon this theory, the Ninth Circuit found that a criminal defendant, even after pleading guilty to resisting arrest per **P.C. § 148(a)(1)**, may sue the officer for using unreasonable force in a continuous course of action so long as at least part of the officer’s actions were lawful. (*Hooper v. County of San Diego* (9th Cir. 2011) 629 F.3rd 1127.) Both *Smith* and *Hooper* are dog bite cases.

Where the dog’s handler closely followed his police dog and called her off very quickly after the initial contact with the plaintiff, and due to the officer’s close proximity to his dog, the encounter between plaintiff and the dog was so brief that the officer did not even know if contact had occurred, where the risk of harm posed by this particular use of force, and the actual harm caused, was moderate, the district court properly determined that the use of force in this instance was not severe. Summary judgment for the City of San Diego was upheld. (*Lowry v. City of San Diego* (9th 2017) 858 F.3rd 124.)

Non-Criminal Homicides: Not all homicides, however, are criminal. The non-criminal homicides are commonly grouped into two general categories; “*excusable*” (**P.C. § 195**; when committed by “*accident or misfortune*”) and “*justifiable*” (**P.C. §§ 196 et seq.**), when authorized by law.

The use of *deadly force*, and the resulting killing of a human being, may be “*justifiable*” (i.e., not illegal) when committed as authorized by statute, and as limited by case law. (See *People v.*

Velez (1983) 144 Cal.App.3rd 558, 566-568, *People v. Frye* (1992) 7 Cal.4th 1148, 1155; and CALCRIM # 505-509 (*Justifiable*) and # 510-511 (*Excusable*) Homicide.)

See *People v. McNally* (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1419, 1425, upholding a second degree “implied malice” murder conviction where defendant claimed the shooting was an accident: “(T)here is a difference between an ‘accidental discharge’ and a ‘negligent discharge’ where the shooter is doing something he or she should not be doing with the firearm. Appellant brandished the loaded pistol and pointed it at (the victim). The jury was instructed that the killing is an accident if appellant ‘was doing a lawful act in a lawful way’ and ‘acting with usual and ordinary caution.’ (CALCRIM No. 510.) There is no evidence that appellant (in this case) was doing a lawful act in a lawful way. Appellant’s intentional act of pointing a loaded pistol at the victim was, at the least, negligent. It was dangerous to human life. The natural and probable consequences of the act created a probable risk of harm.”

Applicable Statutes:

P.C. § 196: Homicide is *justifiable* when committed by *public officers* and those acting by their command in their aid and assistance, when:

1. In obedience to any judgment of a competent court; or
2. When necessarily committed in overcoming actual resistance to the execution of some legal process, or in the discharge of any other legal duty; or
3. When necessarily committed in retaking felons who have been rescued or have escaped, or when necessarily committed in arresting persons charged with a felony, and who are fleeing from justice or resisting such arrest.

See *Kortum v. Alkire* (1977) 69 Cal.App.3rd 325, 333; *Foster v. City of Fresno* (N.D. Cal. 2005) 392 F.Supp.2nd 1140, 1159; and CALCRIM # 507: “*Justifiable Homicide: By Public Officer.*”

P.C. § 197: Homicide is also *justifiable* when committed by *any person* in any of the following situations:

1. When resisting any attempt to *murder*, commit a *felony*, or to do *great bodily injury* upon any person; or

2. When committed in *defense of habitation, property* or *person*, at least in cases of violent felonies; or
3. When committed in *defense of person*, or of a *wife* or *husband, parent, child, master, mistress*, or *servant* of such person, at least in cases of violent felonies; or
4. When necessarily committed in attempting to *apprehend any person* for any *felony*, or in *suppressing any riot*, or in *keeping and preserving the peace*.

The trial court was not required to instruct the jury sua sponte on the law of justifiable homicide in making an arrest, per **P.C. § 197(4)**, where defendant himself claimed he chased the victim for about a quarter of a mile with an axe and killed him, not in an attempt to arrest him for burglary, but rather because the victim looked like he was not a good person. (*People v. Zinda* (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 871, 877-880.)

The Court further rejected defendant's argument that he was also entitled to a "*mistake of fact*" instruction, arguing that he believed his victim had burglarized his home. (*Id.*, at pp. 880-881; "The defense of mistake of fact requires, at a minimum, an actual belief in the existence of circumstances, which, if true, would make the act with which the person is charged an innocent act," quoting *People v. Lawson* (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 108, 115, in that even if the victim had burglarized defendant's home, killing him would not have been legally justified.

See also **CALCRIM # 508**: "*Justifiable Homicide: Citizen Arrest (Non-Peace Officer)*," and **# 509**: "*Justifiable Homicide: Non-Peace Officer Preserving the Peace*."

Limitations: In reading these statutes (**P.C. §§ 196 & 197**), a literal interpretation would seem to indicate the conclusion that killing a suspect in *any felony* situation, even if only a property offense, to prevent the commission of a felony against a person, or to arrest or stop any fleeing felony suspect, nonviolent as well as violent, is lawful.

Forcible and Atrocious Crimes: Although maybe true at one time, modern case law no longer allows such a liberal application of the justifiable homicide defense. Today, the use of deadly force is

specifically limited to defending against, or in the attempt to arrest someone, for “*forcible and atrocious*” crimes only. (*People v. Ceballos* (1974) 12 Cal.3rd 470, 478; *Tennessee v. Garner* (1985) 471 U.S. 1, 12-15 [85 L.Ed.2nd 1, 10-12]; *People v. Martin* (1985) 168 Cal.App.3rd 1111, 1124; and CALCRIM # 509: “*Justifiable Homicide: Non-Peace Officer Preserving the Peace.*”)

History: The wording in the statutes, referring to felonies seemingly without limitation, comes from the “*Common Law*” which, in its early history, made *all felonies*, of which there were only a few, capital offenses. (See *People v. Williams* (2013) 57 Cal.4th 776, 782.)

The Common Law justification for this rule has been quoted, for historical value only, by more recent cases: “‘Ordinarily, an officer or private person, in making an arrest for a felony, may use whatever force is reasonably necessary to overcome a resisting felon or to stop a fleeing felon, even to the extent of taking his life; and, if deadly force is used, the homicide is justifiable. The supportive theory is that “felons ought not to be at large, and that the life of a felon has been forfeited; for felonies at common law were punishable with death.”’” (See *People v. Martin* (1985) 168 Cal.App.3rd 1111, 1115.)

Today, with the law vastly expanded, there are many non-violent, non-capital felonies for which deadly force is *not* an appropriate response. (*People v. Ceballos, supra*; *Tennessee v. Garner, supra.*)

The Fourth Amendment: The restrictions on the use of deadly force have their genesis in the United States Constitution. A **Fourth Amendment** “*seizure*” occurs whenever “there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied.” (*Brower v. Inyo* (1989) 489 U.S. 593, 597 [103 L.Ed.2nd 628, 635].)

“The use of deadly force to prevent the escape of all felony suspects, whatever the circumstances, is constitutionally *unreasonable.*” (Emphasis added; *Tennessee v. Garner, supra*, at p. 11 [85 L.Ed.2nd at p. 9].)

Similarly, the indiscriminate use of a “*booby trap*” (a felony, per P.C. § 12355) (or a “*trap gun*,” a misdemeanor per **Fish & Game Code, § 2007**), set up in the house or

elsewhere to ward off expected intruders, has been held to constitute an illegal use of force which, by its very nature, cannot be limited to those trespassers who constitute a threat of death or great bodily injury. (*People v. Ceballos, supra.*)

See **CALCRIM # 500 et seq.**

“Forcible and Atrocious Crime,” Defined: A “*forcible and atrocious crime,*” warranting the use of deadly force; “is any felony that by its nature and the manner of its commission threatens, or is reasonably believed by the “*defendant*” (i.e., the *victim* of an assault who uses deadly force in response, and who is now being charged with a homicide) to threaten life or great bodily injury so as to instill in him or her a reasonable fear of death or great bodily injury.” (*Tennessee v. Garner, supra.*)

Forcible and atrocious crimes have been held to include *murder, rape, robbery* (at least, when the suspect is armed) and *mayhem*. (*People v. Ceballos* (1974) 12 Cal.3rd 470.)

Depending upon the circumstances, they might also include the so-called “*inherently dangerous felonies*” (with the exception of *burglary*; discussed below) listed in the “*felony murder*” statute; i.e., *arson, carjacking, kidnapping, train wrecking, torture, felony child molest* and other *forcible sex offenses*, and *murder perpetrated by means of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle with the intent to inflict death*. (See **P.C. § 189**)

Note: Viable arguments might be made to include other felonies as well, depending upon the circumstances of an individual case.

Similarly, contrary to a literal reading of the justifiable homicide statutes (e.g., **P.C. § 197.2**), killing someone in *defense of property*, even one’s own home, when not provoked by a threat of death or serious bodily harm to any person, is probably *not* justifiable. (*People v. Ceballos, supra.*) (But, see **P.C. § 198.5**, below.)

Although a trespasser may be physically ejected, using whatever non-deadly force is reasonably necessary under the circumstances should he or she refuse to leave when requested, killing the nonviolent trespasser is only likely to

leave the landowner, who thought he had a right to defend his property interests at all costs, facing possible civil and criminal penalties. (*People v. Corlett* (1944) 67 Cal.App. 27, 35-36; CALCRIM # 506: “*Justifiable Homicide: Defending Against Harm to Person with Home or on Property.*”)

Burglary of a Residence was considered at Common Law to be a dangerous felony. Modernly, however, burglary is not normally considered a forcible and atrocious crime, at least where the character and manner of the burglary does not reasonably create a fear of death or great bodily harm to any person within the home. (*People v. Ceballos* (1974) 12 Cal.3rd 470, 479.)

P.C. § 198.5: However, California has enacted a *statutory presumption* that a resident of a home *is in fact* in reasonable fear of death or great bodily injury to himself, his family, or any member of the household, when someone, not a member of the family or household, has forcibly and unlawfully entered the residence, thus legalizing the resident’s use of deadly force *within the residence*, absent evidence tending to rebut the presumption. (*People v. Owen* (1991) 266 Cal.App.3rd 996, 1003-1004.)

The “resident” need not necessarily be living there lawfully. (*People v. Grays* (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 679; defendant not legally subletting the unit where he’d been staying for four to five months, paid rent, and had a key.)

This presumption, however, is *rebuttable*. Should the homeowner have known under the circumstances that the burglar *was not* a threat, he might very well be criminally and civilly liable for using deadly force against the intruder. (See *People v. Owen, supra*, at pp. 1003-1007; and CALCRIM # 506 (“*Justifiable Homicide: Defending Against Harm to Person Within Home or on Property.*”)

Cases:

Being the victim of a residential burglary is not sufficient to arouse sufficient “heat of passion” to reduce a killing of someone believed to have been

the burglar from murder to voluntary manslaughter. The defendant (victim of the burglary) himself must reasonably believe that the homicide victim provoked defendant's heat of passion. Where defendant arrived home to find a burglary in progress, and chased a person he believed to be one of the burglars with an axe, killing him, a jury verdict of second degree murder was upheld. A person who acts in the heat of passion—without reflection in response to adequate provocation—does not act with malice. An unlawful killing in such a circumstance is reduced from murder to voluntary manslaughter. But the provocation must be caused by the victim or be conduct reasonably believed by defendant to have been engaged in by the victim. The Court here, where the homicide victim was not one of the burglars, concluded that “a reasonable person in defendant's position, even under the stress of coming home to find his house being burglarized, would have more carefully assessed the situation . . . before concluding [that the victim] was involved in the burglary.” (*People v. Zinda* (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 871, 877-880.)

Federally, it is not necessary for a trial court to instruct the jury that: “In the home, the need for self-defense and property defense is most acute.” The standard federal self-defense jury instructions (**9th Cir. Model Crim. Jury Instr. 6.7**) are sufficient. (*United States v. Morsette* (9th Cir. 2010) 622 F.3rd 1200.)

Self-Defense: A personal assault which itself is not sufficient to cause a reasonable apprehension of death or great bodily injury, even if the assault constitutes a felony, is *insufficient* to justify the use of deadly force against the assailant. “(T)he felony contemplated by the (justifiable homicide) statute is one that is more dangerous than a personal assault.” (*People v. Jones* (1961) 191 Cal.App.2nd 478, 481-482; and see **P.C. §§ 197.1, 197.3**, above; see also **CALCRIM # 500 et seq.**)

General Rules:

Any person, including a peace officer, may use deadly force against another when the

circumstances reasonably create a fear of imminent death or serious bodily harm to the person, and the use of deadly force reasonably appears necessary to resist the threat. (*People v. Humphrey* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1082; *People v. Hardin* (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 625, 629-630; *People v. Harris* (1971) 20 Cal.App.3rd 534, 537.)

In defending oneself or another, deadly force may only be used in response to the illegal application of deadly force from the aggressor. Thus, “a misdemeanor assault must be suffered without the privilege of retaliating with deadly force.” (*People v. Jones, supra*, at p. 482; *People v. Clark* (1982) 130 Cal.App.3rd 371, 380.)

Elements: In order for the defense of self-defense to apply, it must be shown that there existed:

- A reasonable belief that the use of force was necessary to defend oneself against the immediate use of unlawful force; *and*
- The use of no more force than was reasonably necessary in the circumstances. (*People v. Minifie* (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1055, 1065; and see *United States v. Biggs* (9th Cir. 2006) 441 F.3rd 1069; rejecting the argument that the defendant must also show that there were no reasonable alternatives to the use of force.)

Examples: An assault by fists does not justify the person being assaulted in using a deadly weapon in response unless that person reasonably believes that the assault is so aggravated that it is likely to result in the infliction of death or great bodily injury.

See *People v. Ramirez* (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 940, 945-953: In a murder case where one of the two defendants shot and killed a rival gang member during what was up until then merely a fistfight, the trial court erroneously instructed the jury, pursuant to **CALCRIM # 3472** (*Right of Self-Defense: May Not Be Contrived*; see below), that a person does not have the right to claim self-defense if the person

provokes a fight or quarrel with the intent to create an excuse to use force. The problem with contrived self-defense instruction in this case was that it did not include the word “*deadly*.” Thus, the instruction “erroneously required the jury to conclude that in contriving to use force, even to provoke only a fistfight, defendants entirely forfeited any right to self-defense” even if the victim escalated the force used in return to “deadly force.”

In a trial for assault and battery, the jury was properly instructed pursuant to **CALCRIM # 3472**, i.e., that a person does not have the right to self-defense if he or she provokes a fight or quarrel with the intent to create an excuse to use force because the jury could have rationally concluded that defendant provoked the conflict and continued to be the aggressor until the victim finally responded, at which point defendant knocked her out with a series of punches. The instruction is a generally correct statement of the law, and the facts of this case did not implicate case law relating to an intent to use only non-deadly force and an adversary’s sudden escalation to deadly violence because defendant’s claim of self-defense and defense of another was not based upon his use of deadly force. (*People v. Eulian* (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1332-1335.)

Imminent Peril: Deadly force is justified only when the apparent peril is *imminent*; meaning at the very time of the deadly response. A threat of future harm does not legally justify the application of deadly force in self-defense. (But see “*Fleeing Felon*,” below.)

“*Imminent peril*” refers to the situation which, from all reasonable appearances, must be instantly dealt with. (*People v. Aris* (1989) 215 Cal.App.3rd 1178, 1187-1188; *In re Christian S.* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768-783.)

The homicide of the defendant’s grandfather was not mitigated (which would have reduced the offense to a voluntary manslaughter under a “heat of passion” theory) by the fact that the grandfather had been overly critical and “mean” to the

defendant in the past. (*People v. Kanawyer* (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1233.)

A person using a firearm to scare off attacking dogs may have a viable self-defense argument. (*People v. Lee* (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1413; conviction for discharging a firearm with gross negligence reversed for failure of the court to allow a self-defense argument.)

A convicted felon, charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm (**P.C. §§ 29800 et. seq.**; formerly **§ 12021**), may use the defense of self-defense where he grabbed a firearm when confronted with an imminent danger in those instances where “the firearm only became available during an emergency and was possessed temporarily in response to the emergency and there was no other means of avoiding the danger,” and the firearm was then immediately thereafter transported to or given to law enforcement. (*People v. King* (1978) 22 Cal.3rd 12, 24; see also **P.C. § 29850**, formerly **P.C. § 12021(h)**.)

Similarly, an inmate of a penal institution has a potential defense to a **P.C. § 4502** (Inmate in Possession of a Weapon) charge when the possession was in response to an imminent danger, where there is no opportunity to seek the help of authorities, and the weapon is given to authorities as soon as the danger has passed. (*People v. Saavedra* (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 561, 568-570.)

But note that the danger has to be imminent. A threat of some future harm is not justification for possessing a prohibited weapon in violation of **P.C. § 4502**. (*People v. Velasquez* (1984) 158 Cal.App.3rd 418, 420.)

“*Bare Fear*,” or the killer’s subjective fear, by itself, is not sufficient to justify self-defense or the defense of others.

Not only must the person attempting to exercise the right to self-defense or defense of others honestly

feel the need to use force, but the circumstances must be sufficient to excite the fears of a *reasonable person* as well. (*People v. Sonier* (1952) 113 Cal.App.2nd 277, 278; *People v. Lopez* (1948) 32 Cal.2nd 673, 675; *People v. Williams* (1977) 75 Cal.App.3rd 731, 739; P.C. § 198; CALJIC # 5.14; “Homicide in Defense of Member of Family.”)

“*Apparent Necessity*” is all that is required. As long as the person is acting reasonably, he may act on appearances even though it is later discovered that there in fact was no real need for self-defense. (*People v. Dawson* (1948) 88 Cal.App.2nd 85, 96; *People v. Pena* (1984) 151 Cal.App.3rd 462, 475-478.)

For example, in using deadly force to prevent a residential burglary, whether or not the deceased actually had the intent to commit a burglary is irrelevant to the issue of whether the person who killed him could legally use deadly force. (*People v. Walker* (1973) 32 Cal.App.3rd 897.) The issue will be what the person who applied the force *reasonably believed* the circumstances to be.

However, an honest but *unreasonable* belief, while insufficient to establish a claim of self-defense in a murder case, might be enough to negate malice aforethought and thus reduce murder to a non-statutory voluntary manslaughter, sometimes referred to as “*imperfect self-defense*.” (*People v. Flannel* (1979) 25 Cal.3rd 688, 674; *People v. Uriarte* (1990) 223 Cal.App.3rd 192; see also *People v. Saille* (1991) 54 Cal.3rd 1103, 1107, fn. 1; *McNeil v. Middleton* (9th Cir. 2005) 402 F.3rd 920.)

The California Supreme Court has held that such an “*honest, but unreasonable belief*” theory applies to the commission of a homicide in the defense of a third person as well. (See *People v. Randle* (2005) 35 Cal.4th 987.)

Imperfect Self-Defense:

The theory of an “*imperfect self-defense*” is not available where the defendant’s acts are based only

upon his own delusions. (*People v. Mejia-Lenares* (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1437.)

The “*imperfect self-defense*” theory did not apply where the victim had the right to use force to try to escape an unlawful, hour’s long imprisonment and to protect himself and the other victim when defendant’s accomplice attacked the other victim in another room. Thus, when the victim charged defendant upon the sound of the accomplice snapping the other victim’s neck, defendant had the option of fleeing, stepping out of the way, or taking what he had coming to him. He did not have the right to defend himself from the victim’s lawful resort to self-defense and the defense of the other victim. (*People v. Frandsen* (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 266.)

Original Aggressor Claiming Self-Defense: Goading another into a deadly quarrel also imposes some restrictions on the use of self-defense.

The one who initiates a quarrel with the intention of forcing a deadly response in an attempt to justify the use of deadly force in return cannot claim self-defense when he kills his victim. (*People v. Garnier* (1950) 95 Cal.App.2nd 489, 496.)

In a murder case where one of the two defendants shot and killed a rival gang member during what was up until then merely a fistfight, the trial court erroneously instructed the jury, pursuant to **CALCRIM # 3472** (*Right of Self-Defense: May Not Be Contrived*), that a person does not have the right to claim self-defense if the person provokes a fight or quarrel with the intent to create an excuse to use force. The problem with contrived self-defense instruction in this case was that it did not include the word “*deadly*.” Thus, the instruction “erroneously required the jury to conclude that in contriving to use force, even to provoke only a fistfight, defendants entirely forfeited any right to self-defense” even if the victim escalated the force used in return to “deadly force.” (*People v. Ramirez* (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 940, 945-953.)

See **CALCRIM # 3471**: “*Right to Self-Defense: Mutual Combat or Initial Aggressor*,” and **CALCRIM # 3472**: “*Right to Self-Defense: “May Not Be Contrived.”*”

However, in *People v. Eulian* (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1332-1335, it was held that **CALCRIM # 3472** is a correct statement of the law and that the instruction was properly given under the facts in this case (i.e., where no deadly force was used), and that the reasoning of *Ramirez, supra*, has no application where the party claiming a right to self-defense did not use deadly force.

Similarly, a person who starts the confrontation with an unjustifiable attack or who voluntarily engages in a fight or mutual combat, and suddenly finds himself losing, cannot claim self-defense unless he first attempts to withdraw from the affray and communicates that withdrawal to his adversary. (*People v. Bolton* (1979) 23 Cal.3rd 51, 68; **P.C. § 197.3**.)

An “*original aggressor*,” or a person engaged in “*mutual combat*,” may claim the right to self-defense *if* he first effectively communicates (or attempts to communicate) by *words or conduct* that he wants to both (1) stop the fighting and (2) is in fact stopping the fighting. (*People v. Hernandez* (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 582.)

See *People v. Nem* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 160, at pp. 166-167, disagreeing with *Hernandez’s* conclusion that the word “*inform*,” in former **CALJIC 5.54**, was misleading because it necessarily caused a jury to believe that the original aggressor’s *words* were the only way to communicate an intent to withdraw.

Also, if the original aggressor used less than deadly force, his intended victim may not respond with deadly force, and if he does, then the original

aggressor has the right to use deadly force in self-defense. (*People v. Hecker* (1895) 109 Cal. 451, 464.)

On the other hand, the one originally attacked has no duty to attempt to withdraw. He may stand his ground and need not take advantage of an opportunity to escape from, or avoid another's attack or any attempt to use deadly force against him. (*People v. Dawson* (1948) 88 Cal.App.2nd 85, 95; *People v. Gonzales* (1887) 71 Cal. 569, 578.)

“(W)hen a man without fault himself is suddenly attacked in a way that puts his life or bodily safety at imminent hazard, he is not compelled to fly or to consider the proposition of flying, but may stand his ground, and defend himself to the extent of taking the life of the assailant, if that be reasonably necessary. (*People v. Newcomer* (1897) 118 Cal. 263, 273.)

This “rule applies even though the assailed person might more easily have gained safety by flight or by withdrawing from the scene.” (*People v. Dawson, supra.*)

Self-Defense is not available to a person charged with murder under the felony murder statute; i.e., one who kills another during the commission of one of the dangerous felonies listed in the murder statute; **P.C. § 189**. The purpose of the “*felony murder rule*” is to deter even accidental killings by imposing strict liability on anyone who causes another's death while committing any one or more of the specified felonies. (*People v. Loustounau* (1986) 181 Cal.App.3rd 163, 170.)

Neither self-defense nor defense of property is available to one who uses force to resist a lawful arrest or to deter a lawful entry upon one's land. (See **P.C. § 693**)

Mutual Combat:

“*Mutual Combat*” has a legal definition. It consists of fighting by mutual intention or consent, as most clearly reflected in an express or implied agreement to fight. There must be evidence from which the jury could reasonably find that both combatants actually consented or intended to fight before the claimed occasion for self-defense arose. (*People v. Ross* (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1043-1047.)

Also, “*mutual combat*” means not merely a reciprocal exchange of blows but one pursuant to mutual intention, consent, or agreement preceding the initiation of hostilities. . . . In other words, it is not merely the combat, but the preexisting intention to engage in it, that must be mutual.” (*People v. Nguyen* (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1044; quoting *People v. Ross* (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1045.)

In *Nguyen*, evidence that rival gangs had a preexisting intention to engage in hostilities whenever the opportunity presented itself supported a finding that a murder of one gang member was a part of “mutual combat.” (*People v. Nguyen, supra.*)

“[A]s used in this state’s law of self-defense, ‘mutual combat’ means not merely a reciprocal exchange of blows but one *pursuant to mutual intention, consent, or agreement preceding the initiation of hostilities*. . . . In other words, it is not merely the *combat*, but the *preexisting intention to engage in it*, that must be mutual.” (Italics in original: *People v. Nguyen, supra*, at pp. 1048-1052; quoting *People v. Ross, supra*, at p. 1045.)

Note, however, that a “*public officer*” does not lose his or her right of self-defense due to initiating a confrontation through the use of reasonable force to affect an arrest, prevent escape, or overcome resistance. (P.C. § 836.5(b))

Once the aggressor makes a good faith attempt at withdrawal, and attempts to inform his opponent of this fact, he regains his right to claim self-defense should the original victim continue the attack. (*People v. Button* (1895) 106 Cal. 628, 632-635; *People v. Hecker* (1895) 109 Cal. 451, 463-465.)

See CALCRIM # 3474: “*Danger No Longer Exists or Attacker Disabled.*”

A jury instruction based upon a mutual combat theory is erroneous when it infers that one engaged in mutual combat must be successful in communicating his intent to withdraw. It need only be shown that the defendant “*really and in good faith have endeavored to decline any further struggle . . .*” (*People v. Quach* (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 294, 300-303; see also P.C. § 197.3)

An “*original aggressor,*” or a person engaged in “*mutual combat,*” may claim the right to self-defense *if* he first effectively communicates (or attempts to communicate) by *words or conduct* that he wants to both (1) stop the fighting and (2) is in fact stopping the fighting. (*People v. Hernandez* (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 582.)

See *People v. Nem* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 160, at pp. 166-167, disagreeing with *Hernandez’s* conclusion that the word “*inform,*” in former CALJIC 5.54, was misleading because it necessarily caused a jury to believe that the original aggressor’s *words* were the only way to communicate an intent to withdraw.

If the one who originally had a right to self-defense continues the altercation after the aggressor has

broken off his assault and there is no longer imminent peril to the original victim, that victim cannot claim the defense when he catches and assaults the former aggressor. (*People v. Smith* (1981) 122 Cal.App.3rd 581, 590; *People v. Perez* (1970) 12 Cal.App.3rd 232, 236.)

See also **CALCRIM # 3474**: “*Danger No Longer Exists or Attacker Disabled.*”

However, if the original victim reasonably and in good faith feels that he must pursue his attacker in order to effectively secure himself from further danger, then self-defense is still applicable. (*People v. Hatchett* (1942) 56 Cal.App.2nd 20, 22.)

The pursuit, however, must not be motivated by revenge nor after the necessity for self-defense has ceased. (*People v. Finali* (1916) 31 Cal.App. 479; *People v. Conkling* (1896) 11 Cal. 616, 626.)

Burden of Proof: Under federal law, it has been held that justification for possessing a firearm (otherwise illegal under **18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)**) in self-defense is an *affirmative defense* for which the defendant must prove by a “*preponderance of the evidence*” the necessity for doing so. (*United States v. Beasley* (9th Cir. 2003) 346 F.3rd 930.)

See also **CALCRIM # 3471**; “*Right to Self-Defense: Mutual Combat or Initial Aggressor.*”

Fleeing Felon: The use of “*deadly force*” to stop a “*dangerous person*” fleeing from the scene of a “*forcible and atrocious crime,*” or suspected of having committed such a crime, is legally justifiable. (See *Tennessee v. Garner*, (1985) 471 U.S. 1 [85 L.Ed.2nd 1]; **P.C. §§ 196.3, 197.4**, above.)

See **CALCRIM # 507**: “*Justifiable Homicide: By Public Officer.*”

An officer may not use deadly force to apprehend a suspect in those circumstances where the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer or others. But on the other hand, it is constitutionally reasonable to use deadly force to

prevent an escape whenever an officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others. In making this decision, a court must consider:

- (1) The severity of the crime at issue;
- (2) Whether the suspect poses an immediate threat of serious physical harm to the officers or others;
and
- (3) Whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.

(*Wilkinson v. Torres* (9th Cir. 2010) 610 F.3rd 546, 550-554.)

A “*dangerous person*” is one who “poses a significant threat of death or serious bodily injury to the person attempting the apprehension or to others, or has committed a forcible and atrocious felony.” (*People v. Martin* (1985) 168 Cal.App.3rd 1111, 1124.)

Police may use deadly force to stop an escaping violent felony suspect who would pose a substantial risk to others if apprehension is delayed. (*Forrett v. Richardson* (9th Cir. 1997) 112 F.3rd 416; deadly force used to stop a “*home invasion*” suspect who had previously shot and wounded a victim.)

While the commission of a violent crime in the immediate past is an important factor, it is *not* justification for using deadly force “*on sight*.” (*Harris v. Roderick* (9th Cir. 1997) 126 F.3rd 1189, 1203.)

See also *Hopkins v. Andaya* (9th Cir. 1992) 958 F.2nd 881, 887; holding that an officer’s second use of deadly force was unreasonable even though the suspect had violently assaulted the officer a few minutes before, but by the time of the second use of deadly force, although he was advancing towards the officer, he was wounded and unarmed.

The force used must still be no greater than necessary under the circumstances. The use of so-called “*less lethal*” (e.g., bean bag ammunition) force may still be deadly, and not

necessarily appropriate despite the fact that the suspect upon which it is used is threatening violence. (*Deorle v. Rutherford* (9th Cir. 2001) 242 F.3rd 1119; imposing a *duty to warn*, where appropriate, before using potentially deadly force.)

Absent circumstances that elevate an incident into a dangerous felony assault, deadly force is *not* lawful in attempting to arrest a misdemeanor suspect. (*People v. Wild* (1976) 60 Cal.App.3rd 829, 832-833.)

However: “(T)he harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not (by itself) justify the use of deadly force to do so.” (*Espinosa v. City and County of San Francisco* (9th Cir. 2010) 598 F.3rd 528, 537; quoting *Tennessee v. Garner* (1985) 471 U.S. 1, 11-12 [85 L.Ed.2nd 1].)

A police officer’s use of deadly force is constitutional where an escaping suspect constitutes a threat of serious physical harm to officers or others. (*Wilkinson v. Torres* (9th Cir. 2010) 610 F.3rd 546, 550-554; attempts to flee in a stolen vehicle endangered two officers lying on the ground and/or standing nearby.)

Transferred Intent: In attempting to determine the legality of a claim of self-defense, and presumably the other legal justifications for committing a homicide, it is important to note that the *doctrine of transferred intent* applies.

E.g.: Accidentally shooting an innocent person while lawfully attempting to defend oneself from someone else’s use of deadly force is a “*justifiable homicide*,” there being no criminal intent. (*People v. Mathews* (1979) 91 Cal.App.3rd 1018, 1024; *People v. Levitt* (1984) 156 Cal.App.3rd 500, 507-508.)

Use of Deadly Force by Police Officers:

Rule: Attacking a police officer with a deadly weapon or deadly force will likely justify the officer’s use of deadly force in response.

“Deadly force is reasonable if ‘the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.’”

(*Lam v. City of San Jose* (9th Cir. 2017) 869 F.3rd 1077; civil jury verdict of officer liability upheld where the officer shot the victim in the back (paralyzing him) when the victim would not drop a knife he held, and even though the victim had turned away from the officer, holding the knife to his own stomach while threatening to hurt himself.)

“(P)ointing a loaded gun at a suspect, employing the threat of deadly force, is use of a high level of force.” *Espinosa v. City and County of San Francisco* (9th Cir. 2010) 598 F.3rd 528, 538.)

The use of a police dog may be “*deadly force*.” (*Smith v. City of Hemet* (2005) 394 F.3rd 689; overruling prior authority to the contrary and defining deadly force as “*force that creates a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury*.”) But it depends upon the circumstances. (*Thompson v. County of Los Angeles* (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 154.)

The survivors of an individual killed as a result of an officer’s excessive use of force may assert a **Fourth Amendment** claim on that individual’s behalf if the relevant state’s law authorizes a survival action. “A cause of action that survives the death of the person entitled to commence an action or proceeding passes to the decedent’s successor in interest . . . , and an action may be commenced by the decedent’s personal representative or, if none, by the decedent’s successor in interest.” (CCP § 337.30) (See *Hayes v. County of San Diego* (9th Cir. 2013) 736 Fd.3rd 1223, 1228-1229.)

Law Enforcement’s Written Policy RE: Use of (Deadly) Force:

In 2012, the Seattle Police Department issued a “Use of Force Policy” which necessarily included the use of deadly force through the use of firearms:

“Officers shall only use objectively reasonable force, proportional to the threat or urgency of the situation, when necessary, to achieve a law-enforcement objective.” The Use of Force Policy provides a set of factors that officers must consider to determine whether a proposed use of force is objectively reasonable, necessary, and proportional

to the threat at issue. Although the Use of Force Policy requires officers to consider those factors before using a firearm, it also states that officers must consider those factors only “[w]hen safe under the totality of circumstances and time and circumstances permit[.]” The Use of Force Policy also requires officers to use de-escalation tactics to reduce the need for force only “[w]hen safe and feasible under the totality of circumstances[.]”

In a civil suit filed by 125 Seattle Police Officers challenging the constitutionality of this policy under the **Second Amendment** right to bear arms, arguing that the policy unconstitutionally restricted the officers’ right to use firearms, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal, in *Mahoney v. Sessions* (9th Cir. 2017) 871 F.3rd 873, upheld the trial court’s determination that said policy was constitutional, concluding as follows:

“The City of Seattle has a significant interest in regulating the use of department-issued firearms by its police officers, and the UF (Use of Force) Policy does not impose a substantial burden on the **Second Amendment** right to use a firearm for the core lawful purpose of self-defense. Therefore, we apply intermediate scrutiny to determine whether the UF Policy violates the **Second Amendment** right of its police officers. We conclude that the UF Policy is constitutional under the **Second Amendment** because there is a reasonable fit between the UF Policy and the City of Seattle’s important government interest in ensuring the safety of both the public and its police officers. We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Appellants’ Second Amendment claim.” (pg. 883.)

Use of Deadly Force Upheld:

Where the suspect violently resisted arrest, physically attacked the officer, and grabbed the officer’s gun, the use of deadly force upheld. (*Billington v. Smith* (9th Cir. 2002) 292 F.3rd 1177, 1185.)

Where a suspect, who had been behaving erratically, swung a knife at an officer. (*Reynolds v. County of San Diego* (9th Cir. 1996) 84 F.3rd 1162, 1168.)

Pointing a gun at a police officer. (See *Scott v. Henrick* (9th Cir. 1994) 39 F.3rd 912, 914; *George v. Morris* (9th Cir. 2013) 736 F.3rd 829, 838-839.)

Although “(l)aw enforcement officials may not kill suspects who do not pose an immediate threat to their safety or to the safety of others simply because they are armed” (see *Harris v. Roderick* (9th Cir. 1997) 126 F.3rd 1189, 1204), “(w)hen an individual points his gun ‘in the officers’ direction,’ the Constitution undoubtedly entitles the officer to respond with deadly force.” (*George v. Morris*, *supra*, at p. 838.)

However, the mere fact alone that a person possesses deadly weapons does not justify the use of deadly force. (*Harris v. Roderick*, *supra*, at p. 1202.)

When the suspect attacked an officer with a rock and a stick. (*Garcia v. United States* (9th Cir. 1987) 826 F.2nd 806, 812.)

Defendant, acting in a bizarre manner, reported to have already assaulted someone, and apparently under the influence of drugs, holding a pen with its point facing toward the officers which “may inflict lethal force,” justified three officers holding him down while he was handcuffed. (*Gregory v. County of Maui* (9th Cir. 2008) 523 F.3rd 1103; suspect died of a heart attack while being held down.)

Although “(l)aw enforcement officials may not kill suspects who do not pose an immediate threat to their safety or to the safety of others simply because they are armed” (see *Harris v. Roderick* (9th Cir. 1997) 126 F.3rd 1189, 1204), “(w)hen an individual points his gun ‘in the officers’ direction,’ the Constitution undoubtedly entitles the officer to respond with deadly force.” (*George v. Morris* (9th Cir. 2013) 736 F.3rd 829, 838.)

Officers were held to be entitled to qualified immunity where the officers shot and killed the decedent after he led them on a 45 minute chase following a domestic disturbance, tried to injure himself and provoke the officers into shooting him, threw rocks at the officers, and then finally advanced on the officers with a large rock over his head as if to assault the officers with it as the officers warned him that he would be shot if he didn't desist. The only alternative force then available, pepper spray, would not have alleviated the danger, and there was no reason to believe that the decedent would have acted rationally. Under the totality of the circumstances, the officers feared immediate serious physical harm. A reasonable officer would have believed that the decedent was threatening them with immediate serious harm that shooting him was a reasonable response. (*Lal v. California* (9th Cir. 2014) 746 F.3rd 1112, 1115-1119.)

When the fleeing felon was known to have shot a victim in the course of a burglary from which he was escaping, the use of deadly force to stop him is justified. (*Forrett v. Richardson* (9th Cir. 1997) 112 F.3rd 416, 420.)

A police officer was held *not* to have violated the **Fourth Amendment** when the decedent began reaching for the officer's gun, rushed at the officer, violently grappled with him, and slammed the officer into multiple cars. As a matter of law, decedent's violent, precipitate, and illegal attack on the officer severed any causal connection between the officer's initial actions and his subsequent use of deadly force during the struggle in the street. (*Johnson v. City of Philadelphia* (3rd Cir. 2016) 837 F.3rd 343.)

See also fn. 2: The question of proximate causation in this case is made straightforward by the exceptional circumstances presented--namely, a sudden, unexpected attack that instantly forced the officer into a defensive fight for his life. As discussed above, that rupture in the chain of events, coupled with the extraordinary violence of Newsuan's assault, makes the **Fourth Amendment** reasonableness analysis similarly straightforward. Given the extreme facts of this case, our opinion should not be misread to broadly immunize police officers from **Fourth Amendment** liability

whenever a mentally disturbed person threatens an officer's physical safety. Depending on the severity and immediacy of the threat and any potential risk to public safety posed by an officer's delayed action, it may be appropriate for an officer to retreat or await backup when encountering a mentally disturbed individual. It may also be appropriate for the officer to attempt to de-escalate an encounter to eliminate the need for force or to reduce the amount of force necessary to control an individual. Nor should it be assumed that mentally disturbed persons are so inherently unpredictable that their reactions will always sever the chain of causation between an officer's initial actions and a subsequent use of force. If a plaintiff produces competent evidence that persons who have certain illnesses or who are under the influence of certain substances are likely to respond to particular police actions in a particular way that may be sufficient to create a jury issue on causation. And of course, nothing we say today should discourage police departments and municipalities from devising and rigorously enforcing policies to make tragic events like this one less likely. The facts of this case, however, are extraordinary. Whatever the **Fourth Amendment** requires of officers encountering emotionally or mentally disturbed individuals, it does not oblige an officer to passively endure a life-threatening physical assault, regardless of the assailant's mental state."

Where an officer arrives late at an ongoing police action and witnesses shots being fired by one of several individuals in a house surrounded by other officers, and that officer then shoots and kills an armed occupant of the house without first giving a warning, the officer did not violate clearly established law based on his failure to provide a verbal warning before utilizing deadly force: "No settled **Fourth Amendment** principle requires that officer to second-guess the earlier steps already taken by his or her fellow officers in instances like the one [the officer] confronted here." (*White v. Pauly* (Jan. 9, 2017) ___ U.S. ___ 137 S.Ct. 548; 196 L.Ed.2nd 463].)

However, the Court left open the issue of Officer White's civil liability if plaintiffs can prove that he witnessed deficient performance by other officers upon his arrival and should have realized that corrective action was necessary before he used deadly force in that this theory was not argued in the courts below.

Where officers shot and killed a minor who, while apparently high on drugs and alcohol, grabbed a knife in a threatening manner while within three to eight feet (the testimony varied) of the officers, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity even though a reasonable jury could find that the decedent's **Fourth Amendment** rights had been violated. It was not clearly established as of the date of the incident (i.e., August 24, 2013) that using deadly force in this situation, even viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, would constitute excessive force under the **Fourth Amendment**. (*S.B. v. County of San Diego* (9th Cir. 2017) 864 F.3rd 1010.)

When the decedent charged at officers from inside an apartment bedroom that was supposed to be vacant, wielding two feet of a broken hockey stick by holding it in a manner as if to strike the officers while within several feet of both police officers, and growling like an animal, shooting him in self defense was held to be justified, the officers having qualified immunity from civil liability. (*Woodward v. City of Tucson* (9th Cir. 2017) 870 F.3rd 1154, 1161-1163.)

Deadly Force Unreasonable:

Civil jury verdict of officer liability upheld where the officer shot the victim in the back (paralyzing him) when the victim would not drop a knife he held, and even though the victim had turned away from the officer, holding the knife to his own stomach while threatening to hurt himself. (*Lam v. City of San Jose* (9th Cir. 2017) 869 F.3rd 1077.)

See also *Curnow v. Ridgecrest Police* (9th Cir. 1991) 952 F.2nd 321, 324-325; holding that deadly force was unreasonable where the suspect possessed a gun but was not pointing it at the officers and was not facing the officers when they shot.

And *Ting v. United States* (9th Cir. 1991) 927 F.2nd 1504, 1508-1511; use of deadly force held to be unreasonable when the suspect had already dropped his gun.

Possession of a pocket knife, with which the deceased was threatening to cut his own throat but not brandishing it towards officers, resulting in the officers shooting and killing him after beanbag rounds failed to subdue him, may not have warranted the use of firearms (nor even the beanbag shotgun) and thus subjecting the officers to potential civil liability. (*Glenn v. Washington County* (9th Cir. 2011) 673 F.3rd 864, 870-880.)

As a “*less lethal*” weapon, the lawfulness of the use of a beanbag shotgun is dependent upon a determination that its use was reasonable under the circumstances. In this case, where the out-of-control subject wasn’t threatening anyone but himself, its use was unjustified. (*Id.*, at 878-880.)

Officers were not entitled to qualified immunity for having shot and killed the decedent despite the lack of any evidence by plaintiffs contradicting the officers’ version of the circumstances. Between the five officers involved, there were discrepancies as to whether defendant reached for his waistband with his left or his right hand, and whether he was inside or outside his car when he did so. A jury, therefore, could plausibly find the officers’ civilly liable for the decedent’s death. (*Cruz v. City of Anaheim* (9th Cir. 2014) 765 F.3rd 1076, 1078-1080.)

Pointing and “training” a firearm at a five-week-old infant while conducting a **Fourth** Waiver search is excessive, and a **Fourth Amendment** violation. (*Motley v. Parks* (9th Cir. 2005) 432 F.3rd 1072, 1088-1089.)

Shooting a person who had not yet been accused of any crime, did not appear to be a threat to the public, and could not escape, even though he had been uncooperative and refused to show his hands, held to raise questions of fact for a civil jury to decide whether the officers had used excessive force by shooting and killing him. (*Espinosa v. City and County of San Francisco* (9th Cir. 2010) 598 F.3rd 528. 537-538.)

Where a **42 U.S.C. § 1983** action requires a jury to sift through various disputed factual contentions, including whether officers were telling the truth about when, why, and how one officer shot the decedent, summary judgment was inappropriate. Specifically, the report from the autopsy performed on decedent's body conflicted with the officer's version of the events. A video taken by the sergeant's dashboard camera was inconsistent with the officer's version of the events. And the officer's and sergeant's statements were inconsistent with one another. (*Newmaker v. City of Fortuna* (9th Cir. 2016) 842 F.3rd 1108, 1115-1117.)

The record did not support the federal district court's determination that a member of a university police department who shot plaintiff four times after plaintiff failed to comply with the officer's order to drop a knife she was holding was entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff's civil claim that the officer used excessive force. Although the officer responded to a report that a person was hacking at a tree with a knife, and then saw her approach another person while holding the knife, plaintiff was on her own property and the evidence did not show that she had threatened the other person. The question of whether the officer was entitled to qualified immunity had to be resolved in a trial. The Ninth Circuit reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment rendered in favor of the officer and remanded the case for a trial on the issue of whether the officer's use of deadly force was reasonable under the circumstances. (*Hughes v. Kisela* (9th Cir. 2017) 862 F.3rd 775, 779-785.)

A police officer was held *not* to be entitled to qualified immunity for having shot and killed an unarmed suspect during an attempted investigatory stop. Deadly force was not justified as a matter of law when the reported domestic dispute had ended before the police became involved and information from the victim indicated that defendant was not known to carry weapons. With the decedent walking away from officers, he did not pose an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others. Shooting the decedent without warning as he pulled his hand out of his pocket, as he was ordered to do by the defendant officer, with no indication that he had a weapon (or anything else) in his

hand, violated the **Fourth Amendment**. Deadly force is permissible only if the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe that he had committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm. (*A.K.H. v. City of Tustin* (9th Cir. 2016) 837 F.3rd 1005, 1010-1013.)

An officer observing a thirteen-year-old boy walking down the street carrying what appeared to be an AK-47 rifle, shot and killed the victim after he ignored the officer's command to drop the weapon. The rifle turned out to be a toy with the bright orange tip removed. The officer was not entitled to qualified immunity where the plaintiff's evidence showed that the officer failed to warn the victim that he might get shot, the rifle was pointed towards the ground at all times, and the victim made no aggressive moves toward the officer. (*Estate of Lopez v. Gelhaus* (9th Cir. 2017) 871 F.3rd 998, 1005-1017.)

A sheriff's deputy was not entitled to qualified immunity where he shot a violent knife-wielding suspect 18 times (and then, because he was still moving, stomped him in the head three times), killing him. A jury could determine that the decedent no longer posed an immediate threat before shooting him the last 9 times, and that any deadly force used after that point violated the **Fourth Amendment**. Although it is not necessary that a police officer cease shooting until the threat is over, a jury could reasonably conclude that the deputy in this case could have sufficiently protected himself and others after the decedent had fallen by pointing his gun at him and pulling the trigger only if he attempted to flee or attack. (*Zion v. County of Orange* (9th Cir. 2017) 874 F.3rd 1072, 1075-1076.)

Federal Officers: There is an implied right of action for civil damages against federal officers alleged to have violated a citizen's constitutional rights. (*Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents* (1971) 403 U.S. 388 [91 S.Ct. 1999; 29 L.Ed.2nd 619].)

See, however, *Ziglar v. Abbasi* (June 19, 2017) ___ U.S. ___ [137 S.Ct. 1843, 1848-1849; 198 L.Ed.2nd 290], describing "special factors" that "counsel hesitation," concentrating on whether the judiciary is well suited, absent congressional

action or instruction, to consider and weight the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed.

Where a U.S. Border Patrol agent, in reaction to subjects throwing rocks at him while he attempted to detain a subject who had illegally crossed the international border with Mexico, shot across the border into Mexico, killing a Mexican national standing on the Mexico side, the U.S. Supreme Court (reversing the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal's holding that the agent was entitled to qualified immunity; see *Hernandez v. Mesa* (5th Cir. 2015) 785 F.3rd 117.) remanded the case to reconsider the viability of a civil suit on **Fourth Amendment** (excessive force) grounds in light of the Court's decision in *Ziglar v. Abbasi*, *supra*, which discussed various "special factors" that "counsel hesitation" in allowing a federal civil action per *Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents*, *supra*, against a federal officer for his alleged use of excessive force. (*Hernandez v. Mesa* (June 26, 2017) ___ U.S. ___ [137 S.Ct. 2003; 198 L.Ed.2nd 625].)

The Court also ruled that granting the federal agent qualified immunity from **Fifth Amendment** "due process" liability was inappropriate when the nationality and the extent of the victim's ties to the United States were unknown to the agent at the time of the shooting. "The qualified immunity analysis thus is limited to the facts that were knowable to the defendant officers at the time they engaged in the conduct in question." (*Id.*, at p. ___ [198 L.Ed.2nd at p. 630].)

Rule of Reasonableness:

The reasonableness of the force used by a police officer must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene. Also, the court must allow for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving. The ultimate question is whether an officer's actions are objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him, the force allowed under the circumstances encompassing a range of conduct. The availability of a less intrusive alternative will not, by itself, render an officer's conduct as unreasonable.

(*Wilkinson v. Torres* (9th Cir. 2010) 610 F.3rd 546, 550-554.)

An officer's pre-shooting conduct is properly included in the totality of the circumstances surrounding his use of deadly force. The officer's duty to act reasonably when using deadly force extends to pre-shooting conduct. (*Hayes v. County of San Diego* (9th Cir. 2013) 736 F.3rd 1223, 1231, 1235-1236 (a negligence civil action); officers shot a suicidal person who approached them with a knife in hand.)

The use of deadly force is lawful whenever an officer has a "reasonable belief" that defendant poses a threat of death or serious harm. However, this language does not negate the need for "probable cause" in that the later refers to the quantity of evidence required for such a reasonable belief. (*Price v. Sery* (9th Cir. 2008) 513 F.3rd 962.)

The potential civil liability of an officer who shot a handcuffed prisoner, seated in the backseat of a patrol car with a semiautomatic pistol, killing him, under the mistaken belief that she was using her stun gun, is an issue for a civil jury to decide. The question was whether her conduct in mistakenly applying deadly force was objectively unreasonable under the totality of the circumstances. Instead of finding that the circumstances forced her to make a split-second judgment about firing a weapon, a reasonable jury could conclude that her own poor judgment and lack of preparedness caused her to act with undue haste. (*Torres v. City of Madera* (9th Cir. 2011) 648 F.3rd 1119.)

Punching and Tasing a non-resisting and compliant arrestee who the officer knew was emotionally troubled and physically ill, and continued to do so when the arrestee did no more than flinch from the pain and cry for help, and then asphyxiating him by sitting on his chest, was unreasonable force. The officer also was not entitled to qualified immunity under the circumstances. (*Mendoza v. City of West Covina* (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 702, 714-720.)

Where a police officer shot and killed the decedent at point-blank range when the decedent had begun to drive away with the officer in the car (the officer having entered the car

in a futile attempt to subdue him as he resisted two officers), pre-trial summary judgment in favor of the officer was not warranted where a reasonable jury could have found that the decedent's vehicle was not traveling at a high rate of speed and that the officer did not reasonably perceive an immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury when he shot the decedent in the head. Also, a jury could find that the officer reasonably perceived a threat, but not one that justified the immediate use of deadly force. A jury could also find that a warning was practicable and that the failure to give a warning before shooting the decedent was not reasonable. (*Gonzalez v. City of Anaheim* (9th Cir. 2014) 747 F.3rd 789, 793-797.)

However, the Court also found that summary judgment on a **Fourteenth Amendment** substantive due process claim was warranted because there was no evidence that the officers had any ulterior motives for using force against the decedent unrelated to legitimate law enforcement objectives. (*Id.*, at pp. 797-798.)

Where officers investigating a 911 call about a suspected drug dealer with a shotgun at an apartment complex found a suspect next to or holding a shotgun and an officer shot and killed him, deadly force was not objectively reasonable because none of the officers was able to provide a clear time line of when they switched from ordering the suspect to raise his arms to ordering him to drop the gun, or how long after that switch the suspect had to comply with the new command before the officer opened fire. However, the officer was entitled to qualified immunity as to the **Fourth Amendment** excessive force claim because it was not clearly established in the law that using deadly force in this situation would constitute excessive force. Summary judgment was inappropriate, however, as to the state law claims because the use of deadly force was not objectively reasonable as a matter of law. (*C.V. v. City of Anaheim* (9th Cir. 2016) 823 F.3rd 1252, 1255-1257.)

Use of Deadly Force Against Foreign Nationals, in a Foreign Country:

Where a U.S. Border Patrol agent, in reaction to subjects throwing rocks at him while he attempted to detain a

subject who had illegally crossed the international border with Mexico, shot across the border into Mexico, killing a Mexican national standing on the Mexico side, the U.S. Supreme Court (reversing the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal's holding that the agent was entitled to qualified immunity; see *Hernandez v. Mesa* (5th Cir. 2015) 785 F.3rd 117.) remanded the case to reconsider the viability of a civil suit on **Fourth Amendment** (excessive force) grounds in light of the Court's decision in *Ziglar v. Abbasi* (June 19, 2017) __ U.S. __ [137 S.Ct. 1843; 198 L.Ed.2nd 290], which discussed various "special factors" that "counsel hesitation" in allowing a federal civil action per *Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents* (1971) 403 U.S. 388 [91 S.Ct. 1999; 29 L.Ed.2nd 619] against a federal officer for his alleged use of excessive force. (*Hernandez v. Mesa* (June 26, 2017) __ U.S. __ [137 S.Ct. 2003; 198 L.Ed.2nd 625].)

The Court also ruled that granting the federal agent qualified immunity from **Fifth Amendment** "due process" liability was inappropriate when the nationality and the extent of the victim's ties to the United States were unknown to the agent at the time of the shooting. "The qualified immunity analysis thus is limited to the facts that were knowable to the defendant officers at the time they engaged in the conduct in question." (*Id.*, at p. __ [198 L.Ed.2nd at p. 630].)

See **CALCRIM # 500 et seq.**

High Speed Pursuits:

A high speed pursuit may or may not allow for the use of deadly force, each case depending upon its individual circumstances. (*Brosseau v. Haugen* (2004) 543 U.S. 194 [160 L.Ed.2nd 583]; finding that an officer who shot a suspect who was attempting to flee in his vehicle did not have "fair notice" based upon the conflicting case law as to whether the force she used was excessive. She was therefore entitled to "qualified immunity" from civil liability.)

The issue of whether the **Fourth Amendment** allows for the shooting of a suspect in a high-speed pursuit situation,

where the fleeing suspect does not necessarily pose a sufficient threat of harm to the officer or others, remains an open question, but, whether legal or not, at least allows for a finding that the officer is entitled to qualified immunity. (*Mullenix v. Luna* (Nov. 9, 2015) __ U.S. __ [193 L.Ed.2nd 255; 136 S. Ct. 305] Per the Court: “(E)xcessive force cases involving car chases reveal the hazy legal backdrop against which Mullenix acted.” (*Id.*, at p. __ [193 L.Ed.2nd at p. 260; 136 S. Ct. at p. 309].)

A police officer was held to be entitled to qualified immunity for shooting and killing a reportedly intoxicated fugitive who was fleeing in a vehicle at high speed, twice threatened to kill officers, and was racing towards another officer’s location before the vehicle reached a spike strip placed on the road. “It was not beyond debate that the officer acted unreasonably in the unclear border between excessive and acceptable force.” (*Mullenix v. Luna, supra*, summary; reversing the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal’s affirmance of a Texas federal trial court’s denial of the officer’s motion for summary judgment. Per the Court: “(E)xcessive force cases involving car chases reveal the hazy legal backdrop against which Mullenix acted.” (*Id.*, at p. __ [193 L.Ed.2nd at p. 260; 136 S. Ct. at p. 309].)

Police officers involved in high speed chases are entitled to qualified immunity under **42 U.S.C. § 1983** unless a person who is injured (i.e., the plaintiff in the resulting civil suit) can prove that the officer acted with a deliberate intent to harm. (*Bingue v. Prunchak* (9th Cir. 2008) 512 F.3rd 1169; see also **V.C. § 17004.7**.)

However, a California police agency which fails to “promulgate” and/or provide periodic training in vehicle pursuits is not entitled to qualified immunity when a plaintiff suffers injury as a result of such a pursuit. (*Morgan v. Beaumont Police Dept.* (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 244.)

See **V.C. § 17004.7(b)(1)** “A public agency employing peace officers that adopts and promulgates a written policy on, and provides

regular and periodic training on an annual basis for, vehicular pursuits complying with **subdivisions (c) and (d)** is immune from liability for civil damages for personal injury to or death of any person or damage to property resulting from the collision of a vehicle being operated by an actual or suspected violator of the law who is being, has been, or believes he or she is being or has been, pursued in a motor vehicle by a peace officer employed by the public entity.”

Ending a dangerous high speed vehicle chase with speeds in excess of 85 miles per hour, where the suspect was driving recklessly and forcing other motorists off the road, by bumping the suspect’s car and pushing him off the road severely injuring him, is reasonable force. Also, there is no duty to break off the chase. (*Scott v. Harris* (2007) 550 U.S. 372 [167 L.Ed.2nd 686].)

The Court held in *Scott* that there was no special **Fourth Amendment** standard for unconstitutional deadly force, but all that matters is whether the police officer’s actions were reasonable. (*Id.*, at pp. 381-383; see also *Acosta v. Hill* (9th Cir. 2007) 504 F.3rd 1323.)

A police officer’s use of deadly force is constitutional where an escaping suspect constitutes a threat of serious physical harm to officers or others. (*Wilkinson v. Torres* (9th Cir. 2010) 610 F.3rd 546, 550-554; attempts to flee in a stolen vehicle endangered two officers lying on the ground and/or standing nearby.)

It was further held that the officer’s use of deadly force under these circumstances, where the officer did not act with an “*intent to harm*,” but rather with a “*legitimate law enforcement objective*,” did not deprive plaintiffs of their **Fourteenth Amendment** due process right to “familial association” with the deceased. (*Id.*, at pp. 554-555.)

The United States Supreme Court held that using deadly force (firing 15 shoots at the driver and his passenger) to stop a dangerous high-speed chase is appropriate where the driver’s flight posed a grave public safety risk and never

abandoned his attempt to flee. (*Plumhoff v. Rickard* (May 27, 2014) 572 U.S. ___ [134 S. Ct. 2012; 188 L. Ed.2nd 1056, 1066-1068].)

And even if not, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity in that as of the date of the shooting, the law was not clearly settled. (*Id.*, 188 L.Ed.2nd at pp. 1069-1070.)

Other federal circuits have approved the use of deadly force to halt a dangerous high-speed vehicular police pursuit, although under circumstances which, arguably, were more aggravated than in *Haugen*. See:

Scott v. Clay County (6th Cir. 2000) 205 F.3rd 867, 877: Shooting a fleeing felon whose reckless driving posed an immediate threat to the safety of officers and innocent civilians.

Smith v. Freland (6th Cir. 1992) 954 F.2nd 343, 347-348: Shooting a fleeing *misdemeanant* who posed a danger to officers at a police roadblock when it appeared likely he would “do almost anything to avoid capture.”

Cole v. Bone (8th Cir. 1993) 993 F.2nd 1328, 1330-1333: Shooting a defendant fleeing in a truck when he posed a threat to travelers on a crowded highway.

Pace v. Capobriano (11th Cir. 2002) 283 F.3rd 1275, 1281: Shooting a fleeing felon in a vehicle when it appeared likely he would continue to use his car aggressively during a police pursuit.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal, however, has not been so forgiving:

Deadly force may *not* be justified in a “nonchalant,” or “rapid Sunday drive” speed pursuit where the driver was rammed twice (under circumstances that were contrary to CHP policy) and then shot six times without a prior warning and without a showing that the officer, or any other officer, was in

immediate danger. (*Adams v. Speers* (9th Cir. 2007) 473 F.3rd 989.)

A police officer violates the **Fourteenth Amendment** due process clause if he kills a suspect when acting with the purpose to harm, unrelated to a legitimate law enforcement objective. An officer was properly found to be civilly liable after shooting and killing the decedent (plaintiffs' mother) at the end of a high speed chase, but where the decedent was blocked in without a means of escape, and where no weapons were observed. (*A. D. v. State of California Highway Patrol* (9th Cir. 2013) 712 F.3rd 446, 452-454, 456-460.)

The officer was also held not to be entitled to qualified immunity. (*Id.*, at pp. 454-455.)

Following a 70-minute high speed pursuit, during which time no weapons were observed in the decedent's possession (dispite an earlier report that he was armed), shooting the decedent in the back and killing him after he was out of the vehicle and had his empty hands raised as if giving up (which the defendant-officer believed to be a "shooting stance"), the officer was *not* entitled to qualified immunity in the decedent's estate's **Fourth Amendment** excessive force **42 U.S.C 1983** lawsuit. (*Longoria v. Pinal County* (9th Cir. 2017) 873 F.3rd 699, 705-711; noting that only the decedent's estate, and not his relatives, had a valid **Fourth Amendment** claim; pg. 711.)

But see *Wilkinson v. Torres* (9th Cir. 2010) 610 F.3rd 546, 550-554, above.

Outrageous Government Misconduct:

Rule: "A prosecution results from outrageous government conduct when the actions of law enforcement officers or informants are 'so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction.' *United States v. Russell*, 411 U.S. 423 431-32, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 36 L.Ed.2nd 366 (1973). A federal court must dismiss a prosecution based on such actions. The standard for dismissal on this ground is 'extremely high.' *United States v. Smith*, 924 F.2nd 899, 897 (9th Cir 1991).

Dismissals are ‘limited to extreme cases in which the government’s conduct violates fundamental fairness.’ *United States v. Gurolla*, 333 F.3rd 944, 950 (9th Cir. 2003). An indictment can be dismissed only where the government’s conduct is ‘so grossly shocking and so outrageous as to violate the universal sense of justice.’ *United States v. Stinson*, 647 F.3rd 1196, 1209 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting *United States v. Restrepo*, 930 F.2nd 705, 712 (9th Cir 1991)).” (*United States v. Pedrin* (9th Cir. 2015) 797 F.3rd 792, 795-796.)

In *Pedrin*, *supra*, it was held that there was no due process violation where defendant was the target of a “reverse sting operation” pursuant to which an undercover ATF agent suggested that defendant and others rob a drug “stash house” (i.e, a house in which drugs are “stashed.”) Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 40 to 50 kilograms of cocaine under **21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846**. Defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment was properly denied because the prosecution did not result from “outrageous government conduct” since one of the co-conspirators reached out to the government, defendant readily agreed to participate in the supposed stash-house robbery, and defendant supplied plans and materials. This all provided a sufficient basis for the Government to infer that defendant had a predisposition to take part in the planned robbery.

The *Pedrin* Court cites a number of other cases involving the same ATF sting operation: *United States v. Cortes* (9th Cir. 2014) 757 F.3rd 850; *United States v. Black* (9th Cir. 2013) 733 F.3rd 294; *United States v. Docampo* (11th Cir. 2009) 573 F.3rd 1091; *United States v. Paisley* (11th Cir. 2006) 178 F.App’x 995; *United States v. Kindle* (7th Cir. 2012) 698 F.3rd 401; *United States v. Mayfield* (7th Cir. 2014) 771 F.3rd 417.

Factors: The courts have identified six factors to consider when determining whether the government has engaged in outrageous government misconduct in conducting a reverse sting operation:

- (1) Known criminal characteristics of the defendants;
- (2) Individualized suspicion of the defendants;
- (3) The government’s role in creating the crime of conviction;
- (4) The government’s encouragement of the defendants to commit the offense conduct;
- (5) The nature of the government’s participation in the offense conduct; *and*

(6) The nature of the crime being pursued and necessity for the actions taken in light of the nature of the criminal enterprise at issue.

(United States v. Pedrin, supra, at p. 796, citing United States v. Black, supra, at p. 303; and noting that “(w)hat the government learns only after the fact cannot supply the individualized suspicion that is necessary to justify the sting if the government had little or no basis for such individualized suspicion when it was setting up the sting.” (Pedrin, at p. 797.)

Civil Liability Protections:

California Statutory Protection from Civil Liability: There shall be *no* civil liability on the part of, and no cause of action shall arise against, any peace officer acting within the scope of his or her authority, for false arrest or false imprisonment arising out of any arrest when:

- **P.C. § 836(a), (b):** Such arrest was lawful or when the officer, at the time of the arrest, had *reasonable* or *probable cause* to believe the arrest was lawful.
- **P.C. § 838:** A magistrate orally ordered the officer to arrest a person who was committing a public offense in the magistrate’s presence.
- **P.C. § 839:** An officer was responding to an oral request for assistance in making an arrest.
- **Gov’t. Code § 815(a):** Public entities are immune from civil liability except as provided by statute.
- **Gov’t. Code § 815.1(b):** Public entities are immune where their employees are immune, except as otherwise provided by statute.
- **Gov’t. Code § 815.2(a):** Public entities are vicariously liable for the torts of their employees.
- **Gov’t. Code § 820(a):** Public employees are liable for their torts except as otherwise provided by statute.
- **Gov’t. Code § 820.2:** “Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public employee is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be abused.”

See *Conway v. County of Tuolumne* (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1005, 1013-1021: Under the circumstances of this case, the defendant county of Tuolumne was held to be immune from civil liability for the discretionary (as opposed to ministerial) conduct of its officers. Once officers decided to arrest plaintiff's son, they were vested with the discretion in determining the best way to accomplish that goal, using personal deliberation, decision, and professional judgment. This discretion included the possible use of tear gas as a way to determine whether plaintiff's son was in plaintiff's mobile home. Given the potential impact of liability on such decisions, **Gov't. Code § 820.2** provided immunity for the officers' actions. (see also *Caldwell v. Montoya* (1995) 10 Cal.4th 972, 980.)

Federal Civil 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Civil Liability and Qualified Immunity:

In a civil (**42 U.S.C. § 1983**) suit for the use of excessive, deadly force, where the defendant/officer moves for summary judgment, the trial court must look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff/non-moving party with respect to the central facts of the case. In this case, where the defendant/officer shot the plaintiff in the chest, the Fifth Circuit failed to acknowledge and credit plaintiff's evidence with regard to the lighting, his mother's demeanor, whether he shouted words that were an overt threat, and his positioning during the shoot. The case was remanded for a consideration of these facts. (*Tolan v. Cotton* (May 5, 2014) ___ U.S. ___ [134 S.Ct. 1861; 188 L.Ed.2nd 895].)

“Public officials are immune from suit under **42 U. S. C. §1983** unless they have ‘violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.’ (*Plumhoff v. Rickard* (May 27, 2014) 572 U.S. ___, at ___ [134 S.Ct. 2012; 188 L.Ed.2nd 1056, 1069].) An officer ‘cannot be said to have violated a clearly established right unless the right’s contours were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in [his] shoes would have understood that he was violating it,’ (*Ibid.*), meaning that ‘existing precedent . . . placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.’ (*Ashcroft v. al-Kidd* (May 31, 2011) 563 U.S. 731, 741 [179 L.Ed.2nd 1149, 1159].). This exacting standard ‘gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments’ by ‘protect[ing] all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’ (*Id.*, at 743 [131 S.Ct. 2074; 179 L.Ed.2nd 1149, 1160].)” (*City & County of San Francisco v. Sheehan* (May 18, 2015) ___ U.S. ___, ___ [135 S.Ct. 1765, 1775-1776; 191 L.Ed.2nd 856].)

The U.S. Supreme Court severely criticized the Ninth Circuit Court of appeal for using the general rationale of prior decisions in holding that officers should have been aware of any particular rule. “We have repeatedly told courts—and the Ninth Circuit in particular—not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality.” (*City & County of San Francisco v. Sheehan*, *supra* at p. ___ [135 S.Ct. at pp.1775-1776; quoting and citing *Ashcroft v. al-Kidd* (May 31, 2011) 563 U.S. 731, 742 [179 L.Ed.2nd 1149, 1159]; and *Lopez v. Smith* (2014) 574 U.S. ___, ___ [135 S.Ct. 1; 190 L.Ed.2nd 1, 5].)

It was also noted in *Sheehan* that the fact that officers may violate or ignore their training and written policies in forcing entry and using force does not itself negate qualified immunity where it would otherwise be warranted. (*City & County of San Francisco v. Sheehan*, *supra*, at p. ___ [135 S.Ct. at p. 1777].)

See also *Messerschmidt et al. v. Millender* (2012) 565 U.S. 535, 546-556 [132 S.Ct. 1235; 182 L.Ed.2nd 47]; *Carroll v. Carman* (Nov. 10, 2014) 574 U.S. ___, ___ [135 S.Ct. 348, 350; 190 L.Ed.2nd 311]; and *Guillory v. Hill* (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 240, 250-252.)

Chapter 5:

Searches and Seizures:

Things Subject to Search and Seizure:

- *Evidence of a crime.*
- *Contraband.*
- *Instrumentalities of a crime.*
- *Fruits of a crime.*

(*People v. Thayer* (1965) 63 Cal.2nd 635; *Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden* (1967) 387 U.S. 294 [18 L.Ed.2nd 782]; *Guidi v. Superior Court* (1973) 10 Cal.3rd 1.)

See Black's Law Dict. (9th ed. 2009) p. 365, defining “*contraband*” as “[g]oods that are unlawful to import, export, produce, or possess.”

See also 3 Oxford English Dict. (2d ed. 1989) p. 833: “*Contraband*” is “[a]nything prohibited to be imported or exported; goods imported or exported contrary to law or proclamation” or something “[f]orbidden, illegitimate, unauthorized.”

Note: Not mentioned above, “*persons*” are also subject to “seizure,” under the **Fourth Amendment**, when they are detained or arrested. (*Florida v. Bostick* (1991) 501 U.S. 429, 434 [115 L.Ed.2nd 389, 398].)

Right to Privacy:

“**Article I, section 1** of the **California Constitution** guarantees certain inalienable rights. ‘Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.’ (**Cal. Const., art. I, § 1.**) The electorate added this protection for ‘privacy’ to the **California Constitution** by a ballot initiative (the **Privacy Initiative**) in 1972. The **Privacy Initiative** addressed the ‘accelerating encroachment on personal freedom and security caused by increased surveillance and data collection activity in contemporary society.’ (*White v. Davis* (1975) 13 Cal.3rd 757, 774) The principal ‘mischiefs’ that the **Privacy Initiative** addressed were: (1) “government snooping” and the secret gathering of personal information; (2) the overbroad collection and retention of unnecessary personal information by government and business interests; (3) the improper use of information properly obtained for a specific purpose, for example, the use of it for another purpose or the disclosure of it to some

third party; and (4) the lack of a reasonable check on the accuracy of existing records.” (*Id.*, a p. 775.)” (*Lewis v. Superior Court [Medical Board of California]* (2017) 3 Cal.5th 561, 569-578; upholding the state medical board’s accessing of patients’ medical records in an investigation of a doctor accused of illegally prescribing controlled medications.)

Searches and Seizures:

Search: A search occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed upon. (*Lavan v. City of Los Angeles* (9th Cir. 2012) 693 F.3rd 1022, 1027.)

Trespassory Searches: The **Fourth Amendment** protects against *trespassory searches*, but only with regard to those items (“*persons, houses, papers, and effects*”) that it enumerates. (*United States v. Jones* (2012) 565 U.S. 400, 404-413 [132 S.Ct. 945, 949-954; 181 L.Ed.2nd 911]; holding that placing a tracking device on a suspect’s vehicle (i.e., the vehicle coming within the category of “*effects*”) and then monitoring its movement is legally a “*search*.”)

Satellite-Based Monitor (SBM): Requiring a recidivist sex offender to wear a *satellite-based monitor*, or “*SBM*,” for the rest of his life, done for the purpose of tracking the individual’s movements and to “obtain information,” constitutes a “search” under the **Fourth Amendment**, and under the theory of *United States v. Jones*, *supra*. The fact that North Carolina’s SBM program is civil in nature does make it any less of a **Fourth Amendment** search issue. (*Grady v. North Carolina* (Mar. 30, 2015) __ U.S. __ [135 S.Ct. 1368; 191 L.Ed.2nd 459]; case remanded for the purpose of determining the reasonableness of the search under the circumstances.)

Taking a DNA sample via a “buccal swab” of the mouth is a search under the **Fourth Amendment**. (*Friedman v. Boucher* (9th Cir. 2009) 580 F.3rd 847, 852-853; *Bill v. Brewer* (9th Cir. 2015) 799 F.3rd 1295, 1299.)

The extraction of blood or other materials from a person’s body for purposes of chemical testing is a search and seizure under the **Fourth Amendment**. (*People v. Mason* (2016) 8 Cal.App.5th Supp. 11, 19; citing *People v. Robinson* (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1104, 1119; and *Schmerber v. California* (1996) 384 U.S. 757, 770 [16 L.Ed.2nd 908; 86 S.Ct. 1826].)

Key in a Lock: Whether or not police using a key in a lock, where the lock is otherwise exposed to public view (e.g., the front door to a suspect's house), is a search has been the subject of a difference of opinion. (See *People v. Robinson* (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 232, 242-255; discussing the conflicting cases, but noting that it need not be decided in this case because even if it was a search, the search was not unreasonable because when balanced with the governmental interest it served, the intrusion was minimal.

Inserting and turning a key in a lock held to be a search:

United States v. Concepcion (7th Cir. 1991) 942 F.2nd 1170, 1172.: Concluding that testing a key in an apartment door lock was a search. “A keyhole contains *information*—information about who has access to the space beyond. As the **[F]ourth [A]mendment** protects private information rather than formal definitions of property, [citations], the lock is a potentially protected zone. And as the tumbler of a lock is not accessible to strangers . . . , the use of an instrument to examine its workings (that is, a key) looks a lot like a search. . . . [¶] Because the agents obtain information from the inside of the lock, which is both used frequently by the owner and not open to public view, it seems irresistible that inserting and turning the key is a ‘search.’”

However, the Court held that the **Fourth Amendment** was not violated in that the insertion of the key into the door lock was such a “*minimal intrusion*.” (*Id.*, at p. 1173.) (See “*Minimal Intrusion Exception*,” below.)

Portillo-Reyes (9th Cir. 1975) 529 F.2d 844, 848: Putting a key into the door lock of a Volkswagen automobile held to be “the beginning of the search” and thus the “reasonable expectancy of privacy” doctrine of *Katz v. United States* (1967) 389 U.S. 347 [19 L.Ed.2nd 576] applies.

Inserting and turning a key in a lock held *not* to be a search:

United States v. Salgado (6th Cir. 2001) 250 F.3rd 438, 456: “(T)he mere insertion of a key into a(n apartment door) lock, by an officer who lawfully possesses the key and is in a location where he has a right to be, to determine whether the key operates the lock, is not a search.”

United States v. Hawkins (1st Cir. 1998) 139 F.3rd 29, 33, fn. 1: “(I)nsertion of a key into the lock of a storage compartment for the purpose of identifying ownership does not constitute a search.”

United States v. Lyons (1st Cir. 1990) 898 F.2nd 210, 212-213: Iinsertion of key into padlock of storage unit for purpose of identifying ownership did not infringe on any reasonable expectation of privacy.

United States v. DeBardleben (6th Cir. 1948) 740 F.2nd 440, 444: The defendant had no “reasonable expectation of privacy in the identity of his vehicle.” A set of car keys lawfully found in defendant’s possession after his arrest were found to fit the door and trunk locks of a car found in a parking lot and suspected to belong to defendant.

Mathis v. State (Alaska 1989) 778 P.2nd 1161, 1165: “Insertion of the key did not constitute a search of the locker, but merely an identification of it as belonging to the [defendants].”

People v. Carroll (1973) 12 Ill.App.3rd 869, 875-876: Insertion and turning of a key in the front door of defendant’s apartment held not to be a search.

It is possible that the recent United States Supreme Court case of *United States v. Jones* (2012) 565 U.S. 400 [132 S.Ct. 945; 181 L.Ed.2nd 911].), reemphasizing the Common Law theory that a trespassory intrusion, where the government physically intrudes into a constitutionally protected area, is a search, and subject to the restrictions of the **Fourth Amendment**, arguably tips the scale towards finding that any use of a key in a lock belonging to a defendant to be a search. (See *People v. Robinson* (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 232, 243, fn. 11, & 244.)

Note: Jones did not say this, but may likely be used by attorneys for this argument.

However, in a post-*Jones* case, the Eight Circuit Court of Appeal concluded that a police detective *did not* commit a trespass when he located a suspect's car in a parking lot by using the suspect's key fob to trigger the car's alarm. The court reasoned that the detective had lawfully seized the key fob and the "mere transmission of electric signals alone" through the key fob was not a trespass on the car. (*United States v. Cowan* (8th Cir. 2012) 674 F.3rd 947, 956.)

Seizure: A seizure of property occurs when there is some meaningful governmental interference with an individual's possessory interest in that property. (*United States v. Jefferson* (9th Cir. 2009) 566 F.3rd 928, 933, citing *United States v. Jacobson* (1984) 466 U.S. 109, 113 [80 L.Ed.2nd 85]; *United States v. Karo* (1984) 468 U.S. 705, 713 [82 L.Ed.2nd 530]; *Lavan v. City of Los Angeles* (9th Cir. 2012) 693 F.3rd 1022, 1027-1031; *Brewster v. Beck* (9th Cir. 2017) 859 F.3rd 1194, 1196.)

The **Fourth Amendment** protects possessory and liberty interests even when privacy rights, involving an assessment of one's expectation of privacy, are not implicated. (*Lavan v. City of Los Angeles*, *supra*, at p. 1028; citing *Soldal v. Cook County* (1992) 506 U.S. 56, 63-64 [121 L.Ed.2nd 450].)

Also, "[A] seizure lawful at its inception can nevertheless violate the **Fourth Amendment** because its manner of execution unreasonably infringes possessory interests protected by the **Fourth Amendment's** prohibition on 'unreasonable seizures.'" (*Lavan v. City of Los Angeles*, *supra*, at p. 1030; *United States v. Jacobsen* (1984) 466 U.S. 109, 124 [104 S.Ct.1652; 80 L.Ed.2nd 85, & fn. 25; citing *United States v. Place* (1983) 462 U.S. 696, 707-710 [103 S.Ct. 2673; 77 L.Ed.2nd 110]; *United States v. Dass* (9th Cir. 1988) 849 F.2nd 414, 414-415; *Brewster v. Beck* (9th Cir. 2017) 859 F.3rd 1194, 1196.)

Seizures also may also constitute a **Fourteenth Amendment** "*due process*" violation, at least when there is a "significant taking of property by the State." (*Fuentes v. Shevin* (1972) 407 U.S. 67, 86 [32 L.Ed.2nd 556]; *Lavan v. City of Los Angeles*, *supra*, at p. 1031-1033.) To find a due process violation, a court must determine:

(1) Whether the asserted individual interests are encompassed within the **Fourteenth Amendment's** protection of “life, liberty or property.” and is so;

(2) What procedures constitute “due process of law.”

(Lavan v. City of Los Angeles, supra, at p. 1031.)

Note: Not mentioned above, “persons” are also subject to “seizure,” under the **Fourth Amendment**, when they are detained or arrested. (*Florida v. Bostick* (1991) 501 U.S. 429, 434 [115 L.Ed.2nd 389, 398]; *District of Columbia v. Wesby et al.* (Jan. 22, 2018) ___ U.S. ___ [138 S.Ct. 577; 199 L.Ed.2nd 453].)

However, no such “seizure” occurs until the person is actually taken into physical custody. Officers shooting at a fleeing vehicle does not constitute a “seizure.” (*Farrell v. Montoya* (10th Cir. N.M. 2017) 878 F.3rd 933; rejecting the argument of an “on-going seizure,” where plaintiff had stopped several times, but then fled again at which point officers shot at her fleeing vehicle.)

Search vs. Seizure: A warrantless *seizure* of a container of contraband does not necessarily also allow for a warrantless *search* of that container. (*Robey v. Superior Court* (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1218, 1223-1243.)

The standards applicable to these two concepts are very similar, if not the same. As the U.S. Supreme Court has noted: “Although the interest protected by the **Fourth Amendment** injunction against unreasonable searches is quite different from that protected by its injunction against unreasonable seizures [citation], neither the one nor the other is of inferior worth or necessarily requires only lesser protection. We have not elsewhere drawn a categorical distinction between the two insofar as concerns the degree of justification needed to establish the reasonableness of police action, and we see no reason for a distinction in the particular circumstances before us here.” (*Arizona v. Hicks* (1987) 480 U.S. 321, 328 [94 L.Ed.2nd 347].)

General Rule: In order for a search to be lawful, a *search warrant*, supported by *probable cause*, must first be obtained. (**Fourth Amendment, United States Constitution; Art 1, § 13, California Constitution; (Riley v. California** (June 25, 2014) 573 U.S. ___, ___ [134 S.Ct. 2473, 2482; 189 L.Ed.2nd 430].)

Search Warrant: “(A)n order in writing, in the name of the people, signed by a magistrate, directed to a peace officer, commanding him or her to search for a person or persons, a thing or things, or personal property, and bring it before the magistrate.” (P.C. § 1523)

Probable Cause: Roughly the same standards apply whether the issue is an arrest or a search. (*Skelton v. Superior Court* (1969) 1 Cal.3rd 144, 150.)

See “Arrests” (Chapter 4), above, and “Searches With a Search Warrant” (Chapter 6), below.

Legal Presumptions:

Searches and seizures are presumed, as a general rule, to be *unreasonable* in the absence of sufficient “*individualized suspicion*” of wrongdoing to support a finding of “*probable cause*.” (*Chandler v. Miller* (1997) 520 U.S. 305, 308 [137 L.Ed.2nd 513, 519].)

And then, even with probable cause, searches without a *search warrant* are presumed to be *unlawful*, absent one of the narrowly construed exceptions to the search warrant exception. (*Mincey v. Arizona* (1978) 437 U.S. 385, 390 [57 L.Ed.2nd 290, 298-299]; *In re Tyrell J.* (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68, 76; reversed on other grounds.)

The *prosecution* bears the burden of justifying a warrantless search, requiring proof of a recognized exception to the search warrant requirement in addition (usually) to having probable cause. (*Welsh v. Wisconsin* (1984) 466 U.S. 740, 749-750 [80 L.Ed.2nd 732, 742-743]; *People v. James* (1977) 19 Cal.3rd 99, 106; *People v. Redd* (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 719; *People v. Simon* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 120.)

Remedy for Violations; The “Exclusionary Rule:” Warrantless searches, performed without probable cause and without an exception to the warrant requirement (or even when a warrant is used, but where the warrant is later determined to be legally defective), subjects any recovered evidence to *exclusion from being used as evidence* in court. (*Weeks v. United States* (1914) 232 U.S. 383 [58 L.Ed. 652].)

The Fourth Amendment Applicable to the States: Although the **Fourth Amendment** was originally intended to restrict the actions of the federal government only, the same exclusionary rule, as a violation of the **Fourteenth Amendment** “*due process*” clause, is applicable to the states (which includes counties and municipalities) as well. (*Mapp v. Ohio*

(1961) 367 U.S. 643 [6 L.Ed.2nd 1081; *People v. Parrott* (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 485, 492.)

Reasoning: Violating one’s **Fourth Amendment** rights is such a fundamental, important, issue that to do so is automatically a violation of the **Fourteenth Amendment** due process rights of the person subjected to the illegal search or seizure. (*Mapp v. Ohio, supra.*)

See “*Exclusionary Rule*,” under “*The Fourth Amendment, United States Constitution*” (Chapter 1), above.

Motion to Suppress; P.C. § 1538.5: California tests the constitutionality of a search or seizure (i.e., **Fourth Amendment** issues) via the procedures as spelled out in **P.C. § 1538.5**.

“**Section 1538.5** affords criminal defendants a procedure by which they may seek suppression of illegally seized evidence. (**§ 1538.5, subs. (a)(1), (d), (f)(1), (i), (m).**) Our high court has said that **section 1538.5** ‘provides a comprehensive and exclusive procedure for the final determination of search and seizure issues prior to trial.’” (*People v. Romeo* (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 931, 940, quoting *People v. Brooks* (1980) 26 Cal.3rd 471, 475.)

Subd. (b): When consistent with the procedures set forth in this section and subject to the provisions of **Sections 170 to 170.6**, inclusive, of the **Code of Civil Procedure**, the motion should first be heard by the magistrate who issued the search warrant if there is a warrant.

“A defendant may file a motion to suppress at the preliminary hearing based on the evidence introduced at that hearing. (**Pen. Code, § 1538.5, subd. (f)(1).**) If the magistrate denies the motion, the defendant may either renew the motion before the trial court or file a motion to dismiss under **Penal Code section 995** raising the suppression issue. (*People v. Superior Court (Cooper)* 114 Cal.App.4th 713, 717 . . . ; see **Pen. Code, § 1538.5, subs. (i) & (m).**) When the defendant files a renewed motion to suppress, the trial court independently reviews the magistrate’s legal conclusion and evaluates any new evidence presented, and we review the court’s determination. (*Cooper*, at p. 717.) In contrast, when the defendant raises the suppression issue in a **Penal Code section 995** motion, the trial court reviews the magistrate’s determination for substantial evidence, and we review the magistrate’s

determination, not the court's. (*Cooper*, at p. 717.)” (*People v. Turner* (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 397, 404.)

P.C. § 1510: The denial of a motion made pursuant to **Section 995** or **1538.5** may be reviewed prior to trial only if the motion was made by the defendant in the trial court not later than 45 days following defendant's arraignment on the complaint if a misdemeanor, or 60 days following defendant's arraignment on the information or indictment if a felony, unless within these time limits the defendant was unaware of the issue or had no opportunity to raise the issue.

By not challenging this procedural error, the failure to file a timely motion to suppress is waived by the People. (*People v. Harris* (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 671, 677, fn. 1; *People v. Ling* (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1, 5, fn. 1.)

“In ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court is charged with

- (1) finding the historical facts;
- (2) selecting the applicable rule of law; *and*
- (3) applying the former to determine whether or not the rule of law as applied to the established facts has been violated.”

(*People v. Parson* (2008) 44 Cal.4th 332, 345; citing *People v. Ayala* (2000) 24 Cal.4th 243, 279; *People v. Turner, supra.*)

The appellate court then “review(s) the trial court's resolution of the first inquiry (above), which involves questions of fact, under the deferential substantial-evidence standard, but subject(s) the second and third inquires to independent review.” (*People v. Parson, supra*, citing *People v. Ayala, supra.*, and *People v. Weaver* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 76, 924.)

“This requires that the ‘defendant[] must do more than merely assert that the search or seizure was without a warrant. The search or seizure must also be unreasonable; that is, it must not fall within any exception to the warrant requirement.’ (Citation) A three-step allocation of the burden of producing evidence governs, with the ultimate burden of persuasion always remaining on the People. ‘[W]hen defendants move to suppress evidence, they must set forth the factual and legal bases for the motion, but they satisfy that obligation, at least in the first instance, by making a prima facie

showing that the police acted without a warrant. The prosecution then has the burden of proving some justification for the warrantless search or seizure, after which, defendants can respond by pointing out any inadequacies in that justification.’ (Citation) The prosecution retains the ultimate burden of ‘proving that the warrantless search or seizure was reasonable under the circumstances.’ (Citation)” (*People v. Romeo* (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 931, 940-941; quoting *People v. Williams* (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 129-130.)

“If the magistrate (at the preliminary examination) denies the motion and holds the defendant to answer, the defendant must, as a prerequisite to appellate review, renew his challenge before the trial court by motion to dismiss under (P.C.) section 995 or in a special hearing. (Citation; P.C. § 1538.5, subds. (i), (m)) At that stage, the evidence is generally limited to the transcript of the preliminary hearing, testimony by witnesses who testified at the preliminary hearing (who may be recalled by the prosecution), and evidence that could not reasonably have been presented at the preliminary hearing. (§ 1538.5, subd. (i).) The factual findings of the magistrate are binding on the court, except as affected by any additional evidence presented at the special hearing.” (*People v. Romeo, supra*, at p. 941; citing *People v. Lilienthal* (1978) 22 Cal.3rd 891, 896.)

“The appellate court (then) views the record in the light most favorable to the ruling and defers to the trial court's factual findings, express or implied, when supported by substantial evidence. But in determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the appellate court exercises its independent judgment. [Citations.] Appellate review is confined to the correctness or incorrectness of the trial court's ruling, not the reasons for its ruling. [Citation.]” (*People v. Mason* (2016) 8 Cal.App.5th Supp. 11, 19; citing *People v. Superior Court (Chapman)* (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1011; *People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler* (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 364-365.)

The Juvenile Court equivalent of a motion to suppress is contained in **Wel. & Inst. Code § 700.1**:

Any motion to suppress as evidence any tangible or intangible thing obtained as a result of an unlawful search or seizure shall be heard prior to the attachment of jeopardy and shall be heard at least five judicial days after receipt of

notice by the people unless the people are willing to waive a portion of this time.

If the court grants a motion to suppress prior to the attachment of jeopardy over the objection of the people, the court shall enter a judgment of dismissal as to all counts of the petition except those counts on which the prosecuting attorney elects to proceed pursuant to **Section 701**.

If, prior to the attachment of jeopardy, opportunity for this motion did not exist or the person alleged to come within the provisions of the juvenile court law was not aware of the grounds for the motion, that person shall have the right to make this motion during the course of the proceeding under **Section 701**.

Fruit of the Poisonous Tree: The evidence that is suppressed is extended to the “*indirect*” as well as the “*direct products*” of the constitutional violation; i.e., the “*fruit of the poisonous tree*.” (*Wong Sun v. United States* (1963) 371 U.S. 471, 484 [9 L.Ed.2nd 441].) (See “*Fruit of the Poisonous Tree*,” under “*The Fourth Amendment, United States Constitution*” (Chapter 1), above.)

Rule: “Evidence obtained by such illegal action of the police is ‘*fruit of the poisonous tree*,’ warranting application of the exclusionary rule if, ‘granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of the illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.’” (Emphasis added; *United States v. Crawford* (9th Cir. 2004) 372 F.3rd 1048, 1054, quoting *Brown v. Illinois* (1975) 422 U.S. 590, at p. 599 [45 L.Ed.2nd 416].)

Not all courts are in agreement that such a remedy is reserved exclusively for constitutional violations. (See discussion in *United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga* (9th Cir. 2000) 206 F.3rd 882, 886-887, and in the dissenting opinion, p. 893.)

Examples:

Observations made after an unlawful, warrantless entry into a structure cannot be used to establish probable cause for later obtaining a search warrant. (*Murray v. United States*

(1988) 487 U.S. 533, 540 [101 L.Ed.2nd 472, 482];
Burrows v. Superior Court (1974) 13 Cal.3rd 238, 251.)

A consent to search given “immediately following an illegal entry or search” is invalid because it “is inseparable from the unlawful conduct.” (***People v. Roberts*** (1956) 47 Cal.2nd 374, 377.)

Officers suspected that illegal activity was taking place at a small airstrip near Tucson, Arizona. After receiving a tip, officers stopped a truck leaving the airstrip and searched it without a warrant. The government conceded that this stop was illegal. As a result of the stop, however, the officers learned the identity of the driver and passenger, and began to surveil them, which led to the discovery and seizure of marijuana. The Court held that the marijuana evidence must be suppressed because the illegally obtained identification significantly directed the investigation which led to the marijuana. Id. at 245. (***United States v. Johns*** (9th Cir. 1989) 891 F.2nd 243, 245.)

Note: This case is of questionable continuing validity in that it has subsequently been held that *evidence of identity*, as with defendant’s person itself, is not subject to suppression, “regardless of the nature of the violation leading to his identity.” (***United States v. Gudino*** (9th Cir. 2004) 376 F.3rd 997; see also ***Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza*** (1984) 468 U.S. 1032, 1039-1040 [82 L.Ed.2nd 778].)

A consent to enter a residence, obtained immediately after a co-resident’s arrest on the front porch and a contemporaneous illegal protective sweep of the residence, held to be invalid as the fruit of the illegal protective sweep. Plain sight observations made inside the residence during the allegedly consensual entry were held to be illegal. (***People v. Werner*** (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1210-1212.)

Where defendant is arrested at some point following an arguably illegal search, and he discards an illegal firearm during that arrest, the fact that defendant attempted to walk away from the officers after the initial illegal search but before discarding the illegal firearm, such fleeing was held

to be an intervening factor that dissipates the taint of the illegal search. (*United States v. McClendon* (9th Cir. 2013) 713 F.3rd 1211, 1217-1218.)

Where defendant was unlawfully arrested, evidence recovered from his person, incriminating statements, and the products of a search warrant that used all the above as part of its probable cause, were subject to being suppressed. (*United States v. Nora* (9th Cir. 2014) 765 F.3rd 1049, 1052-1060.)

In *People v. McCurdy* (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1063, at pp. 1092-1093, the Court ruled that nothing in the record suggested that any assumed illegality concerning defendant's arrest, which resulted in defendant's picture in the news media, influenced a witness's willingness to identify defendant as the man he saw with an 8-year-old abduction and murder victim outside a grocery store on the day she disappeared. Law enforcement did not generate the publicity over this case. And the witness came forward on his own, testifying voluntarily. As such, this testimony was too attenuated from any perceived illegality in defendant's arrest and was not subject to suppression.

In an asset forfeiture proceeding dealing with \$167,070 seized from defendant's motorhome, it was held that the search of defendant's vehicle following the second half of a "coordinated traffic stop" (i.e., a first stop which itself lasted nearly half an hour, but didn't reveal any legal cause to search defendant's motorhome, followed by a second traffic stop set up with a drug-sniffing dog available to conduct a sniff around the exterior of the motorhome) violated the **Fourth Amendment**. Because the dog sniff, which gave the officer in the second stop the necessary probable cause to obtain a search warrant to search defendant's motorhome followed directly in an unbroken chain from the first prolonged traffic stop, the seized currency was held to be the "fruit of the poisonous tree" and was properly suppressed by the trial court. (*United States v. Gorman* (9th Cir. 2017) 859 F.3rd 706, 714-719; as amended at 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 18610.)

Exceptions: Three of the recognized exceptions to the use of the “*Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine*,” as discussed in *Utah v. Strieff* (June 20, 2016) __ U.S. __ [136 S.Ct. 2056; 195 L.Ed.2nd 400], and *United States v. Gorman* (9th Cir. 2017) 859 F.3rd 706, 718; as amended at 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 18610, involve the causal relationship between the unconstitutional act and the discovery of evidence:

The Independent Source Doctrine: Evidence obtained in an unlawful search if officers independently acquired it from a separate, independent source. (See *Murray v. United States* (1988) 487 U. S. 533, 537, [101 L. Ed.2nd 472]; see “*Independent Source Doctrine*,” under “*Searches With a Search Warrant*” (Chapter 6), below.)

The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine: Evidence that would have been discovered even without the unconstitutional source. (See *Nix v. Williams* (1984) 467 U. S. 431, 443-444 [81 L. Ed. 2nd 377]; see “*Doctrine of Inevitable Discovery*,” below.)

The Attenuation Doctrine: When the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that “the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.” (See *Hudson v. Michigan* (2006) 547 U.S. 586, 593 [165 L.Ed.2nd 56]; *Utah v. Strieff*, *supra*.)

“(E)ven when there is a **Fourth Amendment** violation, (the) exclusionary rule does not apply when the costs of exclusion outweigh its deterrent benefits. In some cases, for example, the link between the unconstitutional conduct and the discovery of the evidence is too attenuated to justify suppression.” (*Utah v. Strieff*, *supra*; existence of an arrest warrant “attenuated the taint” between an unlawful detention and the discovery of evidence incident to the arrest on the warrant, at least where the police misconduct was not flagrant.)

In *Strieff*, the Utah Supreme Court declined to apply the attenuation doctrine because it read the U.S. Supreme Court’s precedents as applying the

doctrine only “to circumstances involving an independent act of a defendant’s ‘free will’ (such as) in confessing to a crime or consenting to a search.” (2015 UT 2, 357 P. 3rd 532 at p. 544.) The *Strieff* Court specifically disagreed with this interpretation. “The attenuation doctrine evaluates the causal link between the government’s unlawful act and the discovery of evidence, which often has nothing to do with a defendant’s actions. Per the Supreme Court; “the logic of (its) prior attenuation cases is not limited to independent acts by the defendant.” (*Id.* at 136 S.Ct. at p. 2061.)

See also *People v. Brendlin* (2008) 45 Cal.4th 262, where an illegal traffic stop did not require the suppression of evidence where the defendant had an outstanding arrest warrant. The discovery of an arrest warrant may, depending upon the circumstances, be sufficient of an intervening circumstance to allow for the admissibility of the evidence seized incident to arrest despite the fact that the original detention was illegal.

Defendant, the passenger in a motor vehicle stopped for illegally tinted windows (**V.C. § 26708(a)**), was arrested on an outstanding arrest warrant. Even had the traffic stop had been illegal, the discovery of the arrest warrant was sufficient to attenuate any possible taint of an illegal traffic stop. (*People v. Carter* (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 522, 529-530.)

See also *People v. Durant* (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 57, finding that a suspect’s **Fourth** waiver (subjecting him to warrantless search and seizures) attenuated the taint of an illegal traffic stop, and *People v. Bates* (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 60, 69-71, ruling to the contrary.

The *Bates* Court both declined to adopt the *Durant* Court’s reasoning, and differentiated the cases on their respective facts. (*Ibid.*)

A second traffic stop which resulted in a search of a vehicle, even if the stop is based upon an observed traffic violation, is not attenuated from an earlier

illegally prolonged detention when the search was conducted pursuant to information obtained during the prior stop and illegally prolonged detention. (*United States v. Gorman* (9th Cir. 2017) 859 F.3rd 706, 714-719; as amended at 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 18610.)

Also, when information is contained in the affidavit which is the product of a prior illegal search, that information may be excised and the remainder retested for probable cause. “A search warrant is not ‘rendered invalid merely because some of the evidence included in the affidavit is tainted.’ (Citation) The warrant remains valid if, after excising the tainted evidence, the affidavit’s ‘remaining untainted evidence would provide a neutral magistrate with probable cause to issue a warrant.’” (*United States v. Job* (9th Cir. 2017) 871 F.3rd 852, 863-864; citing *United States v. Nora* (9th Cir. 2014) 765 F.3rd 1049, 1058; and quoting *United States v. Reed* (9th Cir. 1994) 15 F.3rd 928, 933.)

Problem: The “Coordinated Traffic Stop:”

In an asset forfeiture proceeding dealing with \$167,070 seized from defendant’s motorhome, it was held that the search of defendant’s vehicle following the second half of a “coordinated traffic stop” (i.e., a first stop which itself lasted nearly half an hour, but didn’t reveal any legal cause to search defendant’s motorhome, followed by a second traffic stop set up with a drug-sniffing dog available to conduct a sniff around the exterior of the motorhome) violated the **Fourth Amendment**. Because the dog sniff, which gave the officer in the second stop the necessary probable cause to obtain a search warrant to search defendant’s motorhome followed directly in an unbroken chain from the first prolonged traffic stop, the seized currency was held to be the “fruit of the poisonous tree” and was properly suppressed by the trial court. (*United States v. Gorman* (9th Cir. 2017) 859 F.3rd 706, 714-719; as amended at 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 18610.)

The Court noted at p. 719: “Here, the officers’ impermissible gamesmanship is precisely what the Constitution proscribes. . . . The coordinated action at issue in Gorman’s case offers a prime illustration of the value of the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’

analysis. The analysis allows us to see the officers' conduct in Gorman's case as what it is: a single integrated effort by police to circumvent the Constitution by making two coordinated stops. When the result of one stop is communicated and, on that basis, another stop is planned and implemented, the coordinated stops become, in effect, one integrated stop that must as a whole satisfy the Constitution's requirements. An illegal police venture cannot be made legal simply by dividing it into two coordinated stops. (Citations omitted.) The Constitution guards against this kind of gamesmanship because the **Fourth Amendment's** protections extend beyond the margins of one particular police stop and can extend to the integrated and purposeful conduct of the state."

Exceptions:

Private persons:

Rule: A private person, not associated or working with law enforcement, may violate a subject's constitutional rights without threat of suppression in that the constitutional protections apply to *government searches* only. (***People v. Johnson*** (1947) 153 Cal.App.2nd 873.)

A *licensed private investigator* who is acting in furtherance of a private interest, rather than for a law enforcement or government purpose, is not subject to the restrictions of the **Fourth Amendment**. (***People v. Mangiefico*** (1972) 25 Cal.App.3rd 1041, 1046-1047; ***People v. De Juan*** (1985) 171 Cal.App.3rd 1110, 1119.)

Bail bondspersons and "*Bounty Hunters*," although allowed to take a defendant into custody (**P.C. §§ 847.5, 1300, 1301**), they are acting as private citizens and are not subject to the Exclusionary Rule. (***People v. Houle*** (1970) 13 Cal.App.3rd 892, 895; ***Landry v. A-Able Bonding, Inc.*** (1996) 75 F.3rd 200, 203-205.)

Even an *off-duty police officer* “may” not be acting as a law enforcement officer in conducting a search, when he acts in his capacity as a private citizen, and through mere curiosity. (*People v. Wachter* (1976) 58 Cal.App.3rd 311, 920-923; see also *People v. Peterson* (1972) 23 Cal.App.3rd 883, 893; off-duty police trainee acting out of concern for his own safety.)

Exception to Private Persons Exception: “Agents of Law Enforcement:”

“Private action may be attributed to the state . . . if ‘there is such a “close nexus between the State and the challenged action” that seemingly private behavior “may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” . . . Such a nexus may exist when, for instance, private action ‘results from the State’s exercise of “coercive power,”’ or ‘when the State provides “significant encouragement, either overt or covert,”’ to the private actor.’” (*George v. Edholm* (9th Cir. 2014) 752 F.3rd 1206, 1215-1217; quoting *Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n.* (2001) 531 U.S. 288, 295-296 [148 L.Ed.2nd 807]; officers held responsible for E.R. doctor’s warrantless removal of a bindle of cocaine from the plaintiff’s rectum.)

Anyone acting at the request of, or under the direction of, a law enforcement officer, is an agent of the police and is held to the same standards as the police. (*People v. Fierro* (1965) 236 Cal.App.2nd 344, 347.)

Seizure of blood by a state hospital, working with law enforcement (i.e., an “agent” of law enforcement), taking and testing blood from expectant mothers and testing for drugs, held to be an illegal governmental search. (*Ferguson et al. v. City of Charleston* (2001) 532 U.S. 67 [149 L.Ed.2nd 205].)

In determining whether a person is acting as a police agent, two factors must be considered: (1) Whether the government knew of and acquiesced in

the private search; and (2) whether the private individual intended to assist law enforcement or, instead, had some other independent motivation. The first factor requires evidence of more than mere knowledge and passive acquiescence by a police officer before finding an agency relationship. It takes some evidence of a police officer's control or encouragement. As for the second factor, a dual purpose (e.g., to help the police *and* himself) is not enough. (*People v. Wilkinson* (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1564-1569; also rejecting California's pre-**Proposition 8** stricter standards.)

A civil rights action pursuant to **42 U.S.C. § 1983** was held to be proper against non-law enforcement employees of a private corporation that operated a federal prison under contract. (*Pollard v. GEO Group, Inc.* (9th Cir. 2010) 607 F.3rd 583.)

An employee of the defendant who assisted the government by collecting fraudulent documents belonging to the defendant may have violated the **Fourth Amendment** as a government agent even though her motive may have been simply to "do the right thing." (*United States v. Mazzarella* (9th Cir. 2015) 784 F.3rd 53; evidentiary hearing on the issue required.)

The "Good Faith" Exception: In those cases where enforcing the "Exclusionary Rule" would not advance its remedial purposes, evidence seized unlawfully will not be suppressed. (*Illinois v. Krull* (1987) 480 U.S. 340, 347 [94 L.Ed.2nd 364, 373]; *United States v. Leon* (1984) 468 U.S. 897, 920-921 [82 L.Ed.2nd 677, 697]; *Herring v. United States* (2009) 555 U.S. 135 [172 L.Ed.2nd 496]; *United States v. Needham* (9th Cir. 2013) 718 F.3rd 1190; 1194; *People v. Lazarus* (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 734, 766-767.)

See "Good Faith," below, and "Mistaken Belief in Existence of Probable Cause to Arrest or Search, an Arrest Warrant, or that a **Fourth** Waiver Exists, Based upon Erroneous Information Received from Various Sources," under "Arrests" (Chapter 4), above.

The Taint has been Attenuated: "(G)ranting establishment of the primary illegality," whether or not the resulting evidence is subject

to suppression is a question of whether “the evidence . . . has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” (*Wong Sun v. United States* (1963) 371 U.S. 471, 487-488 [9 L.Ed.2nd 441, 455].)

Factors: In determining whether the “*primary taint*” (i.e., an illegal search, detention or arrest) has been sufficiently “*purged*” requires consideration of three factors:

- The “*Temporal Proximity*” between the illegal act and the resulting evidence.

“*Substantial time*” must have elapsed between an unlawful act and when the evidence is obtained. (*Kaupp v. Texas* (2003) 538 U.S. 626, 633 [155 L.Ed.2nd 814, 822].)

Less than two hours between an unconstitutional arrest and defendant’s confession held not to be sufficient time to attenuate the taint. (*Brown v. Illinois* (1975) 422 U.S. 590, 604 [45 L.Ed.2nd 416].)

- The presence of any “*Intervening Circumstances*” (e.g., an outstanding arrest warrant; see *Utah v. Strieff* (June 20, 2016) __ U.S. __, __ [136 S.Ct. 2056, 2060-2064; 195 L.Ed.2nd 400].); and
- The “*Purpose and Flagrancy*” of the official misconduct.

“For the violation to be flagrant, more severe police misconduct is required than the mere absence of proper cause for the seizure.” (*Utah v. Strieff, supra*, at 136 S.Ct. 2056, 2064.)

See, e.g., *Kaupp v. Texas* (2003) 538 U.S. 626, 633 [155 L.Ed.2nd 814, 822]; finding flagrant violation where a warrantless arrest was made in the arrestee’s home after police were denied a warrant and at least some

officers knew they lacked probable cause:
See also *Taylor v. Alabama* (1982) 457 U.S. 687, 690 [73 L.Ed.2nd 314, 319]; *United States v. Crawford* (9th Cir. 2003) 323 F.3rd 700, 719-722; *Brown v. Illinois* (1975) 422 U.S. 590, 600-605 [45 L.Ed.2nd 416, 425-428]; *Utah v. Strieff*, *supra*.

Miranda: A *Miranda* admonishment and waiver, alone, is legally insufficient to attenuate the taint of an illegal arrest. (*Brown v. Illinois* (1975) 422 U.S. 590, 600-605 [45 L.Ed.2nd 416, 425-428]; *Kaupp v. Texas* (2003) 538 U.S. 626, 633 [155 L.Ed.2nd 814, 822].)

Outstanding Arrest Warrant or Fourth Waiver:

The fact that the defendant had an outstanding arrest warrant, depending upon the circumstances, may be sufficient of an intervening circumstance to allow for the admissibility of the evidence seized incident to arrest despite the fact that the original detention was illegal. (*People v. Brendlin* (2008) 45 Cal.4th 262; an illegal traffic stop; *Utah v. Strieff* (June 20, 2016) ___ U.S. ___, ___ [136 S.Ct. 2056, 2059; 195 L.Ed.2nd 400]; or a **Fourth** waiver; *People v. Bower* (1979) 24 Cal.3rd 638; no.), depending upon the circumstances.)

Defendant, the passenger in a motor vehicle stopped for illegally tinted windows (**V.C. § 26708(a)**), was arrested on an outstanding arrest warrant. Even had the traffic stop had been illegal, the discovery of the arrest warrant was sufficient to attenuate any possible taint of an illegal traffic stop. (*People v. Carter* (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 522, 529-530.)

See *People v. Durant* (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 57, finding that a suspect's **Fourth** waiver (subjecting him to warrantless search and seizures) attenuated the taint of an illegal traffic stop. But see *People v. Bates* (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 60, 69-71, ruling to the contrary.

The *Bates* Court both declined to adopt the *Durant* Court’s reasoning, and differentiated the cases on their respective facts. (*Ibid.*)

When the Purposes of the Exclusionary Rule are Not Served:

The Exclusionary Rule is not intended to prevent all police misconduct or as a remedy for all police errors. “*The use of the exclusionary rule is an exceptional remedy typically reserved for violations of constitutional rights.*” (*United States v. Smith* (9th Cir. 1999) 196 F.3rd 1034, 1040.)

“To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.” (*Herring v. United States* (2009) 555 U.S. 135 [172 L.Ed.2nd 496]; see also *People v. Leal* (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1064-1065.)

The exclusionary rule should only be used when necessary to deter “deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances, recurring or systematic negligence.” (*Herring v. United States*, at p. 144.)

The seizure of defendant’s vehicle based upon it having been reported, and in the computer system, as “stolen,” even though the defendant’s acquisition of the vehicle did not fit “neatly” into the elements of V.C. § 10851 (i.e., the vehicle was purchased from a dealership, albeit with defendant providing the dealer with fraudulent information in his application for credit, after which defendant ceased making payments), did not make the seizure “unreasonable.” There was no bad faith on the part of the detective who entered the vehicle into the computer system as stolen. The seizing officers were entitled to rely upon the information as contained in the computer system. (*United States v. Noster* (9th Cir. 2009) 590 F.3rd 624, 629-633.)

But note that according to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal, a search incident to arrest that was lawful prior to the decision in *Arizona v. Gant* (2009) 556 U.S. 332 [173 L.Ed.2nd 485], is still subject to the new rule in *Gant*,

applying the rule retroactively, in any case that was not yet final as of the date of the decision in *Gant* (April 21, 2009). The officer's good faith in applying the prior rule is irrelevant. (*United States v. Gonzalez* (9th Cir. 2009) 578 F.3rd 1130.)

Arizona v. Gant, supra, held that once defendant is arrested and secured, a "search incident to arrest" of the subject's vehicle is not lawful unless there is some reason to believe that evidence relevant to the cause of arrest may be found. (See "*Searches of Vehicles*" (Chapter 9), below.)

"(E)ven when there is a **Fourth Amendment** violation, (the) exclusionary rule does not apply when the costs of exclusion outweigh its deterrent benefits. In some cases, for example, the link between the unconstitutional conduct and the discovery of the evidence is too attenuated to justify suppression." (*Utah v. Strieff* (June 20, 2016) ___ U.S. ___, __ [136 S.Ct. 2056, 2059; 195 L.Ed.2nd 400]; existence of an arrest warrant "attenuated the taint" between an unlawful detention and the discovery of evidence incident to the arrest on the warrant, at least where the police misconduct was not flagrant.

The Minimal Intrusion Exception:

The United States Supreme Court has recognized, at least by inference, that in those instances where there is a "*minimal intrusion*" into a defendant's privacy rights, suppression of the resulting evidence may not be required. "When faced with special law enforcement needs, diminished expectations of privacy, *minimal intrusions*, or the like, [it] has found that certain general, or individual, circumstances may render a warrantless search or seizure reasonable." (Italics added; *Illinois v. McArthur* (2001) 531 U.S. 326, 330 [148 L.Ed.2nd 838].)

"(A)lthough a warrant may be an essential ingredient of reasonableness much of the time, for less intrusive searches it is not" (*United States v. Concepcion* (7th Cir. 1991) 942 F.2nd 1170, 1172; the issue being whether turning a key in a door lock was a search, but such a minimal intrusion that a search warrant was not necessary.)

Without obtaining a warrant, the police searched the defendant's cellphone for its phone number. The police later used the number to subpoena the phone's call history from the telephone company. Even though there was no urgent need to search the cellphone for its phone number, the Seventh Circuit pointed out "that bit of information might be so trivial that its seizure would not infringe **the Fourth Amendment.**" (*United States v. Flores-Lopez* (7th Cir. 2012) 670 F.3rd 803, 806-807.)

California's First District Court of Appeal (Div. 5) has found this theory to be a whole separate exception to the search warrant requirement, calling it the "*Minimal Intrusion Exception.*" (*People v. Robinson* (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 232, 246-255; "The minimal intrusion exception to the warrant requirement rests on the conclusion that in a very narrow class of 'searches' the privacy interests implicated are 'so small that the officers do not need probable cause; for the search to be reasonable." (*Id.*, at p. 247.)

Noting that searches of the person, at least absent an officer-safety issue, and searches of a residence, may be outside the scope of the minimal intrusion theory. (*Id.*, at p. 249.)

"Although the United States Supreme Court has not clearly articulated the parameters of the exception, federal authorities provide sufficient support for concluding that in appropriate circumstances, the minimal intrusion exception to the warrant requirement may be applied to uphold warrantless searches based on less than probable cause. Moreover, although the high court's decisions in the area have primarily been justified by officer safety concerns (Citations), nothing in the high court's jurisprudence appears to preclude the possibility that a justification less than officer safety could be sufficient to justify an intrusion as minimal as that involved in the present case." (*Id.*, at pp. 249-250.)

Also, the fact that the defendant's front door was within the curtilage of his home, which also enjoys **Fourth Amendment** protection, does not alter the result. When the front door being an area open to

the general public, there was no violation in approaching the door and inserting the key. (*Id.*, at p. 253, fn. 23.)

See also *United States v. Thompson* (7th Cir. 2016) 842 F.3rd 1002: While recognizing that placing a key found on the detained defendant into the lock of an apartment constituted a **Fourth Amendment** search, the Court held that because the privacy interest in the information held by the lock (*i.e.* verification of the key holder's address) is so small, officers did not need a warrant or probable cause to perform such a search.

Statutory-Only Violations:

Rule: Relevant evidence will not be suppressed unless suppression is required by the **Fourth Amendment** to the **United States Constitution**, or when *a statute* violated by law enforcement commands suppression by its terms. (**Cal. Const., Art. 1, § 28(d)**; *In re Lance W.* (1985) 37 Cal.3rd 873, 886-887; *People v. Tillery* (1989) 211 Cal.App.3rd 1569, 1579; *People v. Lepeibet* (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1208, 1212-1213.)

E.g., see **P.C. § 632**, which makes it a felony for a person to eavesdrop on a “*confidential communication*,” and that the result of any such eavesdropping will *not* be admissible in court. (**Subd. (d)**)

However, see *People v. Guzman* (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 184, where, in a child sexual abuse case, the trial court did not err when it admitted a recorded telephone conversation between a defense witness and the mother of one of the defendant's victims, obtained in violation of **P.C. § 632(d)**; Eavesdropping. Although **section 632(d)** bars the admission of evidence obtained as a result of recording a confidential communication without the consent of all parties, the right to truth-in-evidence provision of **Cal. Const. art I, § 28(f)(2)**, as enacted by passage of **Proposition 8** in June, 1982, abrogated that exclusionary rule to the extent it is invoked

to suppress relevant evidence in a criminal proceeding. **Proposition 8** allows the admission of evidence collected in violation of the **Invasion of Privacy Act** where the evidence is relevant and its admission is not otherwise barred by the **U.S. Constitution**. Both prongs were met by the recording in question in this case.

Note: Review granted by the California Supreme Court in this case on June 27, 2017. (2017 Cal. LEXIS 5922.)

E.g., see **P.C. § 1546.4(a)**, providing for the suppression of any evidence obtained in violation of the **Electronic Communications Privacy Act, P.C. §§ 1546 et seq.**

Note: Not all courts are in agreement that such a remedy is reserved exclusively for constitutional violations. (See discussion in *United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga* (9th Cir. 2000) 206 F.3rd 882, 886-887, and in the dissenting opinion, p. 893.)

Examples of Statutory Violations Only:

- It is not unconstitutional to make a custodial arrest (i.e., transporting to jail or court) of a person arrested for a minor misdemeanor (*Atwater v. City of Lago Vista* (2001) 532 U.S. 318 [149 L.Ed.2nd 549].), or even for a fine-only, infraction. (*People v. McKay* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 601, 607; see also *United States v. McFadden* (2nd Cir. 2001) 238 F.3rd 198, 204.)
- California's statutory provisions require the release of misdemeanor arrestees in most circumstances. (E.g., see **P.C. §§ 853.5, 853.6, V.C. §§ 40303, 40500**) However, violation of these statutory requirements is not a constitutional violation and, therefore, *should not* result in suppression of any evidence recovered as a result of such an arrest. (*People v. McKay, supra*, at pp. 607-619, a violation of **V.C. § 21650.1** (riding a bicycle in the

wrong direction); *People v. Gomez* (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 531, 539, seat belt violation (**V.C. § 27315(d)(1)**), citing *Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, supra*; *People v. Bennett* (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 907, 918.)

See also *Virginia v. Moore* (2008) 553 U.S. 164 [170 L.Ed.2nd 559], driving on a suspended license.

- Custodial arrest for a misdemeanor that did not occur in the officer's presence, in violation of **P.C. § 836(a)(1)**. (*People v. Donaldson* (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 532, 539; *People v. Trapane* (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th Supp. 10, 12-14.)

- A “knock and notice” violation:

Violating the terms of **P.C. §§ 844** and/or **1531** (California's statutory “knock and notice” requirements) does not necessarily also violate the **Fourth Amendment**. (*Wilson v. Arkansas* (1995) 513 U.S. 927 [131 L.Ed.2nd 976]; *People v. Zabelle* (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1282.) Whether or not it does depends upon the circumstances. (See “Knock and Notice,” below.)

But even when such a violation is determined to have been done contrary to the dictates of the **Fourth Amendment**, the Exclusionary Rule has recently been held to be an inappropriate remedy, at least in most cases. (*Hudson v. Michigan* (2006) 547 U.S. 586 [165 L.Ed.2nd 56].)

Per *Hudson*, the suppression of evidence is only necessary where the interests protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would be served by suppressing the evidence thus obtained. The interests protected by the knock and notice rules include human life, because “an

unannounced entry may provoke violence in supposed self-defense by the surprised resident.” Property rights are also protected by providing residents an opportunity to prevent a forcible entry. And, “privacy and dignity” are protected by giving the occupants an opportunity to collect themselves before answering the door. (*Ibid.*)

The Court also ruled in *Hudson* that because civil suits are more readily available than in 1914 with the exclusionary rule was first announced, and because law enforcement officers, being better educated, trained and supervised, can be subjected to departmental discipline, suppressing the product of a knock and notice violation is no longer a necessary remedy. (*Ibid.*)

The rule as dictated by *Hudson* (a search warrant case) is applicable as well as in a warrantless, yet lawful, arrest case, pursuant to P.C. § 844. (*In re Frank S.* (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 145.)

However, *Hudson* is not to be interpreted to mean that the Exclusionary Rule is to be scraped. Intentionally unlawful law enforcement actions will still be subject to the Exclusionary Rule where necessary to discourage future illegal police activities. (*People v. Rodriguez* (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1137; case remanded for a determination whether police fabricated probable cause for a traffic stop, which led to the discovery of an outstanding arrest warrant, the search incident thereto resulting in recovery of controlled substances.)

But see United States v. Weaver (D.C. Cir. 2015) 808 F.3rd 26, where the D.C. Court of

Appeal rejected the applicability of *Hudson v. Michigan, supra*, in an arrest warrant service situation, and held that federal agents violated the knock-and-announce rule by failing to announce their purpose before entering defendant's apartment. By knocking but failing to announce their purpose, the agents gave defendant no opportunity to protect the privacy of his home. The exclusionary rule was the appropriate remedy for knock-and-announce violations in the execution of arrest warrants at a person's home.

- Violation of a *government agency regulation* (i.e., not a statute or a constitutional principle) also does not necessitate suppression of the resulting evidence. (*United States v. Ani* (9th Cir. 1998) 138 F.3rd 390.)
- Possible violation of an Indian Reservation statute or rule, not involving a constitutional principle, will not result in the suppression of any evidence. (*United States v. Becerra-Garcia* (9th Cir. 2005) 397 F.3rd 1167, 1173.)
- Mistakenly collecting blood samples for inclusion into California's DNA data base (See **P.C. § 296**), when the defendant did not actually have a qualifying prior conviction, is *not* a **Fourth Amendment** violation, but even if it were, it does not require the suppression of the mistakenly collected blood samples, nor is it grounds to suppress the resulting match of the defendant's DNA with that left at a crime scene. (*People v. Robinson* (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1104, 1116-1129.)

Doctrine of Inevitable Discovery:

Rule: Evidence seized unlawfully will be held to be admissible in those instances where, but for the illegal search, there is a "*reasonable possibility*" that the evidence would have been lawfully found by other means. (*Murray v. United States* (1988) 487 U.S. 533, 539 [101 L.Ed.2nd 472]; *Nix v. Williams* (1984) 467 U.S. 432 [81 L.Ed.2nd

377], violation of defendant's **Sixth Amendment** right to counsel; *People v. Superior Court [Walker]* (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1214-1217; *People v. Redd* (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 721.)

“The inevitable discovery doctrine, recognized by the Supreme Court in *Nix*, supra, 467 U.S. 431, is ‘closely related’ to the independent source doctrine. (Id. at p. 443.) It is ‘in reality an extrapolation from the independent source doctrine: Since the tainted evidence would be admissible if in fact discovered through an independent source, it should be admissible if it inevitably would have been discovered.’” (*People v. Superior Court (Corbett)* (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 670, 682; quoting *Murray v. United States*, supra.)

The First Federal Circuit in *United States v. Clark* (1st Cir. ME 2018) 879 F.3rd 1, lists the requirements for the inevitable discovery doctrine to apply:

- (1) The legal means by which the evidence would have been discovered was truly independent,
- (2) The use of the legal means would have inevitably led to the discovery of the evidence, and
- (3) Applying the inevitable discovery rule would not provide an incentive for police misconduct or significantly weaken constitutional protections.

The prosecution has the burden of proving facts and circumstances justifying the inevitable discovery doctrine by a preponderance of the evidence. Failing to do so, the rule will not be used by a court to allow the admission of evidence otherwise discovered illegally. (*People v. Evans* (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 735, 755-756; *People v. Superior Court [Chapman]* (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1021-1022; *United States v. Camou*, supra.; *People v. Cervantes* (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 860, 872.)

Cases:

“The purpose of the inevitable discovery rule is to prevent the setting aside of convictions that would have been obtained without police misconduct.’ (Citation.) ‘Fairness can be assured by placing the State and the accused in the same positions they would have been in had the impermissible conduct not taken place. However, if the government can prove that the evidence would have been obtained inevitably and, therefore, would have been admitted regardless of any overreaching by the police, there is no rational basis to keep that evidence from the jury in order to ensure the fairness of the trial proceedings. In that situation, the State has gained no advantage at trial and the defendant has suffered no prejudice. Indeed, suppression of the evidence would operate to undermine the adversary system by putting the State in a worse position than it would have occupied without any police misconduct.’ (*People v. Cervantes* (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 860, 872; quoting *Nix v. Williams*, *supra*, at p. 447.)

Stopped and physically arrested for driving on a suspended license (with a prior conviction for the same), defendant was secured in the back seat of a patrol car. The subsequent search of his vehicle, resulting in the recovery of cocaine and an illegal firearm (defendant being a convicted felon) was found to be in violation of the rule of *Arizona v. Gant* (2009) 556 U.S. 332 [173 L.Ed.2nd 485], where it was held that once defendant is arrested and secured, a “search incident to arrest” of the subject’s vehicle is not lawful unless there is some reason to believe that evidence relevant to the cause of arrest may be found. (See “*Searches of Vehicles*” (Chapter 9), below.) However, the evidence was held to be admissible anyway under the “*inevitable discovery rule*” in that the vehicle was to be impounded and subjected to an inventory search; (*United States v. Ruckes* (9th Cir. 2009) 586 F.3rd 713, 716-719.)

Evidence lying under the deceased would have inevitably been found and given to the police when the Coroner's investigator took charge of the body and moved it. (*People v. Superior Court [Chapman]* (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1021-1022; The Coroner may deliver any property or evidence related to the investigation or prosecution of a crime to the law enforcement agency or district attorney. (Govt. Code § 27491.3(b))

Upon discovering that defendant's passenger was on probation with **Fourth** waiver search and seizure conditions, the Court declined to rule on whether a police officer could legally search two bags on the back seat under the theory of *People v. Schmitz* (2012) 55 Cal.4th 909, holding instead that methamphetamine later found in the center console of defendant's car was clearly lawful under *Schmitz*, and had the officer searched there first, the drugs in the backseat bags would have inevitably been found anyway. (*People v. Cervantes* (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 860, 871-874.)

See "Containers in the Vehicle," under "Searches of Vehicles" (Chapter 9), below.

Exceptions:

Inevitable discovery *does not* apply, however, merely because the officers had probable cause and could have gotten a search or arrest warrant. (*Hudson v. Michigan* (2006) 547 U.S. 586 [165 L.Ed.2nd 56]; *People v. Robles* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789; *People v. Superior Court [Walker]*, *supra*, at p. 1215; *United States v. Camou* (9th Cir. 2014) 773 F.3rd 932, 943-944; *United States v. Lundin* (9th Cir. 2016) 817 F.3rd 1151; *United States v. Mejia* (9th Cir. 1995) 69 F.3rd 309, 320; *United States v. Echevoyen* (9th Cir. 1986) 799 F.2nd 1271, 1280, fn. 7; *People v. Superior Court (Corbett)*, *supra*, at pp. 681-688.)

This is because "[i]f evidence were admitted notwithstanding the officers' unexcused failure to obtain a warrant, simply because

probable cause existed, then there would never be *any* reason for officers to seek a warrant.” (*United States v. Lundin* (9th Cir. 2016) 817 F.3rd 1151, 1161-1162; quoting *United States v. Mejia* (9th Cir. 1995) 69 F.3rd 309, 320.)

A court cannot base an “*inevitable discovery*” conclusion on a speculative inference. Where an inventory search of a vehicle was the issue, and where there was no evidence that the arresting officers actually intended to impound the defendant’s vehicle or that it was actually impounded (i.e., speculative inference on top of a speculative inference), it was held that discovery of an illegal baton in the defendant’s car could not be based upon an inevitable discovery theory; i.e., that had the vehicle been impounded, the baton would have been lawfully discovered. (*People v. Wallace* (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 82, 93-94.)

The inevitable discovery doctrine was held to be inapplicable where there was no evidence that the defendant’s vehicle was going to be subjected to an inventory search beyond that which was already done, and where the tow yard employees testified to inventorying items in plain sight only. (*People v. Evans* (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 735, 755-756; cocaine hidden in the vehicle’s air vents.)

The fact that a search warrant *could have* been obtained before illegally searching defendant’s home, and was in fact obtained prior to a second search, does not excuse the earlier illegal warrantless search of his residence. (*People v. Superior Court (Corbett)* (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 670, 681-685.)

Searches Based Upon Existing Precedent; The “Faith In Case Law” or “Statute” Exception:

Searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent in effect at the time of the search, despite a later decision changing the rules, are not

subject to the Exclusionary Rule. (*Davis v. United States* (2011) 564 U.S. 229, 236-239 [180 L.Ed.2nd 285].)

See *United States v. Sparks* (1st Cir. 2013) 711 F.3rd 58; holding that the use of a GPS prior to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in *United States v. Jones* (2012) 565 U.S. 400 [132 S.Ct. 945; 181 L.Ed.2nd 911], even if done in violation of the **Fourth Amendment**, does not require the suppression of the resulting evidence due to the officer's good faith reliance in earlier binding precedence.

Also, whether or not the theory of *Florida v. Jardines* (2013) 569 U.S. 1 [133 S.Ct. 1409; 185 L.Ed.2nd 495], involving the illegality of using drug-sniffing dogs within the curtilage of a person's home, is applicable to a drug-sniffing dog used around the outside, and leaning up against, the open bed and tool box in a suspect's truck (which would over-rule prior case law), was left open by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal, holding that the pursuant to the "faith-in-case law" rule of *Davis v. United States* (2011) 564 U.S. 229, 236-239 [180 L.Ed.2nd 285], it was unnecessary to decide the issue. (*United States v. Thomas* (9th Cir. 2013) 726 F.3rd 1086, 1092-1095.)

As a result, a search of a defendant's vehicle following his custodial arrest, done in violation of *Arizona v. Gant* (2009) 556 U.S. 332 [173 L.Ed.2nd 485], did not require the suppression of two firearms found in the car in that this search occurred prior to the *Gant* decision. (*United States v. Tschacher* (9th Cir. 2012) 687 F.3rd 923, 932-933.)

When reconsidered in light of *United States v. Jones* (2012) 565 U.S. 400 [132 S.Ct. 945; 181 L.Ed.2nd 911] (the GPS case), the 9th Circuit reversed itself in *United States v. Pineda-Moreno* (9th Cir. 2012) 688 F.3rd 1087, finding it to be a **Fourth Amendment** violation to attach a GPS tracking device, without a warrant, to the undercarriage of defendant's car while located in his own driveway. The Court, however, affirmed defendant's conviction. While noting that under *Jones*, the attaching of a GPS onto defendant's vehicle while in parked within the curtilage of his residence was indeed illegal, the officers, in good faith, were merely following existing precedent. As such, defendant was not entitled to the suppression of the resulting evidence per the U.S. Supreme Court's rule that

the Exclusionary Rule does not apply under such circumstances. (Citing *Davis v. United States*, *supra*. See also *United States v. Brooks* (9th Cir. 2014) 772 F.3rd 1161, 1173.)

Because California case law allowed for the warrantless placement of a GPS device by law enforcement at the time such a device was placed on the co-defendant's car in this case (i.e., 2007), the fact that the United States Supreme Court has since held that such conduct required a warrant did not dictate exclusion of the tracking device evidence. (*People v. Mackey* (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 32, 93-97.)

Good faith reliance upon the validity of the implied consent provisions of V.C. § 23612(a)(5), for an unconscious or deceased DUI suspect to provide a blood sample, makes admissible defendant's blood/alcohol test results in this case although a search warrant should have been obtained under the **Fourth Amendment**. (*People v. Arredondo* (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 186, 206-210.)

Note: Petition for Review was granted by the California Supreme Court in *People v. Arredondo* on June 8, 2016, making this case unavailable for citation.

An injured person may be searched without a warrant or probable cause. It is reasonable for a police officer to attempt to identify an injured person. In fact, he has a duty to do so. Anything the officer sees in the process is admissible in court. (*People v. Gonzales* (1960) 182 Cal.App.2nd 276.)

Evidence of identity, as with defendant's person itself, is not subject to suppression, "regardless of the nature of the violation leading to his identity." (*United States v. Gudino* (9th Cir. 2004) 376 F.3rd 997.)

See also *United States v. Garcia-Beltran* (9th Cir. 2004) 389 F.3rd 864; fingerprints used for identity purposes only are not subject to suppression for a **Fourth Amendment** violation (i.e., illegal arrest here). Case remanded, however, for a determination whether defendant's fingerprints were seized for "*investigatory purposes*" as opposed to establish identity, in which case they *are* subject to suppression.

It is a rule of law that neither a person's *body* nor his or her *identity* is subject to suppression, "even if it is conceded that an unlawful arrest, search, or interrogation occurred." (*Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza* (1984) 468 U.S. 1032, 1039-1040 [82 L.Ed.2nd 778].)

For purposes of this rule, it makes no difference that the illegal arrest, search or interrogation was "egregious" in nature; e.g., the result of "racial profiling." (*United States v. Gudino*, *supra*.)

Impeachment Evidence:

Evidence illegally seized may be introduced for the *purpose of impeaching* the defendant's testimony given in both direct examination (*Walder v. United States* (1954) 347 U.S. 62 [98 L.Ed. 503].) and cross-examination, so long as the cross-examination questions are otherwise proper. (*United States v. Havens* (1980) 446 U.S. 620 [64 L.Ed.2nd 559].)

California authority prior to passage of **Proposition 8** (The "Truth in Evidence Initiative"), to the effect that evidence suppressed pursuant to a motion brought under authority of **P.C. § 1538.5** is suppressed for all purposes (i.e., *People v. Belleci* (1979) 24 Cal.3rd 879, 887-888.), was abrogated by **Proposition 8**. Now, it is clear that suppressed evidence may be used for purposes of impeachment should the defendant testify and lie. (*People v. Moore* (1988) 201 Cal.App.3rd 877, 883-886.)

Also, suppressed evidence pursuant to **P.C. § 1538.5(d)** is admissible at the defendant's probation revocation hearing unless the officer's actions were egregious. "(T)he exclusionary rule does not apply in probation revocation hearings, unless the police conduct at issue shocks the conscience." (Citations omitted; *People v. Lazlo* (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1068-1072.)

Asset Forfeiture Proceedings:

Evidence seized illegally may still be subject to asset forfeiture proceedings so long as there is admissible

probable cause supporting the conclusion that the evidence is the product of the defendant's illegal activity. (*United States v. \$186,416.00 in U.S. Currency* (9th Cir. 2010) 590 F.3rd 942, 948-949.)

But see *United States v. Gorman* (9th Cir. 2017) 859 F.3rd 706, 714; as amended at 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 18610, where the Court, without discussing the issue, assumed that cash discovered in violation of the **Fourth Amendment** was not subject to asset forfeiture.

Parole and Probation Revocation Hearings:

Parole Hearings: Evidence recovered in an illegal parole search is admissible in a parole revocation proceeding, held pursuant to the relatively informal procedures used pursuant to *Morrissey v. Brewer* (1972) 408 U.S. 471 [33 L.Ed.2nd 484]. (*Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott* (1998) 524 U.S. 357 [141 L.Ed.2nd 344].)

The need to use illegally seized evidence, from both **Fourth** and **Fifth Amendment** violations, in parole revocation hearings, outweighs the policy considerations underlying the Exclusionary Rule (i.e., deterring illegal police conduct.), and therefore is admissible in such circumstances. (*In re Martinez* (1970) 1 Cal.3rd 641, 648-650.)

Probation Hearings:

The same theory used in *Martinez* has been used to allow the admission of illegally seized evidence in probation revocation hearings. (*People v. Hayko* (1970) 7 Cal.App.3rd 604.)

In *People v. Vickers* (1972) 8 Cal.3rd 451, 461, the *Morrissey* due process protections were extended to probation revocations.

Defendant, under **PRCS (“Post-Release Community Supervision Act of 2011”)** supervision, claimed that her due process rights were violated because she was not arraigned within 10 days of her arrest and provided a *Morrissey*-compliant probable cause hearing. The court of

appeal disagreed and affirmed: “The trial court correctly ruled that the procedural differences between parole revocation and revocation of **PRCS** do not violate [defendant’s] due process rights” and “[t]he requirement for a formal arraignment in the superior court within 10 days of arrest, as discussed in *Williams (v. Superior Court, infra.)*, does not apply to **PRCS** revocations.” (*People v. Byron* (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1013-1018.)

Incarcerated parolees facing revocation under **P.C. § 1203.2** are entitled to a timely preliminary hearing. (*People v. DeLeon* (July 24, 2017) 2017 Cal. LEXIS 5853; appeal ordered dismissed as moot in that defendant had completed his parole.)

Per *Williams v. Superior Court* (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 636, a parolee is entitled to arraignment within 10 days of an arrest for a parole violation, a probable cause hearing within 15 days of the arrest, and a final hearing within 45 days of the arrest. A parolee must be brought before the court for arraignment no later than the Board of Parole Hearings is currently authorized by statute to hold the parolee without court intervention.

Defendant on **PRCS** supervision cannot be held responsible for not reporting his residence when he was homeless both before and after being paroled in that the **PRCS** statutes don’t defined what constitutes a residence. (*People v. Gonzalez* (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 370, 381-383.)

Standing:

Defined: The legal right of an individual to contest the illegality of a search and seizure. Only the person *whose rights are being violated* has “standing” to challenge an alleged governmental constitutional violation. (*Rakas v. Illinois* (1978) 439 U.S. 128, 138-139 [58 L.Ed.2nd 387, 397-398]; *Minnesota v. Carter* (1998) 525 U.S. 83 [142 L.Ed.2nd 373]; *People v. Casares* (2016) 62 Cal.4th 808, 835.)

Whether or not a person has “*standing*” to challenge the legality of a search is a mixed question of fact (i.e., determining the circumstances) and law (i.e., determining whether the facts justify a finding that the defendant has a legitimate expectation of privacy under the law). (*United States v. Singleton* (9th Cir. 1993) 987 F.2nd 1444, 1447; *United States v. \$40,955 in United States Currency* (9th Cir. 2009) 554 F.3rd 752, 755-756.)

One must have a legitimate possessory interest in the property seized, or a legitimate privacy interest in the area searched, or a personal liberty interest that was infringed. (See *People v. Roybal* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 481.)

Claiming ownership of the property being seized does not establish that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in that property. The “*possessory interest*” must be a “*legitimate*” one; i.e., excluding contraband and other items not lawfully in the subject’s possession. (See *Rawlings v. Kentucky* (1980) 448 U.S. 98, 105-106 [65 L.Ed.2nd 633]; *United States v. Pulliam* (9th Cir. 2005) 405 F.3rd 782, 786; see also *United States v. \$40,955 in United States Currency*, *supra.*, at p. 756.)

See also *People v. Warren* (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 619, 624: “(N)o privacy right guaranteed by the **Fourth Amendment** is infringed by the search and seizure of a known illicit substance.” E.g.: While the search of a thing or place over which a defendant has a legitimate expectation of privacy is subject to being tested, the searching of an illegal item (e.g., contraband) itself does not provide the defendant with the right to raise the search issue.

Defendant must show that he personally had a “*property interest*” that is protected by the **Fourth Amendment** and that was interfered with, and a “reasonable expectation of privacy” that was invaded by the search. (*United States v. Lopez-Cruz* (9th Cir. 2013) 730 F.3rd 803, 807.)

Reasonable Expectation of Privacy: The question really is whether the defendant, as opposed to someone else, had a “*reasonable* (or ‘*legitimate*’) *expectation of privacy*” in the place being searched or the items being seized. The federal cases have gotten away from using the term “*standing*” while moving towards a discussion of one’s “*reasonable*” or “*legitimate expectation of privacy*.” (*Rakas v. Illinois*, *supra.*, at p. 143 [58 L.Ed.2nd at p. 401]; *United States v. Davis* (9th Cir. 2003) 332 F.3rd 1163, 1167; *United States v. Caymen* (9th Cir. 2005) 404 F.3rd 1196, 1199-1200.) California courts have been encouraged to do the same. (See *People v. Ayala* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 254, fn. 3; *People v. Magee* (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 178, 183, fn. 4.)

“The touchstone of **Fourth Amendment** analysis is whether a person has a ‘constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.’” (*California v. Ciraolo* (1986) 476 U.S. 207, 211 [90 L.Ed.2nd 210, 215].)

“(T)o say that a party lacks [**F**]ourth [**A**]mendment standing is to say that *his* reasonable expectation of privacy has not been infringed.” (Italics in original; *United States v. SDI Future Health, Inc.* (9th Cir. 2009) 568 F.3rd 684, 695; citing *United States v. Taketa* (9th Cir. 1991) 923 F.2nd 665, 669.)

See also **article I, section 1** of the California Constitution: “All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, *and privacy.*” (Italics added)

See *In re M.H.* (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 699; right to privacy in a high school bathroom toilet stall.

Test: Whether or not a person has “*standing*” to challenge the constitutionality of a search has been described by the United States Supreme Court in *Rakas v. Illinois*, *supra*, as follows: “(W)hether the challenged search and seizure violated the **Fourth Amendment** rights of a criminal defendant who seeks to exclude the evidence obtained during it” (*Id.*, at p. 140.), “whether the disputed search and seizure has infringed an interest of the defendant which the **Fourth Amendment** was designed to protect” (*Ibid.*), or “whether the person who claims the protection of the (**Fourth**) **Amendment** has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place” (*Id.* at p. 143.). (*People v. Stewart* (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 242, 249.)

Burden of Proof: The defendant bears the burden of showing he or she had a *reasonable expectation of privacy* in the place searched or the thing seized. (*Rakas v. Illinois* (1978) 439 U.S. 128, 141, fn. 9 [58 L.Ed.2nd 387, 399-400]; *People v. McPeters* (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1171; *People v. Shepherd* (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 825, 828; *People v. Cowan* (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 795, 798; *United States v. Caymen* (9th Cir. 2005) 404 F.3rd 1196, 1199-1200; *United States v. \$40,955 in United States Currency* (9th Cir. 2009) 554 F.3rd 752, 756; *People v. Magee* (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 178, 183; *People v. Diaz* (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 743, 753.)

However, the court has the discretion to order the prosecution to present its evidence before the defendant proves his standing. (*People v. Contreras* (1989) 210 Cal.App.3rd 450.)

Although the prosecution may not take “contradictory positions in order to defeat an asserted expectation of privacy,” the defendant is “not ‘entitled to rely on the government's allegations in the pleadings, or positions the government has taken in the case, to establish standing.’” (*United States v. Long* (9th Cir. 2002) 301 F.3rd 1095, at p. 1100, citing *United States v. Zermeno* (9th Cir. 1995) 66 F.3rd 1058, 1062.)

Factors to Consider:

- Whether the defendant had a property or possessory interest in the thing seized or the place searched;
- Whether he had a right to exclude others from that place [or the thing seized];
- Whether he exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy that it would remain free from governmental intrusion;
- Whether he took normal precautions to maintain privacy; and
- Whether he was legitimately on the premises or legitimately in possession of the thing seized.
- Whether the defendant was present at the place searched “*for a commercial purpose*” (no standing) or was there as an “*overnight guest*” (standing) with the knowledge and permission of an identifiable host.

(*People v. Shepherd* (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 825, 828; *United States v. Silva et al.* (9th Cir. 2001) 247 F.3rd 1051; *People v. Stewart* (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 242, 250; *In re Rudy F.* (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1132; *People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler* (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 364-370; *United States v. Lopez-Cruz* (9th Cir. 2013) 730 F.3rd 893, 807-809; citing *United States v. Finley* (5th Cir. 2007) 477 F.3d 250, 258–259, recognizing this to be a non-exhaustive list.)

General Principles:

“[S]ubjective expectations of privacy that society is not prepared to recognize as legitimate have no [Fourth Amendment] protection. (*People v. Leon* (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 966, 974.)

“The absence of a right to exclude others from access to a situs is an important factor militating against a legitimate expectation of privacy.”

(United States v. Bautista (9th Cir. 2004) 362 F.3rd 584, 589; citing *Rawlings v. Kentucky* (1980) 448 U.S. 98, 105 [65 L.Ed.2nd 633, 642].)

See also *United States v. King* (2010) 693 F.Supp.2nd 1200: A justified eviction from a hotel room ends any expectation of privacy defendant may have had in the room, or in any of the contents of that room, justifying a warrantless entry and search of the room by FBI agents.

The existence of a “*reasonable expectation of privacy*” must be determined by an analysis of the “*totality of the circumstances.*” (*People v. Koury* (1989) 214 Cal.App.3rd 676, 686 *In re Rudy F.* (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1132.)

A defendant has the burden of proving that he had standing to contest a warrantless search. In other words, he must first prove that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the areas searched. A person seeking to invoke the protection of the **Fourth Amendment** must demonstrate both that he harbored a subjective (i.e., in his own mind) expectation of privacy and that the expectation was objectively reasonable. An objectively reasonable expectation of privacy is one that society is willing to recognize as reasonable. Among the factors considered in making this determination are whether a defendant has a possessory interest in the thing seized or place searched; whether he has the right to exclude others from that place; whether he has exhibited a subjective expectation that it would remain free from governmental invasion; whether he took normal precautions to maintain his privacy; and whether he was legitimately on the premises. (*People v. Nishi* (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 954, 959-963; defendant held to not have an expectation of privacy in his tent on public land without a permit, nor the area around his tent.)

Merely declining ownership of the items searched (e.g., cellphones) by itself, while a factor to consider, is not enough by itself to show that the defendant did not have standing, at least where there is nothing to indicate that he wasn't in permissive possession of the item searched. (*United States v. Lopez-Cruz* (9th Cir. 2013) 730 F.3rd 803, 808-809.)

Prior California Rule; “Vicarious Standing:” Everyone charged with a criminal offense resulting from a search or seizure could challenge the constitutionality of that search or seizure, without the necessity of showing “*standing.*” (E.g., *People v. Martin* (1955) 45 Cal.2nd 755, 761.)

This theory, long since rejected by the United States Supreme Court (see *United States v. Salvucci* (1980) 448 U.S. 83, 92 [65 L.Ed.2nd 619].), was abrogated by passage of **Proposition 8 (Cal. Const., Art. 1, § 28(d))** in June, 1982. California now follows the federal rule. (*In re Lance W.*

(1985) 37 Cal.3rd 873, 886-887; **People v. Nelson** (1985) 166 Cal.App.3rd 1209, 1213.)

Examples:

Vehicles:

The *owner*, or a *borrower* of vehicle with the owner's permission (i.e., a person in lawful possession), *has standing* to challenge the search of the vehicle. (**People v. Leonard** (1987) 197 Cal.App.3rd 235, 238; **People v. Nelson** (1985) 166 Cal.App.3rd 1209; **United States v. Kovac** (9th Cir. 1986) 795 F.2nd 1509, 1510-1511, owner; **United States v. Portillo** (9th Cir. 1980) 633 F.2nd 1313, 1317, borrower; **People v. Casares** (2016) 62 Cal.4th 808, 835-836; borrower.)

A *passenger* in a vehicle that he neither owns nor leases *lacks standing* to object to a *search* of areas within the vehicle, such as the glove compartment, the trunk, or underneath the seat. (**Rakas v. Illinois** (1978) 439 U.S. 128 [58 L.Ed.2nd 387]; **United States v. Portillo** (9th Cir. 1980) 633 F.2nd 1313, 1317; **United States v. Pulliam** (9th Cir. 2005) 405 F.3rd 782, 785-786.)

But, the *passenger* as well as the *driver* has standing to object to the basis for a vehicle's initial stop or detention. (**Brendlin v. California** (2007) 551 U.S. 249 [168 L.Ed.2nd 132]; see below.); see also **People v. Lionberger** (1986) 185 Cal.App.3rd Supp. 1; **United States v. Twilley** (9th Cir. 2000) 222 F.3rd 1092, 1095; **United States v. Colin** (9th Cir. 2002) 314 F.3rd 439, 442-443; **People v. Lamont** (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 404.)

One who steals a car (**People v. Shepherd** (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 825.), or who is simply an occupant of a stolen car (**People v. Catuto** (1990) 217 Cal.App.3rd 714; **People v. Melnyk** (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1533.), or is caught driving a stolen vehicle (**People v. Carter** (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1139-1142.) that is later searched, has no standing to challenge the later search of that car.

Defendant had no standing to challenge the illegal search of another person's vehicle which resulted in recovery of information used to obtain a search warrant for defendant's home. (**People v. Madrid** (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1888, 1896.)

A person driving a rental vehicle, when the person is neither an authorized driver under the rental contract nor driving the vehicle with the renter's permission, does not have standing to challenge the search of a vehicle. (*United States v. Thomas* (9th Cir. 2006) 447 F.3rd 1191; noting that merely being an unauthorized driver, per the terms of the rental agreement, will not deprive a person of standing. In this case, it was the defendant's failure to present any evidence that he was driving the car with the permission of the person who rented it that deprived him of standing to contest the search of the car.)

The United States Supreme Court has recently reversed the California Supreme Court on the issue of whether the passenger is detained by virtue of being in the car when it is initially stopped, and held that at least in a private motor vehicle (as opposed to a taxi, bus, or other common carrier), the passenger in a vehicle stopped for a possible traffic infraction is in fact detained, giving him the right (i.e., standing) to challenge the legality of the traffic stop. (*Brendlin v. California* (2007) 551 U.S. 249 [168 L.Ed.2nd 132].)

The owner of a vehicle, but who takes steps to disassociate himself from the vehicle by having someone else pay cash for the car and then putting the car and other documentation in the other person's name (done because the defendant knew the car would be used to transport controlled substances), does not have standing to challenge an illegal entry into the car for the purpose of installing a GPS to track the vehicle. (*People v. Tolliver et al.* (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1231, 1236-1241.)

Being "the exclusive driver" of defendant's wife's car gives the defendant standing to challenge the legality of the installation of a GPS (i.e., a search) on that vehicle. (E.g., see *United States v. Jones* (2012) 565 U.S. 400, 404, fn. 2 [132 S.Ct. 945, 949; 181 L.Ed.2nd 911].)

However, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the conversations between prisoners in the back seat of a patrol car, making it lawful to secretly record such conversations. (*People v. Crowson* (1983) 33 Cal.3rd 623, 628.)

See also, *United States v. Webster* (7th Cir 2015) 775 F.3rd 897, where it was held that a prisoner being detained in the backseat of a patrol car has no expectation of privacy as to his conversations. Recording the defendant's conversation with another detainee and

cellphone calls he made while seated in the patrol car is not a violation of the **Fourth Amendment**.

However, even though a person may not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a vehicle, he may still challenge a search of that vehicle where it is the product of the person's unlawful detention as a passenger in the vehicle. (*Brewer v. Superior Court* (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 1019, 1023-1025.)

Residential Visitors:

An *overnight guest* in a residence *does* have standing to contest an unlawful search. (*Minnesota v. Olson* (1990) 495 U.S. 91 [109 L.Ed.2nd 85]; *People v. Hamilton* (1985) 168 Cal.App.3rd 1058; *Espinosa v. City and County of San Francisco* (9th Cir. 2010) 598 F.3rd 528, 533-534.)

The fact that the defendant is a parolee, subject to **Fourth Amendment** search and seizure conditions, does not mean that he doesn't have the right to challenge law enforcement's warrantless entry into a third party's residence. (*United States v. Grandberry* (9th Cir. 2013) 730 F.3rd 968, 973-975.)

As an "*occasional*" guest at his girlfriend's apartment, defendant had standing to challenge the entry of his girlfriend's bedroom where the two of them stayed together, along with the search of his gym bag he kept under the bed. (*United States v. Davis* (9th Cir. 2003) 332 F.3rd 1163, 1167-1168.)

When an *overnight guest* in a residence has standing to contest an unlawful search (*Minnesota v. Olson, supra.*), it is irrelevant that the guest is a drug smuggler. (*United States v. Gamez-Orduno* (9th Cir. 2000) 235 F.3rd 453.)

However, a visitor who is there for a limited time (e.g., 2½ hours), for an unlawful purpose (e.g., to package contraband), without any prior relationship with the lawful occupant, does *not* have standing. (*Minnesota v. Carter* (1998) 525 U.S. 83 [142 L.Ed.2nd 373].)

However, the defendant failed to meet his burden of showing standing in a hotel room where he was not registered as a guest, he did not have a key to the room, and

he did not have any possessions in the room besides the sneakers and t-shirt he was trying to put on when the officers entered. Based on these facts, the court could not determine what purpose defendant had in the room, how long he stayed there, how long he slept there, if at all, and how well he knew the other occupants. (*United States v. Aiken* (1st Cir. ME 2017) 877 F.3rd 451.)

The *estranged husband*, when he regularly visited overnight with his children, had a key and unrestricted access, kept personal papers and clothing in a bedroom, and was present at the time of the search, has standing. (*People v. Koury* (1989) 214 Cal.App.3rd 676, 688.)

A *Babysitter* during the time he or she is engaged in babysitting activities has standing. (*People v. Moreno* (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 577, 579, 587.)

Simple, *casual visitors* in a place being searched *do not* normally have standing. (*People v. Nelson* (1985) 166 Cal.App.3rd 1209; *People v. Ooley* (1985) 169 Cal.App.3rd 197; *People v. Cowan* (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 795, 798, 800; *People v. Dimitrox* (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 18; *People v. Rios* (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 584, 591-592.)

Being a family member but not living there does not change the result. (*People v. Rios, supra*, at 592, fn. 4; citing *In re Rudy F.* (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1135.)

The *temporary occupant* of a house does *not* have standing to challenge the search of a bedroom he did not occupy, never entered, and had no permission to enter. (*People v. Hernandez* (1988) 199 Cal.App.3rd 1182, 1188.)

A person who does not stay overnight, but who has a key and free reign of the house, coming and going as he pleases, doing his laundry, cooking, and watching the T.V. in the house, and taking showers, etc., was held to have standing. (*People v. Stewart* (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 242.)

Defendant's parents, where defendant conducted his marijuana dealings from his own room, maintained standing to challenge the search of defendant's bedroom where they maintained the rights of access, possession, and exclusion of others. (*United States v.*

\$40,955 in United States Currency (9th Cir. 2009) 554 F.3rd 752, 756-757.)

However, the daughter (defendant's sister?), who no longer lived in the house, did not have standing despite the fact that she had a key to the house and stored items there. (*Id.*, at pp. 757-758.)

Merely claiming to be an overnight guest, or to otherwise having standing to contest the entry and/or search of a residence, is insufficient. There must be some evidence to the effect that the person did in fact have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the residence. (*United States v. Reyes-Bosque* (9th Cir. 2010) 596 F.3rd 1017, 1026-1029.)

Whether or not a visitor has standing to challenge law enforcement's warrantless entrance into a residence depends upon that visitor's purpose for being there. For instance, if visiting the legal residents, at least when the visitor does so on a regular basis and is free to come and go as he wishes without knocking, he likely has standing. But when that same person enters the residence for the purpose of destroying evidence while being chased by police, he does not. (*People v. Magee* (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 178.)

The **Fourth Amendment** rights of homeowners are implicated by the use of a surreptitiously planted listening device to monitor third-party conversations that occurred within their home. (*Alderman v. United States* (1969) 394 U.S. 165 [22 L.Ed.2nd 176].)

Defendant held to not have an expectation of privacy in his tent on public land without a permit, nor the area around his tent. (*People v. Nishi* (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 954, 959-963.)

In a capital murder case, the trial court did not err in denying the lead defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized during a warrantless search of a drug house, defendant having failed to provide any competent evidence that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the house when it was searched. (*People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler* (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 364-370.)

Neither an evicted former tenant, nor her "overnight house guest," have standing to contest the warrantless entry of law enforcement

officers who were there checking on a report of trespassers in the vacant apartment. (*Woodward v. City of Tucson* (9th Cir. 2017) 870 F.3rd 1154, 1159-1161.)

Personal Property:

There is no expectation of privacy in a gun given to another person (*People v. McPeters* (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1171.), or an opaque bag left, unsealed, in another person's car (*People v. Root* (1985) 172 Cal.App.3rd 774, 778.), or a purse left in another's vehicle. (*People v Shepherd* (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 825, 827, 829.)

There is no expectation of privacy in a stolen computer (*United States v. Wong* (9th Cir. 2003) 334 F.3rd 831), or one that was obtained by fraud. (*United States v. Caymen* (9th Cir. 2005) 404 F.3rd 1196, 1200.)

There is no expectation of privacy in a duffle bag left in an apartment laundry room open to anyone, even though placed out of the way on a high shelf. (*United States v. Fay* (9th Cir. 2005) 410 F.3rd 589.)

But defendant, as the owner of a gym bag he kept under his girlfriend's bed in her apartment, had standing to challenge the search of that gym bag. (*United States v. Davis* (9th Cir. 2003) 332 F.3rd 1163, 1167-1168.)

Defendant had standing to challenge a wiretap order on his cellular telephone purchased by the defendant while using a fictitious name in that there is nothing illegal in the attempt to remain anonymous. (*People v. Leon* (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 966, 974-977.)

A business that owns the company's computers may consent to the search of a computer used by an employee, at least when the employee is on notice that he has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the computer he is using. (*United States v. Ziegler* (9th Cir. 2006) 456 F.3rd 1138.)

Denying possession or ownership in a briefcase found in a vehicle defendant was driving will deprive that defendant of the right to later challenge the legality of the warrantless search of that briefcase. (*United States v. Decoud* (9th Cir. 2006) 456 F.3rd 996.)

See "*Disclaiming Standing*," below.

There is no expectation of privacy in the outside of a piece of mail sent to the defendant. “(B)ecause the information is foreseeably visible to countless people in the course of a letter reaching its destination, ‘an addressee or addressor generally has no expectation of privacy as to the outside of mail.’” (*People v. Reyes* (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1189-1192; quoting *United States v. Osunegbu* (1987 5th Cir.) 822 F.2nd 472, 380, fn. 3.)

In *Reyes*, an employee of a private postbox company spontaneously handed officers defendant’s mail when the officers inquired as to whether defendant had rented a box at that facility even though the employees didn’t “normally” hand over a client’s mail absent a court order. The fact that defendant was never told that his mail would be kept private was also a factor to consider.

A jail inmate talking over a jail telephone, where he is warned that his conversations were subject to monitoring, asking a friend to retrieve what officers understood to be a gun (although defendant only referred to it as “*the thing*”) from a container (also described in vague, generic terms) in the closet of his girlfriend’s home, did *not* waive any expectation of privacy defendant had in the container that was later retrieved by law enforcement and illegally searched without a search warrant. (*United States v. Monghur* (9th Cir. 2009) 588 F.3rd 975, 978-981.)

Monghur differentiated these facts from a similar circumstance where defendant told law enforcement officers, clearly and unequivocally, that a particular container contained contraband. The Court in the case found that such a concession waived any expectation of privacy defendant might have had in the container, thus allowing for a warrantless search of that container. (*United States v. Cardona-Rivera* (7th Cir. 1990) 904 F.2nd 1149.)

An Internet subscriber has no expectation of privacy in the subscriber information he supplies to his Internet provider. (*People v. Stipo* (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 664, 668-669.)

Allowing another person unrestricted access to a mutually owned computer negates any expectation of privacy the first person might have had. A co-owner has actual authority to give consent to the police to search. And if it turns out that the person is not actually a co-owner, the doctrine of apparent authority may justify the search. (*United States v. Stanley* (9th Cir. 2011) 653 F.3rd 946, 950-952.)

There is no privacy right in the mouthpiece of the PAS device, which was provided by the police and where defendant abandoned any expectation of privacy in the saliva he deposited on the device when he failed to wipe it off. Whether defendant subjectively expected that the genetic material contained in his saliva would become known to the police was irrelevant because he deposited it on a police device and thus made it accessible to the police. The officer who administered the PAS test testified that used mouthpieces were normally discarded in the trash. Thus, any subjective expectation defendant may have had that his right to privacy would be preserved was unreasonable. (*People v. Thomas* (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 338.)

Merely declining ownership of the items searched (e.g., cellphones) by itself, while a factor to consider, is not enough by itself to show that the defendant did not have standing. (*United States v. Lopez-Cruz* (9th Cir. 2013) 730 F.3rd 803, 808-809.)

See “*Disclaiming Standing*,” below.

Pinging a victim’s cellphone, using its GPS capabilities to track defendant who had just stolen it in a robbery, was not a **Fourth Amendment** violation. (*People v. Barnes* (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1508, 1517-1519; the case involved no trespassory placing of the GPS into the defendant’s property, and no expectation of privacy violated.

See also **P.C. § 1546** et seq., the “**Electronic Communications Privacy Act**,” which, by statute, greatly restricts law enforcement’s access to electronic communication information from a service provider in California.

And see “*Electronic Tracking Devices (Transmitters) and “Pinging” a Cellphone*,” under “*New and Developing Law Enforcement Technology*” (Chapter 11), below.

The **Fourth Amendment** does not require suppression of evidence developed through use of software targeting peer-to-peer file-sharing networks to identify IP addresses associated with known digital files of child pornography. Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his shared folder, despite his measures to keep contents of computer private. (*People v. Evensen* (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 1020.)

Abandoned Property:

Rule: Abandoning property will generally forestall any later claim of a reasonable expectation of privacy in the item abandoned.

Leaving a cellphone at the scene of a crime negates the suspect's expectation of privacy in the contents of that phone, and is therefore abandoned property despite the suspect's subjective wish to retrieve it, which he fails to act on. "Abandonment . . . is not meant in the strict property-right sense, but rests instead on whether the person so relinquished his interest in the property that he no longer retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in it at the time of the search." (*People v. Daggs* (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 361.)

See also *People v. Juan* (1985) 175 Cal.App.3rd 1064, 1069; defendant had "no reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to his jacket left draped over a chair at an empty table in a restaurant open to the public. . . . Indeed, an individual who leaves behind an article of clothing at a public place most likely hopes that some Good Samaritan will pick up the garment and search for identification in order to return it to the rightful owner. By leaving his jacket unattended in the restaurant, [the defendant] exposed it to the public and he cannot assert that he possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in the pockets of the jacket."

And see *United States v. Nowak* (8th Cir. 2016) 825 F.3rd 946; defendant abandoned his backpack when he fled from police and left it in another's vehicle. The firearm found in the backpack was properly admitted into evidence.

Abandoning a cigarette butt onto a public street constitutes a loss of one's right to privacy in that butt, making it available to law enforcement to recover and test for DNA without a search warrant. (*People v. Gallego* (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 388, 394-398.)

However, tricking a suspect out of an item of personal property and then testing it for DNA can raise other issues, such as whether the abandonment was coerced. But, as noted in *Gallego*, at p. 396,

several courts from other jurisdictions have found such a tactic to be lawful. (See *Commonwealth v. Perkins* (Mass. 2008) 883 N.E.2nd 230; and *Commonwealth v. Bly* (Mass. 2007) 862 N.E.2nd 341; testing cigarette butts and a soda can left behind after an interview with police. *Commonwealth v. Ewing* (Mass 2006) 67 Mass.App.Ct. 531 [854 N.E.2nd 993, 1001; offering defendant cigarettes and a straw during an interrogation. *People v. LaGuerre* (2006) 29 A.D.3rd 822 [815 N.Y.S.2nd 211]; obtaining a DNA sample from a piece of chewing gum defendant voluntarily discarded during a contrived soda tasting test. *State v. Athan* (Wash. 2007) 158 P.3rd 27; DNA obtained from defendant's saliva from licking an envelope he mailed to detectives in a police ruse.)

See also *People v. Thomas* (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 338: There is no privacy right in the mouthpiece of the PAS device, which was provided by the police and where defendant abandoned any expectation of privacy in the saliva he deposited on the device when he failed to wipe it off. Whether defendant subjectively expected that the genetic material contained in his saliva would become known to the police was irrelevant because he deposited it on a police device and thus made it accessible to the police. The officer who administered the PAS test testified that used mouthpieces were normally discarded in the trash. Thus, any subjective expectation defendant may have had that his right to privacy would be preserved was unreasonable.

The *Thomas* court further held that using defendant's DNA taken from the PAS device mouthpiece to legitimately test defendant's blood/alcohol level, with his consent, was not a coercive ruse, and therefore lawful. (*Id.*, at p. 344.)

Leaving all his belongings in a motel room, disappearing in the middle of the night and without making arrangements to extend his stay, it was held that defendant abandoned the motel room, his personal belongings in the room, and his

vehicle in the parking lot. There being no reasonable expectation of privacy in these items due to this abandonment, defendant lost his standing to challenge the warrantless entry. The defendant's actual intent is irrelevant. (*People v. Parson* (2008) 44 Cal.4th 332, 342-348.)

The issue is “whether the person so relinquished his interest in the property that he no longer retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in it at the time of the search.” (*Id.*, at p. 346.)

No standing to challenge the search of containers left by defendant at an auto body shop where defendant was a “mere guest or invitee.” (*People v. Ayala* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 253.)

By throwing his backpack onto the roof of a house upon the approach of police officers, defendant abandoned any expectation of privacy in that backpack that he might have previously had. (*United States v. Juszcyk* (10th Cir. Kan. 2017) 844 F.3rd 1213.)

See “*Abandoned Property*,” under “*Searches of Containers*” (Chapter 13), below.

Abandonment Caused by a “Threatened Illegal Detention:” What happens when the property is abandoned as a direct result of a police officer's attempt to illegally stop and detain a suspect?

The United States Supreme Court resolved a previous three-way split of authority: There is no constitutional violation in a “*threatened unlawful detention*.” The **Fourth Amendment** does not apply to such a situation until the person is actually illegal detained; i.e., when the officer actually catches the defendant or the defendant otherwise submits to the officer's authority (i.e.; he gives up). (*California v. Hodari D.* (1991) 499 U.S. 621 [113 L.Ed.2nd 690].)

Result: Any evidence abandoned (e.g., tossed or dropped) during a foot pursuit of a fleeing suspect, even without any reasonable suspicion justifying a detention (i.e., a “*threatened unlawful detention*”), is admissible as abandoned property (as well as supplying the necessary

“reasonable suspicion” to justify the suspect’s detention upon being caught).

But, if the suspect does not abandon the contraband until *after* he has been caught, and thus illegally detained, then it *is* subject to suppression as “fruit of the poisonous tree;” i.e., the unlawful detention.

Defendant discarding a firearm as officers were attempting to (arguably) illegally arrest him, did not require the suppression of the firearm in that when the gun was discarded, defendant had not yet been “touched,” nor had he “submitted” to the officers. Thus, the **Fourth Amendment** was not yet implicated. (*United States v. McClendon* (9th Cir. 2013) 713 F.3rd 1211, 1214-1217.)

The Court noted that neither a temporary hesitation, nor the officer’s use of a firearm while telling him he was under arrest, alters the rule of *Hodari D.* (*Id.*, at pp. 1216-1217.)

Outside, Common Areas:

Defendant, observed by police officers retrieving contraband from a hole in the ground in the common area behind an apartment complex, did not have any reasonable expectation of privacy in that hole. (*People v. Shaw* (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 833.)

Observation by police of defendant’s growing marijuana plants from a neighbor’s property, even without the neighbor’s knowledge or permission, by looking into defendant’s adjacent backyard, was held to be lawful. Defendant did not have standing to challenge the trespass into the neighbor’s yard, and did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in what was growing in his own yard in that his marijuana plants were plainly visible. (*People v. Claeys* (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 55.)

Indoor, Common Areas:

Bypassing an apartment’s security system by entering the locked common hallways and allowing a drug-sniffing dog to locate the source of an odor of burning marijuana was not illegal. The defendant tenant had no expectation of privacy in the hallways that were accessible to other tenants and their guests. (*State v. Nguyen* (2013) ND 252, 841 N.W.2nd 676; citing, among other

cases, *United States v. Nohara* (9th Cir. 1993) 3 F.3rd 1239, 1241-1242; holding the defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy in hallway of secured apartment building even though the officers may have been trespassing.)

Note also *United States v. Diaz* (2nd Cir. 2017) 854 F.3rd 197, holding that an officer's conclusion that a "common-area stairwell" in an apartment building was a "public place" was reasonable.

Businesses: In evaluating a business, the Supreme Court has held that: "Property used for commercial purposes is treated differently for **Fourth Amendment** purposes from residential property." (*Minnesota v. Carter* (1998) 525 U.S. 83, 90 [142 L.Ed.2nd 373].)

"In the employment context, we have found a reasonable expectation of privacy to exist in an area 'given over to [an employee's] exclusive use.'" (*Schowengerdt v. General Dynamics* (9th Cir. 1987) 823 F.2nd 1328, 1335.) O'Brien's office was given over to O'Brien's exclusive use and contained his personal desk and files; . . ." (*United States v. Taketa* (9th Cir. 1991) 923 F.2nd 665, 671.)

However; "An expectation of privacy in commercial premises . . . is different from, and indeed less than, a similar expectation in an individual's home." (*United States v. SDI Future Health, Inc.* (9th Cir. 2009) 568 F.3rd 684, 695; citing *New York v. Burger* (1987) 482 U.S. 691, 700 [96 L.Ed.2nd 601].)

The employee of a liquor store had no standing to challenge the search of the counter area where she had no expectation of privacy. (*People v. Thompson* (1988) 205 Cal.App.3rd 1503.)

No expectation of privacy in documents seized from another's business premises where the defendant had no control over the business and no possessory interest in the documents at the time of seizure. (*People v. Workman* (1989) 209 Cal.App.3rd 687, 696.)

No standing to challenge the search of containers left by defendant at an auto body shop where defendant was a "mere guest or invitee." (*People v. Ayala* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 253.)

A hospital employee has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the hospital's mailroom. (*United States v. Gonzalez* (9th Cir. 2003) 328 F.3rd 543.)

A business that owns the company's computers may consent to the search of a computer used by an employee, at least when the employee is on notice that he has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the computer he is using. (*United States v. Ziegler* (9th Cir. 2006) 456 F.3rd 1138.)

Contrary to a small, family-owned business over which an individual exercises daily management and control (E.g., see *United States v. Gonzalez* (9th Cir. 2005) 412 F.3rd 1102.), challenging the legality of a search in a large business is much more complicated. Being the owner or manager of a business, alone, is not enough. The defendant must generally show some personal connection to the places being searched and the materials seized. Factors to consider in evaluating this personal connection include, but are not necessarily limited to:

- Whether the item seized is personal property or otherwise kept in a private place separate from other work-related material.
- Whether the defendant had custody or immediate control of the item when officers seized it.
- Whether the defendant took precautions on his own behalf to secure the place searched or things seized from any interference without authorization.

(*United States v. SDI Future Health, Inc.* (9th Cir. 2009) 568 F.3rd 684, 698.)

Renting with a Stolen Credit Card: Under California law, one who rents a hotel room with a stolen credit card does not have standing to challenge an unlawful entry of the room by law enforcement. (*People v. Satz* (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 322.)

However, the Ninth Circuit has developed the rule that use of a stolen credit card alone is insufficient to negate the person's expectation of privacy in his room. There has to be evidence that the management has, or was at least intending to, evict the tenant for that reason before the tenant's expectation of privacy in his room becomes unreasonable. (See *United States v. Dorais* (9th Cir. 2001) 241 F.3rd 1124, 1127-1128.)

Despite renting a motel room with a stolen credit card, the defendant did not lose his standing to challenge an unlawful entry until the motel's manager took some

affirmative steps to repossess the room. (*United States v. Bautista* (9th Cir. 2004) 362 F.3rd 584.)

Also, a defendant has not lost his expectation of privacy in his hotel room (which was later, after the fact, discovered to have been rented with a stolen credit card) by the hotel locking him out when he was locked out pursuant to a policy to do so after a dangerous weapon (a firearm) was found in the room by hotel employees. Locking him out, in this case, was not done with the intent to evict him. The fact that he was arrested before his room was searched also does not diminish his expectation of privacy in the room. Lastly, use of the stolen credit card did not negate the defendant's expectation of privacy when its use was not known at the time, and therefore did not cause an intent to evict him because of its use. (*United States v. Young* (9th Cir. 2009) 573 F.3rd 711, 715-720.)

Another panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal reached the opposite result under similar circumstances, finding that a person *does not* have standing in a hotel room rented with a fraudulent credit card and other fraudulent documents. (*United States v. Cunag* (9th Cir. 2004) 386 F.3rd 888.)

Note: This case may perhaps be differentiated from *Bautista* and *Young* because in *Bautista*, the hotel manager was still trying to work out some method of payment. And in *Young*, there was no attempt by the hotel manager, who at the time was unaware that the credit card used to rent the room was stolen, to evict defendant.

See also *United States v. King* (2010) 693 F.Supp.2nd 1200: A justified eviction from a hotel room ended any expectation of privacy defendant may have had in the room, or in any of the contents of that room, justifying a warrantless entry and search of the room by FBI agents.

However, using counterfeit money to rent a motel room does not deprive the defendant of standing to challenge the warrantless entry of her motel room unless there is some proof that the defendant knew that the money she used was counterfeit (i.e., no intent to defraud) and that the motel manager has already attempted to evict the defendant or seek the help of law

enforcement in such an eviction. (*People v. Munoz* (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 126.)

Disclaiming Standing:

Rule: Generally, anyone who disclaims ownership of the place or item being searched will normally be held to have disclaimed standing in the process. (*People v. Mendoza* (1986) 176 Cal.App.3rd 1127; and *People v. Dasilva* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3rd 43; *People v. Scott* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 405.)

Denying possession or ownership in a briefcase found in a vehicle defendant was driving deprived that defendant of the right to later challenge the legality of the warrantless search of that briefcase. (*United States v. Decoud* (9th Cir. 2006) 456 F.3rd 996.)

Exceptions: In cases that almost eat up the rule, disclaiming standing is generally held to be but one factor to consider.

Disclaimer is but one factor to consider when determining whether defendant had standing. (*People v. Allen* (1993) 17 Cal.App.3rd 1214.)

United States v. Hawkins (11th Cir. 1982) 681 F.2nd 1343, at p. 1346, has been used in both published and unreported California cases: “[A] disclaimer of ownership, while indeed strong indication that a defendant does not expect the article to be free from government intrusion, is not necessarily the hallmark for deciding the substance of a **fourth amendment** claim.”

After the defendant was stopped by border agents, he told the agents that the car he was driving belonged to a friend. There were two cell phones in the center console. In response to questioning by the agents, the defendant said the phones also belonged to a friend. After being given permission to search the phones, the agents then answered incoming calls and pretended to be the defendant. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained when the agents answered the phone. The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court that the location of the phones in the car suggested that the defendant was in possession of them and were being used by him at the time of the encounter. The agents apparently thought likewise since

they asked defendant for consent before seizing the phone. The Court of Appeal noted that defendant had made no effort to get rid of the phones when he was stopped. Nothing suggested that defendant did not legitimately possess the phones. The Court of Appeal concluded the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the phones. (*People v. Lopez-Cruz* (9th Cir. 2003) 730 F.3rd 803, 807-808.)

And see *United States v. Stephens* (9th Cir. 2000) 206 F.3rd 914, where the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal has held that even denial of standing (i.e.; “*That ain’t mine.*”) concerning seized property during an illegal detention will not keep that property from being suppressed as the product of the unlawful detention.

Also, denial by a defendant that he possessed a gun, allegedly recovered by police from his waistband, did not defeat defendant’s claim of standing when he later challenged the search of his person. (*People v. Dachino* (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1429.)

Merely declining ownership of the items searched (e.g., cellphones) by itself, while a factor to consider, is not enough by itself to show that the defendant did not have standing, at least where there is nothing to indicate that he wasn’t in permissive possession of the item searched. (*United States v. Lopez-Cruz* (9th Cir. 2013) 730 F.3rd 803, 808-809.)

Denying owning any vehicles and telling officers that the vehicle in issue did not belong to him did not prevent him from claiming standing to contest the warrantless search of that vehicle. That’s because there was no proof that he hadn’t borrowed the car, or was otherwise in lawful possession of it. (*People v. Casares* (2016) 62 Cal.4th 808, 835-836.)

On Appeal: Whether or not an individual’s expectation of privacy was objectively reasonable is reviewed by an appellate court “*de novo.*” (*United States v. Bautista* (9th Cir. 2004) 362 F.3rd 584, 588-589.)

Reasonableness; Evaluated for Purposes of Search & Seizure:

Rule: As the U.S. Supreme Court has reiterated many times: “The touchstone of the **Fourth Amendment** is reasonableness. [Citation] The **Fourth Amendment** does not proscribe all state-initiated searches and seizures; it merely proscribes those which are unreasonable.” (*Florida v. Jimeno* (1991) 500 U.S. 248, 250 [114 L.Ed.2nd 297]; see also *Brigham City v. Stuart* (2006) 547 U.S. 398, 403 [164 L.Ed.2nd 650]; *Michigan v. Fisher* (2009) 558 U.S. 45, 47 [130 S.Ct. 546, 548; 175 L.Ed.2nd 410]; *County of Los Angeles v. Mendez* (May 30, 2017) ___ U.S. ___, ___ [137 S.Ct. 1539; 198 L.Ed.2nd 52]; see also *People v. Robinson* (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1104, 1119-1120; *People v. Robinson* (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 232, 246.)

Determining Reasonableness: The reasonableness of a search is determined by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests. (*United States v. Knights* (2001) 534 U.S. 112, 118-119 [151 L.Ed.2nd 497, 505]; *People v. Robinson* (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 232, 246.)

See *People v. Smith* (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1354, where it was held that a public strip search of a probationer or parolee may in fact be unreasonable. But lowering a parolee’s pants and pulling back the elastic band of his underwear only to the extent necessary to see the crotch area, while shielding the suspect from public view, is neither a strip search nor unreasonable.

Taking blood samples from a convicted person in the mistaken belief that the **DNA and Forensic Identification Data Base and Data Bank Act of 1998** authorizes it, when the defendant is in fact a prisoner with a reduced expectation of privacy, is not unreasonable and does not require suppression of the result. (*People v. Robinson* (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1104, 1119-1120.)

The standard to be applied when evaluating the legality of the length of time a suspect is deprived of his property pending a search is one of “reasonableness,” taking into account the “totality of the circumstances,” and not necessarily requiring that the Government pursue the least intrusive course of action. Determining reasonableness requires a “balancing test,” balancing “the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.” (Citations omitted; *United States v. Sullivan* (9th Cir. 2015) 797 F.3rd 623, 633; finding 21 days to be reasonable during which time the defendant’s laptop was in law enforcement custody, in that defendant was in custody at the

time so he couldn't use it anyway, was subject to a **Fourth** waiver, gave consent, and where the computer had to be transferred to a different agency to conduct the necessary forensic search.)

The Officer's Intentions:

Old Rule: Evaluating any **Fourth Amendment** search and seizure issue involved analyzing the law enforcement officer's actions *both* from a "*subjective*" (i.e., in the officer's own mind) and "*objective*" (as viewed by a reasonable person) viewpoint. If a contested search or seizure was not both *subjectively* held and *objectively* reasonable, the search or seizure would be found to be illegal. (See *Katz v. United States* (1967) 389 U.S. 347, 3612 [19 L.Ed.2nd 576, 588].)

New Rule; Subjective Motivations are Irrelevant: A police officer's *subjective* motivations (or even his ignorance of the legality of the reasons) for conducting a search or seizure are irrelevant. The only issue is whether the **Fourth Amendment** was in fact violated. In other words, was a search or arrest lawful according to some statute or constitutional principle, even though the officer was not aware of it, or even thought, in his own mind, he believed he was in violation of the applicable law or principle? If the answer is "yes," then (with limited exceptions, see below), the search or arrest is lawful. (*Whren v. United States* (1996) 517 U.S. 806 [135 L.Ed.2nd 89].)

“Reasonableness ... is measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances’ [citation], and ‘whether a particular search meets the reasonableness standard “‘is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's **Fourth Amendment** interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’” [Citations.]” (*People v. Robinson* (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1104, 1120 [104 Cal. Rptr. 3d 727, 224 P.3d 55]; see *Bell v. Wolfish* (1979), 441 U.S. 520 at p. 559 [“Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted.”]’.)” (*People v. Boulter* (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 761.)

Pretext Stops: *Whren v. United States*, *supra*, involved the use of a "*pretext*" to make a traffic stop (i.e., using a traffic infraction when the officers' real motivation involved an issue not supported by the necessary reasonable suspicion), the U.S. Supreme Court deciding such a tactic was lawful so long as there was some lawful reason justifying the stop.

See "*Pretext Stops*," under "*Detentions*" (Chapter 3), above.

“Posse Comitatus;” Use of the Military by Civilian Law Enforcement:

The Act: The so-called “*Posse Comitatus Act*” (“PCA”) provides, in part; “[w]hoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.” (18 U.S.C. § 1385; see *United States v. Dreyer* (9th Cir. 2015) 804 F.3rd 1266, 1272.)

See also 10 U.S.C. § 375: “The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to ensure that any activity (including the provision of any equipment or facility or the assignment or detail of any personnel) . . . does not include or permit direct participation by a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps in a search, seizure, arrest, or other similar activity unless participation in such activity by such member is otherwise authorized by law.” (*United States v. Dreyer, supra.*)

“Although the PCA does not directly reference the Navy or Marine Corps,’ Congress prohibits ‘Navy involvement in enforcing civilian laws.’” (*United States v. Dreyer, supra*, quoting *United States v. Chon* (9th Cir. 2000) 210 F.3rd 990, at 993; see also *United States v. Hitchcock* (9th Cir. 2002) 286 F.3rd 1064, 1069-1070; the Navy and Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) is bound by the PCA-like restrictions mandated by § 375.)

A civilian special agent of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) is also bound by the PCA-like restrictions. (*United States v. Dreyer, supra*, at p. 1274.)

“*Posse*” means “*to be able*,” or “*to have power*.” “*Comitatus*” means “*county*.” At common law, “*Posse Comitatus*” referred to the power of the sheriff to summon aid from every male in the county over 15 years of age and not infirm to assist in preserving the peace. (See *People v. Bautista* (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 229, 233, fn. 2.)

Note: The federal Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal interprets “*Posse Comitatus*” as meaning “*power of the country*,” as opposed to “*county*.” (*United States v. Dreyer, supra.*)

Some states, including California, still retain one form or another of this power. (See P.C. § 150; making it an infraction for any able-bodied person over the age of 18 to fail to assist a law enforcement officer requesting such assistance.)

Prohibited Activity:

DoDD 5525.5 § E4.1.3.4: Restrictions on direct assistance by military personnel in local criminal investigations : The use of military personnel for surveillance or pursuit of individuals, or as undercover agents, informants, investigators, or interrogators.

Activities which constitute an active role in direct law enforcement include the investigation of a crime. (*United States v. Red Feather* (D.S.D. 1975) 932 F.Supp. 916, 925.)

Exceptions:

Four categories of people are exempt from the PCA-like restrictions:

- (1) Members of reserve components when not on active duty;
- (2) Members of the National Guard when not in the Federal Service;
- (3) Civilian employees of Department of Defense (DoD) unless under the direct command and control of a military officer; *and*
- (4) Military service members when off duty and in a private capacity. (*United States v. Dreyer* (9th Cir. 2015) 804 F.3rd 1266, 1273-1274; citing *United States v. Chon* (9th Cir. 2000) 210 F.3rd 990.)

But see **32 C.F.R. §§ 182.3 and 182.6(a)(1)(iii)(A)**, defining “*DoD personnel*” as “Federal military officers and enlisted personnel and civilian employees of the Department of Defense.” These regulations state that “DoD personnel are prohibited from providing [specified] forms of direct civilian law enforcement assistance,” including “search or seizure”; “[e]vidence collection”; “[s]urveillance . . . of individuals [or] items, . . . or acting as undercover agents, informants, [or] investigators”; and “[f]orensic investigations or other testing of evidence obtained from a suspect for use in a civilian law enforcement investigation in the United States unless there is a DoD nexus.”. The new regulations expressly “[a]ppl[y] to civilian employees of the DoD Components,” and “to all actions of DoD personnel worldwide.” (**32 C.F.R. §§**

182.2(e), 182.4(c). The Secretary of Defense instituted these regulations under express congressional delegation (see **10 U.S.C. § 375**), and they unambiguously interpret PCA-like restrictions to apply to civilian employees of DoD. (*United States v. Dreyer, supra*, at p. 1274.)

See statutory exceptions at **10 U.S.C. §§ 372-374, 379-382.**

There is no violation where the military merely supplies equipment, logistical support, and backup security. (*United States v. Klimavicius-Viloria* (9th Cir. 1998) 144 F.3rd 1249, 1259; *United States v. Khan* (9th Cir. 1994) 35 F.3rd 426, 431-432.)

“PCA-like restrictions prohibit direct military involvement in civilian law enforcement activities, but they permit some indirect assistance, such as involvement that arises ‘during the normal course of military operations or other actions that ‘do not subject civilians to the use of military power that is regulatory, prescriptive, or compulsory.’” (*United States v. Dreyer, supra*, at p. 1274; quoting *United States v. Hitchcock* (9th Cir. 2002) 286 F.3rd 1064, 1069.)

Purpose: The federal Act was enacted to prevent the use of federal military personnel to help enforce civilian law, thus preventing the U.S. Government from becoming “a government of force,” i.e., run by the military. (*People v. Bautista, supra*, at p. 233, fn. 2.)

“The statute ‘eliminate[s] the direct active use of Federal troops by civil law authorities,’ *United States v. Banks*, 539 F.2nd 14, 16 (9th Cir. 1976), and ‘prohibits Army and Air Force military personnel from participating in civilian law enforcement activities,’ (*United States v. Chon* ((9th Cir. 2000)) 210 F.3rd (990) at 993.” (*United States v. Dreyer, supra*.)

In 1981, Congress amended the *Posse Comitatus Act* to allow for certain military assistance in fighting the war on drugs. (See **18 U.S.C. §§ 371-378**) However, these statutes were specifically “not [to] include or permit direct participation by a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps in a search, seizure, arrest, or other similar activity unless participation in such activity by such member is otherwise authorized by law.” (**18 U.S.C. § 375**)

“[R]egular and systematic assistance by military investigative agents to civilian law enforcement in the investigation of local drug traffic” raises issues as to whether the “*Posse Comitatus Act*” has been violated. (*People v. Blend* (1981) 121 Cal.App.3rd 215, 228.)

Case Law:

In *People v. Blend* (1981) 121 Cal.App.3rd 215, 225-228, it was held that the *Posse Comitatus Act* was *not* violated when an active duty WAVE assisted local law enforcement with arranging the purchase of cocaine from the defendant, despite the cooperation of the Naval Investigative Service (NIS) which permitted the investigation to proceed on the base, provided the investigator with passes, and assisted in appellant's arrest.

Per the Court, the WAVE acted on her own initiative as a private citizen. Moreover, she was not regularly involved in law enforcement activities with the military, and her usefulness to civil law enforcement was unrelated to the fact that she was a WAVE.

The court also found that the cooperation by the NIS in permitting the investigation of appellant to continue on the base did not demonstrate a violation of the act, and there was no evidence that the NIS arranged or participated in a program to detect violation of the civil narcotics laws.

In *People v. Bautista* (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 229, 232-237, use of an Army sergeant and his drug-sniffing dog that alerted on the defendant's storage locker in which 100 pounds of marijuana was later found, did not constitute a violation of the "*Posse Comitatus Act*" because the sergeant did not participate in any stage of the investigation and search other than to point out the location of the defendant's hidden drugs by smelling odors in a public place.

An agent of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) launched an investigation for online criminal activity by anyone in the State of Washington, whether connected with the military or not, and found evidence that defendant was trafficking in child pornography but was not a member of the military. The agent passed along the information to local law enforcement which obtained a search warrant for defendant's computer and, when child pornography was found on his computer, indicted him in federal court. The Ninth Circuit ruled that NCIS and its civilian agents are subject to **Posse Comitatus Act (PCA)**-like restrictions under **10 U.S.C. § 375**, proscribing direct assistance to civilian law enforcement. The NCIS agent's investigation in this case violated these **PCA**-like restrictions in that it was not limited to members of the military, but monitored all computers in a geographical area. Application of the exclusionary rule to suppress child pornography evidence found on defendant's computer, however, was not warranted in that it was not shown that suppression was necessary to prevent future violations. The

military was best suited to correct the violation and had initiated steps to do so. (*United States v. Dreyer* (9th Cir. 2015) 804 F.3rd 1266, 1272-1281.)

Sanctions for Violations: It is questionable whether the use of the *Exclusionary Rule* is a proper sanction for a violation of the “**Posse Comitatus Act**.”

The Fourth Circuit in *United States v. Walden* (4th Cir. 1974) 490 F.2nd 372, 376-377, found no indication of widespread violation of the Act or its policy and declined to adopt an exclusionary rule. The court stated that the statute was previously little known, that there was no evidence that the violation in this case was deliberate or intentional, that the policy expressed in the *Posse Comitatus Act* is for the benefit of the nation as a whole, and not designed to protect the personal rights of defendants. Noting that a rationale for adopting an exclusionary rule for **Fourth Amendment** violations is that available alternative remedies have proved ineffectual, the court expressed confidence that the military would take steps to ensure enforcement of the **Act**.

However, the Court noted at page 377; “Should there be evidence of widespread or repeated violations in any future case, or ineffectiveness of enforcement by the military, we will consider ourselves free to consider whether adoption of an exclusionary rule is required as a future deterrent.” (See also *United States v. Wolffs* (5th Cir. 1979) 594 F.2nd 77, 84-85.)

Application of the exclusionary rule to suppress child pornography evidence found on the non-military defendant’s computer by an NCIS agent was not warranted in that it was not shown that suppression was necessary to prevent future violations of the “**Posse Comitatus Act**.” The military was best suited to correct the violation and had initiated steps to do so. (*United States v. Dreyer* (9th Cir. 2015) 804 F.3rd 1266, 1277-1281.)

Chapter 6:

Searches With a Search Warrant:

Search Warrant Defined: A “*search warrant*” is “an order in writing, in the name of the people, signed by a magistrate, directed to a peace officer, commanding him or her to search for a person or persons, a thing or things, or personal property, and bring it before the magistrate.” (P.C. § 1523)

Basic Requirements: “The ‘precise and clear’ words of the **Fourth Amendment** ‘require only three things’ for a valid search warrant:

First, warrants must be issued by neutral, disinterested magistrates.

Second, those seeking the warrant must demonstrate to the magistrate their probable cause to believe that the evidence sought will aid in a particular apprehension or conviction for a particular offense.

Finally, warrants must particularly describe the things to be seized, as well as the place to be searched.” (Italics added; **Bill v. Brewer** (9th Cir. 2015) 799 F.3rd 1295, 1300; citing **Dalia v. United States** (1979) 441 U.S. 238, 255 [60 L.Ed.2nd 177].)

Preference for Search Warrants: No doubt because warrants are commanded by the **Fourth Amendment**, the courts have long shown a preference for using a search warrant whenever possible:

“Our cases have determined that ‘[w]here a search is undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evidence of criminal wrongdoing, ... reasonableness generally requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant.’ (Citations) ‘In the absence of a warrant, a search is reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception to the warrant requirement.’ (Citation) The burden is on the People to establish an exception applies. (Citations.)” (**People v. Macabeo** (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1213.)

“‘[T]he text of the **Fourth Amendment** does not specify when a search warrant must be obtained.’ **Kentucky v. King**, 563 U. S. 452, 459, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 179 L.Ed. 2nd 865 (2011); see also **California v. Acevedo**, 500 U. S. 565, 581, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 114 L.Ed. 2nd 619 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (‘What [the text] explicitly states regarding warrants is by way of limitation upon their issuance rather than requirement of their use’). But ‘this Court has inferred that a warrant must [usually] be secured.’ **King**, 563 U. S., at 459, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 179 L.Ed. 2nd 865.” (**Birchfield v. North Dakota** (June 23, 2016) ___ U.S. ___, ___ [136 S.Ct. 2160;195 L.Ed.2nd 560]; a DUI, blood test case.)

“The **Fourth Amendment** demonstrates a ‘strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant’” (*People v. Harris* (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 671, 682; quoting *Maryland v. Dyson* (1999) 527 U.S. 465, 466 [144 L.Ed.2nd 442].)

“In *Jones v. United States* [(1960)] 362 U.S. 257, 270 [4 L.Ed.2nd 697, 708] this Court, strongly supporting the preference to be accorded searches under a warrant, indicated that in a doubtful or marginal case a search under a warrant may be sustainable where without one it would fall.” (*United States v. Ventresca* (1965) 380 U.S. 102, 106 [13 L.Ed.2nd 684, 687].)

Why Search Warrants are Preferred: There are a number of reasons why use of a search warrant to conduct any search is preferable even in those instances when one might not be legally required. For instance:

1. *Presumption of Lawfulness:* Use of a search warrant raises a presumption in a later motion to suppress evidence (per **P.C. § 1538.5**) that the search was *lawful*. The defense has the burden of proof in attempting to rebut this presumption. (*Theodor v. Superior Court* (1972) 8 Cal.3rd 77, 101; *People v. Kurland* (1980) 28 Cal.3rd 376.)

Burden of Proof: Defendant, as the moving party in attacking a warrant, bears the burden of going forward with the evidence. (*People v. Thompson* (1990) 221 Cal.App.3rd 923, 936-37.) To do so the defendant must not only demonstrate standing (*Ibid.*), he must also prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the search was conducted without a warrant. (*People v. Williams* (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119; *Badillo v. Superior Court* (1956) 46 C.2nd 269.) If, however, the search was supported by a warrant, the burden stays with the defendant. (*Theodor v. Superior Court* (1972) 8 Cal.3rd 77, 101; *People v. Gallo* (1981) 127 Cal.App.3rd 828, 840.) A presumption of validity attaches to a search warrant because it has already been reviewed by a magistrate. (*People v. Hobbs* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 948, 969.) A defendant claiming that the warrant or supporting affidavit is inaccurate or incomplete bears the burden of alleging and then proving the errors or omissions. (*People v. Amador* (2000) 24 Cal.4th 387, 393.)

With the burden of attacking a search warrant upon the defendant, and the necessity of making a “*substantial showing*” even before being allowed to hold an evidentiary hearing (See “*Motion to Traverse*,” “*A Franks Hearing*,” below), it is extremely difficult for a defendant to successfully challenge a search conducted pursuant to a

search warrant. (See *People v. Wilson* (1986) 182 Cal.App.3rd 742.)

“(W)here (the) circumstances are detailed, where reason for crediting the source of the information is given, and when a magistrate has found probable cause, the courts should not invalidate the warrant by interpreting the affidavit in a hypertechnical, rather than a common sense, manner. . . .

(R)esolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants.” (*United States v. Ventresca* (1965) 380 U.S 102, 109 [13 L.Ed.2nd 684, 689].)

This judicially mandated preference for warrants has specifically been adopted by the California Supreme Court. (*People v. Superior Court [Johnson]* (1972) 6 Cal.3rd 704, 711; *People v. Mesa* (1975) 14 Cal.3rd 466, 469.)

Minor, technical errors will not likely result in any sanction. (See (*People v. Stipo* (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 664, 670; listing the wrong time for an occurrence, missing the actual time by 20 minutes.)

The magistrate’s failure to initial that part of a search warrant listing the defendant’s residence, where she did initial those parts of the warrant describing defendant’s person and his vehicle, held to be a “minor technical error rather than evidence of a constitutional deficiency in the contents of the search warrant.” The search of the residence, based upon the search warrant, was upheld where all the circumstances (including the magistrate’s testimony at a suppression hearing) indicated that there was probable cause to search the residence and that the magistrate had intended to approve the search of the residence. (*United States v. Hurd* (9th Cir. 2007) 499 F.3rd 963.)

Motion to Quash: Motion attacking the sufficiency of the *probable cause* in the warrant affidavit as it is written. (**P.C. § 1538.5(a)(1)(B)**)

Normally, only the warrant and affidavit itself may be considered by the trial court in ruling on a motion to quash. An exception might be when a law enforcement officer’s testimony is necessary to interpret some of the language in

the affidavit. (See *People v. Christian* (1972) 27 Cal.App.3rd 554.)

In reviewing the sufficiency of the affidavit on a motion to quash, the reviewing court ordinarily considers only the “four corners” of the affidavit. (See *Whiteley v. Warden* (1971) 401 U.S. 560, 565, fn. 8 [28 L.Ed.2nd 306].) In determining the sufficiency of an affidavit in support of a warrant, the test of probable cause is “whether the facts contained in the affidavit are such as would lead a [person] of ordinary caution or prudence to believe, and conscientiously to entertain, a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused.” (*People v. Kraft* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1041.)

See *People v. Lazarus* (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 734, 763-766; motion to quash denied where affidavit was held to be supported by probable cause despite 23-year lapse between crime and the issuance of a search warrant for defendant’s home, vehicle and computers.

Motion to Traverse: Motion attacking the truth of the information contained in the warrant affidavit. The defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing (i.e., referred to as a “*Franks Hearing*”) under limited circumstances. (*Franks v. Delaware* (1978) 438 U.S. 154 [57 L.Ed.2nd 667].)

A “*Franks Hearing*:” Defendant is entitled to an evidentiary *Franks Hearing only* after making a “*substantial showing*” that:

- The affidavit contains statements (or makes material omissions) that are *deliberately* false or were made with a *reckless* disregard for the truth (*People v. Scott* (2011) 52 Cal.4th 452, 484; *Ewing v. City of Stockton* (9th Cir. 2009) 588 F.3rd 1218, 1223-1228; *Bravo v. City of Santa Maria* (9th Cir. 2011) 665 F.3rd 1076, 1087-1088; *People v. Lazarus* (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 734, 767-768.), (or omitted information which the magistrate would have wanted to know); *and*
- The affidavit’s remaining contents are reevaluated after the false statements are excised (or omitted material information is considered) to see if, as

corrected, there is still sufficient evidence to justify a finding of probable cause. (*Franks v. Delaware* (1978) 438 U.S. 154, 155-156 [57 L.Ed.2nd 667, 672]; precluding the cross-examination of the affiant until the necessary showing is made. See also *People v. Kurland* (1980) 28 Cal.3rd 376, 385-388; *People v. Wilson* (1986) 182 Cal.App.3rd 742, 747; *Theodor v. Superior Court* (1972) 8 Cal.3rd 77, 103; *People v. Cook* (1978) 22 Cal.3rd 67, 78; and *People v. Bradford* (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1297; *People v. Lewis et al.* (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 989; *United States v. Craighead* (9th Cir. 2008) 539 F.3rd 1073, 1080-1082; *Ewing v. City of Stockton* (9th Cir. 2009) 588 F.3rd 1218, 1223-1228); *United States v. Payton* (9th Cir. 2009) 573 F.3rd 859, 861; *People v. Scott* (2011) 52 Cal.4th 452, 475-476; *United States v. Ruiz* (9th Cir. 2014) 758 F.3rd 1144, 1148; *People v. Lazarus* (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 734, 768; *United States v. Ubaldo* (9th Cir. 2017) 859 F.3rd 690, 703.)

Note: If the affidavit is corrected as suggested by the defendant and would still warrant a finding of probable cause, then no *Franks* hearing is required. (*People v. Sandoval* (2015) 62 Cal.4th 394, 409.)

Also note: A negligent or innocent mistake does not warrant suppression. (*United States v. Perkins* (9th Cir. 2017) 850 F.3rd 1109, 1116.)

Or:

- The affidavit contains information that is the direct product of a *Fourth Amendment* violation. (See *People v. Weiss* (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1073.)

Where a defendant's motion to traverse is unaccompanied by any of the evidentiary material required of the moving party the court may properly deny the request for the hearing. Conclusory contradictions of the affiant's statements are insufficient to justify a *Franks* hearing. Even if the defense is able

to establish that the statements were inaccurate, the court properly denies the request if the defense fails to demonstrate that the statements were material to the determination of probable cause. (*People v. Panah* (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 456.)

In a “*Motion to traverse*” a search warrant affidavit, only *intentional* or *reckless* inaccuracies are grounds for sanctions, and in those cases the sanction is limited to striking the inaccurate information, retesting the warrant affidavit for probable cause after striking that information. Unintentional or negligent misstatements are left in the affidavit. (*Franks v. Delaware* (1978) 438 U.S. 154 [57 L.Ed.2nd 667]; *People v. Wilson* (1986) 182 Cal.App.3rd 742; *United States v. Ubaldo* (9th Cir. 2017) 859 F.3rd 690, 703.)

Note: But remember, the defendant must have “*standing*” to challenge the collection of the illegal information in order to contest its inclusion in the warrant affidavit. See “*Standing*,” above.)

See “*Independent Source Doctrine*,” below

Material Omissions: A defendant who challenges a search warrant based upon an affidavit containing *omissions* bears the burden of showing that the omissions would have been material to the magistrates’ determination of probable cause. (*People v. Bradford* (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1297; *People v. Lazarus* (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 734, 768; *People v. Lee* (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 161, 171-172; *United States v. Perkins* (9th Cir. 2017) 850 F.3rd 1109, 1116.)

“To prevail on a *Franks* challenge, the defendant must establish two things by a preponderance of the evidence: first, that ‘the affiant officer intentionally or recklessly made false or misleading statements or omissions in support of the warrant[.]’ and second, that the false or misleading statement or omission was material, i.e., ‘necessary to finding probable

cause.’ *United States v. Martinez-Garcia*, 397 F.3d 1205, 1214-15 (9th Cir. 2005). If both requirements are met, ‘the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded . . .’ *Franks*, 438 U.S. at 156.” (*United States v. Perkins*, supra.)

“Omissions or misstatements resulting from negligence or good faith mistakes will not invalidate an affidavit which on its face establishes probable cause.” (*Ewing v. City of Stockton* (9th Cir. 2009) 588 F.3rd 1218, 1224.)

Neglecting to include an informant’s criminal history could invalidate a warrant, in that the magistrate’s decision will usually require a determination of the informant’s credibility. (*United States v. Reeves* (9th Cir. 2000) 210 F.3rd 1041.)

Omitting facts which would have *supported* a finding of probable cause had it been included is *not* grounds to traverse a warrant. (*People v. Lim* (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1289.)

“Facts omitted from a search warrant affidavit are ‘not material’ if ‘there is no ‘substantial possibility they would have altered a reasonable magistrate’s probable cause determination,’ and their omission did not ‘make the affidavit[s] substantially misleading.’” (*People v. Lazarus* (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 734, 768; citing *People v. Eubanks* (2011) 53 Cal.4th 110, 136.)

Intentional or reckless misstatements and/or omissions in a search warrant affidavit are material errors whenever a magistrate would not have found probable cause absent those errors, and may result in potential civil liability for the affiant. (*Chism v. Washington State* (9th Cir. 2011) 661 F.3rd 380; where had the information been reported to the magistrate correctly, it would have been apparent that other parties had used the plaintiffs’ previously stolen credit card to purchase child pornography.)

For a plaintiff in a civil lawsuit to survive a summary judgment motion where it is alleged that there were material misstatements or omission in a search warrant, he must make a *substantial showing* that there were misstatements and/or omissions in the warrant affidavit that were either *deliberately* or *recklessly* included (or, for an omission, excluded), and that but for the misstatements or omissions, the warrant not would have been approved by the magistrate. Purely negligent or unintentional mistakes in a search warrant affidavit are irrelevant to the validity of the warrant. In this case, the Court had no difficulty finding that the affiant's misstatements and omissions were at the very least reckless. (*Ibid.*)

The affiant's failure to disclose that the plaintiff's son was in jail at the time of the issuance of the warrant, and for over six months prior, and therefore not only was not present in the home, but moreover could not have been involved in a described shooting or the storage of weapons used in it. Plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue as to whether a detective's omission of this material fact was intentional or reckless, as opposed to merely negligent. Had the omitted facts of the son's two-year sentence and custody status been included, it was extremely doubtful that an issuing judge would simply have issued the warrant or authorized nighttime service without more information. (*Bravo v. City of Santa Maria* (9th Cir. 2011) 665 F.3rd 1076, 1083-1088.)

Omitting an informant's entire criminal history from a warrant affidavit may be grounds to invalidate the warrant. However, the warrant is still valid so long as that information wasn't intentionally or recklessly left out, *or* if it wouldn't have made a difference to the magistrate even if he'd known. (*Garcia v. County of Merced* (9th Cir. 2011) 639 F.3rd 1206, 1211-1212.)

Failing to include in a warrant affidavit information about one of the witnesses connections to drug trafficking was held to be a material omission that was “recklessly” left out. However, there was found to sufficient probable cause when added to the affidavit in that the witness’ information was sufficiently corroborated by other witnesses and the physical evidence. (*United States v. Ruiz* (9th Cir. 2014) 758 F.3rd 1144, 1148-1152.)

Where there was evidence that a suspect used the victim’s credit card without his permission, there was no error in the affiant not including in the affidavit her (the affiant’s) working relationship with the victim (a fellow sheriff’s deputy), the victim and the suspect’s ongoing custody dispute (having had two children together), and the extent of the victim’s and the suspect’s financial intermingling. None of these facts were the type that, even if known by the magistrate, would have prevented him from finding probable cause. (*Cameron v. Craig* (9th Cir. 2013) 713 F.3rd 1012, 1019-1020.)

See *People v. Lazarus* (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 734, 767-769; finding no material omissions or misrepresentations in two affidavits in search warrants for defendant’s residence, vehicles and computers in warrants issued 23 years after defendnat’s crime.

In a search warrant authorizing law enforcement to seize firearms from defendant, it was not material under the **Fourth Amendment** that the affiant failed to include information in the affidavit that defendant had purchased the guns almost 17 years before the current prosecution and six years before the conviction that made it illegal for him to possess guns, in that probable cause was sufficiently established by evidence that defendant was prohibited from owning any firearms and that guns were currently registered to him without the necessity of showing when he’d obtained the guns. Also, defendant did not make the necessary substantial showing required for a *Franks* hearing

because the failure to include the timing information in the warrant affidavit did not establish a reckless disregard for the truth in the absence of any evidence that defendant had disposed of the guns, that the registration information was inaccurate, or that the omitted purchase date was relevant. (*People v. Lee* (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 161, 169-176.)

“A defendant can challenge a search warrant by showing that the affiant deliberately or recklessly omitted material facts that negate probable cause when added to the affidavit.” (*People v. Eubanks* (2011) 53 Cal.4th 110, 136.) However, while “(e)very falsehood makes an affidavit inaccurate, . . . not all omissions do so.” Only material or relevant adverse facts need to be included in a warrant affidavit. “[F]acts are ‘material’ and hence must be disclosed if their omission would make the affidavit *substantially misleading*. On review under (**P.C.**) **section 1538.5**, facts must be deemed material for this purpose if, because of their inherent probative force, there is a substantial possibility they would have altered a reasonable magistrate's probable cause determination.” (*People v. Kurland* (1980) 28 Cal.3d 376, 385.) Conclusory allegations that admittedly were based upon assumptions only are insufficient to justify a *Franks* hearing. The fact that police had obtained a search warrant for someone else's house based upon other evidence that someone other than defendant had committed the murder that defendant was suspected of committing did not detract from the later developed probable cause to believe defendant was the killer. Also, the failure to include a witness' complete criminal history, particularly when the magistrate already had information as to the witness' illegal activities, was not a material omission. (*People v. Sandoval* (2015) 62 Cal.4th 394, 405-412.)

2. *Presumption of Unlawfulness Without a Warrant*: The absence of a search warrant raises a presumption that the search was *unlawful*, which the prosecution is required to rebut. (*Mincey v. Arizona* (1978) 437 U.S. 385, 390 [57 L.Ed.2nd 290, 298-299]; *In re Tyrell J.* (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68, 76, overruled on other grounds.)

The prosecution bears the burden of providing proof of a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, justifying a warrantless search. (*Welsh v. Wisconsin* (1984) 466 U.S. 740, 749-750 [80 L.Ed.2nd 732, 742-743]; *People v. James* (1977) 19 Cal.3rd 99, 106.)

3. *Good Faith*: Evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant will not be suppressed even if the warrant was defective so long as the officers acted in reasonable and objective good faith in relying upon the warrant and serving it. (*United States v. Leon* (1984) 468 U.S. 897 [82 L.Ed.2nd 677]; *Massachusetts v. Sheppard* (1984) 468 U.S. 981 [82 L.Ed.2nd 737]; *People v. Rodrigues-Fernandez* (1986) 182 Cal.App.3rd 742; *United States v. Crews* (9th Cir. 2007) 502 F.3rd 1130; *Messerschmidt et al. v. Millender* (2012) 565 U.S. 535 [132 S.Ct. 1235; 182 L.Ed.2nd 47]; *United States v. Schesso* (9th Cir. 2013) 730 F.3rd 1040, 1050-1051; *Armstrong v. Asselin* (9th Cir. 2013) 734 F.3rd 984, 989-995; *United States v. Schesso* (9th Cir. 2013) 730 F.3rd 1040, 1050-1051; *United States v. Needham* (9th Cir. 2013) 718 F.3rd 1190; 1194; (*People v. Lazarus* (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 734, 766-767.)

History: See *People v. Macabeo* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1219-1223, for a history of the Good Faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

Exclusionary Rule Restricted: The Exclusionary Rule is “restricted to those situations in which its remedial purpose is effectively advanced.” (*Illinois v. Krull* (1987) 480 U.S. 340, 347 [94 L.Ed.2nd 364, 373].)

“The good faith exception rests on the premise that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter official misconduct by depriving the state of the fruits of unlawful searches.” (*People v. Arredondo* (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 186, 208.)

Note: Petition for Review was granted by the California Supreme Court in *People v. Arredondo* on June 8, 2016, making this case unavailable for citation.

The good faith reliance upon a state statute allowing for a warrantless administrative search was justified where the statute was not obviously unconstitutional. (*Illinois v.*

Krull, supra; see also *Michigan v. DeFillippo* (1979) 443 U.S. 31, 37-38, and fn. 3 [61 L.Ed.2nd 343, 439-350]; good faith reliance on an ordinance that was later declared to be unconstitutional. See also *People v. Arredondo* (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 186, 206-210.)

In evaluating the applicability of “good faith reliance upon a statute, two questions must be answered: (1) Does substantial evidence support a finding that the officer relied on the statute, and (2) was such reliance “reasonable” for purposes of the good faith exception? (*Id.*, at p. 208.)

Note: Petition for Review was granted by the California Supreme Court in *People v. Arredondo* on June 8, 2016, making this case unavailable for citation.

Application of the Exclusionary Rule is *unwarranted* where it would *not* result in appreciable deterrence to unlawful police conduct. (*Arizona v. Evans* (1995) 514 U.S. 1 [131 L.Ed.2nd 34]; An arrest based upon erroneous court records.)

The Exclusionary Rule should not be applied to evidence obtained by a police officer whose reliance on a search warrant issued by a neutral magistrate was objectively reasonable, even though the warrant was ultimately found to be defective. (*United States v. Leon* (1984) 468 U.S. 897 [82 L.Ed.2nd 677]; see also *Massachusetts v. Sheppard* (1984) 468 U.S. 981 [82 L.Ed.2nd 737].)

Similarly, the alleged unconstitutionality of a statute, the violation for which serves as the basis for a search warrant, is irrelevant so long as officers reasonably relied upon the statute’s validity at the time of the obtaining of the search warrant. (*United States v. Meek* (9th Cir. 2004) 366 F.3rd 705, 714.)

An officer’s reasonable reliance upon the advice of a prosecutor, although not conclusive, is some evidence of good faith. (*Dixon v. Wallowa County* (9th Cir. 2003) 336 F.3rd 1013, 1019; see also *Stevens v. Rose* (9th Cir. 2002) 298 F.3rd 880, 884.)

See also *Johnston v. Koppes* (9th Cir. 1988) 850 F.2nd 594, 596, listing four relevant factors in evaluating the officer's good faith reliance on advice of a lawyer:

- Whether the attorney was independent;
- Whether the advice addressed the constitutionality of the proposed action;
- Whether the attorney had all the relevant facts; *and*
- Whether the advice was sought before or after the officer's actions.

A defective search warrant description (i.e., lack of particularity) may be cured where the affidavit supplies the necessary particularity. However, the government has the burden of proving that the officers who executed the warrant read and were guided by the contents of the affidavit. (*United States v. SDI Future Health, Inc.* (9th Cir. 2009) 568 F.3rd 684, 706; citing *United States v. Luk* (9th Cir. 1988) 859 F.2nd 667, 677.)

“(A) warrant issued by a magistrate normally suffices to establish’ that a law enforcement officer has ‘acted in good faith in conducting the search.” “(E)vidence seized will not be excluded where officers rely on warrants that are later ruled to be invalid if their reliance was objectively reasonable.” (Citations omitted; *People v. Stipo* (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 664, 673.)

A search warrant affidavit that was held to be insufficient due to a lack of detail in the affidavit, using information from three informants what was conclusory only, and that corroborated each other only as to “pedestrian facts” that could have been known to anyone, was saved by the “good faith” rule because a reasonable officer could have been let to believe the warrant was good due to prior cases holding that information from unconnected informants may be enough to establish probable cause. (*People v. French* (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1307, 1323-1325.)

The federal Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, in a split 2-1 decision, found the warrantless, extended, accessing of two of defendants’ cell-site data (221 days’ worth of cell site location information [CLSI], which itself yielded an impressive 29,659 location data points for defendant

Graham and 28,410 for co-defendant Jordan, enough to provide a “reasonably detailed account of their movements” during the intervals covered by the disclosure orders) amounted to an unconstitutional search under the **Fourth Amendment**. Officers obtained court orders pursuant to the “**Stored Communications Act**” (18 U.S.C. § 2703(d)), but not search warrants. The resulting information was used against the defendants at trial. The Appellate Court refused, however, to order the suppression of the collected information because of the **Fourth Amendment’s** “*good faith*” exception, and thus affirmed both the defendants’ convictions of various charges associated with a series of armed robberies. (*United States v. Graham* (4th Cir. 2015) 796 F.3rd 332.)

However, it was held that police lacked a “good faith” basis for the search of defendant’s residence that was separate from the residence listed in the search warrant, but from which it was believed that defendant used the same IP address, even assuming there was a wireless signal extending from the identified residence to defendant’s residence, because they had no actual evidence to support the belief that defendant had a password to the network or that he had accessed it in any fashion. (*People v. Nguyen* (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 574, 586-587.)

Civil Cases and Qualified Immunity: The standards applicable to the “Good Faith” exception in a criminal case are the same as used in civil cases where it is found that “*qualified immunity*” protects an officer from civil liability. (*United States v. Needham* (9th Cir. 2013) 718 F.3rd 1190; 1194-1195.)

Exceptions to the Good Faith Rule: However; “A police officer may not shift all of the responsibility for the protection of an accused’s **Fourth Amendment** rights to the magistrate by executing a warrant no matter how deficient it may be in describing the places to be searched and the items to be seized. An officer applying for a warrant is required to exercise reasonable professional judgment. [Citations]” (*People v. Bradford* (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1292.) Pursuant to *United States v. Leon* (1984) 468 U.S. 897, 922-923 [82 L.Ed.2nd 677, 698-699, and other cases (see below), the “*Good Faith*” exception *does not* apply when:

- *This Magistrate was Misled:* The magistrate issuing the search warrant was *misled* by information in the affidavit

that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for a reckless disregard for the truth. (See *United States v. Crews* (9th Cir. 2007) 502 F.3rd 1130, 1138-1139.)

This probably applies to material omissions in the warrant affidavit as well. (*United States v. Flores* (9th Cir. 1982) 679 F.2nd 173; *United States v. Lefkowitz* (9th Cir. 1980) 618 F.2nd 1313.)

“(S)uppression of evidence is an appropriate remedy only if ‘the magistrate or judge in issuing [the] warrant was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth,’ the affidavit is “‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable,’ or the affidavit is so deficient in particularizing the place to be searched or the things to be seized that the executing officer ‘cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.’ (*Leon, supra*, at p. 923.) In considering the issue, we apply the objective test of ‘whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate’s authorization.’” (*People v. Lazarus* (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 734, 766-767; upholding a search warrant with 23-year-old information constituting the probable cause.)

- *Magistrate Abandoned his Judicial Role*: The issuing magistrate has “*wholly abandoned his judicial role . . .*” to the extent that no reasonably well-trained officer would rely upon the warrant. For example:

Issuing a warrant based upon a “*bare bones*” affidavit; i.e., one written in “*conclusory*,” as opposed to “*factual*,” language. (See *United States v. Harper* (5th Cir. 1986) 802 F.2nd 115; and *United States v. Maggitt* (5th Cir. 1985) 778 F.2nd 1029, 1036.)

Where the judge becomes a part of the searching party, personally authorizing seizures during the

search. (*Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York* (1979) 442 U.S. 319 [602 L.Ed.2nd 920].)

A judge who merely acts as a “*rubber stamp*” signer of warrants, approving anything submitted for issuance. (See *United States v. Brown* (7th Cir. 1987) 832 F.2nd 991; and *Rodriguez v. Superior Court* (1988) 199 Cal.App.3rd 1453.)

- *Lack of Indicia of Probable Cause*: A search warrant affidavit that is so *lacking in the indicia of probable cause* that official belief in the existence of probable cause is entirely unreasonable. (*Malley v. Briggs* (1986) 475 U.S. 335, 344-345 [89 L.Ed.2nd 271]; see also *United States v. Crews* (9th Cir. 2007) 502 F.3rd 1130, 1135-1138; *Messerschmidt et al. v. Millender* (2012) 565 U.S. 535 [132 S.Ct. 1235; 182 L.Ed.2nd 47]; *United States v. Underwood* (9th Cir. 2013) 725 F.3rd 1076, 1081-1088; *United States v. Needham* (9th Cir. 2013) 718 F.3rd 1190; 1194.)

However, “the threshold for establishing this exception is a high one, and it should be.” (*Messerschmidt et al. v. Millender*, *supra.*, at p. 547 [132 S.Ct. at p. 1245].)

E.g.: The “*bare bones*” warrant, written in “*wholly conclusory statements*” as opposed to *factual allegations*. (*United States v. Maggitt*, *supra.*; *United States v. Barrington* (5th Cir. 1986) 806 F.2nd 529, 542; *United States v. Underwood*, *supra.*, and below.)

Delay of 52 days between a controlled buy of almost a pound of marijuana and the execution of a search warrant, despite the officer’s expert opinion and good faith belief that the seller would still have contraband in his residence (the sale taking place in a parking lot in another city), was held to be stale. The officer’s belief was not objectively reasonable, under the circumstances. (*People v. Hulland* (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1646.)

A warrant that failed to identify a particular suspect as an alleged “chemist” arriving from a foreign

country, to provide any basis for the tip that a chemist was coming to the United States, or to describe any activity by the suspect that was indicative of setting up a meth lab, failed to make even a “colorable argument for probable cause.” (*United States v. Luong* (9th Cir. 2006) 470 F.3rd 898.)

Officers obtained a warrant and searched defendant’s home for a firearm that was used in a homicide that had occurred nine months earlier. Defendant himself was not a suspect in the homicide. But it was believed that two of his sons had some connection to it. The officers did not find the firearm from the homicide; however, they did find two other firearms and ammunition, which Grant unlawfully possessed because he was a convicted felon. Disagreeing with the trial court, the Ninth Circuit held that the search warrant affidavit did not establish probable cause that the firearm used in the homicide might be located in defendant’s home. Other than a single conversation between defendant and one of his sons, nothing in the affidavit suggested any connection between the sought-for gun and defendant’s home. The Court further held that the good-faith exception did not apply because the officers’ reliance on the warrant was unreasonable. (*United States v. Grant* (9th Cir. 2012) 682 F.3rd 827, 832-841.)

The trial court was held to have properly suppressed drug trafficking evidence found in defendant’s home because the search warrant was defective under the **Fourth Amendment** in that the affidavit failed to establish probable cause: The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule was per se not met because the affidavit was a bare bones affidavit that was so lacking in indicia of probable cause, relying primarily on unsupported conclusions, that it failed to provide a colorable argument for probable cause. Even assuming the affidavit was not a bare bones affidavit, the good faith exception was not met because an analysis of the totality of the circumstances, including extrinsic factors, established that reliance was objectively

unreasonable. (*United States v. Underwood* (9th Cir. 2013) 725 F.3rd 1076, 1081-1088.)

- *Warrant Deficient*: The warrant is so *lacking in those specifics required of warrants* that it cannot in good faith be presumed valid. (See *Massachusetts v. Shepard* (1984) 468 U.S. 981 [82 L.Ed.2nd 737].)

E.g.: The officer's reliance on the magistrate's probable cause determination is not objectively reasonable. I.e.: Should a reasonably well-trained officer have known that the search warrant was defective despite the magistrate's authorization? (See *People v. Lim* (2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1289, 1296-1297.)

In this regard, it adds to the officer's good faith to have his warrants reviewed and approved by a deputy district attorney prior to taking it to a magistrate. (See *People v. Camarella* (1991) 54 Cal.3rd 592, 602-607.)

- *Affidavit Based on Illegally Collected Information*: Also, "Good Faith" is not applicable when the *information* upon which the warrant is based *was gathered in an earlier illegal search*. (*United States v. Vasey* (9th Cir. 1987) 834 F.2nd 782; *People v. Baker* (1986) 187 Cal.App.3rd 562; *People v. Brown* (1989) 210 Cal.App.3rd 849.)

However, it must be the defendant's own **Fourth Amendment** rights that were violated. (*People v. Weiss* (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1073, 1081.) Information gathered in violation of someone else's **Fourth Amendment** rights, for which this defendant has no standing to challenge, *may* be used in a search warrant affidavit. (*People v. Madrid* (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1888, 1896.)

Exigent Circumstances:

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal has indicated that it might be appropriate to factor in exigent circumstances, such as necessary time restraints, in determining whether the "good faith" exception applies. (*United States v. Weber* (9th Cir. 1990) 923 F.2nd 1338, 1346; *United States*

v. Ramos (9th Cir. 1991) 923 F.2nd 1346, 1355, fn. 18, overruled on other grounds.)

But claiming an exigency as an excuse for applying a good faith exception will not be upheld where the officers don't treat the situation accordingly. (*United States v. Luong* (9th Cir. 2006) 470 F.3rd 898, 904; claiming that the dangerousness of a possible meth lab in a residential area justified application of the good faith exception was rejected when the officers waited seven hours to obtain the warrant and then three more hours before executing it.

See “*Exigent Circumstances*,” under “*Warrantless Searches*” (Chapter 7), below.

Examples:

“*Good Faith*” applied to a warrant where the description of the property to be seized was erroneously left out of the warrant affidavit. (*People v. Rodriguez-Fernandez* (1991) 235 Cal.App.3rd 543; *People v. Alvarez* (1989) 209 Cal.App.3rd 660.)

Failure to restrict the description of the place to be searched to the defendant's room, making the warrant “*over-broad*,” where that room was all that was in fact searched, was excused under the “*good faith*” rule. (*People v. MacAvoy* (1985) 162 Cal.App.3rd 746, 759-763.)

A warrant that failed to identify a particular suspect as an alleged “*chemist*” arriving from a foreign country, to provide any basis for the tip that a chemist was coming to the United States, or to describe any activity by the suspect that was indicative of setting up a meth lab, failed to make even a “*colorable argument for probable cause*.” (*United States v. Luong* (9th Cir. 2006) 470 F.3rd 898.)

An officer's “*good faith*” is not grounds for denying a defendant's motion to suppress based on a violation of the *wiretap statutes* (see below). (*People v. Jackson* (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 129, 153-160.)

4. *Ramey Inapplicable*: Arrests within a residence (See *People v. Ramey* (1976) 16 Cal.3rd 263; above.) during the service of a search warrant may be made without an arrest warrant. (*People v. McCarter* (1981) 117 Cal.App.3rd 894, 908.)

5. *Consensual Searches* may always be stopped by the subject withdrawing his or her consent; i.e., the suspect is in control of the extent and duration of the search. (See *People v. Martinez* (1968) 259 Cal.App.2nd Supp. 943.) Execution of a warrant, obviously, does not require the cooperation of the occupant.

6. *Informants* who do no more than provide probable cause in an affidavit for a search warrant may normally be kept confidential. (E.C. § 1042(b))

7. *Acting in the Performance of His (or Her) Duties*: An officer serving a search warrant, even if later found to be lacking in probable cause, is “acting in the performance of his (or her) duties” should a criminal offense in which this is an element (e.g., P.C. §§ 148 (Resisting Arrest), 243(b) (Battery on a Peace Officer) occur during the service of the warrant. (*People v. Gonzales* (1990) 51 Cal.3rd 1179, 1222.)

Mental Patients Detained per W&I § 5150: Seizure of Weapons:

Warrant Requirement: Although W&I § 8102(a) authorizes the “confiscation” of firearms or other deadly weapons owned, possessed, or under the control of a detained or apprehended mental patient, a search warrant must be used in order to lawfully enter the house and/or to search for weapons in those cases where there are no exigent circumstances and the defendant has not given consent. (*People v. Sweig* (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1145 (petition granted, see below); rejecting the People’s argument that a warrantless entry to search for and seize the detainee’s firearms was justified under law enforcement’s “community caretaking” function.)

P.C. § 1524(a)(10): Search Warrants for Firearms and other Deadly Weapons:

The *Sweig* Court also found, however, that a search warrant is not allowed for under P.C. § 1524 (see “Statutory Grounds for Issuance (P.C. § 1524(a)(1) through (17)),” below) when the defendant is detained pursuant to W&I § 5150 only. The Court suggested that the Legislature should fix the problem with a legislative amendment to **Section 1524**.

As a result, the Legislature amended P.C. § 1524, effective 1/1/2010, to add new **subdivision (a)(10)**, which now lists as a legal ground for the issuance of a search warrant the following: “When the property or things to be seized include a firearm or any other deadly weapon that is owned

by, or in possession of, or in the custody or control of, a person described in **W&I § 8102(a)**.”

The petition to the California Supreme Court on *People v. Sweig* was granted, making this case no longer available for citation, with review being dismissed on 10/11/09 when the above amendment to **P.C. § 1524** was enacted.

Exigent Circumstances: See also *Rupf v. Yan* (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 411, at pages 421-422, where a warrantless seizure of a mental patient’s firearms from his home was not challenged, the Court perhaps inferring an “*exigent circumstance*” when it noted that:

“The exercise of the police power to regulate firearms is clearly related to the public health, safety and welfare. (Citations.) Respondent identifies the object of the statute as providing a means whereby authorities can confiscate firearms in an emergency situation and may keep firearms from mentally unstable persons. The legislative history of the statute expressly recognizes the urgency and importance of such an objective” (*Ibid.*)

Independent Source Doctrine:

Where information later used in a search warrant has been discovered via an illegal search or seizure, the “*Independent Source Doctrine*” allows for the admission of the evidence recovered during the execution of that warrant that has been discovered by means wholly independent of any constitutional violation. (*People v. Weiss* (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1073.)

“[It] teaches us that the interest of society in deterring unlawful police conduct and the public interest in having juries receive all probative evidence of a crime are properly balanced by putting the police in the same, not a worse, position tha[n] they would have been in if no police error or misconduct had occurred. [Citations.] When the challenged evidence has an independent source, exclusion of such evidence would put the police in a worse position than they would have been in absent any error or violation.’ [Citation.]” *Id.*, at pp. 1077-1078.)

Where a search warrant affidavit supporting a search warrant contains both information obtained by unlawful conduct as well as untainted information, a two-prong test applies to justify application of the independent source doctrine. (*Id.* at pp. 1078-1079, 1082.)

- The affidavit, *excised of any illegally obtained information*, must be sufficient to establish probable cause.

- The evidence must support a finding that “the police subjectively would have sought the warrant even without the illegal conduct.”

(See also *People v. Superior Court (Corbett)* (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 670, 693-594; “When the affidavit supporting a search warrant contains information derived from unlawful conduct as well as other, untainted, information, ‘the reviewing court must excise all tainted information but then must uphold the warrant if the remaining information establishes probable cause;” citing *People v. Weiss, supra*, at p. 1081; and *Franks v. Delaware* (1978) 438 U.S. 154 [57 L.Ed.2nd 667].)

If the application contains probable cause apart from the improper information, then the warrant is lawful and the independent source doctrine applies, provided that the officers were not prompted to obtain the warrant by what they observed during the initial entry. (See also *People v. Robinson* (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 232, 241.)

See also *United States v. Merriweather* (9th Cir. 1985) 777 F.2nd 503, where the Court inappropriately labeled the admissibility of illegally discovered evidence as an application of the “*inevitable discovery*” rule instead of the “*independent source doctrine*.” In noting this error, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal, in *United States v. Lundin* (9th Cir. 2016) 817 F.3rd 1151, 1161-1162, describes the differences between the two legal theories for saving evidence that was otherwise discovered illegally: “Unlike the inevitable discovery doctrine, which asks whether evidence ‘*would have*’ been discovered by lawful means rather than by means of the illegal search, *Nix v. Williams*, 467 U.S. 431, 447, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 81 L. Ed. 2d 377 (1984) (emphasis added), the independent source doctrine asks whether the evidence *actually* was ‘obtained independently from activities untainted by the initial illegality.’ *Murray v. United States*, 487 U.S. 533, 537, 108 S. Ct. 2529, 101 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1988).”

Non-Standard Types of Warrants and Orders:

Types of Warrants: There are a number of types of warrants, typically referred to by description terms of art. For instance:

- **Telephonic Search Warrants:** Telephonic search warrants, with an oral affidavit taken under oath and recorded and later transcribed, is statutorily provided for. (P.C. § 1526)

Procedure:

Generally used during those hours when the courts are closed and a magistrate is otherwise not personally present,

although there is no legal impediment to using this procedure during court hours.

Typically, this involves a four-way telephone conference call set up between the affiant, the magistrate, prosecutor, and a tape recorder.

P.C. § 1526:

(a) The magistrate, before issuing the warrant, may examine on oath the person seeking the warrant and any witnesses the person may produce, and shall take his or her affidavit or their affidavits in writing, and cause the affidavit or affidavits to be subscribed by the party or parties making them.

(b) In lieu of the written affidavit required in **sub. (a)**, the magistrate may take an oral statement under oath under one of the following conditions:

(1) The oath shall be made under penalty of perjury and recorded and transcribed. The transcribed statement shall be deemed to be an affidavit for the purposes of this chapter. In these cases, the recording of the sworn oral statement and the transcribed statement shall be certified by the magistrate receiving it and shall be filed with the clerk of the court. In the alternative in these cases, the sworn oral statement shall be recorded by a certified court reporter and the transcript of the statement shall be certified by the reporter, after which the magistrate receiving it shall certify the transcript which shall be filed with the clerk of the court.

(2) The oath is made using telephone and facsimile transmission equipment, telephone and electronic mail, or telephone and computer server, as follows:

(A) The oath is made *during* a telephone conversation with the magistrate, *after* the affiant has signed his or her affidavit in support of the application for the search warrant and transmitted the proposed search warrant and all supporting affidavits and

documents to the magistrate. The affiant's signature may be in the form of a digital signature or electronic signature if electronic mail or computer server is used for transmission to the magistrate.

(B) The magistrate shall confirm with the affiant the receipt of the search warrant and the supporting affidavits and attachments. The magistrate shall verify that all the pages sent have been received, that all pages are legible, and that the affiant's signature, digital signature, or electronic signature is acknowledged as genuine.

(C) If the magistrate decides to issue the search warrant, he or she shall:

(i) Sign the warrant. The magistrate's signature may be in the form of a digital signature or electronic signature if electronic mail or computer server is used for transmission by the magistrate.

(ii) Note on the warrant the exact date and time of the issuance of the warrant.

(iii) Indicate on the warrant that the oath of the affiant was administered orally over the telephone.

(D) The magistrate shall transmit via facsimile transmission equipment, electronic mail, or computer server, the signed search warrant to the affiant. The completed search warrant, as signed by the magistrate and received by the affiant, shall be deemed to be the original warrant. The original warrant and any affidavits or attachments in support thereof shall be returned as provided in **P.C. § 1534**.

- *Anticipatory Search Warrants*: Issuance of a warrant, conditioned upon the happening of a particular event (e.g., the delivery of illegal substances or articles to a particular address; i.e., a “*triggering condition*”), is legal. (*United States v. Grubbs* (2006) 547 U.S. 90, 93-97 [164 L.Ed.2nd 195]; *United States v. Garcia* (2nd Cir. 1989) 882 F.2nd 699; and see *United States v. Loy* (3rd Cir. 1999) 191 F.3rd 360, 364; listing cases upholding the concept.)

“(T)he fact that the contraband is not ‘presently located at the place described in the warrant’ is immaterial, so long as ‘there is probable cause to believe that it will be there when the search warrant is executed.’ *United States v. Lowe*, 575 F.2d 1193, 1194 (6th Cir. 1978), . . . see *United States v. Dornhofer*, 859 F.2d 1195, 1198 (4th Cir. 1988), . . .” (*United States v. Garcia, supra.*, at p. 702.)

To be constitutional under the **Fourth Amendment’s** requirement that there be probable cause, *two* prerequisites of probability must be satisfied:

- That there is a “*fair probability*” that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place; *and*
- That there is probable cause to believe the triggering condition will in fact occur.

(*United States v. Grubbs, supra*, see also *United States v. Ruddell* (9th Cir. 1995) 71 F.3rd 331, 333; and *United States v. Hendricks* (9th Cir. 1984) 743 F.2nd 653, 654-657; *United States v. Goff* (9th Cir. 1982) 681 F.2nd 1238, and *United States v. Wylie* (5th Cir 1990) 919 F.2nd 969, 974-975; “. . . when it is known that contraband is on a *sure course* to its destination”)

California authority, questionable since the United States Supreme Court’s decision in *United States v. Grubbs, supra*, has held that; “(A)n anticipatory warrant may issue on *clear showing* that the police’s right to search at a certain location for particular evidence of a crime will exist within a reasonable time in the future. (Citations)” *People v. Sousa* (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 549, 558.)

Preparation and approval by a magistrate of an anticipatory search warrant has the tactical advantage of making the warrant effective immediately upon the happening of the described “*triggering*

event,” thus eliminating the delay between such an event and the eventual obtaining of a warrant.

Tip: State the contingency on the *face of the warrant* itself: E.g.; “THIS WARRANT IS LEGALLY EFFECTIVE AND CAN BE SERVED *ONLY IF* A SALE OF NARCOTICS TAKES PLACE AT THE PREMISES TO BE SEARCHED. (Initials of the magistrate)”

Failure of the warrant itself to clearly specify on its face the anticipatory nature of the warrant (i.e., that it is not to be served until the happening of a specific event, such as above) *may* invalidate the warrant. (*United States v. Hotal* (9th Cir. 1998) 143 F.3rd 1223; *United States v. Vesikuru* (9th Cir. 2002) 314 F.3rd 1116, 1123-1130; *United States v. Grubbs* (2006) 547 U.S. 90, 99-102 [164 L.Ed.2nd 195]; concurring opinion.)

The Federal Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal has indicated that if the warrant specifically incorporates an attached affidavit which describes the anticipatory nature of the warrant, this *might* suffice. However, the affidavit must then accompany the warrant to the scene of the search to be valid. (*United States v. Hotal, supra.*; *United States v. McGrew* (9th Cir. 1997) 122 F.3rd 847, 849-850.)

Other federal circuits have upheld the validity of an anticipatory warrant without the conditions specified on the warrant itself if: (1) Clear, explicit, and narrowly drawn conditions for the execution of the warrant are contained in the affidavit; and (2) those conditions are actually satisfied before the warrant is executed. (See *United States v. Moetamedi* (2nd Cir. 1995) 46 F.3rd 225, 229; *United States v. Rey* (6th Cir. 1991) 923 F.2nd 1217, 1221; *United States v. Dennis* (7th Cir. 1997) 115 F.3rd 524, 529; *United States v. Tagbering* (8th Cir. 1993) 985 F.2nd 946, 950; *United States v. Hogoboom* (10th Cir. 1979) 112 F.3rd 1081, 1086-1087.)

Under California law, while failure to describe the conditions precedent on the face of the warrant itself, or incorporate them by reference to the affidavit, is not necessarily fatal to the validity of the warrant, it is better practice to do so anyway. (*People v. Sousa, supra*, at p. 561.)

Note: If only to eliminate the issue, and because California cases may end up in the Ninth Circuit at some point, the

better procedure is to describe the anticipatory nature of the warrant on the face of the warrant itself.

Federal Rules: According to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal, a copy of the document that describes the triggering conditions (i.e., the warrant itself, the affidavit, or any other attachments) must be presented to the lawful occupants (along with a copy of the warrant) upon the execution of the warrant. Failing to do so will invalidate the anticipatory search warrant as a **Fourth Amendment** violation. (*United States v. Grubbs* (9th Cir. 2004) 377 F.3rd 1072, as reprinted and amended at 389 F.3rd 1306; certiorari granted; reversed and remanded; (2006) 547 U.S. 90, 98-99 [164 L.Ed.2nd 195]; see above.)

See also *United States v. Vesikuru* (9th Cir. 2002) 314 F.3rd 1116, 1123-1124, holding that an “*anticipatory warrant*,” the conditions precedent for which being contained in the affidavit and incorporated into the warrant by reference, requires the presence of both the warrant and affidavit at the scene.

In that California interprets the **Fourth Amendment** differently, the general rule being that it is *not* required that a copy of the warrant be shown to, or left with, the occupants of the place being searched (see *People v. Calabrese* (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 79.), it is likely that there also is no requirement that the conditions triggering an anticipatory search warrant be described in any documents given to the occupants.

- *Sneak and Peek Warrants:* A “*sneak and peek*” warrant is one which authorizes surreptitious entry of a premises, without notice, often during the nighttime, and provides that objects of the search are not to be seized but may only be noted, photographed, copied or otherwise recorded.

Some courts, particularly the Federal Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal, are critical of such warrants for failure to require notice to the occupants, but have reluctantly upheld them. (See *United States v. Freitas* (9th Cir. 1986) 800 F.2nd 1451; *United States v. Johns* (9th Cir. 1998) 851 F.2nd 1131, 1134-1135.)

The federal courts are concerned that a “*sneak and peek*” warrant violates **Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 41**. **Rule 41** requires that the officer executing the warrant either give to the owner of the searched premises a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the property taken, or leave the copy and receipt on the premises. It also requires that the inventory be made in the

presence of the owner of the premises “or in the presence of at least one credible person other than the applicant for the warrant.”

However, “a violation of **Rule 41** . . . does not lead to suppression of evidence unless: (1) it is a ‘fundamental’ violation—that is, a violation that ‘in effect, renders the search unconstitutional under traditional **fourth amendment** standards’ [Citation], (2) ‘the search might not have occurred or would not have been so abrasive if the Rule had been followed [Citation]’ or (3) ‘there is evidence of intentional and deliberate disregard of a provision of the Rule.’ [Citation]” (*United States v. Johns*, *supra.*, at p. 1134.)

Other courts have approved sneak and peak warrants so long as *delayed notice* is given, after approval by the magistrate that there is good cause for the delay. (*United States v. Villegas* (2nd Cir. 1990) 899 F.2nd 1324, 1327.)

Note: No California case has ruled upon the legality of such a procedure.

The Supreme Court, however, although never directly discussing the issue, has intimated that notice may be delayed if to do otherwise might defeat the purpose of the warrant. (*Katz v. United States* (1967) 389 U.S. 347, 355, fn. 16 [19 L.Ed.2nd 576, 584]; discussing the lack of need for “*prior notice*” in a wiretap case.)

- **P.C. § 1524.1: AIDS Testing:** A search warrant requiring a criminal suspect to submit to a blood test for the HIV virus may be issued by the court after a request by a victim and a hearing showing probable cause to believe that the accused committed a charged offense, and probable cause to believe that blood, semen, or any other bodily fluid capable of transmitting HIV has been transferred from the accused to the victim.

This provision is for the benefit of the victim, and, per the requirements of the section, is *not* intended to serve as an aid in the prosecution of any criminal suspect. (**P.C. § 1524.1(a)**)

A judge may approve a search warrant upon finding probable cause to believe the defendant committed a crime and that the AIDS virus has been transferred from the accused to the victim (**Subd. (b)(1)**), or the defendant is charged with one or more of a specified list of sex offenses and there exists a police report alleging an as of yet uncharged listed sex offense. (**Subd. (b)(2)**)

A declaration by the victim’s mother “*on information and belief*,” even though not being based on her personal knowledge, was found to be legally sufficient to support a search warrant pursuant to this section. *Hearsay* may be used to support the affidavit required by this section. (*Humphrey v. Appellate Division of the Superior Court* (2002) 29 Cal.4th 569.)

Because such a warrant is concerned with the public safety, such a warrant comes within the less stringent requirement of a “*Special Needs*” search. (*Id.*, a pp. 574-575.) (See below.)

- **P.C. § 1524.2(b):** *Records of Foreign Corporations Providing Electronic Communications or Remote Computing Services:* Foreign corporations doing business in California, providing *electronic communications* or *remote computing services* to the general public, must respond to a search warrant issued by a California court and properly served, when asked for records revealing the *identity of customers* using the services, *data* stored by, or on behalf of, the customer, the *customer’s usage* of those services, the *recipient* or *destination* of communications sent to or from those customers, or the *content* of those communications.

Definitions:

“*Electronic communications services*” and “*remote computing services*” is to be construed in accordance with the federal the federal **Electronic Communications Privacy Act: 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et seq.**

18 U.S.C. § 2701 refers to **18 U.S.C. § 2501, subdivision (15)** of which defines “*electronic communication service*” as a “service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications.”

18 U.S.C. § 2501(1), (18): “*Wire communication*” includes “any aural transfer (i.e., one containing the human voice) made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception (including the use of such connection in a switching station)”

This includes telephone conversations. (*Briggs v. American Air Filter Co., Inc.* (5th Cir. 1980) 630 F.2nd 414; *United States v. Harpel* (10th Cir. 1974) 493 F.2nd 346.)

A “*foreign corporation*” is one that is qualified to do business in California pursuant to **Corp. Code § 2105**, although based in another state.

Per **Corp. Code § 2105**, foreign corporations must consent to service of process as a condition of doing business in California.

“*Properly served*” means that a search warrant has been delivered by hand, or in a manner reasonably allowing for proof of delivery if delivered by United States mail, overnight delivery service, or facsimile to a person or entity listed in **Corp. Code § 2110**, or any other means specified by the recipient of the search warrant, including email or submission via an Internet web portal that the recipient has designated for the purpose of service of process. (**Subd. (a)(6)**)

Corp. Code § 2110 requires that an agent, in California, identified by the corporation as the person responsible for accepting service of process, including search warrants, be served.

Providing the Requested Information: The foreign corporation is required to provide the information requested within five (5) business days, which may be shortened or extended upon a showing of good cause, and to authenticate such records, thus making them admissible in court per **Evid. Code §§ 1561, 1562**. (**P.C. § 1524.2(b)**)

Out-of-State Warrants: The section further requires California corporations to honor out-of-state search warrants as if issued within this state. (**P.C. § 1524.2(c)**)

- **P.C. § 1524.3(a):** *Records of Foreign Corporations Providing Electronic Communications or Remote Computing Services:* Foreign corporations providing *electronic communications* or *remote computing services* must disclose to a governmental prosecuting or investigating agency, when served with a search warrant issued by a California court pursuant to **P.C. § 1524(a)(7)** (i.e., in misdemeanor cases), records revealing the *name*,

address, local and long distance telephone toll billing records, telephone number or other subscriber number or identity, and length of service of a subscriber to or customer of that service, the types of services the subscriber or customer utilized, and the contents of communication originated by or addressed to the service provider when the governmental entity is granted a search warrant pursuant to **P.C. § 1524(a)(7)**.

(b): The search warrant shall be limited to only that information necessary to achieve the objective of the warrant, including by specifying the target individuals or accounts, the applications or services, the types of information, and the time periods covered, as appropriate.

(c) Information obtained through the execution of a search warrant pursuant to this section that is unrelated to the objective of the warrant shall be sealed and not be subject to further review without an order from the court.

(d)

(1) A governmental entity receiving subscriber records or information under this section shall provide notice to a subscriber or customer upon receipt of the requested records. The notification may be delayed by the court, in increments of 90 days, upon a showing that there is reason to believe that notification of the existence of the search warrant may have an “*adverse result*.”

(2) An “*adverse result*” for purposes of **para. (1)** means any of the following:

- (A)** Endangering the life or physical safety of an individual.
- (B)** Flight from prosecution.
- (C)** Tampering or destruction of evidence.
- (D)** Intimidation of a potential witness.
- (E)** Otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation or unduly delaying a trial.

(e) Upon the expiration of the period of delay for the notification, the governmental entity shall, by regular mail or email, provide a copy of the process or request and a notice, to the subscriber or customer. The notice shall accomplish all of the following:

(1) State the nature of the law enforcement inquiry with reasonable specificity.

(2) Inform the subscriber or customer that information maintained for the subscriber or customer by the service provider named in the process or request was supplied to or requested by the governmental entity, and the date upon which the information was supplied, and the request was made.

(3) Inform the subscriber or customer that notification to the subscriber or customer was delayed, and which court issued the order pursuant to which the notification was delayed.

(4) Provide a copy of the written inventory of the property that was taken that was provided to the court pursuant to **P.C. § 1537**.

(f) A court issuing a search warrant pursuant to **P.C. § 1524(a)(7)**, on a motion made promptly by the service provider, may quash or modify the warrant if the information or records requested are unusually voluminous in nature or compliance with the warrant otherwise would cause an undue burden on the provider.

(g) A provider of wire or electronic communication services or a remote computing service, upon the request of a peace officer, shall take all necessary steps to preserve records and other evidence in its possession pending the issuance of a search warrant or a request in writing and an affidavit declaring an intent to file a warrant to the provider. Records shall be retained for a period of 90 days, which shall be extended for an additional 90-day period upon a renewed request by the peace officer.

(h) No cause of action shall be brought against any provider, its officers, employees, or agents for providing information, facilities, or assistance in good faith compliance with a search warrant.

- **Pen. Code §§ 11470-11482:** *Court Orders Authorizing the Interruption of Communication Services:*

Public Util. Code §§ 7907-7908, dealing with the interruption of communication services, was *repealed*, effective 1/1/2018 and replaced by more detailed provisions in **Pen. Code §§ 11470-11482 (Part 5, Title 1, Chapter 3, Article 7)**.

Pen. Code § 11470: Definitions:

For the purposes of this article, the following terms have the following meanings:

(a) “*Communication service*” means any communication service that interconnects with the public switched telephone network and is required by the Federal Communications Commission to provide customers with 911 access to emergency services.

(b) “*Government entity*” means every local government, including a city, county, city and county, a transit, joint powers, special, or other district, the state, and every agency, department, commission, board, bureau, or other political subdivision of the state, or any authorized agent thereof.

(c) “*Interrupt communication service*” means to knowingly or intentionally suspend, disconnect, interrupt, or disrupt a communication service to one or more particular customers or all customers in a geographical area.

(d) “*Judicial officer*” means a magistrate, judge, commissioner, referee, or any person appointed by a court to serve in one of these capacities, of a superior court.

(e) “*Service provider*” means a person or entity, including a government entity, that offers a communication service.

Pen. Code § 11471: Prohibition on the Interruption of Communications Services; Exceptions:

(a) Except as authorized by this article, no government entity, and no service provider acting at the request of a government entity, shall interrupt a communication service for either of the following purposes:

(1) To prevent the communication service from being used for an illegal purpose.

(2) To protect public health, safety, or welfare.

(b) A government entity *may* interrupt a communication service for a purpose stated in **subdivision (a)** in any of the following circumstances:

(1) The interruption is authorized by a court order pursuant to **P.C. § 11473**.

(2) The government entity reasonably determines that (A) the interruption is required to address an extreme emergency situation that involves immediate danger of death or great bodily injury, (B) there is insufficient time, with due diligence, to first obtain a court order under **P.C. § 11473**, and (C) the interruption meets the grounds for issuance of a court order under **P.C. § 11473**. A government entity acting pursuant to this paragraph shall comply with **P.C. § 11475**.

(3) Notwithstanding **P.C. §§ 591, 631, or 632**, or **Pub. Util.Code § 7906**, a supervising law enforcement official with jurisdiction may require that a service provider interrupt a communication service that is available to a person if (A) the law enforcement official has probable cause to believe that the person is holding hostages and is committing a crime, or is barricaded and is resisting apprehension through the use or threatened use of force, and (B) the purpose of the interruption is to prevent the person from communicating with anyone other than a peace officer or a person authorized by a peace officer. This paragraph does not authorize the interruption of communication service to a wireless device other than a wireless device used or available for use by the person or persons involved in a hostage or barricade situation.

Pen. Code § 11472: *Application for Court Order:*

(a) An application by a government entity for a court order authorizing the interruption of a communication service

shall be made in writing upon the personal oath or affirmation of the chief executive of the government entity or his or her designee, to the presiding judge of the superior court or a judicial officer designated by the presiding judge for that purpose.

(b) Each application shall include all of the following information:

- (1)** The identity of the government entity making the application.
- (2)** A statement attesting to a review of the application and the circumstances in support of the application by the chief executive officer of the government entity making the application, or his or her designee. This statement shall state the name and office of the person who effected this review.
- (3)** A full and complete statement of the facts and circumstances relied on by the government entity to justify a reasonable belief that the order should be issued, including the facts and circumstances that support the statements made in **paragraphs (4) to (7)**, inclusive.
- (4)** A statement that probable cause exists to believe that the communication service to be interrupted is being used or will be used for an unlawful purpose or to assist in a violation of the law. The statement shall expressly identify the unlawful purpose or violation of the law.
- (5)** A statement that immediate and summary action is needed to avoid serious, direct, and immediate danger to public health, safety, or welfare.
- (6)** A statement that the proposed interruption is narrowly tailored to the specific circumstances under which the order is made and would not interfere with more communication than is necessary to achieve the purposes of the order.

(7) A statement that the proposed interruption would leave open ample alternative means of communication.

(8) A statement that the government entity has considered the practical disadvantages of the proposed interruption, including any disruption of emergency communication service.

(9) A description of the scope and duration of the proposed interruption. The application shall clearly describe the specific communication service to be interrupted with sufficient detail as to customer, cell sector, central office, or geographical area affected.

(c) The judicial officer may require the applicant to furnish additional testimony or documentary evidence in support of an application for an order under this section.

(d) The judicial officer shall accept a facsimile copy of the signature of any person required to give a personal oath or affirmation pursuant to subdivision (a) as an original signature to the application.

Pen. Code § 11473: *Issuance of a Court Order; Necessary Findings:*

Upon application made under **P.C. § 11472**, the judicial officer may enter an ex parte order, as requested or modified, authorizing interruption of a communication service in the territorial jurisdiction in which the judicial officer is sitting, if the judicial officer determines, on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant, that all of the following requirements are satisfied:

(a) There is probable cause that the communication service is being or will be used for an unlawful purpose or to assist in a violation of the law.

(b) Absent immediate and summary action to interrupt the communication service, serious, direct, and immediate danger to public health, safety, or welfare will result.

(c) The interruption of communication service is narrowly tailored to prevent unlawful infringement of speech that is protected by the **First Amendment** to the United States Constitution or **Section 2 of Article I** of the California Constitution, or a violation of any other rights under federal or state law.

(d) The interruption of a communication service would leave open ample alternative means of communication.

Pen. Code § 11474: *Contents of a Court Order:*

An order authorizing an interruption of a communication service shall include all of the following:

(a) A statement of the court's findings required by **P.C. § 11473**.

(b) A clear description of the communication service to be interrupted, with specific detail as to the affected service, service provider, and customer or geographical area.

(c) A statement of the period of time during which the interruption is authorized. The order may provide for a fixed duration or require that the government end the interruption when it determines that the interruption is no longer reasonably necessary because the danger that justified the interruption has abated. If the judicial officer finds that probable cause exists that a particular communication service is being used or will be used as part of a continuing criminal enterprise, the court may order the permanent termination of that service and require that the terminated service not be referred to another communication service.

(d) A requirement that the government entity immediately serve notice on the service provider when the interruption is to cease.

Pen. Code § 11475: *Required Actions of a Government Entity Interrupting a Communication Service; Application for a Court Order; Statement of Intent:*

A government entity that interrupts a communication service pursuant to **P.C. § 11471(b)(2)** shall take all of the following steps:

(a) Apply for a court order under **P.C. § 11472** without delay. If possible, the application shall be filed within *six hours* after commencement of the interruption. If that is not possible, the application shall be filed at the first reasonably available opportunity, but in no event later than *24 hours* after commencement of an interruption of a communication service. If an application is filed more than six hours after commencement of an interruption of a communication service, the application shall include a declaration, made under penalty of perjury, stating the reason for the delay.

(b) Prepare a signed statement of intent to apply for a court order. The statement of intent shall clearly describe the extreme emergency situation and the specific communication service to be interrupted. If a government entity does not apply for a court order within six hours, the government entity shall submit a copy of the signed statement of intent to the court within six hours.

(c) Provide conspicuous notice of the application for a court order on the government entity's Internet Web site without delay, unless the circumstances that justify an interruption of a communication service without first obtaining a court order also justify not providing the notice.

Pen. Code § 11476: *Interruption of Communication Services for a Geographical Area; Notification to the Governor's Office of Emergency Services:*

(a) If an order issued pursuant to **P.C. § 11473** or a signed statement of intent prepared pursuant to **P.C. § 11475** would authorize the interruption of a communication service for all customers of the interrupted communication

service within a geographical area, the government entity shall serve the order or statement on the Governor's Office of Emergency Services.

(b) The Governor's Office of Emergency Services shall have policy discretion on whether to request that the federal government authorize and effect the proposed interruption.

Pen. Code § 11477: *Notice to the Service Provider and the Customer:*

If an order issued pursuant to **P.C. § 11473** or a signed statement of intent prepared pursuant to **P.C. § 11475** is *not* governed by **P.C. § 11476**, the government entity shall serve the order or statement on both of the following persons:

(a) The appropriate service provider's contact for receiving requests from law enforcement, including receipt of state or federal warrants, orders, or subpoenas.

(b) The affected customer, if the identity of the customer is known. When serving an affected customer, the government entity shall provide notice of the opportunity for judicial review under **P.C. § 11479**.

Pen. Code § 11478: *Civil Liability; Designation of a Security Employee; Compliance with PUC or Federal Communication Commission Rules and Notification Requirements:*

(a) Good faith reliance by a service provider on a court order issued pursuant to **P.C. § 11473**, a signed statement of intent prepared pursuant to **P.C. § 11475**, or the instruction of a supervising law enforcement officer acting pursuant to **P.C. § 11471(b)(3)** shall constitute a complete defense for the service provider against any action brought as a result of the interruption of a communication service authorized by that court order, statement of intent, or instruction.

(b) A communications service provider shall designate a security employee and an alternate security employee, to

provide all required assistance to law enforcement officials to carry out the purposes of this article.

(c) A service provider that intentionally interrupts communication service pursuant to this article shall comply with any rule or notification requirement of the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) or Federal Communications Commission, or both, and any other applicable provision or requirement of state or federal law.

Pen. Code § 11479: *Customer's Remedies:*

(a) A person whose communication service has been interrupted pursuant to this article may petition the superior court to contest the grounds for the interruption and restore the interrupted service.

(b) The remedy provided in this section is not exclusive. Other laws may provide a remedy for a person who is aggrieved by an interruption of a communication service authorized by this chapter.

Pen. Code § 11480: *Legislature's Finding and Declaration:*

The Legislature finds and declares that ensuring that California users of any communication service not have that service interrupted, and thereby be deprived of 911 access to emergency services or a means to engage in constitutionally protected expression, is a matter of statewide concern and not a municipal affair, as that term is used in **Section 5 of Article XI** of the California Constitution.

Pen. Code § 11481: *Exceptions:*

(a) This article does *not* apply to any of the following actions:

(1) The interruption of a communication service with the consent of the affected customer.

(2) The interruption of a communication service pursuant to a customer service agreement, contract, or tariff.

(3) The interruption of a communication service to protect the security of the communication network or other computing resources of a government entity or service provider.

(4) The interruption of a communication service to prevent unauthorized wireless communication by a prisoner in a state or local correctional facility, including a juvenile facility.

(5) The interruption of a communication service to transmit an emergency notice that includes, but is not limited to, an Amber Alert, a message transmitted through the federal Emergency Alert System, or a message transmitted through the federal Wireless Emergency Alert System.

(6) An interruption of a communication service pursuant to a statute that expressly authorizes an interruption of a communication service, including **B&P Code §§ 149 and 7099.10**, and **Publ. Util. Code §§ 2876, 5322, and 5371.6**.

(7) An interruption of communication service that results from the execution of a search warrant.

(b) Nothing in this section provides authority for an action of a type listed in **subdivision (a)** or limits any remedy that may be available under law if an action of a type listed in **subdivision (a)** is taken unlawfully.

Pen. Code § 11482: *The Public Utilities Commission:*

This article does not restrict, expand, or otherwise modify the authority of the Public Utilities Commission.

Business Records:

Evid. Code § 1560(f): Search Warrants for Business Records; Admissibility in Criminal Proceedings:

Where a search warrant for business records is served upon the custodian of records or other qualified witness of a business in compliance with **P.C. § 1524** (listing the various lawful grounds for issuance of a search warrant) regarding a criminal investigation in which the business is neither

a party nor the place where any crime is alleged to have occurred, and the search warrant provides that the warrant will be deemed executed if the business causes the delivery of records described in the warrant to the law enforcement agency ordered to execute the warrant, it is sufficient compliance therewith, making such records admissible in evidence if the custodian or other qualified witness delivers by mail or otherwise a true, legible, and durable copy of all of the records described in the search warrant to the law enforcement agency ordered to execute the search warrant, together with the affidavit as described in **Evid. Code § 1561** (below) within five days after the receipt of the search warrant or within such other time as is set forth in the warrant.

Evid. Code § 1561: Affidavit of Custodian Of Records for Business Records Obtained via Subpoena Duces Tecum or Search Warrant:

This section allows for the admissibility in a criminal proceeding of business records when obtained via a “subpoena duces tecum” and when accompanied by an affidavit of the custodian or other qualified witness, laying the evidentiary foundation for the admissibility of such records as described in the section, is amended in **subd. (a)(2)** to include records obtained by a search warrant, as described in **Evid. Code § 1560**, above.

P.C. § 1524.4: Service Providers and Law Enforcement Contact Process:

(a) This section applies to a service provider that is subject to the **Electronic Communications Privacy Act (P.C. §§ 1546 et seq.)** and that operates in California. This section does not apply to a service provider that does not offer services to the general public.

(b)

(1) Every service provider described in **subdivision (a)** shall maintain a law enforcement contact process that meets the criteria set forth in **paragraph (2)**.

(2) Every service provider described in **subdivision (a)** shall ensure, at a minimum, that its law enforcement contact process meets all of the following criteria:

(A) Provides a specific contact mechanism for law enforcement personnel.

(B) Provides continual availability of the law enforcement contact process.

(C) Provides a method to provide status updates to a requesting law enforcement agency on a request for assistance.

(3) Every service provider described in **subdivision (a)** shall, by *July 1, 2017*, file a statement with the Attorney General describing the law enforcement contact process maintained pursuant to **paragraph (1)**. If a service provider makes a material change to its law enforcement contact process, the service provider shall, as soon as practicable, file a statement with the Attorney General describing its new law enforcement contact process.

(c) The Attorney General shall consolidate the statements received pursuant to this section into one discrete record and regularly make that record available to local law enforcement agencies.

(d) The exclusive remedy for a violation of this section shall be an action brought by the Attorney General for injunctive relief. Nothing in this section shall limit remedies available for a violation of any other state or federal law.

(e) A statement filed or distributed pursuant to this section is confidential and shall not be disclosed pursuant to any state law, including, but not limited to, the **California Public Records Act (Govt' Code §§ 6250 et seq.)**

Requirement of a “Neutral and Detached” Magistrate:

Rule: The lawful issuance of a search warrant requires a “*neutral and detached*” magistrate, as required by the **Fourth Amendment**. (*Coolidge v. New Hampshire* (1971) 403 U.S. 443 [29 L.Ed.2nd 564].)

Only bench officers who are designated “*magistrates*” and authorized to issue warrants are judges of the superior courts, justices of the state appellate courts, and justices of the state Supreme Court. (**P.C. § 808**)

This necessarily excludes court commissioners, judges pro tem, referees, and federal judges.

Note: The idea behind this theory is to insure that there is an impartial arbitrator between an over-zealous law enforcement officer, seeking to intrude upon a person’s privacy rights, and the person whose privacy rights are about to be intruded upon, who may fairly determine whether *probable cause* exists sufficient to justify the intended government intrusion.

Violations: Violations of this rule have occurred when:

The state attorney general in charge of the investigation issued the warrant in his capacity as a justice of the peace. (*Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra.*)

The magistrate personally participated in the search. (*Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York* (1979) 442 U.S. 319 [60 L.Ed.2nd 290].)

The magistrate was paid a fee for each warrant issued, with no compensation for warrants which were not approved. (*Connally v. Georgia* (1977) 429 U.S. 245 [50 L.Ed.2nd 444].)

The investigating deputy sheriff had the warrant issued by his father, a judge. (*O'Connor v. Superior Court* (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 113: However, this warrant was saved by application of the “good faith” rule.)

No Violation:

Choosing to seek a search warrant from a state court magistrate instead of a federal magistrate in order avoid a federally imposed rule (See *United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc.* (9th Cir. 2010) 621 F.3rd 1162, recommending a certain protocol for warrants involving computerized data) does not negate a finding of good faith so long as not done with the “knowledge . . . that the search was unconstitutional under the **Fourth Amendment.**” (*United States v. Schesso* (9th Cir. 2013) 730 F.3rd 1040, 1050-1051.)

Composition of a Search Warrant:

Three Parts: *search warrant* comes in *three* parts:

- *The Warrant* itself.
- *The Affidavit* to the Search Warrant.
- *The Receipt and Inventory* (or “*Return*”).

1. **The Warrant:** *The Warrant Itself*, signed by a magistrate, directing a peace officer to search a “*particular*” person, place or vehicle, for a “*particular*” person, thing, or list of property.

P.C. §§ 1523, 1529: *Contents:* The *search warrant* must include the following:

- The name of every person whose affidavit has been taken.
- The statutory grounds for issuance. (See P.C. §§ 1524, 1524.2 and/or 1524.3.)
- A description with *reasonable particularity* of the persons, places and vehicles to be searched.
- A description with *reasonable particularity* of the persons, things or property to be seized.

A warrant that fails to include a list of the things to be seized, at least where the list is not in an affidavit or other attachment that is incorporated by reference and which then accompanies the warrant to the scene of the search, is “*facially deficient*,” and in violation of the **Fourth Amendment**. (*Groh v. Ramirez* (2004) 540 U.S. 551 [157 L.Ed.2nd 1068].)

Failure to list the property to be seized, or at the least a reference to, and incorporation of, a list of the property, is a **Fourth Amendment** violation, and constitutes a defect the officers writing the warrant, and/or supervising the search, should have been aware of. (*Ramirez v. Butte-Silver Bow County* (9th Cir. 2002) 298 F.3rd 1022; finding that the affiant and supervising ATF agent *did not* have qualified immunity from civil liability in a civil suit for failing to list the property to be seized on the face of the warrant.)

And see United States v. Celestine (9th Cir. 2003) 324 F.3rd 1095, describing “the policies that underlie the warrant requirement; providing the property owner assurance of the lawful authority of the executing officer, his need to search, and the limits of his power to search.”

- Authorization for a *nighttime search* (if necessary; see P.C § 1533).
- The *signature* of the magistrate.
- The *date* issued.

P.C. § 1524(a)(1) through (18): Statutory Grounds for Issuance:

(1): When the property to be seized was stolen or embezzled.

(Note: Includes misdemeanors.)

(2): When the property or things to be seized were used as the means of committing a felony.

(3): When the property or things to be seized are in the possession of any person with the intent to use it as a means of committing a public offense, or in the possession of another to whom he may have delivered it for the purpose of concealing it or preventing them from being discovered.

The term “*public offense*” includes misdemeanors. (*People v. Garcia* (1969) 274 Cal.App.2nd 100, 103.)

(4): When the property or things to be seized consist of any item or constitute any evidence that tends to show a felony has been committed, or tends to show that a particular person has committed a felony.

(5): When the property or things to be seized consists of evidence which tends to show that sexual exploitation of a child (per **P.C. § 311.3**), or possession of matter depicting sexual conduct of a person under the age of 18 years (per **P.C. § 311.11**), has occurred or is occurring. (See *In re Duncan* (1987) 189 Cal.App.3rd 1348.)

(6): When there is a warrant to arrest a person.

(7): When a provider of an electronic communication service or remote computing service has records or evidence, as specified in **P.C. § 1524.3**, showing that property was stolen or embezzled constituting a misdemeanor, or that property or things are in the possession of any person with the intent to use them as a means of committing a misdemeanor public offense, or in the possession of another to whom he or she may have delivered them for the purpose of concealing them or preventing their discovery.

(8): When the property or things to be seized include an item or any evidence that tends to show a violation of **Labor Code § 3700.5**, or tends to show that a particular person has violated **L.C. § 3700.5**.

Labor Code § 3700.5 deals with the failure to secure the payment of compensation, which is defined as “every benefit or payment conferred by this division upon an injured employee, or in the event of his or her death, upon his or her dependents, without regard to negligence.” (**L.C. § 3207**)

(9): When the property or things to be seized include a firearm or any other deadly weapon at the scene of, or at the premises occupied or under the control of the person arrested in connection with, a domestic violence incident involving a threat to human life or a physical assault as provided in **P.C. § 18250**. This section does not affect warrantless seizures already authorized under the statute.

Note: **P.C. § 18250** gives authority to any of the law enforcement officers listed in the section who is at the scene of a domestic violence incident involving a threat to human life or a physical assault, and who is serving a protective order as defined in **Fam. Code § 6218**, or is serving a gun violence restraining order issued pursuant to **P.C. §§ 18100 et seq.**, to take temporary custody of any firearm or other deadly weapon in plain sight or discovered pursuant to a consensual or other lawful search as necessary for the protection of the peace officer or other persons present.

(10): When the property or things to be seized include a firearm or any other deadly weapon that is owned by, or in possession of, or in the custody or control of, a person described in **W&I § 8102(a)**.

Note: **W&I § 8102(a)** lists any person who:

- Has been detained or apprehended for examination of his or her mental condition (e.g., per **W&I § 5150**); *or*
- Is a person described in **W&I § 8100 ((a)** mental patients receiving inpatient treatment, *or* **(b)** mental patients after having communicated a threat to a psychotherapist.)
- Is a person described in **W&I § 8103 ((a)** persons adjudicated to be a danger to others or as a mentally disordered sex offender, *or* **(b)** persons found to be not guilty by reason of insanity in serious cases, *or* **(c)** persons found to be not guilty by reason of insanity in other cases, *or* **(d)** persons found mentally incompetent to stand trial, *or* **(e)** persons placed under conservatorship, *or* **(f)** persons

taken into custody as a danger to themselves or others, *or* (g) persons certified for intensive treatment.

(11): When the property or things to be seized include a firearm that is owned by, or in possession of, or in the custody or control of, a person who is subject to the prohibitions regarding firearms pursuant to **Fam. Code § 6389**, if a prohibited firearm is possessed, owned, in the custody of, or controlled by a person against whom a protective order has been issued pursuant to **Fam. Code § 6218**, the person has been lawfully served with that order, and the person has failed to relinquish the firearm as required by law.

Fam. Code § 6389 makes it illegal for a person subject to a protective order to own, possess, purchase, or receive a firearm or ammunition while the protective order is in effect. Accordingly, firearms that are within the possession or control of the restrained person must be relinquished: “Upon issuance of a protective order, as defined in **Section 6218**, the court shall order the respondent to relinquish any firearm in the respondent’s immediate possession or control or subject to the respondent’s immediate possession or control.” (**Subd. (c)(1)**) The statute establishes specific procedures for firearms surrender. The relinquishment process “shall occur by immediately surrendering the firearm in a safe manner, upon request of any law enforcement officer, to the control of the officer, after being served with the protective order.” (**Subd. (c)(2)**) “Alternatively,” if there is no request for relinquishment, “the relinquishment shall occur within 24 hours of being served with the order, by either surrendering the firearm in a safe manner to the control of local law enforcement officials, or by selling the firearm to a licensed gun dealer . . .” (**Ibid.**) Within 48 hours of service of the order, the restrained person must file a receipt with the court that issued the order and the law enforcement agency that served it showing that the firearm was surrendered to law enforcement or sold to a licensed gun dealer. (**Ibid.**)

Fam. Code § 6218 defines the term “*protective order*” as including orders enjoining specific acts of abuse (**Fam. Code § 6320**), excluding a person from a dwelling (**Fam. Code § 6321**), and, as relevant here, enjoining other specified behavior (**Fam. Code § 6322**).

See *People v. Superior Court (Corbett)* (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 670, 686-693; the fact that a search warrant was eventually obtained to search defendant's home for firearms, after an earlier warrantless search was conducted, but when the warrant affidavit did not specify that the warrant was obtained pursuant to **P.C. § 1524(a)(11)**, did not trigger the inevitable discovery doctrine.

(12): A search warrant may be issued for the use of a tracking device when the information to be received from the tracking device constitutes evidence that tends to show that a felony has been committed or is being committed, or a misdemeanor violation of the **F&G Code**; or a misdemeanor violation of the **Pub. Res. Code** has been committed or is being committed, or tends to show that a particular person has committed or is committing any of these crimes, or will assist in locating a person who has committed or is committing any of these crimes.

Search Warrant Requirement: A tracking device search warrant shall be executed pursuant to the provisions of **P.C. § 1534(b)**.

P.C. § 1534(b): Tracking Device Search Warrant Procedures:

(1): A tracking device search warrant issued pursuant to **Pen. Code § 1524(a)(12)** (see above) shall identify the person or property to be tracked and shall specify a reasonable length of time, not to exceed 30 days from the date the warrant is issued, that the device may be used.

The court may, for good cause, grant one or more extensions for the time that the device may be used, with each extension lasting for a reasonable length of time, not to exceed 30 days.

The search warrant shall command the officer to execute the warrant by installing a tracking device or serving a warrant on a third-party possessor of the tracking data.

The officer shall perform any installation authorized by the warrant during the

daytime unless the magistrate, for good cause, expressly authorizes installation at another time.

Execution of the warrant shall be completed no later than 10 days immediately after the date of issuance. A warrant executed within this 10-day period shall be deemed to have been timely executed and no further showing of timeliness need be made. After the expiration of 10 days, the warrant shall be void, unless it has been executed.

(2) An officer executing a tracking device search warrant shall not be required to knock and announce his or her presence before executing the warrant.

(3) No later than 10 calendar days after the use of the tracking device has ended, the officer executing the warrant shall file a return to the warrant.

(4)

(A) No later than 10 calendar days after the use of the tracking device has ended, the officer who executed the tracking device warrant shall notify the person who was tracked or whose property was tracked pursuant to **P.C. § 1546.2(a)(1)**.

Subd. (a)(2) provides that “(n)otwithstanding **paragraph (1)**, notice is not required if the government entity accesses information concerning the location or the telephone number of an electronic device in order to respond to an emergency 911 call from that device.”

(B) Notice under this paragraph may be delayed pursuant to **P.C. § 1546.2(b)**.

(See “*The California Electronic Communications Privacy Act: P.C. §§*

1546-1546.4,” under “Searches of Cellphones, Disks, Computers and Other High Tech Devices” under “Searches of Containers” (Chapter 13), below.)

(5) An officer installing a device authorized by a tracking device search warrant may install and use the device only within California.

(6) As used in this section, “*tracking device*” means any electronic or mechanical device that permits the tracking of the movement of a person or object.

(7) As used in this section, “daytime” means the hours between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m. according to local time.

Note: Subdivision (12), and P.C. § 1534(b), are in response to the U.S. Supreme Court’s determination to the effect that the installation and use of a tracking device on a suspect’s motor vehicle is a search, under the Fourth Amendment, and requires a search warrant as a general rule. (See United States v. Jones (2012) 565 U.S. 400 [132 S.Ct. 945; 181 L.Ed.2nd 911].)

(13) To obtain a blood sample in V.C. §§ 23140 (person under age 21 driving with BA of 0.05% or higher), 23152 (DUI), and 23153 (DUI with injury) cases when the person has refused to submit to or has failed to complete a blood test, and the sample will be drawn in a “*reasonable, medically approved manner.*” This new paragraph is not intended to abrogate a court’s mandate to determine the propriety of the issuance of a search warrant on a case-by-case basis.

The Supreme Court held that being arrested for driving while under the influence did not allow for a non-consensual warrantless blood test absent exigent circumstances beyond the fact that the blood was metabolizing at a normal rate. (*Missouri v. McNeely* (2013) 569 U.S. 141 [133 S.Ct. 1552; 185 L.Ed.2nd 696].)

(14) When the property or things to be seized are firearms or ammunition or both that are owned by, in the possession of, or in the custody or control of a person who is the subject of a gun

violence restraining order that has been issued pursuant to **P.C. § 18100 et seq.** if a prohibited firearm or ammunition or both is possess, owned, in the custody of, or controlled by a person against whom a gun violence restraining order has been issued, the person has been lawfully serviced with that order, and the person has failed to relinquish the firearm as required by law.

See **P.C. §§ 18100 et seq.**, re: *Gun Violence Restraining Orders*.

(15) When the property or things to be seized include a firearm that is owned by, or in the possession of, or in the custody or control of, a person who is subject to the prohibitions regarding firearms pursuant to **P.C. §§ 29800 or 29805**, and the court has made a finding pursuant to **P.C. § 29810(c)(3)** that the person has failed to relinquish the firearm as required by law.

Note: **P.C. § 29800** is the firearms prohibition that applies to convicted felons and narcotic drug addicts. **P.C. § 29805** is the 10-year firearms prohibition for persons convicted of a specified misdemeanor.

Note: **P.C. § 29810(c)(4)**, after making the necessary finding as noted in **subd. (3)**, requires the court to issue an order for the search and removal of firearms upon a probable cause finding that the defendant has failed to relinquish firearms.

(16) When the property or things to be seized are controlled substances or a device, contrivance, instrument, or paraphernalia used for unlawfully using or administering a controlled substance pursuant to the authority in **H&S § 11472**.

Note: **H&S § 11472** provides: “Controlled substances and any device, contrivance, instrument, or paraphernalia used for unlawfully using or administering a controlled substance, which are possessed in violation of this division, may be seized by any peace officer and in the aid of such seizure a search warrant may be issued as prescribed by law.”

(17) When a sample of the blood of a person constitutes evidence that tends to show a violation of operating a boat or a specified water device under the influence of alcohol or a drug, or with a blood alcohol level of 0.04 percent or more, or while addicted to

any drug (**Harb. & Nav. Code § 655(b), (c), (d), (e), and (f)**), and the person has refused an officer's request to submit to, or has failed to complete, a blood test; and the sample will be drawn in a "reasonable, medically approved manner."

This subdivision also provides that this is not intended to abrogate a court's mandate to determine the propriety of the issuance of a search warrant on a case-by-case basis.

See **Har. & Nav. Code § 655.1: *Advisement Requirements for Persons Arrested for DUI, Water Vessels, Etc.***:

A person arrested for the crime of operating a vessel, skis, aquaplane, or similar water device while under the influence of alcohol and/or a drug, must be informed that the officer has the authority to seek a search warrant compelling the arrested person to submit a blood sample.

The arrested person must also be informed that a criminal complaint may be filed for operating a vessel, skis, aquaplane, or similar water device under the influence of alcohol and/or a drug and that chemical testing may be refused.

Note: After amendments to the section effective 1/1/2017, the section *continues* to require that the arrested person be advised that he or she does not have the right to have an attorney present before deciding which chemical test to take or during the administration of the test. The amendments, however, *eliminated* the requirement that the arrested person be informed that a refusal to submit to, or failure to complete a chemical test may be used against the person in court and may result in increased penalties, upon conviction. Instead, the officer is required to simply inform the arrested person that he or she has a right to refuse chemical testing.

(18) When the property or things to be seized consists of evidence that tends to show that a violation of **P.C. § 647(j)(1), (2), or (3)** has occurred or is occurring.

P.C. § 647(j) is the misdemeanor “*disorderly conduct*” offense of:

(1) Peeping through a hole or opening into “the interior of a bedroom, bathroom, changing room, fitting room, dressing room, or tanning booth, or the interior of any other area in which the occupant has a reasonable expectation of privacy, with the intent to invade the privacy of a person or persons inside.”

(2) Using “a concealed camcorder, motion picture camera, or photographic camera of any type, to secretly videotape, film, photograph, or record by electronic means,” under or through a non-consenting person’s clothing, “with the intent to arouse, appeal to, or gratify the lust, passions, or sexual desires of that person and invade the privacy of that other person, under circumstances in which the other person has a reasonable expectation of privacy.”

(3) Using “a concealed camcorder, motion picture camera, or photographic camera of any type, to secretly videotape, film, photograph, or record by electronic means, another, identifiable person who may be in a state of full or partial undress, for the purpose of viewing the body of, or the undergarments worn by, that other person, without the consent or knowledge of that other person, in the interior of a bedroom, bathroom, changing room, fitting room, dressing room, or tanning booth, or the interior of any other area in which that other person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, with the intent to invade the privacy of that other person.”

For Grounds Not Listed: It is an open question whether a search warrant issued for some purpose not listed in the statutory grounds for a warrant is lawful. The question is: Does a magistrate have “*common law*” authority to issue a warrant for any purpose, even though not listed in the statutory grounds, merely upon a showing of probable cause?

Other provisions:

P.C. § 1534(c): Duplicate Originals: If a duplicate original search warrant has been executed, the peace officer who executed the warrant shall enter the exact time of its execution on its face.

P.C. § 1534(d): Returns: A search warrant may be made returnable before the issuing magistrate or his or her court.

See also **P.C. §§ 1524.2(b)** and **1524.3(a)**, re: *Records of Foreign Corporations Providing Electronic Communications or Remote Computing Services*. (See above)

Other Case Law:

It is irrelevant that a peace officer lists an incorrect charged offense, justifying the issuance of the warrant, so long as there is some legal grounds for the issuance of the warrant under some statute. (*United States v. Meek* (9th Cir. 2004) 366 F.3rd 705, 713-714; A “statutory variance in the affidavit is not fatal to the warrant’s validity.”)

In a federal case, the failure of the warrant to include a copy of the court’s official seal, if a violation at all (**28 U.S.C. § 1691**), is merely a technical violation and will not result in a finding that the warrant is legally insufficient. (*United States v. Smith* (9th Cir. 2005) 424 F.3rd 992, 1008.)

2. The Affidavit to the Search Warrant:

Defined: A sworn statement, sworn to by the affiant, describing the “probable cause” to search a particular person, place, or vehicle for a particular person, thing, or list of property. (**P.C. §§ 1525, 1527**)

Referred to as the “*Statement of Probable Cause*” in jurisdictions where a combined search warrant and affidavit form is used. (See *People v. Hale* (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 942.)

“*Probable Cause:*”

“The **Fourth Amendment** to the United States Constitution prohibits ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ and requires search warrants to be issued only upon a showing of ‘probable cause’ describing with particularity ‘the place to be searched, and the . . . things to be seized.’ United States Supreme Court decisions

establish an exclusionary rule that, when applicable, forbids the use of evidence obtained in violation of the **Fourth Amendment** at trial. (*Herring v. United States* (2009) 555 U.S. 135, 139 [172 L.Ed.2nd 496, . . .].) ““Probable cause sufficient for issuance of a warrant requires a showing that makes it ““substantially probable that there is specific property lawfully subject to seizure presently located in the particular place for which the warrant is sought.”” [Citation.] That showing must appear in the affidavit offered in support of the warrant. [Citation.]”” (*People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler* (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 365) . . . at pp. 369-370, quoting *People v. Carrington* (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 161) Probable cause may be shown by evidence that would not be competent at trial, including ““information and belief.”” (*People v. Varghese* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1103 . . . , quoting *Humphrey v. Appellate Division* (2002) 29 Cal.4th 569, 573) (*People v. Lazarus* (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 734, 763.)

In evaluating the sufficiency of a warrant affidavit: “The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a *practical common-sense* decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of the persons supplying hearsay information, there is a *fair probability* that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” (Emphasis added; *Illinois v. Gates* (1983) 462 U.S. 213 [76 L.Ed.2nd 527] see also *United States v. Ventresca* (1965) 380 U.S. 102, 108 [13 L.Ed.2nd 684, 689]; *United States v. Adjani* (9th Cir. 2006) 452 F.3rd 1140, 1145; and see *Florida v. Harris* (2013) 568 U.S. 237, 243-245 [133 S.Ct. 1050; 185 L.Ed.2nd 61]; a warrantless search of a vehicle based upon a drug-detection dog’s sniff.)

“In determining whether an affidavit is supported by probable cause, the magistrate must make a “practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” [Citation] The sufficiency of the affidavit must be evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances. [Citation].” (*People v. Garcia* (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 715, 721; quoting *Fenwick & West v. Superior Court* (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1272, 1278; *People v. Lieng* (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1228-1229.)

“The purpose of the exclusionary rule is . . . to deter illegal police conduct, not deficient police draftsmanship.”

(People v. Superior Court [Nasmeh] (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 85, 97.)

Note that **Gates** also describes the standard for probable cause in a search warrant affidavit as a “*fair probability*” (pg. 238) or a “*substantial chance*” (pg. 244, fn. 13) that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place, which is arguably a lesser standard than as described in older California cases requiring a “*substantial probability*.” (E.g.; see **People v. Cook** (1978) 22 Cal.3rd 67, 84, fn. 6.)

“A search warrant must be supported by probable cause. (U.S. Const., Fourth Amend.; § 1525.) In determining whether probable cause exists, the magistrate considers the totality of the circumstances. (**Illinois v. Gates** (1983) 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527.) ‘Probable cause, unlike the fact itself, may be shown by evidence that would not be competent at trial. [Citation.] Accordingly, information and belief alone may support the issuance of search warrants, which require probable cause. [Citations.]’ (**Humphrey v. Appellate Division** (2002) 29 Cal.4th 569, 573, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 645, 58 P.3d 476.)” (**People v. Varghese** (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1103.)

California follows the **Gates** “*totality of the circumstances*” test. (**People v. Spears** (1991) 228 Cal.App.3rd 1, 17.)

Probable cause must be shown for each of the items listed in the warrant as property to be seized, justifying its seizure. (**People v. Frank** (1985) 38 Cal.3rd 711, 726-728.)

Probable cause showing a sufficient “*nexus*” between the evidence to be seized and the place to be searched must also be established. (**People v. Garcia** (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 715, 721.)

However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal has shown a reluctance to find probable cause when it is based upon “*a lengthy chain of inferences*.” (**United States v. Gourde** (9th Cir. 2004) 382 F.3rd 1003; no probable cause to support the issuance of a search warrant when based upon the defendant’s known subscription to a child pornography website, unlimited access to the child pornography on the website, defendant’s failure to unsubscribe after two months, and an expert’s opinion that the above necessarily means that defendant would likely be in personal possession of child pornography.)

The fact that the person whose property (i.e., a computer in this case) is seized and searched is not at that time subject to arrest (i.e., no probable cause) does not mean that the seizure and search of that property is not lawful. (*United States v. Adjani* (9th Cir. 2006) 452 F.3rd 1140, 1146-1147.)

A warrant that establishes probable cause to search a vehicle for items missing from a possible homicide victim's residence will necessarily also allow for the seizure of that vehicle for later examination at a police lab, and to search the vehicle for trace evidence related to the missing items, even if the seizure of the car and the search for trace evidence is not specifically mentioned in the warrant. (*People v. Superior Court [Nasmeh]* (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 85, 94-98.)

A description of the affiant's training and experience, the fact that persons involved in drug trafficking commonly conceal caches of drugs in their residences and businesses, the fact that one of the co-conspirator's telephone was listed as being to that residence, and a description of coconspirators use of the defendant's residence each time a sale of drugs was ordered, was sufficient to establish probable cause for a search warrant for that residence. (*United States v. Garcia-Villalba* (9th Cir. 2009) 585 F.3rd 1223, 1232-1234.)

A warrant affidavit need not include all of the information available to the police, so long as the omitted facts are not material, nor must a police officer ordinarily continue the investigation seeking further corroboration once the officer has probable cause. (*Ewing v. City of Stockton* (9th Cir. 2009) 588 F.3rd 1218, 1226-1227.)

A single photograph of a nude minor (female child who is between 8 and 10 years old), by itself, is insufficient to establish probable cause for a search warrant. But a second such photo, under the "totality of the circumstances," is enough. (*United States v. Battershell* (9th Cir. 2006) 457 F.3rd 1048.)

However, a single photograph of a nude minor (female of about 15 to 17 years of age), when combined with other suspicious circumstances (e.g., 15 computers in house found in complete disarray, with two minors not belonging to the defendant, where the defendant, a civilian, is staying in military housing), *may* be enough to justify the issuance of a search warrant. (*United States*

v. Krupa (9th Cir. 2011) 658 F.3rd 1174, 1177-1179; but see dissent, pp. 1180-1185.)

The known fact that defendant uploaded a particular child pornography video to a decentralized peer-to-peer file-sharing network known as “eDonkey,” was sufficient by itself to establish a “fair probability” that defendant would have other child pornography on his computer system. (*United States v. Schesso* (9th Cir. 2013) 730 F.3rd 1040, 1045-1047; search warrant upheld.)

Evidence of a person’s abnormal sexual interest in children, including inappropriate touching, does *not*, by itself, establish probable cause to believe that the person might also have child pornography at his home (*Dougherty v. City of Covina* (9th Cir. 2011) 654 F.3rd 892.) or on his computer. (*United States v. Needham* (9th Cir. 2013) 718 F.3rd 1190, 1193-1196; search warrant upheld under the Good Faith doctrine.)

“(A) search warrant issued to search a suspect’s home computer and electronic equipment lacks probable cause when (1) no evidence of possession or attempt to possess child pornography was submitted to the issuing magistrate; (2) no evidence was submitted to the magistrate regarding computer or electronics use by the suspect; and (3) the only evidence linking the suspect’s attempted child molestation to possession of child pornography is the experience of the requesting police officer, with no further explanation.” (*Id.*, at pp. 1194-1195.)

It is irrelevant that a theft victim is not identified by name in a search warrant affidavit so long as the theft of the victim’s property is otherwise sufficiently described. (*People v. Scott* (2011) 52 Cal.4th 452, 485-486.)

Where evidence of illegal guns and ammunition was recovered in the execution of a search warrant, the Court found that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding there was a fair probability that evidence of a crime would be found in defendant’s home. There was probable cause to believe defendant was the president of a local chapter of a motorcycle gang even though he was apparently the treasurer only. The search warrant sought club documents, not for their indication of membership in the gang, but because those documents detailed illegal activity. The warrant was not an unconstitutional general warrant. Any falsity about his status as the president was immaterial in that he was apparently

still an officer. (*United States v. Vasquez* (9th Cir. 2011) 654 F.3rd 880, 883-885.)

A search warrant affidavit was found to be legally insufficient to establish probable cause when information from three separate informants was found to be conclusory only, corroborating each other only as to “pedestrian facts” that could have been known to anyone (i.e., “*pedestrian facts*”). Information from an arrestee was based upon hearsay only. Information from two other informants did not describe first-hand information, failing to describe the facts and circumstances underlying the informants’ conclusions that defendant and his girlfriend were dealing drugs. Information that the girlfriend had a prior criminal history did not specify the details of that history. Also, the fact that one of the informants had supplied information to law enforcement before was lacking in detail as to the nature of the prior reports and how long ago. (*People v. French* (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1307; warrant saved by the officer’s reasonable good faith.)

The fact that the target of a residential search warrant was actually in prison at the time of the alleged crime and could not have participated in either the commission of the crime or in hiding the weapons used is a fact that the magistrate should have known in determining whether probable cause existed. (*Bravo v. City of Santa Maria* (9th Cir. 2011) 665 F.3rd 1076, 1087-1088.)

Upon a motion to suppress evidence recovered pursuant to a search warrant, the issue is whether there was a fair probability that evidence related to the suspected offense(s) might be found in the place to be searched. The fact that that evidence is instead used to prosecute a separate offense is irrelevant. (*United States v. Nguyen* (9th Cir. 2012) 673 F.3rd 1259; evidence collected in a state investigation of **Election Code** violations (**Elect. Code § 18540**; threats to influence voters) but later used to prosecute defendant on federal charges (**18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3)**); obstruction of justice for failing to disclose the full extent of his knowledge regarding the creation and mailing of the letter at issue.)

A search warrant for defendant’s home was based upon the belief that defendant’s two sons had some connection with a homicide and that the firearm used would be found in defendant’s home. The Court found that the warrant affidavit failed to establish sufficient probable causes to believe that either son might have taken the firearm to defendant’s home, or even that the sons might have possessed the firearm themselves. The court further held that

the good-faith exception did not apply in this case because the officers' reliance on the warrant was unreasonable. (*United States v. Grant* (2012) 682 F.3rd 827, 832-841.)

A search warrant, supported by probable cause, authorized the police to search defendant's house and seize gang indicia of any sort. Such indicia could logically be found in defendant's cellphone, which had the capacity to store people's names, telephone numbers and other contact information, as well as music, photographs, artwork, and communications in the form of emails and messages. Defendant's phone was the likely container of many items that were the functional equivalent of those specifically listed in the warrant. The text messages seized during the search of defendant's phone were related to a gang-related assault that he was suspected of committing, and their suppression was thus not required under the exclusionary rule. (*People v. Rangel* (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1315-1317.)

There is no duty on the part of the affiant to investigate the suspect's version of the events before obtaining a search warrant. (*Cameron v. Craig* (9th Cir. 2013) 713 F.3rd 1012, 1019.)

An affiant's subjective intent in seeking a search warrant is irrelevant. "(O)nce probable cause exists, and a valid warrant has been issued, the officer's subjective intent in conducting the search is irrelevant." (*People v. Lee* (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 161; quoting *People v. Carrington* (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 168.)

When information is contained in the affidavit which is the product of a prior illegal search, that information may be excised and the remainder retested for probable cause. "A search warrant is not 'rendered invalid merely because some of the evidence included in the affidavit is tainted.' (Citation) The warrant remains valid if, after excising the tainted evidence, the affidavit's 'remaining untainted evidence would provide a neutral magistrate with probable cause to issue a warrant.'" (*United States v. Job* (9th Cir. 2017) 871 F.3rd 852, 863-864; citing *United States v. Nora* (9th Cir. 2014) 765 F.3rd 1049, 1058; and quoting *United States v. Reed* (9th Cir. 1994) 15 F.3rd 928, 933.)

DNA Swab Search Warrant Taken for the Purpose of Eliminating Others as a Suspect: A state court order pursuant to **Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-3905** authorizing the collection of DNA samples from officers of the Phoenix Police Department satisfied the **Warrant Clause** of the **Fourth Amendment** in that the orders were issued by a state court judge and

described a saliva sample to be seized by mouth swab from the person of plaintiff police officers. The state court expressly found probable cause to believe that the crime of homicide had been committed and that excluding public safety personnel as the source of the of DNA left at the scene would have plainly aided in the conviction of an eventual criminal defendant by negating any contention at trial that police had contaminated the relevant evidence. No undue intrusion occurred because it was hardly unreasonable to ask sworn officers to provide saliva samples for the sole purpose of demonstrating that DNA left at a crime scene was not the result of inadvertent contamination by on-duty public safety personnel. (*Bill v. Brewer* (9th Cir. 2015) 799 F.3rd 1295.)

Minimum Contents: At a minimum, a warrant affidavit should include the following:

- The Name or Names of the Affiant(s).

It is not necessary that the affiant be a sworn peace officer. “(T)here seems no reason why seeking one (i.e., a search warrant) should be confined to peace officers instead of unsworn members of law enforcement.” (*People v. Bell* (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1030, 1054-1055.)

A warrant may also be supported by affidavits from more than one person. (See *Skelton v. Superior Court* (1969) 1 Cal.3rd 144.)

- The Statutory Grounds for Issuance. (See P.C. §§ 1524, 1524.2 and 1524.3.)

It is irrelevant that a peace officer lists an incorrect charged offense justifying the issuance of a warrant, so long as there is *some* legal grounds for the issuance of the warrant under some statute. (*United States v. Meek* (9th Cir. 2004) 366 F.3rd 705, 713-714; a “statutory variance in the affidavit is not fatal to the warrant’s validity.”)

- A Physical Description, with “*reasonable particularity*,” of the Persons, Places, Things and Vehicles to be Searched.

A warrant’s description of the property to be searched will be reviewed by the appellate courts in a *common sense* and *realistic* fashion. (*People v. Minder* (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1784; *United States v. Ventresca* (1965) 380 U.S 102, 109 [13 L.Ed.2nd 684, 689].)

See “The ‘*Reasonable Particularity*’ Requirement,” below.

- A Physical Description, with “*reasonable particularity*,” of the Persons, Things or Property to be Seized.

See “The ‘*Reasonable Particularity*’ Requirement,” below.

- A Detailed Statement of the Expertise (i.e., training and experience) of the Affiant.
- A Chronological Narrative and *Factual* (as opposed to *conclusory*) *Description* of the circumstances substantiating the officer’s conclusion that Probable Cause for a search exists. This would include:

- Facts showing the commission of a crime (or crimes);
- Facts connecting the listed suspect(s) to the crime(s);
- Facts connecting the suspect(s) to the location(s), vehicle(s), and/or person(s) to be searched;
- Facts connecting the property to be seized to the location(s), vehicle(s), and/or person(s) to be searched;
- Facts describing how the descriptions were obtained.

The facts as described in the search warrant affidavit making up the “*probable cause*” for issuance of a warrant must be attested to by the affiant as the truth. Failing to do so *may* invalidate the warrant. See:

People v. Hale (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 942; not a fatal error, being one of “*form*” over “*substance*.”

People v. Leonard (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 878; finding it to be one of “*substance*” over “*form*,” and fatal to the validity of the warrant.

- *Police Reports, Charts, Maps, Etc.*, may be used as exhibits, attached and “incorporated by reference,” but should not be used as a substitute for a statement of probable cause.

The term “*incorporate by reference*” is a term of art that is not always necessary to use. So long as the warrant affidavit makes reference to any attachments, it can be assumed that the magistrate considered it. (See *People v. Stipo* (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 664, 669-670.)

- *The Affiant’s Conclusion* (i.e., his/her opinion) based upon his or her training and experience, that:

Probable cause exists for the search; and

The item(s) sought will be found at the location(s) to be searched.

A qualified officer/affiant can attach special significance to his observations and set forth expert opinion in an affidavit. (*People v. Carvajal* (1988) 202 Cal.App.3rd 487, 496-498.)

“(L)aw enforcement officers may draw upon their expertise to interpret the facts in a search warrant application, and such expertise may be considered by the magistrate as a factor supporting probable cause.” (*People v. Nicholls* (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 703, 711; child molest case.)

“The magistrate issuing the warrant ‘is entitled to rely upon the conclusions of experienced law enforcement officers in weighing the evidence supporting a request for a search warrant as to where evidence of crime is likely to be found. [Citation.] It is not essential that there be direct evidence that such evidence will be at a particular location. Rather, the magistrate “‘is entitled to draw reasonable inferences about where evidence is likely to be kept, based on the nature of the evidence and the type of offense.’” (Citations)” (*People v. Lazarus* (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 734, 764.)

- Justification for a *Nighttime Search*, if necessary. (See P.C. § 1533)

The “*Reasonable Particularity*” Requirement (P.C. §§ 1525, 1529); *The Persons, Places, Things and Vehicles to be Searched*:

Rule: The persons, places, things and vehicles to be searched must be described with sufficient detail so that an officer executing the warrant may, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the person, place, thing or vehicle intended. (*People v. Grossman* (1971) 19 Cal.App.3rd 8, 11.)

Factors: The following factors will be considered by the court:

- Whether probable cause exists to seize all items of a particular type described in the warrant;
- Whether the warrant sets out objective standards by which executing officers can differentiate items subject to seizure from those which are not; *and*
- Whether the government was able to describe the items more particularly in light of the information available to it at the time the warrant was issued.

(*United States v. Adjani* (9th Cir. 2006) 452 F.3rd 1140, 1148.)

Suggested Procedures:

The affiant should personally view the place, etc., to be searched, if possible, in order to guarantee the accurateness of the description in the warrant.

Too much detail, so long as it is accurate, is better than not enough.

Use of photographs and/or diagrams, attached as exhibits, may be advisable.

More than one person, place or vehicle may be listed in a single warrant so long as there is probable cause described in the affidavit for each.

A later judicial finding that the search of one of the listed locations is not supported by probable cause will not necessarily affect the search of any of the other locations where the probable cause supporting the search of the other locations is in itself sufficient. (*People v. Joubert* (1983) 140 Cal.App.3rd 946.)

“*Good faith*” may save a warrant with a defective description. (See *People v. MacAvoy* (1984) 162 Cal.App.3rd 746, 763-765.)

See “*Good Faith*,” under “*Why Search Warrants are Preferred*,” above.

Cases:

“It is enough if the description is such that the officer with a search warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended.” (*Steele v. United States* (1925) 267 U.S. 498, 503 [69 L.Ed. 757].)

“The test for determining the validity of a warrant is [(1)] whether the warrant describes the place to be searched with ‘sufficient particularity to enable law enforcement officers to locate and identify the premises with reasonable effort,’ and [(2)] whether any reasonable probability exists that the officers may mistakenly search another premises.” (*United States v. Brobst* (9th Cir. 2009) 558 F.3rd 982, 991-994, quoting *United States v. Mann* (9th Cir. 2004) 389 F.3rd 869, 876.)

In *Brobst*, the affiant had the wrong street number and the physical description matched other residences in the area as well. However, the officers took steps to verify that they had the right house (e.g., checking a tax/property map and asking neighbors) before executing the warrant. Also, the residence had defendant’s name posted on it. The search was upheld.

A warrant’s description of the property to be searched will be reviewed by the appellate courts in a *common sense* and *realistic* fashion. (*People v. Minder* (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1784; *United States v. Ventresca* (1965) 380 U.S. 102, 109 [13 L.Ed.2nd 684, 689].)

The fact that the affiant himself is personally familiar with the place to be searched, and therefore could reasonably be expected to find it, has been held, at least in one case, to be a factor which will help to overcome errors in the description. (*People v. Amador* (2000) 24 Cal.4th 387; wrong street number and faulty physical description not fatal when no other houses in the area could likely be mistaken for the place to be searched, and the affiant, who executed the warrant, was familiar with the place.)

An incorrect address was not fatal to the warrant when two agents executing the warrant personally knew which premises were intended to be searched and other circumstances helped to identify the correct house. (*United States v. Turner* (9th Cir. 1985) 770 F.3rd 1508, 1511.)

The “curtilage” of the home is included as a part of the home, whether or not specifically mentioned in the warrant. (*United States v. Gorman* (9th Cir. 1996) 104 F.3rd 272.)

But, what constitutes a part of the curtilage may be an issue. (See *United States v. Cannon* (9th Cir. 2001) 264 F.3rd 875; the defendant’s storage areas attached to a second residence, rented to a third party, to the rear of the main residence, properly searched as within the curtilage of the main residence.)

Note: The better practice is to specifically include in the description of the place to be searched all places around the residence one might expect to find the items being searched for, thus eliminating the issue.

Because “(a) magistrate is entitled to draw reasonable inferences about where evidence is likely to be kept, based on the nature of the evidence and the type of offense (*United States v. Angulo-Lopez* (9th Cir. 1986) 791 F.2nd 1394, 1399.),” a search of a narcotics suspect’s vehicle, based upon no more than the affiant’s knowledge, gained through training and experience, that persons who traffic in drugs often secret more narcotics and other evidence in their vehicles, may be authorized. (*United States v. Spearman* (9th Cir. 1976) 532 F.2nd 132, 133.)

The same argument can be made for authorizing the search of a narcotics suspect's *person*, even though away from his home. (*United States v. Elliott* (9th Cir. 2003) 322 F.3rd 710.)

However, when a vehicle is not specifically listed in the search warrant as something the officers have probable cause to search, its mere proximity to the premises searched does not give officers the right to search the vehicle based upon its apparent connection to that property. (*People v. Casares* (2016) 62 Cal.4th 808, 836.)

The computer of a roommate, the roommate himself not being targeted, where there is probable cause to believe that the suspect has access to the roommate's computer, was properly listed in the warrant affidavit as an item to be searched. The critical element in a search is not whether the owner of property to be searched is a suspect, but rather whether there is reasonable cause to believe that it contains seizable evidence. (*United States v. Adjani* (9th Cir. 2006) 452 F.3rd 1140.)

Getting a search warrant for a residence where it is believed that the suspect is at least staying part time, recognizing that a person may have one domicile but several residences, is proper. (*United States v. Crews* (9th Cir. 2007) 502 F.3rd 1130, 1139; citing *Martinez v. Bynum* (1983) 461 U.S. 321, 339 [75 L.Ed.2nd 879].)

The wrong address listed in the warrant, caused by an address change effected by local authorities from one town to another, did not affect the validity of the search warrant when the officers could still reasonably ascertain the correct house to be searched. (*United States v. Brobst* (9th Cir. 2009) 558 F.3rd 982, 991-994; steps taken by the officers at the scene to verify that they were about to search the right house.)

A general provision in a warrant giving police authorization to search "any vehicles under the control of [the real property] or the occupants of the premises to be searched, at the time the warrant is to be served as established by DMV documents and records, possession of keys or actual

use of the vehicles and/or statements of the witnesses,” was held to be sufficient to allow for the search of a vehicle found on the front lawn of defendant’s residence where a records check revealed that a release of liability was issued to defendant’s mother who lived at the residence. (*People v. Camel* (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 989, 998-999.)

Whether or not a warrant description is “*overbroad*” is a question of law and dependent upon the circumstances. “In analyzing this question, we consider the purpose of the warrant, the nature of the items sought, and the totality of the circumstances surrounding the case. ‘A warrant that permits a search broad in scope may be appropriate under some circumstances, and the warrant’s language must be read in context and with common sense.’” (*Id.*, at p. 999.)

In a prosecution for possession of child pornography (**P.C. § 311.11(a)**), defendant’s motion to quash a search warrant and suppress the resulting evidence seized from his laptop computer was properly granted by the trial court. The evidence in issue was seized from a residence located behind and separate from the address listed in the search warrant affidavit as the location of an Internet account that was sharing child pornography online. The warrant for the listed address permitted the search of the residence, garages, and outbuildings on the property at the listed address. The trial court found that the search of defendant’s residence, which was completely separate from that property, was overbroad and thus violated the **Fourth Amendment**. Defendant’s residence, found behind the residence listed in the warrant, was no longer a garage because at the time of the search it had a bedroom, a kitchen, a bathroom, and a living space, and there was no evidence it was capable of housing a vehicle. It was also not an outbuilding because there was no evidence it was used in connection with the main house or that it served as anything other than a separate residence for defendant. Even if the language of the warrant could be interpreted to include a search of defendant’s residence, the warrant affidavit did not establish probable cause for such a search because the police had no basis to believe the network with the suspect IP address was accessed from defendant’s residence. Finally, the police lacked a “good faith” basis

for the search of defendant’s residence, even assuming there was a wireless signal extending from the identified residence to defendant’s residence, because they had no evidence that defendant had a password to the network or that he had accessed it in any fashion. (*People v. Nguyen* (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 574, 581-588.)

The “Reasonable Particularity” Requirement (P.C. §§ 1525, 1529); The property to be seized:

Rule: *The property to be seized* must be described with sufficient particularity so that an officer with no knowledge of the facts underlying the warrant and looking only at the description of the property on the face of the warrant would be able to recognize and select the items described while conducting the search. (See *People v. Superior Court [Williams]* (1978) 77 Cal.App.3rd 69, 77; providing a complete discussion of cases approving and disapproving certain descriptions.)

Issues: In determining whether a warrant’s description of the items to be seized is sufficiently specific to be constitutional under the **Fourth Amendment**, a court must consider three issues:

- Whether probable cause exists to seize all items of a particular type described in the warrant;
- Whether the warrants sets out objective standards by which executing officers can differentiate items subject to seizure from those which are not; *and*
- Whether the government was able to describe the items more particularly in light of the information available to it at the time the warrant was issued.

(*Millender v. County of Los Angeles* (9th Cir. 2010) 620 F.3rd 1016, 1024; see below.)

Cases:

The United States Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s *Millender v. County of Los Angeles* decision in *Messerschmidt et al. v. Millender* (2012) 565 U.S. 535 [132 S.Ct. 1235; 182 L.Ed.2nd 47], holding that officers were entitled to qualified immunity from civil liability when their conduct, even if illegal, did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. The Supreme Court

held that based upon a suspect's known gang affiliation, his use of firearms, and his tendency towards violence, that it was not unreasonable to assume that more than just the gun used in his crime, and relevant gang paraphernalia, might be found in the defendant's residence where the suspect was known to live.

See also: *United States v. Spilotro* (9th Cir. 1986) 800 F.2nd 959, 963; *United States v. Wong* (9th Cir. 2003) 334 F.3rd 831.)

However, "a search warrant need only be reasonably specific, rather than elaborately detailed. . . . (T)he specificity required depends on the circumstances of the case and the type of items involved." (*Ewing v. City of Stockton* (9th Cir. 2009) 588 F.3rd 1218, 1228; citing *United States v. Brobst* (9th Cir. 2009) 558 F.3rd 982, 993.)

"In determining whether seizure of particular items exceeds the scope of the warrant, courts (are to) examine whether the items are similar to, or the 'functional equivalent' of, items enumerated in the warrant, as well as containers in which they are reasonably likely to be found." (*People v. Rangel* (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1316; upholding the seizure and search of defendant's cellphone (i.e., "smartphone") although not mentioned in the warrant, but where the officers were authorized to seize "gang indicia.")

"*Particularity*" refers to the requirement that the warrant must clearly state what is sought. "*Breadth*" deals with the requirement that the scope of the warrant be limited by the probable cause on which the warrant is based. (*United States v. Brobst* (9th Cir. 2009) 558 F.3rd 982, 994-995; citing *United States v. Towne* (9th Cir. 1993) 997 F.2nd 537, 554; *United States v. SDI Future Health, Inc.* (9th Cir. 2009) 568 F.3rd 684, 702; *Millender v. County of Los Angeles* (9th Cir. 2010) 620 F.3rd 1016, 1024; certiorari granted; see *Messerschmidt et al. v. Millender* (2012) 565 U.S. 535 [132 S.Ct. 1235; 182 L.Ed.2nd 47], above.)

The description must "*place a meaningful restriction on the objects to be seized . . .*" (*People v. Murray* (1978) 89 Cal.App.3rd 809, 832.)

Documents or other evidence showing “*dominion and control*” (i.e., “*D and C papers*”) over the place being searched should be listed among the items for which the affiant wishes to search. (*People v. Williams* (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1535; *People v. Rushing* (1989) 209 Cal.App.3rd 618; *People v. Nicolaus* (1991) 54 Cal.3rd 551, 575.)

“Indicia tending to establish the identity of persons in control of the premises,” has been held to be specific enough to meet the “particularly” requirements for a search warrant. (*Ewing v. City of Stockton* (9th Cir. 2009) 588 F.3rd 1218, 1229.)

In an Internet sexual solicitation of a child case, the following items were held to be appropriate in a search warrant for the suspect’s house and vehicle: “(S)exually explicit material or paraphernalia used to lower the inhibition of children, sex toys, photography equipment, child pornography, as well as material related to past molestation such as photographs, address ledgers including names of other pedophiles, and journals recording sexual encounters with children,” as well as the defendant’s computer system, including “computer equipment, information on digital and magnetic storage devices, computer printouts, computer software and manuals, and documentation regarding computer use.” (*United States v. Meek* (9th Cir. 2004) 366 F.3rd 705, 714-716.)

So long as sufficiently described, it is not necessary that a warrant affidavit contain the actual photographs of what is alleged to be child pornography. (*United States v. Battershell* (9th Cir. 2006) 457 F.3rd 1048.)

But what is, and what is not, “*child pornography*” might be an issue. As a “starting point” for determining the existence of “*lasciviousness*” in a photo or photos, a court may use the following non-exclusive six factor test:

- Whether the focal point of the visual depiction is on the child’s genitalia or pubic area;
- Whether the setting of the visual depiction is sexually suggestive, i.e., in a place or pose generally associated with sexual activity;

- Whether the child is depicted in an unnatural pose, or in inappropriate attire, considering the age of the child;
- Whether the child is fully or partially clothed, or nude;
- Whether the visual depiction suggests sexual coyness or a willingness to engage in sexual activity;
- Whether the visual depiction is intended or designed to elicit a sexual response in the viewer.

(*United States v. Hill* (9th Cir. 2006) 459 F.3rd 966, 970-973, citing *United States v. Dost* (S.D. Cal. 1986) 636 F.Supp. 828, 832.)

Practice Note: It is best to include a sampling of the pornography in issue as an attachment to a warrant affidavit, for the magistrate to consider. (See *United States v. Perkins* (9th Cir. Mar. 2017) 850 F.3rd 1109.) However, such an attachment should be sealed per *People v. Hobbs* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 948 (see *Sealing the Warrant Affidavit*; i.e., the “*Hobbs Warrant*,” below) to prevent any unnecessary publication of the pornography itself, particularly when dealing with child victims.

Things the affiant “*hopes to find*,” but for which there is no articulable reason to believe will be found, should not be listed. However, property that there is a “*fair probability*” would be found, given the nature of the offense, may be listed despite the lack of any specific evidence that such an item is in fact in the place to be searched. (See *People v. Ulloa* (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1000; computer containing Internet correspondence in a child molest case.)

“*Telephone calls*” (i.e., authorization to intercept them while executing the warrant) should be listed where there is probable cause to believe the telephone is being used for illegal purposes. (*People v. Warner* (1969) 270 Cal.App.2nd 900, 907, bookmaking case; *People v. Nealy* (1991) 228 Cal.App.3rd 447, 452, narcotics case.)

The contents of a telephone call to a narcotics dealer’s home asking to buy narcotics, answered by

the police executing a search warrant, are admissible into evidence as a judicially created exception to the Hearsay Rule. (*People v. Morgan et al.* (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 935.)

The *Morgan* Court further determined that the telephone call was “*non-testimonial*,” as described in *Crawford v. Washington* (2004) 541 U.S. 36 [158 L.Ed.2nd 177], and thus admissible over a **Sixth Amendment**, “*right to confrontation*” objection. (*People v. Morgan, supra*, at pp. 946-947.)

Other courts have held that the contents of a telephone call are admissible as non-hearsay circumstantial evidence of the defendants’ dope dealing. (*People v. Nealy* (1991) 228 Cal.App.3rd 447; and *People v. Ventura* (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1515.)

Practice Note: Asking for authorization to answer the telephone for the purpose of establishing “*dominion and control*” over the place being searched (E.g.; “*Hello, is Doper John home?*”) is also a good practice.

Computers, including disks, etc., based upon the affiant’s knowledge that criminals will often chronicle their criminal activities on their computers, may often be included. With sufficient probable cause connecting a computer to criminal activity, the computer and all its attachments, disks, etc., are subject to seizure and removal to a lab where it may be properly and carefully inspected by experts. (*United States v. Hay* (9th Cir. 2000) 231 F.3rd 630; see also *People v. Ulloa* (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1000.)

See also *Guest v. Leis* (6th Cir. 2001) 255 F.3rd 325, 334-337; seizure of the whole computer system was not unreasonable so long as there was probable cause to conclude that evidence of a crime would be found on the computer.

And *Mahlberg v. Mentzer* (8th Cir. 1992) 968 F.2nd 772; seizure of computer equipment, programs and disks *not* listed in the warrant upheld.

Seizure of computers in a homicide investigation justified by probable cause to believe that specific documentary evidence would reasonably be found in the defendant's computer. (*United States v. Wong* (9th Cir. 2003) 334 F.3rd 831.)

A laptop computer, open and running, properly seized as potential evidence of dominion and control over the searched premises, even though not specifically listed in the warrant. (*People v. Balint* (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 200; see also *People v. Varghese* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1100-1103.)

The computer of a roommate, the roommate himself not being targeted, where there is probable cause to believe that the suspect has access to the roommate's computer, was properly listed in the warrant affidavit as an item to be searched. The critical element in a search is not whether the owner of property to be searched is a suspect, but rather whether there is reasonable cause to believe that it contains seizable evidence. (*United States v. Adjani* (9th Cir. 2006) 452 F.3rd 1140.)

The seizure of defendant's computer and all computer related items (e.g., compact disks, floppy disks, hard drives, memory cards, DVDs, videotapes, and other portable digital devices), based upon no more than the discovery of one printed-out photo of child pornography, was lawful in that it was reasonable to conclude that the picture had come from his computer and that similar pictures were likely to be stored in it. (*United States v. Brobst* (9th Cir. 2009) 558 F.3rd 982, 994.)

Failure of the magistrate's order to include an authorization to search defendant's computer, even though in the statement of probable cause the affiant indicated a desire to search any possible computers found in defendant's house, was a fatal omission.

Searching defendant's computer, therefore, went beyond the scope of the warrant's authorization. (*United States v. Payton* (9th Cir. 2009) 573 F.3rd 859, 861-864.)

The fact that the issuing magistrate testified to an intent to allow for the search of defendant's computers, and that the warrant included authorization to search for certain listed records which might be found in a computer, was held to be irrelevant. (*Id.* at pp. 862-863.)

But see *United States v. Giberson* (9th Cir. 2008) 527 F.3rd 882, where it was held that some circumstances might lead searching officers to a reasonable conclusion that documentary evidence they are seeking would be contained in computers found at the location, authorizing the search of those containers despite the failure of the warrant to list computers as things that may be searched. It was recommended, however, that the computer be seized and a second warrant be obtained authorizing its search.

See *People v. Rangel* (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1316, likening defendant's "smartphone" to a computer, given its capability to store photographs, e-mail addresses, and other personal information.

See "Computer Searches," under "Probable Cause Issues," below, and "Searches of Cellphones, Disks, Computers and Other High Tech Devices" under "Searches of Containers" (Chapter 13), below.

Inadvertent changes to the language of a warrant and affidavit after it is signed by the judge create issues that could result in suppression of all, or maybe a part of, the evidence seized, depending upon the flagrancy of the violation. (*United States v. Sears* (9th Cir. 2005) 411 F.3rd 1124; severance and partial suppression held to be sufficient sanction where the officer used the wrong attachment describing the places to be searched and

property to be seized which was different in only a few, minor ways.)

“*General Warrants*:” Warrants without sufficient particularity (i.e., “*general warrants*”) are legally insufficient and invalid. (*Burrows v. Superior Court* (1974) 13 Cal.3rd 238, 249-250.)

“The purpose of the ‘*particularity*’ requirement of the **Fourth Amendment** is to avoid general and exploratory searches by requiring a particular description of the items to be seized. [Citation]” (*People v. Bradford* (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1296; citing *Collidge v. New Hampshire* (1971) 403 U.S. 443, 467 [29 L.Ed.2nd 564, 583]; and *Stanford v. Texas* (1965) 379 U.S. 476, 485 [13 L.Ed.2nd 432, 437].)

“*Particularity*” is the requirement that the warrant must clearly state what is sought.

“*Breadth*” deals with the requirement that the scope of the warrant be limited by the probable cause on which the warrant is based. (*United States v. SDI Future Health, Inc.* (9th Cir. 2009) 568 F.3rd 684, 702.)

This “*particularity*” requirement serves two important purposes. It:

- Limits the discretion of the officers executing the warrant; *and*
- Informs the property owner or resident of the proper scope of the search.

(*United States v. Vesikuru* (9th Cir. 2002) 314 F.3rd 1116, 1123-1124; (*United States v. SDI Future Health, Inc.*, *supra*, at pp. 701-705.)

A search warrant and affidavit that fails to “*particularly describe*” and place “*meaningful restrictions*” on the property to be seized, violates the **Fourth Amendment**. (*United States v. Bridges* (9th Cir. 2003) 344 F.3rd 1010.)

Describing in the warrant itself (as opposed to the affidavit) the suspected criminal offense(s) *might* be

enough to overcome an otherwise “*overly broad*” description of the property to be seized, in that it at least puts the searching officers on some notice as to the limits of their discretion. (*Id.*, at p. 1018.)

An exception to this rule (i.e., “*overly broad*”) might be when the place being searched is a business, and it is alleged and substantiated in the affidavit that the business’s “*entire operation was permeated with fraud.*” (*Id.*, at pp. 1018-1019; *United States v. SDI Future Health, Inc.* (9th Cir. 2009) 568 F.3rd 684, 703, and fn. 13.)

See *United States v. Smith* (9th Cir. 2005) 424 F.3rd 992, 1004-1006.

In *Smith*, an “*extraordinarily broad*” search warrant was held to be justified where it was determined that “the entirety of the businesses operated by (defendants) are criminal in nature.” (*Id.*, at p. 1006.)

Overbreadth issues in a search warrant affidavit may be satisfied under the “doctrine of severance,” where only legally admissible evidence is actually used at trial. Under this doctrine, a court may sever out information seized from a computer that was the product of an overly broad warrant affidavit, leaving only that which was lawfully seized. (*United States v. Flores* (9th Cir. 2015) 802 F.3rd 1028, 1042-1046.)

The same issue existed for a federal grand jury subpoena that was held to be overly broad and should have been quashed in that it included e-mail information sought from a former state governor’s e-mail account that might include information in which the governor had a reasonable expectation of privacy (including, but not limited to, communications protected by the attorney-client privilege). (*Grand Jury Subpoena v. Kitzhaber* (9th Cir. 2016) 828 F.3rd 1083, 1087-1094.)

“(T)he more specificity the warrant describes the items sought, the more limited the scope of the search.

Conversely, the more generic the description, the greater the risk of a prohibited general search. (Citation)” (*People v. Balint* (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 200, 206.)

Seizure of “*all computer media*” is not too broad, given the difficulty in determining what might be on such media prior to a forensic examination by experts, at least so long as there is an explanation in the affidavit explaining why a wholesale seizure is necessary under the circumstances. (*United States v. Hill* (9th Cir. 2006) 459 F.3rd 966, 973-977.)

Use of language such as; “. . . *including, but not limited to* . . .” should not be used, in that such a description is *too general*, and legally insufficient to justify seizure of any property intended to be included under the “*not limited to*” phrase. (See *United States v. Reeves* (9th Cir. 2000) 210 F.3rd 1041, 1046-1047; *United States v. Bridges* (9th Cir. 2003) 344 F.3rd 1010, 1017-1018.)

“Indicia tending to establish the identity of persons in control of the premises,” has been held to be specific enough. (*Ewing v. City of Stockton* (9th Cir. 2009) 588 F.3rd 1218, 1229.)

Finding a small amount of marijuana on an arrestee’s person, and observing him earlier with a single, semi-automatic pistol, were insufficient to support an allegation that “marijuana, heroin, and methamphetamine, or . . . evidence of gang membership,” as well as “[f]irearms, assault rifles, handguns of any caliber and shotguns of any caliber,” as well as ammunition for such firearms,” would be found in defendant’s home. Even discovery of his criminal history; i.e., that he’d been convicted of the illegal possession of a firearm and for being a felon in possession of a firearm, did not support a belief that multiple firearms might be found in his home. (*United States v. Nora* (9th Cir. 2014) 765 F.3rd 1049, 1052-1060.)

See “*The Cleland Warrant; Narcotics*,” below.

Although defendant had met a false imprisonment victim through social media several months before the crime, a probation condition upon conviction that allows law enforcement unrestricted computer searches for material

prohibited by law was overbroad under the **Fourth Amendment**. Such a condition allows for searches of vast amounts of personal information unrelated to defendant's criminal conduct or his potential future criminality. A narrower means might include either requiring defendant to provide his social media account and passwords to his probation officer for monitoring, or restricting his use of, or access to, social media websites and applications without the prior approval of his probation officer. A condition requiring defendant not to delete his browser history was held to be valid, assuming a properly narrowed condition monitoring his use of social media can be fashioned. (*People v. Appleton* (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, 721-728.)

Items listed in a search warrant to be seized that are found to be “*overbroad*” may be severed without affecting the otherwise valid portions of the warrant. This is true whether the issue arises in a criminal (*United States v. SDI Future Health, Inc.* (9th Cir. 2009) 568 F.3rd 684, 707.) or a civil case. (*Ewing v. City of Stockton* (9th Cir. 2009) 588 F.3rd 1218, 1228-1229.)

Supplementing the Affidavit: To be legally effective, the affidavit may be supplemented by an examination, under oath, of the affiant by the magistrate. (**P.C. § 1526**)

The oral examination, however, will not be considered part of the probable cause unless reduced to writing and signed by the affiant. (*Charney v. Superior Court* (1972) 27 Cal.App.3rd 888, 891.)

Information not contained “within the four corners of a written affidavit given under oath” will not be considered and cannot be used to help establish probable cause. (*United States v. Luong* (9th Cir. 2006) 470 F.3rd 898, 904, 905.)

Note that there is some federal case authority to the contrary, from other circuits, allowing information known to the affiant and orally told to the magistrate to be considered. (See *United States v. Frazier* (6th Cir. 2005) 423 F.3rd 526, 535-536; *United States v. Legg* (4th Cir. 1994) 18 F.3rd 240, 243.244; and see dissenting opinion in *United States v. Luong*, *supra.*, at pp. 905-907.)

Combined Affidavit with Warrant: Some authorities advocate the use of a combined search warrant and affidavit form with an attached declaration of probable cause. (See **People v. MacAvoy** (1984) 162 Cal.App.3rd 746.)

However, care must be taken to insure that the attached declaration of probable cause is “*incorporated by reference*,” signed, and sworn to by the officer, for the warrant to be legally sufficient. (**People v. Leonard** (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 878; defective warrant saved under “*Good Faith*” exception. See also (**United States v. SDI Future Health, Inc.** (9th Cir. 2009) 568 F.3rd 684, 699-700.)

Incorporation may be made simply by using “*suitable words of reference*.” (*Id.*, at pp. 699-700; citing **United States v. Towne** (9th Cir. 1993) 997 F.2nd 537, 545.)

While no specific language is necessary, the Ninth Circuit has upheld such wording as; “*Upon the sworn complaint made before me there is probable cause to believe that the [given] crime . . . has been committed.*” (**United States v. Vesikuru** (9th Cir. 2002) 314 F.3rd 1116, 1120; see also **United States v. SDI Future Health, Inc.**, *supra*, at pp. 699-700.)

The Ninth Circuit also requires that the incorporated affidavit is either attached physically to the warrant or a least accompanies the warrant while agents execute the search. (**United States v. SDI Future Health, Inc.**, *supra*, at p. 699.)

Also, such a format potentially raises issues concerning the need to provide a copy of the affidavit to the suspect, along with the warrant. (See **United States v. Gantt** (9th Cir. 1999) 194 F.3rd 987, 1001, and fn. 7; affidavit needed to cure a deficiency in the description of the property to be seized; and **United States v. Smith** (9th Cir. 2005) 424 F.3rd 992, 1006-1008.)

Multiple Affiants/Affidavits: There may be more than one affiant and/or more than one affidavit in support of a search warrant. (**Skelton v. Superior Court** (1969) 1 Cal.3rd 144; P.C. § 1527.)

Staleness: The information contained in the warrant affidavit must not be “*stale*.” (**People v. Mesa** (1975) 14 Cal.3rd 466, 470.) Information that is remote in time (i.e., between the development of the probable cause and the obtaining of a search warrant) may be deemed to be too stale and

therefore unreliable. (*Alexander v. Superior Court* (1973) 9 Cal. 3rd 387, 393.)

Drug Sales Cases: Delays of more than *four weeks*, at least in a narcotics sales case and absent some new evidence tending to show the continued presence of the controlled substances in question, are generally considered insufficient to demonstrate present probable cause. For instance:

See *Hemler v. Superior Court* (1975) 44 Cal.App.3rd 430, 433-434; delay of 34 days between controlled sale of heroin and the officer's affidavit for the search warrant is stale.

Delay of 52 days between a controlled buy of almost a pound of marijuana and the execution of a search warrant, despite the officer's expert opinion that the seller would still have contraband in his residence (the sale taking place in a parking lot in another city), was held to be stale. (*People v. Hulland* (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1646.)

A delay of two months and three weeks (82 days) between the purchase of methamphetamine and the obtaining of a search warrant for defendant's house was too long. With the information being stale, the warrant was invalid as to him. It is irrelevant that defendant's purchase of drugs was part of a nine-month investigation into a drug-trafficking conspiracy involving multiple suspects when there was no showing that defendant himself was involved at all during the two months and three weeks in question. (*People v. Hirata* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1499.)

Exception: Historical Warrants:

While "*stale information*" by itself will not generally support a finding of probable cause, when combined with some evidence of a present criminal violation, an ongoing pattern of criminal activity may add up to sufficient probable cause. (*People v. Mikesell* (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1711; sometimes called an "*historical warrant*;" see also *People v. Medina* (1985) 165 Cal.App.3rd 11, 20-21; and *United States v. Fries* (9th Cir. 2015) 781 F.3rd 1137, 1150-1151.)

A continuing criminal enterprise, with no reason to believe the defendant has moved from her home where she was known to have lived some six months earlier, negated any staleness issue. (*People v. Gibson* (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 371, 380-381.)

Other Exceptions:

Expert opinion that, under the circumstances, the sought-for property is likely still to be found on the premises to be searched will normally overcome an issue of staleness. (See *United States v. Lacy* (9th Cir. 1997) 119 F.3rd 742; 10-month old information concerning the receiving of child pornography.)

But see *People v. Hulland* (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1646, where the officer's expert opinion was held to be insufficient to overcome a staleness (52 days) issue in a narcotics sales case.

“If circumstances would justify a person of ordinary prudence to conclude that an activity had continued to the present time, then the passage of time will not render the information stale.” (*People v. Carrington* (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 164; quoting *People v. Hulland, supra*, at p. 1652.)

In *Carrington*, the California Supreme Court held that it there was a “fair probability” that defendant would still have stolen checks in her home even after two months when some of the checks remained outstanding, as well as a key to the business that she'd burglarized. (*People v. Carrington, supra*, at pp. 163-164.)

Evidence that the defendant's criminal activities are a continuing offense, with no reason to believe that the defendant know he was being investigated, and every reason to believe that defendant would retain incriminating evidence, a search warrant will not be held to be based upon stale information. (*People v. Stipo* (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 664, 672-673; a computer-hacking enterprise.)

With about two months between the last illegal use of the victim's address and Social Security number and the later issuance of a search warrant for defendant's residence, the

warrant affidavit was still held to support a finding of probable cause. This finding was based upon a series of similar incidents over several years, all of which could be either directly or circumstantially connected to defendant. (*People v. Jones* (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 735.)

In that defendant fit the profile of a collector of child pornography, and the affiant included in the warrant affidavit the fact that individuals who possess, distribute, or trade in child pornography, rarely, if ever, dispose of sexually explicit images of children because they tend to treat such photos as “prized possessions,” the fact that a warrant was not obtained and executed until some 20 months after defendant had uploaded a child pornography video did not make the information stale. (*United States v. Schesso* (9th Cir. 2013) 730 F.3rd 1040,1047.)

Despite the passage of 23 years, and despite the fact that defendant had changed residences in that time period, the nature of the items sought (i.e., a firearm [the murder weapon], information stored on a computer, and photographs, journals and diaries), being items people normally hold onto for years, and that this defendant, having been in love with the victim’s husband, wouldn’t have likely discarded, the information in the affidavit listing these as items or information being sought, was not stale in that it was probable that defendant would not have discarded these items, or removed the information from her computer. (*People v. Lazarus* (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 734, 765-776.)

Obtaining a search warrant for defendant’s Facebook account almost 3½ months after information was developed that it might contain incriminating information was held not to be so stale that there was no longer a fair possibility that the evidence might still be there, particularly since the affiant submitted a preservation request 2 months after the probable cause was developed. Even if deleted, the information could likely be recovered. (*United States v. Flores* (9th Cir. 2015) 802 F.3rd1028, 1046-1047.)

Documentary gun registration information is not considered “stale” even though it shows that the firearms in question were purchased years earlier (17 years in this case), at least absent other information showing that the guns were

disposed of in the meantime. (*People v. Lee* (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 161, 172-173.)

Fingerprints: Note *Hayes v. Florida* (1985) 470 U.S. 811 [84 L.Ed.2nd 705], for the proposition that a search warrant may authorize the temporary detention, *without probable cause*, of a person for the purpose of taking fingerprints *if*:

- There is at least a “*reasonable suspicion*” that the suspect committed a criminal act;
- There is a reasonable basis for believing that fingerprints will establish or negate the suspect’s connection with that crime; *and*
- The procedure used is carried out with dispatch.

“There is thus support in our cases for the view that the **Fourth Amendment** would permit seizures for purposes of fingerprinting, if there is reasonable suspicion that the suspect has committed a criminal act, if there is a reasonable basis for believing that fingerprinting will establish or negate the suspect’s connection with that crime, and if the procedure is carried out with dispatch.” (*Id.*, at p. 817.)

Note: The Court in *Hayes* specifically declined to decide whether this would include transporting the subject to the station for fingerprinting. Because a non-consensual transportation is generally considered to be an arrest, requiring full “*probable cause*” (See “*Detentions*” (Chapter 3), above), it is strongly suggested that the procedure be conducted in the field.

See also *Davis v. Mississippi* (1969) 394 U.S. 721, 727-728 [22 L.Ed.2nd 676, 681-682]; noting that the taking of fingerprints of a person who is merely subject to a temporary detention is lawful.

And Note Virgle v. Superior Court (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 572, 574; where the Court referred to *Hayes* with approval.

Although the above holding in *Hayes* is dicta, it is “carefully considered language” that should be accorded weight. (*United States v. Dorcelly* (D.C. Cir. 2006) 454 F.3rd 366, 375.)

Description of the Facts; Factual vs. Conclusory Language: and circumstances that comprise the probable cause: “*Conclusory*,” as opposed to “*factual*,” allegations by the affiant are legally insufficient. (*Barnes v. Texas* (1965) 380 U.S. 253 [13 L.Ed.2nd 818].)

Note: The affiant must describe the *facts and circumstances* which comprise the probable cause, so that a magistrate may independently evaluate the existence or nonexistence of sufficient facts to justify issuance of the warrant. Merely listing the affiant’s conclusions, without describing the facts and circumstances that lead to the affiant’s conclusions, is legally insufficient.

Using terms such as “*pornography*” and “*harmful matter*” without describing what it is the affiant believes is pornographic, is a conclusory statement that may invalidate a warrant. (*People v. Hale* (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 942; warrant saved by other language in the affidavit from which the magistrate could infer the pornographic nature of the pictures.)

A “*purely conclusory*” statement by a narcotics officer that the residence from which a box suspected of containing narcotics was a “stash house,” with no evidence indicating what facts or circumstances led the officer to reach this conclusion, “was entitled to little if any weight” in the probable cause determination. (*United States v. Cervantes* (9th Cir. 2012) 703 F.3rd 1135, 1148-1140; discussing the warrantless search of a vehicle, based upon probable cause.)

“*Good Faith:*” Officers obtaining a search warrant in “*good faith*” and acting in reasonable reliance on an otherwise facially valid warrant, issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, will not require suppression of evidence even when the warrant is later found to be lacking in probable cause. (*United States v. Leon* (1984) 468 U.S. 897 [82 L.Ed.2nd 677].)

See “*Good Faith*,” under “*Why Search Warrants are Preferred*,” above.

Use of Hearsay: Use of *hearsay* in an affidavit, or even “*double* (i.e., multiple level) *hearsay*,” is okay “so long as there [is] a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay.” (*United States v. Ventresca* (1965) 380 U.S. 102, 108 [12 L.Ed.2nd 684, 688-689], quoting *Jones v. United States* (1960) 362 U.S. 257, 272 [4 L.Ed.2nd 697, 708]; *People v. Superior Court [Bingham]* (1979) 91 Cal.App.3rd 463, 469.) In fact, it is usually unavoidable. (*People v. Magana* (1979) 95 Cal.App.3rd 453, 460, 462.)

See also *City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court* (1989) 49 Cal.3rd 74, 87-88; *People v. Smith* (1976) 17 Cal.3rd 845, 850.)

Each level of hearsay, however, must be shown in the affidavit to be reliable. (See *People v. Superior Court [Bingham]*, *supra*; *Caligari v. Superior Court* (1979) 98 Cal.App.3rd 725; *People v. Love* (1985) 168 Cal.App.3rd 104.)

Miranda: Statements taken in violation of the defendant's **Miranda** rights (*Miranda v. Arizona* (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2nd 694].), so long as not coerced or involuntary, may be used in an affidavit adding to the probable cause. (*United States v. Patterson* (9th Cir. 1987) 812 F.2nd 1188, 1193; *People v. Brewer* (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 442.)

Third Party's Fourth Amendment Violation: Evidence obtained in violation of someone else's (i.e., someone other than the present defendant's) **Fourth Amendment** (*search and seizure*) rights may be used as part of the probable cause in a search warrant affidavit, unless the defendant can show that he has "*standing*" (i.e., it was *his* reasonable expectation of privacy that was violated) to challenge the use of the evidence. (*People v. Madrid* (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1888, 1896.)

"*Standing*" depends upon a showing that it was the defendant's own constitutional rights which were violated. (*People v. Shepherd* (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 825, 828.)

See "*Standing*," under "*Searches and Seizures*," Chapter 5, above.

Information in a search warrant affidavit that is the product of a violation of the defendant's own **Fourth Amendment** rights will be excised from the affidavit. The redacted affidavit will then be retested to determine whether probable cause still exists. (*People v. Weiss* (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1073, 1081.)

Privileged Information:

Rule; Passive Recipient: Information that comes into the hands of law enforcement that may be "*privileged information*," obtained without any "*complicity*" on the part of law enforcement, may be used as a part of the probable cause justifying the issuance of the search warrant. (*People v. Navarro* (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 146; Attorney-Client information supplied by the attorney in violation of E.C. §§ 950 et seq.; see also *United States v. White* (7th Cir. 1992) 970 F.2nd 328.)

The issue is one of a **Fifth (and Fourteenth) Amendment** “*due process*” violation. (*People v. Navarro, supra.*)

Being a “*passive recipient of privileged information*” shows a lack of “*complicity.*” (*People v. Navarro, supra*, at pp. 158-162.)

Deliberate Violation: To show that law enforcement was *not* just a passive recipient of privileged information, the defendant must prove that:

- The government (i.e., law enforcement) knew a lawyer-client relationship existed between the defendant and his informant;
- The government deliberately intruded into that relationship; *and*
- The defendant was prejudiced as a result.

(*Ibid*, citing *United States v. Kennedy* (10th Cir. 2000) 225 F.3rd 1197, 1194-1195.)

Cases:

Law enforcement officers gaining access to, and reading, privileged material (defendant’s notes to his attorney), a **Sixth Amendment** violation, did not require dismissal of the case or any other sanctions absent evidence that defendant was somehow “disadvantaged” by the violation. In this case, jail sheriff’s deputies looked at notes defendant had written to his attorney. However, there was no evidence that any of the information discovered by this violation was passed onto the prosecutors. None of the deputies were witnesses in the case. There being no prejudice, defendant’s motion to dismiss was properly denied. (*People v. Ervine* (2009) 47 Cal.4th 745, 764-772.)

When a prosecutor instructs her investigator to eavesdrop on an attorney-client conversation in a courtroom holding cell, such an act is so egregious as to warrant dismissal of the case. (*Morrow v. Superior Court* (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1252.)

However, law enforcement officers intentionally eavesdropping on an attorney-client conversation

that takes place at the offices of the law enforcement agency, without the complicity of a prosecutor, is not so egregious as to require dismissal. Exclusion of the discovered information, and any products of that information, is sufficient a remedy under the circumstances. (*People v. Shrier et al.* (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 400.)

A prison inmate has a viable lawsuit under **42 U.S.C. § 1983** where he has alleged that prison officials have opened and read, as opposed to merely inspected for contraband, his legal mail addressed to his attorney, and, in seeking injunctive relief, he sufficiently alleged the threatened repetition of his **Sixth Amendment** rights where he remains incarcerated and a corrections director personally informed him that prison officials were permitted to read his legal mail. (*Nordstrom v. Ryan* (9th Cir. 2014) 762 F.3rd 903,908-912; citing *Wolff v. McDonnell* (1974) 418 U.S. 539, 576-577 [41 L.Ed.2nd 935], which upheld the right of jail officials to open and inspect, but not read, mail to an inmates attorney.)

Proposed California Rule of Professional Conduct Rule 4.4
(patterned after the **American Bar Association's Model Rule 4.4**):

Where it is reasonably apparent to a lawyer (including a prosecutor) who has received a writing that was inadvertently sent or produced and relates to a lawyer's representation of a client, and the recipient lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the writing is privileged or subject to the work product doctrine, the lawyer shall refrain from examining the writing any more than it is necessary to determine that it is privileged or protected work product and shall promptly notify the sender.

Note: While this does not affect law enforcement's receipt of privileged material, nor does it provide for an exclusionary rule, it is an ethics issue for a lawyer, including prosecutors, when he or she receives privileged material, whether directly or from a law enforcement source.

Nighttime Searches: Justification for a nighttime search must be established in the warrant affidavit by establishing “good cause,” risking the possible suppression of evidence if it is not. (P.C. § 1533; *Tuttle v. Superior Court* (1981) 120 Cal.App.3rd 320, 328.)

“Nighttime” for purposes of executing a search warrant is *between 10:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m.* (P.C. § 1533) The search need only be commenced before 10:00 p.m. It is irrelevant how long after 10:00 p.m. it takes to finish the search. (*People v. Zepeda* (1980) 102 Cal.App.3rd 1, 7-8.)

See *Rodriguez v Superior Court* (1988) 199 Cal.App.3rd 1453, 1470; suggesting that because a night search does not violate any constitutional principles, evidence discovered during a nighttime search without judicial authorization should *not* result in suppression of any evidence.

But see *Bravo v. City of Santa Maria* (9th Cir. 2011) 665 F.3rd 1076, 1085-1086, where the Court found the failure to justify the need for a nighttime search to be the intrusive equivalent of failing to comply with the “knock and notice” requirements.

The test for determining “good cause” is as follows: “(T)he affidavit furnished the magistrate must set forth specific facts which show a necessity for service of the warrant at night rather than between the hours of 7 a.m. and 10 p.m. This means that the magistrate must be informed of facts from which it reasonably may be concluded that the contraband to be seized will not be in the place to be searched during the hours of 7 a.m. to 10 p.m.” (*People v. Watson* (1977) 75 Cal.App.3rd 592, 598.)

The need for a nighttime search may be shown by a description of “some factual basis for a prudent conclusion that the greater intrusiveness of a nighttime search is justified by the exigencies of the situation.” (*People v. Kimble* (1988) 44 Cal.3rd 480, 494.)

Note: While typically this is an issue in the searches of *residences*, the statute (P.C. § 1533) is not so restricted. Therefore, a search warrant authorizing the search of a person, vehicle, or other container *may* also require a “nighttime endorsement” if executed at night (i.e., 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.).

Leaving a Copy at the Scene: It is *not* legally required that a copy of the affidavit be left at the scene (*United States v. Celestine* (9th Cir. 2003) 324 F.3rd 1095, 1107.), at least when the place to be searched and the property

to be seized is sufficiently described in the search warrant itself. (*United States v. McGrew* (9th Cir. 1997) 122 F.3rd 847.)

See “*Leaving a Copy of the Warrant, Affidavit and/or Receipt and Inventory,*” below.

P.C. § 964: Victim and Witness Confidential Information: **P.C. § 964** requires the establishment of procedures to protect the confidentiality of “*confidential personal information*” of victims and witnesses. The section is directed primarily at prosecutors and the courts, but also contains a provision for documents filed by law enforcement with a court in support of search and arrest warrants; i.e., *an affidavit*.

“*Confidential personal information*” includes, *but is not limited to*, addresses, telephone numbers, driver’s license and California identification card numbers, social security numbers, date of birth, place of employment, employee identification numbers, mother’s maiden name, demand deposit account numbers, savings or checking account numbers, and credit card numbers. (**Subd. (b)**)

3. The “Receipt and Inventory” (or “Return”): This document is self-descriptive. It is used to list the property seized as a result of the execution of the search warrant, serving as an inventory of such property. (**P.C. § 1535**)

The original is returned to the Court with the original warrant and affidavit.

A copy is left with the person from whom property is taken, or left at the place searched, as a receipt of for those items taken by the searching officers.

P.C. § 1535 is not to be interpreted as a requirement to show to the suspect, or to leave a copy of at the scene, the search warrant itself. (*People v. Calabrese* (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 79.)

Sources of Information Establishing Probable Cause:

Other Police Officers: Suspect information or other criminal activity information received from other peace officers, either verbally, at pre-shift briefings, from department-originated notices, etc., or when communicated via radio through a police dispatcher, is considered reliable and generally establishes *probable cause* to arrest or search by itself. (*People v. Hill* (1974) 12 Cal.3rd 731, 761; *People v. Ramirez* (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1548.)

This is sometimes referred to as having received information through “official channels,” which refers to when it comes from any law enforcement source. (*People v. Lara* (1967) 67 Cal.2nd 365, 371.)

Examples:

- Police radio broadcasts.
- Pre-shift briefings.
- “A.P.B.s” (i.e., an “*All-Points Bulletin*”) and similar law enforcement generated memos.

“An officer may arrest or detain a suspect ‘based on information received through “official channels.”’ (Citations) If a 911 call ‘has sufficient indicia of reliability . . . a dispatcher may alert other officers by radio, who may then rely on the report, [citation], even though they cannot vouch for it.’” (*People v. Brown* (2015) 61 Cal.4th 968, 982-983.)

However: Eventually, law enforcement may be required in court to trace the information back to its source in order to disprove an accusation that the information establishing probable cause was “*manufactured in the police station;*” i.e., that it was the result of speculation or other unreliable source. (*People v. Orozco* (1981) 114 Cal.App.3rd 435; *People v. Brown, supra.*)

This is sometimes referred to as the “*Harvey/Madden rule,*” based upon authority in *People v. Harvey* (1958) 156 Cal.App.2nd 516, and *People v. Madden* (1970) 2 Cal.3rd 1017, or an “*Ojeda motion,*” based upon *Ojeda v. Superior Court* (1970) 12 Cal.App.3rd 909.)

“An officer may arrest or detain a suspect ‘based on information received through “official channels.”’” (Citation) Upon proper objection, however, “““the People must prove that the source of the information is something other than the imagination of the officer who does not become a witness””” by offering evidence that the source has ““sufficient indicia of reliability.”” (*People v. Romeo* (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 931, 943; quoting *People v. Brown, supra,* at p. 983.)

However, an exception to the “*Harvey/Madden rule*” is generally found when the responding officers find the situation at the scene to be consistent with the substance of the radio call. When the source of the information is corroborated by what is found at the scene, there is no longer any purpose in further corroboration by calling as a witness the source of that information. (*In re Richard G.* (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1252, 1258-1260; disagreeing with *In*

re Eskiel S. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1638, which required strict compliance with *Harvey/Madden*.)

“When the reason for a rule ceases, so should the rule itself.” (Civ. Code § 3510)

“The *Harvey/Madden* rule, however, merely precludes the prosecution from relying on hearsay information communicated to the arresting officer that is not sufficiently specific and fact based to be considered reliable.” (quoting *People v. Gomez* (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 531, 541.) The Appellate Court held that the hearsay exception that makes the officer’s testimony concerned his prior knowledge of the residents of a house **Fourth** waiver status to be admissible is **Evidence Code § 1250(a)(1)**; the “state-of-mind” exception. The officer’s testimony that he obtained information from the database was admissible to prove his receipt of information from an independent source. **Evidence Code § 1250(a)(1)** made admissible his testimony to prove his state of mind; i.e., his knowledge about the two residents’ **Fourth** waiver status. So long as the officer’s testimony had sufficient indicia of reliability, as can be inferred by the fact that the preliminary hearing magistrate overruled defendant’s objections on this issue, it was admissible. (*People v. Romeo* (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 931, 944-949.)

Citizen Informants: Private persons motivated to provide law enforcement with information of criminal wrongdoing purely through a sense of good citizenship, without expecting any benefit or reward in return.

Information from a “*citizen informant*” establishes probable cause by itself, at least as to facts within the informant’s personal knowledge, absent known or suspected facts or circumstances that cast doubt upon the reliability of the information provided. (*People v. Ramey* (1976) 16 Cal.3rd 263, 269.)

Note: This assumes that the witness has the expertise necessary to interpret what it is he sees. E.g., a witness telling law enforcement that he has observed a person using a controlled substances would have to be able to establish that he has the training or experience to recognize what the controlled substance looks like.

“It may . . . be stated as a general proposition that private citizens who are witnesses to or victims of a criminal act, absent some circumstances that would cast doubt upon their information, should be considered reliable.”

(People v. Ramey, supra, at pp. 268-269; see also *People v. Duncan* (1973) 9 Cal.3rd 218; and *People v. Hogan* (1969) 71 Cal.2nd 888, 890.)

A justification for this presumption (of reliability) is that a private citizen who furnishes information exposes himself to possible action for malicious prosecution if his accusations are proved groundless. (*People v. Reed* (1981) 121 Cal.App.3rd Supp. 26, 33.)

“We have distinguished between those informants who ‘are often criminally disposed or implicated, and supply their “tips” . . . in secret, and for pecuniary or other personal gain’ and victims or chance witnesses of crime who ‘volunteer their information fortuitously, openly, and through motives of good citizenship.’ [Citation.] O. and J. (juvenile victims in this case) neither concealed their identity to shield themselves from liability for false statements nor offered information for any ulterior or pecuniary motive. . . . The trial court correctly deemed the children presumptively reliable.” (*Humphrey v. Appellate Division of the Superior Court* (2002) 29 Cal.4th 569, 576.)

The victim of a crime will usually qualify. (*People v. Griffin* (1967) 250 Cal.App.2nd 545, 550.)

However; the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal disagrees: “In establishing probable cause, officers may not solely rely on the claim of a citizen witness that [s]he was a victim of a crime, but must independently investigate the basis of the witness’s knowledge or interview other witnesses.” (*Citations omitted; Hopkins v. Bonvicino* (9th Cir. 2009) 573 F.3rd 752, 767; a questionable decision In light of all the overwhelming case law to the contrary.)

See *Gillan vs. City of San Marino* (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1045; where the alleged victim of a crime was held to be *not* credible under the circumstances of this case, but then cites the general rule: “Typically, information from a victim or a witness to a crime, “absent some circumstance that would cast doubt upon their information,” is enough to establish probable cause. Such a victim or witness is generally considered to be reliable. “Information provided by a crime victim or chance witness alone can establish probable cause if the information is sufficiently specific to cause a reasonable person to believe that a crime was committed and that the named suspect was the perpetrator. [Citation.] ‘Neither a previous demonstration of reliability nor subsequent corroboration is ordinarily necessary when witnesses to or victims of criminal activities report their observations in detail to the authorities.’ [Citation]”

The identity of the citizen informant need not always be disclosed, but sufficient facts for the magistrate to conclude that the informant does so qualify as a citizen informant must be made available. (*People v. Lombera* (1989) 210 Cal.App.3rd 29, 32.)

Some involvement with criminal activity does not preclude one from being classified as a “*citizen informant*.” (*People v. Schulle* (1975) 51 Cal.App.3rd 809.) But the informant’s *motivation* for providing the information must be examined.

Information that initially came to police from an anonymous informant was deemed to be reliable when the informant was contacted and readily admitted being the source of the anonymous information. Once contacted by law enforcement, he provided information without hesitation, expecting nothing in return. As such, he was a “*citizen informant*” even after changing his story about how he came to know some of the information. Information from a citizen informant, as opposed to an informant who is looking for some reward of benefit for himself, and which is provided out of apparent good citizenship, is presumed to be reliable. (*People v. Scott* (2011) 52 Cal.4th 452, 475-476.)

Also, other negative information known to a police officer which puts into question a victim’s veracity may be enough to negate probable cause. (See *Wesley v. Campbell* (6th Cir. Mar. 2, 2015) 779 F.3rd 421.)

Information obtained from the suspects themselves (e.g., through a lawful wiretap), absent some reason to believe the subjects were not telling the truth, is entitled to the same level of belief as that from a citizen informant, and will supply the probable cause necessary to justify a traffic stop and seizure of the vehicle. (*United States v. Magallon-Lopez* (9th Cir. 2016) 817 F.3rd 671, 675-676.)

Although not using the label “citizen informant,” the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal has recognized the value of information coming from a “telephone tipster” who fully identifies himself by name, telephone number and address. (*United States v. Williams* (9th Cir. 2017) 846 F.3rd 303, 308-310.)

Reliable (“Tested”) Informants: Informants who provide information with the expectation of some favor or personal gain from law enforcement in return, when he/she is known to have provided law enforcement with truthful information concerning criminal activity in the past.

The presumption is, absent some reason to disbelieve him, that such an informant is reliable. (See *People v. Prewitt* (1959) 52 Cal.2nd 330, 334-337; *People v. Metzger* (1971) 22 Cal.App.3rd 338, 345; *People v. Dumas* (1973) 9 Cal.3rd 871; *People v. McFadin* (1982) 127 Cal.App.3rd 751.)

Such an informant commonly has a criminal record, pending criminal case, and/or some present involvement in criminal activity.

The expected favor or personal gain is sometimes referred to as a “benefit.” A “benefit” is defined as “any consideration or advantage the informant was offered, promised, or received in exchange for the information provided.” Such a benefit includes, but is not necessarily limited to:

- Monetary payments of any kind, including, but not limited to, money, room and board, or use of an automobile.
- Leniency shown in arrest or booking, requesting appropriate bail, or contesting the source of the bail per **P.C. § 1275**.
- Leniency shown in filing appropriate charges or enhancements.
- Delay in arraignment or other court dates.
- Reduction of charges, period of custody or other condition of probation or sentence, including favorable input by a prosecutor or law enforcement officer.
- Relocation of the informant or the informant’s family.
- Use immunity or transactional immunity, formal or informal.
- Favorable action with other governmental agencies, civil courts, or private interests (such as employers).

(Source: San Diego District Attorney “*Cooperating Individual and Immunity*” Manual, 1997, Chapter 1, p. 3.)

Such a person has a proven track record of giving reliable information in the past. A single prior incident may establish reliability (See *People v. Gray* (1976) 63 Cal.App.3rd 282, 288.), although in such a case, some corroboration of the informant’s information may be necessary.

Having given some bad information in the past does not necessarily disqualify an informant from being labeled “reliable.” (*People v. Barger* (1974) 40 Cal.App.3rd 662; *People v. Murphy* (1974) 42 Cal.App.3rd 81.) However, facts showing why in this case the informant is to be believed may be necessary, or other corroboration of his/her information.

Note: In practice, despite the favorable case law, police officers most often seek to corroborate even a reliable informant’s information just because, being motivated by personal gain, common sense tells us that such a person’s credibility is almost always something that should be substantiated before acting upon his or her information.

Unreliable (“Untested”) Informants: A person who provides information with the expectation of receiving some favor or personal gain in return (i.e., a “benefit”), but either without the prior track record of having given truthful information, has provided untruthful information in the past, or as of yet, has not been used before as an informant.

Information from an untested or unreliable informant is *not* presumed to be credible in the absence of corroborating information. The information from such an individual must be corroborated before he/she can be used to establish probable cause. (*People v. Superior Court [Johnson]* (1972) 6 Cal.3rd 704, 712; *People v. Love* (1985) 168 Cal.App.3rd 104.)

However, it has been held that *two* untested informants providing the same information, acting independently, may be sufficient to corroborate each other. (*People v. Balassy* (1973) 30 Cal.App.3rd 614, 621.)

However, a search warrant affidavit was held to be insufficient to establish probable cause even though the affiant depended on three informants. Information from each of the informants was found to be conclusory only, and corroborated each other only as to “pedestrian facts” regarding defendant’s residence and vehicle. (*People v. French* (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1307, 1321-1323.)

See “Corroboration,” below, under “Anonymous Informants.”

Use in trial of an informant as a prosecution witness who knowingly provided perjured testimony may, if material, be a **Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment** “due process” violation and result in a reversal of a defendant’s conviction. (*Maxwell v. Roe* (9th Cir. 2010) 628 F.3rd 486.)

The fact that the government informant had engaged in past crimes did not raise due process concerns about the government’s use of him as a confidential informant in its investigation, and the nature of his past

crimes did not render the government's conduct outrageous. It is also not shocking that the informant was cooperating out of self-interest. (*United States v. Hullaby* (9th Cir. 2013) 736 F.3rd 1260, 1262-1263.)

Anonymous Informants: One who provides information to law enforcement (often via a telephone call) while refusing to identify him or herself.

Rule:

Because it is impossible to determine the motivations or credibility of an anonymous informant, such information is not considered reliable by itself. (*Wilson v. Superior Court* (1956) 46 Cal.2nd 291, 294.)

Anonymous information does not even establish a “reasonable suspicion” of criminal activity (*Alabama v. White* (1990) 496 U.S. 325, 331 [110 L.Ed.2nd 301, 309]; *Florida v. J.L.* (2000) 529 U.S. 266 [146 L.Ed.2nd 254]; *United States v. Morales* (9th Cir. 2001) 252 F.3rd 1070.) unless corroborated by the circumstances. (*People v. Ramirez* (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1608.)

Anonymous information from at least two separate sources *might*, depending upon the circumstances, establish probable cause. (*People v. Coulombe* (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 52.)

Corroboration:

Rule: “Because unverified information from an untested or unreliable informant is ordinarily unreliable, it does not establish probable cause unless it is ‘corroborated in essential respects by other facts, sources or circumstances.’ [Citations.] For corroboration to be adequate, it must pertain to the alleged criminal activity; accuracy of information regarding the suspect generally is insufficient. [Citation.] Courts take a dim view of the significance of ‘pedestrian facts’ such as a suspect’s physical description, his residence and his vehicles. [Citation.] However, the corroboration is sufficient if police investigation has uncovered probative indications of criminal activity along the lines suggested by the informant. [Citation.] Even observations of seemingly innocent activity provide sufficient corroboration if the anonymous tip casts the activity in a suspicious light. [Citations.]” (*People v. Johnson* (1990) 220 Cal.App.3rd 742, 749; *People v. Gotfried* (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 254.)

Examples: Corroboration comes in many forms. For example:

Statements from an informant which are “against the informant’s own ‘*penal interest*’” (i.e., potentially subjecting the informant to criminal liability) may be sufficient corroboration. (*People v. Mardian* (1975) 47 Cal.App.3rd 16, 33; *Ming v. Superior Court* (1970) 13 Cal.App.3rd 206, 214; *United States v. Todhunter* (9th Cir. 2002) 297 F.3rd 886, 890.)

Anonymous information corroborated by accurately predicting a suspect’s future behavior may itself also establish probable cause. (See *Illinois v. Gates* (1983) 462 U.S. 213 [76 L.Ed.2nd 527]; *Alabama v. White* (1990) 496 U.S. 325, 332 [110 L.Ed.2nd 301].)

See also; “*Anonymous Information,*” under “*Detentions*” (Chapter 3), above.

Practice Notes:

In a narcotics case, using the informant, a different informant, or an undercover law enforcement officer, to attempt to make a purchase of narcotics while under strict surveillance (i.e., a “*controlled buy*”), is a common method of corroborating the informant’s information.

Surveillance, records checks, and other forms of more traditional investigative work help to corroborate an informant’s information.

Keeping Confidential Informants Confidential:

Problem: Whether classified as a “*Citizen Informant,*” a “*Tested Informant,*” or an “*Untested Informant,*” law enforcement may seek to keep the informant’s identity confidential. This is typically necessitated by the danger to the informant inherent in the practice of informing on criminal suspects.

Rule: An informant’s identity, if the informant is used properly and when the case is charged appropriately (i.e., charging offenses to which the informant *is not* a percipient witness, only supplying information that

helps establish probable cause), may often be kept confidential. (See E.C. §§ 1041, 1042(b), (c) and (d))

“It is well settled that California does not require disclosure of the identity of an informant who has supplied probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant where disclosure is sought merely to aid in attacking probable cause.” (*Theodore v. Superior Court* (1972) 8 Cal.3rd 77, 88.)

Restrictions: It is only when the court determines that there is a “reasonable possibility” that the informant can give evidence on the issue of guilt which might result in defendant’s exoneration, that the informant’s identity will have to be revealed. (*Honore v. Superior Court* (1969) 70 Cal.2nd 162, 168.)

Revealing the Informant’s Identity: In practice, an informant’s identity will have to be revealed only:

- When he or she was an eyewitness to (i.e., a “percipient witness”), or an actual participant in, the crime or crimes charged; *or*
- When he or she might otherwise be able to provide evidence favorable to the defendant. (*People v. Goliday* (1963) 8 Cal.3rd 771, 778-779; see also *People v. Bradley* (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 607, 618-627.)

Merely because an informant was a percipient witness does not mean that his identity must always be revealed. But an in camera hearing must be held in order to determine whether the informant’s information, as a percipient witness, could be material to defendant’s innocence. (*Davis v. Superior Court [People]* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1272, 1276-1278.)

Procedure: In order to avoid having to reveal an informant’s identity, we use his or her information only to establish probable cause. A search warrant is issued based upon that probable cause. Then, the suspect is charged only with the offenses revealed upon the search and/or arrest of the suspect; matters to which the informant *is not* a witness.

Motions to Reveal the Identity of an Informant:

“(Evidence Code) Section 1041 grants a public entity a privilege not to disclose, and to prevent from being disclosed, the identity of a person who furnished information to a law enforcement officer

‘purporting to disclose a violation of a law of the United States or of this state.’ (§ 1041, subd. (a).) The public entity may claim this privilege when disclosure is forbidden by federal or state statute, or, as the prosecution claimed here, when disclosure of the identity ‘is against the public interest because the necessity for preserving the confidentiality of [the informer’s] identity outweighs the necessity for disclosure in the interest of justice.’ (§ 1041, subd. (a)(2).)” (*People v. Bradley* (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 607, 618-619.)

It is the burden on the defendant to make a sufficient showing that the unnamed informer does in fact have information which would be material to the defendant’s innocence. (*Price v. Superior Court* (1970) 1 Cal.3rd 836, 843; *Davis v. Superior Court [People]* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1272, 1276.)

In order to discharge his burden of proving the informant is a material witness, the defendant need not necessarily show what the informant would testify to, nor even that the informer could give testimony favorable to him. (*Price v. Superior Court, supra.*)

However, bare speculation or unsupported conclusions that the informant is a “*material witness*” are insufficient to discharge a defendant’s burden. The defendant must produce evidence or a declaration articulating the theory of his defense or demonstrating in what manner he would be benefited by disclosure of the informant’s name. (*People v. McCoy* (1970) 13 Cal.App.3rd 6, 12-13; *People v. Thomas* (1970) 12 Cal.App.3rd 1102, 1112-1113.)

A defense attorney’s affidavit “*on information and belief*” is, as a matter of law, an insufficient factual showing, and is therefore not sufficient justification for divulging an informant’s identity. (*People v. Oppel* (1990) 222 Cal.App.3rd 1146, 1153.)

When the informant “merely pointed the finger of suspicion at the defendant,” disclosure of the informant’s identity is generally not required. (*People v. Wilks* (1978) 21 Cal.3rd 460, 469; *People v. McCoy, supra*, at p. 13.)

“*Luttenberger*” Motions; Discovering An Informant’s Background History:

Upon a “*substantial preliminary showing*” of the need for discovery made by the defense, the court may order that the prosecution provide records

and other background information concerning a confidential informant. (*People v. Luttenberger* (1990) 50 Cal.3rd 1.)

However, in order to justify an in camera hearing on this issue, at which the court must review the informant's history and other relevant information related to credibility, the defendant need only raise a "reasonable doubt" concerning the informant's veracity. (*People v. Estrada* (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 783.)

If, after such an in camera review, the court finds the necessary "substantial preliminary showing" of information that tends to contradict material representations made in the affidavit, or constitutes material omissions from it, the court should then order the disclosure of the documents to the defendant. Based upon this information, a "*Franks* hearing, per *Franks v. Delaware* (1978) 438 U.S. 154 [57 L.Ed.2nd 667], may be appropriate. (See above.)

Note: The purpose is to challenge the reliability of the information obtained from a confidential informant, without necessarily revealing the informant's identity. The danger is in insuring that the court does not inadvertently give away too much information, affording the defense the opportunity to figure out who the informant is.

If the defense can meet its burden of showing some need for the information and some proof that there is something of some substance in existence (beyond merely speculating that some adverse information exists), the court should inspect the documents in camera, deleting any reference to the informant's identity before providing the information to the defense. (*People v. Luttenberger, supra.*)

An Informant Sworn Before a Magistrate; a "Skelton Warrant:"

If an informant can give a "factual" (as opposed to a "conclusory") description of some on-going criminal activity, but does not fit within any of the preceding categories of reliable informants, and his information cannot be corroborated, he may nevertheless be deemed reliable if he personally testifies and swears to the truth of his information before the issuing magistrate. (*Skelton v. Superior Court* (1969) 1 Cal.3rd 144.)

Sometimes referred to as a "*Skelton warrant*," where the magistrate is allowed to observe the informant's demeanor and appearance, the magistrate can evaluate his credibility just as with any other witness.

The informant's transcribed testimony (and the tape of that testimony) before the magistrate becomes the search warrant affidavit.

P.C. § 1111.5; In-Custody Informants: Neither a jury nor a judge may convict a defendant, find a special circumstance true, nor use a fact in aggravation, based on the uncorroborated testimony of an *in-custody informant*.

However, an accomplice's testimony, which must also be corroborated in order to sustain a conviction (**P.C. § 1111**), may be used to corroborate the testimony of an in-custody informant, and vice versa. I.e., the two individuals may legally corroborate each other. (***People v. Huggins*** (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 715, 718-720; "An accomplice is hereby defined as one who is liable to prosecution for the identical offense charged against the defendant on trial in the cause in which the testimony of the accomplice is given." (**P.C. § 1111**))

Probable Cause Issues:

Anonymous information, where sufficiently corroborated by accurately predicting a suspect's future behavior, may establish probable cause sufficient to obtain a search warrant. (***Illinois v. Gates*** (1983) 462 U.S. 213 [76 L.Ed.2nd 527].)

See "*Anonymous Information*," under "*Detentions*" (Chapter 3), above.

Searches of a Residence:

Stolen Property: When property has been stolen by a defendant and has not yet been recovered, a fair probability exists that the property will be found at the defendant's home. A magistrate can reasonably conclude that a suspect's residence is a logical place to look for specific incriminating items where there exists probable cause to believe that the defendant stole them. (***People v. Carrington*** (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 161-164.)

See also ***People v. Lee*** (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 161, 173, holding that upon proof that there are firearms registered to defendant, it is logical to assume that he possesses them in his home, even though he is only temporarily residing in that residence. "(I)t is no great leap to infer that the most likely place to keep a firearm is in one's home." But see ***People v. Superior Court (Corbett)*** (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 670, 683, ignoring the rule of ***Lee*** to the effect that it is logical to assume that an owner of firearms would keep them in his home.

The Cleland Warrant; Narcotics: Arrest of a person for selling narcotics, or for being in the possession of narcotics for purposes of sale, plus an experienced narcotics officer's expert opinion, has been held to be probable cause to believe he has evidence of this illegal activity *in his home*, justifying a search warrant for the home. (*People v. Cleland* (1990) 225 Cal.App.3rd 388, 392-393; *People v. Aho* (1985) 166 Cal.App.3rd 984, 991-993; *People v. Johnson* (1971) 21 Cal.App.3rd 235, 242-246; *United States v. Pitts* (9th Cir. 1993) 6 F.3rd 1366, 1369; *United States v. Terry* (9th Cir. 1990) 911 F.2nd 272; *United States v. Job* (9th Cir. 2017) 871 F.3rd 852, 863-865.)

Probable cause to believe defendant was a narcotics seller's source of supply and that he would have evidence of his crimes in his apartment was found where the defendant was at the scene during, or shortly before, three separate narcotics transactions and he was followed to his apartment as he used "*countersurveillance* (driving) *techniques*" on one occasion. (*United States v. Chavez-Miranda* (9th Cir. 2002) 306 F.3rd 973.)

But:

While such circumstances provide the necessary probable cause to satisfy the **Fourth Amendment** search purposes, they do not provide an exigent circumstance excusing the lack of a search warrant. (*People v. Koch* (1989) 209 Cal.App.3rd 770, 778-781.)

Also, *simple possession* of a controlled substance, without indications that the defendant is a drug dealer, will *not* likely be sufficient to justify a search warrant for the defendant's home, despite an expert officer's opinion to the contrary. (*People v. Pressey* (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1178.)

And, knowing that a person is selling contraband *from a business*, when the seller is *not* an employee or owner of the business, *does not*, by itself, establish probable cause to believe that more contraband will be found in the business. (*People v. Garcia* (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 715.)

Finding a small amount of marijuana on an arrestee's person, and observing him earlier with a single, semi-automatic pistol, were *insufficient* to support an allegation that "marijuana, heroin, and methamphetamine, or . . . evidence of gang membership," as well as "[f]irearms, assault rifles, handguns of any caliber and shotguns of any

caliber,' as well as ammunition for such firearms," would be found in defendant's home. Even discovery of his criminal history; i.e., that he'd been convicted of the illegal possession of a firearm and for being a felon in possession of a firearm, did not support a belief that multiple firearms might be found in his home. (*United States v. Nora* (9th Cir. 2014) 765 F.3rd 1049, 1052-1060.)

Trashcan Searches: Fresh marijuana stem and leaf cuttings found in a trashcan in front of a residence establishes probable cause justifying the issuance of a search warrant for the residence. (*People v. Thuss* (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 221.)

Note: There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the trash one places in trashcans out at the curb for pick up. (*California v. Greenwood* (1988) 486 U.S. 35 [100 L.Ed.2nd 30].)

Computer Searches:

Rule: Probable cause supporting the issuance of a search warrant may be based entirely upon circumstantial evidence together with reasonable inferences there from. Receipt of child pornography in numerous (e.g., nine) e-mails from various sources (e.g., two) to various screen names (e.g., two) supports an inference of knowing possession of that pornography. (*United States v. Kelley* (9th Cir. 2007) 482 F.3rd 1047.)

Cases:

A properly qualified expert officer's opinion, connecting common characteristics of a child molester with known facts related to a child molest and the molester's act of hiding his computer, establishes probable cause supporting a search warrant for that computer. (*People v. Nicholls* (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 703.)

Where a search warrant specifies certain documents to be seized, and a computer is found under circumstances where it is reasonable to believe that the computer has been used to generate those documents or otherwise contain the information from which the documents came, then the computer may be seized (and probably searched) even though not mentioned in the search warrant. (*United States v. Giberson* (9th Cir. 2008) 527 F.3rd 882, 886-889.)

A signal photograph of a nude minor (female child who is between 8 and 10 years old), by itself, is insufficient to establish probable cause for a search warrant. But a second such photo, under the

“totality of the circumstances,” is enough. (*United States v. Battershell* (9th Cir. 2006) 457 F.3rd 1048.)

However, a single photograph of a nude minor (female of about 15 to 17 years of age), when combined with other suspicious circumstances (e.g., 15 computers in house found in complete disarray, with two minors not belonging to the defendant, where the defendant a civilian, is staying in military housing), *may* enough to justify the issuance of a search warrant. (*United States v. Krupa* (9th Cir. 2011) 658 F.3rd 1174, 1177-1179; but see dissent, pp. 1180-1185.)

An Internet subscriber has no expectation of privacy in the subscriber information he supplies to his Internet provider. (*People v. Stipo* (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 664, 668-669.)

See *People v. Rangel* (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1316, likening defendant’s “smartphone” to a computer, given its capability to store photographs, e-mail addresses, and other personal information.

A warrant authorizing an electronic search of all of defendant’s computer equipment and digital storage devices was not overbroad, did not raise the risks inherent in over-seizing, and did not violate the **Fourth Amendment** because evidence showing that defendant possessed and distributed a child pornography video on a peer-to-peer file-sharing network provided probable cause to search defendant’s entire computer system and his digital storage devices for any evidence of possession of or dealing in child pornography. The government had no way of knowing which or how many illicit files there might be or where they might be stored, or of describing the items to be seized in a more precise manner. Because there was probable cause to believe that defendant was a child pornography collector, his entire computer system and his digital storage devices were suspect. (*United States v. Schesso* (9th Cir. 2013) 730 F.3rd 1040, 1045-1047.)

Downloading video files with sexually suggestive titles after viewing non-pornographic files that had been found by the owner of a computer store on defendant’s computer, and then viewing the downloaded videos without a warrant, held to be beyond the scope of the private search and illegal. (*People v. Michael E.* (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 261, 268-279.)

The Court included a whole segment criticizing the current trend of referring to computers and cellphones as “*containers of information*.” ““Since electronic storage is likely to contain a greater quantity and variety of information than any previous storage method, . . . ’[r]elying on analogies to closed containers or file cabinets may lead courts to “oversimplify a complex area of Fourth Amendment doctrines and ignore the realities of massive modern computer storage.” [Citation.]” (Citing *United States v. Carey* (10th Cir. 1999) 172 F.3rd 1268, 1275.) Interestingly enough, however, most of the authority the Court cites here are container-search cases. (*Id.*, at pp. 276-277.)

The United States Supreme Court agrees, at least as to cellphones, ruling that given the amount of personal information contained on the modern-day “smart phone,” they are indeed entitled to greater protection from warrantless searches. (See *Riley v. California* (June 25, 2014) 573 U.S. __ [134 S.Ct. 2473, 2484-2485; 189 L.Ed.2nd 430].)

See also *United States v. Lara* (9th Cir. 2016) 815 F.3rd 605, 610-611; declining to include defendant’s cellphone under the category of a “*container*,” in defendant’s **Fourth** wavier search conditions.

The fact that the defendant may not have owned the computers that the affiant was asking to search at the time of the crime did not preclude the possibility that she had also transferred information or records—particularly photographs—to computers owned at the time of the search. (*People v. Lazarus* (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 734, 776; noting that personal computers often hold “diaries, calendars, files, and correspondence.”)

Although defendant had met a false imprisonment victim through social media several months before the crime, a probation condition upon conviction that allows law enforcement unrestricted computer searches for material prohibited by law was overbroad under the **Fourth Amendment**. Such a condition allows for searches of vast amounts of personal information unrelated to defendant’s criminal conduct or his potential future criminality. A narrower means might include either requiring defendant to provide his social media account and passwords to his probation officer for monitoring, or restricting his use of, or access

to, social media websites and applications without the prior approval of his probation officer. A condition requiring defendant not to delete his browser history was held to be valid, assuming a properly narrowed condition monitoring his use of social media can be fashioned. (*People v. Appleton* (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, 721-728.)

An “administrative subpoena” is all that is necessary in order to obtain the internet protocol (IP) address associated with the computer that accessed a particular website. (*United States v. Caira* (7th Cir. Ill. 2016) 833 F.3rd 803.)

Note: There being no such thing as an “administrative subpoena” under California statutory law, it is assumed that an “administrative warrant” will suffice. See “*Inspection (or Administrative) Warrants,*” under “*Other Warrants,*” below.)

The **Fourth Amendment** does not require suppression of evidence developed through use of software targeting peer-to-peer file-sharing networks to identify IP addresses associated with known digital files of child pornography. Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his shared folder, despite his measures to keep contents of computer private. (*People v. Evensen* (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 1020.)

See “*Searches of Containers,*” below.

Miscellaneous Searches:

A Puerto Rico statute authorizing “police to search the luggage of any person arriving in Puerto Rico from the United States” was held to be unconstitutional because it failed to require either probable cause or a warrant. (*Torres v. Puerto Rico* (1979) 442 U.S.465, 466-471 [61 L.Ed.2nd 1].)

Conspiracy:

A civil plaintiff’s argument that the victim and a law enforcement officer conspired together to obtain an invalid search warrant and to execute it at a time when the plaintiff and victim’s children were present, and to use excessive force in the execution of the warrant, with a goal of giving the victim an unfair advantage in the couple’s custody proceedings, if supported by some evidence, must be evaluated by a civil jury.

“Conspiracy to violate a citizen’s rights under the **Fourth Amendment** . .

. is evidently as much a violation of an established constitutional right as the [underlying constitutional violation] itself.” (*Cameron v. Craig* (9th Cir. 2013) 713 F.3rd 1012, 1023-1024; citing *Baldwin v. Placer County* (9th Cir. 2005) 418 F.3rd 966, 971.)

Use of a Search Warrant:

Rule: The use of a *search warrant* as a prerequisite to a lawful search is a constitutional requirement, pursuant to the **Fourth Amendment**.

The **Fourth Amendment** prohibits all *unreasonable searches and seizures*, and it is a cardinal principle that “searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are *per se* unreasonable under the **Fourth Amendment**—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” (*Katz v. United States* (1967) 389 U.S. 347, 357 [19 L.Ed.2nd 576, 585].)

“Evidence which is obtained as a direct result of an illegal search and seizure may not be used to establish probable cause for a subsequent search.” (*United States v. Wanless* (9th Cir. 1989) 882 F.2nd 1259, 1465.)

This includes “*verbal evidence*,” (i.e., a suspect’s admissions or confession), as well as physical evidence, when obtained as a direct product of an illegal detention, arrest or search. (See *United States v. Crews* (9th Cir. 2007) 502 F.3rd 1130, 1135.)

Exceptions: There are a limited number of such “*well-delineated exceptions*” to the general rule, however. For instance:

- “*Exigent Circumstances*” excuse the absence of a search warrant, at least up until when the “*exigency*” no longer exists. (*People v. Bacigalupo* (1991) 1 Cal.4th 103, 122-123.)

“*Exigent Circumstances*:” Any instance where the officers have no opportunity to obtain a warrant without risking the loss or destruction of evidence, the fleeing of suspects, or the arming of a suspect. (See *People v. Seaton* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598.)

See “*Exigent Circumstances*,” under “*Warrantless Searches*” (Chapter 7), below.

- “*Consent*:” A “*consent*” to search excuses the absence of a search warrant, or even probable cause. (*Florida v. Bostick* (1991) 501 U.S. 429 [115 L.Ed.2nd 389].)

Such consent, however, must be “*freely and voluntarily*” obtained. (*Bumper v. North Carolina* (1968) 391 U.S. 543, 548 [20 L.Ed.2nd 797, 802]; *People v. Ling* (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1, 7.)

See “*Consent Searches*” (Chapter 16), below.

- “*Probationary or Parole Fourth Waiver Searches:*”

All *parolees*, and some *probationers*, are subject to what is commonly referred to as a “**Fourth Waiver**,” i.e., where the subject has agreed, prior to the fact, to waive any objections to being subjected to searches and seizures without the necessity of the law enforcement officer meeting the standard **Fourth Amendment** requirements of *probable cause* and a *search warrant*. (See *Vandenberg v. Superior Court* (1970) 8 Cal.App.3rd 1048, 1053.)

The same rules apply to probation searches under the “**Post-Release Community Supervision Act of 2011**,” P.C. §§ 3450 et seq. (*People v. Douglas* (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 855, 863-873.)

See “*Fourth Waiver Searches*” (Chapter 15), below.

- “*Inevitable Discovery:*”

The effects of an otherwise illegal warrantless search (i.e., suppression of the resulting evidence) may be offset in those instances where the evidence would have “*inevitably*” been found anyway through some source independent of the illegal search. (*Nix v. Williams* (1984) 467 U.S. 431, 443 [81 L.Ed.2nd 377, 387]; *People v. Boyer* (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 447-454.)

However, the “*inevitable discovery*” doctrine does not apply just because a search warrant could have been obtained had the searching officers asked for one. This argument would negate the need to ever seek a warrant, effectively repealing the **Fourth Amendment**. (*People v. Robles* (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1286.)

The fact that the evidence would have inevitably been discovered anyway must be established by the People by “a preponderance of the evidence.” (*United States v. Young* (9th Cir. 2009) 573 F.3rd 711, 721-723; where it was not shown that the hotel where its employees discovered the defendant’s firearm would not have merely stored the weapon and return it to defendant, as according to its policy. [See also the dissent, pp. 723-729, arguing that the inevitable discovery rule applied].)

Evidence lying under the deceased would have inevitably been found and given to the police when the Coroner's investigator took charge of the body and moved it. (*People v. Superior Court [Chapman]* (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1021-1022; The Coroner may deliver any property or evidence related to the investigation or prosecution of a crime to the law enforcement agency or district attorney. (Govt. Code § 27491.3(b))

See “*Doctrine of Inevitable Discovery*,” under “*Searches and Seizures*” (Chapter 5), above.

- “*Searches of Vehicles:*”

Probable cause to believe that a lawfully stopped vehicle contains contraband justifies a warrantless search of the vehicle, including the trunk, despite the absence of additional exigent circumstances. (*People v. Chavers* (1983) 33 Cal.3rd 462; *People v. Superior Court [Valdez]* (1983) 35 Cal.3rd 11; *People v. Varela* (1985) 172 Cal.App.3rd 757.)

The search may be as broad as could have been authorized by a search warrant, including any closed containers within the vehicle. (*United States v. Ross* (1982) 456 U.S. 798 [72 L.Ed.2nd 572]; *California v. Acevedo* (1991) 500 U.S. 565 [114 L.Ed.2nd 619]; *People v. Chavers, supra.*)

See “*Searches of Vehicles*” (Chapter 9), below.

- “*Searches of Persons with Probable Cause:*”

A person may be searched without a warrant any time the officer has “*probable cause*” to believe the person may have contraband or other seizable property on him. (*People v. Coleman* (1991) 229 Cal.App.3rd 321.)

See “*Searches of Persons*” (Chapter 8), below.

- “*Searches Incident to Arrest:*”

An arrestee, and the area within his immediate reach when arrested (i.e., the “*lunging area*”), is subject to a warrantless search, so long as done contemporaneously in time and place with the arrest. (*Chimel v. California* (1969) 395 U.S. 752 [23 L.Ed.2nd 685]; *United States v. Robinson* (1973) 414 U.S. 218 [38 L.Ed.2nd 427];

People v. Sanchez (1985) 174 Cal.App.3rd 343; *People v. Dennis* (1985) 172 Cal.App.3rd 287; *People v. Summers* (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 288.)

This includes “‘a relatively extensive exploration’ of the areas within the arrestee’s immediate control,” including the arrestee’s clothing and inside his pockets. (*United States v. Williams* (9th Cir. 2017) 846 F.3rd 303, 312; citing *United States v. Robinson*, *supra*, at p. 227, and *United States v. Maddox* (9th Cir. 2010) 614 F.3rd 1046, 1048.)

When arrested in *or at* a vehicle (*New York v. Belton* (1981) 453 U.S. 454 [69 L.Ed.2nd 768]; *People v. Stoffle* (1992) 1 Cal.App.4th 1671.), or as a “*recent occupant*” of a vehicle (*Thornton v. United States* (2004) 541 U.S. 615 [158 L.Ed.2nd 905]; *United States v. Osife* (9th Cir. 2005) 398 F.3rd 1143), the entire passenger area of the vehicle may normally be searched without a warrant.

However, see *Arizona v. Gant* (2009) 556 U.S. 332 [173 L.Ed.2nd 485], severely limiting the ability to conduct a search incident to arrest in a vehicle, finding *Belton* to be inapplicable in the situation where the arrestee has already been removed from the vehicle and secured, thus negating any reasonable possibility that the arrestee could reach for a weapon or destroy evidence in the vehicle.

See “*Searches Incident to Arrest*,” under “*Searches of Persons*” (Chapter 8) and under “*Searches of Vehicles*” (Chapter 9), below.

- “*Administrative/Regulatory Searches*:”

“*Pervasively*” or “*Closely Regulated Businesses*:” The courts have indicated that a warrant is *not* necessary in those cases where the place to be searched is commercial property, and the industry involved is one that is so “*pervasively regulated*” or “*closely regulated*” that warrantless inspections are necessary to insure proper, or legal, business practices. (*Donovan v. Dewey* (1981) 452 U.S. 594, 598-599 [69 L.Ed.2nd 262, 268-169]; *New York v. Burger* (1987) 482 U.S. 691, 700 [96 L.Ed.2nd 601, 612-613]; *People v. Paulson* (1990) 216 Cal.App.3rd 1480, 1483-1484.)

See “*Administrative/Regulatory Searches*,” below.

Crime Scene Searches: Generally, once any exigencies no longer justify an immediate entry, entering or re-entering a building to investigate a criminal offense, or even to continue a search already begun due to exigent circumstances that existed upon the initial entry, requires a search warrant. For example:

Murder Scene: *Mincey v. Arizona* (1978) 437 U.S. 385 [57 L.Ed.2nd 290]; *Flippo v. West Virginia* (1999) 528 U.S. 11 [145 L.Ed.2nd 16].)

Arson Scene: *Michigan v. Tyler* (1978) 436 U.S. 499 [56 L.Ed.2nd 486].)

However, arson investigations done immediately upon the extinguishing of a fire, before firefighters leave the scene and the home is secured, as an “*administrative search*,” may be conducted without a warrant. Any later belated search requires a search warrant. (*Michigan v. Clifford* (1984) 464 U.S. 287, 294 [78 L. Ed. 2nd 477].)

Bank Records: Otherwise private papers (i.e., records) turned over to a bank deprives the owner of the papers of any claim of privacy as to the contents of those records. (*United States v. Miller* (1976) 425 U.S. 435, 440 [48 L.Ed.2nd 71].)

Pursuant to California’s **Right to Privacy Act (Gov’t. Code §§ 7460-7493)**, there are six (6) lawful methods of obtaining a criminal suspect’s bank records:

- Customer Authorization: **(Gov’t. Code § 7473):**

The authorization must be in writing. Records sought must be very specifically identified and must include a phrase informing the customer that he/she has a right to withdraw consent.

- Administrative Subpoena or Summons **(Gov’t. Code § 7474):**

Requires notice to the customer and the bank. Customer has ten days to move to quash the subpoena.

- Search Warrant **(Gov’t. Code § 7475):**

The customer will be notified by the bank unless the search warrant contains an order that notice be delayed.

The request to defer notice to the customer must be justified in the affidavit on the grounds that notification would impede the investigation, and the court finds this to be “*good cause*.”

The normal ten-day period for service and return of the warrant may be extended if the bank cannot reasonably make the records available within ten days.

A search warrant for bank records was held to be valid in *People v. Meyer* (1986) 183 Cal.App.3rd 1150.

- Judicial Subpoena or Subpoena Duces Tecum (**Gov't. Code § 7476**):

Notice must be given to the customer in most situations. May be used in NSF (i.e., “non-sufficient funds” cases). (See **Gov't. Code § 7476(c)**)

- Police Request (**Gov't. Code § 7480**):

May obtain certain types of financial information (e.g., dishonored checks and overdrafts) upon certification to the financial institution, in writing, that the checks were used fraudulently. (**Gov't. Code § 7480(b)**: The section provides for a statement of account and other records for 30 days before and after the alleged illegal act.)

Such information may also be provided by the bank to a county adult protective services office or to a long-term care ombudsman.

May also receive, upon request, information as to whether a person has an account and the account number. (**Gov't. Code § 7480(c)**)

- Victimized Financial Institution turns over Records (**Gov't. Code § 7470(d)**):

When the bank is the victim of a crime committed by a customer, it may lawfully turn over the customer's bank records without the need of a court order. (*People v. Nosler* (1984) 151 Cal.App.3rd 125; *People v. Nece* (1984) 160 Cal.App.3rd 285.)

Note: The above listed requirements and provisions are not exclusive. The referenced **Government Code** sections must be consulted. (See also *Burrows v. Superior Court* (1974) 13 Cal.3rd 238; and *People v. Blair* (1979) 25 Cal.3rd 640, regarding constitutional limitations upon the seizure of financial records.)

Mortgage Fraud Records:

P.C. § 532f(a): Mortgage Fraud: Intentionally using a misrepresentation, misstatement, or omission, in the mortgage lending process, or facilitating its use, with the intent that it be relied upon by the lender, or receiving the funds as a result of the above, or filing with the county recorder any document in connection with a mortgage loan transaction knowing it contains a misrepresentation, misstatement, or omission, with a loss of over \$400, is a felony (wobbler).

Subd. (c) contains provisions for a peace officer investigating mortgage fraud to obtain relevant real estate records via a court order, obtained upon the officer submitting an ex parte court application made under penalty of perjury, alleging that there is reasonable cause to believe that the records sought are material to an on-going investigation. Provisions are made for the sealing of such application and other procedures for obtaining the necessary records.

Subd. (g) provides for an affidavit from the custodian of records authenticating the records, laying the foundation to meet any hearsay objections to admission of the records into evidence.

Commercial Mail Receiving Agency Records:

B&P Code § 22780: Postal Service Form 1583:

- (a)** A commercial mail receiving agency shall not accept a Postal Service Form 1583 until positive identification has been established for the person filing the form. For purposes of this section, positive identification means any one of the following:
- (1) Driver's license.
 - (2) State identification card.
 - (3) Armed forces identification card.
 - (4) Employment identification card which contains the bearer's signature and photograph.
 - (5) Any similar documentation which provides the agency with reasonable assurance of the identity of the filer.

- (b) A commercial mail receiving agency shall maintain a copy of any Postal Service Form 1583 filed with the United States Postal Service. Upon the request of any law enforcement agency conducting an investigation, the commercial mail receiving agency shall make available to that law enforcement agency for purposes of that investigation and copying, its copy of the Postal Service Form 1583.
- (c) A violation of this chapter is an infraction punishable by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars (\$100) for the first offense, and a fine of not less than five hundred dollars (\$500) for each subsequent offense.

Credit Card Information: Charges made by a credit card holder cannot be obtained except by search warrant or other judicial order. (*People v. Blair* (1979) 25 Cal.3rd 640, 652.)

Exception: When the credit card company is the victim. (*People v. Nosler* (1984) 151 Cal.App.3rd 125; *People v. Nece* (1984) 160 Cal.App.3rd 285.)

Telephone Records:

Unlisted Numbers: A search warrant is necessary in order to obtain the name and address of the holder of an *unlisted telephone number* from the telephone company. (*People v. Chapman* (1984) 36 Cal.3rd 98.)

Note: Under federal constitutional standards, obtaining phone records *without* a warrant is *not* illegal. (*Smith v. Maryland* (1979) 442 U.S. 735 [61 L.Ed.2nd 220].) Therefore, although seizing such records without a warrant is in violation of California law, doing so will *not* result in the suppression of the records. (*People v. Bencomo* (1985) 171 Cal.App.3rd 1005, 1015; *People v. Martino* (1985) 166 Cal.App.3rd 777, 786, fn. 3.)

Note: The continuing validity of *Smith v. Maryland* may be tested in the near future.

Telephone Calls Made: Telephone company records relating to *telephone calls made* are also protected and require a warrant. (*People v. McKunes* (1975) 51 Cal.App.3rd 487.)

Note: Telephone toll records are maintained in “*billing rounds*,” covering approximately 30 days, but not necessarily corresponding with a calendar month.

An affidavit should contain facts, information, and opinion justifying the time period for which toll call records are sought.

Certification for Non-Disclosure: Pursuant to **California Public Utilities Commission decision number 93361**, dated July 21, 1981, the telephone company must notify the customer of a search warrant issued for his telephone records unless there is a “*certification for non-disclosure*” contained on the face of the search warrant.

Provides for a 90-day delay in notice, which can be extended another 90 days.

The “*certification of non-disclosure*” is a statement that notification will impede the investigation of the offense being investigated.

Justification for the delayed notice must be included in the warrant affidavit.

Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices: Installation of a “*pen register*” and/or a “*trap and trace device*” may be accomplished by use of a search warrant or other court order, at least under state rules. (See ***People v. Larkin*** (1987) 194 Cal.App.3rd 650, 654, and newly enacted (effective 1/1/2016) statutory rules, below.)

P.C. § 638.50: Definitions:

(a) “*Wire Communication*” and “*Electronic Communication*” have the meanings set forth in **P.C. § 629.51(a)**; i.e.:

(1) “*Wire communication*” means any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception (including the use of a like connection in a switching station), furnished or operated by any person engaged in providing or operating these facilities for the transmission of communications.

(2) "*Electronic communication*" means any transfer of signs, signals, writings, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectric, or photo-optical system, but does not include any of the following:

- (A) Any wire communication defined in **para. (1)**.
- (B) Any communication made through a tone-only paging device.
- (C) Any communication from a tracking device.
- (D) Electronic funds transfer information stored by a financial institution in a communications system used for the electronic storage and transfer of funds.

(b) "*Pen register*" means a device or process that records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted, but not the contents of a communication. "*Pen register*" does not include a device or process used by a provider or customer of a wire or electronic communication service for billing, or recording as an incident to billing, for communications services provided by such provider, or a device or process used by a provider or customer of a wire communication service for cost accounting or other similar purposes in the ordinary course of its business.

(c) "*Trap and trace device*" means a device or process that captures the incoming electronic or other impulses that identify the originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic communication, but not the contents of a communication.

P.C. § 638.51: Prohibitions on Installation of Pen Registers and Trap & Trace Devices; Exceptions:

(a) Except as provided in **subd. (b)**, a person may *not* install or use a pen register or a trap and trace device without first obtaining a court order pursuant to **P.C. §§ 638.52** or **638.53**.

(b) A provider of electronic or wire communication service may use a pen register or a trap and trace device for any of the following purposes:

- (1) To operate, maintain, and test a wire or electronic communication service.
- (2) To protect the rights or property of the provider.
- (3) To protect users of the service from abuse of service or unlawful use of service.
- (4) To record the fact that a wire or electronic communication was initiated or completed to protect the provider, another provider furnishing service toward the completion of the wire communication, or a user of that service, from fraudulent, unlawful, or abusive use of service.
- (5) If the consent of the user of that service has been obtained.

(c) A violation of this section is punishable by a fine not exceeding \$2,500, or by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year, or by imprisonment pursuant to **P.C. § 1170(h)** (i.e., 16 months, 2 or 3 years in state prison or county jail), or by both that fine and imprisonment.

(d) A good faith reliance on an order issued pursuant to **P.C. § 1546.1**, or an authorization made pursuant to **P.C. § 638.53**, is a complete defense to a civil or criminal action brought under this section or under this chapter.

P.C. § 638.52: Court Orders:

(a) A peace officer may make an application to a magistrate for an order or an extension of an order authorizing or approving the installation and use of a pen register or a trap and trace device. The application shall be in writing under oath or equivalent affirmation, and shall include the identity of the peace officer making the application and the identity of the law enforcement agency conducting the investigation. The applicant shall certify that the information likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation and shall include a statement of the offense to which the information likely to be obtained by the pen register or trap and trace device relates.

(b) The magistrate shall enter an ex parte order authorizing the installation and use of a pen register or a trap and trace device if he or she finds that the information likely to be obtained by the installation and use of a pen register or a trap and trace device is relevant to an ongoing investigation and that there is “*probable*

cause” to believe that the pen register or trap and trace device will lead to any of the following:

- (1) Recovery of stolen or embezzled property.
- (2) Property or things used as the means of committing a felony.
- (3) Property or things in the possession of a person with the intent to use them as a means of committing a public offense, or in the possession of another to whom he or she may have delivered them for the purpose of concealing them or preventing them from being discovered.
- (4) Evidence that tends to show a felony has been committed, or tends to show that a particular person has committed or is committing a felony.
- (5) Evidence that tends to show that sexual exploitation of a child, in violation of **P.C. § 311.3**, or possession of matter depicting sexual conduct of a person under 18 years of age, in violation of **P.C. § 311.11**, has occurred or is occurring.
- (6) The location of a person who is unlawfully restrained or reasonably believed to be a witness in a criminal investigation or for whose arrest there is probable cause.
- (7) Evidence that tends to show a violation of **Labor Code § 3700.5**, or tends to show that a particular person has violated **Labor Code § 3700.5**.
- (8) Evidence that does any of the following:

(A) Tends to show that a felony, a misdemeanor violation of the **Fish and Game Code**, or a misdemeanor violation of the **Public Resources Code**, has been committed or is being committed.

(B) Tends to show that a particular person has committed or is committing a felony, a misdemeanor violation of the **Fish and Game Code**, or a misdemeanor violation of the **Public Resources Code**.

(C) Will assist in locating an individual who has committed or is committing a felony, a misdemeanor violation of the **Fish and Game Code**, or a misdemeanor violation of the **Public Resources Code**.

(c) Information acquired solely pursuant to the authority for a pen register or a trap and trace device shall not include any information that may disclose the physical location of the subscriber, except to the extent that the location may be determined from the telephone

number. Upon the request of the person seeking the pen register or trap and trace device, the magistrate may seal portions of the application pursuant to *People v. Hobbs* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 948, and **Evid. Code §§ 1040, 1041, and 1042.**

(d) An order issued pursuant to **subd. (b)** shall specify all of the following:

- (1)** The identity, if known, of the person to whom is leased or in whose name is listed the telephone line to which the pen register or trap and trace device is to be attached.
- (2)** The identity, if known, of the person who is the subject of the criminal investigation.
- (3)** The number and, if known, physical location of the telephone line to which the pen register or trap and trace device is to be attached and, in the case of a trap and trace device, the geographic limits of the trap and trace order.
- (4)** A statement of the offense to which the information likely to be obtained by the pen register or trap and trace device relates.
- (5)** The order shall direct, if the applicant has requested, the furnishing of information, facilities, and technical assistance necessary to accomplish the installation of the pen register or trap and trace device.

(e) An order issued under this section shall authorize the installation and use of a pen register or a trap and trace device for a period not to exceed 60 days.

(f) Extensions of the original order may be granted upon a new application for an order under **subds. (a)** and **(b)** if the officer shows that there is a continued probable cause that the information or items sought under this subdivision are likely to be obtained under the extension. The period of an extension shall not exceed 60 days.

(g) An order or extension order authorizing or approving the installation and use of a pen register or a trap and trace device shall direct that the order be sealed until the order, including any extensions, expires, and that the person owning or leasing the line to which the pen register or trap and trace device is attached not disclose the existence of the pen register or trap and trace device or the existence of the investigation to the listed subscriber or to any other person.

(h) Upon the presentation of an order, entered under **subds. (b)** or **(f)**, by a peace officer authorized to install and use a pen register, a provider of wire or electronic communication service, landlord, custodian, or other person shall immediately provide the peace officer all information, facilities, and technical assistance necessary to accomplish the installation of the pen register unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference with the services provided to the party with respect to whom the installation and use is to take place, if the assistance is directed by the order.

(i) Upon the request of a peace officer authorized to receive the results of a trap and trace device, a provider of a wire or electronic communication service, landlord, custodian, or other person shall immediately install the device on the appropriate line and provide the peace officer all information, facilities, and technical assistance, including installation and operation of the device unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference with the services provided to the party with respect to whom the installation and use is to take place, if the installation and assistance is directed by the order.

(j) A provider of a wire or electronic communication service, landlord, custodian, or other person who provides facilities or technical assistance pursuant to this section shall be reasonably compensated by the requesting peace officer's law enforcement agency for the reasonable expenses incurred in providing the facilities and assistance.

(k) Unless otherwise ordered by the magistrate, the results of the pen register or trap and trace device shall be provided to the peace officer at reasonable intervals during regular business hours for the duration of the order.

(l) The magistrate, before issuing the order pursuant to **subd. (b)**, may examine on oath the person seeking the pen register or the trap and trace device, and any witnesses the person may produce, and shall take his or her affidavit or their affidavits in writing, and cause the affidavit or affidavits to be subscribed by the parties making them.

P.C. § 638.53: *Emergency Court Orders:*

(a) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, upon an oral application by a peace officer, a magistrate may grant oral approval for the installation and use of a pen register or a trap and

trace device, without an order, if he or she determines all of the following:

- (1) There are grounds upon which an order could be issued under **P.C. § 638.52**.
- (2) There is probable cause to believe that an emergency situation exists with respect to the investigation of a crime.
- (3) There is probable cause to believe that a substantial danger to life or limb exists justifying the authorization for immediate installation and use of a pen register or a trap and trace device before an order authorizing the installation and use can, with due diligence, be submitted and acted upon.

(b)

- (1) By midnight of the second full court day after the pen register or trap and trace device is installed, a written application pursuant to **P.C. § 638.52** shall be submitted by the peace officer who made the oral application to the magistrate who orally approved the installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace device. If an order is issued pursuant to **P.C. § 638.52**, the order shall also recite the time of the oral approval under subdivision (a) and shall be retroactive to the time of the original oral approval.
- (2) In the absence of an authorizing order pursuant to **para. (1)**, the use shall immediately terminate when the information sought is obtained, when the application for the order is denied, or by midnight of the second full court day after the pen register or trap and trace device is installed, whichever is earlier.

(c) A provider of a wire or electronic communication service, landlord, custodian, or other person who provides facilities or technical assistance pursuant to this section shall be reasonably compensated by the requesting peace officer's law enforcement agency for the reasonable expenses incurred in providing the facilities and assistance.

P.C. § 638.54: *Notice to Identified Targets; Order Delaying Unsealing of Order and Notification:*

- (a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a government entity that obtains information pursuant to **P.C. § 638.52**, or obtains information pursuant to oral authorization pursuant to **P.C.**

§ 638.53, shall serve upon, or deliver to by registered or first-class mail, electronic mail, or other means reasonably calculated to be effective, the identified targets of the order a notice that informs the recipient that information about the recipient has been compelled or requested and states with reasonable specificity the nature of the government investigation under which the information is sought. The notice shall include a copy of the order or a written statement setting forth facts giving rise to the emergency. The notice shall be provided no later than 30 days after the termination of the period of the order, any extensions, or an emergency request.

(b)

(1) Prior to the expiration of the 30-day period specified in **subdivision (a)**, the government entity may submit a request, supported by a sworn affidavit, for an order delaying unsealing of the order and notification and prohibiting the person owning or leasing the line to which the pen register or trap and trace device is attached from disclosing the existence of the pen register or trap and trace device or the existence of the investigation to the listed subscriber or any other person. The court shall issue the order if the court determines that there is reason to believe that notification may have an adverse result, but only for the period of time that the court finds there is reason to believe that the notification may have that adverse result, and not to exceed 90 days.

(2) The court may grant extensions of the delay of up to 90 days each on the same grounds as provided in **paragraph (1)**.

(3) Upon expiration of the period of delay of the notification, the government entity shall serve upon, or deliver to by registered or first-class mail, electronic mail, or other means reasonably calculated to be effective as specified by the court issuing the order authorizing delayed notification, the identified targets of the order or emergency authorization a document that includes the information described in **subdivision (a)** and a copy of all electronic information obtained or a summary of that information, including, at a minimum, the number and types of records disclosed, the date and time when the earliest and latest records were created, and a statement of the grounds for the

court's determination to grant a delay in notifying the individual. The notice shall be provided no later than three days after the expiration of the period of delay of the notification.

(c) If there is no identified target of an order or emergency request at the time of its issuance, the government entity shall submit to the Department of Justice, no later than three days after the termination of the period of the order, any extensions, or an emergency request, all of the information required in **subdivision (a)**. If an order delaying notice is obtained pursuant to **subdivision (b)**, the government entity shall submit to the department, no later than three days after the expiration of the period of delay of the notification, all of the information required in **paragraph (3) of subdivision (b)**. The department shall publish all those reports on its Internet Web site within 90 days of receipt. The department may redact names or other personal identifying information from the reports.

(d) For the purposes of this section, “*adverse result*” has the meaning set forth in **P.C. § 1546(a)**.

P.C. § 638.55: *Motion to Suppress; Civil Action by Attorney General to Compel Compliance; Petition to Void or Modify Warrant, Order, or Process, or for Destruction of Information:*

(a) Any person in a trial, hearing, or proceeding may move to suppress wire or electronic information obtained or retained in violation of the **Fourth Amendment** to the United States Constitution or of this chapter. The motion shall be made, determined, and be subject to review in accordance with the procedures set forth in **P.C. § 1538.5(b) to (q)**, inclusive.

(b) The Attorney General may commence a civil action to compel any government entity to comply with the provisions of this chapter.

(c) An individual whose information is targeted by a warrant, order, or other legal process that is not in compliance with this chapter, the California Constitution, or the United States Constitution, or a service provider or any other recipient of the warrant, order, or other legal process may petition the issuing court to void or modify the warrant, order, or process, or to order the destruction of any information obtained in violation of this chapter, the California Constitution, or the United States Constitution.

Pen. Code § 1546.1: *Search Warrants and Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices:*

Effective *September 23, 2016*, pen register and trap and trace court orders (P.C. §§ 638.50–638.55) are added as **subdivisions (b)(5)** and **(c)(12)** to the list of warrants and orders authorized by the **CalECPA** for the obtaining of electronic communication information, so that it is clear that P.C. §§ 638.50–638.55 are effective provisions and may be used by law enforcement without running afoul of the **CalECPA**.

Note: The amendments to P.C. § 1546.1(b) and (c) permit a government entity to compel production of communication information from a service provider, to compel the production of or access to electronic device information from a person or entity other than the authorized possessor of the device, and to access electronic device information by means of physical interaction or electronic communication with the device, pursuant to an order for a pen register or trap and trace device, or both.

Federal Rules: Federally, use of a pen register is *not* considered to be a search, and therefore does not require a search warrant. (*Smith v. Maryland* (1979) 442 U.S. 735, 745-746 [61 L.Ed.2nd 220, 229-230].)

A “*Mirror Port*.” The same rule is applicable to a “*mirror port*,” which is similar to a pen register, but which allows the government to collect the “to” and “from” addresses of a person’s e-mail messages, the IP addresses of the websites the person visits, and notes the total volume of information sent to or from the person’s account. (*United States v. Forrester* (9th Cir. 2008) 512 F.3rd 500.)

18 U.S.C. § 3121 was amended as a part of the “*Patriot Act*,” **Pub. L. No. 107-56**, to expand these definitions to include processes that capture routing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an electronic communication facility, thus permitting the interception of information from computers and cells phones, as well as from land-line telephones.

The Federal Electronic Communication Privacy Act (18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127) expressly authorizes a *state investigative or law enforcement officer* to apply for “*an order*,” as opposed to a search warrant, or an extension of an order, authorizing the installation and use of either a *pen register* or a “*trap-and-trace*” device, when a request is made in writing, under oath, to a court of “*competent*

jurisdiction” of the state, and is otherwise not prohibited by state law.

18 U.S.C. § 2123 requires the applicant to state that the information likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation (as opposed to the probable cause required for a warrant).

An order is good for no more than 60 days. Extensions, for up to 60 days, may be obtained upon making a separate application.

The order shall direct that it be sealed pending further order of the court.

Even if the procedures described in these statutes are violated, suppression of evidence is not an appropriate remedy. (*United States v. Forrester* (9th Cir. 2007) 495 F.3rd 1041, 1051.)

The federal Second Circuit Court of Appeal court joined the other circuits that have considered this issue and held that collecting IP address information, without content, is “constitutionally indistinguishable” from the use of pen registers and trap and trace devices to collect telephone dialing information. As a result, the court held that the pen register and trap and trace orders did not violate the **Fourth Amendment**. (*United States v. Ulbricht* (2nd Cir. 2017) 858 F.3rd 71.)

Note: These rulings that have held that no search warrant is necessary is an application of the so-called “third party doctrine,” where it is recognized that when a person willingly provides private information to a third party, he loses any reasonable expectation in his right to privacy as to that information.

California’s Stricter Rules:

Citing pre-**Proposition 8** authority (*People v. Blair* (1979) 25 Cal.3rd 640.), which rejected the rationale of *Smith v. Maryland*, *supra*, the California Attorney General is of the opinion that despite the lack of legal authority to suppress the resulting evidence (due to passage of **Proposition 8** in June, 1982), obtaining pen register or trap and trace information based upon an

ex parte court order (as opposed to a search warrant), being in violation of the California Constitution (**Art. I, § 13**, as well as **Art. I, § 1**), is “*prohibited by state law.*” The federal authorizing statutes, therefore, which allow for a court order obtained by state law enforcement officers “(u)nless prohibited by State law” (**18 U.S.C. § 3122(a)(2)**), do not apply to California because such a procedure *is* prohibited by state law. (86 *Opinion of Attorney General Bill Lockyer* 198 (2003); see also newly enacted (effective 1/1/2016) California statutory rules, **P.C. §§ 638.50 et seq.**, above.)

The California Attorney General, in this same opinion, also noted that **Gov’t. Code § 11180** similarly does not allow for an “*Administrative Subpoena*” due to the lack of a prior judicial review as required by the California Constitution.

See also, 69 *Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen.* 55 (1986): A California magistrate may authorize the installation of a pen register by the issuance of a search warrant.

Because a search warrant, if used, is only good for 10 days (**P.C. § 1534**), a new warrant or an extension (see **P.C. § 638.52(a), (f) & (g)**, above) must be obtained for each succeeding 10-day period.

Information received from a pen register and/or a trap and trace device, recording “call data content” (i.e., “CDC,” data about call origination, length, and time of call), are not protected by the wiretap statutes. There is no expectation of privacy in such information, per *Smith v. Maryland* (1979) 442 U.S. 735 [61 L.Ed.2nd 220]. (*United States v. Reed* (9th Cir. 2009) 575 F.3rd 900, 914-917.)

Use of a pen register and trap and trace device, except maybe when combined with other forms of electronic surveillance, is *not* enough alone to establish the required “*necessity*” to justify the issuance of a wiretap warrant. (*United States v.* (9th Cir. 2009) 585 F.3rd 1223, 1228, citing *United States v. Gonzalez, Inc.*, (9th Cir. 2005) 412 F.3rd 1102, 1113.)

Records of Foreign Corporations Which Provide Electronic Communications Services or Remote Computing Services to the General Public:

P.C. § 1524.2: *Out-of-State Electronic Communications Information:*
This section authorizes the service of a search warrant for information related to the *identity of customers, data* stored by, or on behalf of, the

customer, the *customer's usage* of those services, *the recipient or destination* of communications sent to or from those customers, or *the content of those communications*, upon a “foreign corporation” which provides “*electronic communications services or remote computing services* to the general public.”

“*Electronic communications services*” and “*remote computing services*” is to be construed in accordance with the federal **Electronic Stored Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et seq.**

18 U.S.C. § 2701 refers to **18 U.S.C. § 2501, subd. (15)** of which defines “*electronic communication service*” as a “service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications.”

18 U.S.C. § 2501(1), (18): “*Wire communication*” includes “*any aural transfer* (i.e., one containing the human voice) made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception (including the use of such connection in a switching station)”

This includes telephone conversations. (*Briggs v. American Air Filter Co., Inc.* (5th Cir. 1980) 630 F.2nd 414; *United States v. Harpel* (10th Cir. 1974) 493 F.2nd 346.)

E-mail records of a business may only be obtained from an Internet Service Provider (ISP) via a search warrant. The defendant enjoyed a reasonable expectation of privacy in his emails vis-a-vis his ISP. Thus, government agents violated his **Fourth Amendment** rights by compelling the ISP to turn over the emails without first obtaining a warrant based on probable cause. However, because the agents relied in good faith on provisions of the **Stored Communications Act**, the Exclusionary Rule did not apply. (*United States v. Warshak* (6th Cir. 2010) 631 F.3rd 266.)

The Court ruled that the federal **Stored Communications Act (SCA)** expressly prohibits electronic communication service providers from knowingly divulging to any person or entity the contents of a communication. The Supremacy

Clause of the U.S. Constitution prohibits enforcement of the trial court's order compelling petitioner (Facebook), a social media provider, to produce the contents of the victim's social media account because California's discovery laws cannot be enforced in a way that compels a provider to make disclosures violating the SCA. The Court also rejected Real Party in Interest's assertion that the confrontation clause of the **Sixth Amendment** and the due process clause of the **14th Amendment** mandates disclosure of otherwise privileged information for purposes of Real Party's pretrial investigation of the prosecution's case. (*Facebook, Inc. v. Superior Court [Lance Touchstone]* (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 729, 735-748.)

A “foreign corporation” is one that is qualified to do business in California pursuant to **Corp. Code § 2105**, even though based in another state.

“Properly served,” as required by the statute, necessitates “(d)elivery by hand of a copy of any process against a foreign corporation;

(a) to any officer of the corporation or its general manager in this state, or if the corporation is a bank to a cashier or an assistant cashier,

(b) to any natural person designated by it as agent for the service of process, or

(c) if the corporation has designated a corporate agent, to any person named in the latest certificate of the corporate agent filed pursuant to **Section 1505 . . .**” (P.C. § **1524.2(a)(6)**, referencing **Corp. Code § 2110**)

Per **Corp. Code § 2105**, foreign corporations must consent to service of process as a condition of doing business in California.

The foreign corporation is required to provide the information requested within five (5) business days, which may be shortened or extended upon a showing of good cause, and to authenticate such records, thus making them admissible in court per **Evid. Code §§ 1561, 1562**. (P.C. § **1524.2(b)**)

The section further requires California corporations to honor out-of-state search warrants as if issued within this state. (**P.C. § 1524.2(c)**)

These are procedural requirements for introducing the resulting records into evidence at trial, and irrelevant to the use of the same records for probable cause purposes for a follow-up search warrant. (*People v. Stipo* (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 664, 670-672.)

P.C. § 1524.3(a): *Records of Foreign Corporations Providing Electronic Communications or Remote Computing Services:* Foreign corporations providing *electronic communications* or *remote computing services* must disclose to a governmental prosecuting or investigating agency, when served with a search warrant issued by a California court pursuant to **P.C. § 1524(a)(7)** (i.e., in *misdemeanor cases*), records revealing the *name, address, local and long distance telephone toll billing records, telephone number* or *other subscriber number or identity*, and *length of service* of a subscriber to or customer of that service, and the *types of services* the subscriber or customer utilized.

P.C. § 1524.3(b): The governmental entity receiving subscriber records or information under this section is *not* required to provide notice to a subscriber or customer.

P.C. § 1524.3(d): Upon a request of a peace officer, the provider shall take all necessary steps to preserve records and other evidence in its possession pending the issuance of a search warrant or a request in writing and an affidavit declaring an intent to serve the provider with a search warrant. Records shall be retained for 90 days upon such request, and may be extended for an additional 90 days upon a renewed request by the peace officer.

Marijuana Issues:

Although **California's Compassionate Use Act (H&S §§ 11362.5 et seq.)** provides a defense at trial or a basis to move to set aside the indictment or information prior to trial, it does not shield a person suspected of possessing or cultivating marijuana from an investigation or arrest. Nor does it impose an affirmative duty on law enforcement officers to investigate a suspect's status as a qualified patient or primary caregiver prior to seeking a search warrant. A trial court, therefore, did not err in denying defendant's suppression motion upon determining that the affidavit in support of the search warrant established probable cause to search. (*People v. Clark* (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 490, 497-501.)

Where execution of a search warrant results in the recovery of marijuana pursuant to the order of the court, confiscation of the marijuana must be completed despite the suspect's claims that its for valid medical purposes, pursuant to **Proposition 215**. (*People v. Fisher* (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1147.)

H&S Code § 11485: Disposition of Personal Property Seized Pursuant to a Search Warrant and Used in Growing and Processing Cannabis Where no Prosecution Results:

Any peace officer of this state who, incident to a search under a search warrant issued for a violation of **H&S § 11358** (i.e., *Planting, Cultivating, Harvesting, Drying, or Possessing Cannabis Plants*) with respect to which no prosecution of a defendant results, seizes personal property suspected of being used in the planting, cultivation, harvesting, drying, processing, or transporting of cannabis, shall, if the seized personal property is not being held for evidence or destroyed as contraband, and if the owner of the property is unknown or has not claimed the property, provide notice regarding the seizure and manner of reclamation of the property to any owner or tenant of real property on which the property was seized. In addition, this notice shall be posted at the location of seizure and shall be published at least once in a newspaper of general circulation in the county in which the property was seized. If, after 90 days following the first publication of the notice, no owner appears and proves his or her ownership, the seized personal property shall be deemed to be abandoned and may be disposed of by sale to the public at public auction as set forth in **Civ. Code §§ 2080 et seq. (Title 6, Division 3, Part 4, Chapter 4)**, or may be disposed of by transfer to a government agency or community service organization. Any profit from the sale or transfer of the property shall be expended for investigative services with respect to crimes involving cannabis.

Limitations on the Use of Search Warrants:

Newsroom Searches:

P.C. § 1524(g) provides that; “No warrant shall issue for any item described in **section 1070** of the **Evidence Code**.”

Evid. Code § 1070 is the so-called “*newsman’s privilege*” section and lists “*unpublished information*” such as “notes, outtakes, photographs, tapes or other data of whatever sort not itself disseminated to the public” as privileged.

Therefore, such items may not be the subject of a search warrant.

This is not a federal constitutional requirement. Such searches are legal except as prohibited by state law. (*Zurcher v. The Stanford Daily* (1978) 436 U.S. 547 [56 L.Ed.2nd 525].)

This does *not* protect from search warrants *other* evidentiary items and contraband, as listed in **P.C. § 1524(a)(1)** through **(17)**, where there is probable cause to believe the item sought is in a newsroom.

Searches of, and on, Indian Tribal Property:

Search Warrants:

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal initially ruled that use of a search warrant to seize “*uniquely tribal property on tribal land*” is a violation of Indian sovereignty, in a civil suit filed pursuant to **42 U.S.C. § 1983**, and therefore illegal. (*Bishop Paiute Tribe v. County of Inyo* (9th Cir. 2002) 275 F.3rd 893.)

The Court reasoned that seizure of Indian casino employee records in a welfare fraud case was *not* authorized by **Public Law 280 (18 U.S.C. § 1162(a))**, which gave selected states (including California) jurisdiction over criminal offenses committed by or against individual Indians.

However, the United States Supreme Court vacated the decision in this case finding that an Indian tribe is not a “*person*,” as required by **42 U.S.C. § 1983**, and thus could not legally file a civil suit alleging a violation of their civil rights under authority of this section. The case was remanded it back for a determination whether there is some other legal basis for Indian tribes to challenge the execution of a search warrant on tribal property. (*Inyo County v. Paiute-Shone Indians* (2003) 538 U.S. 701 [155 L.Ed.2nd 933].)

Applicability of the Fourth Amendment:

As for Indian reservations outside of California (i.e., Arizona in this case), it has been held that the **Fourth Amendment** *does not* directly govern the conduct of tribal governments. Rather, the “**Indian Civil Rights Act**” (i.e., “**ICRA**”) applies instead. However, because the **ICRA** contains a provision regulating tribal law enforcement with language identical to that contained in the **Fourth Amendment** (see **25 U.S.C. § 1302(2)**), the same legal reasoning as used in enforcing the **Fourth Amendment** applies to Indian tribes as well. (*United States v. Becerra-Garcia* (9th Cir. 2005) 397 F.3rd 1167.)

California Indian law, however, involves the so-called “**Public Law 280**,” which calls for different standards. Arguably, therefore, **Fourth Amendment** standards (in principle, if not in the letter of the law) are applicable. But, see below.

This same reasoning was used to find a search by California Indian tribal officers (Amador County) to be illegal and subject to an Exclusionary Rule. Although the **Fourth Amendment** did not apply to the Indian law enforcement officers, **25 U.S.C. § 1302(2)** and the **Fourteenth Amendment’s** due process clause mandated the suppression of evidence which was the product of an unlawful search of a vehicle on an Indian reservation. (*People v. Ramirez* (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1464.)

Jurisdictional Issues:

The states have exclusive criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed on Indian land between non-Indians, as well as victimless crimes committed by non-Indians. (See *United States v. McBratney* (1882) 104 U.S. 621 [26 L.Ed. 869]; *Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe* (1978) 435 U.S. 191 [55 L.Ed.2nd 209]; see also *People v. Ramirez, supra.*, at p. 1475, fn. 9.)

California has assumed exclusive jurisdiction over other crimes committed by or against Indians on Indian land. (*People v. Ramirez, supra.*, at p. 1475, fn. 9; **18 U.S.C. § 1162.**)

Search of Unauthorized Cellphones Recovered at CDCR:

P.C. § 4576: CDCR (California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation) shall *not* access data or communications that have been captured using available technology from the *unauthorized* use of a wireless communication device except after obtaining a search warrant.

Mechanics of Preparation:

Use a Deputy District Attorney, Assistant State Attorney General, or Assistant U.S. Attorney to at least review and approve the warrant and affidavit “*for legal sufficiency,*” if not to assist in the actual preparation.

Aside from the benefits of having someone else proofread the warrant and affidavit, this also adds to the “*good faith*” argument should the warrant later be found to be lacking in probable cause. (See *People v. Camarella* (1991) 54 Cal.3rd 592, 602-607; and *Armstrong v. Asselin* (9th Cir. 2013) 734 F.3rd 984, 994.)

Collect all reports, necessary physical descriptions of the place to be searched and the property to be seized, exhibits, etc., prior to beginning the preparation.

Make sure all exhibits are labeled and attached to the warrant affidavit, and are “incorporated by reference” in the affidavit.

Keep the warrant and affidavit *separate*.

The suspect(s) should later be allowed to read the warrant with a copy being left at the place searched, although this is not required by California state law. The affidavit is *not* shown to the suspect(s) nor left at the scene. (*People v. Calabrese* (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 79.)

Federal rules, as interpreted by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal, are to the contrary, mandating that a copy of the warrant be shown to, and left with, the subject whose property is being searched in all cases. (See *Ramirez v. Butte Silver Bow County* (9th Cir. 2002) 298 F.3rd 1022; and **Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 41(d)**) (See “*Leaving a Copy of the Warrant, Affidavit, and/or Receipt and Inventory,*” below)

Leave a copy of the “*Receipt and Inventory*” at the scene. (P.C. § 1535)

The magistrate will ask the affiant(s) to swear to the truth of the affidavit.

The magistrate will sign the affidavit *and* the warrant.

There is no duty on the part of the affiant to investigate the suspect’s version of the events before obtaining a search warrant. (*Cameron v. Craig* (9th Cir. 2013) 713 F.3rd 1012, 1019.)

Choosing to seek a search warrant from a state court magistrate instead of a federal magistrate in order avoid a federally imposed rule (See *United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc.* (9th Cir. 2010) 621 F.3rd 1162, recommending a certain protocol for warrants involving computerized data) does not negate a finding of good faith so long as not done with the “knowledge . . . that the search was unconstitutional under the **Fourth Amendment.**” (*United States v. Schesso* (9th Cir. 2013) 730 F.3rd 1040, 1050-1051.)

Service and Return:

Who May Serve: A search warrant is directed to “*any peace officer*” for service. (P.C. § 1529)

Only a “*peace officer*” (with exceptions as noted below), as listed on the face of the warrant (i.e., “*any peace officer*”), may lawfully serve a search warrant, although the peace officer may be assisted by others. (P.C. §§ 1529, 1530)

While the affiant need not necessarily be a sworn peace officer (*People v. Bell* (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1030, 1054-1055.), the person executing the warrant must be.

Exceptions: There are some exceptions to the general rule that the person serving a search warrant must be a peace officer:

P.C. § 830.13: Persons listed below who are not “*peace officers*” may exercise the power to serve warrants as specified in P.C. §§ 1523 & 1530, and 830.11 during the course and within the scope of their employment, if they receive a course in the exercise of that power pursuant to P.C. § 832.

Subd. (a)(1): Persons employed as investigators of an auditor-controller or director of finance of any county, or persons employed by a city and county who conduct investigations under the supervision of the controller of the city and county, who are regularly employed and paid in that capacity, provided that the primary duty of these persons shall be to engage in investigations related to the theft of funds or the misappropriation of funds or resources, or investigations related to the duties of the auditor-controller or finance director as set forth in **Gov't. Code §§ 26880 et seq., 26900 et seq., 26970 et seq., and 26980 et seq.**

Subd. (a)(2): Persons employed by the Department of Justice as investigative auditors, provided that the primary duty of these persons shall be to investigate financial crimes. Investigative auditors shall only serve warrants for the production of documentary evidence held by financial institutions, Internet service providers, telecommunications companies, and third parties who are not reasonably suspected of engaging or having engaged in criminal activity related to the documentary evidence for which the warrant is requested.

V.C. § 21100.4(a)(1): A “designated local transportation officer,” for the purpose of seizing and causing the removal of a vehicle operated as a taxicab or other passenger vehicle for hire upon establishing in an affidavit reasonable cause to believe that said vehicle is being operated in violation of licensing requirements adopted by a local authority under **V.C. § 21100(b).**

A “*designated local transportation officer*” means any local public officer employed by a local authority to investigate and enforce local taxicab and vehicle for hire laws and regulations.

Rules as to Others Who are Not California Peace Officers:

Federal Criminal Investigators and Federal Law Enforcement Officers are not California peace officers. (See P.C. 830.8(a))

Note: The power of a federal agent to make arrests for a state violation, after completing a training course pursuant to **P.C. § 832**, as described in **P.C. § 830.8**, does not give a federal officer the power to execute a state search warrant.

P.C. § 830.85: *Federal Officers and California Peace Officers:* Notwithstanding any other law, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers and United States Customs and Border Protection officers *are not* California peace officers.

Victims: It is permissible for a burglary victim to accompany the searching officers and point out items stolen from him. (***People v. Superior Court [Meyers]*** (1979) 25 Cal.3rd 67; ***People v. Superior Court [Moore]*** (1980) 104 Cal.App.3rd 1001.)

Police Dogs: It is also lawful to use a police dog trained to detect narcotics. (See ***People v. Russell*** (1987) 195 Cal.App.3rd 186.)

News Media, Etc.: Members of the *news media*, or any other third party not necessary to the execution of the warrant, must *not* be allowed to enter a suspect's private residence. To allow such persons to accompany the searching officers is a **Fourth Amendment** violation. (***Wilson v. Layne*** (1999) 526 U.S. 603, 614 [143 L.Ed.2nd 818, 830]; ***Hanlon v. Berger*** (1999) 526 U.S. 808 [143 L.Ed.2nd 978].)

But even though members of the news media are present, suppression is not called for where they do not discover or develop any of the evidence later used at trial. Where, despite being led on tours through the crime scene, the media did not expand the scope of the search beyond a search warrant's dictates nor assist the police, or touch, move, handle or taint the admitted evidence in any way, the **Fourth Amendment** does not require the suppression of any evidence. (***United States v. Duenas*** (9th Cir. 2012) 691 F.3rd 1070, 1079-1083.)

Necessity to Serve: A search warrant is not an invitation that officers can choose to accept or reject. It is an order of the court based on probable cause which must be executed. (***People v. Fisher*** (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1147; search warrant for marijuana executed despite defendant's presentation of proof at the scene that he was legally entitled to possess marijuana pursuant to **H&S § 11362.5**, California's "***Compassionate Use Act;***" **Proposition 215**.)

However, it is expected that officers will exercise some discretion in avoiding the taking of excessive, cumulative property, and unnecessary destructive behavior, in executing a search warrant. (*San Jose Charter of the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club v. City of San Jose* (9th Cir. 2005) 402 F.3rd 962.)

Night Service: Search warrants must be served between 7:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m., absent an endorsement by the magistrate for night service. (P.C. § 1533)

“Night service” must be supported by “good cause,” i.e., some articulable reason why service cannot wait until morning. (See “Nighttime Searches,” above.)

Note: Although typically, night service becomes an issue when executing a search warrant at a residence, the statute does not limit the necessity for a night service endorsement to residences. When a search warrant specifies a *person, vehicle* or any other *container* to be searched, execution of such a warrant at night probably also must be justified in the affidavit and approved by the magistrate.

Executing a search warrant “at night” without authorization, at least if no one is home (i.e., no prejudice being shown), will not result in the suppression of any evidence. (*Tidwell v. Superior Court* (1971) 17 Cal.App.3rd 780, 787.)

Use of a Motorized Battering Ram: The California Supreme Court has determined in a case that has never been overruled that at least where a “motorized battering ram” is used to force entry into a building, prior judicial authorization in the search warrant is necessary. Failure to obtain such authorization is both a violation of the **California Constitution** and the **Fourth Amendment**. (*Langford v. Superior Court* (1987) 43 Cal.3rd 21.)

“We conclude therefore that the motorized battering ram may be used in executing searches or arrests only after the LAPD satisfies three preliminary requirements: i.e., it (1) obtains a warrant upon probable cause, (2) receives prior authorization to use the ram from a magistrate, and (3) at the time of entry determines there are exigent circumstances amounting to an immediate threat of injury to officers executing the warrant or reasonable grounds to suspect that evidence is being destroyed.” (*Id.*, p. 32.)

“The magistrate should decide only whether the motorized battering ram could be used with relative safety against a particular building, if the need arises during execution of a search or arrest warrant.” (*Id.*, p. 31.)

The same rule would apply to the use of a motorized battering ram in the execution of an arrest warrant. (*Id.*, p. 33.)

But such prior judicial authorization is not legally required where the issue is the use of some lesser, less dangerous, force, such as the use of “flashbangs.” (*Id.*, p. 28.)

In-County Service: A judge can issue a warrant to be served anywhere in the county in which he or she is sitting. (*People v. Smead* (1985) 175 Cal.App.3rd 1101.)

Out-of-County Service: Search warrants may be issued for, and served, out-of-county so long as it relates to an offense that can be prosecuted in the issuing magistrate’s county. (*People v. Ruster* (1976) 16 Cal.3rd 690; *People v. Fleming* (1981) 29 Cal.3rd 698, 707; *People v. Easley* (1983) 34 Cal.3rd 858, 869-870; *People v. Ruiz* (1990) 217 Cal.App.3rd 574.)

The issuing magistrate must merely have *probable cause* to believe that the case is triable in his or her county. (*People v. Easley, supra.*)

P.C. § 1524(j) provides statutory authority for a magistrate to issue a search warrant to be executed in a different county where the alleged offense(s) include a violation of **P.C. § 530.5** (Identify Theft), and the victim resides in the issuing magistrate’s county.

Even though the issuing magistrate is later determined to *not* have jurisdiction over a crime for which he issues a warrant (i.e., it is later discovered that the alleged crime is *not* triable in the magistrate’s county), “*good faith*” may save the improperly issued out-of-county warrant. (*People v. Ruiz, supra; People v. Galvan* (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 866; *People v. Dantzler* (1988) 206 Cal.App.3rd 289.)

Out-of-State Crimes: A California judge may issue a search warrant for a location within his or her county to search for evidence located within the county relevant to a crime committed in another state. (*People v. Kraft* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978.)

It is not a legal requirement that law enforcement authorities in the foreign state have requested, or even be aware of, the search warrant. (*Ibid.*)

Knock and Notice:

General Rule: Any time a police officer makes entry into the residence of another *to arrest* (P.C. § 844), with or without an arrest warrant, or *to serve a search warrant* (P.C. § 1531), he must first:

- Knock.
- Identify him- or herself as a police officer.
- State his or her purpose (e.g., “serving a warrant”).
- Demand Entry.

(*Richards v. Wisconsin* (1997) 520 U.S. 385, 387–388 [137 L. Ed.2nd 615, 117 S. Ct. 1416]*People v. Schad* (1971) 21 Cal.App.3rd 201, 207; *People v. Murphy* (2005) 37 Cal.4th 490, 495.)

Note: P.C. § 844 is not limited to law enforcement officers, imposing these requirements on a *private person* as well, “*if the offense is a felony.*”

Knock and notice requirements apply to *entries for “investigative purposes”* as well, although not coming within the provisions of P.C. §§ 844 or 1531. (*People v. Miller* (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 190, 201.)

Knock and notice requirements also apply to entries made for purposes of conducting a **Fourth** Waiver search. (*People v. Constancio* (1974) 42 Cal.App.3rd 533, 542; *People v. Lilienthal* (1978) 22 Cal.3rd 891, 900; *People v. Mays* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 969, 973, fn. 4; and see *People v. Murphy* (2005) 37 Cal.4th 490.)

The federal equivalent, most often referred to as “*knock and announce,*” is contained in **18 U.S.C. § 3109.**

P.C. § 1531: “The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or any part of a house or anything therein, to execute the warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance.”

Purpose: The primary purpose of the rule is to avoid violent confrontations by giving the occupants the time and opportunity to peaceably open the door and admit the officers. (*People v. Peterson* (1973) 9 Cal.3rd 717, 723; *Duke v. Superior Court* (1969) 1 Cal.3rd 314, 321.) There are other purposes, as well:

“The purposes and policies underlying **section 844** are fourfold: (1) the protection of the privacy of the individual in his home [citations]; (2) the protection of innocent persons who may also be present on the premises where an arrest is made [citation]; (3) the prevention of situations which are conducive to violent confrontations between the occupant and individuals who enter his home without proper notice [citations]; and (4) the protection of police who might be injured by a startled and fearful householder.” (*People v. King* (1971) 5 Cal.3rd 458, 464, fn. 3; *People v. Murphy* (2005) 37 Cal.4th 490, 496.)

When compliance does not serve to satisfy the purposes behind the knock and notice requirements, failing to comply with those requirements *may not* be a violation of the Constitution. (*Martin v. City of Oceanside* (9th Cir. 2004) 360 F.3rd 1078, 1083-1084; noting that: “The prophylactic purpose of the rule is not served where the occupants of the home know that it is the police knocking at the door and simply leave the area and choose not to answer.”)

Problem: Does this not also give the occupants an opportunity to destroy evidence, arm themselves, and/or escape? *Yes!* But, the Legislature and the courts, in balancing the interests, have determined that warning the occupants that it is law enforcement that is making entry, and allowing time for the occupants to open the door peaceably, is the safer alternative in most cases. (*Duke v. Superior Court, supra.*)

Exceptions:

Businesses: The rule does not apply to the entry of a business that is open to the public. (*People v. Lovett* (1978) 82 Cal.App.3rd 527, 532.)

Inner doors of a business are also not protected, at least after the owners have been contacted and

informed as to what the officers are doing. (*People v. Pompa* (1989) 212 Cal.App.3rd 1308, 1312.)

An exception might be someone's locked inner office where a higher expectation of privacy is being exhibited. (*People v. Lee* (1986) 186 Cal.App.3rd 743, 750.)

Inner Doors of a Residence: The majority rule is that the knock and notice rules *do not* apply to *inner doors* of a residence, whether or not the inner door is closed. (*People v. Livermore* (1973) 30 Cal.App.3rd 1073; *People v. Howard* (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1544; *People v. Aguilar* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 632; *People v. Mays* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 969.)

But see *People v. Webb* (1973) 36 Cal.App.3rd 460, expressing the minority opinion that, so long as closed, the rule *does* apply to inner doors.

Refusal: If the occupants do not allow the officers to enter, the police may make a *forcible entry*.

Implied Refusal: "Refusal" need not necessarily be *express*. Waiting a reasonable time with no response will justify a forced entry. After a reasonable time, the officers may assume they are being denied entry and make a forcible entry. (*People v. Gallo* (1981) 127 Cal.App.3rd 828, 838.)

Note that a refused entry is not one of the listed statutory prerequisites under **P.C. § 844**. Therefore, a refusal is not an element necessary to prove compliance with a warrantless entry done for the purpose of affecting an arrest. (*People v. Schmel* (1975) 54 Cal.App.3rd 46, 50-51.)

In *Schmel*, however, the officers and the occupants were staring at each other through a screen door. Waiting for a refusal, per the court, would have been fruitless. The purpose of knock and notice had been met when the occupants knew the officers were there and were demanding entry.

Reasonable Time: How long constitutes a “reasonable time” to wait depends upon the circumstances, (***People v. Trujillo*** (1990) 217 Cal.App.3rd 1219, 1226.), taking into consideration the size of the house, the time of day, any perceived exigencies, etc.

“‘How many seconds’ wait are too few? Our “reasonable wait time” standard [citation], is necessarily vague.’ (Citation.) ‘[W]hat constituted a “reasonable wait time” in a particular case, [citation] (or, for that matter, how many seconds the police in fact waited), or whether there was “reasonable suspicion” of the sort that would invoke the ***Richards*** exceptions, is difficult for the trial court to determine and even more difficult for an appellate court to review.’” (***People v. Byers*** (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 856, 863; referencing ***Richards v. Wisconsin*** (1997) 520 U.S. 385, 387–388 [137 L. Ed.2nd 615, 117 S. Ct. 1416].)

In ***Byers***, it was noted that in a drug possession case, “the proper measure of a reasonable wait time in a drug case is ‘how long it would take to dispose of the suspected drugs.’” (***People v. Byers, supra***, at p. 867; quoting ***Hudson v. Michigan*** (2006) 547 U.S. 586, 590 [165 L.Ed.2nd 56].)

Rule of Thumb: For most homes, most courts are satisfied with approximately 30 seconds.

Five seconds is definitely *not* long enough. (***United States v. Granville*** (9th Cir. 2000) 222 F.3rd 1214.)

Fifteen to twenty seconds was not enough to satisfy the statute, under the circumstances of ***People v. Hoag*** (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1198, but was not so aggravated as to be a constitutional violation. (See below)

But twenty to thirty seconds was found to be enough when entering a small apartment (800 square feet) in the early evening, knowing three persons were home and having some reason to fear

that defendant might be dangerous. (*United States v. Chavez-Miranda* (9th Cir. 2002) 306 F.3rd 973.)

Most recently, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a 15 to 20 second wait, noting that the more important factor is the nature of the exigency, as opposed to the size of the residence. Where the officers are concerned with the destruction of a controlled substance, which can be accomplished in a matter of seconds, officers need not wait as long as they might have to under circumstances where physical property is the subject of the search, or the time it takes a person to come to the door is of more concern. (*United States v. Banks* (2003) 540 U.S. 31 [157 L.Ed.2nd 343].)

The Court also held that the fact that property must be damaged (e.g., the door) to gain entry does not require a corresponding heightened exigency to justify a forced entry. (*Id.*, at p. 37 [157 L.Ed.2nd at p. 355]; citing *United States v Ramirez* (1998) 523 U.S. 65, 70-71 [140 L.Ed.2nd 191].)

Officers were found to have waited long enough when 25 to 35 seconds passed before entering the garage, and another 30 second passed before entering the house, in a narcotics-related case, even though the entry was at 7:00 a.m. (*People v. Martinez* (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 233, 243-245.)

Exigent Circumstances: If the officers hear noises or see movement from inside indicating that suspects are escaping, evidence is being destroyed, or the occupants are arming themselves, or any other circumstance which reasonably indicates to the officers that waiting for an occupant to open the door would be a futile act, will compromise the collection of evidence, or unnecessarily risk the safety of the officers or others, then an immediate forcible entry may be made. (*People v. Maddox* (1956) 46 Cal.2nd 301, 306; hearing retreating footsteps inside.)

See also *People v. Tribble* (1971) 4 Cal.3rd 826, at p. 833: Failing to comply with the “knock and notice” rules is excused, “if the specific facts known to the officer before his entry are sufficient to support his good faith belief that

compliance will increase his peril, frustrate the arrest, or permit the destruction of evidence.”

Exigent circumstances will be found under any one of three types of circumstances: When officers have a “*reasonable suspicion*” that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, it would:

- Be dangerous;
- Futile; *or*
- Inhibit the effective investigation of the crime, such as by allowing the destruction of evidence.

(*United States v. Peterson* (9th Cir. 2003) 353 F.3rd 1045, 1048; citing *Richards v. Wisconsin* (1997) 520 U.S. 385, 394 [137 L.Ed.2nd 613, 624].)

It need only be shown that the officer had an articulable “*reasonable suspicion*” justifying such an exigent circumstance to excuse compliance with knock and notice. (*Richards v. Wisconsin*, *supra*; *Hudson v. Michigan* (2006) 547 U.S. 586, 595-596 [165 L.Ed.2nd 56].)

See also *United States v. Banks* (2003) 540 U.S. 31, 43 [157 L.Ed.2nd 343, 356]: “But in a case like this, where the officers knocked and announced their presence, and forcibly entered after a *reasonable suspicion* of exigency had ripened, their entry satisfied (18 U.S.C. § 3109) as well as the **Fourth Amendment**, even without refusal of admittance.” (Italics added)

California subscribes to the rule in *Banks*. (*People v. Murphy* (2005) 37 Cal.4th 490; Officers made entry without complying with knock and notice after “*loudly*” arresting someone outside, causing the officers to believe that the occupants would likely destroy narcotics known to be inside. See also *People v. Flores* (1982) 128 Cal.App.3rd 512, 521.)

For example:

Hearing retreating footsteps inside. (*People v. Maddox* (1956) 46 Cal.2nd 301.)

An occupant is heard screaming. (*People v. Hall* (1971) 3 Cal.3rd 922.)

An occupant opened the door before the officers were prepared to knock, noted the police uniforms, and slammed the door shut. (*United States v. Peterson* (9th Cir. 2003) 353 F.3rd 1045.)

Occupants see the officers approaching, after which one of the occupants is seen attempting to jump from a window and sounds of a toilet flushing were heard. (*People v. Lopez* (1969) 269 Cal.App.2nd 461, 469.)

Officers hear a door slamming and rapid footsteps inside. (*People v. Watson* (1979) 89 Cal.App.3rd 376, 380.)

An officer smelled ether and observed occupants running. (*People v. Stegman* (1985) 164 Cal.App.3rd 936, 946.)

Officers see one suspect attempting to dispose of narcotics and defendant slammed the door on the officers. (*People v. Newell* (1969) 272 Cal.App.2nd 638, 644.)

When immediate entry is necessary to check the welfare of an occupant. (*People v. Miller* (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 190.)

However, a “*generalized fear*” that occupants of a residence may be armed, that suspects may be fleeing, or that evidence is being destroyed, absent articulable reasons for so believing, is probably insufficient to justify a finding of “*exigent circumstances*.” At the very least, it is *not* sufficient cause to justify the issuance of a “*no knock*” warrant. (*Richards v. Wisconsin*, *supra*; see “*No Knock Search Warrants*,” below.)

Although prior knowledge of firearms being in the house, by itself, does not excuse the failure to comply with knock and notice (*United States v. Marts* (8th Cir. 1993) 986 F.2nd 1216.), “the

presence of a firearm coupled with evidence that a suspect is willing and able to use the weapon will often justify non-compliance with the knock and announce requirement.” (*United States v. Bynum* (9th Cir. 2004) 362 F.3rd 574, 581-582; defendant known to answer the door with a pistol in hand, and acted strangely [in the nude] when he did so.)

Upon seeing an altercation taking place through the kitchen window, and being ignored when announcing their presence at the screen door, the uniformed officers were justified in making an immediate entry where a second announcement was made, quelling the disturbance. *Brigham City v. Stuart* (2006) 547 U.S. 398 [164 L.Ed.2nd 650]; it “serv(ing) no purpose to require them to stand dumbly at the door awaiting a response while those within brawled on, oblivious to their presence.” (at p. 407.)

Doctrine of Substantial Compliance: The courts do not generally require law enforcement officers to perform an idle act. (CC § 3532; “*Maxims of Jurisprudence*”)

“Substantial compliance means ‘actual compliance in respect to the substance essential to every reasonable objective of the statute,’ as distinguished from ‘mere technical imperfections of form. [Citation.] The essential inquiry is whether under the circumstances the polices underlying the knock-notice requirements were served. [Citation.]” (Italics in original; *People v. Urziceanu* (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 747, 791; citing *People v Hoag* (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1198, 1208.)

Therefore, it is not necessary to knock or identify one’s self if the occupant is standing right there staring at the police uniform. (*People v. Uhler* (1989) 208 Cal.App.3rd 766, 769-771.)

“Where a criminal offense has just taken place within a room, the occupants may reasonably be expected to know the purpose of a police visit and an express statement may not be necessary. (*People v. Hall* (1971) 3 Cal.3rd 992, 997; *People v. Superior Court [Quinn]* (1978) 83 Cal.App.3rd 609; *People v. Lawrence* (1972) 25 Cal.App.3rd 213; *People v. Lee* (1971) 20 Cal.App.3rd 982.)

It is not necessary to explain why admittance is sought when the officers' intentions are reasonably apparent. (*People v. Hill* (1974) 12 Cal.3rd 731, 758.)

Knocking and announcing their presence at a door which was partially open, and then entering without demanding entry or stating their purpose, was found to be “*substantial compliance*” when entry is made to check the welfare of occupants who might need assistance. (*People v. Miller* (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 190.)

“Substantial compliance is sometimes found even though officers have failed to state their purpose before entering. . . . However, compliance does require, at the very least, that police officers identify themselves *prior* to entry.” (*People v. Keogh* (1975) 46 Cal. App. 3d 919, 927; identifying themselves *while* entering found to be insufficient.)

Failing to physically knock at the door was excused where announcement was made at the front of the house over a public address system for 30 seconds to a minute, and then repeated at the rear door, where entry was made, where a methamphetamine lab was suspected and there were indications that the occupants were in the process of cooking the meth at that time. (*United States v. Combs* (9th Cir. 2005) 412 F.3rd 1020.)

Upon seeing an altercation taking place through the kitchen window, and being ignored when announcing their presence at the screen door, the uniformed officers were justified in making an immediate entry where a second announcement was made, quelling the disturbance. *Brigham City v. Stuart* (2006) 547 U.S. 398 [164 L.Ed.2nd 650]; it “serv(ing) no purpose to require them to stand dumbly at the door awaiting a response while those within brawled on, oblivious to their presence.” (at p. 407.)

“*No-Knock*” Search Warrants: Obtaining judicial authorization in the search warrant itself; justification for ignoring the knock and notice requirements being in the warrant affidavit.

California authority has yet to expressly recognize “*No-Knock Search Warrants*,” i.e., prior judicial authorization in the warrant allowing for an immediate entry without complying with the knock/notice requirements. (See

Parsley v. Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3rd 934, 939-949; finding them in violation of the **Fourth Amendment**.)

However, the United States Supreme Court has since ruled that no-knock warrants are *not* unconstitutional, and that they may be authorized by a magistrate on a case-by-case basis. (*Richards v. Wisconsin* (1997) 520 U.S. 385 [137 L.Ed.2nd 615]; see also *United States v. Banks* (2003) (2003) 540 U.S. 31, 36 [157 L.Ed.2nd 343, 352].)

However, a *blanket* no-knock authorization, just because a search warrant is for a specific type of case (e.g., narcotics cases), is unconstitutional. (*Richards v. Wisconsin, supra*.)

Because *Parsley* based its decision on California's interpretation of the **Fourth Amendment**, and because passage of **Proposition 8** in 1982, California's "*Truth in Evidence*" initiative, in effect negated California's stricter search and seizure rules, *Richards* and *Banks* should be interpreted as overruling the rule of *Parsley*, even though neither case expressly refers to *Parsley*.

"No-knock" warrants are justified when police officers have a "*reasonable suspicion*" that knocking and announcing their presence before entering would "be dangerous or futile, or . . . inhibit the effective investigation of the crime." (*Richards v. Wisconsin, supra*, at p. 394 [137 L.Ed.2nd at p. 624].)

The fact that property might be damaged or destroyed during the entry does not require a higher degree of exigency in order to justify the no-knock authorization. (*United States v. Ramirez* (1998) 523 U.S. 65 [140 L.Ed.2nd 191; *United States v. Banks, supra*, at p. 37 [157 L.Ed.2nd at p. 355]; *United States v. Bynum* (9th Cir. 2004) 362 F.3rd 574, 580.)

Note: The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal talks in terms of a "*no-knock warrant*" in a case where the officers had the door slammed in their face at the front porch. (*United States v. Peterson* (9th Cir. 2003) 353 F.3rd 1045.)

Peterson, however, is more of an “*exigent circumstance*” situation, which developed at the front door, and did not involve an attempt to get a “*no-knock*” authorization from the magistrate prior to the actual execution of the warrant.

Entry by Ruse: One way to avoid the problems inherent in complying with the knock and notice statutes is to use a *ruse* to gain entry. As long as the officer has probable cause justifying an entry beforehand, the use of a ruse is lawful. (*People v. Reeves* (1964) 61 Cal.2nd 268, 273.)

However, the entry must be supported by “*probable cause*” to be legal. Absent probable cause (and, absent exigent circumstances, a search warrant), it is illegal to use a ruse to make entry, or even to trick the suspect into opening his door, such a trick constituting a violation of the defendant’s right to privacy. (*People v. Hudson* (1964) 225 Cal.App.2nd 554; *People v. Miller* (1967) 248 Cal.App.2nd 731; *United States v. Bosse* (9th Cir. 1990) 898 F.2nd 113.)

It is equally illegal to trick a suspect out of his home, unless such the ruse is supported by probable cause to believe the suspect is engaged in illegal activity. (*People v. Reyes* (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 7.)

Also, officers must remember that either a warrant, or probable cause and exigent circumstances, will likely be required under the rule of *People v. Ramey* (1976) 16 Cal.3rd 263, 276; *Payton v. New York* (1980) 445 U.S. 573 [63 L.Ed.2nd 639]. (See above)

When armed with a search warrant, officers may use a ruse to induce the occupants to open the door. This is not a violation of the knock and notice requirements. (*People v. Rudin* (1978) 77 Cal.App.3rd 139; *People v. McCarter* (1981) 117 Cal.App.3rd 894, 906.)

Also, it is not illegal to use an undercover agent during a criminal investigation who makes entry upon the occupant’s invitation, despite the lack of probable cause. Such a situation does not involve a need to avoid a violent confrontation. (*Hoffa v. United States* (1966) 385 U.S. 293 [17 L.Ed.2nd 374].)

The **Fourth Amendment's** protections do not extend to information that a person voluntarily exposes to a government agent, including an undercover agent. A defendant generally has no privacy interest in that which he voluntarily reveals to a government agent. Therefore, a government agent may make an audio-video recording of a suspect's statements even in the suspect's own home, and those audio-video recordings, made with the consent of the government agent, do not require a warrant. (*United States v. Wahchumwah* (9th Cir. 2013) 710 F.3rd 862, 866-868; an investigation involving the illegal sale of eagle feathers under the **Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act (16 U.S.C § 668(a)** and the **Lacey Act (16 U.S.C. §§ 2271(a)(1) & 3373(d)(1)(B),)**)

Standing: An Absent Tenant: If the subject to be arrested, or the owner of a home which is to be searched, is not home at the time of the execution of the entry, whether or not he or she has “standing” to contest a failure to comply with the **P.C. §§ 844 or 1531** knock and notice requirements is subject to a split of opinion. (See *Hart v. Superior Court* (1971) 21 Cal.App.3rd 496, 500-504.)

In discussing the knock and notice requirements pursuant to **P.C. § 1531** (serving a search warrant), it has been determined by at least one appellate court that the defendant did not need to be home to assert *standing* to challenge a knock and notice violation, in that defendant still had a privacy interest in his residence, and an interest in protecting his fiancée who was home at the time. (*People v. Hoag* (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1198.)

Hart v. Superior Court, *supra*, at pp. 500-504, and federal authority (*United States v Silva* (9th Cir. 2001) 247 F.3rd 1051, 1058-1059.), are all to the contrary.

However, entering the house to arrest a subject without *probable cause* (or “*reasonable grounds*,” see below) to believe the suspect is even home is a **Fourth Amendment** violation in itself. (*Hart v. Superior Court*, *supra*, at p. 502; “**Section 844** by its own terms provides that the entry can only be made if the person to be arrested is actually present or if the arrestor has reasonable grounds to believe he is present.” See also *People v. Jacobs* (1987) 43 Cal.3rd

472, 478-479; and *United States v. Gorman* (2002) 314 F.3rd 1105; interpreting “reasonable grounds” or “a reason to believe” to be the equivalent of “probable cause.” But also see *People v. Downey* (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 652, 657-662, finding that less than probable cause is required.

Sanctions for Violations: When executing an otherwise lawfully issued search warrant on a residence, a knock and notice violation, even if a violation of state and federal statutes and the **Fourth Amendment** (see below), does not necessarily trigger the Exclusionary Rule. (*Hudson v. Michigan* (2006) 547 U.S. 586 [165 L.Ed.2nd 56]; *People v. Byers* (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 856, 862-86.)

“In part, this is because the exclusionary rule and the knock-notice requirement serve different purposes. The exclusionary rule protects against unlawful warrantless searches. (Citation.) The knock-notice requirement, in contrast, seeks to prevent violence (due to an inhabitant being taken by surprise), property destruction (e.g., of a door), and loss of an occupant's privacy and dignity (caused by an outsider’s sudden entry).” (*Id.*, at pp. 863-864.)

Per *Hudson*, the suppression of evidence is only necessary where the interests protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would be served by suppressing the evidence thus obtained. The interests protected by the knock and notice rules include human life, because “an unannounced entry may provoke violence in supposed self-defense by the surprised resident.” Property rights are also protected by providing residents an opportunity to prevent a forcible entry. And, “privacy and dignity” are protected by giving the occupants an opportunity to collect themselves before answering the door. (*Ibid.*)

The Court also ruled in *Hudson* that because civil suits are more readily available than in 1914 with the exclusionary rule was first announced, and because law enforcement officers, being better educated, trained and supervised, can be subjected to departmental discipline, suppressing the product of a knock and notice violation is no longer a necessary remedy. (*Ibid.*)

The fact that a “no-knock” warrant could have been obtained does not require a different finding. Also, the use of a battering ram on the door, rubber bullets to knock out windows, and “flash bang” devices (one of which seriously injured defendant) to distract the occupants, even though possibly unreasonable under the circumstances, but where there is no “causal nexus” between the entry and the recovery of evidence in the home, does not require suppression of the evidence. (*United States v. Ankeny* (9th Cir. 2007) 502 F.3rd 829, 835-838; a one to 1½ second delay between knocking and entering.)

Note, however, that the use of a motorized battering ram may require a search warrant authorizing such use. (See *Langford v. Superior Court* (1987) 43 Cal.3rd 21.)

The rule as dictated by *Hudson* (a search warrant case) is applicable as well as in a warrantless, yet lawful, arrest case, pursuant to P.C. § 844. (*In re Frank S.* (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 145.)

Hudson is not to be interpreted to mean that the Exclusionary Rule is to be scrapped. Intentionally unlawful law enforcement actions will still be subject to the Exclusionary Rule where necessary to discourage future illegal police activities. (*People v. Rodriguez* (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1137; case remanded for a determination whether police fabricated probable cause for a traffic stop, which led to the discovery of an outstanding arrest warrant, the search incident thereto resulting in recovery of controlled substances.)

See *United States v. Weaver* (D.C. Cir. 2015) 808 F.3rd 26, where the D.C. Court of Appeal rejected the applicability of *Hudson v. Michigan*, *supra*, in an arrest warrant service situation, and held that federal agents violated the knock-and-announce rule by failing to announce their purpose before entering defendant’s apartment. By knocking but failing to announce their purpose, the agents gave defendant no opportunity to protect the privacy of his home. The exclusionary rule was the appropriate remedy for knock-and-announce violations in the execution of arrest warrants at a person’s home.

Note: No local (California or Ninth Circuit) case has yet to rule upon this issue; i.e., whether **Hudson v. Michigan** is inapplicable to the arrest warrant situation.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal invented a so-called “*provocation rule*” holding that even when it is held that reasonable force is used by law enforcement, the officers using that force may still be civilly liable if they provoked the need to use force by violating some other constitutional principle, at least when that earlier violation was done intentionally or recklessly. (**Billington v. Smith** (9th Cir. 2001) 292 F.3rd 1177.) “The Ninth Circuit’s provocation rule permits an excessive force claim under the **Fourth Amendment** “where an officer intentionally or recklessly provokes a violent confrontation, if the provocation is an independent **Fourth Amendment** violation.” (**County of Los Angeles v. Mendez** (May 30, 2017) __ U.S. __, __ [137 S.Ct. 1539; 198 L.Ed.2nd 52]; citing **Billington**, at p. 1189, and overruling the Ninth Circuit on this issue where the lower court used this rule in **Mendez v. County of Los Angeles** (9th Cir. 2016) 815 F.3rd 1178; a knock and notice violation.)

However, it has been held that “a person in common ownership or control . . . who is not within the premises cannot give such consent to enter and search the premises as to excuse the police from complying with the (knock and notice) requirements” (**Duke v. Superior Court** (1969) 1 Cal.3rd 314, 322; see also **People v. Byers** (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 856, 862.)

Not Necessarily a Fourth Amendment Violation: And in any case, a knock and notice violation, violating the terms of **P.C. § 844** and/or **P.C. § 1531**, does not necessarily also violate the **Fourth Amendment**. (**Wilson v. Arkansas** (1995) 514 U.S. 927 [131 L.Ed.2nd 976]; **People v. Zabelle** (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1282.)

Note: Where the line is between a constitutional knock and notice violation and a simple statutory knock and notice violation has not yet been specifically determined by either any California or United States Supreme Court decisions, and must await future cases for clarification. However, it has been held that the failure to comply with the statutory knock and notice requirements is one factor to consider

when determining whether the entry into a residence was reasonable. (*People v. Byers* (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 856, 863; citing *United States v. Banks* (2003) 540 U.S. 31, 35 [157 L. Ed.2nd 343, 124 S. Ct. 521].)

It is helpful to look for circumstances relevant to the purposes of the knock and notice requirements, such as the lessening of the likelihood of a violent confrontation. For instance: “Here, the potential for violence and peril to the officers would have been *increased* had the officers announced their presence at the door. The officers could not see defendant's hands and whether he might have a weapon or syringe that could be used against them. Officer Norvall limited the potential for violence by entering to a place where he could put his hands on defendant before waking him.” (*People v. Zabelle*, *supra*, at p. 1287, where the officer’s unannounced entry was made upon seeing the defendant asleep.)

And note *People v. Hoag* (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1198, where it was held that a 15-to-20 second wait was not enough to satisfy the statute, but that it was only a “*technical violation*,” not implicating the Constitution or requiring the suppression of any evidence.

The federal statutory “*knock and announce*” requirements, pursuant to **18 U.S.C. § 3109**, have been held to be judged by the same standards as is an alleged **Fourth Amendment** violation for entering without a proper announcement. (*United States v Bynum* (9th Cir. 2004) 362 F.3rd 574, 579.)

A warrantless entry into defendant’s apartment was justified under the **Fourth Amendment** when officers received the voluntary consent of defendant’s housemate. The consent was not coerced even though the housemate was handcuffed and in custody outside the apartment. The officer credibly testified that the housemate admitted to having drugs and a gun in his bedroom and that no threats or promises were made to obtain consent to search his bedroom to retrieve these items. The trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence on whether the officers waited long enough to comply with the knock-notice requirement when they entered the apartment, but the error was harmless because exclusion of evidence, the only relief requested, was not the proper remedy. (*People v. Byers*

(2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 856, 862-865; noting that “(w)hen the police obtain consent from a co-occupant who is off the premises, they must comply with the knock-and-announce rule.” *Id.*, at pp. 862, 866.)

“*However*, “when a search is conducted pursuant to an absent co-tenant’s consent, the purposes of the knock-notice requirement (Citation.) do not include preventing law enforcement from seeing or seizing evidence pursuant to the consent exception,” finding the failure to comply with knock and notice to be harmless error. (*Id.*, at p. 864.)

Seizing Items not Listed in the Warrant: Those items listed in the warrant may be seized, along with any other items reasonably identified as *contraband* or *evidence of a crime*, observed in plain sight during the search. (*Skelton v. Superior Court* (1969) 1 Cal.3rd 144, 157.)

Plain View Doctrine: “Where an officer has a valid warrant to search for one item but merely a suspicion, not amounting to probable cause, concerning a second item, that second item is not immunized from seizure if found during a lawful search for the first item.” (*People v. Bradford* (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1294; citing *Horton v. California* (1990) 496 U.S. 128, 138-139 [110 L.Ed.2nd 112, 124].), and noting that prior Supreme Court cases required “*probable cause*” to believe that the “second item” constitutes evidence of a crime. (*People v. Bradford, supra*, at p. 1290.)

Seizing the “second item” is based upon an application of the “*plain view doctrine*,” allowing for seizure of items observed in plain sight from a position the discovering officer has a legal right to be. However; “(t)he officers lawfully must be in a position from which they can view a particular area; it must be immediately apparent to them that the items they are observing may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to lawful seizure, and the officers must have a lawful right of access to the object. (Citation)” (*People v. Bradford, supra*, at p. 1295.)

Items observed during the lawful execution of a search warrant which are identifiable as contraband or evidence of another crime are subject to seizure despite not being listed in the warrant itself. (*People v. Gallegos* (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 612.)

“Items in plain view, but not described in the warrant, may be seized when their incriminating character is immediately apparent. [Citation.] The incriminating character of evidence in plain view is not immediately apparent if ‘some further search of the object’ is required.” (*People v. Lenart* (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 119; citing *Minnesota v. Dickerson* (1993) 508 U.S. 366, 375 [124 L.Ed.2nd 334].)

Note: When evidence of a different crime is discovered during a lawful warrant search, the better procedure is to fall back and obtain a second search warrant for the new offense, thus specifically allowing for the search for more evidence related to the newly discovered crime (see *People v. Carrington* (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 160, 164-168.) and eliminating some difficult legal issues later in the inevitable suppression hearings. (See *People v. Albritton* (1982) 138 Cal.App.3rd 79.)

In *People v. Carrington*, *supra.*, officers from agency #2 accompanied officers from agency #1 who were executing a lawful search warrant in their own case. The officers from agency #2 were there for the purpose of making “plain sight” observations of evidence related to their agency’s own investigation. Upon making such observations, this information was used to obtain a second warrant directed specifically at agency #2’s investigation. This procedure was approved by the California Supreme Court.

“Even assuming the officers (from the agency #2) . . . hoped to find evidence of other offenses, their subjective state of mind would not render their conduct unlawful. . . . The existence of an ulterior motivation does not invalidate an officer’s legal justification to conduct a search.” (*Id.*, at p. 168; citing *Whren v. United States* (1996) 517 U.S. 806 [135 L.Ed.2nd 89].)

This case, citing *Whren v. United States* for the proposition that an officer’s “*subjective motivations*” are irrelevant, looking only at whether the officers, from an “*objective*” standpoint, were lawfully acting, in effect overrules *People v.*

Albritton, supra. *Albritton* stood for the theory that it is illegal to use one warrant to look for evidence related to a different crime, even if such evidence is found in plain sight.

Searching a computer for drug related documents, and discovering child pornography, does not authorize the officer to begin searching for more child pornography without first obtaining a second search warrant for the pornography. (*United States v. Carey* (10th Cir. 1999) 172 F.3rd 1268, 1273; *United States v. Giberson* (9th Cir. 2008) 527 F.3rd 882, 890.)

As evidence of “*dominion and control*” over a residence, the seizure of a computer not specifically listed in the warrant should be upheld. (*People v. Varghese* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1100-1103; *People v. Balint* (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 200.)

But see *United States v. Payton* (9th Cir. 2009) 573 F.3rd 859, 861-864, where it was held that failure to include the magistrate’s authorization to search defendant’s computer, even though in the statement of probable cause the affiant indicated a desire to search any possible computers found in defendant’s house, was a fatal omission. Searching defendant’s computer, therefore, went beyond the scope of the warrant’s authorization.

The fact that the issuing magistrate testified to an intent to allow for the search of defendant’s computers, and that the warrant included authorization to search for certain listed records which might be found in a computer, was held to be irrelevant. (*Id.* at pp. 862-863.)

Problem of Overbreadth: “The **Fourth Amendment** requires that a warrant particularly describe both the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized. . . . The description must be specific enough to enable the person conducting the search reasonably to identify the things authorized to be seized. The purpose of the breadth requirement is to limit the scope of the warrant by the probable cause on which the warrant is based. . . .” (*United States*

v. Fries (9th Cir. 2015) 781 F.3rd 1137, 1151; quoting *United States v. Smith* (9th Cir. 2005) 424 F.3rd 992, 1004.)

The wholesale seizure of more records (a “few dozen boxes”) than was authorized by the search warrant, so long as not used, should not result in suppression of the records that were authorized by the warrant. (*United States v. Tamura* (9th Cir. 1982) 694 F.2nd 591.)

So how does the Ninth Circuit suggest that such a situation be handled? At pp. 595-596, and fn. 3: “In the comparatively rare instances where documents are so intermingled that they cannot feasibly be sorted on site, we suggest that the Government and law enforcement officials generally can avoid violating **fourth amendment** rights by sealing and holding the documents pending approval by a magistrate of a further search, in accordance with the procedures set forth in the **American Law Institute's Model Code of Pre-Arrest Procedure (Section SS 220.5)**. If the need for transporting the documents is known to the officers prior to the search, they may apply for specific authorization for large-scale removal of material, which should be granted by the magistrate issuing the warrant only where on-site sorting is infeasible and no other practical alternative exists. (Citation) The essential safeguard required is that wholesale removal must be monitored by the judgment of a neutral, detached magistrate (fn. omitted).”

The Ninth Circuit expanded upon the *Tamura* decision in *United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc.* (9th Cir. 2010) 621 F.3rd 1162, at pp. 1178-1180, where, in a non-binding concurring opinion, it was suggested that magistrates require as a condition of issuing a search warrant in such cases (i.e., where large amounts of documents or data are subject to being collected that may go beyond the probable cause authority of the warrant) that a “search protocol” be provided for in the affidavit that includes the following requirements:

1. Magistrate judges should insist that the government waive reliance upon the plain view doctrine in digital evidence cases.
2. Segregation and redaction of electronic data must be done either by specialized personnel or an independent third party. If the segregation is to be done by government computer personnel, the government must agree in the warrant application that the computer personnel will not disclose to the investigators any information other than that which is the target of the warrant.
3. Warrants and subpoenas must disclose the actual risks of destruction of information as well as prior efforts to seize that information in other judicial fora.
4. The government's search protocol must be designed to uncover only the information for which it has probable cause, and only that information may be examined by the case agents.
5. The government must destroy or, if the recipient may lawfully possess it, return non-responsive data, keeping the issuing magistrate informed about when it has done so and what it has kept.

The *Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc.* protocol is advisory only, and not always necessary for upholding a search warrant for computerized data. (*United States v. Schesso* (9th Cir. 2013) 730 F.3rd 1040, 1047-1050; where the warrant was properly executed, and nothing for which there was not probable cause was seized.)

It was pointed out that such a protocol is not a constitutional requirement, although "heeding this guidance will significantly increase the likelihood that the searches and seizures of electronic storage that they authorize will be deemed reasonable and lawful." (*Id.*, at p. 1049.)

Also, the Ninth Circuit has disallowed the use of an affidavit and other attachments to expand upon the list of items to be searched for and seized as shown on the warrant

itself, even though the attachments were properly incorporated into the warrant. (*United States v. Sedaghaty* (9th Cir. Aug. 23, 2013) 728 F.3rd 885, 910-915.)

It was noted by the Court in discussing the “curative effect” that an affidavit may have on a defective warrant, that it is error to use a “broad ranging” probable cause affidavit to serve to expand the express limitations imposed by a magistrate in issuing the warrant itself. (*Id.*, at pp 913-914.)

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recognizes three factors in analyzing the breadth of a warrant:

- (1) whether probable cause existed to seize all items of a category described in the warrant;
- (2) whether the warrant set forth objective standards by which executing officers could differentiate items subject to seizure from those which were not; *and*
- (3) whether the government could have described the items more particularly in light of the information available.

(*United States v. Flores* (9th Cir. 2015) 802 F.3rd1028, 1042-1046.); citing *United States v. Lei Shi* (9th Cir. 525 F.3rd 709, 731-732, where the seizure of 11,000 pages, covering five to six years, of defendant’s Facebook account was excused when only two sets of Facebook information were used at trial, both from the same day as defendant’s crimes.

It was also noted in *United States v. Flores* that the warrant allowed the government to search only the Facebook account associated with defendant’s name and email address, and authorized the government to seize only evidence of violations of **18 U.S.C. § 371** (Conspiracy) and **21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 960** (Importation of a Controlled Substance). The warrant also established “Procedures For Electronically Stored Information,” providing executing officers with sufficient “objective standards” for segregating responsive material from the rest of Flores’s account, helping to minimize the overbreadth issue. (*Id.*, at pp. 1044-1047.)

The Ninth Circuit also employs the “*doctrine of severance*,” which allows the reviewing court to strike from a warrant those portions that are invalid and preserve those portions that satisfy the Fourth Amendment. (*United States v. Flores, supra*, at pp. 1042-1046.)

Seizure of a Restrained Person’s Firearms During the Execution of a Search Warrant, per **P.C. § 1542.5**:

(a) The law enforcement officer executing the warrant shall take custody of any firearm or ammunition that is in the restrained person’s custody or control or possession or that is owned by the restrained person, which is discovered pursuant to a consensual or other lawful search.

(b)

(1) If the location to be searched during the execution of the warrant is jointly occupied by the restrained person and one or more other persons and a law enforcement officer executing the warrant finds a firearm or ammunition in the restrained person’s custody or control or possession, but that is owned by a person other than the restrained person, the firearm or ammunition shall not be seized if both of the following conditions are satisfied:

(A) The firearm or ammunition is removed from the restrained person’s custody or control or possession and stored in a manner that the restrained person does not have access to or control of the firearm or ammunition.

(B) There is no evidence of unlawful possession of the firearm or ammunition by the owner of the firearm or ammunition.

(2) If the location to be searched during the execution of the warrant is jointly occupied by the restrained person and one or more other persons and a locked gun safe is located that is owned by a person other than the restrained person, the contents of the gun safe shall not be searched except in the owner’s presence, and with his or her consent or with a valid search warrant for the gun safe.

Note: See P.C. §§ 18100 et seq., re: *Gun Violence Restraining Orders*.

Answering the Telephone: In some cases (e.g., bookmaking, narcotics, etc.), answering the suspect’s telephone during service of the warrant may lead to valuable corroborative evidence. (*People v. Warner* (1969) 270 Cal.App.2nd 900, 907; *People v. Sandoval* (1966) 65 Cal.2nd 303, 308; *People v. Nealy* (1991) 228 Cal.App.3rd 447, 452.)

A standard paragraph in the affidavit justifying the expectation of receiving incriminating evidence from callers, and inclusion in the warrant authorization to answer the phone, is advisable, although failure to do so should not preclude answering the phone. (See *People v. Vanvalkenburgh* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3rd 163, 167.)

Note: Justification for answering the telephone during execution of a warrant may also be premised upon the need to corroborate the occupant’s possessory interest over the place being searched, as a form of oral “*dominion and control*” evidence.

The contents of a telephone call to a narcotics dealer’s home asking to buy narcotics, answered by the police executing a search warrant, are admissible as a judicially created exception to the Hearsay Rule. (*People v. Morgan et al.* (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 935.)

Other courts have held that the contents of a telephone call are admissible as non-hearsay circumstantial evidence of the defendants’ dope dealing. (*People v. Nealy, supra*; and *People v. Ventura* (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1515.)

The *Morgan* Court further determined that the telephone call was “*non-testimonial*,” as described in *Crawford v. Washington* (2004) 541 U.S. 36 [158 L.Ed.2nd 177], and thus admissible over a **Sixth Amendment**, “*right to confrontation*” objection. (*People v. Morgan et al, supra*, at pp. 946-947.)

Answering incoming calls did not exceed the scope of the relevant search warrant. (*United States v. Ordonez* (9th Cir. 1984) 737 F.2nd 793, 810 (amended opinion), and *United States v. Gallo* (9th Cir. 1981) 659 F.2nd 110.)

Searching pursuant to the suspect's *consent*, unless specifically included in the consent, does *not* give the searching officers the right to answer the telephone. (*People v. Harwood* (1977) 74 Cal.App.3rd 460, 465.)

But, with probable cause to believe that a robbery suspect might be calling, and the exigent circumstance of not being able to obtain a search warrant without losing the opportunity to receive the expected call from the suspect, thus compromising the officers' ability to quickly locate and apprehend him, answering the telephone without permission is lawful. (*People v. Ledesma* (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 704.)

Detentions in a Residence During the Execution of a Search Warrant:

See "*Detentions in a Residence During the Execution of a Search Warrant*," above, under "*Detentions*" (Chapter 3).

Time Limitations: The warrant must be served and returned within *ten* (10) *calendar days* of issuance or it is deemed to be "void." A warrant which is executed within the ten-day period shall be deemed to have been timely executed and no further showing of timeliness need be made. (P.C. § 1534(a))

However, at least where the execution of the warrant is begun within the statutory time period, and absent any showing of bad faith, failure to complete the execution of the warrant within the 10-day period is not a constitutional violation and will not result in the suppression of any evidence. (*People v. Superior Court [Nasmeh]* (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 85, 98-100; citing *United States v. Gerber* (11th Cir.1993) 994 F.2d 1556, 1560.)

However, the Court in *Nasmeh* specifically declined to discuss the implications of violating P.C. § 1534 in that defendant had failed to raise the issue at the trial court level. (fn. 5.)

The day the warrant is signed by the magistrate is "*day zero*," with "*day one*" being the next day. Saturday, Sunday and holidays are *included* in the calculation. (*People v. Clayton* (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 440, 444-445.)

After service of the warrant, the officer "*must forthwith*" return the executed warrant to the magistrate with the "*receipt and inventory*" (referred to as the "*return*" by some jurisdictions). (P.C. § 1537)

Even if **P.C. § 1537** is violated by a return after the 10-day period, this defect does not require suppression of the evidence unless the defendant can show that he was prejudiced by the delay. (*People v. Couch* (1979) 97 Cal.App.3rd 377; *People v. Kirk* (1979) 99 Cal.App.3rd 89, 94; *People v. Head* (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 954; delay of one year!)

A violation of **Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 41's** provisions for filing of the return of inventory, by failing to file the return for two years, did not require the suppression of evidence in that the delayed filing was inadvertence rather than a delibetate or intentional disregard of the rules. (*United States v. Beckmann* (8th Cir. 2015) 786 F.3rd 672.)

The “*return package*” consists of the following:

- The original warrant.
- The original affidavit.
- An inventory (or “*return*” form) of all the items seized, upon which the officer who executed the warrant swears that the inventory is a true list of everything seized during the execution of the warrant, including items seized but which were not listed in the warrant.

The physical evidence seized is to be retained (i.e., “*impounded*”) by the officer pending use of the evidence in court or other court ordered disposition. (**P.C. § 1536**)

One Continuous Search: If officers complete the execution of a warrant, and leave the scene, a second search warrant must be obtained in order to return and renew the search. However, so long as at least one officer remains on the scene, reasonable breaks to accomplish other police activity (e.g., transporting the suspect to jail), do not necessarily mean that a renewed search requires a new warrant. (*People v. James* (1990) 219 Cal.App.3rd 414.)

However, the Courts tend to be a bit flexible on this rule. In *United States v. Kaplan* (9th Cir. 1990) 895 F.2nd 618, after defendant’s arrest, his office was searched by FBI agents with a search warrant authorizing the seizure of certain files. Leaving the

scene with the files thus obtained, the agents later discovered that they had not received all the files that were authorized by the warrant. Two hours and ten minutes after the initial execution of the warrant, agents returned and seized the remaining files. The Court noted that the issue was whether the second search was really no more than a continuation of the first. The Court decided that it was, citing the fact that the files seized on the second trip were listed in the warrant.

Leaving a Copy of the Warrant, Affidavit and/or Receipt and Inventory: There is no state statutory nor constitutional rule requiring that searching officers show the suspects the warrant, the affidavit to the warrant, or a copy of either, or that a copy of either be left at the scene after the search. (*People v. Calabrese* (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 79.)

Only a copy of the “*receipt and inventory*” (or “*return*”) must be left with the occupants or at the scene. (**P.C. § 1535**)

P.C. § 1535: “When the officer takes property under the warrant, he must give a receipt for the property taken (specifying it in detail) to the person from whom it was taken by him, or in whose possession it was found; or, in the absence of any person, he must leave it in the place where he found the property.”

There’s no requirement that officers advise defendants, at the time items are taken, what it is that is being taken, so long as they ultimately comply with the return requirements of **P.C. § 1535** by leaving a receipt for the items taken from the scene. (*People v. Reed* (1981) 121 Cal.App.3rd Supp. 26, 35.)

Note: Fed. Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 41(d), applying only to the execution of a federal search warrant, requires that the occupant be given a copy of the warrant and a receipt for property taken in the search, or that these documents be left at the scene.

The Ninth Circuit’s Opinion: The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal is of the belief that failure to provide to an occupant a copy of a warrant, properly describing the place to be searched and the property to be seized, may be a **Fourth Amendment** violation (See *Ramirez v. Butte Silver Bow County* (9th Cir. 2002) 298 F.3rd 1022.), thus creating some potential federal civil liability for state officers who choose to follow the state rule.

However, the Ninth Circuit has also noted that only a “*fundamental*” violation of **Rule 41(d)** will mandate suppression of evidence. Where the agent was not aware of this rule, and otherwise insured that defendant was aware of why they were in his home and what they were looking for, suppression of evidence was not a proper remedy. (*United States v. Williamson* (9th Cir. 2006) 439 F.3rd 1125; discussing the difference between “*intentionally*,” but not “*deliberately*,” failing to provide defendant with a copy of the warrant prior to searching his house.)

See also *United States v. Welch* (8th Cir. 2016) 811 F.3rd 275; Although notice to defendant of a Network Investigative Technique warrant did not comport with **Fed. R. Crim. P. 41**, there was no **Fourth Amendment** violation because it appeared that the delay was a good-faith application of the warrant and not reckless disregard of proper procedure.

Note: Therefore, despite not being required by state law, it is probably *good practice* for a state law enforcement officer to show the occupants a copy of the search warrant (but not the affidavit), or, if no one is home, leave a copy of the search warrant at the scene. There is no harm in doing this, and brings the state execution of a search warrant in compliance with the federal rules.

And see United States v. Celestine (9th Cir. 2003) 324 F.3rd 1095, 1105-1108, describing “the policies that underlie the warrant requirement: providing the property owner assurance of the lawful authority of the executing officer, his need to search, and the limits of his power to search.”

However, where the occupant tells the searching officers that he does not understand English, and the officers take immediate steps to find a Spanish-speaking interpreter, the **Fourth Amendment** is *not* violated when the officers commence the search before the occupant can be read, in his own language, the contents of the warrant. (*United States v. Martinez-Garcia* (9th Cir. 2005) 397 F.3rd 1205.)

See *United States v. Vesikuru* (9th Cir. 2002) 314 F.3rd 1116, 1123-1124.), requiring that the warrant describe the

place to be searched and property to be seized with “*particularity*,” thus serving two important purposes. It:

- Limits the discretion of the officers executing the warrant; *and*
- By showing it to the property owner or resident, it gives notice of the proper scope of the search.

In order to accomplish these purposes, the warrant must therefore be brought to the scene of the search and shown to the occupants. (*Ibid.*)

The United States Supreme Court has recently ruled that the Ninth Circuit’s belief that a copy of the search warrant must be given to the occupants of the place being searched *at the initiation* of the search (see *United States v. Williamson* (9th Cir. 2006) 439 F.3rd 1125, above), is simply wrong. (*United States v. Grubbs* (2006) 547 U.S. 90, 98-99 [164 L.Ed.2nd 195].)

But see the concurring opinion in *Grubbs* (p. 101), noting that it has yet to be decided whether there is a constitutional requirement to show the property owner a copy of the warrant if he demands to see it.

In *United States v. Hector* (9th Cir. 2007) 474 F.3rd 1150, 1154, the Ninth Circuit noted that it is not clear whether *Grubbs* overrules their cases to the contrary, but found that under authority of *Hudson v. Michigan* (2006) 547 U.S. 586 [165 L.Ed.2nd 56] (ruling that suppression of evidence is not an appropriate remedy for a constitutional violation that was not the “unattenuated but-for cause” of obtaining the disputed evidence), suppressing evidence is not required where law enforcement’s mistake was nothing more than a failure to present a person with a copy of the search warrant.

But then in *United States v. SDI Future Health, Inc.* (9th Cir. 2009) 568 F.3rd 684, 701, the Ninth Circuit finally conceded that *Grubbs* overrules any prior cases that might have previously held that the occupant must be given a copy of the warrant affidavit.

Destruction of Property:

Officers are expected to use some discretion in the execution of a warrant to avoid the taking of unnecessarily excessive (i.e., “cumulative”) property and engaging in unnecessarily destructive behavior. (*San Jose Charter of the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club v. City of San Jose* (9th Cir. 2005) 402 F.3rd 962; damaging property in the taking of “truckloads” of “indicia of affiliation” property, plus the shooting of several dogs without having considered alternative methods of controlling the dogs.)

However, the fact that property might be damaged or destroyed during the entry does not require a higher degree of exigency in order to justify the no-knock authorization when applying for a search warrant. (*United States v. Ramirez* (1998) 523 U.S. 65 [140 L.Ed.2nd 191; *United States v. Banks*, *supra*, at p. 37 [157 L.Ed.2nd at p. 355]; *United States v. Bynum* (9th Cir. 2004) 362 F.3rd 574, 580.)

It was not illegal to use a battering ram to gain access to defendant’s residence when the fiancée, who was locked out, expressly consented to the use of such a method to gain entry. (*United States v. Moore* (9th Cir. 2014) 770 F.3rd 809, 814.)

The California Supreme Court has determined in a case that has never been overruled that at least where a “motorized battering ram” is used to force entry into a building, prior judicial authorization in the search or arrest warrant is necessary. Failure to obtain such authorization is both a violation of the **California Constitution** and the **Fourth Amendment**. (*Langford v. Superior Court* (1987) 43 Cal.3rd 21.)

“We conclude therefore that the motorized battering ram may be used in executing searches or arrests only after the LAPD satisfies three preliminary requirements: i.e., it (1) obtains a warrant upon probable cause, (2) receives prior authorization to use the ram from a magistrate, and (3) at the time of entry determines there are exigent circumstances amounting to an immediate threat of injury to officers executing the warrant or reasonable grounds to suspect that evidence is being destroyed.” (*Id.*, pg. 32.)

“The magistrate should decide only whether the motorized battering ram could be used with relative safety against a

particular building, if the need arises during execution of a search or arrest warrant.” (*Id.*, pg. 31.)

The same rule would apply to the use of a motorized battering ram in the execution of an arrest warrant. (*Id.*, pg. 33.)

But such prior judicial authorization is not legally required where the issue is the use of some lesser, less dangerous, force, such as the use of “flashbangs.” (*Id.*, pg. 28.)

The use of a battering ram on the door, rubber bullets to knock out windows, and “flash bang” devices (one of which seriously injured defendant) to distract the occupants, even though possibly unreasonable under the circumstances, but where there is no “causal nexus” between the entry and the recovery of evidence in the home, does not require suppression of the evidence. (*United States v. Ankeny* (9th Cir. 2007) 502 F.3rd 829, 835-838; a one to 1½ second delay between knocking and entering.)

Sealing the Warrant Affidavit; i.e., the “Hobbs Warrant:”

The Problem:

“(T)he contents of a search warrant, including any supporting affidavits setting forth the facts establishing probable cause for the search, become a public record once the warrant is executed.” (*People v. Hobbs* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 948, 962; citing P.C. § 1534(a), and *People v. Seibel* (1990) 219 Cal.App.3rd 1279, 1291.)

The Solution:

To avoid unnecessarily revealing confidential informant information, all or part of the warrant affidavit may be ordered sealed by the court if necessary to protect the identity of the informant. (*People v. Hobbs*, *supra*; see also *People v. Sanchez* (1972) 24 Cal.App.3rd 664, 678; (*People v. Galland* (2008) 45 Cal.4th 354, 363-365.)

No Right to Public Access: There are two categories of documents that are *not* covered by the common law right to public access to records of judicial proceedings and records; (1) grand jury transcripts; and (2) warrant materials in the midst of a pre-

indictment investigation. (*Times Mirror Co. v. United States* (9th Cir. 1989) 873 F.2nd 1210, 1219.)

The same is not true for *post-investigation* warrant materials. (*United States v. The Business of the Custer Battlefield Museum* (9th Cir. 2011) 658 F.3rd 1188; see “*Post-Investigation Disposition of Warrant Application and Supporting Affidavits*,” below.

How Accomplished: This is done by obtaining the signature of a judge on a separate affidavit (describing the need for sealing) and order, requesting the sealing of a search warrant affidavit.

The warrant itself must contain a corresponding order by the court sealing the warrant affidavit, or a portion thereof:
E.g.:

“GOOD CAUSE appearing therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the attached affidavit (and attachments thereto) be sealed pending further order of the court. IT IS SO ORDERED.” (Dated and signed by the magistrate)

When Warrants May be Sealed: Search warrant affidavits are commonly sealed when necessary to protect the identity of a confidential informant either because his or her safety could be jeopardized, and/or because he or she is being used in other investigations that might be compromised if it is known who he or she is. (*United States v. Napier* (9th Cir. 2006) 436 F.3rd 1133.)

However, despite the lack of any case authority, there is no reason why sealing an affidavit must necessarily be restricted to protecting confidential informants. While this procedure should not be used unless actually necessary, there may be other legitimate reasons for requiring an affidavit to be sealed. (e.g.; to avoid news media publicity compromising an investigation-in-progress.)

There is as of yet no case authority on the issue as to whether this, or any other purpose other than to protect informant confidentiality, justifies the sealing of a warrant affidavit.

The justification behind the *Hobbs* decision had a lot to do with the importance of encouraging the use of, and

protecting the confidentiality of the identities of, informants. (*People v. Hobbs*, *supra*, at p. 958, citing *McCray v. Illinois* (1967) 386 U.S. 300, 308-309 [18 L.Ed.2nd 62, 69].)

“We therefore conclude that, taken together, the informant’s privilege (E.C. § 1041), the long-standing rule extending coverage of that privilege to *information* furnished by the informant which, if disclosed, might reveal his or her identity, and the codified rule that disclosure of an informant’s identity is not required to establish the legality of a search pursuant to a warrant is valid on its face (E.C. § 1042(b)) compel a conclusion that all or any part of a search warrant affidavit may be sealed if necessary to implement the privilege and protect the identity of a confidential informant.” (*People v. Hobbs*, *supra*, at p. 971.)

While a criminal defendant’s due process rights (to be treated fairly) at trial are substantial, they “are less elaborate and demanding” in a motion to suppress. The purpose of a trial is to find the truth. The purpose of a suppression motion is “to avoid the truth.” “The very purpose of a motion to suppress is to escape the inculpatory thrust of evidence in hand, . . .” (*United States v. Napier*, *supra*, at p. 1137; quoting *McCray v. Illinois*, *supra*, at p. 307.)

The Court in *People v. Camel* (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 989, at p. 1009, approved of the sealing of two attachments to a wiretap warrant.

Criticism of Procedure: The practice of sealing warrant affidavits is not without its critics, in that a defendant’s **Sixth Amendment** right to confront his accusers is arguably compromised.

The *Hobbs* sealing was upheld in *People v. Theilen* (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 326, but criticized by the author of the opinion who felt that federal authority (*Waller v. Georgia* (1984) 467 U.S. 39 [81 L.Ed.2nd 31].) required the prosecution to demonstrate an “*overriding interest*” likely to be prejudiced before allowing the sealing of an affidavit.

Court Procedures: When testing the validity of a sealed warrant affidavit, the following court procedures should be followed (See *People v. Martinez* (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 233.):

- The defense must file a properly noticed motion seeking to *quash* and/or *traverse* the search warrant.
- The trial court should conduct an in camera hearing pursuant to E.C. § 915(b) and *People v. Luttenberger* (1990) 50 Cal.3rd 1, 20-21.

The prosecution and police officer may be present.

Defendant and his/her counsel will be excluded, although defense counsel should be allowed to submit questions for the magistrate to ask any witnesses present at the in camera hearing.

Failure to conduct an in camera hearing, reviewing the sealed portions of the affidavit to determine whether there are any litigable issues, is an abuse of discretion. (See *People v. Galland* (2008) 45 Cal.4th 354, 372, citing *People v. Galland* (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 489, at pp. 492-494.)

- The trial court should determine whether sufficient grounds exist for maintaining the confidentiality of the informant's identity.
- The trial court then determines whether the entirety of the affidavit or any portion thereof is properly sealed; i.e., whether the extent of the sealing is necessary to avoid revealing the informant's identity.
- In a *traversal* motion:

The trial court must scrutinize the affidavit and other materials the magistrate determines are necessary for a fair determination of the issue, such as police reports and information regarding the informant.

The trial court should consider examining the affiant, the informant, or any other witness whose testimony it deems necessary.

If the affidavit is found to have been properly sealed, the court must then determine, based upon the general allegations made by defendant in his/her motion, and in considering the public and sealed portions of the affidavit, whether there are any intentional or reckless misstatements or omissions in the affidavit, as with any such motion. (See *Franks v. Delaware* (1978) 438 US 154, 155-156 [57 L.Ed.2nd 667, 672].)

If it is determined that defendant's allegations are *not* supported by the information before the court, defendant's motion should be denied.

If it is determined that there *is* a "reasonable probability" that defendant would prevail on the motion to traverse, the District Attorney must be afforded the option of:

Consenting to disclosure of the sealed materials and proceeding with the motion to traverse after full disclosure to the defense;
or

Suffering the granting of defendant's motion to traverse.

Examples:

The affiant failed to disclose that the plaintiff's son was in jail at the time of the issuance of the warrant, and for over six months prior, and therefore not only was not present in the home, but moreover could not have been involved in a described shooting or the storage of weapons used in it. Plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue as to whether a detective's omission of this material fact was intentional or reckless, as opposed to merely negligent. Had the omitted facts of

the son's two-year sentence and custody status been included, it was extremely doubtful that an issuing judge would simply have issued the warrant or authorized nighttime service without more information. (*Bravo v. City of Santa Maria* (9th Cir. 2011) 665 F.3rd 1076, 1083-1088.)

- In a motion to *quash*:

If the affidavit is found to have been properly sealed, the trial court should:

Determine whether the affidavit (public and sealed portions) establishes *probable cause* (i.e., whether there was a “*fair probability*”) that contraband or evidence would be found in the place searched pursuant to the warrant.

If yes, defendant's motion should be denied.

If the court determines, considering the public and sealed portions, that there is a “*reasonable probability*” the defendant would prevail, then again, the District Attorney must be given the option of:

Consenting to disclosure of the sealed materials and proceeding with the motion to quash after full disclosure to the defense; or

Suffering a granting of defendant's motion to quash. (*People v. Hobbs, supra*, at pp. 971-975.)

Retention of the Documents: A sealed affidavit should generally be retained by the court, but may be retained by a law enforcement agency upon a five-part showing:

- (1) The disclosure would impair further investigation of criminal conduct, or endanger the safety of a confidential informant or the informant's family;
- (2) Security procedures at the court clerk's office are inadequate to protect the affidavit against disclosure;
- (3) The security procedures at the law enforcement agency are sufficient to protect the affidavit against disclosure;
- (4) The law enforcement agency has procedures to ensure the affidavit is retained for 10 years (permanently in capital cases) after the final disposition of the case, pending further order of the court (see **Gov't. Code § 68152(j)(18)**); *and*
- (5) The magistrate has made a sufficient record of the documents reviewed, including the sealed materials, to permit identification of the original sealed affidavit or to permit reconstruction of the affidavit.

(People v. Galland (2008) 45 Cal.4th 354, 368; also finding that the loss of the affidavit did not invalidate the warrant when "other evidence may be presented to establish the fact that an affidavit was presented, as well as its contents.")

Wiretap Case: The trial court denied discovery of the unredacted supporting wiretap affidavits that were sealed pursuant to *People v. Hobbs* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 948, in a wiretap case, and then refused to suppress the wiretap evidence. The Appellate Court found that the privileges and procedures of **E.C. §§ 1040-1042** (Official Information Privilege) apply to wiretap affidavits. Defendants failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion by ruling that defendants' rights were adequately protected with respect to their requests for disclosure of privileged documentation, and to their challenges to the sufficiency of the wiretap authorization orders in this case. (*People v. Acevedo* (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1040, 1047-1050.)

Post-Investigation Disposition of Warrant Application and Supporting Affidavits:

The public has a qualified common law right of access to warrant materials after an investigation has been terminated. The concerns

about suspects destroying evidence, coordinating their stories before testifying, or fleeing the jurisdiction are no longer present once an investigation has been terminated. Absent a compelling reason or factual basis for limiting and restricting the use of such documents, a court may not do so. (*United States v. The Business of the Custer Battlefield Museum* (9th Cir. 2011) 658 F.3rd 1188.)

Return of Property:

Property seized by search warrant may only be released by *court order*:

P.C. § 1536: All property taken by warrant is to be retained by the officer “*subject to the order of the court.*”

P.C. § 1540: The magistrate has the authority to release property seized by warrant.

Stolen or embezzled property in cases where a complaint has been filed should be released by a magistrate after notice to anyone claiming an interest in the property. (**P.C. §§ 1408, 1410, 1413(c)**)

Otherwise, property may be returned to the lawful owner by the seizing law enforcement officer, but only after notice is given to the person from whom the property was seized. (**P.C. § 1413(b)**)

If, after termination of any related prosecution, or if no case has been filed, and the owner fails to claim the property and no one else has claimed it, it “*may*” be delivered to the county for disposal pursuant to the procedures set out in **P.C. § 1411(a)**.

The section was amended, effective 1/1/2014, to provide in new **subd. (b)** that the section does *not* govern the disposition of property held by a pawnbroker and placed on hold by a peace officer pursuant to **B&P § 21647** unless the licensed pawnbroker or secondhand dealer refuses to consent to a **B&P § 21647** hold on the property, or a search warrant for the business of the licensed pawnbroker or secondhand dealer has resulted in the seizure of the property.

Note: Special provisions for the disposition of *firearms* (**P.C. § 12028**) and *money* (**P.C. §§ 1420 et seq.**)

It is *not* legally necessary for officers executing a search warrant to give a person from whom property has been seized any notice of the applicable

statutes or the means by which that person may seek the return of his or her property. (*City of West Covina vs. Perkins* (1999) 525 U.S. 234 [142 L.Ed.2nd 636]; reversing a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal opinion to the contrary.)

Federally, **Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g)** provides a mechanism by which any person may seek to recover property seized by federal agents. The rule states that if a motion to return property is granted, “the court must return the property to the movant.”

Where the subject property has been lost or destroyed, **Rule 41(g)** is silent as to what alternative relief, if any, the movant may seek. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal has held that even when it results in a wrong without a remedy, the federal courts are without jurisdiction to award money damages against the government. Equitable considerations standing alone cannot waive the government’s immunity from suit. (*Ordonez v. United States* (9th Cir. 2012) 680 F.3rd 1135.)

The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a case out of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal reviewing the Appellate Court’s decision holding that **Rule 41(g)** does not allow for the return of firearms to a convicted felon even though the felon intended to transfer ownership of the firearm to an unrelated person to whom the felon had already sold all his property interest. (See *Henderson v. United States* (11th Cir. 2014) 555 Fed. Appx. 851.)

Burden of Proof when the Return of Property is Contested:

“‘When a motion for return of property is made before an indictment is filed (but a criminal investigation is pending), the movant bears the burden of proving both that the seizure was illegal and that he or she is entitled to lawful possession of the property.’ *United States v. Martinson*, 809 F.2d 1364, 1369 (9th Cir.1987) (citations omitted). ‘However, when the property in question is no longer needed for evidentiary purposes, either because trial is complete, the defendant has pleaded guilty, or . . . the government has abandoned its investigation, the burden of proof changes. The person from whom the property is seized is presumed to have a right to its return, and the government has the burden of demonstrating that it has a legitimate reason to retain the property.’ *Id.* (footnotes and citations omitted). The ‘government must justify its continued possession of the property by

demonstrating that it is contraband or subject to forfeiture.’ *Id.*” (*United States v. Harrell* (9th Cir. 2008) 530 F.3rd 1051, 1057.)

It is the government’s (i.e., the prosecution’s) burden to prove that defendant’s non-contraband evidence should not be returned to him upon filing of a motion under **Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 41(g)**. Failure to submit any evidence to show the difficulty and cost of segregating defendant’s requested data from pornographic material, claiming such difficulty and cost to be a “legitimate reason” for refusing to return the non-contraband materials to him, required the remand of the case for a reconsideration of this issue. (*United States v. Gladding* (9th Cir. 2014) 775 F.3rd 1149, 1151-1154.)

Extensions:

Search warrants must be served within *ten* (10) *calendar days* of issuance. (**P.C. § 1534**)

The sole exception provided for by statute is for bank records. If a bank cannot reasonably retrieve the requested records within ten days, the affiant may request for some time period longer than ten days. (**Gov’t. Code § 7475**)

So long as served within the 10-day limit, no further evidence of timeliness need be shown. (*Cave v. Superior Court*) 1968) 267 Cal.App.2nd 517.)

If, during the 10-day period, it becomes apparent that the warrant cannot, or will not, be served, the officer may do either of the following:

- Submit a new warrant and affidavit, with an added explanation in the affidavit for why the warrant was not executed on time and listing any facts relevant to a possible change in probable cause or why it is believed the property to be seized will still be in the place to be searched; *or*
- Take the original warrant, with a supplemental affidavit incorporating by reference the entire original affidavit, back to the issuing magistrate to “*revalidate and reissue*” the same warrant (*People v. Sanchez* (1972) 24 Cal.App.4th 664.) upon a showing that the probable cause has not become stale. (*People v. Brocard* (1985) 170 Cal.App.3rd 239-242.)

Special Masters:

Rule: Per **P.C. § 1524(c)**, search warrants for documentary evidence in the possession of, or under the control of, a . . .

- *Lawyer,*
- *Doctor,*
- *Psychotherapist,* or
- *Clergyman,*

. . . who is *not* him or herself reasonably suspected of engaging or having engaged in criminal activity related to the *documentary evidence* for which a warrant is requested, are invalid unless certain statutory requirements relating to obtaining the assistance of a “*special master*” are first met. (See ***Deukmejian v. Superior Court*** (1980) 103 Cal.App.3rd 253.)

When not applicable:

This special master system is specifically *not* available for evidence coming within the so-called “*newsman’s privilege*,” as described in **E.C. § 1070**. (**P.C. § 1524(g)**)

A special master is not necessary if the attorney, etc., is him or herself reasonably suspected of the criminal activity about which the documentary evidence is sought. (***People v. Blasquez*** (1985) 165 Cal.App.3rd 408.)

However, this does not preclude an attorney, etc., from obtaining an order from the court sealing the seized files pending an in camera determination of the applicability of any privilege. (***People v. Superior Court [Bauman & Rose]*** (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1757.)

The search of a Deputy District Attorney’s (DDA) home, when the DDA was the target of the criminal investigation, did not require a special master, while the search of the DDA’s office, where there might be confidential material belonging to the District Attorney (as opposed to the DDA himself) *did* require the services of a special master. (***People ex rel. Lockyer v. Superior Court*** (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 387.)

A “*special master*” must first be appointed by the court, who must then accompany the officers serving the warrant. A “*special master*” is an attorney licensed to practice law, in good standing, in California, to be selected from a list of qualified attorneys maintained by the State Bar for the purpose of conducting such searches. (P.C. § 1524(d))

“*Documentary evidence*” includes, but is not limited to, writings, documents, blueprints, drawings, photographs, computer printouts, microfilms, x-rays, files, diagrams, ledgers, books, tapes, audio and video recordings, films or papers of any type or description. (P.C. § 1524(f))

Procedure:

The special master must inform the person in possession of the specific items being sought and allow the party in possession of the documents to voluntarily provide the items requested.

If, in the judgment of the special master, the party fails to provide the items requested, the special master shall conduct the search for the items in the areas designated in the search warrant.

Potentially privileged documents must be sealed.

The documents sealed by the special master *cannot* be:

Unsealed and/or turned over to the investigating agency (or to the prosecutor) without notice being given to the person from whom they were seized (i.e., the attorney, physician, psychotherapist, or clergyman); *nor*

Returned to the person from whom they were seized without notice to the person executing the warrant (or, alternatively, to the investigating agency or the prosecutor). (*Gordon v. Superior Court* (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1546.)

The Court Hearing: If the party indicates that the items seized should not be disclosed (e.g., due to “*privilege*” issues), the special master must seal them and deliver them to the court for a hearing on the issue.

The court will review the material in camera if a privilege (e.g., attorney-client, or work product, etc., privilege) is claimed. (*PSC Geothermal Services Co. v. Superior Court* (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1697, 1711-1712; *Geilim v. Superior Court* (1991) 234 Cal.App.3rd 166, 171.)

The Court has a duty to hear and determine the applicability of a claim of privilege, but lacks the statutory or inherent power to require the parties to bear the cost of a special master's services. (*People v. Superior Court [Laff]* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 703.)

A special master *may not* release even an inventory of the items seized to a police officer after a privilege is invoked. (*Magill v. Superior Court* (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 61.)

The hearing will resolve issues related to:

- Suppression issues pursuant to **P.C. § 1538.5** (i.e., a “*motion to suppress evidence.*”)
- Claims of “*privilege,*” pursuant to **E.C. §§ 900 et seq.**

The hearing must be held in Superior Court within *three (3) days* of the service of the warrant, or as soon as possible if three days is impracticable.

Although the statute is silent on the issue, it has been held that the special master should determine whether a hearing is required and give notice to the parties concerning when and where such hearing is to be held. (*Gordon v. Superior Court*, (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1546.)

Other Service Conditions:

Execution of the search warrant must be done during business hours if possible. (**P.C. § 1524(c)(3)**)

The search warrant must be served on the person who appears to have possession or control of the documents sought. If no such person can be found, the special master is responsible for sealing and returning to the court any items that appear to be privileged. (**P.C. § 1524(c)(3)**)

Police officers may accompany the special master during the search, but shall not participate in the search nor shall they examine any of the items being seized except upon agreement of the party upon whom the warrant has been served. (**P.C. § 1524(e)**)

The Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Special Masters may also be appointed under authority of P.C. § 1546.1(e)(1) of the **Electronic Communications Privacy Act** upon seeking electronic information obtained through the execution of a warrant or court order.

Other Warrants:

Inspection (or Administrative) Warrants: Enforcement of some codes, such as *building, fire, health, safety, health, plumbing, electrical, labor or zoning codes*, require the periodic inspections of some buildings. (See ***Dawson v. City of Seattle*** (9th Cir. 2006) 435 F.3rd 1054.)

Regulatory Scheme: California has enacted a regulatory scheme for what are referred to as “*inspection warrants*,” for obtaining search warrants for regulatory inspections “required or authorized by state or local or regulation relating to building, fire (etc.),” code compliance. (CCP §§ **1822.50 et seq.**)

CCP §§ 1822.50: “An inspection warrant is an order, in writing, in the name of the people, signed by a judge of a court of record, directed to a state or local official, commanding him to conduct any inspection required or authorized by state or local law or regulation relating to building, fire, safety, plumbing, electrical, health, labor, or zoning.”

CCP § 1822.51: Consent to search is to be requested first.

“An inspection warrant shall be issued upon cause, unless some other provision of state or federal law makes another standard applicable. An inspection warrant shall be supported by an affidavit, particularly describing the place, dwelling, structure, premises, or vehicle to be inspected and the purpose for which the inspection is made. In addition, the affidavit shall contain either a statement that consent to inspect has been sought and refused or facts or circumstances reasonably justifying the failure to seek such consent.”

If consent is refused, then a warrant is needed, but may be obtained on less than the traditional probable cause. (See ***Salwasser Manufacturing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Appeals Board*** (1989) 214 Cal.App.3rd 625.)

A warrant may be obtained upon a showing that the area is blighted, non-discriminatory searches are conducted on a regular basis, and/or areas are picked at random for inspection.

“Cause” needed to obtain a warrant, when consent is refused, is “deemed to exist if either reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting a routine or area inspection are satisfied with respect to the particular place, dwelling, structure, premises, or vehicle, or there is reason to believe that a condition of nonconformity exists with respect to the particular place, dwelling, structure, premises, or vehicle.” (CCP § 1822.52)

Examples:

Residences. (*Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco* (1967) 387 U.S. 523 [18 L.Ed.2nd 930].)

Commercial Areas. (*See v. City of Seattle* (1967) 387 U.S. 541 [18 L.Ed.2nd 943].)

CCP § 1822.53: Examination of Witnesses: “Before issuing an inspection warrant, the judge may examine on oath the applicant and any other witness, and shall satisfy himself of the existence of grounds for granting such application.”

CCP § 1822.54: Issuance and Contents of Warrant: “If the judge is satisfied that the proper standard for issuance of the warrant has been met, he or she shall issue the warrant particularly describing each place, dwelling, structure, premises, or vehicle to be inspected and designating on the warrant the purpose and limitations of the inspection, including the limitations required by this title.”

CCP § 1822.55: Duration, Extension or Renewal of Warrant; Execution and Return: “An inspection warrant shall be effective for the time specified therein, but not for a period of more than 14 days, unless extended or renewed by the judge who signed and issued the original warrant, upon satisfying himself that such extension or renewal is in the public interest. Such inspection warrant must be executed and returned to the judge by whom it was issued within the time specified in the warrant or within the extended or renewed time. After the expiration of such time, the warrant, unless executed, is void.”

CCP § 1822.56: Manner of Inspection; Notice: “An inspection pursuant to this warrant may not be made between 6:00 p.m. of any day and 8:00 a.m. of the succeeding day, nor in the absence of an owner or occupant of the particular place, dwelling, structure, premises, or vehicle unless specifically authorized by the judge upon a showing that such authority is reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the regulation being

enforced. An inspection pursuant to a warrant shall not be made by means of forcible entry, except that the judge may expressly authorize a forcible entry where facts are shown sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion of a violation of a state or local law or regulation relating to building, fire, safety, plumbing, electrical, health, labor, or zoning, which, if such violation existed, would be an immediate threat to health or safety, or where facts are shown establishing that reasonable attempts to serve a previous warrant have been unsuccessful. Where prior consent has been sought and refused, notice that a warrant has been issued must be given at least 24 hours before the warrant is executed, unless the judge finds that immediate execution is reasonably necessary in the circumstances shown.”

Reasonable force may be used to insure everyone’s safety, including the temporary detention of a resident’s occupants if necessary under the circumstances. (*Dawson v. City of Seattle* (9th Cir. 2006) 435 F.3rd 1054, 1065-1070.)

CCP § 1822.57: *Punishment:* “Any person who willfully refuses to permit an inspection lawfully authorized by warrant issued pursuant to this title is guilty of a misdemeanor.”

CCP § 1822.58: *Inspections by Personnel of Fish and Game Department:* “A warrant may be issued under the requirements of this title to authorize personnel of the Department of Fish and Game to conduct inspections of locations where fish, amphibia, or aquatic plants are held or stored under (**Fish & Game Code §§ 15000 et seq. (Div. 12).**)”

CCP § 1822.59: *Inspections for Purpose of Animal or Plant Pest or Disease Eradication:*

(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of **Section 1822.54**, for purposes of an animal or plant pest or disease eradication effort pursuant to (**Food & Agri. Code §§ 5001 et seq. (Div. 4)**) or (**Food & Agri. Code §§ 9101 et seq. (Div. 5)**), the judge may issue a warrant under the requirements of this title describing a specified geographic area to be inspected by authorized personnel of the Department of Food and Agriculture.

(b) A warrant issued pursuant to this section may only authorize the inspection of the exterior of places, dwellings, structures, premises or vehicles, and only in areas urban in character. The warrant shall state the geographical area which it covers and the purpose of and limitations on the inspection.

(c) A warrant may be issued pursuant to this section whether or not the property owners in the area have refused to consent to the inspection. A peace officer may use reasonable force to enter a property to be inspected if so authorized by the warrant.

CCP § 1822.60: Warrant for DOJ Inspections: “A warrant may be issued under the requirements of this title to authorize personnel of the Department of Justice to conduct inspections as provided in (B&P Code § 19827(a)).”

B&P Code § 19827(a) deals with DOJ’s powers with respect to investigations.

Hotels and Motels: Hotels and motels do *not* qualify as closely regulated businesses, although an administrative subpoena or warrant is all that is necessary for the inspection of the business’ guest registry records. (*City of Los Angeles v. Patel* (June 22, 2015) __ U.S. __, __ [135 S.Ct. 2443, 192 L.Ed.2nd 435].)

Entry to Make Arrests: Use of an administrative, or “*inspection*” warrant, issued by a court for the purpose of regulating building, fire, safety, plumbing, electrical, health, labor or zoning codes, does not justify an entry by police to make an arrest given the lesser proof standards needed to obtain an administrative warrant. If an entry is effected for the purpose of arresting the occupant, an arrest warrant must first be obtained. (*Alexander v. City and County of San Francisco* (1994) 29 F.3rd 1355.)

Rendition (or Extradition):

Article IV, § 2, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution states that: “A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another state, shall on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime.”

The term “*rendition*,” literally translated as “*to surrender*,” refers to what is more commonly known as “*extradition*.”

The Implementing Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3182, provides in substance that, on a proper demand of the executive of one state upon the executive of another, it is the duty of the latter to have the fugitive arrested and delivered to the agent of the demanding state.

The federal statute and constitutional provisions provide the basis for the interstate extradition of fugitives.

The “*asylum*” state has a duty to release to the “*demanding*” state one who has allegedly violated the laws of the later. It is for the demanding state alone, and not the asylum state, to determine the offending party’s innocence or guilt. (*In re Golden* (1977) 65 Cal.app.3rd 789, 796.)

Upon receipt of the defendant in the “*demanding state*,” his return to the “*asylum state*” prior to a determination of guilt will result in dismissal of the charges in the demanding state, under the terms of the *Interstate Agreement on Detainers*. (*Alabama v Bozeman* (2001) 533 U.S. 146 [150 L.Ed.2nd 188].)

International extraditions are the subject of treaties between the United States and other individual countries.

Extradition by the States: All fifty states have supplemented the federal provisions through the adoption of the “**Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.**”

California adopted the **Act** in 1937. (See **P.C. §§ 1548 et seq.**)

P.C. § 1548.1; the Governor’s Duty: “Subject to the provisions of this chapter, the Constitution of the United States, and the laws of the United States, it is the duty of the Governor of this State to have arrested and delivered up to the executive authority of any other State any person charged in that State with treason, felony, or other crime, who has fled from justice and is found in this State.”

Under the **Uniform Act for Out-of-State Probationer or Parolee Supervision (P.C. §§ 11175 et seq.)**, a paroled prisoner or probationer may be arrested and brought back from another state, on revocation of his parole or probation, without invoking the more difficult extradition procedure.

If the defendant has a case pending in this state, he may be held here until he is tried and discharged or convicted and has served his sentence. (**P.C. § 1551.1**).

Procedure:

P.C. § 1548.2: The Demand: The demand must be in writing and accompanied by:

A copy, certified as authentic by the executive, of an indictment, information, or affidavit before a magistrate in the demanding state, charging the commission of a crime under the laws of that state;
and

A copy of any warrant issued thereon; *or*

A copy of a judgment of conviction or sentence imposed, with a statement that the person claimed has escaped or violated his bail, probation or parole.

P.C. § 1548.3: Investigating the Demand: The governor of the asylum state may then call upon the Attorney General or any District Attorney to *Investigate the Demand* and report on whether the person should be surrendered.

It is not supposed to be an issue in the asylum state whether or not the defendant is guilty. The only issue to be resolved by the asylum state is whether the defendant in custody is the same person demanded by the other state. (P.C. §§ 1550.1. 1553.2)

However, despite the fact that the **Uniform Act** is worded in mandatory terms, it has been held that while a court may force the governor to make a decision, courts *do not* have the power to make a governor make a *specific* decision; i.e., the governor cannot be forced to honor another state's request for extradition. (*South Dakota v. Brown* (1978) 20 Cal.3rd 765.)

A 30-year delay in extraditing a California resident, nor the defendant's ill health, do not justify an exception to the extradition requirements. (*In re Walton* (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 934.)

A probationer who flees California may be ordered to pay the costs of his extradition back to California. (*People v. Washington* (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 590.)

P.C. §§ 1547 et seq.: The Governor’s Warrant: When the decision is made to surrender the defendant, a “*Governor’s Warrant of Extradition*” is issued which authorizes the arrest and delivery of an accused to the agent of the demanding state.

Waiver of Extradition; P.C. § 1555.2: A person may be required to give a prior waiver of extradition as a condition of his or her release from custody, or as a part of a plea bargain, on the original charge which later becomes the subject of the extradition from the asylum state. (Overruling a prior court decision to the contrary, *In re Klock* (1982) 133 Cal.App.3rd 726.)

Ignoring Extradition Treaties: Prosecution of a defendant is not precluded merely because a defendant is abducted abroad for the purpose of prosecution, even if done in violation of an extradition treaty, such as when U.S. law enforcement agents forcibly abduct a foreign national in Mexico and bring him to the United States for prosecution. (*Alvarez-Machain* (1992) 504 U.S. 655 [119 L.Ed.2nd 441]; see also *Ker v. Illinois* (1886) 119 U.S. 436 [30 L.Ed. 421]; *People v. Salcido* (2008) 44 Cal.4th 93, 119-126.)

Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution (“UFAP”): 18 U.S.C. § 1073; The Fugitive Felon Act:

Scope: This federal statute provides criminal penalties for unlawful flight to avoid prosecution, confinement, giving of testimony, or to avoid service of process. (\$5,000 fine and/or 5 years in prison.)

The primary purpose of the statute is to give the federal government the jurisdiction to assist in the location and apprehension of fugitives from state justice, through the use of a “*UFAP Warrant.*”

Procedure:

- A federal complaint for unlawful flight to avoid prosecution is appropriate where there is probable cause to believe that the fugitive has fled and that his flight was for the purpose of avoiding prosecution and that he has moved or traveled in interstate or foreign commerce.

The mere absence from the state without evidence of an intent to avoid prosecution is *not* sufficient. (*In re King* (1970) 3 Cal.3rd 226, 236, fn. 8.)

- Although not legally required, state prosecution should have been commenced by complaint, warrant, indictment, or information, prior to issuance of the federal complaint.

However, it is not necessary that the flight itself occur prior to the initiation of the prosecution. (*Lupino v. United States* (8th Cir. 1959) 268 F.2nd 799.)

- Certified copies of the charging documents should be delivered to the United States Attorney's Office.

UFAP specifically applies as well to *parental kidnapping* and interstate or international flight to avoid prosecution for that crime.

The Department of Justice has established guidelines for issuing warrants in these cases which require independent and credible information that the kidnapped child is in a condition of abuse or neglect.

UFAP also covers flight for the purpose of *avoiding custody or confinement*.

Applies to inmates of jails and prisons as well as those on conditional liberty; i.e., probation or parole.

Evidence should be available indicating that a probationer or parolee knew or believed that his conditional liberty was about to be revoked or was at least in jeopardy.

A complaint may also be authorized where a witness has fled the state to *avoid giving testimony* in a criminal proceeding which involves a felony.

The criminal proceedings must actually have been initiated in state court. (*Durbin v. United States* (D.C. Cir. 1954) 221 F.2nd 520.)

There should be substantial evidence to indicate that the intent was to flee in order to avoid the giving of testimony.

UFAP prohibits interstate flight “to *avoid service of*, or contempt proceedings for alleged disobedience of, *lawful process*, requiring attendance and the giving of testimony or the production of documentary evidence before an agency of a state empowered by the law of such state to conduct investigations of alleged criminal activities.”

UFAP does not supersede, nor is it intended to provide an alternative for, *state extradition* proceedings.

The *federal complaint* charging unlawful flight will generally be *dismissed* once a fugitive has been apprehended and turned over to state authorities to await interstate extradition.

Wiretaps and Eavesdropping:

Wiretaps vs. Right to Privacy: Both the federal Congress and California’s Legislature, expressing concern over the potential for violating privacy rights (see *Alderman v. United States* (1969) 394 U.S. 165 [22 L.Ed.2nd 176].), have enacted statutes controlling the use of wiretaps by law enforcement.

Federal rules are contained in the *Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968* (Title III, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 et seq.). However, in that California’s state statutes are more restrictive (see *People v. Jones* (1973) 30 Cal.App.3rd 852.), it is generally accepted that if a police officer acts in compliance with P.C. §§ 629.50 et seq., he or she will also be in compliance with the federal requirements.

Alderman v. United States, supra: The **Fourth Amendment** rights of homeowners are implicated by the use of a surreptitiously planted listening device to monitor third-party conversations that occurred within their home.

The federal *Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968* authorizes the states to enact their own wiretap laws only if the provisions of those laws are at least as restrictive as the federal requirements for a wiretap set out in **Title III**. (*People v. Jackson* (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 129, 146-147; *People v. Otto* (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1088, 1098.)

The federal District Court denied defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from a series of surveillance orders that authorized the interception of communications over cellular phones pursuant to the **Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968**, associated with defendant and his co-

conspirators. Defendant claimed that the surveillance orders authorized the government to transform the cellular phones into roving electronic bugs by using sophisticated eavesdropping technology. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, sustaining the district court's ruling, noting that if the government seeks authorization for the use of new technology to convert cellular phones into roving bugs, it must specifically request that authority. In this case, however, the surveillance orders were intended only to authorize standard interception techniques and the government only utilized standard interception techniques. (*United States v. Oliva* (9th Cir. 2012) 705 F.3rd 390, 395-401.)

California: P.C. § 630: Statement of Legislative Purpose: Recognizing the advances in science and technology that have led to the development of new devices and techniques for the purpose of eavesdropping upon private communications and the resulting invasion of privacy involved, the Legislature enacted the following statutes for the purpose of protecting the *right of privacy* of the people of this state.

It is *not* the intent of the Legislature, however, to place greater restraints on the use of listening devices and techniques by law enforcement agencies than existed prior to the effective date (i.e., January 2, 1968) of this Chapter. (*Ibid.*)

This section pertaining to wiretapping and other electronic devices is a general provision declaring a broad legislative purpose; **P.C. § 633** is the specific section dealing with the classes exempted from the two preceding sections prohibiting wiretapping and it is only the officers named in the latter section who are exempt from the sanctions imposed by §§ **631** and **632**. (55 *Op.Cal.Atty.Gen.* 151 (1972))

Penal Code § 632: Eavesdropping or Recording Confidential Communications:

Subd. (a): Every person who, intentionally and without the consent of all parties to a confidential communication, by means of any electronic amplifying or recording device, eavesdrops upon or records the confidential communication, whether the communication is carried on among the parties in the presence of one another or by means of a telegraph, telephone, or other device, except a radio, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand five hundred dollars (\$2,500), or imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year, or in the state prison, or by both that fine and imprisonment. If the person has previously been

convicted of a violation of this section or **Section 631, 632.5, 632.6, 632.7, or 636**, the person shall be punished by a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars (\$10,000), by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year, or in the state prison, or by both that fine and imprisonment.

In a civil suit alleging a violation of **P.C. §§ 632(a) and 632.7(a)**, the plaintiff must prove that the recording of confidential telephone conversations was done intentionally. (*Rojas v. HSBC Card Services, Inc.* (Jan. 16, 2018) __ Cal.App.5th __ [2018 Cal. App. LEXIS 114].)

Subd. (b): The term “*person*” includes an individual, business association, partnership, corporation, limited liability company, or other legal entity, and an individual acting or purporting to act for or on behalf of any government or subdivision thereof, whether federal, state, or local, but excludes an individual known by all parties to a confidential communication to be overhearing or recording the communication.

Subd. (c): The term “*confidential communication*” includes any communication carried on in circumstances as may reasonably indicate that any party to the communication desires it to be confined to the parties thereto, but excludes a communication made in a public gathering or in any legislative, judicial, executive or administrative proceeding open to the public, or in any other circumstance in which the parties to the communication may reasonably expect that the communication may be overheard or recorded.

See *Flanagan v. Flanagan* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 766, 772-773, 776-777; “[U]nder **section 632** ‘confidentiality’ appears to require nothing more than the existence of a reasonable expectation by one of the parties that no one is ‘listening in’ or overhearing the conversation. (Citation) Thus, the court concluded, ‘a conversation is confidential under section 632 if a party to that conversation has an objectively reasonable expectation that the conversation is not being overheard or recorded.’” (See also *Santa Ana Police Officers Assn. v. City of Santa Ana* (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 317, 325-326; communications between officers during the execution of a search warrant *did not* qualify as “*confidential.*”)

Subd. (d): Except as proof in an action or prosecution for violation of this section, no evidence obtained as a result of eavesdropping upon or recording a confidential communication in violation of this section shall be admissible in any judicial, administrative, legislative, or other proceeding.

Subd. (e): This section does not apply (1) to any public utility engaged in the business of providing communications services and facilities, or to the officers, employees or agents thereof, where the acts otherwise prohibited by this section are for the purpose of construction, maintenance, conduct or operation of the services and facilities of the public utility, or (2) to the use of any instrument, equipment, facility, or service furnished and used pursuant to the tariffs of a public utility, or (3) to any telephonic communication system used for communication exclusively within a state, county, city and county, or city correctional facility.

Subd. (f): This section does not apply to the use of hearing aids and similar devices, by persons afflicted with impaired hearing, for the purpose of overcoming the impairment to permit the hearing of sounds ordinarily audible to the human ear.

Note: Under federal **Title III**; “(I)t shall not be unlawful . . . for a person acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication where . . . *one of the parties* to the communication has given prior consent to such interception.” (Italics added; **18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c), (d)**)

P.C. § 632.01: Disclosure or Distribution of Confidential Communications with a Health Care Provider:

(a) It is a felony to intentionally disclose or distribute, in any manner, including but not limited to, Internet Web sites and social media, or for any purpose, the contents of a confidential communication with a health care provider, that was obtained in violation of **P.C. § 632(a)** (i.e., by using an electronic amplifying or recording device to eavesdrop upon or record a confidential communication without the consent of all parties).

In order for aiding and abetting principles to apply, the aider/abettor must violate or aid and abet both **P.C. §§ 632.01 and 632.**

(c) “*Health care provider*” is defined as any of the following:

- (1) A person licensed or certified pursuant to **Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 500 et seq.**
- (2) A person licensed pursuant to the **Osteopathic Initiative Act** or the **Chiropractic Initiative Act**.
- (3) A person certified pursuant to **H&S Code §§ 1797 et seq.**
- (4) A clinic, health dispensary, or health facility licensed or exempt from licensure pursuant to **H&S Code §§ 1200 et seq.**
- (5) An employee, volunteer, or contracted agent of any group practice prepayment health care service plan regulated pursuant to the **Knox-Keene Health Care Service Plan Act of 1975; H&S Code §§ 1340 et seq.**
- (6) An employee, volunteer, independent contractor, or professional student of a clinic, health dispensary, or health care facility or health care provider described in this subdivision.
- (7) A professional organization that represents any of the other health care providers described in this subdivision.

(d)(1) The recording/overhearing exceptions that already exist for **P.C. § 632** in current law apply. (E.g., Per **P.C. § 633** [general law enforcement exceptions], **P.C. § 633.02** [body-worn cameras or investigating sexual assault], **P.C. § 633.05** [city attorneys], **P.C. § 633.1** [incoming calls to airport law enforcement], **P.C. § 633.5** [obtaining evidence of specified crimes; i.e., extortion, kidnapping, bribery, **P.C. § 653m** telephone harassment, any felony involving violence against the person, and human trafficking], **P.C. § 633.6** [recording by domestic violence victim with judicial permission], and **P.C. § 633.8** [hostage or barricade situations].)

(d)(2) This section does not affect the admissibility of any evidence that would otherwise be admissible pursuant to the authority of any section specified in **paragraph (d)(1)**.

Punishment: Felony; 16 months, 2 or 3 years in prison, and/or a fine of up to \$2,500 per violation, or up to \$10,000 per violation with a prior conviction for the same offense. (**Subd. (b)**)

Note: This legislation, effective 1/1/2017, was a knee-jerk reaction to the highly publicized Planned Parenthood eavesdropping situation.

P.C. § 633: Exceptions: Nothing in **Section 631, 632, 632.5, 632.6, or 632.7** prohibits the Attorney General, any district attorney, or any assistant, deputy, or investigator of the Attorney General or any district attorney, any officer of the California Highway Patrol, any chief of police, assistant chief of police, or police officer of a city or city and county, any sheriff, undersheriff, or deputy sheriff regularly employed and paid in that capacity by a county, police officer of the County of Los Angeles, or any person acting pursuant to the direction of one of these law enforcement officers acting within the scope of his or her authority, from overhearing or recording any communication that they could lawfully overhear or record prior to the effective date of this chapter.

Nothing in **Section 631, 632, 632.5, 632.6, or 632.7** renders inadmissible any evidence obtained by the above-named persons by means of overhearing or recording any communication that they could lawfully overhear or record prior to the effective date of this chapter.

A participant in a telephone conversation, which otherwise would have been in violation of **P.C. § 632**, may properly record a telephone conversation at the direction of a law enforcement officer, acting within the course and scope of his or her authority, in the course of a criminal investigation. (*Telish v. State Personnel Board [California Dept. of Justice]* (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1479, 1487-1494.)

In finding that having an informant secretly record telephone conversations with the defendant, the Court ruled that “the looseness of law enforcement direction to [the informant] in making the tape recordings properly goes to the weight given to those recordings and not their initial admissibility.” (*People v. Towery* (1985) 174 Cal.App.3rd 1114, 1129; see also *People v. Clark* 63 Cal.4th 522, 595.)

Both the **California Invasion of Privacy Act** and the **Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522.)** proscribe only *intentional*, as opposed to inadvertent, overhearing or intercepting of communications. (*People v. Buchanan* (1972) 26 Cal.App.3rd 274.)

The restrictions on eavesdropping apply for the benefit of a person outside the state as well, so long as one party to a telephone conversation is in California. (*Kearney v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc.* (2006) 39 Cal.4th 95.)

P.C. § 633.5: Exception; Recording by Party to the Communication:

Sections 631, 632, 632.5, 632.6, and 632.7 do not prohibit one party to a confidential communication from recording the communication for the purpose of obtaining evidence reasonably believed to relate to the commission by another party to the communication of the crime of *extortion, kidnapping, bribery*, any felony involving *violence against the person*, including, but not limited to, *human trafficking*, as defined in **Section 236.1**, or a violation of **Section 653m**, or *domestic violence* as defined in **Section 13700**. **Sections 631, 632, 632.5, 632.6, and 632.7** do not render any evidence so obtained inadmissible in a prosecution for *extortion, kidnapping, bribery*, any felony involving *violence against the person*, including, but not limited to, *human trafficking*, as defined in **Section 236.1**, a violation of **Section 653m**, or *domestic violence* as defined in **Section 13700**, or any crime in connection therewith.

A juvenile child molest victim, may be a party to a telephone conversation with her adult molester when the consent to recording the telephone call is given by the minor's parent. (*People v. Trever P.* (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 486.)

Jail and Prison Inmates: The Recording of prisoner telephone conversations, even when made between the jail and the outside world, would fall within the restrictions of both the federal and state wiretap statutes *unless* the inmate is put on notice that his conversations may be monitored and/or recorded.

Under **Title III**; "(I)t shall not be unlawful . . . for a person acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication where . . . *one of the parties* to the communication has given prior consent to such interception." (Italics added; **18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c), (d)**)

Based upon this, it has been held that where a sign has been posted indicating that "*telephone calls may be monitored and recorded*," inmates are on notice, and his or her "decision to engage in conversations over those phones constitutes implied consent to that monitoring and takes any wiretap outside the prohibitions of **Title III**." (*People v. Kelly* 103 Cal.App.4th 853, 858; warrantless recording of defendant's telephone conversations to parties on the outside approved.)

Such warning signs also take such telephone calls outside the search warrant provisions of California's wiretap statutes (**P.C. §§ 629.50 et seq.**) as well. (*Id.*, at pp. 859-860.)

P.C. § 631: Wiretapping:

Subd. (a): Prohibitions:

The *prohibitions* on wiretaps make illegal the following:

- The use of any machine, instrument, or contrivance, or in any other manner, to intentionally tap, or make an unauthorized connection, whether physically, electrically, acoustically, inductively, or otherwise, with any telegraph or telephone wire, line, cable, or instrument, including the wire, line, cable, or instrument of any internal telephonic communication system, *or*
- Without the consent of *all* the parties to a communication, or in any unauthorized manner, to read, attempt to read, or to learn the contents or meaning of any message, report, or communication while the same is in transit or passing over any wire, line, or cable, or is being sent from, or received at any place within this state; *or*
- The use or attempt to use in any manner or for any purpose, or to communicate in any way, any information so obtained; *or*
- To aid, agree with, employ, or conspire with anyone to do any of the above.

Punishment: Violation is punishable by a fine of \$2,500, and/or one year in county jail, or 16 months, two or three years in prison or county jail (per **P.C. § 1170(h)**), or by both such fine and imprisonment. The fine increases to \$10,000 with a prior conviction for any of the offenses listed in this Chapter.

Violation of wiretapping statutes may also be a **Fourth Amendment** violation if the illegal wiretap also violates a

person's legitimate expectation of privacy. (*United States v. Shrylock* (9th Cir. 2003) 342 F.3rd 948, 978.)

Subd. (b): Exceptions:

In General: The section *does not* apply to:

- Any public utility engaged in the business of providing communications services and facilities, when for the purpose of construction, maintenance, conduct or operation of the services and facilities of the public utility; *or*
- The use of any instrument, equipment, facility, or service furnished and used pursuant to the tariffs of a public utility; *or*
- Any telephonic communication system used for communication exclusively within a state, county, city and county, or city correctional facility.

Prison Visitors: A phone used during a physical visitation by a prisoner and his or her visitor does *not* meet the requirements of a “*wire communication*,” not using a line in interstate or foreign commerce. It is therefore not subject to the wiretap restrictions of **P.C. § 631**. (*People v. Santos* (1972) 26 Cal.App.3rd 397, 402.)

Subd. (c): Non-Admissibility: The section also provides for the non-admissibility of any evidence derived through a violation of this section, except as proof of such violation.

Similar restrictions are contained in:

P.C. § 632: Electronic eavesdropping, in general.

P.C. § 632.5: Cellular radio telephone communications.

P.C. § 632.6: Cordless telephone communications.

P.C. § 632.7: Recording communications between cellular radio telephones and cordless telephones, or between these and a landline telephone.

A “*Controlled Telephone Call*” made by a victim or witness to a suspect for the purpose of obtaining incriminating statements from the suspect, at law enforcement’s request (See **P.C. §§ 632, 633**), is not a privacy violation or an illegal **Fourth Amendment** search. (See *United States v. White* (1971) 401 U.S. 745 [28 L.Ed.2nd 453].)

See also *People v. Nakai* (2010) 183 Cal. App. 4th 499, 517-518: Incriminating online chat with a minor is not a confidential communication per **P.C. . 632** that requires suppression.

P.C. §§ 629.50 through 629.98 regulate the implementation of “*wiretaps*” and the use of information obtained thereby, including derivative evidence, and are listed in detail below. (See *People v. Jackson* (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 129, 144-159.)

P.C. § 629.50: Requirements for a Wiretap Order:

An *application for a wiretap order* authorizing the interception of a wire, electronic pager, or electronic cellular telephone communication *shall*:

- Be made in writing upon the personal oath or affirmation of:

The Attorney General,

Chief Deputy Attorney General,

Chief Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Law Division, *or*

A District Attorney, or the person designated to act as District Attorney in the District Attorney’s absence.

The language “the principal prosecuting attorney,” found in **18 U.S.C. § 2516(2)**, may include a state assistant district attorney who had been duly designated to act in the absence of the elected district attorney. Compliance with **18 U.S.C. § 2516(2)** necessarily requires an analysis of the applicable state wiretap statute, i.e., **P.C. §**

629.50. The attorney designated to act in the district attorney’s absence, as specified in **P.C. § 629.50**, must be acting in the district attorney’s absence not just as an assistant district attorney designate with the limited authority to apply for a wiretap order, but as an assistant district attorney duly designed to act for all purposes as the district attorney of the political subdivision. (*United States v. Perez-Valencia* (9th Cir. 2013) 727 F.3rd 852, 854-855.)

Upon remand for a determination of the assistant district attorney’s duties and responsibilities at the time he requested the instant wiretap order, it was found that the assistant district attorney did in fact meet the necessary requirements to bring him within the dictates of **18 U.S.C. § 2516(2)** and **P.C. § 629.50**. (*United States v. Perez-Valencia* (9th Cir. 2014) 744 F.3rd 600.)

- Be made to:

The presiding judge of the Superior Court, *or*

Another judge designated by the presiding judge, *or*

The highest judge listed on an “*ordered list*” of additional judges, upon a determination that none of the above judges are available.

The fact that the application was made to a “*successor judge*” designated by the presiding judge to hear applications if the first-named judge is unavailable did not violate the requirements under this section. (*People v. Munoz* (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 239, 242.)

- Include all of the following information:

The identity of the investigative or law enforcement officer making the application,

The apparent discrepancy between the person who prepared the government's application for a wiretap and the person who signed it did not render the interception of the wire communications unlawful under **18 U.S.C. § 2518** because misidentification of the authorizing officer in the wiretap application is not a technical deficiency that requires suppression. (*United States v. Fowlkes* (9th Cir. 2015) 804 F.3rd 954, 968-969.)

The identity of the investigative or law enforcement officer authorizing the application,

Failure to identify the authorizing official should not invalidate the subsequent wiretap order. (See *United States v. Callum* (9th Cir. 2005) 410 F.3rd 571, discussing the corresponding federal statute; **18 U.S.C. § 2518(4)(d)**.)

But where the failure to include information identifying the Department of Justice as authorizing a wiretap application makes it impossible for a judge to conclude from the face of the application that it had been in fact so authorized, will invalidate the warrant. (*United States v. Staffeldt* (9th Cir. 2006) 451 F.3rd 578; an attached memorandum purportedly identifying the Department of Justice as authorizing the wiretap application was, due to human error, the wrong memorandum.)

See also *United States v. Scurry* (D.C. Cir. 2016) 821 F.3rd 1; finding that failure to identify the "high-level Justice Department official who approved the wiretap application," as required by **18 U.S.C. §**

2518(4)(d), was sufficient to invalidate the wiretap order.

The identity of the law enforcement agency that is to execute the order,

A statement attesting to a review of the application and the circumstances in support thereof by the chief executive officer or his or her designee (who must be identified by name) of the law enforcement agency making the application,

A full and complete statement of the facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant to justify his or her belief that an order should be issued, including:

Details as to the particular offense that has been, is being, or is about to be committed,

The fact that conventional investigative techniques have been tried and were unsuccessful, or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed or to be too dangerous,

A particular description of the nature and location of the facilities from which, or the place where the communication is to be intercepted,

A particular description of the type of communication sought to be intercepted,
and

The identity, if known, of the person committing the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted, or if that person's identity is not known, then the information relating to the person's identity that is known to the applicant.

Wiretap authority is tied to specific communications facilities or locations (including a specific

telephone or cellphone), and not individual suspects. So when a previously unknown coconspirator is identified, it is not necessary to cease the eavesdropping nor make application to the court for a new order. (*United States v. Reed* (9th Cir. 2009) 575 F.3rd 900, 910-912.)

In the context of a motion to suppress wiretap evidence, the district court judge was held to have erred in applying an “abuse of discretion” standard to both determinations made by the issuing judge; i.e., (1) whether the affidavit contained a full and complete statement of facts under **18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c)**, and (2) the ultimate decision that it was necessary to authorize the wiretap, under **§ 2518(3)(c)**. However, the error was harmless in that the wiretap affidavits adequately explained why the interception of wire communications was necessary to investigate the conspiracy and the target subjects, and they contained a full and complete statement of facts to establish necessity under **18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c)**. (*United States v. Rodriguez* (9th Cir. 2017) 851 F.3rd 931, 937-944.)

A statement of the period of time for which the interception is required to be maintained:

And if the nature of the interception is such that the authorization for interception should not automatically terminate when the described type of communication has been first obtained, a particular description of the facts establishing probable cause to believe that additional communications of the same type will occur thereafter, *and*

A full and complete statement of the facts concerning all previous applications known to the individual authorizing and to the individual making the application, to have been made to any judge of a state or federal court for authorization to intercept wire, electronic pager, or wire or electronic communication involving any of the same persons, facilities, or places specified in the application, and the action taken by the judge on each of those applications.

This requirement may be satisfied by making inquiry of the California Attorney General and the United States Department of Justice and reporting the results of these inquiries in the application.

Note: Use of a wiretap to combat a large conspiracy, given the greater threat to society, allows for the use of greater discretion by the courts to allow the government to use wiretaps. (*United States v. McGuire* (9th Cir. 2002) 307 F.3rd 1192, 1198.)

Failure to show that all traditional investigative methods have been tried and determined to be inadequate will result in a suppression of any evidence obtained from the resulting wiretaps. (*United States v. Gonzalez, Inc.* (9th Cir. 2006) 437 F.3rd 854; see **18 U.S.C. § 2518.**)

However, law enforcement officials need not exhaust every conceivable investigative technique before seeking a wiretap order. (*United States v. Lococo* (9th Cir. 2008) 514 F.3rd 860; see also *United States v. Rivera* (9th Cir. 2008) 527 F.3rd 891; *United States v. Reed* (9th Cir. 2009) 575 F.3rd 900, 908-910.)

“The necessity for the wiretap is evaluated in light of the government’s need not merely to collect some evidence, but to ‘develop an

effective case against those involved in the conspiracy.” (*Id.*, at p. 909, quoting *United States v. Rivera*, *supra*, at p. 902, and *United States v. Decoud*, *infra*, at pg. 1007.)

The fact that a pen register could have been used, with its limited value in collecting necessary information, does not mean that the necessity for a wiretap had not been established. “The necessity for the wiretap is evaluated in light of the government’s need not merely to collect some evidence, but to ‘develop an effective case against those involved in the conspiracy.’” (*United States v. Decoud* (9th Cir. 2006) 456 F.3rd 996, 1006-1007; the fact that the informant had been sent to prison, and that a surveillance had been detected, helped to establish the need for a wiretap.)

If the application is for the extension of an order, a statement setting forth the number of communications intercepted pursuant to the original order, and the results thus far obtained from the interception, or a reasonable explanation of the failure to obtain results.

An application for a modification of the original order may be made when there is “*probable cause*” to believe that the target of a wiretap is using a facility or device that is not subject to the original order.

The modified order is only good for that period that applied to the original order. The application must provide all the information required of the original order and a statement of the results thus far obtained from the interception, or a reasonable explanation for the failure to obtain results.

The judge may require the applicant to furnish additional testimony or documentary evidence in support of the application.

A judge must accept a facsimile copy of the signature that is required on an application for a wiretap order.

The original signed document is to be sealed and kept with the application.

P.C. § 629.51: Definitions:

“Wire Communication:” “(A)ny aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception (including the use of a like connection in a switching station), furnished or operated by any person engaged in providing or operating these facilities for the transmission of communications.”

See also *People v. Von Villas* (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 175, at p. 224, defining “*wire communication*” as “any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception (including the use of such connection in a switching station) furnished or operated by any person engaged in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign commerce”

A phone used during a physical visitation by a prisoner and his or her visitor does not meet the requirements of a “*wire communication*,” not using a line in interstate or foreign commerce. It is therefore not subject to the wiretap restrictions of P.C. § 631. (*People v. Santos* (1972) 26 Cal.App.3rd 397, 402.)

But cloned cellphones *are* included. (*United States v. Staves* (2004) 383 F.3rd 977.)

“Electronic pager communication:” “(A)ny tone or digital display or tone and voice pager communication.

“Electronic cellular telephone communication:” “(A)ny cellular or cordless radio telephone communication.

“Aural Transfer:” “(A) transfer containing the human voice at any point between and including the point of origin and the point of reception.”

The audio portion of a videotape would seem to fall within this definition. (*United States v. Shrylock* (9th Cir. 2003) 342 F.3rd 948, 977; “The videotapes contained both video

and audio portions. The audio portions are governed by the federal wiretap statute, **18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 et seq.**”)

P.C. § 629.52: Authority to Issue a Wiretap Order:

Upon application made per **P.C. § 629.50** (see above), a judge may enter an ex parte order, as requested or modified, authorizing the interception of;

- Wire,
- Electronic pager, *or*
- Electronic communication;

When such communication is initially intercepted within the territorial jurisdiction of the court in which the judge is sitting, *if* the judge determines, on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant, *all of the following*:

- There is *probable cause* to believe that an individual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit, one of the following offenses:

1. Importation, possession for sale, transportation, manufacture, or sale of controlled substances in violation of **H&S §§ 11351, 11351.5, 11352, 11370.6, 11378, 11378.5, 11379, 11379.5, or 11379.6**, when:

The substance contains heroin cocaine, PCP, methamphetamine, or their analogs; *and*

The substance exceeds ten (10) gallons by liquid volume *or* three (3) pounds of solid substance by weight,

2. Murder,

3. Solicitation to commit murder,

4. A felony involving a *destructive device*, per **P.C. §§ 18710, 18725, 18715, 18740, 18730, 18745, 18750, 18755, 18720** (formerly, **P.C. §§ 12303, 12303.1, 12303.2, 12303.3, 12303.6, 12308, 12309, 12310 or 12312**, respectively),

5. Aggravated kidnapping, as specified in P.C. § 209,

6. Any felony violation of P.C. § 186.22 (gang crimes),

7. A felony violation of the offenses involving *weapons of mass destruction* as described in P.C. §§ 11418, relating to weapons of mass destruction, 11418.5, relating to threats to use weapons of mass destruction, or 11419, relating to restricted biological agents, *or*

8. An attempt or conspiracy to commit any of the above-mentioned crimes;

- There is *probable cause* to believe that particular communications concerning the illegal activities will be obtained through that interception, including, but not limited to, communications that may be utilized for locating or rescuing a kidnap victim;
- There is *probable cause* to believe that the facilities from which, or the place where the wire, electronic pager, or electronic communication are to be intercepted:

Are being used, or are about to be used, in connection with the commission of the offense, *or*

Are leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly used by the person whose communications are to be intercepted; *and*

- Normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed, *or* reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried, *or* reasonably appear to be too dangerous.

“The requirement of necessity is designed to ensure that wiretapping is neither ‘routinely employed as the initial step in criminal investigation’ (*United States v. Giordano* (1974) 416 U.S. 505, 515, 94 S.Ct. 1820, 40 L.Ed.2nd 341) nor ‘resorted to in situations where traditional investigative techniques would suffice to expose the crime.’ (*United States*

v. Kahn (1974) 415 U.S. 143, 153, fn. 12.)”
(*People v. Leon* (2007) 40 Cal.4th 376, 385.)

“(It is not necessary that law enforcement officials exhaust every conceivable alternative before seeking a wiretap.”
(*Ibid.*)

The necessity requirement of **subdivision (d)** of this section (and the similar federal requirement under **18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c) & (3)(c)**) was met based upon the trial court’s finding that the evidence against the defendant was purely circumstantial, witnesses against the defendant wished to remain anonymous, questioning of the defendant was not likely to produce any additional evidence, and that the defendant was likely to call friends from his jail cell and have them destroy evidence if he discovered that he was the focus of the new murder investigation. (*People v. Zepeda* (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1205.)

Similarly, where a dangerous conspiracy is being investigated (e.g., the “*Montana Freeman*”), where infiltration would be dangerous and difficult, and informants were generally uncooperative, this requirement is met. (*United States v. McGuire* (9th Cir. 2002) 307 F.3rd 1192, 1197.)

But see *United States v. Blackmon* (9th Cir. 2001) 273 F.3rd 1204, citing *United States v. Carneiro* (9th Cir. 1988) 861 F.2nd 1171, 1181, for the proposition that a conspiracy *does not* loosen the standard of proof on this issue.

And even when informants are used, a finding that such informants “could not possibly reveal the full nature and extent of the enterprise and it’s countless, and at times disjointed, criminal tentacles,” satisfied this requirement. (*United States v. Shrylock* (9th Cir. 2003) 342 F.3rd 948, 975-976; see also *United States v. Gomez* (9th Cir. 2004) 358 F.3rd 1221.)

It is not necessary that the government prove that it pursued “to the bitter end . . . every non-electronic device.” (Citation). “(T)he adequacy of the showing concerning other investigative techniques is ‘to be tested in a practical and common sense fashion [citation] that does not ‘hamper unduly the investigative powers of law enforcement agents.’” (*People v. Leon* (2007) 40 Cal.4th 376, 392.)

It was not necessary that investigators have attempted to provide cloned cellphones for defendant’s use as a prerequisite to applying for a wiretap warrant in that monitoring cloned cellphones itself would require a wiretap order to be lawful. (*United States v. Staves* (9th Cir. 2004) 383 F.3rd 977.)

The necessity for a wiretap is evaluated in light of the government’s need not merely to collect some evidence, but to develop an effective case against the defendants. An “*effective case*” means “*proof beyond a reasonable doubt*,” not merely to get an indictment. Where the investigation of a drug-distribution conspiracy was stalled at information obtained from a pen register and trap and trace device, obtaining a series (i.e., 4) of wiretaps was held to be lawful. (*United States v. Garcia-Villalba* (9th Cir. 2009) 585 F.3rd 1223, 1227-1234; rejecting defendant’s argument that by the time a wiretap for a fourth cellphone was obtained, law enforcement was relying upon an impermissible “*cascading theory of necessity*.”) Examples of factors used to establish a necessity for a wiretap (pp. 1228-1230):

- Pen register and trap and trace device does not reveal the contents of the defendants’ conversations.
- Physical surveillance was impossible due to main defendant living in a rural location.
- Defendants used counter-surveillance techniques.
- A trash search was impossible due to main defendant living in a rural location.

- Search warrants, subpoenas, interviews and arrests would have terminated the investigation before all the coconspirators were found.
- Confidential informants could not be developed.

Note: Use of pen registers and trap and trace devices, except maybe when combined with other forms of electronic surveillance, is *not* enough alone to establish necessity for a wiretap. (*United States v. Garcia-Villalba, supra.*, at p. 1228, citing *United States v. Gonzalez, Inc.*, (9th Cir. 2005) 412 F.3rd 1102, 1113.)

It is where the intercepted communications were first heard by federal government agents that determines which federal court has jurisdiction for purposes of filing the resulting criminal prosecution, at least under the federal rules; i.e., **18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)**. (*United States v. Luong* (9th Cir. 2006) 471 F.3rd 1107.)

The first question to be answered in analyzing a motion to suppress wiretap evidence is whether the defendant established a violation of the **Wiretap Act**. If the defendant did not establish a violation of the **Wiretap Act**, there can be no constitutional violation and no suppression. (*People v. Camel* (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 989, 1001.)

The Court in *Camel* rejected defendant's argument that in determining probable cause, a court is to use the old *Aguilar-Spinelli* test (*Aguilar v. Texas* (1964) 378 U.S. 108 [12 L.Ed.2nd 723; 84 S. Ct. 1509]; *Spinelli v. United States* (1969) 393 U.S. 410 [21 L.Ed.2d 637; 89 S. Ct. 584]), holding instead that the totality-of-the-circumstances test (per *Illinois v. Gates* (1983) 462 U.S. 213 [76 L.Ed.2nd 527; 103 S. Ct. 2317].) is to be used since passage of **Proposition 8** (the Truth in Evidence Proposition) in June of 1982. (*Id.*, at pp. 1004-1010.)

The Court in *Camel* further approved of the sealing of two attachments to the warrant affidavit under authority of *People v. Hobbs* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 948. (*Id.*, at pp. 1009.)

P.C. § 629.53: Judicial Guidelines: The Judicial Council may establish guidelines for judges to follow in granting an order authorizing the interception of any wire, electronic pager, or electronic communication.

P.C. § 629.54: *Contents of the Wiretap Order:*

An order authorizing the interception of any wire, electronic digital pager, or electronic cellular telephone communication *shall* specify *all of the following*:

- The identity, if known, of the person whose communications are to be intercepted, or if the identity is not known, then that information relating to the person's identity known to the applicant,
- The nature and location of the communication facilities as to which, or the place where, authority to intercept is granted,
- A particular description of the type of communication sought to be intercepted, and a statement of the illegal activities to which it relates,
- The identity of the agency authorized to intercept the communications and of the persons making the application, *and*
- The period of time during which the interception is authorized including a statement as to whether or not the interception shall automatically terminate when the described communication has been first obtained.

P.C. § 629.56: Oral Approval in Lieu of Court Order:

Upon the informal application by the Attorney General, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, or a District Attorney, or a person to act as District Attorney in the District Attorney's absence, the presiding judge of the Superior Court, or the first available judge designated as provided in **P.C. § 629.50**, may grant oral approval for an interception, without a court order, if he or she determines *all of the following*:

- There are grounds upon which an order could be issued under this chapter, *and*

- There is *probable cause* to believe that an emergency situation exists with respect to the investigation of an offense enumerated in **P.C. § 629.52**, and
- There is *probable cause* to believe that a *substantial danger to life or limb* exists justifying the authorization for immediate interception of a private wire, electronic digital pager, or electronic cellular telephone communication before an application for an order could with due diligence be submitted and acted upon.

Approval for an interception under this section *shall* be conditioned upon filing with the judge by midnight of the second full court day after the oral approval, a written application for an order which, if granted consistent with this chapter, shall also recite the oral approval under this subdivision and be retroactive to the time of the oral approval.

P.C. § 629.58: Duration of a Wiretap Order:

No order entered under this chapter shall authorize the interception of any wire, electronic pager, or electronic cellular telephone, or electronic communication for a period longer than:

- Necessary to achieve the objective of the authorization, *nor in any event*,
- Thirty (30) days.

The 30-day limit on a wiretap begins on the day of the initial interception, or 10 days after the issuance of the wiretap order, whichever comes first.

Extensions of an order may be granted in accordance with **P.C. § 629.50** and upon the court making the findings required by **P.C. § 629.52**.

The period of extension *shall* be no longer than the authorizing judge deems necessary to achieve the purposes for which it was granted and in no event longer than thirty (30) days.

Every order and extension thereof *shall* contain a provision that the authorization to intercept *shall*:

- Be executed as soon as practicable,

- Be conducted so as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception under this chapter, *and*
- Terminate upon attainment of the authorized objective, or in any event at the time expiration of the term designated in the order or any extensions.

Where the target of the wiretap order is discovered to be using an alias, and changes his name during the life of the order, agents did not fail to “minimize” the interception of conversations not related to the investigation by continuing to eavesdrop on the target while he uses the new name. (*United States v. Fernandez* (9th Cir. 2008) 527 F.3rd 1247.)

In the event the intercepted communication is in a *foreign language*, an interpreter of that foreign language may assist peace officers in executing the authorization provided in this chapter, provided that:

- The interpreter has had the same training as any other interceptor authorized under this chapter, *and*
- The interception shall be conducted so as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception under this chapter.

P.C. § 629.60: Progress Reports:

Whenever an order authorizing an interception is entered, the order *shall* require reports in writing or otherwise to be made to the judge who issued the order:

- Showing the number of communications intercepted pursuant to the original order; *and*
- A statement setting forth what progress has been made towards achievement of the authorized objective, *or*
- A satisfactory explanation for its lack of progress, and the need for continued interception.

The judge *shall* order that the interception immediately terminate *if* he or she finds that:

- Progress has not been made, *and*
- The explanation for its lack of progress is not satisfactory, *or*
- No need exists for continued interception.

The reports *shall*:

- Be filed with the court at least every ten (10) days, or more frequently if ordered by the court; *and*
- Be made by any reasonable and reliable means, as determined by the judge.

When a defendant moved to suppress evidence on the grounds the reports required under **P.C. § 629.60** were inadequate or untimely, the State had the burden to show there was no error. However, the violation did not contravene a central purpose of **California's Presley-Felando-Eaves Wiretap Act of 1988, P.C. §§ 629.50 et seq.**, or the purpose of the provision was achieved despite any error. Under that framework, the trial court did not err in denying defendants' motion to suppress wiretap evidence because the wiretaps were obtained legally and minimized. (*People v. Roberts et al.* (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1149.)

P.C. § 629.61: Report to Attorney General:

A court order authorizing an interception shall require a report in writing or otherwise to be made to the Attorney General, showing:

- What persons, facilities, places or any combination of these, are to be intercepted; *and*
- The action taken by the judge on each application.

The report shall be made at the interval that the order may require, but not less than ten (10) days after the order was issued.

The report shall be made by any reasonable and reliable means, as determined by the Attorney General.

The Attorney General may issue regulations prescribing the collection and dissemination of information collected.

The Attorney General shall, upon the request of an individual making an application for an interception order, provide any information known as a result of these reporting requirements, as required by **P.C. § 629.50(a)(6)**.

P.C. § 629.62: Annual Report to the Legislature, etc.:

The Attorney General *shall* prepare and submit an annual report to the Legislature, the Judicial Council, and the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Court on interceptions conducted under the authority of this chapter during the preceding year.

Information for this report shall be provided to the Attorney General by any prosecutorial agency seeking an order pursuant to this chapter.

The report *shall* include *all* of the following data:

- The number of orders or extensions applied for,
- The kinds of orders or extension applied for,
- The fact that the order or extension was granted as applied for, was modified, or was denied,
- The number of wire, electronic pager, and electronic cellular telephone devices that are the subject of each order granted,
- The period of interceptions authorized by the order, and the number and duration of any extensions of the order,
- The offense specified in the order or application, or extension of any order,
- The identity of the applying law enforcement officer and agency making the application and the person authorizing the application,
- The nature of the facilities from which, or the place where communications were to be intercepted,

- A general description of the interceptions made under the order or extension, including:

The number of persons whose communications were intercepted.

The number of communications intercepted.

The percentage of incriminating communications intercepted.

The percentage of other communications intercepted, *and*

The approximate nature, amount, and costs of the manpower and other resources used in the interceptions,

- The number of arrests resulting from interceptions made under the order or extension, and the offenses for which arrests were made,
- The number of trials resulting from the interceptions,
- The number of motions to suppress made with respect to the interceptions, and the number granted or denied,
- The number of convictions resulting from the interceptions and the offenses for which the convictions were obtained, and a general assessment of the importance of the interceptions,
- Except with regard to the initial report required by this section, the information required by the preceding five (5) paragraphs (excluding the immediately preceding paragraph about the number of convictions) with respect to orders or extensions obtained in a preceding calendar year,
- The date of the order for service of inventory made pursuant to **P.C. § 629.68**, confirmation of compliance with the order, and the number of notices sent.

- Other data that the Legislature, the Judicial Council, or the Director of the Administrative Office shall require.

The annual report shall include a summary analysis of the above. The Attorney General may issue regulations prescribing the content and form of the reports required to be filed by a prosecutorial agency.

The Attorney General's annual report shall be filed no later than April of each year.

The Attorney General shall, upon the request of an individual making an application for an interception order, provide any information known as a result of these reporting requirements that would enable the individual making an application to comply with the requirements of **P.C. § 629.50(a)(6)**.

P.C. § 629.64: Recording, Sealing and Retaining Intercepted Communications:

The contents of any wire or electronic communication intercepted by any means authorized by this chapter *shall*, if possible, be recorded on any recording media.

The recording of the contents of any wire or electronic cellular telephone communication *shall* be done in a way that:

- Will protect the recording from editing or other alterations, *and*
- Will ensure that the audiotape recording can be immediately verified as to its authenticity and originality, *and*
- Any alteration can be immediately detected.

The monitoring or recording device used *shall* be of a type, and *shall* be installed, to preclude any interruption or monitoring of the interception by any unauthorized means.

Immediately upon the expiration of the period of the order, or extensions thereof, the recordings *shall* be made available to the judge issuing the order.

The recording *shall* be sealed under the direction of the judge. The presence of the seal, or a satisfactory explanation for the absence of the seal, *shall* be a prerequisite for the use or disclosure of the contents of any wire or electronic cellular telephone communication or evidence derived therefrom under **P.C. § 629.78**, below.

See *United States v. McGuire* (9th Cir. 2002) 307 F.3rd 1192, 1201-1205, where the FBI in a federal wiretap provided satisfactory reasons for delaying the sealing where they had the court's permission, the judge was in another district, and they took steps to protect the recordings pending the sealing.

Information received from a pen register and/or a trap and trace device, recording "call data content" (i.e., "CDC," data about call origination, length, and time of call), are not protected by the wiretap statutes. There is no expectation of privacy in such information, per *Smith v. Maryland* (1979) 442 U.S. 735 [61 L.Ed.2nd 220]. (*United States v. Reed* (9th Cir. 2009) 575 F.3rd 900, 914-917.)

Custody of the recordings *shall* be where the judge orders.

Recordings *shall* be retained for a minimum of ten (10) years, and shall be destroyed thereafter only upon an order of the issuing or denying judge.

Duplicate recordings may be made for use or disclosure pursuant to **P.C. §§ 629.74** and **629.76** (below) for investigations.

The sealing order may be oral or written, and the physical sealing of the tapes need not be done in the judge's presence. (*People v. Superior Court [Westbrook]* (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 41, 47-51; discussing former **P.C. § 629.14**, now **§ 629.64**.)

P.C. § 629.66: Application and Orders to be Sealed:

The application and orders made pursuant to this chapter *shall* be:

- Sealed by the judge.
- Kept where the judge orders.
- Disclosed only upon a showing of *good cause* before a judge.
- May be made to the defendant and at trial.

- Retained for ten (10) years, and thereafter destroyed only upon order of the issuing or denying judge.

See *People v. Hobbs* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 948, re; sealing warrant affidavits.

P.C. § 629.68: Notice to Parties to Intercepted Communications:

Within a reasonable time, but no later than ninety (90) days:

- After termination of the period of an order or extensions thereof; *or*
- After filing of an application for an order of approval under **P.C. § 629.56** which has been denied;

The issuing judge *shall* issue an order that *shall* require the requesting agency to serve:

- Persons named in the order or application, *and*
- Other known parties to intercepted communications;

An inventory which *shall* include notice of all of the following:

- The fact of the entry of the order, *and*
- The date of the entry and the period of authorized interception, *and*
- The fact that during the period wire, electronic digital pager, or electronic communication, cellular telephone communications were or were not intercepted.

Upon the filing of a motion, the judge *may*, in his or her discretion, make available to the person or his or her counsel for inspection the portions of the intercepted communications, applications and orders that the judge determines to be in the interest of justice.

On an ex parte showing of *good cause* to a judge, the serving of the inventory required by this section may be postponed.

The period of postponement shall be no longer than the authorizing judge deems necessary to achieve the purposes for which it was granted.

P.C. § 629.70: Discovery Prerequisite to Use in Evidence:

A criminal defendant shall be notified that he or she was identified as the result of an interception, such notice being before a plea of guilty or at least ten (10) days before trial, hearing or proceeding in the case other than an arraignment or grand jury proceeding.

The defendant is also entitled to a copy of all recorded interceptions, a copy of the court order, and accompanying application and monitoring logs, at least ten (10) days before trial, hearing or proceeding in the case other than a grand jury proceeding.

As a prerequisite to admissibility into evidence or other disclosure in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding, except a grand jury proceeding, of the contents of any intercepted wire, electronic pager, or electronic cellular telephone communication, *or any* evidence derived there from, each party *shall* be furnished not less than ten (10) days before such trial, hearing, or proceeding, with:

- A transcript of the contents of the interception, *and*
- A copy of all recorded interceptions, *and*
- A copy of the court order, accompanying application, and monitoring logs.

The ten (10) day period may be waived by the judge if he or she finds that it was not possible to furnish the party with the above information ten days before trial, hearing or proceeding, and that the party will not be prejudiced by the delay in receiving that information.

The court may issue an order limiting disclosure to the parties upon a showing of good cause.

The trial court denied discovery of the unredacted supporting wiretap affidavits that were sealed pursuant to *People v. Hobbs* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 948, and then refused to suppress the wiretap evidence. The Appellate Court found that the privileges and procedures of E.C. §§ 1040-1042 (Official Information Privilege) applies to wiretap affidavits. Defendants failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion by ruling that defendants' rights

were adequately protected with respect to their requests for disclosure of privileged documentation, and to their challenges to the sufficiency of the wiretap authorization orders in this case. (*People v. Acevedo* (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1040, 1047-1050.)

P.C. § 629.72: Motions to Suppress:

Any person in any trial, hearing or proceeding may move to suppress:

- Some or all of the contents of any intercepted wire, electronic pager, or electronic communication, *or*
- Any evidence derived there from;

Only on the basis that the contents or evidence were obtained in violation of:

- The **Fourth Amendment**, *or*
- The terms of this Chapter.

This Chapter, having been enacted subsequent (1995-1996) to the passage of **Proposition 8** (1982), and by a two-thirds vote of the Legislature, makes effective this statutory exclusionary rule. (*People v. Leon* (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 966, 977-978.)

A suppression motion *shall* be made, determined, and subject to review in accordance with the procedures set forth in **P.C. § 1538.5**.

As such, in order to warrant an evidentiary hearing and the cross-examining of the affiant to a wiretap search warrant, the defendant must first meet the requirements of *Franks v. Delaware* (1978) 438 U.S. 154 [57 L.Ed.2nd 667]. I.e., defendant must first make a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement was deliberately or recklessly included in the affidavit submitted in support of the wiretap application, and that such false statement was material to the court's finding of necessity. (*United States v. Shrylock* (9th Cir. 2003) 342 F.3rd 948, 976-977.)

“Evidence obtained from an unlawful wiretap may only be suppressed if the wiretap violated the United States Constitution or a procedure intended to play a central role in the legislative scheme and the purpose of that procedure was not achieved in some other manner.” (*People v. Jackson* (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 129, 148-153; finding also that California’s Truth in Evidence provisions (i.e., **Proposition 8**) do not prevent the suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the wiretap statutes that were enacted subsequent to the passage of **Proposition 8** by at least a two-thirds majority. Pgs. 152-153.)

Case law:

An officer’s “*good faith*” is not grounds for denying a defendant’s motion to suppress based on a violation of the wiretap statutes. (*People v. Jackson, supra*, at pp. 153-160.)

Failure to raise a search issue or one dealing with compliance with the statutory requirements of a wiretap waive (i.e., “forfeit”) that issue for purposes of appeal. (*People v. Davis* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 617, 625-632.)

P.C. § 629.74: Disclosure to Other Law Enforcement Agencies:

The Attorney General, any Deputy Attorney General, District Attorney, Deputy District Attorney, or any peace officer, who by any means authorized by this Chapter has obtained knowledge of the contents of any wire, electronic digital pager, or electronic cellular telephone communication, or evidence derived therefrom, *may* disclose the contents to:

- Anyone referred to in this section (above),
- Any investigative or law enforcement officer defined in **18 U.S.C. § 2510(7)**, *or*
- Any judge or magistrate;

To the extent disclosure is:

- Permitted per **P.C. § 629.82**, *and*
- Appropriate to the proper performance of the official duties of the individual making or receiving the disclosure.

No other disclosure, except to a grand jury, of intercepted information is permitted prior to a public court hearing by any person regardless of how the person may have come into possession thereof.

P.C. § 629.76: Use of Intercepted Information:

The Attorney General, any Deputy Attorney General, District Attorney, Deputy District Attorney, or any peace officer or federal law enforcement officer;

Who, by means authorized by this Chapter, has obtained knowledge of the contents of any wire, electronic pager, or electronic cellular communication, or evidence derived there from;

May use the contents or evidence to the extent the use:

- Is appropriate to the proper performance of his or her official duties; *and*
- Is permitted by **P.C. § 629.82**.

P.C. § 629.78: Disclosure of Intercepted Information in Testimony:

Any person who has received by any means authorized by this Chapter any information concerning a wire, electronic pager, or electronic cellular telephone communication, or evidence derived therefrom, intercepted in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter;

May, per **P.C. § 629.82**, disclose the contents of that communication or derivative evidence;

While giving testimony under oath or affirmation in any criminal court proceeding or in any grand jury proceeding.

P.C. § 629.80: Privileged Communications:

No otherwise privileged communication intercepted in accordance with this Chapter shall lose its privileged character.

Note: See **Evid. Code, §§ 900 et seq.** for the statutory privileges.

When a peace officer or federal law enforcement officer, while engaged in the intercepting of wire, electronic pager, or electronic communication pursuant to this Chapter, intercepts a privileged communication;

- He or she *shall* immediately cease the interception for at least two (2) minutes.
- After two (2) minutes, interception may be resumed for up to thirty (30) seconds during which time the officer shall determine if the nature of the communication is still privileged.
- If still privileged, the officer *shall* again cease interception for at least two (2) minutes.
- After two (2) minutes, the officer may again resume interception for up to thirty (30) seconds to redetermine the nature of the communication.
- The officer shall continue to go online and offline in this manner until the time that the communication is no longer privileged or the communication ends.

The recording device shall be metered so as to authenticate upon review that interruptions occurred as set for in this section.

See *People v. Reyes* (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 671, 681-687, noting the minimization requirements under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) and discussing the “*standing*” of one of the defendants to raise the issue even though it was not her phone that was tapped, and *United States v. McGuire* (9th Cir. 2002) 307 F.3rd 1192, 1199-1203, discussing the “*minimization*” of intercepted fax communications under the federal statutes.

What is required in the way of “minimization” depends upon the circumstances. The minimization requirement is lessened when there is uncertainty as to the scope of the conspiracy, or when co-conspirators are talking. (*People v. Reyes, supra.*)

P.C. § 629.82: Interception of Communications Relating to Crimes *Other Than* Those Specified in the Authorization Order:

For crimes listed in **P.C. § 629.52(a)**, or listed in **P.C. § 667.5(c)** as a “*violent felony*:”

If a peace officer or federal law enforcement officer, while engaged in the intercepting of wire, electronic digital pager, or electronic communication pursuant to this Chapter;

Intercepts wire, electronic pager, or electronic communication relating to crimes other than those specified in the order of authorization, but which are listed in **P.C. § 629.52(a)**, or listed in **P.C. § 667.5(c)** as a “*violent felony*:”

- The contents thereof, and evidence derived therefrom, may be disclosed or used as provided in **P.C. § 629.74** and **629.76**; *and*
- The contents thereof, and evidence derived therefrom, may be used under **P.C. § 629.78** when authorized by a judge if the judge finds, upon subsequent application, that the contents were otherwise intercepted in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter.

The “subsequent application” *shall* be made as soon as practicable.

See **18 U.S.C. § 2517(5)** for federal rules relative to the disclosure of intercepted communications involving offense other than those specified in a federal judge’s authorization or approval.

For *other than* **P.C. § 629.52(a)** crimes or **P.C. § 667.5(c)** violent felonies:

If a peace officer or federal law enforcement officer, while engaged in the intercepting of wire, electronic pager, or electronic communication pursuant to this Chapter, intercepts wire, electronic pager, or electronic communication relating to crimes *other than* those specified in the order of authorization *and* which are *not* listed in **P.C. § 629.52(a)** or **P.C. § 667.5(c)**:

- The contents thereof, and evidence derived therefrom, may *not* be disclosed or used as provided in **P.C. § 629.74** and **629.76**,
- *Except* to prevent the commission of a public offense.
- The contents thereof, and evidence derived therefrom, may *not* be used under **P.C. § 629.78**, *except* where:

The evidence was obtained through an independent source, *or*

The evidence would have been inevitably discovered anyway, *and*

The use is authorized by a judge who finds that the contents were intercepted in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter.

Right to Notice and Copy: The use of the contents of an intercepted wire, electronic pager, or electronic cellular telephone communication relating to crimes other than those specified in the order of authorization to obtain a search or arrest warrant entitles the person(s) named in the warrant to:

- *Notice* of the intercepted wire, electronic digital pager, or electronic cellular telephone communication; *and*
- *A copy* of the contents thereof that were used to obtain the warrant.

Section 629.82(a) extends the “*plain view*” doctrine to information communicated by someone other than the person identified in the wiretap order about a crime other than the one which justified the tap. (*People v. Jackson* (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 129, 145.)

See also *United States v. Carey* (9th Cir. 2016) 836 F.3rd 1092, holding that evidence obtained in “*plain hearing*,” when overhearing speakers unrelated to the target conspiracy while listening pursuant to a valid wiretap, is admissible.

P.C. § 629.84: Criminal Punishment for Violations:

Any violation of this Chapter is punishable by:

- A fine not exceeding two thousand five hundred dollars (\$2,500.00), *or*
- Imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year, *or*
- Imprisonment in the state prison or county jail, pursuant to **P.C. § 1170(h)**, for 16 months, 2 or 3 years (see **P.C. § 18**), *or*
- Both the above fine *and* the county jail or state prison imprisonment.

P.C. § 629.86: Civil Remedies for Unauthorized Interceptions:

Any person whose wire, electronic pager, or electronic cellular telephone communication is intercepted, disclosed, or used in violation of this Chapter *shall* have the following civil remedies:

- A civil cause of action against any person who intercepts, discloses, or uses, or procures any other person to intercept, disclose, or use the communications.
- Be entitled to recover, in that action, all of the following:
 - Actual damages, but not less than liquidated damages computed at the rate of one hundred dollars (\$100.00) a day for each day of violation, or one thousand (\$1,000.00), whichever is greater; *and*
 - Punitive damages; *and*
 - Reasonable attorney's fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred.

A good faith reliance on a court order is a complete defense to any civil or criminal action brought under this Chapter, or under Chapter 1.5 (**P.C. §§ 630 et seq.**; Eavesdropping), or any other law.

P.C. § 629.88: Effects of Other Statutes:

Nothing in **P.C. §§ 631** (Wiretapping), **632.5** (Intercepting or Receiving Cellular Radio Telephone Communications), **632.6** (Intercepting or receiving Cordless Telephone Communications), or **632.7** (Recording Communications Via Cellular Radio, Cordless, or Landline Telephone Without Consent of All Parties) shall be construed as:

- Prohibiting any peace officer or federal law enforcement officer from intercepting of any wire, electronic digital pager, or electronic cellular telephone communication pursuant to an order issued in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter, *or*
- Rendering inadmissible in any criminal proceeding in any court or before any grand jury any evidence obtained by means of an order issued in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter.

Nothing in **P.C. § 637** (Wrongful disclosure of Telegraphic or Telephonic Communication) shall be construed as prohibiting the disclosure of the contents of any wire, electronic pager, or electronic cellular telephone communication obtained by any means authorized by this Chapter.

Nothing in this Chapter shall apply to any conduct authorized by **P.C. § 633** (Exceptions for Law Enforcement; Eavesdropping).

P.C. § 629.89: Covert Residential Entries Prohibited:

No order issued pursuant to this Chapter *shall* either directly or indirectly authorize entry into or upon the premises of a residential dwelling, hotel room, or motel room, for installation or removal of any interception device or for any other purpose.

Notwithstanding that this entry is otherwise prohibited by any other section or code, this Chapter *expressly prohibits* covert entry of a residential dwelling, hotel room, or motel room to facilitate an order to intercept a wire, electronic digital pager, or electronic communication.

P.C. § 629.90: Order for Cooperation of Public Utilities, Landlords, Custodians and Others:

An order authorizing the interception of wire, electronic pager, or electronic cellular telephone communication shall direct, upon request of the applicant, that:

- A public utility engaged in the business of providing communications services and facilities, *or*
- A landlord, *or*
- A custodian, *or*
- Any other person;

Furnish the applicant forthwith all information, facilities, and technical assistance necessary to accomplish the interception unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference with the services the person or entity is providing the person whose communications are to be intercepted.

Any such person or entity furnishing facilities or technical assistance shall be fully compensated by the applicant for the reasonable costs of furnishing the facilities and technical assistance.

P.C. § 629.91: Civil or Criminal Liability; Reliance Upon Court Order:

A good faith reliance on a court order issued in accordance with this Chapter by any public utility, landlord, custodian, or any other person furnishing information, facilities, and technical assistance as directed by the order;

Is a complete defense to any civil or criminal action brought under this Chapter, or Chapter 1.5 (**P.C. §§ 630 et seq.**), or any other law.

P.C. § 629.92: Authority to Conform Proceedings and Order to Constitutional Requirements:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, *any court* to which an application is made in accordance with this Chapter *may* take any evidence, make any finding, or issue any order required to conform the proceedings or the issuance of any order of authorization or approval to the provisions of:

- The Constitution of the United States, *or*
- Any law of the United States, *or*
- This Chapter.

P.C. § 629.94: Training and Certification of Law Enforcement Officers:

The Commission on “Peace Officer Standards and Training” (“POST”), in consultation with the Attorney General, shall establish a course of training in the legal, practical, and technical aspects of the interception of private wire, electronic pager, or electronic communication and related investigative *techniques*.

The Attorney General *shall* set minimum standards for certification and periodic recertification* of the following persons as eligible to apply for orders authorizing the interception of private wire, electronic digital pagers, or electronic communication, to conduct the interceptions, and to use the communications or evidence derived from them in official proceedings:

- Investigative or law enforcement officers; *and*
- Other persons, when necessary, to provide linguistic interpretation who are designated by the Attorney General, Chief Deputy Attorney General, or Chief Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Law Division, or the District Attorney or the district attorney's designee, and are supervised by an investigative or law enforcement officer.

POST (Peace Officer Standards and Training) may charge a reasonable enrollment fee for those students who are employed by an agency not eligible for reimbursement by the Commission to offset the costs of the training.

The Attorney General may charge a reasonable fee to offset the costs of certification.

**Note:* Recertification has been set for every five (5) years.

P.C. § 629.96: Severability:

If any provision of this Chapter, or the application thereof to any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of the Chapter, and the application of its provisions to other persons or circumstances, shall not be affected thereby.

P.C. § 629.98: Automatic Repeal:

This Chapter shall remain in effect only until January 1, 2020, and as of that date is repealed.

P.C. § 632: Eavesdropping, Compared:

Separate from, and in addition to, the restrictions on wiretapping, is the issue of “*eavesdropping*” on the “*confidential communications*” of others (effective 11/8/67).

See *People v. Ratekin* (1989) 212 Cal.App.3rd 1165: Although **P.C. §§ 631 and 632**, which prohibit wiretapping and eavesdropping, respectively, envision and describe the use of same or similar equipment to intercept communications, the manner in which such equipment is used is clearly distinguished and mutually exclusive: “*Wiretapping*” is intercepting communications by an unauthorized connection to the transmission line whereas “*eavesdropping*” is interception of communications by the use of equipment which is not connected to any transmission line.

However, see *People v. Guzman* (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 184, where, in a child sexual abuse case, the trial court did not err when it admitted a recorded telephone conversation between a defense witness and the mother of one of the defendant’s victims, obtained in violation of **P.C. § 632(d)**; Eavesdropping. Although **section 632(d)** bars the admission of evidence obtained as a result of recording a confidential communication without the consent of all parties, the right to truth-in-evidence provision of **Cal. Const. art I, § 28(f)(2)**, as enacted by passage of **Proposition 8** in June, 1982, abrogated that exclusionary rule to the extent it is invoked to suppress relevant evidence in a criminal proceeding. **Proposition 8** allows the admission of evidence collected in violation of the **Invasion of Privacy Act** where the evidence is relevant and its admission is not otherwise barred by the **U.S. Constitution**. Both prongs were met by the recording in question in this case.

Note: Review granted by the California Supreme Court in this case on June 27, 2017. (2017 Cal. LEXIS 5922.)

P.C. § 633.8: *Eavesdropping in Hostage or Barricading Situations:*

(a) Legislative Intent: To allow peace officers to eavesdrop and record confidential oral communications in hostage and barricading situations.

(b) A peace officer may use an electronic amplifying or recording device to eavesdrop on and/or record, any oral communication within a particular location in response to the taking of a hostage or the barricading of a location if:

(1) The officer reasonably determines that an emergency situation exists involving the immediate danger of death or serious physical injury to any person;

(2) The officer reasonably determines that the emergency situation requires that eavesdropping occur immediately;
and

(3) There are grounds upon which an order could be obtained pursuant to **18 U.S.C. § 2516(2)** for the offenses specified in it.

Note: 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2) permits the interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications when the interception may provide evidence of the commission of murder, kidnapping, gambling, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic drugs, marijuana or other dangerous drugs, or other crimes dangerous to life, limb, or property, and is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year.

(c) Only a peace officer who has been designated by either a district attorney or by the Attorney General may make the three determinations listed above.

(d) A peace officer is not required to knock or announce his or her presence before entering or before installing or using any electronic amplifying or recording devices.

(e) An application for an order approving eavesdropping must be made within 48 hours *after* the eavesdropping has begun.

Compliance with **P.C. § 629.50** (setting forth the requirements of a wiretap application) is required.

(f) Any oral communications overheard must be recorded, and in such a manner as to protect the recording from alterations.

(g) A “*barricading*” occurs when a person refuses to come out from a covered or enclosed position, or when a person is held against his or her will and the captor has not made a demand.

(h) A “*hostage situation*” occurs when a person is held against his or her will and the captor has made a demand.

(i) A judge is prohibited from granting an eavesdropping application in anticipation of an emergency situation.

A judge is required to grant the application in a barricade or hostage situation where there is probable cause to believe that an individual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit an offense listed in **18 U.S.C. § 2516(2)** (see *Note* above) and only if the peace officer has fully complied with the requirements of this section.

(j) A peace officer who makes the decision to use an eavesdropping device is *not* required to undergo wiretap training pursuant to **P.C. § 629.94**.

(k) A peace officer is required to stop using an eavesdropping device when the barricade or hostage situation ends, or upon the denial by a judge for an order approving eavesdropping, whichever occurs first.

(l) Nothing in this new section is intended to affect the admissibility or inadmissibility of evidence.

Chapter 7:

Warrantless Searches:

General Rule:

“A seizure conducted without a warrant is *per se* unreasonable under the **Fourth Amendment**—subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions.” (*United States v. Hawkins* (9th Cir. 2001) 249 F.3rd 867, 872; *Brewster v. Beck* (9th Cir. 2017) 859 F.3rd 1194, 1196.)

Also, it is well established that “a seizure lawful at its inception can nevertheless violate the **Fourth Amendment** because its manner of execution unreasonably infringes possessory interests.” (*United States v. Jacobsen* (1984) 466 U.S. 109, 124 [104 S.Ct.1652; 80 L.Ed.2nd 85, & fn. 25; citing *United States v. Place* (1983) 462 U.S. 696, 707-710 [103 S.Ct. 2673; 77 L.Ed.2nd 110]; *United States v. Dass* (9th Cir. 1988) 849 F.2nd 414, 414-415; *Lavan v. City of Los Angeles* (9th Cir. 2012) 693 F.3rd 1030; *Brewster v. Beck*, *supra*, at p. 1196.)

Although the use of a search warrant when conducting any search is the general rule (see below, and “*Searches With a Search Warrant* (Chapter 6), above), under the terms of the **Fourth Amendment**, the search of a *person, vehicle* and (possibly) *container* without a warrant may often be justified under one or more of *three* legal theories:

- *Incident to Arrest*
- *With Probable Cause plus Exigent Circumstances*
- *With Consent*

Note: Each of these theories is separately discussed in the following chapters.

Searches of a *house* (or *residence*) pose different problems relating to the necessity of a warrant. (See “*Searches of Residences*,” below)

Exceptions to the Search Warrant Requirement:

Aside from the three legal theories noted above, there are at least nine other justifications for the search and/or seizure of evidence without the need for a search warrant, as discussed below:

- *Plain Sight Observations*

- *Plain Hearing*
- *Plain Smell*
- *Exigent Circumstances*
- *Special Needs Searches and Seizures*
- *Closely Regulated Businesses or Activities*
- *School Searches*
- *Airport Searches*
- *Minimal Intrusion*

Plain Sight Observations: A “*plain sight*” observation (or “*plain smell*” or “*plain hearing*”) is *not a search*, and thus *does not* implicate the **Fourth Amendment**.

Rule: A plain sight observation of contraband or other evidence made while the officer is in a place or a position he or she has a lawful right to be does *not* involve any constitutional issues. (***People v. Block*** (1971) 6 Cal.3rd 239, 243; ***North v. Superior Court*** (1972) 8 Cal.3rd 301, 306.)

No Search: There is *no search* when an officer “observe(s) criminal activity with the naked eye from a vantage point accessible to the general public.” (***United States v. Garcia*** (9th Cir. 1993) 997 F.2nd 1273, 1279; ***People v. Ortiz*** (1994) 32 Cal.App.4th 286, 291.)

Justification for Seizure: When a peace officer lawfully discovers an item he reasonably believes is potential evidence of a particular crime, observed in “*plain sight*,” and its seizure appears necessary for its preservation, he may seize the item without a warrant. (***People v. Curley*** (1970) 12 Cal.App.3rd 732.) Five requirements are listed by the court (at p. 747):

- The officer must have reasonable (i.e., “probable cause”) cause to believe a particular crime has been committed. This requirement is compelled by the Constitution in order to avoid the danger of exploratory searches and seizures.
- The evidence must not have been discovered as the result of any invasion, intrusion, or illegal entry other than purely formal trespass.
- The evidence must be in plain sight or readily accessible to routine inspection without rummage or pry. If the evidence is discoverable only as a result of inquisitive or exploratory action then what is involved is a search, and the rules for search apply.

- The officer must have reasonable cause to believe the evidence tends to show the commission of the crime or tends to show that a particular person committed the crime.
- The seizure must be necessary to preserve potential evidence, and the degree of invasion of other interests affected by the seizure must be in proportion to the seriousness of the crime.

No Expectation of Privacy: There is *no expectation of privacy* in anything voluntarily exposed to public view. (See *People v. Benedict* (1969) 2 Cal.App.4th 400, 403-404; defendant's physical characteristics observed in plain sight by a police officer, leading to his arrest for being under the influence of a controlled substance.)

“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of **Fourth Amendment** protection.” (*Katz v. United States* (1967) 389 U.S. 347, 351 [19 L.Ed.2nd 576, 582.]

“Thus a man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the ‘plain view’ of outsiders are not ‘protected’ because no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited. . . . (C)onversations in the open would not be protected against being overheard, for the expectation of privacy under the circumstances would be unreasonable.” (*Id.*, at p. 361 [19 L.Ed.2nd at p. 588]; concurring opinion.)

Examples:

An officer standing in the common areas of an apartment complex, observing contraband through a person's uncovered windows, is *not* illegal. (*People v. Superior Court [Reilly]* (1975) 53 Cal.App.3rd 40, 50.)

But, trespassing at the side of a house where the public is *not* impliedly invited, at least when investigating a minor offense (i.e., loud music) and no attempt is first made to contact the resident by knocking at the front door, makes the officers' observations into the defendant's uncovered windows illegal. (*People v. Camacho* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 824.)

But see the dissent in *Camacho*, at pp. 843-844, listing a considerable number of federal circuit court decisions [*not* binding upon the state courts] which have ruled to the contrary in similar circumstances.

Walking around to the back of the defendant's house to knock, while looking for an armed parolee-at-large, was held to be lawful, differentiating the rule of *Camacho* on the facts and the relative seriousness of the crimes involved. The fact that the officer was "trespassing" held not to be significant when considering the "reasonableness" of the officer's actions. (*People v. Manderscheid* (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 355.)

Walking all the way around a house in an attempt to locate an occupant was lawful, and the plain sight observations made while doing so were therefore admissible. (*United States v. Hammett* (9th Cir. 2001) 236 F.3rd 1054.)

Use of night vision goggles to observe areas within the curtilage of defendants' residence was irrelevant. (*People v. Lieng* (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1227-1228.) The use of a flashlight to look into a structure, when the officers are in a place they have a lawful right to be, is not a search. (*United States v. Dunn* (1987) 480 U.S. 294, 298, 304 [94 L.Ed.2nd 326, 333, 336-337]; . (*People v. Chavez* (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1493, 1501; *United States v. Barajas-Avalos* (9th Cir. 2004) 359 F.3rd 1204, 1214, but see dissenting opinion, at pp. 1220-1221.)

Observing defendant retrieving contraband from a hole in the ground behind an apartment complex, this observation being made from another person's private property with that person's permission, is a lawful plain sight observation. (*People v. Shaw* (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 833.)

The use of binoculars to enhance what the officer can already see, depending upon the degree of expectation of privacy involved under the circumstances, is normally lawful. (*People v. Arno* (1979) 90 Cal.App.3rd 505.)

Similarly, observation of a marijuana patch while flying at an altitude of some 1,500 to 2,000 feet, visible to the naked eye (and then enhanced through the use of binoculars), did not violate the

defendant's privacy rights. (*Burkholder v. Superior Court* (1979) 96 Cal.App.3rd 421; see also *People v. St Amour* (1980) 104 Cal.App.3rd 886, observations made from 1,000 to 1,500 feet, again enhanced through the use of binoculars, held to be lawful.)

Ordering a person to lift his sunglasses exposing his eyes is *not* a search. (*People v. Weekly* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1264; dilated pupils observed.)

The surveillance and photographing of defendant in public was not a **Fourth Amendment** violation despite the fact that defendant's identity and location where he was expected to appear were determined through the use of a witness telephone hotline program which guaranteed anonymity to its callers. (*People v. Maury* (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 382-403.)

Observation of child pornography on the defendant's computer, being lawfully searched as authorized by a homicide warrant, was in "*plain sight*," and admissible in a later pornography prosecution. (*United States v. Wong* (9th Cir. 2003) 334 F.3rd 831.)

A person who exposes his facial features, and/or body in general, to the public, in a public place, has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his appearance. (See *People v. Benedict* (1969) 2 Cal.App.3rd 400, 403-404; "The latter phenomenon (defendant's physical characteristics) was in plain sight of the officer and observed by him without any semblance of a search or seizure; his use of a flashlight to observe the pupillary reaction was not improper. The utilization of the light from a flashlight directed to that which is in plain sight ordinarily does not render observation thereof a search;" citing *People v. Cacioppo* (1968) 264 Cal.App.2nd 392, 397.)

Exception:

The Eight Circuit Court of Appeal has held, in a questionable decision, that seizing a firearm observed in plain sight under circumstances where there was no reason to believe anyone was in any danger, or other probable cause to believe that the firearm was associated with any crime, was a **Fourth Amendment** violation. (*United States v. Lewis* (8th Cir. 2017) 864 F.3rd 937.)

The "Plain Sight Observation" vs. the Right To Enter a Residence: When observing contraband within a residence from the outside, a warrantless entry into those premises to seize the contraband would *not* be justified

absent exigent circumstances. (*Horton v. California* (1990) 496 U.S. 128, 137, fn. 7 [110 L.Ed.2nd 112, 123]; *United States v. Murphy* (9th Cir. 2008) 516 F.3rd 1117, 1121.) A search warrant authorizing the entry of the residence must first be obtained.

However, exigent circumstances would be present if the officer reasonably believes that the occupants of the residence have discovered that the police are aware of contraband in the residence. (*Horton v. California, supra.*)

“Plain Hearing:” It has also been held that an offense occurring within a police officer’s *sense of hearing* is within his presence, and can supply probable cause. (*People v. Bradley* (1957) 152 Cal.App.2nd 527.)

The crime of making annoying or harassing telephone calls, per P.C. § 653x, is done in the listener’s presence. (*People v. Bloom* (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1496; harassing phone calls to a police dispatcher.)

Evidence obtained in “*plain hearing*,” when overhearing speakers unrelated to the target conspiracy while listening pursuant to a valid wiretap, is admissible. (*United States v. Carey* (9th Cir. 2016) 836 F.3rd 1092.)

“Plain Smell:” It has been argued that there should be no logical distinction between something apparent to the *senses of sight and hearing* and the same thing apparent to the *sense of smell*. (*People v. Bock Leung Chew* (1956) 142 Cal.App.2nd 400.)

Rule: “If the presence of odors is testified to before a magistrate and he finds the affiant qualified to know the odor, and it is one sufficiently distinctive to identify a forbidden substance, this Court has never held such a basis insufficient to justify issuance of a search warrant. Indeed, it might very well be found to be evidence of most persuasive character.” (*Johnson v. United States* (1948) 333 U.S. 10, 13 [92 L.Ed. 436, 440]; see also *District of Columbia v. Wesby et al.* (Jan. 22, 2018) __ U.S. __, fn. 5 [138 S.Ct. 577; 199 L.Ed.2nd 453].)

This, however, does not relieve the officer of the legal duty to obtain a search warrant before opening an already seized package which is the source of the odor, absent exigent circumstances excusing the lack of a warrant. (*Id.* at p. 14 [92 L.Ed. at pp. 440-441].)

While the odor of marijuana coming from a mailed package will justify the seizure of such package, it does not excuse the lack of a

search warrant when law enforcement opens the package without exigent circumstances. (*Robey v. Superior Court* (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1218, 1223-1243; overruling *People v. McKinnon* (1972) 7 Cal.3rd 899, 909; which had held to the contrary.)

See particularly the concurring opinion in *Robey v. Superior Court*, *supra*, at pp. 1243-1254.)

Examples:

The odor of opium coming from an apartment supplied sufficient probable cause to justify an entry, arrest and search of the apartment. (*People v. Bock Leung Chew*, *supra*.)

Odor of marijuana smoke during a traffic stop justified the search of a vehicle. (*People v. Lovejoy* (1970) 12 Cal.App.3rd 883, 887.)

The “strong odor of fresh marijuana” on defendant’s person was held to be probable cause to believe defendant was in possession of the marijuana. (*People v. Gale* (1973) 9 Cal.3rd 788, 793, fn. 4.)

The odor of marijuana emanating from two trucks at a private airstrip, under circumstances consistent with smuggling operations, was found to constitute probable cause to believe the trucks contained marijuana. (*United States v. Johns* (1985) 469 U.S. 478 [83 L.Ed.2nd 890].)

The odor of beer noted during a traffic stop supplied probable cause to search the car for alcohol. (*People v. Molina* (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1038.)

The odor of burnt marijuana plus the plain sight observation of a pipe containing what appeared to be marijuana residue in defendant’s vehicle was sufficient to justify the warrantless search of the vehicle. (*People v. Waxler* (2014) 224 Cal. App. 4th 712.)

It was not error for the federal district court to deny defendant’s motion to suppress evidence retrieved from his car because the prolonged stop following a routine traffic stop was justified by the smell of marijuana along with the credible testimony by the police officer. The odor alone was sufficient to establish probable cause to search the automobile and its contents. (*United States v. Smith*) (8th Cir. 2015) 789 F.3rd 923.)

“(T)he smell of burnt marijuana alone establishes probable cause to search a vehicle for the illegal substance.” (*United States v. Snyder* (10th Cir. 2015) 793 F.3rd 1241; see also *United States v. Walker* (8th Cir. 2016) 840 F.3rd 477; odor of unburned marijuana alone supplied sufficient probable cause to search defendant’s vehicle.)

Exceptions:

Minority Opinion:

The courts in some jurisdictions feel that the odor alone, without other suspicious circumstances, *may not* be sufficient to establish probable cause. (See *People v. Taylor* (Mich. 1997) 564 N.W.2nd 24; odor of marijuana did not justify the warrantless search of a vehicle.)

It is also been held elsewhere that there must be probable cause to believe that there is a criminal amount of marijuana in a vehicle in order to justify a warrantless search. (See *Commonwealth v. Cruz* (2011) 459 Mass. 459 [945 N.E.2d 899]. California has rejected this rule. (*People v. Waxler*, *supra*, at pp. 722-723; “(N)either the California Supreme Court nor the United States Supreme Court has limited the automobile exception to situations where the defendant possesses a “criminal amount of contraband.”)

And see “*Odor of Ether*,” below.

Odor of Marijuana in a Residence: Entering a residence with probable cause to believe only that the non-bookable offense of possession of less than an ounce of marijuana is occurring (**H&S § 11357(b)**), is closer to the *Welsh v Wisconsin* (1984) 466 U.S. 740 [80 L.Ed.2nd 732] situation (a civil offense only), and a violation of the **Fourth Amendment** when entry is made without consent or a search warrant. (*People v. Hua* (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1027; *People v. Torres et al.* (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 989, 993-998.)

The *Torres* Court also rejected as “speculation” the People’s argument that there being four people in the defendants’ hotel room indicated that a “marijuana-smoking party” was occurring, which “probably” involved a bookable amount of marijuana. (*People v. Torres et al.*, *supra*, at p. 996.)

Odor of Marijuana in a Vehicle:

Issue: Is a warrantless search of a vehicle lawful based upon no more than the odor and/or other information indicating that no more than a legal amount of marijuana is in the car?

Argument: As of January 1, 2018, it legal for anyone 21 years of age or older to possess up to an ounce of marijuana, and to smoke the stuff if he or she is so inclined (**H&S § 11362.1(a)(1) & (3)**) The person need no longer have a medical necessity for doing so. (See the “**Compassionate Use Act of 1996**,” per **H&S §§ 11362.5 et seq.**) In other words, the “*recreational use*” of marijuana (or “cannabis”) is lawful in California. But there are limitations. On the limited issue of the use or possession of marijuana in vehicles, the following statutory restrictions are important: **H&S § 11362.3(a)** makes it illegal (an infraction) to smoke or ingest marijuana (1) in a public place (**subd. (a)(1)**), which arguably includes in a vehicle while out on the public streets or in any other public place), (2) anywhere where smoking tobacco is prohibited (**subd. (a)(2)**), (3) within 1,000 feet (including simple possession, whether or not it’s being smoked, if on the grounds) of a school, day care center, or youth center while children are present (**subd. (a)(3) & (5)**), or (4) while driving or operating, or when riding in the passenger seat or compartment, of a motor vehicle, boat, vessel, or aircraft (**subd. (a)(7) & (8)**). It is also illegal for anyone to (5) possess (whether or not it’s being smoked) an open container or open package of marijuana while driving, operating, or riding in the passenger seat of a motor vehicle, boat, vessel, or aircraft. (**Subd. (a)(4)**) (See also **Veh. Code §§ 23220, 23221, and 23222**, relative to cannabis in vehicles.) So in recognizing all these restrictions, the burning (no pun intended) question is now this: *What may a police officer do upon legally stopping a motor vehicle and developing probable cause to believe that there is at least some marijuana in the car?* In other words, *is a warrantless search of that vehicle lawful?* And if the occupants of the vehicle claim a medical marijuana excuse, or that they aren’t otherwise in violation of any of the **section 11362.3** restrictions, *can the officer still conduct a search of the vehicle to verify compliance with*

the statutes? The necessary probable cause to search the vehicle is typically developed through an officer's observation of even a minimal amount of marijuana (*People v. Waxler* (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 712, 718-725; *People v. Steele* (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1115-1120.), or simply by smelling the odor of burnt or bulk marijuana. (*United States v. Johns* (1985) 469 U.S. 478; *United States v. Snyder* (10th Cir. 2015) 793 F.3rd 1241; *United States v. Smith* (8th Cir. 2015) 789 F.3rd 923; *People v. Lovejoy* (1970) 12 Cal.App.3rd 883, 887; *People v. Gale* (1973) 9 Cal.3rd 788, 793, fn. 4.) However, if an officer conducts a vehicle search based upon no more than observing less than an ounce of marijuana in a car, when it is not being smoked, not in an open container, or otherwise not in violation of any of the **section 11362.3** restrictions, it can be expected that a defense attorney will later argue that such a search is illegal. There is statutory and case authority for such an argument. Specially, **H&S § 11362.1(c)** clearly provides that marijuana possessed under lawful circumstances is "not contraband nor subject to seizure," nor does a subject's lawful conduct pursuant to **section 11362.1(a)** "constitute the basis for detention, search, or arrest." Also, *People v. Torres et al.* (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 989, 993-998, held that a warrantless search upon the speculative belief that more marijuana than lawfully allowed may be found is illegal. However, *Torres* is a residential search case. With a vehicle, having a lower expectation of privacy as compared to a residence (see *People v. Valencia* (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 922, 938-939.), we also have a strong argument that evidence of the presence of some marijuana, despite no observable or admitted **section 11362.3(a)** violations, supplies the required "fair probability" (which is all you need to establish probable cause; *Illinois v. Gates* (1983) 462 U.S. 213.) to believe that a search of the entire vehicle will uncover more marijuana and a violation. Four cases support this argument: In *People v. Strasburg* (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1052, it was held that an officer's probable cause to believe that a person is in illegal possession of marijuana was not diminished by the fact that the person produced a medical marijuana identification card or a physician's authorization. The Court held that defendant was lawfully detained and his car lawfully searched despite producing a doctor's authorization to use marijuana for medical purposes. Also, in *People v. Waxler, supra*, it was

held that the odor of marijuana in a vehicle, with the plain sight observation of a marijuana pipe with what appeared to be a small amount of marijuana in the bowl, supplied the necessary probable cause and allowed for the warrantless search of the entire vehicle. The fact that possession of less than an ounce of marijuana was (at the time this case was decided) only an infraction, or that the defendant had a medical marijuana card, was held in *Waxler* to be irrelevant. Lastly, according to *People v. Dey* (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1318, and *People v. Hunter* (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 371, discovery of a limited amount of contraband in the passenger area of a vehicle supplies the necessary probable cause to search the entire vehicle for more. Until there is an 11362.1/11362.3 case on point, however, it is unknown at this time which of the above two theories the appellate courts will adopt.

Odor of Ether: The courts uniformly have held that the *odor of ether* (a byproduct of the manufacturing process for some dangerous drugs), emanating from a particular location (e.g., a house or garage), is *not* probable cause to search for drugs.

However it *is* an exigent circumstance, given the potential volatility of ether, to justify an immediate warrantless entry while escorting the fire department to “neutralize” the dangerous situation. (*People v. Messina* (1985) 165 Cal.App.3rd 931; *People v. Osuna* (1987) 187 Cal.App.3rd 845.)

So long as (1) the police have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property, (2) their assistance is not primarily motivated by the intent to arrest a person or seize evidence, and (3) there is some reasonable basis, “*approximating probable cause*,” to associate the emergency with the area or place to be entered, then the “*emergency doctrine*” will allow for a warrantless entry to neutralize the emergency. (*United States v. Cervantes* (9th Cir. 2000) 219 F.3rd 882.)

And then, any plain sight observations made while lawfully in the house neutralizing the danger can provide the necessary probable cause to secure the house, arrest the occupants, and obtain a search warrant for the rest of the house. (*People v. Hill* (1974) 12 Cal.3rd 731.)

The odor of ether plus other circumstances which corroborate the suspected presence of an illicit substance will normally establish probable cause. (*People v. Stegman* (1985) 164 Cal.App.3rd 936; *People v. Patterson* (1979) 94 Cal.App.3rd 456; *People v. Torres* (1981) 121 Cal.App.3rd Supp. 9.)

Odor From a Container: But while a distinctive odor may provide probable cause to believe that contraband is contained inside a package or bag, justifying the seizure of that container, a warrantless opening of that bag (i.e., a search), absent exigent circumstances (see *Guidi v. Superior Court* (1973) 10 Cal.3d 1.), would not be justified. (*People v. Marshall* (1968) 69 Cal.2nd 51; see also concurring opinion in *Robey v. Superior Court* (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1218, 1243-1254.)

The California Supreme Court, in its majority opinion, discussed the theory that a distinctive odor (of marijuana) might fit within the category of “*Single Purpose Containers*,” allowing for warrantless searches of a container, it declined to decide the issue because the record was not sufficiently developed at the trial court level. (*Robey v. Superior Court*, *supra.*, at pp. 1241-1243, and concurring opinion at 1247-1254; see also “*The Single Purpose Container Theory*,” under “*Searches of Containers*,” below.)

Exigent Circumstances: The presence of *exigent circumstances* (when combined with probable cause) will excuse the lack of a warrant. “*Exigent Circumstances*” are present, as a general rule, whenever there is no reasonable opportunity for the police officers to stop and take the time to get a search warrant. (See *United States v. Ventresca* (1965) 380 U.S. 102, 107 [13 L.Ed.2nd 684, 688]; *United States v. Camou* (9th Cir. 2014) 773 F.3rd 932, 940-941.)

Defined: “An exigent circumstance is ‘an emergency situation requiring swift action to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage to property, or to forestall the imminent escape of a suspect or destruction of evidence.’” (*People v. Superior Court [Chapman]* (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1012; quoting *People v. Ramey* (1976) 16 Cal.3rd 263, 276.)

“A person detained for investigation has no constitutional right to dispose of evidence.” (*People v. Quick* (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1006,

1008; citing *People v. Bracamonte* (1975) 15 Cal.3rd 394, 405, fn. 6; and *People v. Maddox* (1956) 46 Cal.2nd 301, 306.)

Rule: “[E]xigent circumstances are present when a reasonable person [would] believe that entry . . . was necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons, the destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some other consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts.” (*United States v. Alaimalo* (9th Cir, 2002) 313 F.3rd 1188, 1192-1193, quoting *Bailey v. Newland* (9th Cir. 2001) 263 F.3rd 1022, 1033; *United States v. Brooks* (9th Cir. 2004) 367 F.3rd 1128, 1133, fn. 5, & 1135; *United States v. Camou*, *supra*, at p. 940, quoting *United States v. McConney* (9th Cir. 1984) 728 F.2nd 1195, 1199.)

Per the California Supreme Court: “We have defined ‘exigent circumstances’ to include ‘an emergency situation requiring swift action to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage to property’ (*People v. Ramey* (1976) 16 Cal.3rd 263, 276) The action must be ‘prompted by the motive of preserving life or property and [must] reasonably appear to the actor to be necessary for that purpose.’ (*People v. Roberts* (1956) 47 Cal.2nd 374, 377)” (*People v. Duncan* (1986) 42 Cal.3rd 91, 97.)

“‘[E]xigent circumstances’ means an emergency situation requiring swift action to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage to property, or to forestall the imminent escape of a suspect or destruction of evidence.” (*People v. Panah* (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 465.)

The United States Supreme Court, in *Riley v. California* (June 25, 2014) 573 U.S. ___, at page ___ [134 S.Ct. 2473, at page 2494; 189 L.Ed.2nd 430], described “*exigent circumstances*,” excusing the lack of a search warrant when searching a cellphone discovered incident to arrest, to include:

- The need to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence;
- To pursue a fleeing suspect; *and*
- To assist persons who are seriously injured or are threatened with imminent injury.

Examples:

- To prevent the *destruction of evidence*. (*People v. Huber* (1965) 232 Cal.App.2nd 663; *People v. Bennett* (1998) 17 Cal.4th 373, 384-385; *People v. Seaton* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598; *United States v.*

Ojeda (9th Cir. 2002) 276, 486, 488; (*People v. Superior Court [Chapman]* (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1011.)

The warrantless entry and temporary seizure of a home while police obtain a search warrant is reasonable where there exists; (a) probable cause to believe the home contains evidence, (b) good cause to believe the occupants unless restrained will destroy the evidence, (c) the method used is less restrictive to the occupants than detaining them, and (d) a reasonable period of time is used to obtain a warrant. (*In re Elizabeth G.* (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 496.)

With “*probable cause*” to believe that contraband is contained in a particular residence, and a “*reasonable belief*” that if the house is not immediately secured the evidence will be destroyed, officers may enter to secure the house pending the obtaining of a search warrant or a consent to do a complete search. (*United States v. Alaimalo* (9th Cir, 2002) 313 F.3rd 1188; see also *Sandoval v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t.* (9th Cir. 2014) 756 F.3rd 1154, 1161; *Sialoi v. City of San Diego* (9th Cir. 2016) 823 F.3rd 1238.)

An intercepted telephone call indicating the occupants’ intent to secret or destroy evidence was held to be sufficient to justify a warrantless entry of a residence in order to secure the residence pending the obtaining of a search warrant. The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress 2.6 ounces of cocaine seized from his apartment based upon the officers’ reasonable belief that the entry was necessary to prevent the destruction of contraband. (*United States v. Fowlkes* (9th Cir. 2015) 804 F.3rd 954, 969-971.)

The fact that it took about an hour to coordinate the officers necessary to make the warrantless entry and the securing of defendant’s apartment was irrelevant; the exigency still existed. (*Id.*, at p. 971.)

See also *United States v. Dent* (1st Cir. Me. 2017) 867 F.3rd 37, where the court held that pending the obtaining of a search warrant, the securing of the residence, including doing a protective sweep during which illegal contraband was observed, did

not affect the legality of the search warrant where there was no evidence that either the warrant or the decision to seek the warrant was based on anything the officers discovered during their warrantless entry. The court found that the process of applying for the search warrant had already been initiated based on other independent sources of information and that drugs observed under an air mattress were not included in the search warrant affidavit.

Searching an arrestee's cellphone after its seizure and removal from defendant's control was held to be unlawful in that the possibility that he might delete incriminating data had been eliminated. Also, there was nothing to indicate that his phone was vulnerable to "remote wiping." If remote wiping was suspected, the possibility that such a tactic might be employed could have been eliminated by merely disconnecting the phone from the network. Lastly, the agent's search went beyond the scope of any probable cause that might have existed, searching not only the phone's call logs but videos and photographs as well. (*United States v. Camou* (9th Cir. 2014) 773 F.3rd 932, 940-941.)

"A person detained for investigation has no constitutional right to dispose of evidence." (*People v. Quick* (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1006, 1008; citing *People v. Bracamonte* (1975) 15 Cal.3rd 394, 405, fn. 6; and *People v. Maddox* (1956) 46 Cal.2nd 301, 306.)

See "*Securing the Premises Pending the Obtaining of a Search Warrant*," below.

- *Officers' Safety*. (*United States v. Ojeda*, *supra*; (*People v. Superior Court [Chapman]* (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1011)

See "*Protective Sweeps*," under "*Searches of Residences and Other Buildings*" (Chapter 10), below.

- *Fresh or Hot Pursuit* of a criminal suspect. (*Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden* (1967) 387 U.S. 294 [18 L.Ed.2nd 782]; *United States v. Santana* (1976) 427 U.S. 38 [49 L.Ed.2nd 300]; *People v. Escudero* (1979) 23 Cal.3rd 800, 808-811; *People v. Spain* (1984) 154 Cal.App.4th 845.)

See *Stanton v. Sims* (Nov. 4, 2013) 571 U.S. ___ [134 S.Ct. 3; 187 L.Ed.2nd 341], noting that the seriousness of the offense as a factor in justifying a warrant entry in a hot pursuit situation is an open question.

- *Search for additional suspects.* (*People v. Block* (1971) 6 Cal.3rd 239.)
- *Protection of life and property.* (*People v. Ammons* (1980) 103 Cal.App.3rd 20.)

A reasonable belief in the existence of an *imminent threat to life* or the *welfare of a person* within the home, probable cause to believe a *person reported missing is therein*, or a reasonable belief a person within is in *need of aid*, are all well recognized as exigent circumstances which justify an immediate, warrantless entry. (*People v. Coddington* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529; *Welsh v. Wisconsin* (1984) 466 U.S. 740, 750 [80 L.Ed.2nd 732, 743].)

The presence of a drug lab, as evidence by the odor of ether, given the explosive nature of the chemicals used, justifies an immediate warrantless entry to neutralize the danger. (*People v. Duncan* (1986) 42 Ca.3rd 91; *People v. Stegman* (1985) 164 Cal.App.3rd 936, 943; *People v. Messina* (1985) 165 Cal.App.3rd 937.)

See “*Plain Smell*,” above.

Note: The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal considers the warrantless entry of a residence in such drug lab cases as justified by the so-called “*emergency doctrine*,” which, per the court, is something different than “*exigent circumstances*.” (*United States v. Cervantes* (9th Cir. 2000) 219 F.3rd 882.)

Based upon probable cause to believe a domestic violence incident had occurred and that the female victim, known to be in a hotel room, might need the officer’s assistance; a warrantless entry was upheld. (*United States v. Brooks* (9th Cir. 2004) 367 F.3rd 1128.)

A warrantless entry into a residence when necessary to “*preserve the peace*” in the execution of a restraining order, allowing the defendant’s daughter to retrieve certain

property, was held to be lawful. Reasonable force was also properly used when necessary to effectively preserve the peace. (*Henderson v. City of Simi Valley* (9th Cir. 2002) 305 F.3rd 1052.)

To check on the welfare of persons reasonably believed to need law enforcement's assistance. (*Martin v. City of Oceanside* (9th Cir. 2004) 360 F.3rd 1078.)

To check for a missing eight-year-old girl where there was cause to believe that a male resident in the apartment searched had had contact with her earlier in the day and was now hiding, refusing to open the door. (*People v. Panah* (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 464-466. The fact that later evidence indicated that the victim might no longer be alive did not negate the exigency justifying a second warrantless entry upon discovery of evidence implicating defendant and indicating that the victim, who might still be alive despite defendant's statements to the contrary, had been in his apartment. (*Id.*, at pp. 467-468.)

- To prevent the *escape of suspects*, or when *suspects arm themselves*. (See *People v. Miller* (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 190, 200.)

E.g.: A possible trafficker in narcotics, ducking back into his residence upon the approach of peace officers, while attempting to shut the door and close the blinds, is an exigent circumstance justifying an immediate, warrantless entry. *United States v. Arellano-Ochoa* (9th Cir. 2006) 461 F.3rd 1142; gun found on the floor next to the front door, after the fact.)

Warrantless Seizure of a Child for Protective Custody Purposes:

The state's decision to take custody of a child implicates the constitutional rights of the parent and the child under the **Fourteenth** (Due Process) and **Fourth Amendments**, respectively. (*Mabe v. San Bernardino County, Department of Public Social Services* (9th Cir. 2001) 237 F.3rd 1101, 1106.)

Where social workers took a two-day-old child into protective custody from a hospital without prior judicial authorization due to the mother's addiction to methamphetamine, the father's **Fourteenth Amendment** claim failed because he did not have a

constitutionally recognized liberty interest in his relationship with the child since, at the time, no one was confident about whether he was the biological father. The child's **Fourth Amendment** claim survived summary judgment, however, because a reasonable juror could find that the social workers could not have reasonably believed that the child would likely experience bodily harm during the time it would have taken to obtain a warrant since the child would have very likely remained in the hospital. (*Kirkpatrick v. County of Washoe* (9th Cir. 2015) 792 F.3rd 1184, 1189-1190.)

While the parents' right to the custody of their children without governmental interference is to be measured under the **Fourteenth Amendment** due process cause, the child's rights not to be taken from his or her parents is a **Fourth Amendment** seizure issue. (*Id.*, at pp. 1190-1192.)

Where doctors recommended immediate medical care (spinal tap and infusion of antibiotics) to determine and treat possible meningitis in a 5-week-old infant, a pre-hearing taking of the child from an uncooperative parent, and temporary detention of that irate parent, is lawful as a "*special needs*" taking. (*Mueller v. Auker* (9th Cir. 2012) 700 F.3rd 1180, 1185-1190; adopting the factual description as provided at (9th Cir. 2009) 576 F.3rd 979, 982-986; and finding that the officer/civil defendant was entitled to qualified immunity in that the issue is an unsettled one.)

Special Needs Searches and Seizures: An exception to the search warrant requirement, as well as the need to even show any "*individualized suspicion*," is when a search is found to serve "*special needs*" beyond the need for normal law enforcement.

Test: The legality of a warrantless search under the "*special needs*" exception is determined by balancing (1) *the need to search* against (2) *the constitutional intrusiveness* of the search. (*Henderson v. City of Semi Valley* (9th Cir. 2002) 305 F.3rd 1052, 1059; citing *Ferguson v. City of Charleston* (2001) 532 U.S. 67, 78 [149 L.Ed.2nd 205].)

Suspicionless searches may be upheld if they are conducted for important "*non-law enforcement purposes*" in contexts where adherence to the warrant and probable cause requirement would be impracticable. (*Friedman v. Boucher* (9th Cir. 2009) 580 F.3rd 847, 853; finding that a forced extraction of a DNA sample from defendant's mouth by means of a buccal swab for inclusion in Nevada's cold case data bank was *not* justified by the Special Needs exception to the search warrant requirement.)

See also *City of Los Angeles v. Patel* (June 22, 2015) ___ U.S. ___, ___ [135 S.Ct. 2443, 192 L.Ed.2nd 435], involving the warrantless inspection of hotel and motel guest registration records.

See *People v. Maikho* (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1074, where the California Supreme Court, in reversing the lower court, held that a game warden, under authority of **Fish & Game § 1006**, who reasonably believes that a person has recently been fishing or hunting, but lacks reasonable suspicion that the person has violated an applicable fish or game statute or regulation, may stop a vehicle in which the person is riding to demand the person display all fish or game the person has caught or taken. As an administrative, special needs search, the standard **Fourth Amendment** probable cause requirements are irrelevant.

However, the administrative search exception is applicable only to warrantless searches where (1) the search promotes an important governmental interest, (2) is authorized by statute, and (3) the authorizing statute and its regulatory scheme provide specific limitations on the manner and place of the search so as to limit the possibility of abuse. (*Tarabochia v. Adkins* (9th Cir. 2014) 766 F.3rd 1115, 1121-1125; finding a traffic stop to check the plaintiff's fish to be in violation of the **Fourth Amendment** in that the applicable Washington State statutes (**Wash. Rev. Code §§ 77.15.080(1) & 77.15.096**) did not authorize traffic stops and limited such searches to “while fishing.”

Examples:

- *Random testing of student athletes (Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton* (1995) 515 U.S. 646 [132 L.Ed.2nd 564].) and those involved in extracurricular activities. (*Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls* (2002) 536 U.S. 822 [153 L.Ed.2nd 735].)
- *Suspicionless drug testing of teachers and administrators* because of the unique role that teachers play in the lives of school children, the *in loco parentis* obligations imposed upon them, and the fact that by statute (in Tennessee), teachers were charged with securing order such that they were “on the ‘frontline’ of school security, including drug interdiction.” (*Knox County Educ. Ass’n v. Knox County Bd. Of Educ.* (6th Cir. 1998) 158 F.3rd 361, 375.)

- *Random metal detector searches of students*, without any individualized suspicion, to help in keeping weapons off campuses. (*In re Latasha W.* (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1524.)
- *Search of a student's computer* based upon information that the graduate student was “hacking into” the school’s e-mail server and had the capability of “threaten(ing) the integrity of campus computer or communication systems.” (*United States v. Heckenkamp* (9th Cir. 2007) 482 F.3rd 1142.)
- *Drug testing* for United States Customs Service employees, in certain positions. (*Treasury Employees v. Von Raab* (1989) 489 U.S. 656 [103 L.Ed.2nd 685].)
- *Searches of employees' backpacks* to prevent inventory loss. (*United States v. Gonzalez* (9th Cir. 2002) 300 F.3rd 1048.)
- *Pre-departure airport screening procedures*, including the use of a magnetometer, at airports, as an “administrative search” to insure that dangerous weapons will not be carried onto an airplane and to deter potential hijackers from attempting to board. (*People v. Hyde* (1974) 12 Cal.3rd 158; *United States v. Aukai* (9th Cir. 2007) 497 F.3rd 955.)
- *Drug and alcohol testing* for railway employees involved in train accidents. (*Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn.* (1989) 489 U.S. 602 [103 L.Ed.2nd 639].)
- *Administrative inspections* of certain “closely regulated” businesses. (*New York v. Burger* (1987) 482 U.S. 691 [96 L.Ed.2nd 601].)
- *Administrative inspection* of fire-damaged premises to determine the cause of a fire. (*Michigan v. Tyler* (1978) 436 U.S. 499 [56 L.Ed.2nd 486].)
- *Administrative inspections* to ensure compliance with city housing code. (*Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco* (1967) 387 U.S. 523 [18 L.Ed.2nd 930].)
- *Border Patrol Checkpoints.* (*United States v. Martinez-Fuerte* (1976) 428 U.S. 543 [49 L.Ed.2nd 1116].)

- *Sobriety Checkpoints. (Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz* (1990) 496 U.S. 444 [110 L.Ed.2nd 412].)
- Entry into a residence when necessary to *enforce a court order*, such as a *temporary restraining order* related to domestic violence. (*Henderson v. City of Simi Valley* (9th Cir. 2002) 305 F.3rd 1052.)
- **Fourth Waiver** searches of parolees and some probationers. (*In re Tyrell J.* (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68, 77, overruled on other grounds; citing *Griffin v. Wisconsin* (1987) 483 U.S. 868, 873 [97 L.Ed.2nd 709, 717].)
- A search warrant issued pursuant to **P.C. § 1524.1**, for HIV testing in specified circumstances, authorized for purposes of public safety, has been referred to as a “*special needs*”-type search, and therefore subject to less stringent requirements than normally applicable. (*Humphrey v. Appellate Division of the Superior Court* (2002) 29 Cal.4th 569, 574-575.)
- The taking of *biological samples* from prison inmates, parolees and probationers for the purpose of completing a federal *DNA database*, might qualify as a “*special needs*” search. (*United States v. Kincade* (9th Cir. 2004) 379 F.3rd 813, 823-832.)
- *Search of luggage in a subway facility*: Implemented in response to terrorist attacks on subways in other cities, a program was designed to deter terrorists from carrying concealed explosives onto the New York’s subway. The city program established daily inspection checkpoints at selected subway facilities where officers searched bags that met size criteria for containing explosives. Subway riders wishing to avoid a search were required to leave the station. In a bench trial, the district court found that the program comported with the **Fourth Amendment** under the “*special needs doctrine*.” On appeal, the court affirmed, finding that the program was reasonable and therefore constitutional. In particular, the court found that preventing a terrorist attack on the subway was a special need, which was weighty in light of recent terrorist attacks on subway systems in other cities. In addition, the court found that the disputed program was a reasonably effective deterrent. Although the searches intruded on a full privacy interest, the court further found that such intrusion was minimal, particularly as inspections involved only certain size containers and riders could decline inspection by leaving the station. (*MacWade v. Kelly* (2nd Cir. 2006) 460 F.3rd 260.)

- *The search of a high school student's pockets* based upon a standard policy that all students who leave and return to the campus during the school day are subject to search, done to prevent the introduction of drugs and weapons onto the campus., at least where the search is very non-intrusive (i.e., the student is not touched). (*In re Sean A.* (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 182.)
- *Enforcement of Fish and Game Regulations*: A game warden, under authority of **Fish & Game § 1006**, who reasonably believes that a person has recently been fishing or hunting, but lacks reasonable suspicion that the person has violated an applicable fish or game statute or regulation, may nonetheless stop a vehicle in which the person is riding to demand the person display all fish or game the person has caught or taken. As an administrative, special needs search, the standard **Fourth Amendment** probable cause requirements are irrelevant. (*People v. Maikho* (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1074.)

However, the administrative search exception is applicable only to warrantless searches where (1) the search promotes an important governmental interest, (2) is authorized by statute, and (3) the authorizing statute and its regulatory scheme provide specific limitations on the manner and place of the search so as to limit the possibility of abuse. (*Tarabochia v. Adkins* (9th Cir. 2014) 766 F.3rd 1115, 1121-1125; finding a traffic stop to check the plaintiff's fish to be in violation of the **Fourth Amendment** in that the applicable Washington State statutes (**Wash. Rev. Code §§ 77.15.080(1) & 77.15.096**) did not authorize traffic stops and limited such searches to "while fishing."

See "*Fish and Game Code*," Below.

- *Depriving Parents of the Liberty Interest in the Care, Custody and Control of their Child due to Medical Necessity*: Where doctors recommended immediate medical care (spinal tap and infusion of antibiotics) to determine and treat possible meningitis in a 5-week-old infant, a pre-hearing taking of the child from an uncooperative parent, and temporary detention of that irate parent, is lawful as a "special needs" taking. (*Mueller v. Aufer* (9th Cir. 2012) 700 F.3rd 1180, 1185-1190; adopting the factual description as provided at (9th Cir. 2009) 576 F.3rd 979, 982-986; and finding that the officer/civil defendant was entitled to qualified immunity in that the issue is an unsettled one.)

- *Breathalyzer Tests for Police Officers Involved in Shootings*: A mandatory suspicionless Breathalyzer test administered to any police officer involved in an Officer Involved Shooting where someone was either injured or killed held to be lawful as a Special Needs search. (*Lynch v. City of New York* (2nd Cir. 2013) 737 F.3rd 150.)
- *Home “Walk-Throughs” for Purposes of Determining Welfare Eligibility*: Home visits by a social worker, made pursuant to the administration of a welfare program, are not searches because they were made for the purpose of verifying eligibility for benefits and not as part of a criminal investigation. (*Wyman v. James* (1971) 400 U.S. 309, 317-318 [27 L.Ed.2nd 408]; *Sanchez v. County of San Diego* (9th Cir. 2006) 464 F.3rd 916, 920-928; noting applicability of the “Special Needs” doctrine.)
- A city obtaining the transcripts of *text messages from a police officer’s city owned pager* when it was necessary for a non-investigatory work-related purpose; i.e., in order to determine whether the character limit on the city’s contract was sufficient to meet the city’s needs and to determine whether the employee’s overages were the result of work-related messaging or personal use. (*Ontario v. Quan* (2010) 560 U.S.746 [177 L.Ed.2nd 216].)
- *Searching of school lockers for a firearm* reported to have been used in a shooting by a student on a city transit bus the day before. (*In re J.D.* (2014) 225 Cal. App. 4th 709, 714-720.)
- *Jail Booking Strip Searches*: Visual body cavity searches of incoming inmates as a part of the routine booking process, where the inmate is not touched in any way, upheld despite the lack of probable cause. (*Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Burlington* (2012) 566 U.S. 318 [132 S.Ct. 1510; 182 L.Ed.2nd 566].)

An en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal, in *Bull v. City and County of San Francisco* (9th Cir. 2010) 595 F.3rd 964, overruled itself in its prior decision of *Giles v. Ackerman* (9th Cir 1984) 746 F.2nd 614, *Giles* having held that a person arrested on minor misdemeanor arrest warrants, with no prior criminal history or any relationship to drugs or weapons, could not be subjected to a strip

search even though she was to be put into the general jail population.

Exceptions to the Exceptions; i.e., where law enforcement is primarily pursuing its general crime control purposes, searches or seizures may *not* be allowed. Examples:

- A highway checkpoint program set up for purposes of drug interdiction. (*City of Indianapolis v. Edmond* (2000) [148 L.Ed.2nd 333].)

See “*DUI* (and other regulatory “*special needs*”) *Checkpoints*,” under “*Detentions*” (Chapter 3), above.

- A state hospital program to test pregnant women for drug use when the results are made available to law enforcement. (*Ferguson v. City of Charleston* (2001) 532 U.S. 67 [149 L.Ed.2nd 205].)

The “*special needs*” doctrine is inapplicable where the arrest and search at issue in a case were clearly for law enforcement purposes. (*Ferguson v. City of Charleston, supra*, at p. 83, fn. 20 [149 L.Ed.2nd 205]; “In none of our previous special needs cases have we upheld the collection of evidence for criminal law enforcement purposes;” and *City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, supra*, at p. 121 [148 L.Ed.2nd 333]; observing that the “special needs” doctrine has never been applied where the purpose of the search was “to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.”].)

Examples where the “Special Need” fails to outweigh a person’s right to privacy:

The *preemployment drug and alcohol screening requirement* for a part time “page” who would be responsible for putting books back on library shelves and, on occasion, staff the desk in the youth services area. (*Lanier v. City of Woodburn* (9th Cir. 2008) 518 F.3rd 1147.)

A *urinalysis drug test requirement for candidates for public office* was held to violate the **Fourth Amendment**. (*Chandler v. Miller* (1997) 520 U.S. 305 [137 L.Ed.2nd 513].)

Drug testing as a condition of placement or employment for Customs employees who were required to handle classified material only was rejected as being too broad (*National Treasury*

Employees Union v. Von Raab (1989) 489 U.S. 656 [103 L.Ed.2nd 685].)

A state hospital's drug testing policy, developed in conjunction with the police, for testing *unwed mothers* for drug abuse, found to be unconstitutional, at least without informing the mothers of the purposes for the test. (*Ferguson v. Charleston* (2001) 532 U.S. 67 [149 L.Ed.2nd 205].)

A forced, warrantless extraction of a DNA sample from defendant's mouth by means of a buccal swab for inclusion in Nevada's cold case data bank was *not* justified by the "special needs" exception to the search warrant requirement. (*Friedman v. Boucher* (9th Cir. 2009) 580 F.3rd 847, 853.)

Interviewing a child victim on a school campus without the parents' consent required a search warrant or other court order, or exigent circumstances, as a **Fourth Amendment** seizure, and did not meet the requirements of a "special needs" seizure. (*Greene v. Camreta* (9th Cir. 2009) 588 F.3rd 1011; certiorari granted.)

This case was overruled by the United States Supreme Court in *Camreta v. Greene* (2011) 563 U.S. 692 [179 L.Ed.2nd 1118], and vacated, making it unavailable for citation, but also leaving the issue unresolved.

See **P.C. § 11174.3(a)**, setting out a statutory procedures police officers are to use in interviewing child victims while at school.

Closely or Pervasively Regulated Businesses or Activities:

Rule: The courts have indicated that a warrant is *not* necessary in those cases where the place to be searched is commercial property, and the industry involved is one that is so "*pervasively regulated*" or "*closely regulated*" that warrantless inspections are necessary to insure proper, or legal, business practices. (*Donovan v. Dewey* (1981) 452 U.S. 594, 598-599 [69 L.Ed.2nd 262, 268-169]; *New York v. Burger* (1987) 482 U.S. 691, 700 [96 L.Ed.2nd 601, 612-613]; *People v. Paulson* (1990) 216 Cal.App.3rd 1480, 1483-1484.)

"*Closely regulated*" businesses (*Colonade Catering Corp. v. United States* (1970) 397 U.S. 72, 74, 77 [25 L.Ed.2nd 60, 63-65].); or

“Pervasively regulated” businesses (*United States v. Biswell* (1972) 406 U.S. 311, 316 [81 L.Ed.2nd 87, 92].) (*New York v. Burger*, *supra*, at p. 700 [96 L.Ed.2nd at pp. 612-613].)

Criteria: To qualify as a closely or pervasively regulated business which may be subject to warrantless, administrative searches, three criteria must be met:

- There must be a substantial governmental interest underlying the regulatory scheme authorizing the inspection.
- The warrantless inspections must be necessary to further the regulatory scheme.
- The statute’s inspection program, in terms of the certainty and regularity of its application, must provide a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant; i.e.:

It must advise the owner of the commercial premises that the search is being made pursuant to the law and has a properly defined scope; *and*

It must limit the discretion of the inspecting officers.

(*New York v. Burger*, *supra*, at pp. 702-702 [96 L.Ed.2nd at pp. 613-615; *People v. Paulson*, *supra*, at p. 1485; *City of Los Angeles v. Patel* (June 22, 2015) __ U.S. __, __ [135 S.Ct. 2443, 192 L.Ed.2nd 435].)

General Examples:

Commercial Trucking is a pervasively regulated industry, allowing for warrantless searches. (*United States v. Delgado* (9th Cir. 2008) 545 F.3rd 1195, 1200-1204; based upon Missouri statutes allowing for such searches.)

Also, for a “commercial vehicle officer,” who had limited law enforcement powers, to contact a regular state Highway Patrol officer to conduct a search, did not require any reasonable suspicion and did not prevent the regular officer from questioning defendant about issues unrelated to commercial vehicle regulations. (*Id.*, at pp. 1204-1205.)

A County Jail, including lockers located outside the visitor center but maintained by the jail personnel, particularly with signs warning visitors

that they were subject to search, is the equivalent to a closely regulated business allowing for a warrantless administrative search of a visitor and the property he deposits in the lockers. (*People v. Boulter* (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 761.)

Liquor Sales. (*Colonade Catering Corp. v. United States* (1970) 397 U.S. 72 [25 L.Ed.2nd 60].)

Firearms Dealers. (*United States v. Biswell* (1972) 406 U.S. 311, 311-312 [32 L.Ed.2nd 87].)

Mining. (*Donovan v. Dewey* (1981) 452 U.S. 594 [69 L.Ed.2nd 262].)

Automobile Junkyards. (*New York v. Burger* (1987) 482 U.S. 691 [96 L.Ed.2nd 601].)

Where Licenses Include a Consent to Search:

In some instances, licenses to do business include a consent to search (**26 U.S.C. § 7342**), and may impose sanctions for refusing to give such consent, but do not, by its terms, permit a forcible entry. (*Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States*, *supra*: Inspections under the federal retail liquor occupational tax stamp act.)

See also *United States v. Biswell* (1972) 406 U.S. 311 [32 L.Ed.2nd 87]; warrantless search of a gun dealer's place of business under authority of the **Gun Control Act (18 U.S.C. §§ 921 et seq.)**, upheld.

People v. Lee (1986) 186 Cal.App.3rd 743, 749; finding a warrantless entry into the private areas of a business (for the purpose of an arrest, in this case), does *not* affect the applicability of a regulatory scheme authorizing warrantless inspections of the private areas of some regulated businesses, unless the search is being conducted for the purpose of seeking contraband or evidence of crime under the guise of an administrative warrant. (*Donovan v. Dewey* (1981) 452 U.S. 594, 598, fn. 6 [69 L.Ed.2nd 262, 268].)

Exception: Hotels and Motels:

Hotels and motels do *not* qualify as closely regulated businesses, although an administrative subpoena or warrant is all that is necessary for the inspection of the business' guest registry records. (*City of Los Angeles v. Patel* (June 22, 2015) __ U.S. __, __ [135 S.Ct. 2443, 192 L.Ed.2nd 435].)

Exception: As an Excuse to Perform a Criminal Function:

Use of an administrative, or “*inspection*” warrant, issued by a court for the purpose of regulating building, fire, safety, plumbing, electrical, health, labor or zoning codes, does not justify an entry by police to make an arrest given the lesser proof standards needed to obtain an administrative warrant. If an entry is effected for the purpose of arresting the occupant, an arrest warrant must first be obtained. (*Alexander v. City and County of San Francisco* (1994) 29 F.3rd 1355.)

Pretextual detentions are illegal when the pretext used to conduct an investigation of “*ordinary criminal wrongdoing*” is an officer’s statutory administrative authority to conduct warrantless and suspicionless inspections, but where the detention and search would not have occurred but for the officer’s intent to conduct the criminal investigation. (*United States v. Orozco* (9th Cir. 2017) 858 F.3rd 1204.)

Other California & United States Regulatory/Administrative Searches:

Vehicle Code:

V.C. § 13353: Blood or breath test for D.U.I. arrestees.
(*Schmerber v. California* (1966) 384 U.S. 757 [16 L.Ed.2nd 980].)

Schmerber v. California, supra, was limited to its circumstances in *Missouri v. McNeely* (2013) 569 U.S. 141 [133 S.Ct. 1552; 185 L.Ed.2nd 696], where the Supreme Court held that being arrested for driving while under the influence did not allow for a non-consensual warrantless blood test absent exigent circumstances beyond the fact that the blood was metabolizing at a normal rate.

See *People v. Ling* (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1, 3-4, for a description of the history from *Schmerber* through *McNeely*. “Given the clarification of *Schmerber* in *McNeely*, **Fourth Amendment** challenges to blood draws must now be viewed through a fresh lens that is unencumbered by the past presumption of an existing exception to the warrant requirement.” (p. 4.)

Schmerber was not overruled by *McNeely*, but merely differentiated on its facts (*Birchfield v. North Dakota* (June 23, 2016) __ U.S. __, __ [136 S.Ct. 2160;195 L.Ed.2nd 560]:

In *Schmerber*, the defendant had been in a traffic collision and had to be transported to the hospital due to his injuries. The Court in *McNeely* pointed out “that where time had to be taken to bring the accused to a hospital and to investigate the scene of the accident, there was no time to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant.” (Citation) ‘Given these special facts,’ we found that it was appropriate for the police to act without a warrant. (Citation)” (*Missouri v. McNeely*, *supra*, at 151.)

California’s “*implied consent law*,” **Veh. Code § 23612**, has been held to be a factor, among the “totality of the circumstances,” in determining whether or not a DUI arrestee has given “actual consent” to a warrantless blood draw. (*People v. Harris* (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 671, 681-692.)

“(A)ctual consent to a blood draw is not ‘implied consent,’ but rather a possible result of requiring the driver to choose whether to consent under the implied consent law. (Citation.) ‘[T]he implied consent law is explicitly designed to allow the driver, and not the police officer, to make the choice as to whether the driver will give or decline to give actual consent to a blood draw when put to the choice between consent or automatic sanctions. Framed in the terms of “implied consent,” choosing the “yes” option affirms the driver’s implied consent and constitutes actual consent for the blood draw. Choosing the “no” option acts to withdraw the driver’s implied consent and establishes that the driver does not give actual consent.’ (Citation)” (*Id.*, at p. 686.)

Note: See *Birchfield v. North Dakota* (June 23, 2016) __ U.S. __, __ [136 S.Ct. 2160;195 L.Ed.2nd 560], for a historical review of the development of DUI statutes, the importance of obtaining a reading of the suspect’s “BAC” (“Blood Alcohol Concentration”), and the advent of implied consent statutes.

Note: To put this rule into a formula:
*Implied consent per V.C. § 23612 +
circumstances consistent with consent =
actual consent.*

The implied consent provisions under **V.C. § 23612(a)(5)**, where, by statute, blood may be drawn from an unconscious or dead DUI suspect, does not overcome the need for a search warrant without a showing of exigent circumstances. (*People v. Arredondo* (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 186, 193-205; no exigency found, pp. 205-206.)

Note: Petition for Review was granted by the California Supreme Court in *People v. Arredondo* on June 8, 2016, making this case unavailable for citation.

Also note **V.C. § 13384** (effective since 1999) requiring for all new and renewed driver's licenses to include the applicant's written consent to submit to a chemical test or tests of that person's blood, breath, or urine, or to submit to a preliminary alcohol screening test pursuant to **V.C. § 23136** (persons under 21 years of age with a blood alcohol level of .01% or higher) when requested to do so by a peace officer, and for the applicant to sign a written declaration consenting to the above. The legal effect of this mandated written consent has yet to be tested, but may offer a solution to the inability of **section 23612's** "implied consent" provisions to avoid the need for a search warrant. (See *People v. Arredondo* (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 186, 198, & fn. 7; *People v. Mason* (2016) 8 Cal.App.5th Supp. 11, 26-27.)

In *Mason*, at p. 26, it was noted that, "(p)roof of that consent by (defendant) here would have at least brought the case closer to the probation condition or advance express-consent context." However, the Court still "doubt(ed)" it would "automatically" encompass the "rights and concerns" addressed under the **Fourth Amendment**. In *Mason*, no evidence of the

defendant's status as a licensed driver was in the record, so the issue was not decided.

Note: Petition for Review was granted by the California Supreme Court in *People v. Arredondo* on June 8, 2016, making this case unavailable for citation.

Where defendant's blood was taken over his objection and without a warrant, *Missouri v. McNeely, supra*, did not mandate suppression of the blood result in that *McNeely* was decided after the arrest in this case. Also, defendant was subject to search and seizure conditions under his "post-release community supervision" (PRCS) terms, eliminating the need for a search warrant. With probable cause to believe that he was driving while under the influence of alcohol when he had a traffic accident, his mandatory PRCS search and seizure conditions, authorizing the blood draw without the necessity of a search warrant, was not in violation of the **Fourth Amendment**. (*People v. Jones* (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1257, 1262-1269.)

A non-violent and/or non-manipulative refusal to submit to a blood or breath test is *not* a violation of the "resisting a peace officer" statute; **P.C. § 148**. "To permit a refusal in and of itself to be independently punished under **section 148**—wholly outside the implied consent scheme and the Legislature's policy judgments—would be inappropriate." "(A) person has the right to refuse to consent to a search" and "the exercise of a constitutional right cannot be punished under **section 148**." (*People v. Valencia* (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th Supp. 11, 16-27.)

In a prosecution for driving under the influence of alcohol, blood draw evidence should have been suppressed under the **Fourth Amendment** in that under the totality of the circumstances, the People failed to show that defendant actually—freely and voluntarily—consented to a blood draw to which she had physically submitted after an incomplete implied consent admonishment. The

admonishment, which stated that defendant was required to submit to a blood test, but did not include the consequences of refusal and was misleading. Defendant had a **Fourth Amendment** right, notwithstanding implied (or “deemed”) consent, to refuse and to bear the consequences of such a refusal. Implied consent does not constitute real or actual consent in fact, for purposes of the **Fourth Amendment**. Also, the People failed to offer any evidence of any advance express consent by defendant, or even that she was a licensed California driver. (*People v. Mason* (2016) 8 Cal.App.5th Supp. 11, 18-33.)

Per the Court, such implied consent “is not real or actual consent in fact for purposes of the **Fourth Amendment**, though it may be perfectly fine for purposes of administrative proceedings involving forfeiture of driving privileges under the implied consent law upon a refusal to submit to a duly requested chemical test. (*Id.*, at pp. 27-28; see *Hughey v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles* (1991) 235 Cal.App.3rd 752, 757.)

The Appellate Department of the San Diego Superior Court has held that sending blood results to a drug lab in those “driving while under the influence” cases where testing for alcohol failed to show sufficient alcohol to account for the degree that the suspect appeared to be under the influence, and where the defendant had consented only to have her blood tested for alcohol, as opposed to drugs, was a violation of the **Fourth Amendment** in that such drug testing is beyond the scope of the consent given; i.e., for alcohol only. (*People v. Pickard* (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th Supp. 12, 15-17.)

The Court further noted that to send the blood to a drug lab constituted “a procedural recurring or systematic failure by the law enforcement agency’s personnel to abide by the **Fourth Amendment**.” As a result, good faith did not prevent a court from suppressing the test result for drugs as being

beyond the scope of the consent given where the defendant is told only that her blood will be tested for alcohol. (*Id.*, at pp. 16-17.)

V.C. § 320(b): Auto dismantlers.

V.C. § 2805: California Highway Patrol and auto theft detectives searching for stolen parts at various businesses dealing in vehicles. (*People v. Woolsey* (1979) 90 Cal.App.3rd 994; *People v. Calvert* (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1820; *People v. Potter* (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 611.)

See “*Searches of Vehicles*” (Chapter 9), below.

Penal Code:

P.C. § 171e: Inspection of a firearm to determine whether it is loaded for purposes of **P.C. §§ 171c & 171d** (Firearms in state buildings and governmental residences.)

P.C. § 25850(b) (formerly **P.C. § 12031(a)**): Inspection of a firearm in a public place.

P.C. § 18250 (formerly **P.C. § 12028.5**): Seizure of firearms and other deadly weapons at domestic violence scenes.

Fish and Game Code: There is case law that refers to the regulation of hunting and fishing as having relaxed search and seizure standards due to the fact that they are “*highly regulated*” activities, and that requiring warrants would make it impossible to effectively implement hunting and fishing laws. But the case law is very sparse:

F&G § 8011: Allowing the warrantless inspection of the records of a wholesale fish dealer licensed under **F&G § 8040(a)**.

Cases:

People v. Harbor Hut Restaurant (1983) 147 Cal.App.3rd 1151; upholding the warrantless inspection of the fish in a restaurant under the theory that “*fishing*” is a “*highly regulated business.*”

Betchard v. Dept. of Fish and Game (1984) 158 Cal.App.3rd 1104; upheld the routine and warrantless inspections of plaintiff’s agricultural rangeland upon which

deer hunting was often done. But the court noted that the relaxed standards were due to the fact that the areas entered were “*open fields*” and the intrusion into the plaintiff’s privacy rights was minimal.

The court also noted that a hunter has given up a certain amount of his or her privacy rights:
“Hunters are required to be licensed. By choosing to engage in this highly regulated activity, there is a fundamental premise that there is an implied consent to effective supervision and inspection as directed by statute.” (*Id.*, at p. 1110.)

People v. Perez (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1168, upheld a highway checkpoint used to implement hunting regulations.

A game warden, under authority of **Fish & Game § 1006**, who reasonably believes that a person has recently been fishing or hunting, but lacks reasonable suspicion that the person has violated an applicable fish or game statute or regulation, may nonetheless stop a vehicle in which the person is riding to demand the person display all fish or game the person has caught or taken. As an administrative, special needs search, the standard **Fourth Amendment** probable cause requirements are irrelevant. (*People v. Maikho* (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1074.)

However, The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal has held that the administrative search exception is applicable only to warrantless searches where (1) the search promotes an important governmental interest, (2) is authorized by statute, and (3) the authorizing statute and its regulatory scheme provide specific limitations on the manner and place of the search so as to limit the possibility of abuse. (*Tarabochia v. Adkins* (9th Cir. 2014) 766 F.3rd 1115, 1121-1125; finding a traffic stop to check the plaintiff’s fish to be in violation of the **Fourth Amendment** in that the applicable Washington State statutes (**Wash. Rev. Code §§ 77.15.080(1) & 77.15.096**) did not authorize traffic stops and limited such searches to “while fishing.”

Financial Code:

Fin. Code § 21206: Inspection of pawned property. (See *Sanders v. City of San Diego* (1996) 93 F.3rd 1423, 1427; *G&G Jewelry*

Inc. v. City of Oakland (9th Cir. 1993) 989 F.2nd 1093, 1099-1101, and fn. 4.)

United States Code:

14 U.S.C. § 89(a): The Coast Guard has statutory authority to search vessels, giving them plenary authority to stop vessels for document and safety inspections. (*People v. Eng* (2002) 94 Cal.App.4th 1184; drugs discovered; see “*Border Searches*” (Chapter 14), below.)

49 U.S.C. § 44901: Transportation Security Administration (TSA) screening of luggage bound for airline flights. (See *United States v. McCarty* (9th Cir. 2011) 2011 U.S.App. LEXIS 18874; child pornography observed during a lawful TSA administrative search may lawfully be used to establish probable cause to arrest; case vacated and remanded, where defendant’s motion to suppress was denied at *United States v. McCarty* (U.S. Dist. Hawaii, 2011) 835 F. Supp.2nd 938.)

Miscellaneous:

Arson Investigations done immediately upon the extinguishing of a fire, before firefighters leave the scene and the building is secured. (*Michigan v. Clifford* (1984) 464 U.S. 287, 294 [78 L. Ed. 2nd 477].)

School Searches:

Athletics and Extracurricular Activities: Given the extent of the drug problem in public schools, and the importance of the governmental interest in preventing the problem from worsening (i.e., a “*Special Needs*” search), the U.S. Supreme Court has approved (warrantless) mandatory random drug tests for certain categories of students as the price for participating in:

School athletics: (*Vernonia School Distirct 47J v. Acton* (1995) 515 U.S. 646 [132 L.Ed.2nd 564].)

The California Supreme Court approved a similar program for a national college athletic organization (NCAA). (*Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn.* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1.)

Extracurricular activities: (Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls (2002) 536 U.S. 822 [153 L.Ed.2nd 735].)

Students in General:

Rule: Recognizing that students (K through high school) do retain some **Fourth Amendment** protections, and that school officials are, in effect, government employees, the Supreme Court struck a balance and found that school administrators may conduct searches of students and their personal belongings on no more than a “reasonable suspicion.” (*New Jersey v. T.L.O.* (1985) 469 U.S. 325 [83 L.Ed.2nd 720].)

A school search “will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.” (*Id.*, at p. 342.)

Constitutional Protections and Statutory Restrictions:

Cal. Const., article I, section 28(c), provides that students and staff of public schools have “the inalienable right to attend campuses which are safe, secure, and peaceful.”

Ed. Code § 49050: The **Education Code** provides that “(n)o school employee shall conduct a search that involves:

- Conducting a body cavity search of a pupil manually or with an instrument.
- Removing or arranging any or all of the clothing of a pupil to permit a visual inspection of the underclothing, breast, buttocks, or genitalia of the pupil.”

Cases:

With information from another student that a minor (Marissa) was supplying other students with prescription and over-the-counter pills at school, that alcohol could be obtained at the plaintiff Savana Safford’s home, and information from Marissa that Savana had supplied her with the pills, and with pills and other contraband being

found in Savana's day planner that was in Marissa's possession (which Savana admitted was hers), a search of Savana's backpack and outer clothing by school administrators was justified by a reasonable suspicion that Savana might have more pills in her possession. However, this level of suspicion was not sufficient to justify the greater intrusion of having Savana strip down to her underwear and pull her bra and panties out to see what fell out, thus partially exposing herself to school officials. (*Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding* (2009) 557 U.S. 354 [174 L.Ed.2nd 354]; finding that the school officials were entitled to qualified immunity from civil liability under these circumstances.)

Using a *drug-sniffing dog* to do sniffs of a student, being more intrusive, are considered to be a search and controlled by the **Fourth Amendment**, but only requires a finding of a "*reasonable suspicion*" when the person sniffed is a student. (*B.C. v. Plumas* (9th Cir. 1999) 192 F.3rd 1260; random and suspicionless drug-sniff search of students held to be unreasonable under the circumstances.)

It is the opinion of the California Attorney General that a policy of unannounced, random, neutral dog sniffing of students' personal belongings, such as backpacks, purses, jackets, and outer garments, after ordering students to leave these items in a classroom and remain in another area, would be unconstitutional absent some suspicion or probable cause to support the search. (83 *Opn.Cal.Atty. Gen.* 257 (2000))

See *Burlison v. Springfield Public Schools* (8th Cir. 2013) 708 F.3rd 1034, upholding, under the circumstances, the use of dogs to sniff students backpacks, purses and other personal belongings after instructing the students to leave these items in a classroom. The procedures used by the school district and police officers to conduct the sweeps reasonably addressed the concerns over drug usage in school in a manner that was minimally intrusive to the students and their belongings.

Use of *metal detectors* at the entrances of a school building, despite the lack of individualized suspicion, is lawful as a "*special needs*" search. (*In re Latasha W.* (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1524.)

Patting a non-student down for possible weapons on a high school campus, where the defendant/minor was to be moved to the security office, need not be justified by an articulable suspicion that he might be armed. (*In re Jose Y.* (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 748.)

A school resource officer, although employed as a municipal police officer, while working full time on a high school campus, adopts the relaxed “*reasonable suspicion*” standard applicable to school officials. (*In re William V.* (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1464; see also *In re Alexander B.* (1990) 220 Cal.App.3rd 1572, 1577-1578.)

The suspicionless search of a student was upheld where it was conducted pursuant to an established policy applying to all students and was consistent with the type of action on the part of a school administrator that fell well within the definition of “*special needs*” of a governmental agency. The search was of a limited nature, being told only to empty out his pockets, as he was not subjected to physical touching of his person nor was he exposed to the intimate process required for a urine sample necessary for drug testing. The purpose of the search was to prevent the introduction of harmful items (weapons and drugs) into the school environment. Given the general application of the policy to all students engaged in a form of rule violation that could easily lend itself to the introduction of drugs or weapons into the school environment (i.e., leaving during the school day without permission and returning later), further individualized suspicion was not required. (*In re Sean A.* (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 182, 186-190.)

But see the dissent (*Id.* at pp. 191-198) criticizing the decision as a non-particularized, suspicionless search of a student in violation of the principles of *New Jersey v. T.L.O.* (1985) 469 U.S. 325 [83 L.Ed.2nd 720], where the Supreme Court held that a reasonable suspicion is required. (See above)

Searching student lockers on less than probable cause, based upon a report that a student had been involved in a shooting on a city transit bus the day before and that he might have a firearm on campus, was justified under a

“special needs” theory and upheld. (*In re J.D.* (2014) 225 Cal. App. 4th 709, 714-720.)

Note: Ironically, J.D.’s sawed-off shotgun was not the firearm being sought, but was found accidentally while lawfully looking for a pistol that was reported to be in the possession of another minor on campus.

Note: The Court in this case, in upholding the search of the students’ lockers, provides a summary of some very frightening statistics involving violence in our schools, from high-profile school shootings to individualized acts of violence. (See *Id.*, at p. 714.)

Also, as to whether the fact that local city police became involved in the search for the firearm in this case might have somehow converted it into something other than a school search, the Court noted that; “the secondary role of the police officers does not cancel the fundamental feature of this case—administrators seeking to secure the school premises from potential for violence.” (*Id.*, at p. 720.)

The warrantless search of the defendant/minor’s cellphone was reasonable at its inception for purposes of the **Fourth Amendment** because a loaded firearm and its magazine cartridge had been seized from a trashcan earlier, the defendant had lingered outside the principal’s office where the student (a known friend of defendant’s), suspected of possessing the firearm, was being detained, and where the defendant was questioned after trying to get away. While being questioned, the defendant physically resisted as he was fingering his cellphone in his pocket. A warrant was not necessary before school officials searched the data on the phone because school officials needed only a reasonable suspicion to conduct a warrantless search, and were confronted by a situation in which a loaded firearm had been discovered on school property and they were reasonably concerned that the defendant might be using his phone to communicate with other students who might possess another firearm or weapon that the officials did not

know about. (*In re Rafael C.* (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1288.)

See also “*Minors*,” under “*Detentions*” (Chapter 3), above.

Airport Searches:

Reasonableness:

Warrantless airport screenings must be reasonable to be lawful. (*United States v. Marquez* (9th Cir. 2005) 410 F.3rd 612.)

“*Reasonableness*” is determined by balancing the right to be free of intrusion with society’s interest in safe air travel. (*United States v. Pulido-Baquerizo* (9th Cir. 1986) 800 F.2nd 899, 901.)

Airport searches are reasonable when:

- They are no more extensive or intensive than necessary, in light of current technology, to detect weapons or explosives;
- They are confined in good faith to that purpose; *and*
- Passengers are given the opportunity to avoid the search by electing not to fly.

(*United States v. Davis* (9th Cir. 1973) 482 F.2nd 893, 913; *Torbet v. United Airlines, Inc.* (9th Cir. 2002) 298 F.3rd 1087, 1089-1090; *United States v. Marquez, supra.*, at p. 616.)

In an older case, subject to question due to changing times and dangers, a Puerto Rico statute authorizing “police to search the luggage of any person arriving in Puerto Rico from the United States” was held to be unconstitutional because it failed to require either probable cause or a warrant. (*Torres v. Puerto Rico* (1979) 442 U.S.465, 466-471 [61 L.Ed.2nd 1].)

Second, Random Screening:

A second, more intense, yet random screening of passengers as a part of airline boarding security procedures, is constitutional. (*United States v. Marquez, supra.*)

Once having gone through the initial screening, a person loses his right to revoke his “*implied consent*” to being searched and must

submit his person (*United States v. Aukai* (9th Cir. 2007) 497 F.3rd 955.) and his carry-on luggage (*Torbet v. United Airlines, Inc., supra.*) to a secondary screening, so long as the selection of those subject to such secondary screenings is done objectively. E.g.:

Carry-on luggage was lawfully searched even though it had already gone through an x-ray examination without incident. (*Torbet v. United Airlines, Inc., supra.*)

Because defendant had attempted to board a flight *without valid identification*. Per TSA (Transportation Security Administration) rules, anyone attempting to board a commercial airplane without a government issued, picture identification, will be subject to a secondary screening. (*United States v. Aukai, supra*; defendant selected for “wanding” of his person even though he had already walked through the magnetometer without setting off an alarm.)

Per *Torbet* and *Aukai*, the first, initial screening, whether by x-ray of one’s carry-on luggage, or of the defendant’s person having walked through a magnetometer, is deemed “*inconclusive*” even though “*it doesn’t affirmatively reveal anything suspicious,*” or when it *fails to “rule out every possibility of dangerous contents,*” thus justifying the need for a secondary screening. So long as such secondary screenings are administered “*objectively,*” they are lawful.

Note: United States v. Aukai, supra, found that “*implied consent*” is not a proper theory for upholding airport searches. Rather, a warrantless, suspicionless search of a passenger, after the passenger has passed through the magnetometer (or has put his carry-on luggage on the conveyor belt for x-raying) is lawful as an “*administrative search.*”

Baggage Searches:

A search of luggage bound for an airline flight may be searched (i.e., “screened”) by Transportation Security Services (TSA) officers without a warrant or probable cause as an administrative search, looking for explosives or other safety hazards. Such a search may not be used as a ruse to conduct an exploratory search for criminal evidence. However, evidence of criminal activity observed in plain sight during such an administrative search may be used as probable cause for a criminal investigation. (*United States v. McCarty* (9th Cir. 2011) 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18874;

child pornography observed during a lawful TSA administrative search may lawfully be used to establish probable cause to arrest; case vacated and remanded, where defendant's motion to suppress was denied at *United States v. McCarty* (U.S. Dist. Hawaii, 2011) 835 F. Supp.2nd 938.)

The Minimal Intrusion Exception:

The United States Supreme Court has recognized, at least by inference, that in those instances where there is a “*minimal intrusion*” into a defendant’s privacy rights, suppression of the resulting evidence may not be required. “When faced with special law enforcement needs, diminished expectations of privacy, *minimal intrusions*, or the like, [it] has found that certain general, or individual, circumstances may render a warrantless search or seizure reasonable.” (Italics added; *Illinois v. McArthur* (2001) 531 U.S. 326, 330 [148 L.Ed.2nd 838].)

“(A)lthough a warrant may be an essential ingredient of reasonableness much of the time, for less intrusive searches it is not” (*United States v. Concepcion* (7th Cir. 1991) 942 F.2nd 1170, 1172; the issue being whether turning a key in a door lock was a search, but such a minimal intrusion that a search warrant was not necessary.)

Without obtaining a warrant, the police searched the defendant’s cellphone for its phone number. The police later used the number to p the phone’s call history from the telephone company. Even though there was no urgent need to search the cellphone for its phone number, the Seventh Circuit pointed out “that bit of information might be so trivial that its seizure would not infringe the **Fourth Amendment**.” (*United States v. Flores-Lopez* (7th Cir. 2012) 670 F.3rd 803, 806-807.)

California’s First District Court of Appeal (Div. 5) has found this theory to be a whole separate exception to the search warrant requirement, calling it the “*Minimal Intrusion Exception*.” (*People v. Robinson* (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 232, 246-255; “The minimal intrusion exception to the warrant requirement rests on the conclusion that in a very narrow class of ‘searches’ the privacy interests implicated are ‘so small that the officers do not need probable cause; for the search to be reasonable.” (*Id.*, at p. 247.)

Noting that searches of the person, at least absent an officer-safety issue, and searches of a residence, may be outside the scope of the minimal intrusion theory. (*Id.*, at p. 249.)

“Although the United States Supreme Court has not clearly articulated the parameters of the exception, federal authorities

provide sufficient support for concluding that in appropriate circumstances, the minimal intrusion exception to the warrant requirement may be applied to uphold warrantless searches based on less than probable cause. Moreover, although the high court's decisions in the area have primarily been justified by officer safety concerns (Citations), nothing in the high court's jurisprudence appears to preclude the possibility that a justification less than officer safety could be sufficient to justify an intrusion as minimal as that involved in the present case." (*Id.*, at pp. 249-250.)

Also, the fact that the defendant's front door was within the curtilage of his home, which also enjoys **Fourth Amendment** protection, does not alter the result. With the front door being an area open to the general public, there was no violation in approaching the door and inserting the key. (*Id.*, at p. 253, fn. 23.)

See "*Minimal Intrusion*," under "*Exceptions*," to the "*Fruit of the Poisonous Tree*" (Chapter 1), above, and "*The Minimal Intrusion Exception*," under "*Searches and Seizures*" (Chapter 5), above.

Chapter 8

Searches of Persons:

Privacy Rights: Of all the areas where a person has a legitimate “*reasonable expectation of privacy*” protecting the person from governmental intrusions, none, perhaps, is greater than that person’s own body. (See *Winston v. Lee* (1985) 470 U.S. 753, 759 [84 L.Ed.2nd 662]; “A compelled surgical intrusion into an individual’s body for evidence . . . implicates expectations of privacy and security of such magnitude that the intrusion may be ‘unreasonable;’ even if likely to produce evidence of a crime.”)

Note: However, given the relative “*mobility*” of one’s person, with sufficient cause, a warrantless search of a person may generally be justified, with the exception of intrusions below the skin level; i.e., blood tests. (See *Missouri v. McNeely* (2013) 569 U.S. 141 [133 S.Ct. 1552; 185 L.Ed.2nd 696].)

See also *United States v. Fowlkes* (9th Cir. 2015) 804 F.3rd 954, 960-968; the physical extraction of a plastic baggie by police officers during a jail strip search of a baggie from defendant’s rectum without a warrant or persons with proper medical training held to be a **Fourth Amendment** violation.

And see *Birchfield v. North Dakota* (June 23, 2016) ___ U.S. ___, ___ [136 S.Ct. 2160; 195 L.Ed.2nd 560], and *Missouri v. McNeely* (2013) 569 U.S. 141 [133 S.Ct. 1552; 185 L.Ed.2nd 696], restricting the taking of a blood sample in DUI cases to when an actual consent is obtained, or exigent circumstances are present. (See “*Blood Samples in DUI Cases,*” and “*Driving Under the Influence Cases,*” respectively, below.)

Rule: Where lawful, warrantless searches of a person are justifiable under one or more of the following legal theories:

- *Searches Incident to Arrest*
- *Searches with Probable Cause*
- *Searches with Less Than Probable Cause*

Searches Incident to Arrest: A warrantless search of a person and the area within his/her immediate reach incident to that person’s custodial arrest, *with or without any probable cause* to believe there is any contraband or evidence subject to seizure on the person, is lawful, and is justified by the need to keep contraband and weapons out of jail, to preserve any possible evidence, and to protect the officer. (*Chimel v. California* (1969) 395 U.S. 752 [23 L.Ed.2nd 685]; *New York*

v. Belton (1981) 453 U.S. 454 [69 L.Ed.2nd 768]; *United States v. Robinson* (1973) 414 U.S. 218, 224 [38 L.Ed.2nd 427]; *People v. Macabeo* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1213.)

History Behind the Rule: See *Birchfield v. North Dakota* (June 23, 2016) ___ U.S. ___, ___ [136 S.Ct. 2160; 195 L.Ed.2nd 560], for a description of the history behind the rule since the 18th century.

Legal Justification: “The rule allowing contemporaneous searches (incident to arrest) is justified, for example, by the need to seize weapons and other things which might be used to assault an officer or effect an escape, as well as by the need to prevent the destruction of evidence of the crime—things which might easily happen where the weapon or evidence is on the accused’s person or under his immediate control.” (*United States v. Ventresca* (1965) 380 U.S. 102, 107 [13 L.Ed.2nd 684, 688]; see also *Cupp v. Murphy* (1973) 412 U.S. 291, 296 [36 L.Ed.2nd 900]; *Riley v. California* (June 25, 2014) 573 U.S. ___, ___ [134 S.Ct. 2473, 2483; 189 L.Ed.2nd 430]; *United States v. Camou* (9th Cir. 2014) 773 F.3rd 932, 937-938; *Birchfield v. North Dakota*, *supra*.)

“A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the **Fourth Amendment**; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification. It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search, and we hold that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the **Fourth Amendment**, but is also a ‘reasonable’ search under that Amendment.” (*United States v. Robinson* (1973) 414 U.S. 218, 235 [38 L.Ed.2nd 427]; *People v. Macabeo* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1213.)

“A person detained for investigation has no constitutional right to dispose of evidence.” (*People v. Quick* (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1006, 1008; citing *People v. Bracamonte* (1975) 15 Cal.3rd 394, 405, fn. 6; and *People v. Maddox* (1956) 46 Cal.2nd 301, 306.)

A warrantless “*search incident to arrest*” may be made of an arrestee and the area within her immediate reach even though the arrestee has been handcuffed and can no longer lunge for weapons or evidence. (*People v. Rege* (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1584; but see below.)

Per *Arizona v. Gant* (2009) 556 U.S. 332 [173 L.Ed.2nd 485], this rule does not generally apply to arrests within a vehicle once the subject has been secured. See “*Searches*

Incident to Arrest,” under “*Searches of Vehicles*” (Chapter 9), below.

Establishing the rule as a blanket rule, and *not* an issue that is to be decided on a case by case basis, the U.S. Supreme Court eventually held that: “The authority to search the person incident to a lawful custodial arrest, while based upon the need to disarm and to discover evidence, does not depend on what a court may later decide was the probability in a particular arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon the person of the suspect.” The mere “fact of the lawful arrest” justifies “a full search of the person.” (*United States v. Robinson* (1973) 414 U.S. 218, 235-236 [38 L.Ed.2nd 427].)

Such a search has traditionally been justified by the need to search “for weapons, instruments of escape, and evidence of crime” upon performing a custodial arrest. (*People v. Diaz* (2011) 51 Cal.4th 84.)

See also the concurring, minority opinion in *People v. Summers* (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 288; for an excellent description of the legal reasoning behind searches incident to arrest, and why (at least as the argument went at that time prior to the decision in *Arizona v. Gant*, *infra*.) it is irrelevant that the person arrested had already been moved from the immediate location where the arrest is first made.

Exceptions:

Cellphones: This rule, however, has been held *not* to apply to cellphones in that cellphones do not pose a danger to officers and once seized, it is unlikely any evidence contained in the phone is going to be destroyed. When balanced with the large amount of personal information likely to be found in cellphones, a warrantless intrusion into the phone is not justified under the **Fourth Amendment** absent exigent circumstances. (*Riley v. California* (June 25, 2014) 573 U.S. __, __ [134 S.Ct. 2473, 2489-2491; 189 L.Ed.2nd 430].)

The United States Supreme Court, in *Riley v. California*, *supra*, at page __ [134 S.Ct. 2473, at page 2494], described “*exigent circumstances,*” excusing the lack of a search warrant when searching a cellphone discovered incident to arrest, to include:

- The need to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence;
- To pursue a fleeing suspect; *and*
- To assist persons who are seriously injured or are threatened with imminent injury.

Blood Samples in DUI Cases: Nor does it apply to the extraction of a blood sample from the person of an arrestee in DUI (Driving while Under the Influence) cases (noting that the significantly lesser bodily intrusion of a breath test may be administered incident to arrest without a search warrant). (*Birchfield v. North Dakota* (June 23, 2016) __ U.S. __, __ [136 S.Ct. 2160; 195 L.Ed.2nd 560].)

The majority of the Supreme Court rejected the dissenting justices' use of *Missouri v. McNeely* (2013) 569 U.S. 141 [133 S.Ct. 1552; 185 L.Ed.2nd 696] in this context, noting that *McNeely* is an “*exigent circumstance*” case, while the issue here is a “*search incident to arrest.*” (136 S.Ct. at p. 2180.)

Physical Body Cavity Searches:

Being arrested for possession of marijuana does not justify a physical body cavity search at the side of the road. (See *Hamilton v. Kindred* (5th Cir. 2017) 845 F.3rd 659; holding that it was clearly established in the Fifth Circuit that an officer could be liable as a bystander in a civil case involving excessive force (referring to the physical body cavity search) if he knew a constitutional violation was taking place and he had a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm.)

(See *Strip Searches Restricted,*” under “*Strip Searches of Prisoners,*” below.)

Legal Justification Under Debate:

The Ninth Circuit Court noted in *United States v. Weaver* (9th Cir. 2006) 433 F.3rd 1104, at page 1107, that searches incident to arrest have gone well beyond the “*rational underpinnings*” of the Supreme Court’s original approval of such searches in *New York v. Belton, supra*. More specifically, the Court noted how “officer safety and preservation of evidence” (see *Chimel v. California, supra*.) are no longer a major concern when the arrestee is

handcuffed and put into a nearby patrol car. And the Court quoted Supreme Court Justice O’Conner who is noted to have said that, “lower court decisions seem now to treat the ability to search a vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent occupant as a police entitlement rather than as an exception justified by the twin rationales of *Chimel* . . . [This is] a direct consequence of *Belton’s* shaky foundation.” (Concurring opinion in *Thornton v. United States* (2004) 541 U.S. 615, 624 [158 L.Ed.2nd 905].)

Note that the U.S. Supreme Court decided in *Arizona v. Gant* (2009) 556 U.S. 332 [173 L.Ed.2nd 485], that a warrantless search of a vehicle incident to arrest is lawful *only* when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.

Although the United States Supreme Court has indicated that *Gant* is limited to “circumstances unique to the vehicle context” (see *Riley v. California* (June 25, 2014) 573 U.S. ___, __ [134 S.Ct. 2473, 2492; 189 L.Ed.2nd 430], citing *Gant* at p. 343.), at least one California court has applied it to the residential situation. (See *People v. Leal* (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1051; arrest in a residence.)

See “*Incident to Arrest*,” under “*Searches of Vehicles*” (Chapter 9), below.

Then, in *United States v. Maddox* (9th Cir. 2010) 614 F.3rd 1046, at pages 1048-1049, the Ninth Circuit found that a search of a metal vial on the defendant’s key chain was unlawful where, although under defendant’s control when he was physically arrested, it was no longer within reach and was beyond defendant’s ability to conceal or destroy evidence by the time it was searched because defendant had been handcuffed and put into a patrol car.

However, with the metal vial in *Maddox* being taken from defendant’s hand as he was being arrested, an argument can be made that pursuant to the subsequent California Supreme Court decision of *People v. Diaz* (2011) 51 Cal.4th 84, where it was held that containers “*immediately associated with the person*” are still subject to a search incident to arrest, even though the suspect has been arrested and secured, and even if the container is not searched until later. (See below.)

Despite the above debate, the United States Supreme Court reiterated the need for a “*categorical rule*” in ***Birchfield v. North Dakota*** (June 23, 2016) __ U.S. __, __ [136 S.Ct. 2160; 195 L.Ed.2nd 560], reaffirming that warrantless searches incident to arrest of the person of the arrestee and the area within his immediate reach are lawful; applying this rule to breath tests in DUI cases.

Transportation Requirement:

Custodial Arrest Requirement: Anyone who is arrested and is to be transported to jail, the police station, a detoxification center, home, etc. (i.e., a “*custodial arrest*”), may be fully searched prior to the transportation. (***United States v. Robinson*** (1973) 414 U.S. 218 [38 L.Ed.2nd 427].)

Robinson involved an arrest for driving on a revoked license where the arrestee was transported to the police station. In the decision, the Court referred to it as a “*full custodial arrest*” which, in turn, was “defined at (sic) one where an officer ‘would arrest a subject and subsequently transport him to a police facility for booking,’” (pg. 223, fn. 2.)

Other than this brief comment (above), and in noting that ***Robinson*** had been subjected to a “*full custodial arrest*,” the issue of whether or not an actual transportation of the arrestee was a legal prerequisite to a “*search incident to that arrest*” was not discussed.

There is no such thing as a “*search incident to citation*,” because of the lack of a physical transportation of the subject from the scene of the arrest. (***Knowles v. Iowa*** (1998) 525 U.S. 113 [142 L.Ed.2nd 492]; see also ***People v. Brisendine*** (1975) 13 Cal.3rd 528, 538-552; ***People v. Macabeo*** (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1218; ***In re D.W.*** (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1249, 1253.)

In ***Knowles***, the Court noted that the officer, under Iowa law, had the option of physically arresting or only citing the driver for a speeding violation. The officer chose to do the later. Therefore, no transportation of the defendant was contemplated. The Supreme Court, in discussing the differences between a *cite and release* situation (albeit for an

infraction) when compared to a “*custodial arrest*” where the subject is transported to a police station, noted the following significant factor:

“We have recognized that . . . officer safety . . . is ‘both legitimate and weighty,’ [Citations]. The threat to officer safety from issuing a traffic citation, however, is a good deal less than in the case of a custodial arrest. In *Robinson*, we stated that a custodial arrest involves ‘danger to an officer’ because of ‘the extended exposure *which follows the taking of a suspect into custody and transporting him to the police station.*’ (Italics added) 414 U.S., at 234-235 We recognized that ‘[t]he danger to the police officer flows from the fact of the arrest, and its attendant proximity, stress, and uncertainty, and not from the grounds for arrest.’ *Id.*, at 234, n. 5 A routine traffic stop, on the other hand, is a relatively brief encounter and ‘is more analogous to a so-called “*Terry stop*” . . . than to a formal arrest.’ [Citations] (“Where there is no formal arrest . . . a person might well be less hostile to the police and less likely to take conspicuous, immediate steps to destroy incriminating evidence”). (Parenthesis in original; pgs. 487-488.)

Note also that the **California Penal Code** dictates that misdemeanor-related laws apply equally to infractions. (**P.C. § 19.7**)

Although there has to be a transportation of the suspect in order to justify a search incident to arrest, the physical arrest *does not need* to be for *an offense for which custody* (as opposed to a citation) *is mandatory*. (*Gustafson v. Florida* (1973) 414 U.S. 260 [38 L.Ed.2nd 456].)

In *Gustafson*, defendant was lawfully arrested for driving without a valid license in his possession and searched incident to that arrest. The officer had planned to transport the defendant to the police station prior to the search; a lawful procedure under

Florida law. The search was upheld as a lawful search incident to this “*lawful custodial arrest*.”

At page 265, the *Gustafson* Court notes that: “Though the officer here was not required to take the petitioner into custody by police regulations as he was in *Robinson*, and there did not exist a departmental policy establishing the conditions under which a full-scale body search should be conducted, we do not find these differences determinative of the constitutional issue. [Citation] It is sufficient that the officer had probable cause to arrest the petitioner and that he lawfully effectuated the arrest, and placed the petitioner in custody.”

This comment, which is not further explained, seems to recognize a difference between a “*full custodial arrest*” (as it is referred to in *Robinson*) and the mere citation and release at the scene.

Also, in footnote 3 (*Id.*, at p. 266), again inferring a difference between citing and releasing at the scene and the taking of the suspect into “*custody*” for transportation, the Court notes that: “Smith (the officer) testified that he wrote about eight to 10 traffic citations per week, and that about three or four out of every 10 persons he arrested for the offense of driving without a license were taken into custody (and transported) to the police station. Smith indicated that an offender is more likely to be taken into custody if he does not reside in the city of Eau Gallie. Finally, Smith testified that after making a custodial arrest, he always searches the arrestee before placing him into the patrol car.”

Taking a person in to “*protective custody*,” where, for instance, he is acting irrationally (e.g., intoxicated, in this case), allows for a patdown for weapons prior to transporting him. (*United States v. Gilmore* (10th Cir.) 776 F.3rd 765.)

A misdemeanor cite and release at the scene of the contact (i.e., a “*non-custodial arrest*”), *absent probable cause* to believe the arrestee has evidence or contraband on him,

would *not* be subject to a search incident to arrest for the simple reason he is *not* to be transported; i.e., it is *not* a “custodial arrest.” (See *People v. Brisendine* (1975) 13 Cal.3rd 528; *United States v. Moto* (9th Cir. 1993) 982 F.2nd 1384.)

Brisendine found a search incident to arrest to be illegal where the person was to be cited at the scene and released for a misdemeanor fire code (i.e., an illegal campfire) violation. Although *Brisendine* was based upon a pre-Proposition 8 interpretation of the California Constitution, the Court did note at page 548, fn. 15: “We also accept the (United States Supreme Court’s) view (in *Robinson* and *Gustafson*) that transportation in a police vehicle per se justifies a limited weapons search, regardless of the likelihood that a particular arrestee is armed.”

Although the California Supreme Court in *Brisendine* limited searches incident to a “custodial arrest” to looking for weapons, interpreting the more restrictive California Constitution, it still preconditioned such a search upon the transportation of the arrestee.

In *United States v. Moto*, *supra.*, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal found the defendants’ custodial arrest for an infraction, where they were transported to the police station, to be contrary to the provisions of P.C. § 853.5 mandating the release of the subject on his written promise to appear absent an exception to the rule, as provided for in the statute. Assuming without discussing the issue that a cite and release is *not* a custodial arrest, the Court here found the “search incident to arrest” to be a **Fourth Amendment** violation.

Moto is questionable authority in light of more recent pronouncements from both the United States and California Supreme Courts (See *Atwater v. City of Lago Vista* (2001) 532 U.S. 318 [149 L.Ed.2nd 549]; *Virginia v. Moore* (2008) 553 U.S. 164 [170 L.Ed.2nd 559]; *People v. McKay* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 601, 607; and see also *United States*

v. McFadden (2nd Cir. 2001) 238 F.3rd 198, 204; *People v. Gomez* (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 531.) have ruled that transporting and even booking a person for a fine-only offense, even if contrary to state law, is *not* a **Fourth Amendment** violation and thus does not subject the resulting evidence to suppression. However, the Court's assumption is still valid that a "custodial arrest," involving the transportation of the arrestee to a police station, is a necessary prerequisite to a lawful "search incident to arrest."

However, **P.C. § 853.5** has been held to provide the excusive grounds for a custodial arrest for an infraction. (*Edgerly v. City and County of San Francisco* (9th Cir. 2013) 713 F.3rd 976, 981-985; citing *In re Rottanak K.* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 260, and *People v. Williams* (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1100.)

In order to justify a search incident to arrest, however, the subject must have actually been subjected to a custodial arrest. Absent such an actual arrest and transportation, the rule that a search incident to citation not being lawful, per *Knowles v. Iowa* (1998) 525 U.S. 113 [142 L.Ed.2nd 492], applies. (*People v. Macabeo* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1216-1219; *In re D.W.* (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1249, 1253.)

Transporting an arrested minor (even if for only a "status offense" such as a curfew violation or truancy), whether the minor is to be transported home (*In re Demetrius A.* (1989) 208 Cal.App.3rd 1245; prowling.) or to a police station (*In re Charles C.* (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 420; curfew.), justifies a search incident to arrest. (See also *In re Humberto O.* (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 237; truancy.)

In *Humberto O.*, the juvenile was taken into custody for a truancy violation. However, it was noted in the decision that "the officers planned to cuff defendant's hands behind his back, put him in the patrol car, and transport him to

school.” (pg. 240.) **Education Code §§ 48264 and 48265** require that the minor be transported to his parents or to school (among other choices). (*Id.*, at p. 241, fn. 2.) “The limited nature of a **section 48264** arrest requires that the minor be transported to school, as the officers here planned to do.” (*Id.*, at p. 244.) Searching the backpack he was carrying incident to this custodial arrest, was upheld.

In *In re Demetrius A.*, *supra*, without discussing the issue of the necessity for a transportation, it was noted that the minor was arrested for prowling and was going to be transported home. A search incident to such a custodial arrest was lawful.

In *In re Charles C.*, *supra*, the minor was “taken into temporary custody” (i.e., “arrested,” see *Id.*, at p. 425, fn. 3.) and transported to the police station where he was searched “incident to the arrest.” The search was upheld, holding that it was irrelevant that the search was not conducted until after the transportation. Without further discussing the issue, the Court did note that citing (albeit for an infraction) at the scene and releasing the subject *does not* justify a search incident to such a citation. (*Id.*, at p. 424, fn. 2, citing *Knowles v. Iowa* (1998) 525 U.S. 113 [142 L.Ed.2nd 492].)

Contemporaneous in Time and Place:

General Rule: The “search incident to arrest” theory is, as a general rule, only applicable if the search is conducted “contemporaneous in time and place.” I.e., the search must be conducted at the time and location of the arrest. Searching after transportation to another location cannot be justified under this theory, absent some practical necessity for moving the person first. (See *People v. Ingham* (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 326.)

“(The) ‘justifications (for allowing a search incident to arrest) are absent where a search is remote in time or place from the arrest. Once an accused is under arrest and in custody, then a search made at another place, without a warrant, is simply not incident to the arrest.’” (*United States v. Ventresca* (1965) 380 U.S. 102, 107 [13 L.Ed.2nd 684, 688]; quoting *Preston v. United States* (1964) 376 U.S. 364, 367 [11 L.Ed.2nd 777, 780-781].)

See also *United States v. McLaughlin* (9th Cir. 1999) 170 F.3rd 889, where the search was conducted five minutes after the arrest, where the officer first drove the defendant from the scene. “The relevant distinction turns not upon the moment of arrest versus the moment of the search but upon whether the arrest and search are so separated in time or by intervening acts that the latter cannot be said to have been incident to the former.” (*Id.*, at p. 983, quoting *United States v. Abdul-Saboor* (D.C. Cir. 1996) 85 F.3rd 664, 668; see also *United States v. Hudson* (9th Cir. 1996) 100 F.3rd 1409; search three minutes after the arrest valid as a search incident to arrest.)

“In evaluating the reasonableness of a search incident to arrest, we have examined not only whether the area searched was within the arrestee’s ‘immediate control,’ but also whether any event occurred after the arrest that rendered the search unreasonable. (*United States v. Maddox*, 614 F.3rd (1046) at 1048. While ‘[t]here is no fixed outer limit for the number of minutes that may pass between an arrest and a valid, warrantless search,’ (*United States v. McLaughlin*, 170 F.3rd 889, 892 (9th Cir. 1999), we have said that the search must be ‘spatially and temporally incident to the arrest,’ *United States v. Camou*, 773 F.3rd 932, 937 (9th Cir. 2014). See also *United States v. Smith*, 389 F.3rd 944, 951 (9th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (interpreting the temporal requirement to mean that the search must be ‘roughly contemporaneous with the arrest’); *United States v. Monclavo-Cruz*, 662 F.2nd 1285, 1288 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that the search of the purse of an arrestee ‘more than an hour after her arrest at the station house’ was not valid incident to arrest).” (*United States v. Cook* (9th Cir. 2015) 808 F.3rd 1195, 1198-1200; upholding the search of defendant’s backpack immediately upon his arrest despite him being handcuffed at the time, differentiating the facts from *Arizona v. Gant* (2009) 556 U.S. 332 [173 L.Ed.2nd 485], where the defendant was fully secured by being not only handcuffed, but also locked inside a patrol car.)

A search of a cellphone made an hour and twenty minutes after the defendant’s arrest, with a string of intervening acts occurring between the arrest and the eventual search, is too far removed from the arrest to be considered a search

incident to the defendant's arrest. (*United States v. Camou* (9th Cir. 2014) 773 F.3rd 932, 937-939.)

However, see *United States v. Edwards* (1974) 415 U.S. 800 [94 S.Ct. 1234; 39 L.Ed.2nd 771], where it was held that police could seize the defendant's clothing and conduct tests for evidence incident to an arrest that had occurred 10 hours earlier. *Edwards* noted that officers were authorized to seize the defendant's clothing immediately upon arrest, but they delayed because "it was late at night; no substitute clothing was then available." (*Id.* at p. 805.) The Court in *Edwards* reasoned: "This was no more than taking from respondent the effects in his immediate possession that constituted evidence of crime. This was and is a normal incident of a custodial arrest, and reasonable delay in effectuating it does not change the fact that Edwards was no more imposed upon than he could have been at the time and place of the arrest or immediately upon arrival at the place of detention." (*Ibid.*)

Search Before or After Arrest:

Where there is preexisting probable cause to arrest, it is irrelevant whether the search occurs before or after the formal act of arrest. (*In re Lennies H.* (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1232, 1239-1240; *United States v. Smith* (9th Cir. 2005) 389 F.3rd 944.)

"An officer with probable cause to arrest can search incident to the arrest before making the arrest. (*Rawlings v. Kentucky* (1980) 448 U.S. 98, 111, . . . 65 L.Ed.2nd 633; *People v. Adams* (1985) 175 Cal.App.3rd 855, 861 . . .) (*People v. Limon* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 524, 538, . . .) The fact that a defendant is not formally arrested until after the search does not invalidate the search if probable cause to arrest existed prior to the search and the search was substantially contemporaneous with the arrest. (*Rawlings v. Kentucky, supra*, 448 U.S. at p. 111, . . . ; *People v. Adams, supra*, 175 Cal.App.3rd at p. 961, . . .)" (*In re Lennies H., supra.*)

See also "Order of Search & Arrest," below.

Exceptions:

A search of a container (e.g., a purse or a backpack) that was lawfully searched incident to arrest, may again be searched at a later time (e.g., at the police station) without a warrant in that with the first incident-to-arrest search, the suspect's expectation of privacy has been reduced to the point where the later warrantless search is then reasonable. (*United States v. Burnette* (9th Cir. 1983) 698 F.2nd 1038, 1049; see also *United States v. Cook* (9th Cir. 2015) 808 F.3rd 1195, 1198-1200; *United States v. Lustig* (9th Cir. 2016) 830 F.3rd 1075, 1085.)

However, probable cause to cite a person for a traffic offense is not the equivalent of having probable cause to arrest. Search incident to a citation is not lawful. (*People v. Macabeo* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1216-1219; citing *Knowles v. Iowa* (1989) 525 U.S. 113 [142 L.Ed.2nd 492].)

See “*Search Incident to Citation*” under “*Other Requirements and Limitations*,” below.

Other Requirements and Limitations:

Search Incident to Citation: There is no such thing as a “*search incident to citation*,” because of the lack of the right to physically transport the subject. (*Knowles v. Iowa* (1998) 525 U.S. 113 [142 L.Ed.2nd 492]; see also *People v. Brisendine* (1975) 13 Cal.3rd 528, 538-552.)

However, it is not unconstitutional to make a custodial arrest (i.e., transporting to jail or court) of a person arrested for a minor misdemeanor (*Atwater v. City of Lago Vista* (2001) 532 U.S. 318 [149 L.Ed.2nd 549]; *Virginia v. Moore* (2008) 553 U.S. 164 [170 L.Ed.2nd 559].); or even for a fine-only, infraction. (*People v. McKay* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 601, 607; see also *United States v. McFadden* (2nd Cir. 2001) 238 F.3rd 198, 204.)

In order to justify a search incident to arrest, however, the subject must have actually been subjected to a custodial arrest. Absent such an actual arrest and transportation, the rule that a search incident to citation not being lawful, per *Knowles v. Iowa* (1998) 525 U.S. 113 [142 L.Ed.2nd 492],

applies. (*People v. Macabeo* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1216-1219; *In re D.W.* (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th1249, 1253.)

California's statutory provisions require the release of misdemeanor arrestees in most circumstances. (E.g., see **P.C. §§ 853.5, 853.6, V.C. §§ 40303, 40500**) However, violation of these statutory requirements is not a constitutional violation and, therefore, *should not* result in suppression of any evidence recovered as a result of such an arrest. (*People v. McKay*, *supra*, at pp. 607-619, a violation of **V.C. § 21650.1** (riding a bicycle in the wrong direction); *People v. Gomez* (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 531, 538-540, seat belt violation (**V.C. § 27315(d)(1)**), citing: *Atwater v. City of Lago Vista*, *supra*; see also *People v. Bennett* (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 907, 918.)

See “Sanctions for Violations,” “Misdemeanors and Infractions,” under “Arrests,” above.

Searches of Containers: Such a search includes any containers found within the area of the defendant's arrest. (*New York v. Belton* (1981) 453 U.S. 454 [69 L.Ed.2nd 768]; *People v. Gutierrez* (1984) 163 Cal.App.3rd 332; *United States v. Robinson* (1973) 414 U.S. 218 [38 L.Ed.2nd 427]; cigarette package found on defendant's person.)

A few years after *Robinson*, the Supreme Court clarified that this exception was limited to “personal property . . . immediately associated with the person of the arrestee.” (*United States v. Chadwick* (1977) 433 U.S. 1 [53 L.Ed.2nd 538].)

It matters not that the container searched did not belong to the person arrested, so long as it was found within the arrested defendant's “lunging area.” (*People v. Prance* (1991) 226 Cal.App.3rd 1525; *People v. Mitchell* (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 672.)

But see *Arizona v. Gant* (2009) 556 U.S. 332 [173 L.Ed.2nd 485], below, severely limiting the search incident to an arrest where the suspect has already been secured.

And see *Riley v. California* (June 25, 2014) 573 U.S. ___ [134 S.Ct. 2473; 189 L.Ed.2nd 430], holding that cellphones

found on an arrestee may not be searched absent a search warrant.

Cellphones are not containers for purposes of the vehicle exception to the search warrant requirement. (*United States v. Camou* (9th Cir. 2014) 773 F.3rd 932, 941-943.)

See also *United States v. Lara* (9th Cir. 2016) 815 F.3rd 605, 610-611; declining to include defendant's cellphone under the category of a "container," in defendant's **Fourth** wavier search conditions.

Property of Booked Person: Property in the possession or under the control of a subject who is booked into custody is subject to search: "Once articles have lawfully fallen into the hands of the police they may examine them to see if they have been stolen, test them to see if they have been used in the commission of a crime, return them to the prisoner on his release, or preserve them for use as evidence at the time of trial. (*People v. Robertson* (1966) 240 Cal.App.2nd 99, 105-106) During their period of police custody an arrested person's personal effects, like his person itself, are subject to reasonable inspection, examination, and test. (*People v. Chaigles* (1923) 237 N.Y. 193 [142 N.E. 583, 32 A.L.R. 676], Cardozo, J.)" (*People v. Rogers* (1966) 241 Cal.App.2nd 384, 389.)

But see *Arizona v. Gant* (2009) 556 U.S. 332 [173 L.Ed.2nd 485], discussed below.

And see *People v. Diaz* (2011) 51 Cal.4th 84, allowing a search incident to arrest of items "*immediately associated with the person,*" even if not done until sometime after the suspect's arrest.

Also see *Riley v. California* (June 25, 2014) 573 U.S. ___ [134 S.Ct. 2473; 189 L.Ed.2nd 430], below, holding that cellphones, seized incident to arrest, may not be searched without a search warrant.

Note: By inference, *Riley* overrules *People v. Diaz*, *supra*, in so far as it relates to cellphones. (See *People v. Macabeo* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1212-1226.)

Arrest in the Home: A person arrested in his home is subject to search as is the area within his immediate reach. (*People v. Summers* (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 288; see the concurring, minority opinion for an excellent description of the legal reasoning behind searches incident to arrest, and why it is irrelevant that the person arrested had already been moved from the immediate location where the arrest is first made.)

However, the U.S. Supreme Court recently restricted searches incident to arrest when searching a vehicle in *Arizona v. Gant* (2009) 556 U.S. 332 [173 L.Ed.2nd 485]. In *Gant*, it was held that a warrantless search of a vehicle incident to arrest is lawful *only* when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.

The theory of *Gant* may not be restricted to vehicle searches. The same theory, disallowing a search incident to arrest when the suspect has already been secured, has been held to be applicable as well to an arrest within one's residence. (*People v. Leal* (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1051.)

The *Leal* court, citing *Summers* and *Gant*, noted that there are limitations to this rule: "A different rule of reasonableness applies when the police have a degree of control over the suspect but do not have control of the entire situation. In such circumstances—e.g., in which third parties known to be nearby are unaccounted for, or in which a suspect has not yet been fully secured and retains a degree of ability to overpower police or destroy evidence—the **Fourth Amendment** does not bar the police from searching the immediate area of the suspect's arrest as a search incident to an arrest." (*Id.*, at p. 1060.)

It was also noted in *Leal* that the law was sufficiently settled prior to *Gant* that "good faith" reliance upon prior authority did not allow for the admissibility of the evidence recovered in this case. (*Id.*, at pp. 1065-1066.)

Arrest in a Vehicle: The same applies to a *person arrested in his vehicle*; the person and the passenger area of that vehicle may be searched incident to that arrest. (*New York v. Belton* (1981) 453 U.S. 454 [69 L.Ed.2nd 768].)

But see *Arizona v. Gant* (2009) 556 U.S. 332 [173 L.Ed.2nd 485], above, and “*Searches of Vehicles*” (Chapter 9), below.

Exceptions:

Strip Searches: A search incident to arrest does *not* include the right to conduct a “*strip search*,” which, as a “*serious intrusion upon personal rights*” and “*an invasion of personal rights of the first magnitude*” (*Chapman v. Nichols* (10th Cir. 1993) 989 F.2nd 393, 395-396.), is generally not allowed prior to booking. (*Foote v. Spiegel* (Utah 1995) 903 F.Supp. 1463.)

See “*Strip Searches of Prisoners*,” below.

Cellphones: A warrantless search incident to arrest also does *not* include cellphones found on the person at the time of his arrest. (*Riley v. California* (June 25, 2014) 573 U.S. ___ [134 S.Ct. 2473; 189 L.Ed.2nd 430].)

However, the Supreme Court also noted (134 S.Ct. at p. 2494) that the lack of a warrant may be excused where “*exigent circumstances*” are found, to include:

- The need to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence;
- To pursue a fleeing suspect; *and*
- To assist persons who are seriously injured or are threatened with imminent injury.

Cellphones are not containers for purposes of the vehicle exception to the search warrant requirement. (*United States v. Camou* (9th Cir. 2014) 773 F.3rd 932, 941-943.)

See also *United States v. Lara* (9th Cir. 2016) 815 F.3rd 605, 610-611; declining to include defendant’s cellphone under the category of a “*container*,” in defendant’s **Fourth** wavier search conditions.

See “*Searches of Cellphones, Disks, Computers and Other High Tech Devices*,” under “*Searches of Containers*” (Chapter 13), below.

Searches with Probable Cause: A person may also be searched without a search warrant any time a law enforcement officer has “*probable cause*” to believe the person has contraband or other seizable property on him. (***People v. Coleman*** (1991) 229 Cal.App.3rd 321.)

The “*Exigency*” excusing the need for a search warrant, obviously, is the fact that when probable cause develops to believe that the a person possesses contraband or evidence of a crime, there will not be an opportunity to obtain a search warrant without risking the loss or destruction of the items sought. (See below)

Probable Cause may be found from the defendant’s own admissions which, without independent evidence of the corpus of the crime, would not be admissible in court. The likelihood of conviction is not relevant in establishing probable cause to arrest. (***People v. Rios*** (1956) 46 Cal.2nd 297; defendant’s admission that he had injected drugs two weeks earlier sufficient to establish probable cause for the past possession of a controlled substance. Search incident to the arrest was therefore lawful.)

When defendant refused to empty his pockets on the hood of a federal law enforcement officer’s car, there was no search. But after defendant admitted to possessing marijuana, and was then asked a second time to empty his pockets, this time complying, doing so constituted a search. But with defendant’s admission to possessing marijuana, the search was based upon probable cause and lawful. (***United States v. Pope*** (9th Cir. 2012) 686 F.3rd 1078, 1080-1084.)

P.C. § 833: By statute, in California, peace officers are authorized to search any person the officer has “*legal cause to arrest*” for “*dangerous weapons*,” and then seize such weapon pending the determination whether the person will be arrested.

Note: In that most of the rules on “*searches incident to arrest*” are constitutionally-based case decisions, anywhere they might differ from the language of this statute (i.e., the need to transport the arrested person as a condition of a search incident to arrest; see below), the case law is likely to take precedence.

See “*Frisks*” below.

Order of Search & Arrest: It is irrelevant whether the officer, with probable cause to believe a subject possesses contraband or some other tangible evidence of a crime, searches first and then arrests, or arrests first and then searches incident to that arrest (***Rawlings v. Kentucky*** (1980) 448 U.S. 98, 110 [65 L.Ed.2nd 633, 645]; ***People v. Gonzales*** (1989) 216 Cal.App.3rd 1185, 1189; ***People v. Avila*** (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1069.), so long as the search is “*substantially contemporaneous*” with the arrest. (See ***People v. Cockrell*** (1965) 63 Cal.2nd 659, 666; ***People v. Nieto*** (1990) 219 Cal.App.3rd 1275, 1277; see also ***United States v. Anchondo*** (10th Cir. 1998) 156 F.3rd 1043, 1045-1046.)

A search of a vehicle incident to arrest is lawful where there exists probable cause to arrest before the search is conducted, even if, in the sequence of events, the search takes place *before* the actual physical arrest of the defendant, so long as the search is “*roughly contemporaneous*” with the arrest. (***United States v. Smith*** (9th Cir. 2005) 389 F.3rd 944; see also ***United States v. Lugo*** (10th Cir. 1999) 170 F.3rd 996.)

But see ***Arizona v. Gant*** (2009) 556 U.S. 332 [173 L.Ed.2nd 485], below, under “*Searches of Vehicles*” (Chapter 9), severely limiting the “search incident to arrest” theory, at least in vehicles.

The old California rule of requiring a valid arrest, even of an unconscious suspect, prior to the extraction of a blood sample (See ***People v. Superior Court [Hawkins]*** (1972) 6 Cal.3rd 757, 762.), was abrogated by passage of **Proposition 8**, in 1982. Now, so long as probable cause exists to believe that the defendant was driving while intoxicated, a formal arrest is not a prerequisite to a warrantless seizure of a blood sample. (***People v. Trotman*** (1989) 214 Cal.App.3rd 430, 435; ***People v. Deltoro*** (1989) 214 Cal.App.3rd 1417, 1422, 1425.)

But see ***Missouri v. McNeely*** (2013) 569 U.S. 141 [133 S.Ct. 1552; 185 L.Ed.2nd 696], requiring a search warrant prior to the blood draw except in exigent circumstances.

The implied consent provisions under **V.C. § 23612(a)(5)**, where, by statute, blood may be drawn from an unconscious or dead DUI suspect, does not overcome the need for a search warrant without a showing of exigent circumstances. (***People v. Arredondo*** (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 186, 193-205; no exigency found, pp. 205-206.)

Note: Petition for Review was granted by the California Supreme Court in *People v. Arredondo* on June 8, 2016, making this case unavailable for citation.

Intrusions into the Human Body: Of all the areas where a person has a legitimate “*reasonable expectation of privacy*” protecting the person from governmental intrusions, none, perhaps, is greater than that person’s own body. (See *Winston v. Lee* (1985) 470 U.S. 753, 759 [84 L.Ed.2nd 662]; “A compelled surgical intrusion into an individual’s body for evidence . . . implicates expectations of privacy and security of such magnitude that the intrusion may be ‘unreasonable;’ even if likely to produce evidence of a crime.”)

Substantial Justification: “A body search . . . requires ‘a more *substantial justification*’ than other searches.” (Italics added; *George v. Edholm* (9th Cir. 2014) 752 F.3rd 1206, 1217-1220; citing *Winston v. Lee*, *supra*, at p. 767.)

“*The Interests in Human Dignity and Privacy*” forbid intrusions into the human body “on the mere chance that desired evidence might be obtained.” (*Schmerber v. California* (1966) 384 U.S. 757, 768 [16 L.Ed.2nd 908, 918]; *People v. Bracamonte* (1975) 15 Cal.3rd 394, 402-405.)

Shocking the Conscience: Searches which “*shock the conscience*,” or which are unreasonable under the circumstances, are not allowed. (*Rochin v. California* (1952) 342 U.S. 165 [96 L.Ed. 183]; *Winston v. Lee*, *supra*, at pp. 760-763 [84 L.Ed.2nd at pp. 668-671].)

Although the *Rochin* case was determined under the **Fourteenth Amendment** “due process” clause, the Supreme Court has since determined that this type of issue is to be viewed under the scrutiny of the reasonableness of the search under the **Fourth Amendment**. (*County of Sacramento v. Lewis* (1998) 523 U.S. 833, 849 [140 L.Ed.2nd 1043]; *George v. Edholm*, *supra*, at p. 1217.)

Factors: In determining the lawfulness of such an intrusion, including the forced extraction of blood, the court will consider:

- The degree of resistance by the suspect.

- The severity of the crime at issue.
- Whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others.
- Whether the police refused to respect a reasonable request to undergo a different form of testing.
- The degree of the authorities' need for the evidence.

(*Hammer v. Gross* (9th Cir. 1991) 932 F.2nd 842.)

The Supreme Court in *Winston* (at pp. 761-762) has identified three factors to consider:

- (1) The extent to which the procedure may threaten the safety or health of the individual,
- (2) The extent of intrusion upon the individual's dignitary interests in personal privacy and bodily integrity, *and*
- (3) The community's interest in fairly and accurately determining guilt or innocence.

(See also *George v. Edholm*, *supra*, at pp. 1217-1220.)

Driving Under the Influence Cases:

Blood Extraction: "The extraction of blood or other materials from a person's body for purposes of chemical testing constitutes a search and seizure for purposes of this guarantee" (i.e., the **Fourth Amendment**). (*People v. Arredondo* (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 186, 193; citing *People v. Robinson* (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1104, 1119; *Birchfield v. North Dakota* (June 23, 2016) __ U.S. __, __ [136 S.Ct. 2160;195 L.Ed.2nd 560].)

Note: Petition for Review was granted by the California Supreme Court in *People v. Arredondo* on June 8, 2016, making this case unavailable for citation.

Blood tests are a “*significant intrusion*.”

- They require a “piercing of the skin.”
- “(U)nlike a breath test, (a blood test) places in the hands of law enforcement authorities a sample that can be preserved and from which it is possible to extract information beyond a simple BAC (blood-alcohol concentration) reading.”

A breath test, on the other hand, while also a “search,” constitutes a relatively minor intrusion (i.e., “does not “implicat[e] significant privacy concerns”) in that:

- It “do(es) not require piercing the skin’ and entail(s) ‘a minimum of inconvenience.’”
- “(B)reath tests are capable of revealing only one bit of information, the amount of alcohol in the subject’s breath. . . . No sample of anything is left in the possession of the police.”
- “(P)articipation in a breath test is not an experience that is likely to cause any great enhancement in the embarrassment that is inherent in any arrest.”

(Birchfield v. North Dakota, supra, 136 S.Ct. at pp. 2176-2178.)

Lesser Intrusions: Lesser warrantless intrusions into a human body may, under some circumstances such as driving under the influence cases, be upheld with a sufficient exigency. (*Schmerber v. California* (1966) 384 U.S. 757, 768 [16 L.Ed.2nd 908, 918]; e.g., blood withdrawal.)

It is recognized by the courts that the “‘delay necessary to procure a warrant . . . may result in the destruction of valuable evidence,’ ‘blood and breath samples taken to measure whether these substances were in the bloodstream when a triggering event occurred must be obtained as soon as possible.’” (*People v. Thompson* (2006) 38 Cal.4th 811, 825;

quoting *Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn.* (1989) 489 U.S. 602, 623 [103 L.Ed.2nd 639]; see also *People v. Toure* (2015) 232 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1103-1104.)

Missouri v. McNeely and Schmerber v. California:
Schmerber v. California, *supra*, was limited to its circumstances (i.e., with a traffic accident to investigate and the defendant hospitalized) in *Missouri v. McNeely* (2013) 569 U.S. 141 [133 S.Ct. 1552; 185 L.Ed.2nd 696], where the Supreme Court held that being arrested for driving while under the influence did not allow for a non-consensual warrantless blood test absent exigent circumstances beyond the fact that the blood was metabolizing at a normal rate.

Schmerber was not overruled by *McNeely*, but merely differentiated on its facts (*Birchfield v. North Dakota* (June 23, 2016) ___ U.S. ___, ___ [136 S.Ct. 2160;195 L.Ed.2nd 560].):

In *Schmerber*, the defendant had been in a traffic collision and had to be transported to the hospital due to his injuries. The Court in *McNeely* pointed out “that where time had to be taken to bring the accused to a hospital and to investigate the scene of the accident, there was no time to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant.” (Citation) ‘Given these special facts,’ we found that it was appropriate for the police to act without a warrant. (Citation)” (*Missouri v. McNeely*, *supra*, at p. 151.)

However, when otherwise lawful, *Schmerber* requires no more than that blood be drawn in a constitutionally reasonable manner, which is not necessarily limited to being by a physician and in a hospital. Drawing blood by someone qualified to do so, and even in a jail or a police station, will normally meet the requirement that it be done in a “medically approved manner.” Also, it is reasonable for the officer himself, observing the blood-draw procedure, as opposed to an expert, to provide the necessary testimony to meet this standard. (*People v. Cuevas* (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th

1278, 1283-1286; *People v. Harris* (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 671, 692-697.)

Also, where actual consent is found (e.g., by signing a consent form), the rule of *McNeely* is irrelevant. An officer's testimony, which the trial court, in its discretion, found as credible, is sufficient to allow for a warrantless blood draw. (*People v. Elder* (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 123, 130-131.)

Veh. Code § 23612; Implied Consent: California's "implied consent law," has been held to be a factor, among the "totality of the circumstances," in determining whether or not a DUI arrestee has given "actual consent" to a warrantless blood draw. (*People v. Harris* (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 671, 681-692.)

"(A)ctual consent to a blood draw is not 'implied consent,' but rather a possible result of requiring the driver to choose whether to consent under the implied consent law. (Citation.) '[T]he implied consent law is explicitly designed to allow the driver, and not the police officer, to make the choice as to whether the driver will give or decline to give actual consent to a blood draw when put to the choice between consent or automatic sanctions. Framed in the terms of "implied consent," choosing the "yes" option affirms the driver's implied consent and constitutes actual consent for the blood draw. Choosing the "no" option acts to withdraw the driver's implied consent and establishes that the driver does not give actual consent.' (Citation)" (*Id.*, at p. 686.)

Note: To put this rule into a formula:
*Implied consent per V.C. § 23612 +
circumstances consistent with consent =
actual consent.*

The implied consent provisions under **V.C. § 23612(a)(5)**, where, by statute, blood may be drawn from an unconscious or dead DUI suspect, does not overcome the need for a search warrant without a showing of exigent circumstances. (*People v.*

Arredondo (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 186, 193-205; no exigency found, pp. 205-206.)

Note: Petition for Review was granted by the California Supreme Court in *People v. Arredondo* on June 8, 2016, making this case unavailable for citation.

“(T)he *failure* to disclose accurate information regarding the potential legal consequences of certain behavior would seem to be a more logical basis for a defendant to assert that his or her decision to engage in that behavior was coerced and involuntary.” (*People v. Harris, supra*, at p. 689; see also *People v. Ling* (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1, 9.)

Also note **V.C. § 13384** (effective since 1999) requiring for all new and renewed driver’s licenses to include the applicant’s written consent to submit to a chemical test or tests of that person’s blood, breath, or urine, or to submit to a preliminary alcohol screening test pursuant to **V.C. § 23136** (persons under 21 years of age with a blood alcohol level of .01% or higher), when requested to do so by a peace officer, and for the applicant to sign a written declaration consenting to the above. The legal effect of this mandated written consent has yet to be tested, but may offer a solution to the inability of **section 23612’s** “implied consent” provisions to avoid the need for a search warrant. See *People v. Arredondo* (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 186, 198, & fn. 7.)

Note: Petition for Review was granted by the California Supreme Court in *People v. Arredondo* on June 8, 2016, making this case unavailable for citation.

Exigent circumstances also excuse the lack of a search warrant. When defendant caused a traffic collision, resulting in the need to care for injured victims and delaying the DUI investigation, and where defendant was uncooperative making it impossible to determine when he’d had his last

drink, forcing a blood draw without a search warrant was justified by exigent circumstances. (*People v. Toure* (2015) 232 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1103-1105.)

“The Legislature’s goal was thus to balance the rights, concerns, and dignity of the individual against the need to enforce California’s DUI laws, and to avoid the unpredictability of forced blood draws. Its solution was to ‘devise . . . an additional or alternative method of compelling a person arrested for drunk driving to submit to a test for intoxication, by providing that such person will lose his automobile driver’s license for a period . . . if he refuses to submit to a test for intoxication.’” (*People v. Valencia* (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th Supp. 11, 18.); citing *Hernandez v. Department of Motor Vehicles* (1981) 30 Cal.3rd 70, 77.)

See V.C. § 23577 for other “enhanced” punishments, that may be imposed upon a DUI conviction, for a person who refuses a chemical test of his blood or breath when arrested for DUI.

The implied consent provisions under V.C. § 23612(a)(5), where, by statute, blood may be drawn from an unconscious or dead DUI suspect, does not overcome the need for a search warrant without a showing of exigent circumstances. (*People v. Arredondo* (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 186, 193-205; no exigency found, pp. 205-206.)

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“Our prior opinions have referred approvingly to the general concept of implied-consent laws that impose civil penalties and evidentiary consequences on motorists who refuse to comply.” (*Birchfield v. North Dakota* (June 23, 2016) __ U.S. __, __ [136 S.Ct. 2160;195 L.Ed.2nd 560]; citing *McNeely*,

supra. [569 U.S. 141]; and *South Dakota v. Neville* (1983) 459 U.S. 553, 560 [74 L.Ed.2nd 748].)

The Court, in *Birchfield*, however, held that statutes that make it a crime to refuse a blood test in a DUI case, or otherwise imposed penal sanctions for refusing to submit to a blood test, were unconstitutional.

McNeely is Not Retroactive:

A forced blood draw performed in 2011, before *McNeely* was decided, does not require the suppression of the blood result in that police officers are entitled to act on the law as it is understood at the time to apply. The **Fourth Amendment** exclusionary rule does not require suppression of evidence from a warrantless blood draw because the draw was conducted in an objectively reasonable reliance on then-binding precedent. (*People v. Youn* (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 571, 576-579; *People v. Jimenez* (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1360-1365; see also *People v. Rossetti* (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1070, 1074-1077; four officers held defendant down as a warrantless forced draw was made in a medically approved manner.)

Where defendant's blood was taken over his objection and without a warrant, *Missouri v. McNeely, supra*, did not mandate suppression of the blood result in that *McNeely* was decided after the arrest in this case. Also, defendant was subject to search and seizure conditions under his "post-release community supervision" (PRCS) terms, eliminating the need for a search warrant. With probable cause to believe that he was driving while under the influence of alcohol when he had a traffic accident, his mandatory PRCS search and seizure conditions, authorizing the blood draw without the necessity of a search warrant, was not in violation of the **Fourth Amendment**. (*People v. Jones* (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1257, 1262-1269.)

P.C. § 1524(a)(13): Since *McNeely*, the California Legislature has amended **P.C. § 1524(a)**, adding new **subd. (13)**, providing statutory authority for a search warrant to retrieve a DUI suspect's blood when necessary due to the suspect's refusal to submit to a blood test.

P.C. § 1524(a)(13): "To obtain a blood sample in **V.C. §§ 23140** (person under age 21 driving with BA of 0.05 or higher), **23152** (DUI), and **23153** (DUI with injury) cases when the person has refused to submit to or has failed to complete a blood test, and the sample will be drawn in a "reasonable, medically approved manner." This new paragraph is not intended to abrogate a court's mandate to determine the propriety of the issuance of a search warrant on a case-by-case basis."

The Unconscious Arrestee: The old California rule of requiring a valid arrest, even of an unconscious suspect, prior to the extraction of a blood sample (See *People v. Superior Court [Hawkins]* (1972) 6 Cal.3rd 757, 762.), was abrogated by passage of **Proposition 8**, in 1982. Now, so long as probable cause exists to believe that the defendant was driving while intoxicated, a formal arrest is not a prerequisite to a warrantless seizure of a blood sample. (*People v. Trotman* (1989) 214 Cal.App.3rd 430, 435-437; *People v. Deltoro* (1989) 214 Cal.App.3rd 1417, 1422, 1425.)

The implied consent provisions under **V.C. § 23612(a)(5)**, where, by statute, blood may be drawn from an unconscious or dead DUI suspect, does not overcome the need for a search warrant without a showing of exigent circumstances. (*People v. Arredondo* (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 186, 193-205; no exigency found, pp. 205-206.)

Note: Petition for Review was granted by the California Supreme Court in *People v. Arredondo* on June 8, 2016, making this case unavailable for citation.

Cases:

The blood test in a drunk driving case should have been suppressed when the defendant had already given a urine sample that was the functional equivalent of the blood test for evidentiary purposes. (*People v. Fiscalini* (1991) 228 Cal.App.3rd 1639.)

But, forcing an arrested DUI suspect to give blood after the suspect intentionally frustrated the officer's attempts at obtaining a breath sample was held to be lawful. (*People v. Sugarman* (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 210; a pre-*McNeely* case.)

When otherwise lawful, *Schmerber* requires no more than that blood be drawn in a constitutionally reasonable manner, which is not necessarily limited to being by a physician and in a hospital. Drawing blood by someone qualified to do so, and even in a jail, will normally meet the requirement that it be done in a "medically approved manner." Also, it is reasonable for the officer himself, observing the blood-draw procedure, as opposed to an expert, to provide the necessary testimony to meet this standard. (*People v. Cuevas* (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1278, 1283-1286; *People v. Harris* (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 671, 692-697.)

Also, where actual consent is found (e.g., by signing a consent form), the rule of *McNeely* is irrelevant. An officer's testimony, which the trial court, in its discretion, found as credible, is sufficient to allow for a warrantless blood draw. (*People v. Elder* (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 123, 130-131.)

Use of Force in Making a Blood Draw:

Where otherwise lawful, using physical force to effect a blood draw, so long as the officers "act reasonably and use only that degree of force which is necessary to overcome a defendant's resistance in taking a blood sample," is lawful. (*People v. Rossetti* (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 1070, 1077-1079;

quoting *Carlton v. Superior Court* (1985)170 Cal.App.3rd 1182, 1187-1191.)

In *Rossetti*, four officers held a handcuffed defendant on the floor when defendant was “kicking around and not doing what [he was] told to do” while a licensed phlebotomist drew blood. The use of force was upheld as reasonable. (*People v. Rossett, supra.*)

Also, in *Carlton*, a struggling defendant was held by six officers to the floor in a “temporary carotid restraint” position, with his face to the floor, as blood was withdrawn by a registered nurse. The force used was upheld as reasonable. (*Carlton v. Superior Court, supra.*)

See also *People v. Ryan* (1981) 116 Cal.App.3rd 168, where the force used was upheld as reasonable when a resisting defendant was restrained by five police officers as a technician removed the blood sample from his left arm, without any showing that the officers “introduced any wantonness, violence or beatings.”

But see *People v Kraft* (1970) 3 Cal.App.3rd 890, where defendant refused to submit to a blood test. Taken to a hospital, defendant resisted being taken inside, resulting in an officer striking him in the cheek with a closed fist. While being carried to a bed in an examination room, defendant fell or was pushed to the floor. While on the floor, police immobilized him while a physician withdrew blood. One officer held defendant’s arm while also holding a scissor lock on his legs. It was acknowledged in testimony that defendant’s behavior had not been aggressive but was “defensive.” The court concluded that the officers’ “strong arm” tactics were “aggressive beyond all

need” and exceeded the limits of permissible force. (*Id.*, at pp. 895-899.)

See also *Freitas v. Shiomoto* (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 294: The trial court erred in finding that rebuttal of the presumption of regulatory compliance in a driver’s license suspension proceeding required the driver to prove the gas chromatograph used in taking an arrested driver’s breath sample was improperly calibrated or maintained because the driver could rebut presumption by showing that a testing apparatus was improperly employed when his sample was tested.

Other Examples of Bodily Intrusions:

Scraping underneath a suspect’s fingernails to find evidence of a crime has been upheld by the United States Supreme Court, calling such a procedure a “very limited intrusion.” (*Cupp v. Murphy* (1973) 412 U. S. 291, [36 L. Ed. 2nd 900].)

Forcing a suspect to submit to the removal of a rubber finger stall of powdered drugs from his rectum, the procedure being conducted by a physician and involving little if any pain, was approved. (*People v. Woods* (1956) 139 Cal.App.2nd 515.)

Where a suspect underwent a digital rectal exam and two enemas before being forced to drink a liquid laxative, the search was held to be unreasonable. (*United States v. Cameron* (9th Cir. 1976) 538 F.2nd 254, 258-260.)

In balancing the interests, the California Supreme Court determined that a magistrate could *not* lawfully authorize a search warrant in a child molest/incest case for a medical examination consisting of the manual massage of the prostate gland causing a discharge of semen. (*People v. Scott* (1978) 21 Cal.3rd 284, 291-295; “(T)he more intense, unusual, prolonged, uncomfortable, unsafe or undignified the procedure contemplated, or the more it intrudes upon essential standards of privacy, the greater must be the showing for the procedure’s necessity.”)

Surgery to remove a bullet from the accused was found, under the circumstances, to be *unreasonable*. (*Winston v. Lee* (1985) 470 U.S. 753, 760-763 [84 L.Ed.2nd 662, 668-671].)

Such a procedure will not even be allowed with a court order. (*Ibid.*)

This is not to say, however, that surgery would *never* be lawful. As the Supreme Court pointed out in *Winston v. Lee*, *supra*, at p. 760 [84 L.Ed.2nd at p. 669]: “The reasonableness of surgical intrusions beneath the skin depends on a case-by-case approach, in which the individual's interests in privacy and security are weighed against society's interests in conducting the procedure. In a given case, the question whether the community's need for evidence outweighs the substantial privacy interests at stake is a delicate one admitting of few categorical answers.” In *Winston*, the defendant would have had to be subjected to general anesthesia, and the prosecution's need for the bullet was questionable, given other evidence of the defendant's guilt.

Inserting the capped end of a ballpoint pen and prying a 2-inch wad of masking tape out of defendant's mouth, suspected of being evidence, is not unreasonable. (*People v. Fulkman* (1991) 235 Cal.App.3rd 555, 563.)

It was held to be a clear **Fourth Amendment** violation where the plaintiff claimed that doctors sedated him, took blood samples, and inserted a catheter into his penis. (*Ellis v. City of San Diego* (9th Cir. 1999) 176 F.3rd 1183, 1186, 1191-1192.)

The U.S. Supreme Court has described the process of the warrantless collecting of a DNA sample, as part of a routine booking process, by rubbing a swab on the inside of a person's cheek as a “negligible” intrusion, and lawful. (*Maryland v. King* (2013) 569 U. S. 435, 446, [133 S.Ct. 1958; 186 L.Ed.2nd 1].)

However, see the earlier case of *Friedman v. Boucher* (9th Cir. 2009) 580 F.3rd 847, 852-853, where it was held that the taking of a DNA sample via a “buccal swab” of the mouth of a pre-trial detainee, without statutory authorization, is a search under the **Fourth Amendment**, and illegal absent a search warrant or an exigent circumstance allowing for such a search.

There is no privacy right in the mouthpiece of the PAS device, which was provided by the police and where defendant abandoned any expectation of privacy in the saliva he deposited on the device when he failed to wipe it off. Whether defendant subjectively expected that the genetic material contained in his saliva would become known to the police was irrelevant because he deposited it on a police device and thus made it accessible to the police. The officer who administered the PAS test testified that used mouthpieces were normally discarded in the trash. Thus, any subjective expectation defendant may have had that his right to privacy would be preserved was unreasonable. (*People v. Thomas* (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 338.)

The forced paralysis, intubation, and digital rectal examination of a suspect where it is suspected that he was concealing contraband in his rectum amounted to an unreasonable search in violation of the **Fourth Amendment**. (*United States v. Booker* (6th Cir. 2013) 728 F.3rd 535.)

Sedating the plaintiff, opening his anus with an anoscope and inserting long forceps into his rectum, and then inserting a tube into his nose and running the tube into his stomach to pump a gallon of liquid laxative through his digestive system thus triggering a complete evacuation of his bowels, when done without consent or a warrant, held to be a violation of the **Fourth Amendment**. (*George v. Edholm* (9th Cir. 2014) 752 F.3rd 1206, 1217-1220.)

Requiring a parolee, subject to search and seizure conditions, and where officers had at least a reasonable suspicion to believe that he was dealing drugs, to remove his pants and bend over, and then “flicking” at a visible baggie that was held between his buttocks (but not inside

his anal cavity), causing the baggie to fall out, was held *not* to be unreasonable. (*United States v. Doxey* (6th Cir. Mich. 2016) 833 F.3rd 692.)

DNA Swabs taken for the Purpose of Eliminating Others as a Suspect: A state court order pursuant to **Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-3905** authorizing the collection of DNA samples from officers of the Phoenix Police Department satisfied the Warrant Clause of the **Fourth Amendment** in that the orders were issued by a state court judge and described a saliva sample to be seized by mouth swab from the person of plaintiff police officers. The state court expressly found probable cause to believe that the crime of homicide had been committed and that excluding public safety personnel as the source of the of DNA left at the scene would have plainly aided in the conviction of an eventual criminal defendant by negating any contention at trial that police had contaminated the relevant evidence. No undue intrusion occurred because it was hardly unreasonable to ask sworn officers to provide saliva samples for the sole purpose of demonstrating that DNA left at a crime scene was not the result of inadvertent contamination by on-duty public safety personnel. (*Bill v. Brewer* (9th Cir. 2015) 799 F.3rd 1295.)

Medical Emergencies: “Intrusive body searches are permissible when they are reasonably necessary to respond to an immediate medical emergency.” (*George v. Edholm* (9th Cir. 2014) 752 F.3rd 1206, 1219, citing *People v. Bracamonte* (1975) 15 Cal.3rd 394; *United States v. Husband* (7th Cir. 2000) 226 F.3rd 626, 635.)

In *Edholm*, it was held that the “*speculative, generalized risk*” that a baggie of drugs secreted in the plaintiff’s rectum might rupture is insufficient by itself to justify the warrantless extraction (see above) of that baggie. “Every person who hides a baggie of drugs in his rectum faces a risk that the baggie will rupture. But the mere fact ‘that the suspect is concealing contraband does not authorize government officials to resort to any and all means at their disposal to retrieve it.’” (*George v. Edholm, supra*, quoting *United States v. Cameron* (9th Cir 1976) 538 F.2nd 254, 258.)

While the potential for death without treatment qualifies as a “medical emergency,” where the suspect himself is responsible for the risk, only a showing of the “greatest imminent harm” will justify intrusive action for the purpose of removal of a drug from his body. (*United States v. Cameron* (9th Cir. 1976) 538 F.2nd 254, 259, fn. 8.)

Choking: Searches of the person may also include the need to forcefully keep a suspect from swallowing evidence.

Rule: So long as the suspect can be prevented from swallowing *without* “*choking*” him, reasonable force may normally be used. (***People v. Jones*** (1989) 209 Cal.App.3rd 725; ***People v. Johnson*** (1991) 231 Cal.App.3rd 1, 15-17.)

“*Choking*” is legally defined as preventing a person from breathing or by obstructing the flow of blood to his head. (*Ibid.*)

Examples:

Holding a subject’s Adam’s apple to prevent swallowing is okay. (***People v. Cappellia*** (1989) 208 Cal.App.3rd 1331, 1337.)

Using pepper spray to cause the subject to spit out the contents of his mouth is *probably* not unreasonable. (***United States v. Holloway*** (Kan. 1995) 906 F.Supp. 1437.)

But see ***Headwaters Forest Defense v. County of Humboldt*** (9th Cir. 2002) 276 F.3rd 1125, holding that the use of pepper spray on non-violent demonstrators to gain their compliance is unreasonable, and grounds for civil liability.

Inserting the capped end of a ballpoint pen and prying a 2-inch wad of masking tape out of defendant’s mouth, suspected of being evidence, is not unreasonable. (***People v. Fulkman*** (1991) 235 Cal.App.3rd 555, 563.)

The use of reasonable force in extracting blood, when done in a medically approved manner, is lawful. (***Ritschel v. City of Fountain Valley*** (2005) 137 Cal.App.4th 107; a misdemeanor case.)

Searches with Less Than Probable Cause: In certain instances, where the governmental interests are stronger than in cases of “*ordinary criminal wrongdoing*,” or the individual’s privacy interests are diminished, the probable cause standards have been relaxed. For instance:

Persons in Pervasively Regulated Industries or Sensitive Positions: In some situations, where there exists a strong governmental interest, neither a warrant nor a showing of individualized suspicion is required to support the validity of statute requiring employees to submit to a blood or urine test. For instance:

Government Employees: A random search, without cause, of an employee's personal effects by a government employer, at least where the employee has prior notice that his possessions may be subject to search, has been held to be lawful. (*United States v. Gonzalez* (9th Cir. 2002) 300 F.3rd 1048)

Railway Workers: The testing of blood or urine of *railway workers* involved in certain train accidents. (*Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn.* (1989) 489 U.S. 602 [103 L.Ed.2nd 639].)

Drug Testing for Customs Officers: Drug testing as a condition of placement or employment for *Customs officers* in a position involving the interdiction of drugs or carrying of firearms. (*National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab* (1989) 489 U.S. 656 [103 L.Ed.2nd 685]; but, similar requirements for persons who were only required to handle classified material was rejected as being too broad.)

Candidates for Public Office: A urinalysis drug test requirement for candidates for public office, however, was held to violate the **Fourth Amendment**. (*Chandler v. Miller* (1997) 520 U.S. 305 [137 L.Ed.2nd 513].)

A State Hospital's Drug Testing Policy for Unwed Mothers: See *Ferguson v. Charleston* (2001) 532 U.S. 67 [149 L.Ed.2nd 205], finding a *state hospital's drug testing policy*, developed in conjunction with the police, for testing *unwed mothers* for drug abuse, to be unconstitutional, at least without informing the mothers of the purposes for the test.

See also "Special Needs Searches and Seizures," under "Warrantless Searches" (Chapter 7), above.

For Students:

See "School Searches," under "Exceptions to the Search Warrant Requirements," under "Warrantless Searches" (Chapter 7), above.

Frisks (or Patdowns) for offensive weapons are considered searches, albeit limited in intrusiveness and scope.

Defined: Frisks generally consist of a police officer doing no more than feeling (i.e., “*patting down*”) the outside of a suspect’s clothing, checking for the feel of any potential offensive weapons. (See *Terry v. Ohio* (1968) 392 U.S. 1 [20 L.Ed.2nd 889].)

Often referred to as a “*Terry* frisk.” (See *Thomas v. Dillard* (9th Cir. 2016) 818 F.3rd 864, 875.)

When an officer has sufficient reasonable suspicion to believe a suspect is armed, he also has, as a matter of law, reasonable suspicion to believe the suspect is dangerous. (*United States v. Robinson* (4th Cir. 2017) 846 F.3rd 694.)

Constitutionality:

“(T)here exists ‘a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime. The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.’ (Citation) ‘[I]n determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or “hunch,” but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.’ (Citation) ‘[I]n justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.’ (Citation) ‘And in making that assessment it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search “warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief” that the action taken was appropriate?’ (Citation) An officer’s good faith is not enough.” (*King v. State of California* (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 265, 283; citing *Terry v. Ohio, supra.*)

A “*stop and frisk*” is *constitutionally permissible* if two conditions are met:

- The investigatory stop must be lawful; i.e., when a police officer reasonably suspects that the person apprehended is committing or has committed a criminal offense.
- The police officer must reasonably suspect that the person stopped is armed and dangerous.

(*Arizona v. Johnson* (2009) 555 U.S. 323 [172 L.Ed.2nd 694].)

A court’s analysis regarding whether a frisk is constitutional “is a dual one” asking:

- Whether the officers’ action was justified at its inception, and
- Whether the officers’ action was “confined in scope” by engaging in a carefully limited search of the outer clothing in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault an officer.

(*United States v. I.E.V.* (9th Cir. 2013) 705 F.3rd 430, 435; citing *Terry v. Ohio* (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 20, 29-30 [20 L.Ed.2nd 889].)

Articulate Facts:

“To establish reasonable suspicion a suspect is armed and dangerous, thereby justifying a frisk, ‘the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.’ (Citation) A ‘mere “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch” that a person is armed and dangerous does not establish reasonable suspicion (Citations), and circumstances suggesting only that a suspect *would* be dangerous if armed are insufficient (Italics added; Citation). There must be adequate reason to believe the suspect is armed.” (*Thomas v. Dillard* (9th Cir. 2016) 818 F.3rd 864, 876.)

For Weapons Only: A frisk is a limited search for *weapons only*. (*Santos v. Superior Court* (1984) 154 Cal.App.3rd 1178; *United States v. I.E.V.*, *supra.*, at p. 435.)

E.g.: Wrong answer: “*I patted him down for weapons and/or contraband.*”

Patting a person down for identification is not lawful even though the person has been lawfully stopped and claims to have no identification. (*People v. Garcia* (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 782.)

But see “*Searching for Identification,*” below.

A Reasonable or Rational Suspicion: The police officer needs to be able to articulate facts establishing a “*reasonable*” or “*rational*” suspicion that the person may be armed. (*Terry v. Ohio*, *supra.*)

Some courts refer to the test as being a “*reason to believe*” that the subject may be armed. (*People v. Lopez* (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 132; see also *In re H.H.* (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 653, 657.)

A traffic stop for an equipment violation in a “*high crime*” (i.e., gang) area at night is *not* reasonable suspicion, by itself, sufficient to justify a detention or patdown for weapons. (*People v. Medina* (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 171.)

Patting down a suspect in a mail theft, merely because the interview is to take place in a small, crowded interview room, that the interview might turn confrontational, and it was felt that patting the suspect down would be the “*prudent*” thing to do, is *not* sufficient reasonable suspicion to believe the person might be armed. (*United States v. Flatter* (9th Cir. 2006) 456 F.3rd 1154.)

Patting a non-student down for possible weapons on a high school campus, where the defendant/minor was to be moved to the security office, need not be justified by an articulable suspicion that he might be armed. (*In re Jose Y.* (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 748.)

Stopping, detaining, and patting down a known gang member, observed running through traffic in a gang area, while looking back nervously as if fleeing from a crime (as

either a victim or a perpetrator), was held to be lawful (*In re H.M.* (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 136.)

A person's assertion of his **Fourth Amendment** right not to be searched cannot be used to establish a reasonable suspicion to believe that he might be armed. (*In re H.H.* (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 653, citing *People v. Dickey* (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 952.)

The test is an objective one. An officer need not later demonstrate that he was in actual fear. (*People v. Osborne* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1061-1062.)

Patting down a passenger in a vehicle for weapons held to be justified based upon the defendant's observed furtive movements of the passenger during the stop of the vehicle, along with his apparently false denial and then unreasonable explanation for the furtive movements. (*United States v. Burkett* (9th Cir. 2010) 612 F.3rd 1103.)

A probation officer confronted with an uncooperative, irate individual who was present in the house of a juvenile probationer during a **Fourth** wavier search, when the detained visitor appeared to be a gang member and who was overly dressed for the weather, and who attempted to turn away and cover his stomach when ordered not to do so, lawfully patted down the suspect for weapons. (*People v. Rios* (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 584, 598-600.)

The Court further determined that a probation officer has the legal authority to detain and patdown a non-probationer pursuant to **P.C. § 830.5(a)(4)** (i.e.; enforcing "violations of any penal provisions of law which are discovered while performing the usual or authorized duties of his or her employment.") (*Id.*, at p. 600.)

A contact in the middle of the night, where the officer was alone with no one in the immediate vicinity who might offer assistance, while outnumbered by three people including one confrontational, much taller male, and a second wearing a knife on a sheath, when both males were wearing clothing loose enough to conceal other weapons, justified a patdown for weapons. (*People v. Mendoza* (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1056, 1082.)

The alerting by a drug-sniffing dog on defendant's vehicle, but where no drugs were found in the vehicle, and where defendant's companion becomes noticeably nervous, does not justify by itself a patdown for weapons. Also, believing the object felt during a the patdown to be contraband as opposed to a weapon does not justify the lifting of defendant's shirt (i.e., a search) to recover the object (found to be a "brick" of marijuana). (*United States v. I.E.V.* (9th Cir. 2013) 705 F.3rd 430, 434-442.)

The officer's belief that two subjects are engaged in an act of domestic violence by itself is insufficient to justify a detention and a frisk for weapons absent some other facts indicating that at least one of the subjects is armed. (*Thomas v. Dillard* (9th Cir. 2016) 818 F.3rd 864, 875-886; but see dissent at pp. 892-901, arguing that the fact alone that domestic violence is involved, given the dangerousness of domestic violence incidents, is sufficient to justify a patdown for weapons.)

The fact that a suspect is wearing clothing capable of hiding a weapon is not a factor, by itself, tending to indicate that he may be armed. (*Thomas v. Dillard, supra*, at p. 884.)

Neither is the fact that the suspect declined to submit to an officer's request that he consent to being searched. The suspect is under no legal obligation to consent. "An individual's steadfast refusal to consent to a search cannot become the basis for reasonable suspicion, absent any other specific facts, to justify a forced search of that individual." (*Ibid.* See also *United States v. Santos* (10th Cir. 2005) 403 F.3rd 1120, 1125-1126.)

Merely being present at the scene of some unexplained police activity, being observed opening a garage door, appearing to be surprised, and wearing baggie clothing with the pockets apparently being "full of items," held not to justify a "*Terry* stop" nor a patdown of the defendant's clothing. (*United States v. Job* (9th Cir. 2017) 871 F.3rd 852, 860-862.)

"A police officer has a strong need to practice caution and self-protection when on patrol." (*People v. Parrott* (2017)

10 Cal.App.5th 485, 495-496; a patdown for firearms was justified by a nervous suspect's continual touching of a bulge in his sweatshirt and his physical resistance to being detained.)

Factors to Consider: A reasonable suspicion to believe that a person may be armed and dangerous is to be determined based upon an evaluation of the “totality of the circumstances” known to the officer at the time. (*Thomas v. Dillard, supra.*) Such factors may include (recognizing that more than one factor may be required):

- Observing a visible bulge in a person's clothing that could indicate the presence of a weapon. (*United States v. Flatter* (9th Cir. 2006) 456 F.3rd 1154, 1157.)
- Seeing a weapon in an area the suspect controls, such as the passenger area of a car. (*Michigan v. Long* (1983) 463 U.S. 1032, 1050 [77 L.Ed.2nd 1201.]
- “Sudden movements” suggesting a potential assault or “attempts to reach for an object that was not immediately visible.” (*United States v. Flatter, supra*, citing *United States v. Flippin* (9th Cir. 1991) 924 F.3rd 163, 164-166; cf. *Ybarra v. Illinois* (1979) 444 U.S. 85, 93 [62 L.Ed.2nd 238], holding that reasonable suspicion was lacking where an individual's hands were empty and he made “no gestures or other actions indicative of an intent to commit an assault”).
- “Evasive and deceptive responses” to an officer's questions about what an individual was up to. (*United States v. Burkett* (9th Cir. 2010) 612 F.3rd 1103, 1107.)
- Unnatural hand postures that suggest an effort to conceal a firearm. (*United States v. Burkett, supra*: Suspect opened the passenger car door with his left hand and kept his right hand next to his body and appeared to reach for his coat pocket.)
- Whether the officer observes anything during an encounter with the suspect that would dispel the officer's suspicions regarding the suspect's potential involvement in a crime or likelihood of being armed. (*Terry v. Ohio, supra*, at p. 28; *United States v. \$109,179 in U.S. Currency* (9th Cir. 2000) 228 F.3rd 1080, 1086.)

The “*nature of the crime*” suspected is a factor in determining whether a frisk for weapons is lawful. “(C)ertain crimes carry with them the propensity for violence, and individuals being investigated for those crimes may be pat searched without further justification.” (*People v. Osborne* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1059; see also *Sibron v. New York* (1968) 392 U.S. 40, 74 [20 L.Ed.2nd 917].) For instance:

Mail theft: *No.* (*United States v. Flatter* (9th Cir. 2006) 456 F.3rd 1154.)

Robbery: *Yes.* (*Terry v. Ohio* (1968) 392 U.S. 1 [20 L.Ed.2nd 889]; *United States v. Hill* (9th Cir. 1976) 545 F.2nd 1191; *Green v. Newport* (7th Cir. Wis. 2017) 868 F.3rd 629.)

Bank robbery: *Yes.* (*United States v. Johnson* (9th Cir. 2009) 581 F.3rd 994.)

Nighttime burglary: *Yes.* (*United States v. Mattarolo* (9th Cir. 2000) 209 F.3rd 1153, 1158.)

Counterfeiting: *No.* (*United States v. Thomas* (9th Cir. 1988) 863 F.2nd 622, 629.)

Large-scale narcotics dealing: *Yes.* (*United States v. \$109,179 in U.S. Currency* (9th Cir. 2000) 228 F.3rd 1080, 1086-1087; *United States v. Post* (9th Cir. 1979) 607 F.2nd 847.)

Drug trafficking: *Yes.* (*People v. Limon* (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 524, 535; *People v. Lee* (1987) 194 Cal.App.3rd 975, 983; *United States v. Thompson* (7th Cir. 2016) 842 F.3rd 1002.)

Large-scale marijuana growing operation: *Yes.* (*United States v. Davis* (9th Cir. 2008) 530 F.3rd 1069, 1082-1083; “Because officers reasonably suspected that Richard Davis was involved in narcotics activity, it was also reasonable for them to suspect that he might be armed.”)

See also *People v. Collier* (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1374; traffic stop where the odor of marijuana was detected and defendant was wearing baggy clothing

through which any possible bulges could not be seen; patdown lawful.

But see *United States v. I.E.V.* (9th Cir. 2012) 705 F.3rd 430, where it was held that a drug-sniffing dog alerting on defendant's vehicle, without any other indications that defendant was armed, was insufficient cause to justify a patdown for weapons.

Drug-related offense; under the influence only: *No.* (*Ramirez v. City of Buena Park* (9th Cir. 2009) 560 F.3rd 1012, 1021-1023: The fact that the defendant was reasonably believed to be under the influence of a controlled substance, by itself, was not cause to pat him down for weapons.)

Vehicle burglary: *No*, but when combined with tools lying nearby, including screwdrivers that could be used as a weapon, the fact that the suspect might be on parole, and he was acting "real nervous," patting him down for weapons was justified. (*People v. Osborne* (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1059-1062.)

Auto theft: *Yes.* (*United States v. Davidson* (8th Cir. 2015) 808 F.3rd 325.)

Domestic violence: *No.* (*Thomas v. Dillard* (9th Cir. 2016) 818 F.3rd 864, 878-886, and fn. 9; but see dissent arguing to the contrary; pp. 892-901.)

Reasonable Suspicion that is Dispelled:

A frisk is not justified when additional or subsequent facts become known to the officer during the contact that dispel or negate the suspicion. (*Terry v. Ohio*, *supra*, at p. 28; *United States v. \$109,179 in U.S. Currency* (9th Cir. 2000) 228 F.3rd 1080, 1086; *Thomas v. Dillard*, *supra*, at p. 877, and fn. 8.)

See *United States v. Thomas* (9th Cir. 1988) 863 F.2nd 622, 626-630: Although there was reasonable suspicion to stop a driver who roughly resembled a counterfeiting suspect and was near the scene of the crime, once the driver exited his vehicle and it was clear he did not match the suspect's

description, there was no reasonable suspicion under the circumstances to justify further detention or a frisk.

Vehicle Drivers and Passengers:

The driver of a motor vehicle stopped for a traffic offense, ordered by a police officer to exit his vehicle, is subject to be patted down for offensive weapons whenever it is determined that there is a reasonable suspicion to believe that he or she “might be armed and presently dangerous.” (*Pennsylvania v. Mimms* (1977) 434 U.S. 106, 112 [54 L.Ed.2nd 331].)

The same rule applies to passengers in the motor vehicle. They are subject to being ordered out of the vehicle (*Maryland v. Wilson* (1997) 519 U.S. 408, 415 [137 L.Ed.2nd 41].), may be detained for the duration of the traffic stop (*Brendlin v. California* (2007) 551 U.S. 249 [168 L.Ed.2nd 132].), and then patted down with a reasonable suspicion to believe that they may be armed. (*Arizona v. Johnson* (2009) 555 U.S. 323 [172 L.Ed.2nd 694].)

See also *Knowles v. Iowa* (1998) 525 U.S. 113, 117-118 [142 L.Ed.2nd 492]; Officers who conduct “routine traffic stop[s]” may “perform a ‘patdown’ of a driver and any passengers upon reasonable suspicion that they may be armed and dangerous.” (See also *Arizona v. Johnson*, *supra.*, at p. 324.)

In a **42 U.S.C. § 1983** civil rights action where a CHP officer was found to be civilly liable after a jury trial, the Court held that the evidence supported a finding that a frisk was unreasonable under the **Fourth Amendment** because the jury found that the traffic stop was constitutionally unreasonable in that the purported reason for the stop; i.e., loud music, was based upon inconsistent, conflicting evidence. The jury could have reasonably discounted testimony that the patdown was justified by horn honking, purported loose clothing, or the presence of gangs in the area. (*King v. State of California* (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 265, 278-291.)

Consensual Patdowns: A patdown, like any other search, may be performed when the suspect provides a free and voluntary consent.

After defendant, who had prior drug and firearm-related convictions, paid cash for a last-minute, one-way ticket without checking any luggage, an officer asked defendant for permission to search his bag and his person. Defendant consented twice and spread his arms and legs to facilitate the search. The officer felt something hard and unnatural in defendant's groin area and arrested him. The appellate court determined that defendant voluntarily consented to a patdown search because he was not in custody, officers told him he was free to leave, and officers did not tell him that they could obtain a search warrant if he refused to consent. The scope of the search was reasonable because it was reasonable for the officer to assume the consent included the groin area since the officer specifically advised defendant that the officer was looking for narcotics, defendant lifted his arms and spread his legs, defendant never objected or revoked consent, the search did not extend inside the clothing, and the officer methodically worked his way up defendant's legs before searching the groin. (*United States v. Russell* (9th Cir. 2012) 664 F.3rd 1279, 1281-1284.)

Procedures:

Limited to Outer Clothing; Exceptions: A frisk is limited to the outer clothing, except when the clothing (or purse, etc.) is so resistant as to prevent feeling a possible weapon below the clothing. (*People v. Brisendine* (1975) 13 Cal.3rd 528, 542.)

E.g.: Where the officer responded to a 9-1-1 call of a disturbance, and was directed to the defendant who was wearing a fanny pack in which the officer could see the apparent outline of a pistol, taking the fanny pack from the defendant and unzipping the outer compartment to remove what was in fact determined to be a pistol was not unreasonable. (*People v. Ritter* (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 274.)

Removal of Weapons: When an object is felt which might be a weapon of any sort, that object may then be removed and inspected. (*People v. Snyder* (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th

389; bottle; *People v. Atmore* (1970) 13 Cal.App.3rd 244, 247; shotgun shell.)

When Suspect Reaches for a Weapon: When an officer reasonably believes the *suspect is reaching for a weapon*, the officer *need not* first undertake a patdown search to feel for the object for which the suspect is reaching. (*People v. Wigginton* (1973) 35 Cal.App.3rd 732, 737-740; *People v. Superior Court [Holmes]* (1971) 15 Cal.App.3rd 806, 813; *People v. Atmore* (1970) 13 Cal.App.3rd 244, 247-248; *People v. Woods* (1970) 6 Cal.App.3rd 832, 838; *People v. Sanchez* (1967) 256 Cal.App.2nd 700, 703-704; *People v. Rosales* (1989) 211 Cal.App.3rd 325, 329.)

P.C. § 833.5: California provides legal authority for peace officers to detain and “conduct a limited search” of a person the officer has “reasonable cause” to believe has a firearm or other deadly weapon and to seize any weapon found. If the person is convicted of a charge related to the firearm or weapon, it shall be deemed a nuisance and disposed of pursuant to **P.C. §§ 18000 & 18005** (formerly, **P.C. § 12028**).

Note: In that most of the rules on “patdown searches” are from constitutionally-based case decisions, anywhere they might differ from the language of this statute, the case law is likely to take precedence.

Problems:

During a “Consensual Encounter” A patdown is probably *not* lawful, although it may never become an issue in that if an officer observes something giving him or her a *reasonable suspicion* that the consensually encountered person may be armed, that same reasonable suspicion would likely elevate the situation into one justifying a lawful detention as well as a patdown. (See *People v. Lee* (1987) 194 Cal.App.3rd 975, 982-983; *People v. Rosales* (1989) 211 Cal.App.3rd 325, 330.)

During Execution of a Search Warrant” or a “Fourth Waiver” search, at least for narcotics: Courts tend to recognize the likelihood that narcotics suspects are often armed and may allow a patdown with no more than the *conclusory opinion* that the “need for officer safety”

dictated the need for a patdown. (*People v. Samples* 1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1197.)

Note *Ybarra v. Illinois* (1979) 444 U.S. 85 [62 L.Ed.2nd 238], where the United States Supreme Court determined to be illegal the detention and patdown of anyone and everyone at the scene of the execution of a narcotics search warrant (i.e., a bar), absent evidence connecting each person to be detained and patted down with the illegal activity being investigated.

During a “*Fourth Waiver*” search of a narcotics suspect’s home: A patdown of a “known associate” of a probationer whose home is being searched according to that person’s terms of probation, with evidence of drug abuse occurring at the house, but without an articulable suspicion that the defendant (the “associate”) might be armed, but just because it is “the safe thing to do,” is illegal. (*People v. Sandoval* (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 205.)

Feeling a Controlled Substance; The “Plain-Feel Doctrine:” When an officer feels a controlled substance (or other items subject to seizure) during the patdown for weapons, and he or she has the training and expertise to recognize that the object is *probably* an illegal substance or object, he may do a full search based upon that newly developed *probable cause*. (*People v. Lee* (1987) 194 Cal.App.3rd 975; *People v. Thurman* (1989) 209 Cal.App.3rd 817, 825-826; see also *United States v. Pacheco* (6th Cir. 2016) 841 F.3rd 384.)

Under what is sometimes referred to as the “*plain-feel doctrine*,” having probable cause to believe that an item felt during a lawful patdown for weapons is illegal contraband (i.e., it being “*immediately apparent*”), a search of the person for the contraband is justified. (*United States v. Graves* (3rd Cir. PA 2017) 877 F.3rd 494.)

E.g.: Feeling a lump which could not have been a weapon, plus other factors (prior lawful observation of pagers, gram scale upon which there was an odor of methamphetamine, and a plastic baggie), justified

a finding of probable cause to search for contraband. (*People v. Dibb* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 832.)

However, if the officer feels what *might* be a controlled substance in the pocket, and “manipulates” (*Minnesota v. Dickerson* (1993) 508 U.S. 366, 378 [124 L.Ed.2nd 334, 345]; *People v. Dickey* (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 952, 957.) or “shakes” it (*United States v. Miles* (9th Cir. 2001) 224 F.3rd 1009.) in an attempt to confirm or verify his suspicions, the manipulation or shaking of the object is a search for contraband, done without *probable cause*, and illegal. (*Ibid.*)

Unless the incriminating character of the contraband becomes “*immediately apparent*” to the officer, he may not retrieve it and may not manipulate it in an attempt to determine what the item may be. (*United States v. Davis* (9th Cir. 2008) 530 F.3rd 1069, 1082-1084.)

See also *United States v. Craddock* (8th Cir. 2016) 841 F.3rd 756; where the Court held that feeling during a patdown what was apparently a keyfob to a vehicle did not supply the necessary probable cause to believe that it might belong to a stolen vehicle parked nearby. Recovering the keyfob was held to be an illegal search.

But, feeling a bulge that is believed to be a weapon, and manipulating it in an attempt to verify that it is a weapon, which requires no more than a *reasonable suspicion*, is lawful. (*United States v. Mattarolo* (9th Cir. 1999) 209 F.3rd 1153.)

Feeling a bulge and being unable to determine whether or not it is a weapon, it is okay to ask the suspect. If the suspect admits that it is contraband, this will give the officer *probable cause* to arrest and search. (*People v. Avila* (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1075-1077.)

But feeling a bulge and recognizing that it is *not* a weapon (a film canister, in this case), and then asking the subject what it is, has been argued by some to be illegal as a “*preliminary step to an illegal search*” (see *People v. Valdez* (1987) 196 Cal.App.3rd 799, 807); a questionable decision at best.

Feeling a bulge which the officer immediately recognized as car keys, after the subject had denied having any car keys on him, and with other evidence tending to connect him to a recent carjacking during which the car keys were taken, was sufficient probable cause to believe that the car keys were evidence of a crime and to justify the retrieval of the keys from his pocket. (*In re Lennies H.* (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1232.)

Frisk for a Firearm based upon an Uncorroborated Anonymous Tip:

A detention and patdown for weapons, based upon an uncorroborated anonymous tip alone, is not lawful in that anonymous information has repeatedly been held to be legally insufficient to establish a *reasonable suspicion*. There is no such thing as a “*firearms exception*” to this rule. (*Florida v. J.L.* (2000) 529 U.S. 266 [146 L.Ed.2nd 254].)

But note: The U.S. Supreme Court, in dicta, hinted strongly that had the anonymous tipster warned of something more dangerous, such as a bomb, a patdown based upon this tip alone might be upheld. The Court also indicated that certain areas where there is a lessened expectation of privacy, such as in an airport or on school grounds, may also be an exception to this rule. (*Id.*, at pp. 273-274 [146 L.Ed.2nd at p. 262].)

The Court, in a concurring opinion, also briefly discusses “*predictive information*” which may supply the necessary corroboration, such as being able to

correctly describe future actions of the suspect. Also, unconnected anonymous informants, or anything which would add the element of credibility to the information, might sufficiently corroborate the anonymous informant. (*Id.*, at p. 275 [146 L.Ed.2nd at p. 263].)

See “*Detentions*” (Chapter 3), above.

Taking the hint, the appellate court in *People v. Coulombe* (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 52, found sufficient corroboration justifying a patdown for a firearm when the information came from two separate informants, where the tips were close in time, the informants contacted the officer personally (thus putting their anonymity at risk), and the setting was in a crowded throng of celebrants at a New Year’s Eve street party, thus increasing the danger.

The fact that the physical description of a suspect who is reported by an anonymous tipster to have a gun in his pocket is very specific still does not corroborate the tipster’s information. Absent at least some suspicious circumstances observed by the responding police officers, finding the person described by the tipster does not create a reasonable suspicion justifying a detention or a patdown for weapons. (*People v. Jordan* (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 544, 553-652; the quick confirmation of the physical description of the defendant and his location, by itself, is legally insufficient.)

A late night radio call concerning two specifically described males causing a disturbance, with one possibly armed, in a known gang area at an address where a call concerning a daytime shooting days earlier resulted in the recovery of two firearms, and where the described males are found within minutes of the call, is sufficient to justify a detention and a

patdown. (*In re Richard G.* (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1252, 1257-1258, fn. 1.)

Other Situations:

Frisk of a person for weapons was lawful when it had been reported to police by a witness that one of several people present had been seen with a firearm, defendant was uncooperative and belligerent, and he kept reaching for an area in his baggy pants where there appeared to be a large, heavy object. (*People v. Lopez* (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 132.)

Stopping someone suspected of having just committed an armed carjacking, with the observation of a knife and bullets, and then a gun, all in plain sight, was more than enough to justify a cursory check of the suspects for possible weapons. Then, feeling objects which, as the deputy testified, could be, or could contain, weapons, the deputy was justified in removing and inspecting those items. (*United States v. Hartz* (9th Cir. 2006) 458 F.3rd 1011, 1018-1019.)

Patting a non-student down for possible weapons on a high school campus, where the defendant/minor was to be moved to the security office, need not be justified by an articulable suspicion that he might be armed. (*In re Jose Y.* (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 748.)

A traffic stop where the odor of marijuana was detected and defendant was wearing baggy clothing through which any possible bulges could not be seen, held to be lawful. (*People v. Collier* (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1374.)

Abandoned Property:

General Rule: There is no expectation of privacy in abandoned, or discarded, property. Such property, therefore, may be searched or seized without a warrant or even probable cause.

Property abandoned by a suspect, without *both* a subjective and an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy, may be seized and searched without probable cause and without a warrant. (*In re Baraka H.* (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1039.)

Leaving all his belongings in a motel room, disappearing in the middle of the night and without making arrangements to extend his stay, it was held that defendant abandoned the motel room, his personal belongings in the room, and his vehicle in the parking lot. There being no reasonable expectation of privacy in these items due to this abandonment, defendant lost his standing to challenge the warrantless entry. (*People v. Parson* (2008) 44 Cal.4th 332, 342-348.)

Leaving a cellphone at the scene of a crime negates the suspect's expectation of privacy in the contents of that phone, and is therefore abandoned property despite the suspect's subjective wish to retrieve it, which he fails to act on. "Abandonment . . . is not meant in the strict property-right sense, but rests instead on whether the person so relinquished his interest in the property that he no longer retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in it at the time of the search." (*People v. Daggs* (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 361.)

Abandoning a cigarette butt onto a public street constitutes a loss of one's right to privacy in that butt, making it available to law enforcement to recover and test for DNA without a search warrant. (*People v. Gallego* (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 388, 394-398.)

Tricking a suspect out of an item of personal property and then testing it for DNA is another issue. But, as noted in *Gallego*, at p. 396, several courts from other jurisdictions have found such a tactic to be lawful. (See *Commonwealth v. Perkins* (Mass. 2008) 883 N.E.2nd 230; and *Commonwealth v. Bly* (Mass. 2007) 862 N.E.2nd 341; testing cigarette butts and a soda can left behind after an interview with police. *Commonwealth v. Ewing* (Mass 2006) 67 Mass.App.Ct. 531 [854 N.E.2nd 993, 1001; offering defendant cigarettes and a straw during an interrogation. *People v. LaGuerre* (2006) 29 A.D.3rd 822 [815 N.Y.S.2nd 211]; obtaining a DNA sample from a piece of chewing gum defendant voluntarily discarded during a contrived soda tasting test. *State v. Athan* (Wash. 2007) 158 P.3rd 27; DNA obtained from defendant's saliva from licking an envelope he mailed to detectives in a police ruse.)

There is no privacy right in the mouthpiece of the PAS device, which was provided by the police and where defendant abandoned any expectation of privacy in the saliva he deposited on the device when he failed to wipe it off. Whether defendant subjectively expected that the genetic material contained in his saliva would become known to the police was irrelevant because he deposited it on a police device and thus made it accessible to the police. The officer who administered the PAS test testified that used mouthpieces were normally discarded in the trash. Thus, any subjective expectation defendant may have had that his right to privacy would be preserved was unreasonable. (*People v. Thomas* (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 338.)

The *Thomas* court further held that using defendant's DNA taken from the PAS device mouthpiece to legitimately test defendant's blood/alcohol level, with his consent, was not a coercive ruse, and therefore lawful. (*Id.*, at p. 344.)

By throwing his backpack onto the roof of a house upon the approach of police officers, defendant abandoned any expectation of privacy in that backpack that he might have previously had. (*United States v. Juszcyk* (10th Cir. Kan. 2017) 844 F.3rd 1213.)

The defendant's subjective reasoning for abandoning a cellphone held to be irrelevant. Leaving his cellphone in a crashed motor vehicle for the stated purpose of getting away from other who were shooting at him did not prevent the responding officers from seizing the cellphone and searching it in an attempt to locate the person who had been driving it. (*United States v. Crumble* (8th Cir. MN 2018) 878 F.3rd 656.)

Trashcans: There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the trash one places in trashcans out at the curb for pick up. (*California v. Greenwood* (1988) 486 U.S. 35 [100 L.Ed.2nd 30].)

The “*Threatened Illegal Detention:*” What happens when the property is abandoned as a direct result of a police officer's attempt to illegally stop and detain a suspect?

The United States Supreme Court resolved a previous three-way split of authority: There is no constitutional violation in a “*threatened unlawful detention*.” The **Fourth Amendment** does not apply to such a situation until the person is actually illegal detained; i.e., when the officer actually catches the defendant or the defendant otherwise submits to the officer’s authority (i.e.; he gives up). (*California v. Hodari D.* (1991) 499 U.S. 621 [113 L.Ed.2nd 690].)

Result: Any evidence abandoned (e.g., tossed or dropped) *during* a foot pursuit of a fleeing suspect, even without any reasonable suspicion justifying a detention (i.e., a “*threatened unlawful detention*”), is admissible as abandoned property (as well as supplying the necessary “*reasonable suspicion*” to justify the suspect’s detention upon being caught).

But, if the suspect does not abandon the contraband until *after* he has been caught, and thus illegally detained, then it *is* subject to suppression as “*fruit of the poisonous tree*,” i.e., the unlawful detention.

Defendant discarding a firearm as officers were attempting to (arguably) illegally arrest him, did not require the suppression of the firearm in that when the gun was discarded, defendant had not yet been “touched” nor had he “submitted” to the officers. Thus, the **Fourth Amendment** was not yet implicated. (*United States v. McClendon* (9th Cir. 2013) 713 F.3rd 1211, 1214-1217.)

The Court noted that a temporary hesitation, nor the officer’s use of firearm while telling him he was under arrest, does not alter the rule of *Hodari D.* (*Id.*, at pp. 1216-1217.)

Searching for Identification:

General Rule: A patdown of an individual for identification is illegal: Patdowns on less than probable cause are allowed only for the purpose of discovering offensive weapons, and then only when the officer is able to articulate a “*reasonable suspicion*” for believing why the person might be armed. (*People v. Garcia* (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 782.)

Exceptions:

A circumstance allowing for a check for identification has been found, however, where the defendant claimed to have none, but the officer could see that he had a wallet in his pocket. (*People v. Long* (1987) 189 Cal.App.3rd 77; telling the suspect to check his wallet and then insisting on watching him do so justified by the need to insure that he didn't conceal evidence or retrieve a weapon.)

Retrieving a wallet from a suspect where the wallet was visible in his pocket, after the suspect, who was lawfully detained, said he didn't have any identification, done for the purpose of checking the wallet for identification, was lawful "under the unique facts of this case." (*People v. Loudermilk* (1987) 195 Cal.App.3rd 996.)

Also, the California Supreme Court has ruled that during a lawful traffic stop, at least after a demand for the driver's license and other vehicle documentation is made and a negative response is obtained (see *United States v. Lopez* (C.D.Cal. 1979) 474 F.Supp. 943, 948-949.), a warrantless, suspicionless intrusion into the vehicle for the limited purpose of locating such documentation is lawful, even if the driver denies that any such documentation exists. In so doing, the officer may look in any location where it is reasonable to believe he or she might find such documentation. (*In re Arturo D.* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 60; *Arturo D.* was joined with the companion case, *People v. Hinger* (using the same cite) out of the Fourth District Court of Appeal.

This would include *under the front seat* (whether looking from the front or rear of the seat), in a *glove compartment*, and over the *visor*. It would probably *not* include within *containers* found in the vehicle or the *trunk*, absent some articulable reason to believe why such documentation might actually be there. (*Id.*, at p. 86, and fn. 25.)

See also *People v. Webster* (1991) 54 Cal.3rd 411; and *People v. Lopez* (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 815.

See “*Searching a Vehicle for a Driver’s License and/or Vehicle Registration, VIN Number, Proof of Insurance, etc.*,” under “*Searches of Vehicles*” (Chapter 9), below.

Fingerprint Evidence:

No Right to Refuse, Upon Arrest:

Upon being arrested, an arrestee has no legal right to refuse a fingerprint examination. (*Virgle v. Superior Court* (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 572.)

The legal authority for fingerprinting an arrestee can be inferred from various state statutes:

P.C. § 7(21): Describing the obtaining of fingerprints as part of the booking procedure.

P.C. § 853.6(g): The requirement that persons arrested and released on a misdemeanor citation provide fingerprints prior to the person’s scheduled court appearance.

P.C. §§ 13125, 13127: Providing for the retention of certain basic information, including fingerprint identification numbers, on arrested individuals.

“Fingerprints taken pursuant to an arrest are part of so-called ‘booking’ procedures, designed to ensure that the person who is arrested is in fact the person law enforcement officials believe they have in custody. (fn. omitted)” (*United States v. Kinkade* (9th Cir. 2003) 345 F.3rd 1095, 100-1101 (Reversed on other grounds); citing *Smith v. United States* (D.C. Cir. 1963) 324 F.2nd 879, 883; and *Napolitano v. United States* (1st Cir. 1965) 340 F.2nd 313, 314.)

Fingerprints taken upon arrest for identification purposes are lawful, even if the product of an illegal arrest. (*Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza* (1984) 468 U.S. 1032, 1039-1040 [82 L.Ed.2nd 778].)

If, however, the fingerprints are found to have been obtained for “*investigative purposes*,” such prints are

subject to suppression absent probable cause justifying the arrest. (*Davis v. Mississippi* (1969) 394 U.S. 721 [22 L.Ed.2nd 676]; *Hayes v. Florida* (1985) 470 U.S. 811 [84 L.Ed.2nd 705]; *United States v. Beltran* (9th Cir. 389 F.3rd 864.)

However, even after fingerprints are taken for investigative purposes, and therefore suppressed as the product of an illegal arrest, the court, upon request, can require defendant to submit a new set of fingerprints for purposes of trial on the new criminal offense. (*United States v. Garcia-Beltran* (9th Cir. 2006) 443 F.3rd 1126; *United States v. Parga-Rosas* (9th Cir. 2001) 238 F.3rd 1209; *United States v. Ortiz-Hernandez* (9th Cir. 2005) 427 F.3rd 567.)

It can also be argued that refusal to cooperate in providing fingerprints during the booking procedure is a violation of **P.C. § 148(a)(1)**, for interfering with the officer in the performance of his or her duties. (See *People v. Quiroga* (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 961, 971; where defendant's conviction for **P.C. § 148** upheld for refusing to identify himself during the booking procedure.)

In that fingerprint evidence does not involve any **Fifth Amendment**, self-incrimination issues (see *Schmerber v. California* (1966) 384 U.S. 757, 764 [16 L.Ed.2nd 908, 916].), an arrestee has no right to refuse to provide them at his or her booking. (*United States v. Kelly* (2nd Cir. 1932) 55 F.2nd 67; *People v. Jones* (1931) 112 Cal.App. 68.)

Use of Force:

While excessive force is not permissible (*People v. Matteson* (1964) 61 Cal.2d 466.), reasonable force which does not “*shock the conscience*” may be used if necessary in order to secure fingerprints from the arrested subject. (*People v. Williams* (1969) 71 Cal.2nd 614, 625.)

Five deputies holding down a resisting criminal defendant for the purpose of obtaining his fingerprints, in a courtroom (but out of the jury's presence), where there were found to be less violent alternatives to obtaining the same evidence, is force that “*shocks the conscience*” and a violation of the defendant's **Fourteenth Amendment** due process rights. (*People v. Herndon* (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 274; held to be

“*harmless error*” in light of other evidence and because defendant created the situation causing the force to be used.)

Refusal Upon Less than an Arrest:

Absent an arrest, the refusal to provide law enforcement with fingerprints is not a crime. However, it is apparently lawful to stop and fingerprint a particular suspect on less than probable cause, at least if done at the scene and without transportation to a police station. (***Davis v. Mississippi*** (1969) 394 U.S. 721 [22 L.Ed.2nd 676]; ***Hayes v. Florida*** (1985) 470 U.S. 811 [84 L.Ed.2nd 705]; ***Virgle v. Superior Court*** (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 572; ***Kaupp v. Texas*** (2003) 538 U.S. 626, 630, fn. 2 [155 L.Ed.2nd 814, 820].)

Right to Assistance of Counsel:

The taking of a defendant's fingerprints is not a critical stage of criminal proceedings at which a defendant needs the presence of counsel. Therefore, there is no **Sixth Amendment** right to the presence of counsel at the taking of fingerprints. (***People v. Williams*** (1969) 71 Cal.2nd 614, 625; citing ***United States v. Wade*** (1967) 388 U.S. 218, 227-228 [18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 1157-1158].)

Handwriting (and other types of) Exemplars:

Similarly, a criminal arrestee *does not* have a **Fifth Amendment** self-incrimination right not to provide a handwriting exemplar. (***Schmerber v. California*** (1966) 384 U.S. 757, 768 [16 L.Ed.2nd 908, 918]; ***Gilbert v. California*** (1967) 388 U.S. 263 [18 L.Ed.2nd 1178]; ***People v. Graves*** (1966) 64 Cal.2nd 208.)

The same legal theory applies to a “*voice exemplar*” (***United States v. Dionisio*** (1973) 410 U.S. 1 [35 L.Ed.2nd 67].), as well as submitting to being photographed. (***Schmerber v. California***, *supra*.)

Note: While it may be physically impossible to force an arrestee to provide any of the above, because there is no constitutional right not to cooperate, his refusal may be used in evidence against him.

Jail, Prison, and Prisoner Searches:

Booking Inventory Searches: A person who is to be booked, and who has objects in his possession, may be subjected to an *inventory search* despite the lack of probable cause to believe he has anything illegal on him. (*Illinois v. Lafayette* (1983) 462 U.S. 640 [77 L.Ed.2nd 65].)

Scope: “This exception (to the search warrant requirement) permits ‘police to search the personal effects of a person under lawful arrest as part of the routine administrative procedure at a police station house incident to booking and jailing the suspect.’” (*People v. Turner* (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 397, 403; quoting *People v. Macabeo* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1212, 1213.)

“*Booking*” entails the recordation of an arrest in official police records, and the taking by the police of fingerprints and photographs of the person arrested. (See *People v. Superior Court [Simon]* (1971) 7 Cal.3rd 186, 208; see also P.C. § 7, subd. 21.)

Purposes:

Warrantless searches may be made by jail and prison officials to accommodate legitimate “*institutional needs and objectives*,” primarily internal security. (*Hudson v. Palmer* (1984) 468 U.S. 517, 524 [82 L.Ed.2nd 393, 401].)

Other Purposes include:

- To prevent the introduction of drugs and other contraband (including weapons) into the premises;
- The detection of escape plots; *and*
- The maintenance of sanitary conditions.

(See *Hudson v. Palmer*, *supra*, at p. 527 [82 L.Ed.2nd at pp. 403-404]; *United States v. Cohen* (2nd Cir. 1986) 796 F.2nd 20, 22-23.)

- Post-booking searches also serve the purpose of collecting evidence against inmates, including pretrial detainees.

(*People v. Davis* (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 523-529.)

Justifications: Booking searches are justified under a number of legal theories:

- To safeguard the person’s property and for security purposes. (*Illinois v. Lafayette* (1983) 462 U.S. 640, 643-647 [77 L.Ed.2nd 65]; *People v. Laiwa* (1983) 34 Cal.3rd 711, 724-727; *People v. Hamilton* (1988) 46 Cal.3rd 123, 137.)

See **Gov’t. Code § 26640**; duty of the sheriff to take charge of, and safely keep, the property of a prisoner.

- To prevent introduction of weapons and contraband into the jail facility. (*People v. Gilliam* (1974) 41 Cal.App.3rd 181, 189.)
- To discover evidence pertaining to the crime for which the person was arrested. (*People v. Maher* (1976) 17 Cal.3rd 196, 200-201.)

Belated Search Incident to Arrest: Older authority has held that a booking search is really a “search incident to arrest with an inconsequential time lag.” (*People v. Superior Court [Murry]* (1973) 30 Cal.App.3rd 257, 263; and *United States v. Edwards* (1974) 415 U.S. 800, 803 [39 L.Ed.2nd 771, 775-776].)

A defendant detained at a jail for failure to present satisfactory evidence of identification, pursuant to **V.C. § 40307**, may properly be subjected to a booking search even though not formally booked into the jail. (*People v. Benz* (1984) 156 Cal.App.3rd 483, 489.)

Containers: The right to conduct a warrantless booking search includes the right to search containers (e.g., purse, wallet, etc.) in the possession of the person to be booked. (*Illinois v. Lafayette, supra*; *People v. Hamilton* (1988) 46 Cal.3rd 123, 137.)

Exception; Cellphones: This rule, however, does not include cellphones:

A warrantless search incident to arrest also does *not* include cellphones found on the person at the time of his arrest. (*Riley v. California* (June 25, 2014) 573 U.S. ___ [134 S.Ct. 2473; 189 L.Ed.2nd 430].)

Cellphones are not containers for purposes of the vehicle exception to the search warrant requirement. (*United States v. Camou* (9th Cir. 2014) 773 F.3rd 932, 941-943.)

See also *United States v. Lara* (9th Cir. 2016) 815 F.3rd 605, 610-611; declining to include defendant's cellphone under the category of a "container," in defendant's **Fourth** wavier search conditions.

Post-Booking Searches of Impounded Property: A warrantless search of a prisoner's impounded property, such as a wallet or a purse, which was not searched until after completion of the booking process, and when there is no exigency, violates the inmate's privacy rights. A search warrant will be required to lawfully search the impounded wallet, purse, or other item. (*People v. Smith* (1980) 103 Cal.App.3rd 840; evidence recovered from a wallet, not previously searched, in the defendant's booked property.)

Exceptions: Although *Smith* has never been expressly overruled, its continuing validity is seriously in question. At the very least, the exceptions to *Smith* have just about eaten up the rule. For instance:

No warrant is necessary for a post-booking search when the personal property searched has previously been viewed by officials. (E.g.; during the booking process or during a lawful search incident to arrest.) (*People v. Davis* (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 390; *United States v. Holzman* (9th Cir. 1989) 871 F.2nd 1496, 1505; *United States v. Thompson* (5th Cir. 1988) 837 F.2nd 673, 675; *United States v. Johnson* (9th Cir. 1987) 820 F.2nd 1065, 1071-1072.)

Property which is evidence of a crime may be taken from the person of the defendant without a warrant, even hours after booking, for the purpose of examination and testing. (*United States v. Edwards* (1974) 415 U.S. 800, 806 [39 L.Ed.2nd 771, 777]; defendant's clothing, worn at the time of the booking, taken from him ten hours later, after replacement clothing was purchased for him.)

Note, however, the Supreme Court refused to "conclude that the Warrant Clause of the **Fourth Amendment** is never applicable to post-arrest seizures of the effects of an arrestee. [fn. Omitted]" (*Id.*, at p. 808 [39 L.Ed.2nd at p. 778].)

Recovery of a ring from defendant's booked property, contained in, and readily visible through, a transparent property bag, without the need to search any containers, was lawfully seized from defendant's property without the need for a warrant. (*People v. Superior Court [Gunn]* (1980) 112 Cal.App.3rd 970.)

Note, however, the Court’s discussion indicating that the right to search property without a warrant may even be broader: “Once articles have lawfully fallen into the hands of the police they may examine them to see if they have been stolen, test them to see if they have been used in the commission of a crime, return them to the prisoner on his release, or preserve them for use as evidence at the time of trial. [Citation] During their period of police custody an arrested person’s personal effects, like his person itself, are subject to reasonable inspection, examination, and test. [Citation] Whatever segregation the police make as a matter of internal police administration of articles taken from a prisoner at the time of his arrest and booking does not derogate the fact of their continued custody and possession of such articles. [Citation]” (*Id.*, at pp. 974-975.)

Ring worn by defendant in a robbery, visible to and identifiable by the victim, and properly in the custody of the sheriff after booking, does not hold the “*vestige of privacy*” as did the wallet in *Smith*, and was therefore properly retrieved from his impounded property in the jail and used as evidence in trial. (*People v. Bradley* (1981) 115 Cal.App.3rd 744, 751; see also *People v. Davis* (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 390.)

The warrantless search of defendant’s personal effects, as an extension of the booking process, is okay. (*People v. Panfili* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3rd 387, 392-394; where the arresting officer was instructed to isolate the property for a more detailed search later.)

An exception, however, does not apply to cellphones in that cellphones do not pose a danger to officers and once seized, it is unlikely any evidence contained in the phone is going to be destroyed. When balanced with the large amount of personal information likely to be found in cellphones, a warrantless intrusion into the phone is not justified under the **Fourth Amendment** absent exigent circumstances. (*Riley v. California* (June 25, 2014) 573 U.S. __ [134 S.Ct. 2473; 189 L.Ed.2nd 430].)

Strip Searches of Prisoners:

Fifth and Fourteenth Due Process, and Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure Issues:

Rule: Whether a prison or county jail inmate may be lawfully subjected to a “strip search” has been the subject of some controversy, and been held to depend upon the circumstances, with **Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment** “due process,” as well as **Fourth Amendment** “search and seizure” implications.

The Fourth Amendment right of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures “extends to incarcerated prisoners; however, the reasonableness of a particular search is determined by reference to the prison context.” (*Michenfelder v. Sumner* (9th Cir. 1988) 860 F.2nd 328, 332; *Bell v. Wolfish* (1979) 441 U.S. 520, 545; [60 L. Ed.2nd 447]; *Bull v. City and County of San Francisco* (9th Cir. 2010) 595 F.3rd 964, 972.)

Note also authority (albeit the minority rule) from another circuit holding that prisoners have *no* privacy interests protected by the **Fourth Amendment**. (*Johnson v. Phelan* (7th Cir. 1995) 69 F.2rd 144, 150.)

However, even if a prisoner retains some degree of his or her **Fourth Amendment** rights, strip searches are reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, and therefore, if conducted properly, and limited to when necessary under the circumstances, are legal. (*Michenfelder v. Sumner*, *supra*, at p. 333.)

Even if the **Fourth Amendment** is inapplicable, the (**Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment** “due process” clause(s) prohibits prison officials from “treating prisoners in a fashion so ‘brutal’ and ‘offensive to human dignity’ as to ‘shock the conscience.’” (*Vaughn v. Ricketts* (9th Cir. 1988) 859 F.2nd 736, 742; digital cavity searches conducted in a brutal fashion.)

“Reasonableness,” under the **Fourth Amendment**, requires the court to balance the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails. Courts must consider the scope of the intrusion, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted. (*Bell v. Wolfish* (1979) 441 U.S. 520, 559 [60 L.Ed.2nd 447, 480].)

Visual Body Inspections:

The constitutionality of a visual inspection of a prison inmate’s unclothed body, including body cavities, depends upon a balancing of (1) the scope of the particular

intrusion, (2) the manner in which it is conducted, (3) the justification for initiating the search, and (4) the place in which it is conducted. (*People v. Collins* (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 137, 152-153.)

The *Collins* Court also noted that the more intrusive, “*physical body cavity search*” requires judicial authorization (i.e., a search warrant) and the use of properly trained medical personnel. (*Id.*, at p. 143; see also *Bouse v Bussey* (9th Cir. 1977) 573 F.2nd 548, 550; and *United States v. Fowlkes* (9th Cir. 2015) 804 F.3rd 954, 960-968.)

California Code of Regulations, Title 15, § 3287(b), allows for a visual search of an inmate, clothed or unclothed, whenever there is a “*substantial reason* to believe the inmate may have unauthorized or dangerous items concealed on his or her person.” (Italics added) Judicial authorization (i.e., a search warrant), and the use of “medical personnel in a medical setting,” is only required in the case of a “*physical* (as opposed to a non-contact *visual*) *body cavity search*.” In *Collins*, a visual inspection of the defendant’s rectal area was intended, for which it is generally accepted that the rigorous requirements of the more intrusive “*physical body cavity search*” is not required.

Such visual body cavity searches have been upheld under circumstances constituting less than even a reasonable suspicion, such as after a visit to the law library, infirmary or exercise room, or an encounter with an outsider. (*Id.*, at pp. 152-155; *Goff v. Nix* (8th Cir. 1986) 803 F.2nd 358, 368-371; *Campbell v. Miller* (7th Cir. 1986) 787 F.2nd 217, 228; and *Arruda v. Fair* (1st Cir. 1983) 710 F.2nd 886, 886-888.)

Note: Violation of the administrative provisions for the searching of prisoners in a prison, absent a constitutional violation, does not require the suppression of any resulting evidence. (*People v. Collins, supra*, at p. 156.)

See *Byrd v. Maricopa County Board of Supervisors* (9th Cir. 2017) 845 F.3rd 919, where it was held that a federal district court had erred when it sua sponte dismissed a pretrial detainee’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil suit which

challenged a county sheriff's policy of allowing female guards to observe male pretrial detainees' use of the shower and bathroom, as plaintiff had stated claims under the **Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments** because the scope and manner of the intrusions were far broader than those that have been previously approved, such that the claim was not foreclosed by precedent, and whether it was a violation of his right to bodily privacy or cruel and unusual punishment required further litigation.

Strip Searches Restricted: With these principles in mind, the Courts have been reluctant to grant jail and prison officials carte blanche authority to conduct unrestricted strip searches:

A “*search incident to arrest*” does not include a “*strip search*” which, as a “serious intrusion upon personal rights” and “an invasion of personal rights of the first magnitude” (*Chapman v. Nichols* (10th Cir. 1993) 989 F.2nd 393, 395-396.), is generally not allowed prior to booking. (*Foote v. Spiegel* (Utah 1995) 903 F.Supp. 1463.)

The fact that the offense for which the defendant was arrested is classified as a felony does not mean that a strip search is constitutional. The seriousness of the offense must be balanced with all the other factors. (*Kennedy v. Los Angeles* (9th Cir. 1989) 901 F.2nd 702, 710-716; arrest for grand theft did not warrant a visual strip search, under the circumstances.)

But, a visual strip search was upheld for a person arrested for grand theft auto, in that this offense is sufficiently associated with violence to justify the intrusion into defendant's privacy. (*Thompson v. Los Angeles* (9th Cir. 1989) 885 F.2nd 1439, 1445-1448.)

Thompson v. Los Angeles, *supra*, however, was overruled in *Bull v. City and County of San Francisco* (9th Cir. 2010) 595 F.3rd 964 (see below; “*Strip Searches Upheld*”), in so far as it noted that strip searches must be based upon a reasonable suspicion that the arrestee is carrying contraband and not on whether he is going to be placed in a jail's general population.

Also, searches which are excessive, vindictive, harassing, or unrelated to any legitimate penological interest will *not* be upheld. (*Michenfelder v. Sumner*, *supra*, at p. 332; routine and repeated visual body cavity searches upheld for inmates in a maximum security prison holding Nevada's 40 most dangerous prisoners.)

Contact body cavity searches of female inmates conducted by police officers, without medical personnel, in a non-hygienic manner and in the presence of male officers, rejected as unreasonable. (*Bonitz v. Fair* (1st Cir. 1986) 804 F.2nd 164, 172-173.)

However, female prison guards subjecting male inmates to periodic body cavity searches was held *not* to be a **Fourteenth Amendment** due process violation, nor an **Eighth Amendment** "*cruel and unusual punishment*," and therefore will not subject the guards to any civil liability. (*Somers v. Thurman* (9th Cir. 1997) 109 F.3rd 614.)

A "*partial strip search*" (i.e., with the prisoner clothed in his boxer shorts only) of a male prisoner by a female detentions cadet (or any such "cross-gender" strip search), held to be a **Fourth Amendment** violation absent an emergency situation. (*Byrd v. Maricopa County Sheriff's Department* (9th Cir. 2011) 629 F.3rd 1135, 1140-1147; but see the dissent, pgs. 1147-1154.)

Strip Searches Upheld:

A full body cavity search of a group of 40 to 44 inmates returning to an honor farm from a day's work furlough was upheld when based upon information that marijuana was being brought into the honor farm. The body cavity searches were conducted by a doctor using an acceptable medical procedure. (*People v. West* (1985) 170 Cal.App.3rd 326.)

X-raying all incoming prisoners being moved from one high-risk prison to a second high-risk prison is lawful. (*People v. Pifer* (1989) 216 Cal.App.3rd 956.)

An en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed its prior decisions and in *Thompson v. City of Los Angeles* (9th Cir. 1989) 885 F.2nd 1439, and *Giles v. Ackerman* (9th Cir.

1984) 746 F.2nd 614, and held that a sheriff's blanket policy of doing non-contact strip searches of all persons being placed into the general jail population was reasonable and lawful. (*Bull v. City and County of San Francisco* (9th Cir. 2010) 595 F.3rd 964.)

Resolution of the Conflict:

Finally, the United States Supreme Court ended the debate on this issue. Defendant, arrested on an outstanding warrant and briefly incarcerated in two different jails in the general jail population, was subject to strip searches on two occasions. The charges against him were later dismissed in that defendant had earlier satisfied the requirements of the warrant. Defendant claimed that individuals arrested for minor offenses should not be required to remove their clothing and expose the most private areas of their bodies to close visual inspection as a routine part of the jail intake process. He argued that jail officials could conduct this kind of search only if they had reason to suspect a particular inmate of concealing a weapon, drugs or other contraband. The Supreme Court disagreed and, in a 5-to-4 decision, affirmed the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, holding that the search procedures at the two jails struck a reasonable balance between inmate privacy and the needs of the institutions. (*Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Burlington* (2012) 566 U.S. 318 [132 S.Ct. 1510; 182 L.Ed.2nd 566].)

In so holding, the Court accepted the prison officials' assertions, supported by evidence presented, that strip searches were needed to:

- Detect injury or disease upon intake;
- Identify gang-related markings and tattoos so as to avoid housing problems and violence, *and*
- Detect contraband that might be harmful to prisoners and prison officials alike.

Note: This rule probably does *not* apply to persons arrested on a minor traffic offense and/or who are *not* held in the jail's general population. (See *Id.*, 132 S.Ct. at pp. 1522-1523; "This case does not require the Court to rule on the types of searches

that would be reasonable in instances where, for example, a detainee will be held without assignment to the general jail population and without substantial contact with other detainees.”) See also “*Misdemeanor (and Infraction) Booking Searches*,” below.

Continued Limitations:

However, the forcible removal of a baggie containing drugs from defendant’s rectum by officers without medical training or a warrant during a visual body cavity search, while defendant was in the city jail, was held to have violated defendant’s **Fourth Amendment** rights. (*United States v. Fowlkes* (9th Cir. 2015) 804 F.3rd 954, 960-968.)

See **Cal. Code of Reg., Title 15, § 3287(b)**, for statutory rules on strip searches of prison inmates.

Misdemeanor (and Infraction) Booking Searches:

Due Process: Balancing the interests involved, it has been held to be a **Fourteenth** (and **Fifth**) **Amendment** *due process* violation to strip-search a *misdemeanor arrestee* where the arrestee is not to be intermingled with the general jail population, the offense for which she was arrested is not one commonly associated with the possession of weapons or contraband (i.e., DUI in this case), and there is no cause to believe she may possess either. (*Logan v. Shealy* (4th Cir. 1981) 660 F.2nd 1007.)

However, an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal, in *Bull v. City and County of San Francisco* (9th Cir. 2010) 595 F.3rd 964, overruled itself in its prior decision of *Giles v. Ackerman* (9th Cir 1984) 746 F.2nd 614, *Giles* having held that a person arrested on minor misdemeanor arrest warrants, with no prior criminal history or any relationship to drugs or weapons, could not be subjected to a strip search even though she was to be put into the general jail population. *Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Burlington* (2012) 566 U.S. 318 [132 S.Ct. 1510; 182 L.Ed.2nd 566] also has the effect of overruling these prior Ninth Circuit decisions.

Statutory Rules: In the case of most misdemeanor and infraction arrestees, the California Legislature has restricted by statute the

right to conduct “*strip*” and “*visual*” or “*physical*” *body cavity searches*. (P.C. §§ 4030 & 4031; see below.)

P.C. § 4030(a): Legislative purpose to establish “a statewide policy strictly limiting strip and body cavity searches” for pre-arraignment misdemeanor and infraction detainees in county jails.

P.C. § 4030(b): The following restrictions apply only to *pre-arraignment detainees* arrested for infraction and misdemeanor offenses, and minors detained prior to a detention hearing for infraction and misdemeanor violations. They *do not* apply to prisoners of the Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation or the Division of Juvenile Justice in the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, or to post-arraignment inmates in local custody.

Definitions:

P.C. § 4030(c)(1): “*Body Cavity*” means the stomach or rectal cavity of a person, and vagina of a female person.

P.C. § 4030(c)(2): “*Physical Body Cavity Search*” means physical intrusion into a body cavity for the purpose of discovering any object concealed in the body cavity. (Often referred to as a “*manual body cavity search*” in federal cases.)

P.C. § 4030(c)(3): “*Strip Search*” means any search which requires the officer to remove or arrange some or all of that person’s clothing so as to permit a visual inspection of the underclothing, breasts, buttocks, or genitalia of the person.

P.C. § 4030(c)(4): “*Visual Body Cavity Search*” means visual inspection of a body cavity.

P.C. § 4030(d)(1): Notwithstanding any other law, including V.C. § 40304.5, when a person is arrested and taken into custody, that person may be subjected to patdown searches, metal detector searches, body scanners, and thorough clothing searches in order to discover and

retrieve concealed weapons and contraband substances prior to being placed in a booking cell.

Subd. (d)(2) An agency that utilizes a body scanner pursuant to this subdivision shall endeavor to avoid knowingly using a body scanner to scan a woman who is pregnant.

P.C. § 4030(e): A person arrested and held in custody on a misdemeanor or infraction offense, except those involving weapons, controlled substances, or violence, or a minor detained prior to a detention hearing on the grounds that he or she is a person described in **W&I Code §§ 300, 601 or 602**, except for those minors alleged to have committed felonies or offenses involving weapons, controlled substances, or violence, shall not be subjected to a strip search or visual body cavity search prior to placement in the general jail population, unless a peace officer has determined there is reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, to believe that person is concealing a weapon or contraband, and a strip search will result in the discovery of the weapon or contraband. A strip search or visual body cavity search, or both, shall not be conducted without the prior written authorization of the supervising officer on duty. The authorization shall include the specific and articulable facts and circumstances upon which the reasonable suspicion determination was made by the supervisor.

P.C. § 4030(f):

Subd. (f)(1) Except pursuant to the provisions of **para. (2)**, a person arrested and held in custody on a misdemeanor or infraction offense not involving weapons, controlled substances, or violence, shall not be confined in the general jail population unless all of the following are true:

- (A) The person is not cited and released.
- (B) The person is not released on his or her own recognizance.
- (C) The person is not able to post bail within a reasonable time, not less than three hours.

Subd. (f)(2) A person shall not be housed in the general jail population prior to release pursuant to the provisions of **para. (1)** unless a documented emergency exists and there is no reasonable alternative to that placement. The person shall be placed in the general population only upon prior written authorization documenting the specific facts and circumstances of the emergency. The written authorization shall be signed by the uniformed supervisor of the facility or by a uniformed watch commander. A person confined in the general jail population pursuant to **para. (1)** shall retain all rights to release on citation, his or her own recognizance, or bail that were preempted as a consequence of the emergency.

An arrest for the misdemeanor offense of being under the influence of a controlled substance, per **H&S § 11550**, does not justify a later visual body cavity search at the jail prior to being taken into the general jail population, despite this statute to the contrary, absent any specific articulable facts amounting to a reasonable suspicion that the arrestee does in fact possess a controlled substance. (*Way v. County of Ventura* (2006) 445 F.3rd 1157.)

P.C. § 4030(g): No person (nor a minor, prior to a disposition hearing) arrested for an infraction or a misdemeanor offense shall be subjected to a “*physical body cavity search*” except under the authority of a *search warrant* issued by a magistrate specifically authorizing the physical body cavity search.

P.C. § 4030(h): A copy of the prior written authorization required by **subds. (e)** and **(f)** and the search warrant required by **subd. (g)** shall be placed in the agency’s records and made available, on request, to the person searched or his or her authorized representative. With regard to a strip search or visual or physical body cavity search, the time, date, and place of the search, the name and sex of the person conducting the search, and a statement of the results of the search, including a list of items removed from the person searched, shall be recorded in the agency’s

records and made available, upon request, to the person searched or his or her authorized representative.

P.C. § 4030(i): Persons conducting a “*strip search*” or a “*visual body cavity search*” shall not touch the breasts, buttocks, or genitalia of the person being searched.

P.C. § 4030(j): “*Physical body cavity searches*” may be conducted only:

- Under sanitary conditions.
- Only by a physician, nurse practitioner, registered nurse, licensed vocational nurse or emergency medical technician Level II, licensed to practice in this state.

P.C. § 4030(k)(1): All persons conducting or otherwise present for a “*strip search*,” or a “*visual*” or “*physical body cavity search*,” except for physicians or licensed medical personnel, shall be of the *same sex* as the person being searched.

Subd. (k)(2) A person within sight of the visual display of a body scanner depicting the body during a scan shall be of the same sex as the person being scanned, except for physicians or licensed medical personnel.

P.C. § 4030(l): All “*strip searches*,” or “*visual*” or “*physical body cavity searches*” shall be conducted in an area of privacy so that the search cannot be observed by persons not participating in the search. Persons are considered to be participating in the search if their official duties relative to search procedure require them to be present at the time the search is conducted.

P.C. § 4030(m): Violation of any of the above is a misdemeanor; 6 months and \$1,000 fine. (P.C. § 19)

P.C. § 4030(n) & (o): Civil remedies for violations.

P.C. § 4031. Searches of Minors in Juvenile Detention Centers:

Subd. (a) This section applies to all minors detained in a juvenile detention center on the grounds that he or she is a person described in **W&I §§ 300, 601, or 602**, and all minors adjudged a ward of the court and held in a juvenile detention center on the grounds he or she is a person described in **W&I §§ 300, 601, or 602**.

Subd. (b) Persons conducting a strip search or a visual body cavity search shall not touch the breasts, buttocks, or genitalia of the person being searched.

Subd. (c) A physical body cavity search shall be conducted under sanitary conditions, and only by a physician, nurse practitioner, registered nurse, licensed vocational nurse, or emergency medical technician Level II licensed to practice in this state. A physician engaged in providing health care to detainees, wards, and inmates of the facility may conduct physical body cavity searches.

Subd. (d) A person conducting or otherwise present or within sight of the inmate during a strip search or visual or physical body cavity search shall be of the same sex as the person being searched, except for physicians or licensed medical personnel.

Subd. (e) All strip searches and visual and physical body cavity searches shall be conducted in an area of privacy so that the search cannot be observed by persons not participating in the search. Persons are considered to be participating in the search if their official duties relative to search procedure require them to be present at the time the search is conducted.

Subd. (f) A person who knowingly and willfully authorizes or conducts a strip searches and visual or physical body cavity search in violation of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor.

Subd. (g) Nothing in this section shall be construed as limiting the common law or statutory rights of a person regarding an action for damages or injunctive relief, or as precluding the prosecution under another law of a peace officer or other person who has violated this section.

Subd. (h) Any person who suffers damage or harm as a result of a violation of this section may bring a civil action to recover actual damages, or one thousand dollars (\$1,000), whichever is greater. In addition, the court may, in its discretion, award punitive damages, equitable relief as it deems necessary and proper, and costs, including reasonable attorney's fees.

Subd. (i) This section does not limit the protections granted by **P.C. § 4030** to individuals described in **subd. (b)** of that section.

Additional Case law:

People v. Wade (1989) 208 Cal.App.3rd 304: Probable cause existed for a visual body cavity search of a defendant arrested for a narcotics violation, although other **P.C. § 4030** requirements were not met. However, **P.C. § 4030** does not provide for suppression of evidence as a remedy for violating the terms of this section, and the search was valid under federal constitutional law. Therefore, the resulting evidence was admissible despite the **P.C. § 4030** violation.

An en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal, in ***Bull v. City and County of San Francisco*** (9th Cir. 2010) 595 F.3rd 964, overruled itself in its prior decision of ***Giles v. Ackerman*** (9th Cir 1984) 746 F.2nd 614, ***Giles*** having held that a person arrested on minor misdemeanor arrest warrants, with no prior criminal history or any relationship to drugs or weapons, could not be subjected to a strip search even though she was to be put into the general jail population. ***Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Burlington*** (2012) 566 U.S. 318 [132 S.Ct. 1510; 182 L.Ed.2nd 566] also has the effect of overruling these prior Ninth Circuit decisions.

See *Byrd v. Maricopa County Board of Supervisors* (9th Cir. 2017) 845 F.3rd 919, where it was held that a federal district court had erred when it sua sponte dismissed a pretrial detainee's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil suit which challenged a county sheriff's policy of allowing female guards to observe male pretrial detainees' use of the shower and bathroom, as plaintiff had stated claims under the **Fourth** and **Fourteenth Amendments** because the scope and manner of the intrusions were far broader than those that have been previously approved, such that the claim was not foreclosed by precedent, and whether it was a violation of his right to bodily privacy or cruel and unusual punishment required further litigation.

Searches of Jail Cells:

The United States Supreme Court has upheld the random, warrantless searches of an inmate's prison cell, concluding that the **Fourth Amendment's** proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures is not applicable because an inmate has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her cell. (*Hudson v. Palmer* (1984) 468 U.S. 517, 526 [82 L.Ed.2nd 393, 402-403].)

The courts have found the rules for prisons to be no different than those for a county jail. (See *DeLancie v. Superior Court* (1982) 31 Cal.3rd 865, overruled on other grounds.)

The California Supreme Court is in accord, applying the rule of *Hudson v. Palmer* to a defendant's jail cell. (*People v. Bittaker* (1989) 48 Cal.3rd 1046, 1096.)

In discussing the warrantless seizure of materials from the defendant's jail cell that were relevant to a pending murder prosecution, the California Supreme Court, at pages 1095-1096, noted that: "(D)efendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in property within his jail cell either under federal law (see *Hudson v. Palmer* (1984) 468 U.S. 517, 526 [82 L.Ed.2d 393, 402-403 . . .].) or under California decisions which govern searches antedating *DeLancie v. Superior Court* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 865 [183 Cal.Rptr. 866, 647 P.2d 142] (see

People v. Valenzuela (1984) 151 Cal.App. 3d 180, 189 [198 Cal.Rptr. 469] and cases there cited). Since Budds could have seized the manuscript without asking for or receiving consent, the issues defendant raises are immaterial to the validity of the seizure.”

The California Supreme Court has also interprets *Hudson* to mean that eavesdropping on jail inmates’ (including pretrial detainees) conversations is lawful due to the lack of an expectation of privacy, and even if done for the purpose of collecting evidence. (*People v. Davis* (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 523-529; recognizing that some courts disagree on whether pretrial detainees have a higher expectation of privacy than do convicted inmates.)

Similarly, the warrantless search of defendant’s dormitory room in a state hospital where he had been committed as a sexually violent predator (SVP) was lawful, defendant not having a reasonable expectation of privacy in the dormitory. The dormitory shared none of the attributes of privacy of a home. The dormitory itself accommodated multiple patients. Officers conducted random searches on a daily basis. Also, various signs throughout the facility warned residents that they were subject to such searches. (*People v. Golden* (2017) 19 Cal.App.5th 905.)

See also **Cal. Code of Reg., Title 15, §§ 3287(a) and 4711** for statutory rules on the searches of prison cells and other inmate property.

Monitoring of Jail Visitations and Telephone Calls:

Rule: Given an inmate’s lack of any reasonable expectation of privacy, the California Supreme Court, in *People v. Loyd* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 997, overruling its previous decision in *Delancie v. Superior Court* (1982) 31 Cal.3rd 865, upheld the *constitutionality* of the following, even when done for the sole purpose of seeking incriminating evidence, despite the lack of a warrant or other judicial authorization.

- Monitoring and recording of *jail visitations*.
- Monitoring and recording of jail conversations over *internal phone lines*.

- Monitoring and recording of jail conversations over *external phone lines*.

P.C. §§ 2600 & 2601(d), purporting to provide state prison (and by inference, county jail) inmates with a right to visitors, were amended by the Legislature in 1997, eliminating that right.

The Court in *Loyd*, however, specifically declined to decide the applicability of **Title III** of the **Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520)** to the monitoring and recording of jail conversations over *external* telephone lines.

See *People v. Zepeda* (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1183, where the need to obtain judicial authorization was assumed, without discussion, to be the law.

However, under **Title III**; “(I)t shall not be unlawful . . . for a person acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication where . . . one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception.” (18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c), (d))

Based upon this, it has been held that where a sign has been posted indicating that “*telephone calls may be monitored and recorded,*” inmates are on notice, and his or her “decision to engage in conversations over those phones constitute implied consent to that monitoring and takes any wiretap outside the prohibitions of **Title III.**” (*People v. Kelly* (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 853, 858; warrantless recording of defendant’s telephone conversations to parties on the outside approved.)

Such warning signs also take such telephone calls outside the search warrant provisions of California’s wiretap statutes. (**P.C. §§ 629.50 et seq.**; *Id.*, at pp. 859-860.)

See also *People v. Windham* (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 881: The warrantless monitoring and recording of a jail inmates’ telephone calls, where signs were posted, a message was heard at the beginning of every call, and jail rules provided to inmates, all noted that telephone calls would be monitored, violated neither the federal **Title III** rules nor California’s **Privacy Act** provisions (**P.C. §§ 630 et seq.**)

Note also, a phone used during a physical visitation by a prisoner and his or her visitor does *not* meet the requirements of a “*wire*

communication,” not using a line in interstate or foreign commerce. It is therefore not subject to the wiretap restrictions of **P.C. § 631**. (*People v. Santos* (1972) 26 Cal.App.3rd 397, 402.)

The California Supreme Court interprets *Hudson* to similarly allow eavesdropping on the conversations of inmates (including pretrial detainees) due to the lack of an expectation of privacy, even if done for the purpose of collecting evidence. (*People v. Davis* (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 523-529.)

See also *People v. Leonard* (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1404, where the California Supreme Court found no violation of the **Fourth Amendment**, the **California Constitution’s** right to privacy, and **Title III of the federal Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. § 3711)** by videotaping the defendant’s end of a telephone conversation with his father when the defendant knew he was being videotaped.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal is in accord. (*United States v. Van Poyck* (9th Cir. 1996) 77 F.3rd 285, 291; “(A)ny expectation of privacy in outbound calls from prison is not objectively reasonable and . . . the **Fourth Amendment** is therefore not triggered by the routine taping of such calls.”)

See also *United States v. Monghur* (9th Cir. 2009) 588 F.3rd 975, 979; noting that the defendant conceded, “as he must, that he had no expectation of privacy in those calls” from county jail, where warnings were posted that telephone conversations from jail were monitored and recorded; citing *Van Poyck, supra*.)

Exceptions: There are a number of very important exceptions with which law enforcement *must* be aware:

- **P.C. § 636(a); Eavesdropping on Conversations with an Attorney, Religious Advisor, or Licensed Physician:** Makes it a felony to *eavesdrop on, or record, by means of an electronic device, a conversation between a person in the physical custody of a law enforcement officer or other public officer, or who is on the property of a law enforcement agency or other public agency, and that person’s attorney, religious advisor, or licensed physician.* (See *In re Jordan* (1972) 7 Cal.3rd 930, 937-938, fn. 3; *People v. Lopez* (1963) 60 Cal.2nd 223, 248.)

Subdivision (b) makes it a felony to *eavesdrop on* such a conversation by “*nonelectronic*” means, but excludes inadvertently overhearing such a conversation, or when the conversation is in a courtroom or other room used for adjudicatory proceedings.

A state prison inmate has no reasonable expectation of privacy under either **P.C. § 636** or **Cal. Const., art. I, § 1**, when he is being seen by a physician for treatment. It is not a violation of these provisions for a correctional officer to be allowed to be present during such examinations where the officer’s presence is a matter of prison policy to further the safety and security of the institution, consistent with **P.C. § 2600**. (*Faunce v. Cate* (2013) 222 Cal. App. 4th 166, 170-172.)

- *Lulling an Inmate into Believing a Conversation was Confidential*: Where jail officers acted so that the suspect “and his wife were lulled into believing that their conversation would be confidential.” (*North v. Superior Court* (1972) 8 Cal.3rd 301, 311; *People v. Loyd* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 997, 1002.)

See also, “*Wiretap Laws*,” under “*Searches with a Search Warrant*” (Chapter 6), above.

Monitoring Jail Mail: It is constitutionally permissible to monitor inmate mail coming into a jail facility. (*Wolff v. McDonnell* (1974) 418 U.S. 539, 576-577 [41 L.Ed.2nd 935]; *People v. Dinkins* (1966) 242 Cal.App.2nd 892, 903; *People v. Jones* (1971) 19 Cal.App.3rd 437, 449.)

Under the theory of *People v. Loyd* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 997, it would seem that monitoring all non-legal mail, coming in and going out of a facility, would be constitutionally permissible even if the purpose is to look for incriminating evidence.

Outgoing mail may be monitored, “to prevent any threats emanating from inmates.” (*People v. Jones, supra*, see **Cal. Code Regs, Title 15, § 3138(a)**)

The sole exception is legal correspondence to the defendant’s attorney. (**Cal. Code Regs, tit. 15, § 3141(b), (c)**): “An attorney at law listed with a state bar.” (**subd. (c)(6)**)

An inmate's "legal mail" (i.e., correspondence with the prisoner's attorney) may be opened as well, so long as it is not read. (*People v. Poe* (1983) 145 Cal.App.3rd 574; *People v. White* (1984) 161 Cal.App.3rd 246.)

A prison inmate has a viable lawsuit under **42 U.S.C. § 1983** where he has alleged that prison officials have opened and read, as opposed to merely inspected for contraband, his legal mail address to his attorney, and, in seeking injunctive relief, he sufficiently alleged the threatened repetition of his **Sixth Amendment** rights where he remains incarcerated and a corrections director personally informed him that prison officials were permitted to read his legal mail. (*Nordstrom v. Ryan* (9th Cir. 2014) 762 F.3rd 903,908-912; citing *Wolff v. McDonnell*, *supra*, which upheld the right of jail officials to open and inspect, but not read, mail to an inmates attorney.)

A prisoner has a **First Amendment** right to be present when his properly marked legal mail is opened for inspection. (*Hayes v. Idaho Correctional Center* (9th Cir. 2017) 849 F.3rd 1204.)

Also, a prisoner's **Sixth Amendment** right to counsel and **First Amendment** freedom of speech are violated when jail guards read, or even open while not in the prisoner's presence, his legal mail relating to criminal proceedings. (*Mangiaracina v. Penzone* (9th Cir, 2017) 849 F.3rd 1191.)

The marital communication privilege does not protect defendant's personal letters to his wife. (*United States v. Griffin* (9th Cir. 2006) 440 F.3rd 1138.)

"Intra-jail mail" between inmates may also be read "to discover any threats that might be made to an inmate, 'snitch jackets' placed on other inmates, and to detect coordination of possible escape attempts between inmates in custody." (*People v. McCaslin* (1986) 178 Cal.App.3rd 1, 4.)

Prison authorities may enact and enforce rules restricting the receipt of magazines and other literature so long as such regulations "support the legitimate penological interests of reducing prohibited behaviors such as sexual aggression and gambling and maintaining respect for legitimate authority." (*Bahrampour v. Lampert* (9th Cir. 2004) 356 F.3rd 969.)

A jail policy of prohibiting unsolicited commercial mail (i.e., magazines) was held to be lawful where the four-factors of *Turner v. Safley, infra*, were satisfied. Given the problems that the paper from such mail cause in a jail (e.g., covering windows and lights, blocking air vents and speakers, clogging toilets, passing notes, obstructing security cameras, and hiding contraband), and in light of the fact that a more appropriate method of allowing the contents of the magazines to be made available to inmates (i.e., the use of electronic kiosks), the jail's policy was upheld as reasonable. (*Crime Justice & Am., Inc. v. Honea* (9th Cir. 2017) 876 F.3rd 966.)

Turner v. Safley (1987) 482 U.S. 79 [107 S.Ct. 2254; 96 L.Ed.2nd 64], laid out a four-factor test for evaluating the reasonableness of jail regulations, requiring courts to consider (1) whether there is a “rational connection” between the regulation and a “legitimate and neutral” government objective; (2) whether “alternative means of exercising the right” remain available to inmates; (3) “the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources;” and (4) whether “the existence of obvious, easy alternatives” to the regulation indicate that it “is an ‘exaggerated response’ to prison concerns.”

Note: None of the above cases have required, or indicated the need for, a search warrant to monitor jail mail.

Regulating Jail/Prison Visitations:

Rule: There is no constitutionally guaranteed “*due process*” right to visitation for jail or prison inmates. “The denial of prison access to a particular visitor ‘is well within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence,’ (*Hewitt v. Helms* (1983) 459 U.S. 460, 468 [96 L.Ed.2nd 654, 686].), and therefore is not independently protected by the Due Process Clause.” (*Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson* (1989) 490 U.S. 454, 461 [104 L.Ed.2nd 506, 515].)

The Los Angeles County Jail has the authority to ban all contact visits between visitors and inmates because of the threat they posed. (*Block v. Rutherford* (1984) 468 U.S. 576 [82 L.Ed.2nd 438].)

A county jail, including lockers located outside the visitor center but maintained by the jail personnel, particularly with signs warning visitors that they were subject to search, is the equivalent to a closely regulated business allowing for a warrantless search of a visitor and the property he deposits in the lockers. (*People v. Boulter* (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 761.)

It is not a violation of the constitutional right of association (**First Amendment**), against cruel and unusual punishment (**Eighth Amendment**), nor due process (**Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments**) to limit the number and relationship of visitors, such regulations being reasonably related to “*legitimate penological interests.*” (*Overton v. Bazzetta* (2003) 539 U.S. 126 [156 L.Ed.2nd 162].)

Exceptions:

A state, however, may create such enforceable liberty interests in the prison, and presumably county jail, settings by statute. (*Ibid.*; *Hewitt v. Helms*, *supra*, at p. 469 [96 L.Ed.2nd at p. 686].)

See **P.C. §§ 2600 & 2601(d)**, purporting to provide state prison (and by inference, county jail) inmates with a right to visitors, were amended by the Legislature in 1997, eliminating that right.

A person who intends to visit a prison or county jail inmate will be subject to a strip search, including a “*visual body cavity search*,” whenever there is a “*reasonable suspicion*” to believe the visitor possesses weapons and/or contraband. (*In re Roark* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1946.)

However, it has been held, at least for purposes of persons attempting to visit an inmate of any of the prisons of the California Department of Corrections, while justifying the lowered search standard on the theory that keeping weapons and contraband out of a prison is an important governmental interest and that therefore searching visitors is an “*administrative search*,” the visitor must be given the option of forgoing the visit, and leaving, rather

than submitting to a strip search. (*Estes v. Rowland*, *infra*; see below.)

The Rule of Estes v. Rowland (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 508:

In *Estes v. Rowland*, *supra*, the Government probably giving away by stipulation a lot more than the case law requires, the following requirements are imposed upon the Department of Corrections before a strip search of a prison visitor or the search of the person's vehicle will be allowed:

- All persons eligible to visit inmates must be mailed written notice in English and Spanish of a dog search policy, the reasons for the policy, and the consequences of finding contraband in a vehicle or on the person of a prison visitor.
- Immediately prior to a proposed search, the driver of each vehicle must be informed orally and in writing (again, in English and Spanish) of what the search will entail, the reasons for it, and the consequences of finding contraband. The notice must advise the driver that he or she has the option of leaving and returning without the car without losing visiting privileges for that day. Searches may be conducted only after written consent for the search is first obtained from the driver.
- If the driver decides to leave, passengers may stay and cannot be denied their visit.
- Local police officers may not be involved in the search process, and may not be present at the search unless there is some valid reason for their presence. Violations of the Vehicle Code may not be reported to any law enforcement agency.
- No vehicle may be delayed more than ten (10) minutes prior to the search. A wait of up to 30 minutes is allowed “*in unusual situations*” (see p. 529 of the decision) “where the exigency is not created by the Department (of Corrections).”

- A search should take no longer than reasonably necessary.
- Dogs must be kept at least twenty (20) feet from visitors at all times.
- Searchers may not read books, letters or other documents in possession of the visitors absent a reasonable suspicion that they are contraband.
- A visitor may be requested to submit to a strip search if a drug dog alerts on the individual or drugs are found in the vehicle. The person must be given the reasons for the search orally and in writing, and given the option of refusing to be searched and leaving the grounds.
- The Department of Corrections must adopt regulations encompassing the conditions and must distribute them to all institutions.

A “*manual*” or “*physical*” body cavity search of a jail visitor, requiring a touching and constituting more than a mere visual inspection, *may* require “*probable cause*” and a search warrant. There is no *local authority* telling us what the standards should be.

See *Laughter v. Kay* (D. Utah 1997) 986 F.Supp. 1362; where *probable cause* and a *search warrant* were required.

But see *Long v. Norris* (6th Cir. 1991) 929 F.2nd 1111; inferring that no more than a *reasonable suspicion* is necessary, and that a *search warrant* was *not* required.

A Prisoner’s Retained Constitutional Rights:

Infringement of Rights: It has been held that prison inmates *do* retain certain basic constitutional rights that may be infringed on, if at all, only when rationally related to “*institutional penological interests.*” (*Overton v. Bazzetta* (2003) 539 U.S. 126 [156 L.Ed.2nd 162].)

“When a prison regulation or practice offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee, federal courts will discharge their duty to protect constitutional rights.”

(*Procunier v. Martinez* (1974) 416 U.S. 396, 405-406 [40 L.Ed.2nd 224, 236].)

However, absent a showing that prison regulations or practices “create inhumane prison conditions, deprive inmates of basic necessities or fail to protect their health or safety . . . (or) involve the infliction of pain or injury, or deliberate indifference to the risk that it might occur,” there is no constitutional violation. (*Overton v. Bazzetta*, *supra*, at p. 137 [156 L.Ed.2nd at p. 173].)

Rights retained by prison inmates include:

- The right to “petition the government for a redress of grievances” (**First Amendment**). (*Johnson v. Avery* (1969) 393 U.S. 483 [21 L.Ed.2nd 718].)
- The right to be protected from “invidious racial discrimination” (**Fourteenth Amendment, Equal Protection**). (*Lee v. Washington* (1968) 390 U.S. 333 [19 L.Ed.2nd 1212].)
- The right to “due process” (**Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments**). (*Wolff v. McDonnell* (1974) 418 U.S. 539 [41 L.Ed.2nd 935]; *Haines v. Kerner* (1972) 404 U.S. 519 [30 L.Ed.2nd 652].)

P.C. §§ 295 et seq: The DNA and Forensic Identification Database and Data Bank Act of 1998:

DNA Testing: As noted by the United States Supreme Court: “DNA testing has an unparalleled ability both to exonerate the wrongly convicted and to identify the guilty. It has the potential to significantly improve both the criminal justice system and police investigative practices.” (*District Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne* (2009) 557 U.S. 51, 55 [174 L.Ed.2nd 38]; *Maryland v.* (2013) 569 U. S. 435, 442, [133 S.Ct. 1958; 186 L.Ed.2nd 1].)

California’s Statutes:

P.C. § 295(a): Name of the Act: The DNA and Forensic Identification Database and Data Bank Act of 1998.

P.C. § 295(b): Statement of Intent. “It is the intent of the people of the State of California, in order to further the purposes of this chapter, to require DNA and forensic identification data bank samples from all

persons, including juveniles, for the felony and misdemeanor offenses described in **subdivision (a) of Section 296.**” (**Para. (2)**)

P.C. § 295(c): Purpose: The stated purpose is to establish a data bank and database to assist federal, state, and local criminal justice and law enforcement agencies in the expeditious detection and prosecution of individuals responsible for sex offenses and other crimes, the exclusion of suspects who are being investigated for these crimes, and the identification of missing and unidentified persons, particularly abducted children.

P.C. § 295(d): Describes these provisions as “an administrative requirement to assist in the accurate identification of criminal offenders.”

P.C. § 295(e): Unless otherwise requested by the Department of Justice, collection of biological samples for DNA analysis from qualifying persons is limited to collection of inner cheek cells of the mouth (“*buccal swab samples*”).

P.C. § 295(f): Authorizes the collection of blood specimens from federal, state or local law enforcement agencies when necessary in a particular case or would aid DOJ in obtaining an accurate forensic DNA profile for identification purposes.

P.C. § 295(g) & (h): Department of Justice is responsible for the management and administration of the DNA and Forensic Identification Database and Data Bank Program, and for liaison with the FBI. Provisions for the enactment of local and state policies and procedures.

Provisions for providing information to an international DNA database and data bank program does not violate defendant’s privacy rights and is therefore constitutional. (*People v. McCray* (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 258.)

P.C. § 295(i): Counties’ Responsibilities:

(1): When the specimens, samples and print impressions are collected at a county jail or other county facility, including a private community correctional facility, the county sheriff or chief administrative officer of the county jail or other facility shall be responsible for all the following:

(A): Collect the specimens, etc., immediately following arrest, conviction, or adjudication, or during the booking or intake or reception center process at that facility, or reasonably promptly thereafter.

(B): Collect the specimens, etc., as soon as administratively practicable after a qualifying person reports to the facility for the purpose of providing them.

(C): Forward the collected specimens, etc., immediately to the Department of Justice, and in compliance with department policies.

(2): The specimens, etc., shall be collected by a person using a collection kit approved by the Department of Justice and in accordance with the requirements and procedures set forth in **P.C. § 298**.

(3): Counties to be reimbursed for expenses.

P.C. § 295(j): Portion of the costs may be paid by defendants at sentencing.

P.C. § 295(k): Funds to be deposited in the DNA Testing Fund.

P.C. § 295(l): The Department of Justice DNA Laboratory to be known as the “*Jan Bashinski DNA Laboratory*.”

P.C. § 295.2: Prohibits the DNA and forensic identification database and data bank, and the Department of Justice DNA Laboratory, from being used as a source of genetic material for testing, research, or experiments, by any person, agency, or entity seeking to find a causal link between genetics and behavior or health.

P.C. § 296(a): The below listed persons *shall* provide buccal swab samples, right thumbprints, and a full palm print impression of each hand, and any blood specimens or other biological samples as described in the statutes, for law enforcement identification analysis:

(1): Any person, including any juvenile, who is *convicted* of or pleads guilty or no contest to any felony offense, or any juvenile who is adjudicated offense.

The mandatory requirements of this section have withstood constitutional attack, as far as adult defendants are concerned, a number of times. (See *People v. King* (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1363; *Alfaro v. Terhune* (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 492; *People v. Travis* (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1271.)

It has also been held that the requirement that a juvenile comply with this section is constitutional (i.e., no **Fourth Amendment** violation) despite the stronger privacy interest in Juvenile Court proceedings. (*In re Calvin S.* (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 443.)

Reduction of defendant's felony conviction to a misdemeanor, after having successfully completed certain terms and conditions of probation for one year, does *not* entitle defendant to the expungement of the DNA data or return or destruction of the DNA sample. (*Coffey v. Superior Court* (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 809.)

(2): Any adult who is *arrested for* or charged with any of the following felony offenses:

(A): All felony **P.C. § 290** (sex registration) offenses, or attempts to commit such offense.

(B): Murder or voluntary manslaughter, or attempts to commit such offense.

(C): Any felony offense (effective 1/1/2009).

The United States Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of taking a mouth swab for DNA testing of all arrestees for “*serious offenses*,” as defined by Maryland statutes, likening the procedure to the taking of fingerprints and photos as part of the booking procedure. (*Maryland v. King* (2013) 569 U. S. 435 [133 S.Ct. 1958; 186 L.Ed.2nd 1].)

The constitutionality of California's statutory requirement that all persons arrested for, or charged with, any felony, whether serious or not, submit to a mouth swab DNA test, was upheld in *Haskell v. Harris* (9th Cir. 2014) 745 F.3rd 1269.)

P.C. § 296(a)(2)(C), allowing the collection of DNA from post-arrest, pre-conviction felony suspects, before a determination of probable cause, was suggested strongly by the First District Court of Appeal (Div. 2) to be in violation of the **Fourth**

Amendment. However, the Court found the issue unnecessary to decide in that it also held that the defendant in this case could not be convicted of a misdemeanor for failing to provide a DNA sample, reversing defendant's conviction for refusal to provide a DNA sample, per **P.C. § 298.1(a)**. The **California Constitution** may provide greater privacy protections than does the **United States Constitution**. To the extent **section 295 et. seq.** requires felony arrestees, upon arrest and before probable cause is even evaluated by a court, to provide a DNA sample for law enforcement analysis and inclusion in the state and federal DNA databases under penalty of a misdemeanor charge, the provision was held to be invalid under **Art I, § 13**, of the **California Constitution**. (*People v. Buza* (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1446, 1453-1497.)

Note: The California Supreme Court granted review in *Buza* on February 18, 2015, making this case unavailable for citing. Oral arguments have recently been held, making this case likely to be decided this year (2018).

(3): Any person, including any juvenile, who is required to register per **P.C. §§ 290** (sex) or **457.1** (arson) because of the commission of, or attempt to commit, a felony or misdemeanor offense, or any person, including any juvenile, who is housed in a mental health facility or sex offender treatment program after referral to such facility or program by a court after being charged with any felony offense.

All registered sex offenders, even when convicted prior to the DNA statutes were passed, are required to provide a DNA sample. The statutes added by **Proposition 69**, adding more offenses to the list of people who must provide a DNA sample, are retroactive. (*Good v. Superior Court [People]* (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1494.)

(4): Includes attempts.

(5): These provisions are not intended to preclude the collection of samples as a condition of a plea for a non-qualifying offense.

P.C. § 296(b): Provisions apply to all qualifying persons regardless of the sentence imposed.

P.C. § 296(c): Provisions apply to all qualifying persons regardless of placement or confinement in any mental hospital or other public or private treatment facility, and shall include, but not be limited to, the following persons including juveniles:

(1): Any person committed to a state hospital or other treatment facility as a mentally disordered sex offender, per **W&I §§ 6300 et seq.**

(2): Any person who has a severe mental disorder, per **P.C. §§ 2960 et seq.**

(3): Any person found to be a sexually violent predator, per **P.C. §§ 6600 et seq.**

P.C. § 296(d): Provisions are mandatory, and apply even if not so advised by the court.

One's religious beliefs *might* provide a particular defendant, under the "**Religious Freedom Restoration Act**" with a legal excuse for declining to provide a blood sample if the defendant can:

- Articulate the scope of his beliefs;
- Show that his beliefs are religious;
- Prove that his beliefs are sincerely held; *and*
- Establish that the exercise of his sincerely held religious beliefs is substantially burdened.

If defendant can prove the above, the government may still require he provide a blood sample if it can show that:

- Requiring that he provide a blood sample furthers a compelling governmental interest;
- It is the least restrictive means available.

(United States v. Zimmerman (9th Cir. 2007) 514 F.3rd 851.)

The Ninth Circuit has held that a warrantless, suspicionless forced mouth swap of a pre-trial detainee in Nevada, for inclusion in the state's cold case data bank, when there is no qualifying conviction,

is a **Fourth Amendment** violation. (*Friedman v. Boucher* (9th Cir. 2009) 580 F.3rd 847.)

The California Supreme Court, in contrast, has held that mistakenly collecting blood samples for inclusion into California's DNA data base (See **P.C. § 296**), when the defendant did not actually have a qualifying prior conviction, is *not* a **Fourth Amendment** violation, but even if it were, it does not require the suppression of the mistakenly collected blood samples, nor is it grounds to suppress the resulting match of the defendant's DNA with that left at a crime scene. (*People v. Robinson* (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1104, 1116-1129.)

P.C. § 296(e): Duty of a prosecutor to notify the court of a defendant's duty to provide the required samples.

P.C. § 296(f): Duty of a court to inquire and verify that the required samples have been collected. Abstract of judgment to show that a defendant was ordered to provide such samples, and advisal to a defendant that he or she will be included in the DNA data bank. Failure to so notify a defendant is not grounds to invalidate an arrest, plea conviction or disposition, or affect the defendant's duty to provide such samples.

P.C. § 296.1(a): The specimens, samples, and print impressions shall be collected from persons as described in **P.C. § 296(a)** for "*present and past qualifying offenses of record*" as follows:

Subd. (a)(1): Collection from any adult following arrest for a felony offense as described in **P.C. § 296(a)(2)(A), (B) and (C)**:

(A): Immediately following arrest, or during the booking or intake or reception center process, or as soon as administratively practicable after arrest, but, in any case, prior to release on bail or pending trial or any physical release from confinement or custody; *or*

(B): Upon mandatory order of the court to report within five calendar days to a county jail facility or to a city, state, local, private, or other designated facility.

Subd. (a)(2): Collection from persons (adult or juvenile) already confined or in custody after conviction or adjudication:

(A): Immediately upon intake, or during the prison reception center process, or as soon as administratively

practicable at the appropriate custodial or receiving institution or program, *if*:

(i): The person has a record of any past or present conviction or adjudication as a ward of the court in California of a qualifying offense described in **P.C. § 296(a)**, or has a record of any past or present conviction or adjudication in any other court, including any state, federal, or military court, of any offense that, if committed or attempted in this state, would have been punishable as an offense as described in **P.C. § 296(a)**; *and*

(ii): The person's specimens, etc., are not in the possession of the Department of Justice DNA Laboratory, or have not been recorded as part of DOJ's DNA data bank program.

Subd. (a)(3): Collection from persons on probation, parole, or other release:

(A): Any person, including a juvenile, who has a record of any past or present conviction or adjudication for any offense listed in **P.C. § 296(a)**, who is on probation, parole, postrelease community supervision (**P.C. §§ 3450 et seq.**), or mandatory supervision pursuant to **P.C. § 1170(h)(5)** for any felony or misdemeanor whether or not listed under **P.C. § 296(a)**, shall provide the required samples *if*:

(i): The person has a record of any past or present conviction or adjudication as a ward of the court in California of a qualifying offense described in **P.C. § 296(a)**, or has a record of any past or present conviction or adjudication in any other court, including any state, federal, or military court, of any offense that, if committed or attempted in this state, would have been punishable as an offense as described in **P.C. § 296(a)**; *and*

(ii): The person's specimens, etc., are not in the possession of the Department of Justice DNA Laboratory, or have not been recorded as part of DOJ's DNA data bank program.

(B): The person shall have the required specimens, etc., collected within five calendar days of being notified by the court, or a law enforcement agency or other agency authorized by the Department of Justice. The specimens, etc., shall be collected in accordance with **P.C. § 295(i)** at a county jail facility or a city, state, local, private, or other facility designated for this collection.

Subd. (a)(4): Collection from parole violators and others returned to custody:

(A): If a person, including a juvenile, who has been released on parole, furlough, or other release for any offense or crime, whether or not set forth in **P.C. § 296(a)**, is returned to a state correctional or other institution for a violation of a condition of his or her parole, furlough, or other release, or for any other reason, that person shall provide the required samples at a state correctional or other receiving institution, *if*:

(i): The person has a record of any past or present conviction or adjudication as a ward of the court in California of a qualifying offense described in **P.C. § 296(a)**, or has a record of any past or present conviction or adjudication in any other court, including any state, federal, or military court, of any offense that, if committed or attempted in this state, would have been punishable as an offense as described in **P.C. § 296(a)**; *and*

(ii): The person's specimens, etc., are not in the possession of the Department of Justice DNA Laboratory, or have not been recorded as part of DOJ's DNA data bank program.

Subd. (a)(5): Collection from persons accepted into California from other jurisdictions:

(A): When an offender from another state is accepted into this state under the various listed agreements and compacts, whether or not the offender is in custody, the acceptance is conditional on the offender providing the required specimens *if* the offender has a record of any past or present conviction or adjudication in California of a qualifying offense as listed in **P.C. § 296(a)**, or has a record

of any past or present conviction or adjudication in any other court, including any state, federal, or military court, of any offense that, if committed or attempted in this state, would have been punishable as an offense as described in **P.C. § 296(a)**.

(B): If the person is not in custody, the required specimens, etc., must be provided within five calendar days after the person reports to the supervising agent or within five calendar days of notice to the person, whichever occurs first. The person shall report to a county jail facility in the country where he or she resides or temporarily is located to have the specimens collected, in accordance with **P.C. § 295(i)**.

(C): If the person is in custody, the required specimens, etc., shall be collected as soon as practicable after receipt in the facility.

Subd. (a)(6): Collection from persons in federal custody:

(A): Subject to the approval of the FBI, persons confined or incarcerated in a federal prison or federal institution who have a record of any past or present conviction or juvenile adjudication for an offense listed in **P.C. § 296(a)**, or a similar crime under the laws of the United States or any other state that would constitute an offense described in **PC. § 296(a)**, are subject to the requirements of these sections *if* any of the following apply:

(i): The person committed the qualifying offense in California;

(ii): The person was a resident of California at the time of the qualifying offense;

(iii): The person has any record of a California conviction for an offense described in **P.C. § 296(a)** regardless of when it was committed; *or*

(iv): The person will be released in California.

(B): The Department of Justice DNA Laboratory shall forward portions of the required specimens, etc., to the U.S.

Department of Justice, upon request. Samples will be collected in accordance with **P.C. § 295(i)**.

P.C. § 296.1(b): The above provisions are retroactive.

P.C. § 296.2: Procedures for obtaining replacement samples when the originals are not usable.

P.C. § 297: Analysis of crime scene samples.

P.C. § 298: Procedures for collection of samples:

Subd. (a)(1): The Director of Corrections, or the Chief Administrative Officer of the detention facility, jail or other facility at which the specimens, etc., were collected shall cause them to be forwarded promptly to the Department of Justice. The specimens, etc., shall be collected by a person using a Department of Justice approved collection kit and in accordance with the requirements and procedures set forth below.

Subd. (a)(2): A blood specimen or buccal swab sample taken from a person arrested for the commission of a felony as specified in **P.C. § 296(a)(2)** that has not been forwarded to the Department of Justice within six months following the arrest of that person because the agency that took the blood specimen or buccal swab sample has not received notice to forward the DNA specimen or sample to the Department of Justice for inclusion in the state's DNA and Forensic Identification Database and Databank Program pursuant to **para (1)** following a determination of probable cause, shall be destroyed by the agency that collected the blood specimen or buccal swab sample.

Note: Only if the California Supreme Court upholds the lower appellate court's decision in ***People v. Buza*** (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1446 (see above), then **subd. (a)(2)**, above, and the following amendment to **subd. (a)(1)**, becomes operative: “. . . except that a blood specimen or buccal swab sample taken from a person arrested for the commission of a felony as specified in **paragraph (2)** of **subdivision (a)** of **Section 296** shall be forwarded to the Department of Justice only after one of the following has occurred, which shall be deemed a finding of probable cause, whichever occurs first: **(i)** A felony arrest warrant has been signed by a judicial officer pursuant to Section 813 or 817. **(ii)** A grand jury indictment has been found and

issued pursuant to **Sections 939.8, 940, or 944. (iii)** A judicial officer has determined that probable cause exists to believe the person has committed the offense for which he or she was arrested.

Subd. (b)(1): Department of Justice’s responsibility for providing kits.

Subd. (b)(2): The withdrawal of blood shall be performed in a medically approved manner by health care providers trained and certified to draw blood.

Subd. (b)(3): Buccal swab samples may be procured by law enforcement or correctional personnel or other individuals trained to assist in buccal swab collection.

Subd. (b)(4): Thumb and palms prints shall be taken on forms prescribed by the Department of Justice, with palm print forms to be forwarded to, and maintained by, the Bureau of Criminal Identification and Information, Department of Justice. Thumbprints to be placed on the sample and specimen containers and forms as directed by the Department of Justice, and forwarded to, and maintained by, the DNA Laboratory.

Subd. (b)(5): The collecting agencies responsibility to confirm that the person from whom the specimens, etc., are collected, qualifies.

Subd. (b)(6): The DNA Laboratory is responsible for establishing procedures for entering data bank and database information.

Subd. (c): Protection from civil or criminal liability for errors in the above. Mistakes also not grounds for invalidating an arrest, plea, conviction, or disposition.

P.C. § 298.1(a): Sanctions for failure to provide the required samples upon *written* notification: *Misdemeanor*; 1 year and \$500 fine. For persons already confined in state prison; “by sanctions for misdemeanors according to a schedule determined by the Department of Corrections.”

P.C. § 296(a)(2)(C), allowing the collection of DNA from post-arrest, pre-conviction felony suspects, before a determination of probable cause, was suggested strongly by the First District Court of Appeal (Div. 2) to be in violation of the **Fourth Amendment**. However, the Court found the issue unnecessary to decide in that it

also held that the defendant in this case could not be convicted of a misdemeanor for failing to provide a DNA sample, reversing defendant's conviction for refusal to provide a DNA sample, per **P.C. § 298.1(a)**. The **California Constitution** may provide greater privacy protections than does the **United States Constitution**. To the extent **section 295 et. seq.** requires felony arrestees, upon arrest and before probable cause is even evaluated by a court, to provide a DNA sample for law enforcement analysis and inclusion in the state and federal DNA databases under penalty of a misdemeanor charge, the provision was held to be invalid under **Art I, § 13**, of the **California Constitution**. (*People v. Buza* (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1446, 1453-1497.)

Note: The California Supreme Court granted review in *Buza* on February 18, 2015, making this case unavailable for citing.

P.C. § 298.1(b)(1): Authorized law enforcement, custodial, or corrections personnel, including peace officers as defined in **P.C. §§ 830, 830.1, 830.2(d), 830.5, and 830.55**, may employ *reasonable force* to collect blood specimens, saliva samples, or thumb or palm print impressions from individuals who, after a written or oral request, refuse to provide those specimens, samples, or thumb or palm print impressions.

P.C. § 298.1(b)(2): The withdrawal of blood shall be performed in a medically approved manner in accordance with the requirements of **P.C. § 298(b)(2)** (above).

P.C. § 298.1(c)(1)(A), (2)(A): “*Use of Reasonable Force*” is defined as force that an objective, trained and competent correctional employee, faced with similar facts and circumstances, would consider necessary and reasonable to gain compliance.

P.C. § 298.1(c)(1)(B), (2)(B): The use of force must be preceded by written authorization by the supervising officer on duty, which must include the details of the request and the subject's refusal.

P.C. § 298.1(c)(1)(C), (2)(C): The use of force must be preceded by efforts to secure voluntary compliance.

P.C. § 298.1(c)(1)(D), (2)(D): If the use of force includes a jail “*cell extraction*,” the extraction shall be videotaped.

P.C. § 299: Expungement of Data.

Subd. (a): A person whose DNA profile has been included in the data bank shall have his or her DNA specimen and sample destroyed and searchable database profile expunged from the data bank if the person has no past or present offense or pending charge which qualifies that person for inclusion within the state's DNA and Forensic Identification Database and Data Bank Program and there otherwise is no legal basis for retaining the specimen or sample or searchable profile.

Subd. (b): A person who has no past or present qualifying offense, and for whom there otherwise is no legal basis for retaining the specimen or sample or searchable profile, may make a written request to have his or her specimen and sample destroyed and searchable database profile expunged from the data bank program *if:*

(1): Following arrest, no accusatory pleading has been filed within the applicable period allowed by law charging the person with a qualifying offense or if the charges have been dismissed prior to adjudication by a trier of fact;

(2) The charges which served as the basis for including the DNA profile in the state's DNA and Forensic Identification Database and Databank Program have been dismissed prior to adjudication by a trier of fact, in which case the court shall forward an order to the Department of Justice upon disposition of the case, indicating that the charges have been dismissed.

(3): The underlying conviction or disposition serving as the basis for including the DNA profile has been reversed and the case dismissed;

(4): The person has been found factually innocent of the underlying offense pursuant to **P.C. § 851.8** or **W&I § 781.5**; *or*

(5): The defendant has been found not guilty or the defendant has been acquitted of the underlying offense.

Subd. (c) Except as provided in this section, the Department of Justice shall destroy a specimen and sample and expunge the searchable DNA database profile pertaining to the person who has no present or past qualifying offense of record upon receipt of the following:

(1): A certified copy of the court order reversing and dismissing the conviction or case, or a letter from the district attorney certifying that no accusatory pleading has been filed or the charges which served as the basis for collecting a DNA specimen and sample have been dismissed prior to adjudication by a trier of fact, the defendant has been found factually innocent, the defendant has been found not guilty, the defendant has been acquitted of the underlying offense, or the underlying conviction has been reversed and the case dismissed.

(2): A court order verifying that no retrial or appeal of the case is pending.

Subd. (d) Pursuant to this section, the Department of Justice shall destroy any specimen or sample collected from the person and any searchable DNA database profile pertaining to the person, unless the department determines that the person is subject to the provisions of this chapter because of a past qualifying offense of record or is or has otherwise become obligated to submit a blood specimen or buccal swab sample as a result of a separate arrest, conviction, juvenile adjudication, or finding of guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity for an offense described in **P.C. § 296(a)**, or as a condition of a plea.

The Department of Justice is not required to destroy analytical data or other items obtained from a blood specimen or saliva, or buccal swab sample, if evidence relating to another person subject to the provisions of this chapter would thereby be destroyed or otherwise compromised.

Any identification, warrant, probable cause to arrest, or arrest based upon a databank or database match is not invalidated due to a failure to expunge or a delay in expunging records.

Subd. (e) Notwithstanding any other law, the Department of Justice DNA Laboratory is not required to expunge DNA profile or forensic identification information or destroy or return specimens, samples, or print impressions taken pursuant to this section if the duty to register under **P.C. §§ 290** or **457.1**.

Subd. (f) Notwithstanding any other law, including **P.C. §§ 17, 1170.18, 1203.4, and 1203.4a**, a judge is not authorized to relieve a

person of the separate administrative duty to provide specimens, samples, or print impressions required by this chapter if a person has been found guilty or was adjudicated a ward of the court by a trier of fact of a qualifying offense as defined in **P.C. § 296(a)**, or was found not guilty by reason of insanity or pleads no contest to a qualifying offense as defined in **P.C. § 296(a)**.

Subd. (g) This section shall only become operative if the California Supreme Court rules to uphold the California Court of Appeal decision in *People v. Buza* (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1446 in regard to the provisions of **P.C. § 299**, as amended by **Section 9** of the **DNA Fingerprint, Unsolved Crime and Innocence Protection Act, Proposition 69**, approved by the voters at the November 2, 2004, statewide general election, in which case this section shall become operative immediately upon that ruling becoming final.

Note: The California Supreme Court granted review in *Buza* at 342 P.3rd 415 on February 18, 2015, making this case unavailable for citation.

A felony conviction or juvenile adjudication reduced to a misdemeanor under **Proposition 47** does not require the expungement of a DNA sample previously collected as a result of the felony conviction/adjudication. (*In re C.B.* (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1112; *In re C.H.* (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1139.)

Note: The California Supreme Court granted review in *In re C.H.* on November 16, 2016.

The contrary decision in *Alejandro N. v. Superior Court* (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1209, was superceded by statute (i.e., **P.C. § 1170.18**) and is no longer valid law. (See *In re C.B.*, *supra*, at p. 1118.)

Reduction of defendant's felony conviction to a misdemeanor, after having successfully completed certain terms and conditions of probation for one year, does *not* entitle defendant to the expungement of the DNA data or return or destruction of the DNA sample. (*Coffey v. Superior Court* (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 809.)

Also, reduction of a defendant's felony conviction to a misdemeanor under the provisions of **P.C. § 1170.18**

(Propoisiton 47) does not allow for the expungment of the defendant's previously obtained DNA sample, as specified in the amended **P.C. § 290(f)**. (*People v. Harris* (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 47, 54-60; also rejecting defendant's arguments that the collection and retention of a DNA buccal swap sample violates his constitutional and equal protecton and priacy rights; at pp. 60-66.)

P.C. § 299.5: Confidentiality requirements and permitted disclosures.

P.C. § 299.6: Dissemination of information to law enforcement agencies:

Subs. (a): Sharing or dissemination of population database or data bank information, DNA profile or forensic identification database or data bank information, analytical data and results generated for forensic identification database and data bank purposes, or protocol and forensic DNA analysis methods and quality assurance or quality control procedures, may be made with:

(1): Federal, state or local law enforcement agencies.

(2): Crime laboratories, public or private, that serve federal, state and local law enforcement agencies, that have been approved by the Department of Justice.

(3): The attorney general's office of any state.

(4): Any state or federally authorized auditing agent or board that inspects or reviews the work of the Department of Justice DNA Laboratory for the purpose of ensuring that the laboratory meets described standards.

(5): Any third party DOJ deems necessary to assist the department's crime laboratory with statistical analyses of population databases, or the analyses of forensic protocol, research methods, or quality control procedures, or to assist in the recovery or identification of human remains for humanitarian purposes, including identification of missing persons.

Subd. (b): The population databases and data banks of the DNA Laboratory may be made available to and searched by the FBI and any other agency participating in the FBI's CODIS System or any other national or international law enforcement database or data bank system.

Subd (c): The Department of Justice may provide portions of biological samples (as described) to local public law enforcement DNA laboratories for identification purposes provided that the privacy provisions are followed, and if each of the following conditions are met:

(1): The procedures used for handling of specimens and samples and the disclosure of results are as established by DOJ pursuant to **P.C. §§ 297, 298 and 299.5.**

(2): The methodologies and procedures used for DNA or forensic identification analysis are compatible with those established by DOJ pursuant to **P.C. § 299.5(i)**, or otherwise are determined by DOJ to be valid and appropriate for identification purposes.

(3): Only tests of value to law enforcement for identification purposes are performed and a copy of the results of the analysis are sent to DOJ.

(4): All provisions concerning privacy and security are followed.

P.C. § 299.7: Disposal of samples.

P.C. §§ 300 et seq.: Construction and severability.

Case Law:

The provisions of these statutes (formerly, **P.C. § 290.2**), requiring the providing of the listed samples, are constitutional. (*People v. King* (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1363.)

The new provisions replacing **P.C. § 290.2 (P.C. §§ 295 et seq.)** have similarly been held to be constitutional. (*Alfaro v. Terhune* (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 492.)

The taking of blood samples from prison inmates, parolees and probationers for the purpose of completing a federal DNA database, is lawful. (*United States v. Kincade* (9th Cir. 2004) 379 F.3rd 813.)

See also *United States v. Lujan* (9th Cir. 2007) 504 F.3rd 1003; upholding the federal “**DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000,**” 42 U.S.C. §§ 14135-14135e, when challenged on the

basis that the **Act** violates the **Fourth Amendment**, the **Ex Post Facto Clause**, that it is a “**Bill of Attainder**, and that it contravenes constitutional “separation of powers” restrictions, when challenged by a federal felon who, when the requirement that she provide a DNA sample was imposed, was on supervised release.

Similarly, further amendment to this legislation by passage of the “**Justice for All Act of 2004**,” expanding the DNA collection requirements to all federal felonies, crimes of violence, and all sexual abuse crimes, where the defendant is on probation, parole or supervised release, is constitutional. (*United States v. Kriesel* (9th Cir. 2007) 508 F.3rd 941.)

Reduction of defendant’s felony conviction to a misdemeanor, after having successfully completed certain terms and conditions of probation for one year, does *not* entitle defendant to the expungement of the DNA data or return or destruction of the DNA sample. (*Coffey v. Superior Court* (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 809.)

The amendments to **P.C. § 296(a)(1)**, providing for the mandatory collection of DNA samples from anyone convicted of a felony offense, do not violate a defendant’s **Fourth** (Search and Seizure) or **Fourteenth** (Equal Protection and Due Process) rights, and is not an *Ex Post Facto* violation despite being enacted after the date of defendant’s offense. (*People v. Travis* (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1271; a felony DUI case.)

The “*Kelly/Frye*” (*People v. Kelly* (1976) 17 Cal.3rd 24; *Frye v. United States* (D.C. Cir. 1923) 293 F. 1013.) standard does not apply to a DNA data base search used to identify a possible suspect. Requiring inmates to supply a DNA sample, even though not a criminal suspect at the time of the taking of the sample, is a constitutional “search” pursuant to **P.C. § 295**. (*People v. Johnson* (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1135.)

All registered sex offenders, even when convicted prior to the DNA statutes were passed, are required to provide a DNA sample. The statutes added by **Proposition 69**, adding more offenses to the list of people who must provide a DNA sample, are retroactive. (*Good v. Superior Court [People]* (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1494.)

California’s provisions for extracting DNA samples from convicted felons, even over a prisoner’s objection and through the use of reasonable force, does not violate either the **Fourth Amendment** search or seizure rules, the **Eighth Amendment** (“reckless and deliberate indifference”),

nor **Fourteen Amendment** due process. (*Hamilton v. Brown* (9th Cir. 2010) 630 F.3rd 889.)

The United States Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of taking a mouth swab for DNA testing of all arrestees for “serious offenses,” as defined by Maryland statutes, likening the procedure to the taking of fingerprints and photos as part of the booking procedure. (*Maryland v. King* (2013) 569 U. S. 435, [133 S.Ct. 1958; 186 L.Ed.2nd 1].)

“(B)uccal swabs are ‘brief and . . . minimal’ physical intrusions ““involv[ing] virtually no risk, trauma, or pain.”” (*Bill v. Brewer* (9th Cir. 2015) 799 F.3rd 1295, 1302, quoting *Maryland v. King*, *supra*, at p. 446.)

The taking of a buccal swab sample of an arrestee, charged with rapes and robberies, pursuant to **P.C. §§ 295 et seq.**, was upheld. The defendant’s privacy interest are outweighed by the de minimis nature of the physical intrusion, the carefully limited scope of the DNA information that is extracted, the strict limits on the range of the permissible uses of the DNA information, and the strong enforcement interests in obtaining arrestees’ identifying information, solving past and future crimes, deterring future criminal acts, and exonerating the innocent. (*People v. Lowe* (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1287-1298.)

Note: Not citable, superseded by grant of review; March 19, 2014. (2014 Cal. LEXIS 2053.)

The constitutionality of California’s statutory requirement that all persons arrested for, or charged with, any felony, whether serious or not, submit to a mouth swab DNA test, was upheld in *Haskell v. Harris* (9th Cir. 2014) 745 F.3rd 1269.)

P.C. § 296(a)(2)(C), allowing the collection of DNA from post-arrest, pre-conviction felony suspects, before a determination of probable cause, was suggested strongly by the First District Court of Appeal (Div. 2) to be in violation of the **Fourth Amendment**. However, the Court found the issue unnecessary to decide in that it also held that the defendant in this case could not be convicted of a misdemeanor for failing to provide a DNA sample, reversing defendant’s conviction for refusal to provide a DNA sample, per **P.C. § 298.1(a)**. The **California Constitution** may provide greater privacy protections than does the **United States Constitution**. To the extent **section 295 et. seq.** requires felony arrestees, upon arrest and before probable cause is even evaluated by a court, to provide a DNA

sample for law enforcement analysis and inclusion in the state and federal DNA databases under penalty of a misdemeanor charge, the provision was held to be invalid under **Art I, § 13**, of the **California Constitution**. (*People v. Buza* (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1446, 1453-1497.)

Note: The California Supreme Court granted review in *Buza* at 342 P.3rd 415 on February 18, 2015, making this case unavailable for citation.

Defendant's motion for the return of blood samples after completion of supervised release, collected upon his imprisonment, was properly denied because the Government's continued retention of the blood sample was reasonable under the circumstances in that the Government used blood samples to ensure the accuracy of DNA identification and CODIS (a nationwide database of genetic identifying information). The match confirmation process is a method of long-term quality control. The retention of the blood samples furthered the Government's goals by ensuring the accuracy of the CODIS profile match. (*United States v. Kriesel* (9th Cir. 2013) 720 F.3rd 1137, 1144-1147.)

Note: "The CODIS database stores DNA profiles of convicted federal felons on supervised release and others who have had brushes with the law. See **DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000 (DNA Act)**, Pub. L. No. 106-546, § 3, 114 Stat. 2746, 2728-30; see also **28 C.R.R. § 28.2**. These DNA profiles are commonly generated from blood samples." (*Id.*, at p. 1140.) CODIS is a "centrally-managed database linking DNA profiles culled from federal, state, and territorial DNA collection programs, as well as profiles drawn from crime-scene evidence, unidentified remains, and genetic samples voluntarily provided by relatives of missing persons." (*Bill v. Brewer* (9th Cir. 2015) 799 F.3rd 1295, 1298, fn. 1.)

A felony conviction or juvenile adjudication reduced to a misdemeanor under **Proposition 47** does not require the expungement of a DNA sample previously collected as a result of the felony conviction/adjudication. (*In re C.B.* (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1112; *In re C.H.* (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1139.)

The contrary decision in *Alejandro N. v. Superior Court* (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1209, was superceded by statute (i.e., **P.C. § 1170.18**) and is no longer valid law. (See *In re C.B.*, *supra*, at p. 1118.)

Chapter 9:

Searches of Vehicles:

General Rule: Search warrants *are not* needed to lawfully seize and search a motor vehicle, at least in most instances, the applicable exceptions overwhelming the general **Fourth Amendment** search warrant requirement.

Warrantless Searches of Vehicles can be justified under one or more of *TEN* legal theories:

- *Incident to Arrest*
- *With Probable Cause*
- *When the Vehicle Itself is Evidence of a Crime*
- *Inventory Searches and Impounding Vehicles*
- *The “Patdown” (or “Protective Search”) of a Vehicle for Weapons*
- *Statutory Automobile Inspections*
- *Statutory Automobile Searches*
- *Searching a Vehicle for a Driver’s License and/or Vehicle Registration, VIN Number, Proof of Insurance, etc.*

Incident to Arrest: Any time a person is arrested “*in,*” or “*near*” (see below), or even as a “*recent occupant*” (see below) of his or her vehicle, a search of the suspect and the area immediately surrounding the suspect, including within the passenger area of his vehicle, is, as a general rule, lawful. (*New York v. Belton* (1981) 453 U.S. 454 [69 L.Ed.2nd 768]; *United States v. Robinson* (1973) 414 U.S. 218 [38 L.Ed.2nd 427]; *People v. Molina* (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1038, 1044; *Thornton v. United States* (2004) 541 U.S. 615 [158 L.Ed.2nd 905].)

The Rationale: The traditional rationale of warrantless searches incident to arrest is the two-fold need to (1) uncover evidence of the crime, to prevent its destruction, and (2) to preclude the possibility the arrestee might reach for a weapon with which he could injure the arresting officer or effect an escape. (*Preston v. United States* (1964) 376 U.S. 364, 367 [11 L.Ed.2d 777, 780]; *United States v. Rabinowitz* (1950) 339 U.S. 56, 72-75 [94 L.Ed. 653, 663-665]; *Agnello v. United States* (1925) 269 U.S. 20, 30 [70 L.Ed. 145, 148]; *United States v. Edwards* (1974) 415 U.S. 800, 802-803 [39 L.Ed.2nd 771]; *People v. Diaz* (2011) 51 Cal.4th 84; *Riley v. California* (June 25, 2014) 573 U.S. __ [134 S.Ct. 2473; 189 L.Ed.2nd 430].)

But see *Arizona v. Gant* (2009) 556 U.S. 332 [173 L.Ed.2nd 485], which has severely limited searches incident to arrest in a vehicle, at least where the arrested subject has already been secured and

can no longer lunge for evidence or weapons. (See “*Limitation of the Chimel/Belton ‘Bright Line’ Test; When the Arrestee Has Been Secured,*” below.)

Containers in the Vehicle:

Rule: The searchable area includes any *containers* found in that area, even if not the arrestee’s property. (***People v. Mitchell*** (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 672, 674-677; ***People v. Prance*** (1991) 226 Cal.App.3rd 1525, 1531; purses belonging to passengers.)

See also ***Wyoming v. Houghton*** (1999) 626 U.S. 295 [143 L.Ed.2nd 408]; search of another person’s purse when the search was based upon *probable cause* (below).

A warrantless search of those areas of the passenger compartment of a vehicle where an officer reasonably expects that the parolee could have stowed personal belongings or discarded items when aware of police activity, as well as a search of personal property located in those areas if the officer reasonably believes that the parolee owns those items or has the ability to exert control over them, is lawful. (***People v. Schmitz*** (2012) 55 Cal.4th 909, 916-933.)

Similarly, a vehicle search based on a passenger’s probation status may extend beyond the probationer’s person and the seat he or she occupies, but is confined to those areas of the passenger compartment where the officer reasonably expects that the probationer could have stowed personal belongings or discarded items when aware of police activity. (***People v. Cervantes*** (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 860, 871.)

Exception; Cellphones:

This rule has been held *not* to apply to cellphones in that cellphones do not pose a danger to officers and once seized, it is unlikely any evidence contained in the phone is going to be destroyed. When balanced with the large amount of personal information likely to be found in cellphones, a warrantless intrusion into the phone is not justified under the **Fourth Amendment** absent exigent circumstances. (***Riley v. California*** (June 25, 2014) 573 U.S. ___ [134 S.Ct. 2473; 189 L.Ed.2nd 430].)

And see “Limitations,” below.

Probable Cause Not Needed: Except for that which is necessary to justify the arrest, there *need not be any separate probable cause* to believe there is anything there to seize, in order to justify the search of the vehicle. The arrest alone justifies the search. (*United States v. Robinson* (1973) 414 U.S. 218 [38 L.Ed.2nd 427]; *People v. Molina* (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1038.)

Limitations:

“*The Lunging area:*” The area to be searched is limited by *Chimel v. California* (1969) 395 U.S. 752 [23 L.Ed.2nd 685], to the “*lunging area*” within the vehicle. (*People v. Summers* (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 288.)

See the concurring, minority opinion in *Summers* discussing the legal justification for a search *after* the suspect has been immobilized and removed from the “*grabbing area,*” delaying the search until it can be done safely.

The “*lunging area*” of *Chimel* generally includes *the entire passenger area* of the car. (*New York v. Belton* (1981) 453 U.S. 454, 460 [69 L.Ed.2nd 768, 775].)

This includes the rear area of a hatchback vehicle, so long as that area is accessible to the passengers in the vehicle, whether or not that storage area is covered. (*United States v. Mayo* (9th Cir. 2005) 394 F.3rd 1271; see also *United States v. Caldwell* (8th Cir. 1996) 97 F.3rd 1063, 1067; *United States v. Doward* (1st Cir. 1994) 41 F.3rd 789, 794.)

See also *United States v. Olguin-Rivera* (10th Cir. 1999) 168 F.3rd 1203, 1205-1207; covered cargo area of a sport utility vehicle.

And *United States v. Pino* (6th Cir. 1988) 855 F.2nd 357, 364; cargo area of midsize station wagon.

The hatchback or rear hatch area of a vehicle held to be a part of the passenger compartment. (*United States v. Stegall* (8th Cir. Ark. 2017) 850 F.3rd 981.)

Contemporaneous in Time and Place: Defendant must be arrested *in or near* his car, and, except when impractical to do so under the circumstances, the search must be “*roughly contemporaneous in time and place*” with the arrest. (*People v. Stoffle* (1992) 1 Cal.App.4th 1671; *People v. Boissard* (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 972; *United States v. Weaver* (9th Cir. 2006) 433 F.3rd 1104.)

If his car is within the “*lunging area*” of *Chimel*, the passenger area of the car may be searched despite the fact that the defendant was not in it when arrested. (*Thornton v. United States* (2004) 541 U.S. 615 [158 L.Ed.2nd 905]; analyzing whether the arrestee was an occupant or a “*recent occupant*” as the definitive test.)

See “*Searches where Arrestee is a ‘Recent Occupant,’*” below.

Federal law is in accord as to the requirement that the search be contemporaneous with the arrest. (*Preston v. United States* (1964) 376 U.S. 364 [11 L.Ed.2nd 777]; *United States v. McLaughlin* (9th Cir. 1999) 170 F.3rd 889.)

A ten to fifteen minute delay between an arrest in a vehicle and the search of that vehicle with no intervening occurrences is still a lawful warrantless search incident to arrest. (*United States v. Weaver, supra.*)

Arresting defendant a block and a half away after a foot pursuit, and when the car is then searched “*well after*” the arrest, is neither contemporaneous in time or place with defendant’s arrest. (*United States v. Caseres* (9th Cir. 2008) 533 F.3rd 1064, 1070-1074.)

See also *United States v. Vasey* (9th Cir. 1987) 834 F.2nd 782, 787; finding unauthorized a vehicle search conducted 30 to 45 minutes after an arrest and after the arrestee had been handcuffed and secured in the back of a police car.

Although defendant was arrested in his car, a search of his cellphone found in the car, but not searched until an hour and twenty minutes after his arrest, with a string of intervening acts occurring between the arrest and the eventual search, is too far removed to be considered a search incident to the defendant’s arrest. (*United States v. Camou* (9th Cir. 2014) 773 F.3rd 932, 937-939.)

Limitation of the Chimel/Belton “Bright Line” Test; When the Arrestee Has Been Secured:

Chimel/Belton Rule Criticized: In addition to the above, a number of courts criticized the application of a “*bright line rule*” allowing for the search of a vehicle incident to arrest in those circumstances where a the arrestee has been removed from the vehicle and secured, and where there is no reasonable possibility he can still lunge for weapons and/or evidence. (E.g., see *United States v. Weaver*, *supra*, at p. 1107; *Thornton v. United States* (2004) 541 U.S. 615, 624 [158 L.Ed.2nd 905]; concurring opinion.)

Arizona v. Gant: Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court decided in *Arizona v. Gant* (2009) 556 U.S. 332 [173 L.Ed.2nd 485], that a warrantless search of a vehicle incident to arrest is lawful *only* when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search. (Overruling *New York v. Belton* (1981) 453 U.S. 454, 460 [69 L.Ed.2nd 768, 775], in so far as it has been interpreted to allow the warrantless, suspicionless search of a motor vehicle incident to arrest *after* the suspect has been handcuffed and secured in a patrol car from where he could no longer lunge for weapons or destroy evidence.)

Although the United States Supreme Court has indicated that *Gant* is limited to “circumstances unique to the vehicle context” (*Thornton v. United States*, *supra*, at pp. 629-632; see also *Riley v. California* (June 25, 2014) 573 U.S. __, __ [134 S.Ct. 2473, 2492; 189 L.Ed.2nd 430], citing *Gant* at p. 343.), at least one California court has applied it to the residential situation. (See *People v. Leal* (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1051; arrest in a residence.) citing as its authority *United States v. Rabinowitz* (1950) 339 U.S. 56 [94 L.Ed. 653].

United States v. Rabinowitz, *supra*, is a case involving the warrantless search of a business office, based upon probable cause, itself being severely criticized later in *Chimel v. California* (1969) 395 U.S. 752, 759-768 [23 L.Ed.2nd 685].

Also, citing *United States v. Fleming* (7th Cir. 1982) 667 F.2nd 602, 605-608, the *Leal* Court noted that handcuffing alone is probably not enough to fully secure the suspect. (*Id.*, at p. 1062.)

“Handcuffs are a temporary restraining device; they limit but do not eliminate a person’s ability to perform various acts. They obviously do not impair a person's ability to use his legs and feet, whether to walk, run, or kick. Handcuffs do limit a person's ability to use his hands and arms, but the degree of the effectiveness of handcuffs in this role depends on a variety of factors, including the handcuffed person's size, strength, bone and joint structure, flexibility, and tolerance of pain. Albeit difficult, it is by no means impossible for a handcuffed person to obtain and use a weapon concealed on his person or within lunge reach, and in so doing to cause injury to his intended victim, to a bystander, or even to himself.”

See also *United States v. Cook* (9th Cir. 2015) 808 F.3rd 1195, 1198-1200, upholding the search of defendant’s backpack immediately upon his arrest eventhough he was already handcuffed, noting that he was not secured in a patrol car as was the defendant in *Gant*. Also, *Gant* had been arrested for a misdemeanor while Cook was under arrest for a felony.

See also *United States v. Shakir* (3rd Cir. 2010) 616 F.3rd 315, 321; where a similar result was reported in a search incident to arrest of the arrestee’s duffle bag although he had been handcuffed and officers were holding his arms.

However, apparently putting a suspect into a locked patrol vehicle while unhandcuffed *is* sufficient to trigger the rule of *Gant*. (See *United States v.*

Ruckes (9th Cir. 2009) 586 F.3rd 713; issue not discussed.)

Gant's Alternative Theory: The ***Gant*** Court, however, also mentions that there is a second legal theory justifying the warrantless search of a vehicle, incident to arrest, even if the suspect has been removed from the vehicle and secured: I.e., when it is “*reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the car.*” (***Id.***, pp. 343-344.)

Note: The Supreme Court in ***Gant*** mentions this as an “*alternate*” theory justifying the warrantless search of a vehicle incident to arrest, but fails to explain when and how it is applicable, merely citing ***Thornton v. United States***, *supra*, as authority for its application.

The Court does state, however, that this alternate theory “stems not from ***Chimel*** (i.e., a “search incident to arrest”) . . . , but from ‘circumstances unique to the vehicle context.’ (i.e., the “automobile exception”).” (***Arizona v. Gant***, *supra*, at p. 343.)

“Some courts have concluded or implied that whether it is reasonable to believe offense-related evidence might be found in a vehicle is determined solely by reference to the nature of the offense of arrest, rather than by reference to the particularized facts of the case. Others have required some level of particularized suspicion, based at least on the facts of the specific case.” (***People v. Evans*** (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 735, 747-751.)

The ***Evans*** Court (Second District Court of Appeal) concluded that “a reasonable belief to search for evidence of the offense of arrest exists when the nature of the offense, considered in conjunction with the particular facts of the case, gives rise to a degree of suspicion commensurate with that sufficient for limited intrusions such as investigatory stops.” (***Id.***, at p. 751.)

Also, the phrases “*reasonable to believe*” and “*reasonable basis to believe*” are not defined (e.g., “*probable cause*” or “*reasonable suspicion?*”) in the **Gant** decision. Neither are the other legal parameters (e.g., is it limited to the passenger area of the car, must it be contemporaneous with the arrest in time and place, etc.?) even discussed.

See **People v. Osborne** (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1065, where “*reasonable basis to believe*” in a **Gant** search of a vehicle was defined as “*a standard less than probable cause.*” (See also **People v. Nottoli** (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 531, 551, fn. 9, & 553.)

The Second District Court of Appeal concluded that the standard is a “(r)easonable suspicion, not probable cause, . . .” (**People v. Evans** (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 735, 751.)

This alternate theory under **Gant** for searching containers and other items found in a vehicle does not apply, however, to cellphones given the higher expectation of privacy in a person’s cellphone. (**Riley v. California** (June 25, 2014) 573 U.S. ___ [134 S.Ct. 2473, 2484-2495; 189 L.Ed.2nd 430]; see also **United States v. Camou** (9th Cir. 2014) 773 F.3rd 932, 941-943.)

Subsequent Case Law:

Arresting defendant for vehicle burglary, sitting in a vehicle, particularly with tools visible in the vehicle, justified the warrantless search of the vehicle upon “*a reasonable basis to believe*” that evidence related to the suspected vehicle burglary might be found in the car. (**People v. Osborne** (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1062-1065.)

Osborne interprets “*reasonable basis to believe*” to be something less than “*probable cause.*” (**Id.**, at p. 1065.)

The search of a cellphone at the scene of an arrest in a vehicle is lawful so long as it is “*reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.*” When the driver is arrested for driving under the influence of drugs, and the record contains expert testimony concerning the use of cellphones by drug users, the warrantless search of the driver’s cellphone is lawful. (*People v. Nottoli* (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 531, 544-559.)

Arresting a person for driving on a suspended license does *not* establish a “*reasonable basis to believe*” that the car will contain any evidence of this offense. (*United States v. Ruckes* (9th Cir. 2009) 586 F.3rd 713, 718; citing *Gant* at 129 S.Ct. p. 1719.)

Stopped and physically arrested for driving on a suspended license (with a prior conviction for the same), defendant was secured in the back seat of a patrol car. The subsequent search of his vehicle, resulting in recovery of cocaine and an illegal firearm (defendant being a convicted felon), was found to be in violation of the rule of *Gant*. (*United States v. Ruckes* (9th Cir. 2009) 586 F.3rd 713, 716-718: Evidence was held to be admissible, however, under the inevitable discovery rule in that the vehicle was to be impounded and subjected to an inventory search; pp. 718-719.)

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeal has found that in a drug conspiracy-related arrest, there is commonly going to be “*a reasonable basis to believe*” that evidence related to the drugs or the conspiracy are going to be found in the defendant’s vehicle. (*United States v. Slone* (7th Cir. 2011) 636 F.3rd 845, 852; defendant arrested while in the process of conducting security or counter-surveillance operations in a drug trafficking conspiracy.)

Two searches of defendant’s car were not justified as incident to his arrest for interfering with an investigation (**P.C. § 148**). The first search did not fall within the *Gant* first prong (arrestee within

reaching distance of his vehicle) because defendant had been Tased and detained, and was lying face down on the ground with officers on him. The second search was conducted at the impound yard. But under the second *Gant* prong, it was not reasonable to believe evidence of interfering with the officer would remain in the vehicle after defendant was removed. A reasonable belief to search a vehicle for evidence of the offense of arrest exists when the nature of the offense, considered in conjunction with the particular facts of the case, gave rise to a degree of suspicion commensurate with that sufficient for limited intrusions. Reasonable suspicion, not probable cause, is required. Therefore, the automobile exception also did not justify either search. Also, probable cause was not established by defendant's erratic driving, nervousness, or refusal to exit the car, or by the location of the stop in gang territory, or the discovery of baggies and cash in the first search. (*People v. Evans* (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 735, 743-755.)

The Court further rejected both the “inventory search” and “inevitable discovery” theories in that the evidence necessary to establish either theory was not sufficiently developed at the trial court level. (*Id.*, at pp. 755-756.)

Arresting a person for driving while under the influence of a controlled substance supplies the necessary “reasonable basis for believing that evidence ‘relevant’ to that type of offense might be in his vehicle.” (*People v. Quick* (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1006, 1011-1012; see also *People v. Nottoli* (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 531, 553-554; “The presence of some amount of the controlled substance or drug paraphernalia in the interior of the vehicle would be circumstantial evidence tending to corroborate that a driver was in fact under the influence of the controlled substance.”)

The Eight Circuit Court of Appeal upheld the warrantless search of the hatchback area of

defendant's SUV as a valid search incident to arrest after defendant was secured in the backseat of a patrol car. The officers had a reasonable basis to believe the vehicle contained evidence relevant to the crime of arrest, making a terroristic threat, where defendant aggravated a road rage incident by pointing a pistol at the victim. The warrantless search was upheld under *Gant's* alternative theory; i.e., where it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the crime for which the suspect was arrested. The court held the warrantless search of defendant's SUV was reasonable under the second part of *Gant* because defendant had confirmed that he was the driver of the SUV involved in the earlier road rage incident, he told the officers he "probably" had a firearm in his vehicle, the 911 caller positively identified defendant as the driver who brandished a gun at him, and witness had seen defendant concealing something in the rear hatch of his SUV. The court further held that the hatchback or rear hatch area of a vehicle is part of the passenger compartment. (*United States v. Stegall* (8th Cir. Ark. 2017) 850 F.3rd 981.)

Exception: Where the person is arrested and transported to the police station, property found "*on his person*" may be searched (and/or his property taken for laboratory analysis) upon arrival at the station, there being little perceived difference between searching in the field and shortly thereafter at the police station. (*United States v. Edwards* (1974) 415 U.S. 800, 802-803 [39 L.Ed.2nd 771]; *In re Charles C.* (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 420, 425; see also *United States v. Finley* (5th Cir. 2007) 477 F.3rd 250, 260, fn. 7; *United States v. Rodriguez* (5th Cir. 2012) 702 F.3rd 206, 209-210; *People v. Diaz* (2011) 51 Cal.4th 84.)

This rule, however, has been held *not* to apply to cellphones in that cellphones do not pose a danger to officers and once seized, it is unlikely any evidence contained in the phone is going to be destroyed. When balanced with the large amount of personal information likely to be found in cellphones, a warrantless intrusion into the phone is not justified under the **Fourth Amendment** absent exigent circumstances. (*Riley v. California* (June

25, 2014) 573 U.S. ___ [134 S.Ct. 2473; 189 L.Ed.2nd 430]; overruling by implication any of the above cases that involve cellphones [e.g., *Finley*, *Diaz*, and *Rodriguez*.])

The California Supreme Court concluded in a warrantless cellphone search case (reversing a lower appellate court decision) that the search of defendant's cellphone would not have been proper even under its prior decision in *People v. Diaz* (2011) 51 Cal.4th 84 (a search incident to arrest case), and that a reasonably well-trained officer would have known this. Defendant was not under arrest when officers searched his phone. Under *Riley v. California* (June 25, 2014) 573 U.S. ___ [134 S.Ct. 2473; 189 L.Ed.2nd 430], which overruled *Diaz*, even if defendant had been properly arrested, a warrant was required to search his cellphone. The search in this case violated the **Fourth Amendment**; the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply. Also, the search was not the result of negligence, nor did it result from any pressure to apply a newly enacted statutory scheme that was confusing and complex. The officers' conduct, including the search, was deliberate. Exclusion of the evidence in this case serves to deter future similar behavior. (*People v. Macabeo* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1212-1226.)

Exception to Exception: The search of an arrestee's vehicle incident to his arrest was held to be justified where he was arrested for driving while under the influence of a controlled substance, and where upon stepping out of his vehicle to perform field sobriety tests, he threw his jacket and keys into the car, rolled up the window, and locked and shut the door. A person arrested for DUI may not defeat a search incident to arrest by locking incriminating evidence inside the car. (*People v. Quick* (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1006, 1011-1012.)

Retroactivity:

Following *Gant*, a gun found during the search of a vehicle in which the defendant was a passenger, searched incident to the arrest of another passenger

and after defendant himself had been handcuffed and secured in a patrol car, should have been suppressed. (*United States v. Gonzalez* (9th Cir. 2009) 578 F.3rd 1130; also noting that the decision in *Gant* applies retroactively to any case not yet final (i.e., still on appeal) despite the officer's good faith in following the old rule that was valid at the time of the search.)

However, the United States Supreme Court has since ruled that searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent in effect at the time of the search, despite a later decision changing the rules, are not subject to the Exclusionary Rule. (*Davis v. United States* (2011) 564 U.S. 229, 236-239 [180 L.Ed.2nd 285.]

As a result, a search of a defendant's vehicle following his custodial arrest, done in violation of *Gant*, did not require the suppression of two firearms found in the car in that this search occurred prior to the *Gant* decision. (*United States v. Tschacher* (9th Cir. 2012) 687 F.3rd 923, 932-933.)

But see *People v. Leal* (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1065-1066, a search incident to arrest in a residence where the Court applied the rule of *Gant*, and found that the law was sufficiently settled prior to *Gant*, at least under California authority as it applied to searches of residences, that "good faith" reliance upon prior authority did not allow for the admissibility of the evidence recovered in this case; a questionable decision in light of the decision in *Davis v. United States*, *supra*.)

Transportation: The arrestee must be subject to a post-arrest transportation to jail or the police station, or perhaps a detoxification facility, before a search incident to arrest is justified. (*People v. Brisendine* (1975) 13 Cal.3rd 528, 538-552.)

Therefore, if the procedure is to cite and release the subject at the scene of the arrest, no "search incident to arrest" is lawful. The theory is that a person is not as prone to attempt to destroy evidence or reach for a weapon if he is only to be cited, as opposed to taken to jail. (*Ibid.*)

Taking a person in to “*protective custody*,” where, for instance, he is acting irrationally (e.g., intoxicated, in this case), allows for a patdown for weapons prior to transporting him. (*United States v. Gilmore* (10th Cir.) 776 F.3rd 765.)

See “*Search Incident to Arrest*,” under “*Searches of Persons*” (Chapter 8), above.

Search Incident to a Citation: There is no such thing as legal justification for a “*search incident to citation*,” because of the lack of the right to physically transport the subject from the scene. (*Knowles v. Iowa* (1989) 525 U.S. 113 [142 L.Ed.2nd 492]; see also *People v. Brisendine* (1975) 13 Cal.3rd 528, 538-552; *People v. Macabeo* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1216-1219; *In re D.W.* (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1249, 1253.)

However, it is not unconstitutional to make a custodial arrest (i.e., transporting to jail or court) of a person arrested for a minor misdemeanor (*Atwater v. City of Lago Vista* (2001) 532 U.S. 318 [149 L.Ed.2nd 549].), or even for a fine-only, infraction. (*People v. McKay* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 601, 607; see also *United States v. McFadden* (2nd Cir. 2001) 238 F.3rd 198, 204; see also *Virginia v. Moore* (2008) 553 U.S. 164 [170 L.Ed.2nd 559].)

In order to justify a search incident to arrest, however, the subject must have actually been subjected to a custodial arrest. Absent such an actual arrest and transportation, the rule that a search incident to citation not being lawful, per *Knowles v. Iowa* (1998) 525 U.S. 113 [142 L.Ed.2nd 492], applies. (*People v. Macabeo* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1216-1219; *In re D.W.* (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1249, 1253.)

California’s statutory provisions require the release of misdemeanor arrestees in most circumstances. (e.g., see **P.C. §§ 853.5, 853.6, V.C. §§ 40303, 40500**) However, violation of these statutory requirements is not a constitutional violation and, therefore, *should not* result in suppression of any evidence recovered as a result of such an arrest. (*People v. McKay, supra*, at pp. 607-619, a violation of **V.C. § 21650.1** (riding a bicycle in the wrong

direction); *People v. Gomez* (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 531, , 538-539, seat belt violation (V.C. § 27315(d)(1)), citing: *Atwater v. City of Lago Vista* (2001) 532 U.S. 318 [149 L.Ed.2nd 549]; *People v. Bennett* (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 907, 918.)

See also; “*Search Incident to Arrest,*” under “*Searches of Persons*” (Chapter 8), above.

Searches where Arrestee is a “Recent Occupant:”

The arrestee need not have been arrested while physically within his vehicle to make it subject to search so long as he is at least a “*recent occupant*” of the vehicle. (*Thornton v. United States* (2004) 541 U.S. 615 [158 L.Ed.2nd 905].)

See *United States v. Osife* (9th Cir. 2005) 398 F.3rd 1143, where the Court, without discussing the issue, found the defendant to be a “*recent occupant*” where he had left his vehicle, gone into a store, and returned to it before being arrested.

But where defendant is arrested a block and a half away after a foot pursuit from his vehicle, so that when arrested he was no longer within reach of the passenger area of his car, the Ninth Circuit is of the belief that he does not qualify as a “*recent occupant.*” (*United States v. Caseres* (9th Cir. 2008) 533 F.3d 1064, 1070-1074.)

Being a “*recent occupant*” of a vehicle does *not* add a requirement that in order to search the passenger area of the vehicle there must be some reason to believe the vehicle contains evidence related to the crime for which the defendant was arrested. (*United States v. Osife, supra*, reaffirming the rule of *New York v. Belton* (1981) 453 U.S. 454, 460 [69 L.Ed.2nd 768, 775], defendant arguing that a minority, concurring opinion in *Thornton* to this effect should be accepted as a new rule.)

Note: It must be assumed that this “*recent occupant*” theory is still subject to the rule of *Arizona v. Gant* (2009) 556 U.S. 332 [173 L.Ed.2nd 485], above.

With Probable Cause: Searches with *Probable Cause* to believe there is contraband or other seizable items in a vehicle:

General Rule: If police officers have *probable cause* to search a car, they may make a warrantless search anywhere a warrant could have authorized. (*Pennsylvania v. Labron* (1996) 518 U.S. 938 [135 L.Ed.2nd 89]; *Maryland v. Dyson* (1999) 527 U.S. 465 [144 L.Ed.2nd 442]; *People v. Superior Court [Nasmeh]* (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 85, 100-102; *United States v. Davis* (9th Cir. 2008) 530 F.3rd 1069, 1084; *United States v. Noster* (9th Cir. 2009) 590 F.3rd 624, 633-634; *People v. Xinos* (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 637, 653-659; *People v. Diaz* (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 743, 753-754, search of a vehicle’s “black box,” or “Sensing Diagnostic Module,” or “SMD;” *United States v. Cervantes* (9th Cir. 2012) 703 F.3rd 1135, 1148-1140; and see *Florida v. Harris* (2013) 568 U.S. 237, 243-250 [133 S.Ct. 1050; 185 L.Ed.2nd 61], a warrantless search of a vehicle based upon a drug-detection dog’s sniff; *People v. Waxler* (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 712, 718-719, a warrantless search of a vehicle based upon the odor of marijuana and observation of a pipe with apparent marijuana residue.)

Search of a purse found in defendant’s vehicle after defendant had been arrested outside the car from which he had just fled, with crack cocaine and a large amount of money in his pockets indicating that he had been engaged in the selling of drugs, constituted sufficient probable cause to believe that more contraband, or other evidence of drug dealing, would be found in his car. The warrantless search of the car, and the purse (in which a gun was found), was upheld as lawful. (*United States v. Williams* (9th Cir. 2017) 846 F.3rd 303, 312-313.)

That same probable cause allows for the warrantless *seizure* of the vehicle. (*United States v. Magallon-Lopez* (9th Cir. 2016) 817 F.3rd 671, 675-676.)

A suspect’s general consent to search his car does not allow the officers to drill through the floor of the trunk. “Cutting” or “destroying” an object during a search requires either explicit consent for the destructive search or probable cause. (*United States v. Zamora-Garcia* (8th Cir. Ark. 2016) 831 F.3rd 979.)

See “*The Scope of the Consent*,” under “*Consent Searches*” (Chapter 16), below.

Sometimes referred to as the “*automobile*” or “*vehicle exception*” to the search warrant requirement, it is accepted that the

automobile is commonly an exigent circumstance in and of itself. (*People v. Nicholson* (1984) 207 Cal.App.3rd 707, 711-712; *People v. Superior Court [Nasmeh]* (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 85, 100-102; *People v. Waxler* (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 712, 718-719.)

Pursuant to the “automobile exception,” a “warrantless search of a vehicle is permitted ‘if there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime.’” *United States v. Brooks*, 610 F.3d 1186, 1193 (9th Cir. 2010). Probable cause exists if there is a ‘fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place,’ under the totality of the circumstances. *United States v. Rodriguez*, 869 F.2d 479, 484 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting *Illinois v. Gates*, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983)). ‘A finding of probable cause must be supported by the objective facts known to the officer at the time of the search.’ *United States v. Rogers*, 656 F.3d 1023, 1029 (9th Cir. 2011).” (*United States v. Faagai* (9th Cir. 2017) 869 F.3rd 1145, 1150.)

See also *United States v. Rowe* (8th Cir. MN 2017) 878 F.3rd 623.

Note: Assuming that there is such a thing as an “*automobile exception*” to the search warrant requirement is perhaps a dangerous assumption. There are still situations where there are viable arguments that a search warrant is necessary in order to lawfully search a vehicle. (See below)

Justifications for the Rule:

- The ready mobility of the automobile. (*Carroll v. United States* (1925) 267 U.S. 132 [69 L.Ed.2nd 543]; *United States v. Ross* (1982) 456 U.S. 798 [72 L.Ed.2nd 572]; *People v. Superior Court [Nasmeh]*, *supra*; *People v. Waxler* (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 712, 719; *United States v. Camou* (9th Cir. 2014) 773 F.3rd 932, 941-943.)
- The lessened expectation of privacy in a vehicle, resulting from the pervasive governmental regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on public highways. (See *Cady v. Dombrowski* (1973) 413 U.S. 433 [37 L.Ed.2nd 706]; *South Dakota v. Opperman* (1976) 428 U.S. 354 [49 L.Ed.2nd 1000]; *Carroll v. United States* (1925) 267 U.S. 132, 153, 156 [60 L.Ed. 543]; *People v. Diaz* (2013) 213

Cal.App.4th 743, 753-754; *People v. Waxler*, *supra*; *United States v Camou*, *supra*; see also *People v. Valencia* (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 922, 938-939, comparing the diminished expectation of privacy in one's vehicle when compared to the "heightened expectation of privacy" in one's residence.)

- The expense, delay, and risk of loss in securing a vehicle while a search warrant is obtained. (*People v. Superior Court [Valdez]* (1983) 35 Cal.3rd 11, 16.)
- The need for clear guidelines for police. (*People v. Superior Court [Valdez]*, *supra*; see also *People v. Chavers* (1983) 33 Cal.3rd 462, 469; and *Arkansas v. Sanders* (1979) 442 U.S. 753, 760-761, 765, fn. 14 [61 L.Ed.2d 235, 242-243, 246].)

Case Law:

The rule is that if such probable cause exists to believe that a lawfully stopped vehicle contains evidence of crime or other contraband, then anywhere in the vehicle that a warrant could have authorized is subject to search. Warrantless searches in such cases are justified by "the reduced expectation of privacy in a vehicle, the fact a vehicle is inherently mobile, and the historical distinction between searches of automobiles and dwellings." (*People v. Evans* (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 735, 753; *People v. Waxler*, *supra*; "justif(ying) the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.")

Erratic driving, nervousness, and a failure to cooperate, even when combined with knowledge that defendant had hidden a weapon in the air vents in his car on a prior occasion, were held to be insufficient to establish probable cause to search his car. (*Id.*, at pp. 753-755.)

For a court to determine the existence of probable cause, it must consider whether, under the totality of the circumstances, there is a "fair probability" that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. (*People v. Little* (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1364, 1371; quoting *Illinois v. Gates* (1983) 462 U.S. 213, 238 [76 L.Ed.2nd 527].)

Warrantless search of defendant's vehicle justified by exigent circumstances (looking for a missing eight-year-old girl) and probable cause (blood seen in the vehicle and a cord hanging out of the trunk). (*People v. Panah* (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 468-469.)

This includes any compartments and containers in the vehicle; assuming the item for which there is probable cause for which to search would reasonably be expected to be in the container searched. (*United States v. Ross* (1982) 456 U.S. 798 [72 L.Ed.2nd 572]; *People v. Chavers* (1983) 33 Cal.3rd 462, 466-467.)

“The scope of a warrantless search of an automobile ‘is defined by the object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found.’” *People v. Diaz* (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 743, 754, citing *United States v. Ross*, *supra*, at p. 824.)

Even if the container searched does not belong to the defendant, it is subject to search. (*Wyoming v. Houghton* (1999) 526 U.S. 295 [143 L.Ed.2nd 408]: Where defendant was a passenger in the vehicle, the search of defendant’s purse which was left in the car when the passengers were ordered out is okay.)

Note *People v. Mitchell* (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 672; *People v. Prance* (1991) 226 Cal.App.3rd 1525, upholding the search of purses belonging to passengers under the “*incident to arrest*” theory (above).

However, a search of the female defendant’s purse left in the car when an officer is conducting a parole search of a male parolee, is illegal absent a reasonable suspicion to believe that the parolee had joint access, possession or control over the purse. (*People v. Baker* (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1152.)

It is not relevant that the car must be damaged to get to the hidden compartments. (*Wimberly v. Superior Court* (1976) 16 Cal.3rd 557, 571.)

It is also lawful to make a warrantless seizure of a vehicle, found in any public area, when an officer has probable cause to believe that the vehicle itself is “*forfeitable contraband*” (*Florida v. White* (1999) 526 U.S. 559 [143 L.Ed.2nd 748]; see also *Carroll v. United States* (1925) 267 U.S. 132, 150-151 [69 L.Ed. 543].), or is transporting contraband. (*United States v. Alvarez-Tejeda* (9th Cir. 2007) 491 F.3rd 1013.)

“(C)ircumstances unique to the vehicle context justify a search incident to a lawful arrest when it is “*reasonable to believe*

evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.” (*Arizona v. Gant* (2009) 556 U.S. 332 [173 L.Ed.2nd 485], citing *Thornton v. United States* (2004) 541 U.S. 615, 629-632 [158 L.Ed.2nd 905].)

Note: This theory for justifying a warrantless search, which is likely to be limited to the searches of vehicles (*Thornton v. United States, infra*, at p. 632.), generates more questions than it answers: For instance, “reasonable to believe” is not defined (e.g., “probable cause” or “reasonable suspicion?”) Neither are the other legal parameters (e.g.: Is it limited to the passenger area of the car, must it be contemporaneous with the arrest in time and place, etc.?) even discussed. The theory itself comes from the concurring (two justices) opinion in *Thornton v. United States* (2004) 541 U.S. 615, at pp. 629-632 [158 L.Ed.2^d 905]. *Thornton* itself cites as its authority *United States v. Rabinowitz* (1950) 339 U.S. 56 [94 L.Ed. 653], which was itself all but overruled in *Chimel v. California* (1969) 395 U.S. 752, 759-768 [23 L.Ed.2nd 685].

The warrantless search of a vehicle pursuant to the “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement is no less justified merely because the vehicle is parked at the defendant’s apartment in a nearby carport. The “twin justifications” for not requiring search warrants to search vehicles; i.e., “the pervasive schemes of regulation, which necessarily lead to reduced expectations of privacy, and the exigencies attendant to ready mobility,” applies just as much as when the car is out on the street. (*People v. Hockstraser* (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 883, 902-905.)

Having probable cause to arrest a passenger in a vehicle for providing false information to a peace officer concerning her age does not constitute probable cause to believe that she is hiding identification in a car when she tells the officer that she does not have any identification with her. (*United States v. Rodgers* (9th Cir. 2011) 656 F.3rd 1023.)

During a traffic stop, defendant gave counterfeit bills to another passenger who stuffed them, folded, into the weather stripping between the right front passenger door and window. An officer noticed the partially-visible bills, removed them, unfolded them, and observed that they were counterfeit. The appellate court determined that suppression was not warranted because (1) the circumstances presented a fair probability that the money was

involved in drug trafficking and that a search of the car would have revealed evidence of a crime since the passenger was nervous, a parolee, and appeared under the influence of a drug, and the money was located in a place that suggested an effort to conceal its presence and called to the officer's mind the door compartments and other hiding places used by drug couriers to transport contraband and cash, and (2) a separate "secondary" search did not occur when the officer unfolded the bills since the money was within the scope of the search. (*United States v. Ewing* (9th Cir. 2011) 638 F.3rd 1226, 1230-1234.)

The fact that the defendant and his cohorts were involved in counterfeiting instead of drug trafficking did not detract from the fact that probable cause to believe that the crime being committed was related to drugs. (*Id.*, at p. 1233.)

Two searches of defendant's car were *not* justified under the probable cause theory in that probable cause was not established by defendant's erratic driving, nervousness, or refusal to exit the car, or by the location of the stop in gang territory, or the discovery of baggies and cash in the first search. (*People v. Evans* (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 735, 753-755.)

A vehicle stop and search based upon the following was held to be based upon sufficient probable cause: (1) The vehicle was stopped only 33 minutes after the initial dispatch was sent out; (2) it was stopped in the city in which the crime of residential burglary had occurred, and only about three miles away from the scene of the crime; (3) the vehicle was "somewhat unique" in that it was a red Ford F-150 with chrome rims; and (4) two Black people were in the truck—one male in his 50's and one female in her 30's, all matching the descriptions put out by police dispatch. Also, upon contacting the vehicle's occupants, (5) one of the vehicle's occupants admitted being at the scene of the burglary, and (6) the clothing descriptions for both subjects matched the victim's descriptions. (*People v. Little* (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1364, 1370-1373.)

A police officer's conclusory statement that a box in defendant's car came from a "suspected narcotics stash house," without defining why the residence was considered to be a "stash house," and his observation that defendant "did not take a direct route to his location," were not sufficient to establish probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of defendant's car under the automobile exception to the **Fourth Amendment's** warrant

requirement. (*United States v. Cervantes* (9th Cir. 2012) 703 F.3rd 1135, 1138-1140.)

The Court further held that a detective’s conclusion that defendant had engaged in “countersurveillance driving techniques” was not substantiated by the record, at least when compared with prior cases (e.g., see *United States v. Del Vizo* (9th Cir. 1990) 918 F.2nd 821, 822.), when the only evidence was that defendant had not taken the most direct route. (*United States v. Cervantes, supra*, at p. 1140.)

“A police officer has probable cause to conduct a search when ‘the facts available to [him] would “warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief” that contraband or evidence of a crime is present. [Citations] The test for probable cause is not reducible to ‘precise definition or quantification.’ [Citation]. ‘Finely tuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence . . . have no place in the [probable-cause] decision.’ [Citation]. All we have required is the kind of ‘fair probability’ on which “reasonable and prudent [people,] not legal technicians, act.’ [Citation]” (*Florida v. Harris* (2013) 568 U.S. 237. 243-244 [133 S.Ct. 1050; 185 L.Ed.2nd 61]; a warrantless search of a vehicle based upon a drug-detection dog’s sniff.)

Finding a cellphone in an arrestee’s vehicle, and then not attempting a search of the phone for another hour and twenty minutes, negates any argument that an exigency existed, making such a search unlawful. (*United States v. Camou* (9th Cir. 2014) 773 F.3rd 932, 937-945.)

Information obtained from the suspects themselves (e.g., through a lawful wiretap), absent some reason to believe the subjects were not telling the truth, is entitled to the same level of belief as that from a citizen informant, and will supply the probable cause necessary to justify a traffic stop of the vehicle and then, particularly with corroboration received at the scene of the stop that “eliminat(ing) virtually any doubt on that score, the warrantless seizure of that car pending the obtaining of a search warrant. (*United States v. Magallon-Lopez* (9th Cir. 2016) 817 F.3rd 671, 675-676.)

An extensive narcotics investigation involving wiretaps and surveillances of defendant and a known drug dealer led to defendant being stopped in his vehicle. The Court upheld the trial court’s conclusion that a warrantless search of defendant’s truck,

upon him being stopped and detained after an apparent buy of methamphetamine, was held to be justified by the automobile exception, there being probable cause to believe that defendant had just make a purchase and that the contraband would be found in his truck. (*United States v. Faagai* (9th Cir. 2017) 869 F.3rd 1145, 1149-1151.)

Removal of the dashboard console to an automobile, although beyond the scope of an inventory search, was held to be lawful based upon a theory of probable cause, under the “automobile exception,” where a white powder, recognized by the officer as a controlled substance, had been found under the seat and there were indications that the console had been tampered with. (*People v. Zabala* (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 335, 343-344.)

Problem: Does finding a *limited amount of contraband* in the passenger area of a car, such as during a search incident to arrest or with a plain-sight observation, provide an officer with *probable cause* to search the *rest* of the vehicle (e.g., the trunk) for more contraband?

The *former rule* was that finding a limited amount of evidence does not necessarily provide probable cause to believe more might be contained in other areas of the car, such as the trunk or the engine compartment. (See *Wimberly v. Superior Court* (1976) 16 Cal.3rd 557; *People v. Gregg* (1974) 43 Cal.App.3rd 137.)

The *new rule* is that anywhere in the vehicle where an officer might logically expect to find whatever it is that there is probable cause to believe is there, is subject to a warrantless search. (*People v. Dey* (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1318; finding that the *old rule*, as expressed in *Wimberly*, was in effect overruled by *United States v. Ross* (1982) 456 U.S. 789 [72 L.Ed.2nd 572], establishing a “*bright line*” test for vehicle searches.)

Dey was reaffirmed in *People v. Hunter* (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 371, where a vehicle’s trunk was searched based upon a limited amount of marijuana found in the passenger area. Passage of **Proposition 8**, the “*Truth in Evidence*” Initiative in June, 1982, dictated that trial courts follow *Ross*.

The Court in *Hunter* criticized the trial judge for not following *Dey*, noting that the rules of “*Stare Decisis*” did not allow a trial court an option.

See also *People v. Waxler* (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 712, 722-724; authorizing the warrantless search of defendant's vehicle based upon the odor of burnt marijuana and observation of a marijuana pipe, rejecting the argument that absent evidence of more than a lawful amount of medical marijuana, the officer could not search the entire car.

The Court in *Hunter* also ruled, however, that even if *Wimberly* were still the rule, the arresting officers in this case had "probable cause" to believe that more contraband would be found in the trunk based upon the vehicle occupants' suspicious actions when first stopped and the fact that one occupant was a known drug dealer and a second a CYA parolee. (*Id.*, at p. 379.)

An officer's probable cause to believe that a person is in illegal possession of marijuana is not diminished just because the person produces a medical marijuana identification card or a physician's authorization. (*People v. Strasburg* (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1052; defendant lawfully detained and his car lawfully searched despite producing a doctor's authorization to use marijuana for medical purposes.)

See also *People v. Waxler* (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 712; holding that the odor of marijuana in a vehicle, with the plain sight observation of a marijuana pipe with what appeared to be a small amount of marijuana in the bowl, supplied probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle. The fact that possession of less than an ounce of marijuana is an infraction, or that the defendant has a marijuana card, is irrelevant.

Problem: Where evidence is found in a vehicle within reach of *more than one of the occupants*, but no one admits ownership (or everyone specifically denies ownership), who, if anyone, is subject to arrest?

Where a large amount of money is found rolled up in a vehicle's glove compartment, and five plastic glassine baggies of cocaine are found behind the center armrest of the backseat, with the armrest pushed up into the closed position to hide the contraband, such contraband being accessible to all the occupants of the vehicle, the arrest of all three subjects in the vehicle (driver, right front and rear

seat passengers) was supported by probable cause. (*Maryland v. Pringle* (2003) 540 U.S. 366 [157 L.Ed.2nd 769].)

Officers had probable cause to arrest both the passenger and the driver for possession of a billy club seen resting against the driver's door. (*People v. Vermouth* (1971) 20 Cal. App. 3d 746, 756.)

Informing two suspects in a vehicle that they would both be arrested for possession of a concealed firearm, prompting a response from defendant that he'd "take the charge," was *not* the functional equivalent of an interrogation that required a *Miranda* admonishment. (*United States v. Collins* (6th Cir. 2012) 683 F.3rd 697, 701-703.)

Note: However, absent sufficient evidence to connect contraband found in the vehicle to one person or the other "beyond a reasonable doubt," the case is unlikely to be filed by a prosecutor.

Problem: Search of a vehicle that is *already impounded* and in police custody, where the search is no longer "contemporaneous in time and place?"

The "contemporaneous in time and place" requirement only applies to "searches incident to arrest." If probable cause to believe a vehicle contains contraband or other seizable items existed at the time the vehicle is seized and impounded, a delayed, warrantless search is no less valid than if searched at the time of seizure. The courts have held that such a delayed search imposes no greater intrusion upon a defendant's privacy rights than if it had been immediately searched upon initial seizure. (*People v. Nicholson* (1989) 207 Cal.App.3rd 707; *United States v. Johns* (1985) 469 U.S. 478 [83 L.Ed.2nd 890]; *United States v. Garcia* (9th Cir. 2000) 205 F.3rd 1182.)

"(T)he passage of time between the seizure and the search of [a] car is legally irrelevant." (*People v. Superior Court [Nasmeh]* (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 85, 100-102; citing *United States v. Gastiaburo* (4th Cir. 1994) 16 F.3rd 582, 587.)

"Delays, however, must be 'reasonable in light of all the circumstances.'" (*United States v. Camou* (9th Cir. 2014) 773 F.3rd 932, 941; citing *United States v. Albers* (9th Cir. 1998) 136 F.3rd

670, where a seven-to-ten-day delay in viewing videotapes and file seized from a houseboat was upheld.)

But note; A Search Warrant Required: Based upon the reasoning of the above cases, it is arguable that when a vehicle is impounded at a time *when there is no probable cause* to believe it contains contraband or other seizable items, developing probable cause to search the vehicle at a later time, *probably does not* allow a warrantless search after impoundment. There no longer being any legal theory allowing for a warrantless search of a vehicle when the probable cause is developed after the fact, nor any exigent circumstances, a search warrant should be obtained.

Problem: Searches of “*closed containers*” in a vehicle:

Old Rule: If a police officer had probable cause to believe a particular closed container in a vehicle contained contraband, as opposed to probable cause to believe that there was contraband in some unknown location in the vehicle in general, then the container itself would have to be seized and a search warrant obtained before opening it. (*United States v. Chadwick* (1977) 433 U.S. 1 [53 L.Ed.2nd 538].)

New Rule: Recognizing the absurdity of trying to distinguish the rule of *Ross* (*United States v. Ross* (1982) 456 U.S. 789 [72 L.Ed.2nd 572].), allowing a warrantless search of containers in a vehicle if there was probable cause to search the car in general (above), and the rule of *Chadwick*, requiring a warrant for a particular container when there was probable cause to believe a known container in a vehicle itself contained contraband or other seizable items, the United States Supreme Court finally overruled *Chadwick* in *California v. Acevedo* (1991) 500 U.S. 565, 580 [114 L.Ed.2nd 619, 634].

Now, pursuant to *Acevedo*, any time a closed container is found in a car, whether searched (1) incident to arrest, (2) with probable cause to believe there is contraband or other seizable evidence somewhere in the car, *or* (3) with probable cause to believe a specific container within the vehicle contains contraband or seizable items, the container may be searched without a search warrant. (See also *People v. Molina* (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1038; and *People v. Thompson* (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 112.)

This includes a closed container belonging to a passenger even though the passenger is not arrested (*People v. Mitchell* (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 672; *People v. Prance* (1991) 226 Cal.App.3rd 1525.) and even though the passenger has already been ordered out of the vehicle. (*Wyoming v. Houghton* (1999) 526 U.S. 295 [143 L.Ed.2nd 408].)

Search of a purse found in defendant's vehicle after defendant had been arrested outside the car from which he had just fled, with crack cocaine and a large amount of money in his pockets indicating that he had been engaged in the selling of drugs, constituted sufficient probable cause to believe that more contraband, or other evidence of drug dealing, would be found in his car. The warrantless search of the car, and the purse (in which a gun was found), was upheld as lawful. (*United States v. Williams* (9th Cir. 2017) 846 F.3rd 303, 312-313.)

If, however, the passenger takes the container (such as a purse) with him or her upon being ordered out of a vehicle, is that container subject to search? *Probably not* (see *United States v. Vaughan* (9th Cir. 1983) 718 F.2nd 332.), absent some reason to believe it may contain a weapon, in which case a "patdown" of the container (i.e., the purse) may be appropriate. (See "Frisks," above.)

While the odor of marijuana coming from a mailed package will justify the seizure of such package, it does not excuse the lack of a search warrant when law enforcement opens the package without exigent circumstances. (*Robey v. Superior Court* (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1218, 1223-1243; overruling *People v. McKinnon* (1972) 7 Cal.3rd 899, 909; which had held to the contrary.)

However, when the search of a cellphone is at issue, it has been held that the limitations imposed by *Chadwick* continue to apply. (*Riley v. California* (June 25, 2014) 573 U.S. __, __ [134 S.Ct. 2473, at pp. 2489; 189 L.Ed.2nd 430]; *People v. Macabeo* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1215.)

See "Exception; Cellphones," above, and "Problem: When the item searched is a cellphone," below

Problem: When the item searched is a cellphone:

The Ninth Circuit has held that cellphones are not containers for purposes of the vehicle exception to the search warrant requirement, and thus may not be searched under this theory. (*United States v. Camou* (9th Cir. 2014) 773 F.3rd 932, 941-943.)

The *Camou* Court cites the Supreme Court decision of *Riley v. California* (June 25, 2014) 573 U.S. __, __ [134 S.Ct. 2473, at pp. 2489-2491; 189 L.Ed.2nd 430], an “incident to arrest” case, for the argument that cellphones are entitled to an enhanced level of privacy given the quantity of personal information contained therein, “differ(ing) in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense from other objects that might be kept on an arrestee’s person.” (134 S.Ct. at p. 2489.) *Camou* thus extends the theory of *Riley v. California* to searches of a vehicle based upon probable cause.

See also *United States v. Lara* (9th Cir. 2016) 815 F.3rd 605, 610-611; declining to include defendant’s cellphone under the category of a “container,” in defendant’s **Fourth** wavier search conditions.

Problem: A *Motorhome* (and other similar “*Vehicles*”):

A motorhome, although having many of the attributes of a private residence, is mobile and subject to registration like any other motor vehicle, and is therefore included within the vehicle exception to the search warrant requirement. (*California v. Carney* (1985) 471 U.S. 386 [85 L.Ed.2nd 406].)

“When a vehicle is being used on the highways, or if it is readily capable of such use and is found stationary in a place not regularly used for residential purposes—temporary or otherwise—the two justifications for the vehicle exception (i.e., ‘*mobility*’ and ‘*lessened expectation of privacy*’) come into play.” (*California v. Carney, supra*, at pp. 392-393 [85 L.Ed.2nd at p. 414].)

Thus, when a motorhome is *not* “*readily capable of . . . use*” on the highway, and *is* found stationary in a place which *is* “*regularly used for residential purposes*,” (i.e., such as when hooked up in the residential area of a park), then the rules for searching homes would apply.

Defendant's pickup/camper, which the parties stipulated was actually defendant's residence, but which was found parked on the street within 1000 feet of an elementary school, was held *not* to come within the "residence" exception to P.C. § 626.9 (firearm in a vehicle within a "gun-free school zone") when a firearm was found in it. (*People v. Anson* (2002) 105 Cal.App.4th 22, 26-27.)

The same rule applies to a *houseboat* (*United States v. Hill* (10th Cir. 1988) 855 F.2nd 664, 668; *United States v. Albers* (9th Cir. 1998) 136 F.3rd 670.) and for a *trailer* used for residential purposes but hooked up to a vehicle and moved to a non-residential area. (*Garber v. Superior Court* (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 724; discussing whether the exceptions to the concealed and loaded firearms statutes applied to defendant's trailer that he lived in; holding that, under the circumstances, they did not.)

Bicycles ridden on public streets are like cars and can be searched without a warrant when there is probable cause to believe it contains contraband. (*People v. Allen* (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 445.)

The vehicle exception has been used with other types of vehicles, such as an *airplane*. (See *United States v. Rollins* (11th Cir. 1983) 699 F.2nd 530.)

Problem: Expanding the scope of the search beyond the purposes of the original cause for the traffic stop:

Having a drug-sniffing dog check the outside of a vehicle stopped for a traffic violation does not require any independent reasons for believing contraband is in the car in order to be lawful. The drug sniff is not a search, and thus does not implicate the **Fourth Amendment**. (*Illinois v. Caballes* (2005) 543 U.S. 405 [160 L.Ed.2nd 842], rejecting the argument that to do so "unjustifiably enlarge(s) the scope of a routine traffic stop into a drug investigation."

But, if the dog-sniff is conducted after the purposes of the traffic stop are completed, and thus during an unlawfully prolonged detention, then it is illegal and the resulting evidence will be suppressed. (*Rodriguez v. United States* (Apr. 21, 2015) __ U.S. __ [135 S.Ct. 1609; 191 L.Ed.2nd 492]; the dog's alert to the presence of drugs being seven to eight minutes after the purposes of the traffic stop had been completed.)

See “*Enlarging the Scope of the Original Detention*,” under “*Detentions*” (Chapter 3), above.

Evidence of Probable Cause: Probable cause to search a motor vehicle is established just as in any other case. (*People v. Carrillo* (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1662; defendant claiming no ownership interest in a vehicle when a registration check showed the vehicle to be registered to him, adds to the evidence needed to prove probable cause.)

An officer’s probable cause to believe that a person is in illegal possession of marijuana is not diminished just because the person produces a medical marijuana identification card or a physician’s authorization. (*People v. Strasburg* (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1052; defendant lawfully detained and his car lawfully searched despite producing a doctor’s authorization to use marijuana for medical purposes.)

See also *People v. Waxler* (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 712; holding that the odor of marijuana in a vehicle, with the plain sight observation of a marijuana pipe with what appeared to be a small amount of marijuana in the bowl, supplied probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle. The fact that possession of less than an ounce of marijuana is an infraction, or that the defendant has a marijuana card, is irrelevant.

However, when the probable cause evidence is something that was illegally seized itself, the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine dictates that that evidence may not be used as a part of the probable cause to search a vehicle. (*United States v. Job* (9th Cir. 2017) 871 F.3rd 852, 862-863; evidence discovered as a result of an illegal patdown used as probable cause to search the suspect’s vehicle.)

When the Vehicle Itself is Evidence of a Crime: Although there is not a lot of authority on the issue, and what authority there is tends to be a bit vague and inconsistent, it has been held that when the vehicle itself constitutes evidence of a crime, or is the instrumentality of a crime, rather than the “*mere container of evidence*,” seizure and a warrantless search of that vehicle is lawful. For instance:

It is lawful to make a warrantless seizure of a vehicle, found in any public area, when an officer has probable cause to believe that the vehicle itself is “*forfeitable contraband*.” (*Florida v. White* (1999) 526 U.S. 559 [143 L.Ed.2nd 748]; see also *Carroll v. United States* (1925) 267 U.S. 132, 150-151 [69 L.Ed. 543].)

Where the defendant's bloody shoeprint was observed on the floorboard of his vehicle, the vehicle itself was found to be evidence of the crime. (*People v. Griffin* (1988) 46 Cal.3rd 1011.)

When the vehicle was used to kidnap the victim, it was found to be the "instrumentality" of the crime of kidnapping. (*North v. Superior Court* (1972) 8 Cal.3rd 301.)

The vehicle in which the victim was shot was evidence of the crime. (*People v. Teale* (1969) 70 Cal.2nd 497.)

"[W]hen the police lawfully seize a car which is itself *evidence* of a crime rather than merely a container of incriminating articles, they may postpone searching it until arrival at a time and place in which the examination can be performed in accordance with sound scientific procedures." (*Id.*, at p. 508.)

When the defendant was arrested for committing lewd acts on children where it was suspected that he took pictures of his victims in his van, the van became evidence of the crime. (*People v. Rogers* (1978) 21 Cal.3rd 542.)

The California Supreme Court noted that this theory for justifying the warrantless seizure and search of a vehicle where the vehicle is itself evidence of, or the instrumentality of, a crime is *implicit* in a number of United States Supreme Court decisions as well. (*People v. Griffin, supra*, at p. 1025, citing *Cardwell v. Lewis* (1974) 417 U.S. 583, 592-593 [41 L.Ed.2d 325, 336]; *Coolidge v. New Hampshire* (1971) 403 U.S. 443, 464 [29 L.Ed.2d 564, 581-582]; *Cooper v. California* (1967) 386 U.S. 58 [17 L.Ed.2d 730]; *Carroll v. United States* (1925) 267 U.S. 132, 153, 156 [69 L.Ed. 543, 551, 552-553]; *United States v. Di Re* (1948) 332 U.S. 581, 586 [92 L.Ed. 210, 216].)

Where defendant, driving while intoxicated, crashed head-on into another vehicle, killing the other driver, defendant's vehicle was held to be the instrumentality of the charged offenses of involuntary manslaughter (**P.C. § 192(b)**), as a lesser included offense to an alleged second degree murder charge, and vehicular manslaughter with gross negligence while intoxicated (**P.C. § 191.5(a)**). (*People v. Diaz* (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 743, 755-757.)

The Court in *Diaz* rejected defendant's arguments that the "Evidence of a Crime" theory had been repudiated by subsequent

case law, such as *United States v. Jones* (2012) 565 U.S. 400 [132 S.Ct. 945; 181 L.Ed.2nd 911]; the GPS case. (*Ibid.*)

Query: When a vehicle has within it a “*false compartment*” (i.e., a “box, container, space or enclosure that is intended for use or designed for use to conceal, hide, or otherwise prevent discovery of any controlled substance within or attached to a vehicle, . . .” See *People v. Arias* (2008) 45 Cal.4th 169.), per H&S § 11366.8, is the vehicle itself “*evidence of a crime?*” No known case has yet to address this issue.

Inventory Searches and Impounding Vehicles: A lawfully impounded vehicle may be searched for the purpose of determining its condition and contents at the time of impounding, to avoid later disputes or false claims. Anything observed in the vehicle during the inventory search will be admissible in court. (*Florida v. Wells* (1990) 495 U.S. 1 [109 L.Ed.2nd 1].)

General Rule: Vehicle inventory searches are a well-defined exception to the **Fourth Amendment** warrant requirement. (*People v. Quick* (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1006, 1010; citing *Colorado v. Bertine* (1987) 479 U.S. 367, 371 [93 L.Ed.2nd 739; 107 S.Ct. 738].)

Evidence found during a lawful inventory search of a vehicle that is being impounded is admissible in court. (See *Harris v. United States* (1968) 390 U.S. 234 [19 L.Ed.2nd 1067].)

The impoundment of an automobile is a seizure within the meaning of the **Fourth Amendment**. (*United States v. Torres* (9th Cir. 2016) 828 F.3rd 1113, 1118 .)

However, there must be some evidence in the record that the vehicle was actually impounded. An arresting officer’s testimony that he searched the vehicle as a pre-impound inventory search, without any evidence to support the theory that the officers in fact intended to impound the vehicle, or that it was it was actually impounded, is insufficient to sustain the trial court’s conclusion that a warrantless search of the vehicle was a valid impound search. (*People v. Wallace* (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 82, 89-93.)

The “Standardized Procedures” Requirement:

Inventory searches are only proper if done according to “*standardized procedures*” used by the involved law enforcement agency. (*United States v. Torres* (9th Cir. 2016) 828 F.3rd 1113, 1118 .)

Such “*standardized procedures*” need not be formal or even in written form, so long as the searching officer is not allowed to act in his own “*unfettered discretion.*” (*People v. Needham* (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 260, 265; oral vehicle inventory search policy of sheriff’s department taught to deputies justified an inventory search of property on a motorcycle.)

It has been held that V.C. § 22651(p) and “*established department practices*” are enough to meet this requirement. (*People v. Benites* (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 309; *People v. Steeley* (1989) 210 Cal.App.3rd 887.)

The standard inventory procedures which prevail throughout the country and approved by an overwhelming majority of courts, if followed by the searching officers, will provide the standards necessary to make an inventory search legal. (*People v. Green* (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 367.)

The standardized criteria requirements, however, only relate to an inventory search. They were not intended to necessarily apply to an officer’s decision to impound the vehicle in the first place. Although an impoundment decision made pursuant to standardized criteria is more likely to satisfy the **Fourth Amendment** than one not made pursuant to standardized criteria, it is not legally necessary that that be the case. The reasonableness of impounding a vehicle based upon the circumstances is the test under the **Fourth Amendment**. (*People v. Shafrir* (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1238.)

Removal of the dashboard console was held to be beyond the scope of an inventory search of an impounded vehicle in that it was inconsistent with the Sheriff’s Department’s inventory search protocol. (*People v. Zabala* (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 335, 340-343; upholding the search instead on a theory of probable cause, under the “automobile exception.”)

Closed Containers: This includes *closed containers* in the vehicle (*South Dakota v. Opperman* (1976) 428 U.S. 364 [49 L.Ed.2nd 1000]; *People v. Salcero* (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 720.), at least if the department’s standardized procedures include closed containers. (*Florida v. Wells*, *supra*, citing *Colorado v. Bertine* (1987) 479 U.S. 367 [93 L.Ed.2nd 739].)

If containers are to be opened, the standardized procedures must cover that topic as well, so as to preclude the inventory search being used as a ruse for a general rummaging for any incriminatory

evidence. (*Florida v. Wells*, *supra*, at p. 4 [109 L.Ed.2nd at p. 6]; *People v. Williams* (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 138.)

See *People v. Nottoli* (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 531, 545-546, where the lack of any evidence as to the arresting officer's department's policies and procedures concerning the searching of containers, including cellphones, led to the finding that the cellphone in question could not be opened and searched as a part of the inventory search of a lawfully impounded vehicle.

Unless required by the officer's department inventory procedures, the officer is *not* required to allow a subject to remove personal items prior to conducting the inventory of an impounded vehicle. (*United States v. Penn* (9th Cir. 2000) 233 F.3rd 1111.)

Note: The evidence was suppressed in *Penn* in an unpublished decision on remand and after rehearing, based upon evidence that the officer opened and looked into a closed container in violation of his department's written inventory procedures. (2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19649.)

In a prosecution for being a felon in unlawful possession of a firearm, an officer's decision to impound defendant's vehicle after arresting him for driving while under the influence of alcohol, and when the car was parked near a red zone in a parking structure of an apartment complex in which defendant did not live, was permissible under the **Fourth Amendment** because it was consistent with his police department's policy and served legitimate community caretaking purposes; i.e., to promote other vehicles' convenient ingress and egress to the parking area and to safeguard the car from vandalism or theft. The inventory search of defendant's vehicle, including the air filter compartment of the vehicle, was also proper under the **Fourth Amendment** because, in fulfilling his duty to search all containers pursuant to department policy, the officer acted within the parameters of that policy when he unlatched the air filter compartment where he found a firearm. (*United States v. Torres* (9th Cir. 2016) 828 F.3rd 1113, 1122.)

Pretext Impounds: The impounding of a vehicle done merely as a *pretext* for conducting an investigatory search is not lawful, and the resulting evidence will be suppressed. (*People v. Aguilar* (1991) 228 Cal.App.3rd 1049.)

"[A]n inventory search must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence." (*United States v. Torres* (9th Cir. 2016) 828 F.3rd 1113, 1118, quoting *Florida v. Wells* (1990) 495 U.S. 1, 4 [109 L.Ed.2nd 1].)

See also *People v. Valenzuela* (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1202; noting that the rule allowing a "pretext" stop under *Whren v. United States* (1996) 517 U.S. 806 [135 L.Ed.2nd 89] is inapplicable to stops or detentions when the legal excuse is to conduct an "administrative search," such as inspecting the licensing of a taxicab or an *inventory search* of a vehicle.

The sole legal basis for doing inventory searches is to (1) protect the owner's property while it is in police custody, (2) insure against claims of lost, stolen or vandalized property, or (3) protect the police from danger. (*South Dakota v. Opperman* (1976) 428 U.S. 364 [49 L.Ed.2nd 1000].)

Using an inventory search of a vehicle as a "ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence" is not a legal justification, or at least can't be the only reason why a car is searched. (*Florida v. Wells* (1990) 495 U.S. 1 [109 L.Ed.2nd 1]; *People v. Williams* (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 126.)

Note: Officers *must* be familiar with their own department's policies for doing vehicle inventory searches and be prepared to testify to the correct factual justifications for conducting such a search.

Impounding a vehicle for the purpose of allowing the officer to do an inventory search of the vehicle in the hopes of finding narcotics-related evidence, when none of the "community caretaking function" elements apply, is illegal. While stopping the vehicle may be for an ulterior purpose, so long as there is also an objectively reasonable basis for doing so (e.g., seeing a traffic violation), the officer's subjective motivations *are* in issue when evaluating the legality of impounding the vehicle and conducting an inventory search. (*People v. Torres* (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 775, 785-793; impoundment and inventory search held to be illegal when the officer admitted that his purpose was to look for narcotics-related evidence.)

The seizure and subsequent inventory search of defendant's car was held not to be justified by the community caretaking exception to the **Fourth Amendment's** warrant requirement. Under the

community caretaking exception, police officers may impound vehicles that jeopardize public safety and the efficient movement of traffic. Neither officer provided testimony that defendant's car was parked illegally, posed a safety hazard, nor was vulnerable to vandalism or theft. Although defendant's car was not located close to his home when the officers impounded it, there was no evidence that it would have been vulnerable to vandalism or theft if it were left in its residential location or that it posed a safety hazard. The court concluded that seizure and inventory search of defendant's car was a pretext for an investigatory search for evidence of narcotics trafficking. (*United States v. Cervantes* (9th Cir. 2012) 703 F.3rd 1135, 1140-1143.)

Note, however, the dissent's argument that the Court should "*necessarily*" find that a vehicle left in any public place might be easily subject to vandalism or theft, citing *Ramirez v. City of Buena Park* (9th Cir. 2009) 560 F.3rd 1012, 1025. (*United States v. Cervantes, supra*, at p. 1144.)

There must be some evidence in the record that the vehicle was actually impounded. An arresting officer's testimony that he searched the vehicle as a pre-impound inventory search, without any evidence to support the theory that the officers in fact intended to impound the vehicle, or that it was actually impounded, is insufficient to sustain the trial court's conclusion that a warrantless search of the vehicle was a valid impound search. (*People v. Wallace* (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 82, 89-93.)

The "Community Caretaking Doctrine:"

Under the "Community Caretaking Doctrine," police may, without a warrant, impound and search a vehicle so long as they do so in conformance with the standardized procedures of the local police department and in furtherance of a community caretaking purpose. (*People v. Quick* (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1006, 1010; citing *People v. Williams* (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 756, 761-762.)

“The authority of police to seize and remove from the streets vehicles impeding traffic or threatening public safety and convenience is beyond challenge.” (*South Dakota v. Opperman* (1976) 428 U.S. 364, 369 [49 L. Ed. 2nd 1000, 96 S. Ct. 3092].) A vehicle impound search will be upheld if it is reasonable under all the circumstances.

(*People v. Shafrir* (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1247 . . .)”
(*People v. Quick*, *supra.*)

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal has ruled that impounding a vehicle can be justified under the “*Community Caretaker Doctrine*” whenever such vehicle may impede traffic, threaten public safety, or be subject to vandalism. (*United States v. Jensen* (9th Cir. 2005) 425 F.3rd 698, 706; *United States v. Torres* (9th Cir. 2016) 828 F.3rd 1113, 1118.)

In a prosecution for being a felon in unlawful possession of a firearm, an officer’s decision to impound defendant’s vehicle after arresting him for driving while under the influence of alcohol, and when the car was parked near a red zone in a parking structure of an apartment complex in which defendant did not live, was permissible under the **Fourth Amendment** because it was consistent with his police department’s policy and served legitimate community caretaking purposes; i.e., to promote other vehicles’ convenient ingress and egress to the parking area and to safeguard the car from vandalism or theft. The inventory search of defendant’s vehicle was also proper under the **Fourth Amendment** because, in fulfilling his duty to search all containers pursuant to department policy, the officer acted within the parameters of that policy when he unlatched the air filter compartment where he found a firearm. (*United States v. Torres* (9th Cir. 2016) 828 F.3rd 1113, 1118-1123.)

However, the Ninth Circuit has also held that a statute allowing for the pre-court-hearing impounding of a vehicle may be in violation of the **Fourth Amendment** absent a legitimate need to prevent it from again being driven illegally, from creating a hazard to others drivers, or being a target for vandalism. (*Miranda v. City of Cornelius* (9th Cir. 2005) 429 F.3rd 858; driver driving without a license.)

The mere fact that its driver is cited or even physically arrested does not necessarily implicate the “*community caretaking doctrine.*” (*Ibid.*)

On the issue of whether the officer has a duty to make sure the unlicensed driver doesn’t continue to illegally drive the car, the Court noted that “the need to deter a driver’s unlawful conduct is by itself

insufficient to justify a tow under the ‘caretaker’ rationale.” However, the rule is otherwise (thus allowing for a tow) where it can be proved that “the driver is unable to remove the vehicle from a public location without continuing its illegal operation.” (*Id.* at pp. 865-866.)

Where the defendant has been physically arrested and taken to jail, impounding the car to prevent him from continuing the offense is unlawful. (*United States v. Caseres* (9th Cir. 2008) 533 F.3rd 1064, 2074-1075; see also *People v. Torres* (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 775, 792, indicating that believing defendant may repeat his offense of driving without a valid license is *never* grounds for impounding his car.)

California is now in accord with the rule as set down in *Miranda v. City of Cornelius*. (*People v. Williams* (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 756; impounding the car, per V.C. § 22651(h)(1), subsequent to the driver’s arrest on an outstanding warrant.)

See also *Quezada v. City of Los Angeles* (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 993, 1008: “As part of their “community caretaking functions,” police officers may constitutionally impound vehicles that ‘jeopardize . . . public safety and the efficient movement of vehicular traffic.’ [Citation.] Whether ‘impoundment is warranted under this community caretaking doctrine depends on the location of the vehicle and the police officers’ duty to prevent it from creating a hazard to other drivers or being a target for vandalism or theft.’ [Citation.]” (quoting *Williams*, at p. 761.)

Towing and impounding a vehicle merely because it is illegally parked, without prior notice to the vehicle’s owner and a pre-seizure hearing, absent an exigency requiring immediate action (such as in an emergency, where notice would defeat the entire point of the seizure, or where the interests at stake are small relative to the burden that giving notice would impose; e.g., the car is parked in the path of traffic, blocking a driveway, obstructing a fire lane, or appears to be abandoned, or where there is no current

registration stickers and there's no guarantee the owner won't move or hide the vehicle instead of paying the fine for illegal parking), is a **Fourteenth Amendment** due process violation despite statutes allowing for the towing, and may generate some civil liability for the police. (*Clement v. City of Glendale* (9th Cir. 2008) 518 F.3rd 1090; an unregistered vehicle with a "planned non-operation (PNO) certificate" filed, parked in a publicly accessible parking lot in violation of **V.C. § 22651(o)**.)

But, at least one federal trial court has upheld the impounding of a vehicle, per **V.C. § 22651(o)(1)**, which had an out-of-date registration of over six months. (*United States v. McCartney* (E.D. Cal. 2008) 550 F.Supp.2d 1215, 1225.)

V.C. § 22651(b) provides that a peace officer may remove a vehicle: "When a vehicle is parked or left standing upon a highway in a position so as to obstruct the normal movement of traffic or in a condition so as to create a hazard to other traffic upon the highway," and is grounds under the Community Caretaking Doctrine to impound a vehicle. (*People v. Quick* (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1006, 1010-1011.)

V.C. § 22651(h)(1) authorizes the impounding of a vehicle "(w)hen an officer arrests any person driving or in control of a vehicle for an alleged offense" and takes that person into custody." However, impounding a vehicle under authority of this section is constitutional only if impoundment serves some "*community caretaking function*." Whether or not the community caretaking function justifies the impounding of a vehicle depends upon the location of the vehicle and the police officer's duty to prevent it from creating a hazard to other drivers or from being a target for vandalism or theft. When it was found that an arrested defendant's vehicle was lawfully parked only two houses down from his own home, impounding it was held to be illegal. (*United States v. Caseres* (9th Cir. 2008) 533 F.3rd 1064, 1074-1075; see also *People v. Quick*, *People v. Quick*, *supra*.)

Impounding a vehicle pursuant to **V.C. § 22651(p)**, when neither the driver nor the passenger could (or would)

produce a valid driver's license, was held to be lawful. (*People v. Hoyos* (2007) 41 Cal.4th 872, 892.)

Note: The “Community Caretaking Doctrine” was not raised in this case.

A police department has discretion to establish guidelines that would allow an impounded vehicle to be released in less than 30 days, under V.C. § **22651(p)**, in situations where a fixed 30-day statutory impoundment period, under V.C. § **14602.6(a)(1)**, may also potentially apply. (95 *Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen* 1 (2012).)

Impounding a vehicle where the driver was driving on a suspended license, with a Washington state statute allowing for the impoundment of the car where the driver has been cited once before for the same, was assumed to be lawful (without discussing the issue) when the car was on a freeway (Interstate 5), defendant was going to jail, and no one else was available to take possession of the car. (*United States v. Ruckes* (9th Cir. 2009) 586 F.3rd 713, 719.)

The decision to impound a vehicle following an arrest when made pursuant to standardized departmental criteria is more likely to satisfy the **Fourth Amendment** than one *not* made pursuant to such criteria. However, it is not legally necessary that that be the case. The reasonableness of impounding a vehicle based upon the circumstances is the test under the **Fourth Amendment**. (*People v. Shafrir* (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1238; defendant's newer Mercedes lawfully impounded following his arrest for DUI because, in the officers' opinions, the car would not be safe if left at the site of the arrest.)

Impounding a vehicle for the purpose of allowing the officer to do an inventory search of the vehicle in the hopes of finding narcotics-related evidence, when none of the “community caretaking function” elements apply, is illegal. While stopping the vehicle may be for an ulterior purpose, so long as there is also an objectively reasonable basis for doing so (e.g., seeing a traffic violation), the officer's subjective motivations *are* in issue when evaluating the legality of impounding the vehicle and conducting an

inventory search. (*People v. Torres* (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 775, 785-793; impoundment and inventory search held to be illegal when the officer admitted that his purpose was to look for narcotics-related evidence.)

Doing an inventory search of a vehicle under the theory that it is to be impounded, absent any evidence that any of the “community caretaking” factors apply (i.e., ; it is abandoned, impeding traffic, or threatening public safety or convenience), is unlawful, particularly in light of the fact that the defendant told the officer that he had a friend who could come out and retrieve his vehicle. (*United States v. Maddox* (9th Cir. 2010) 614 F.3rd 1046, 1049-1050.)

The seizure and subsequent inventory search of defendant’s car was held *not* to be justified by the community caretaking exception to the **Fourth Amendment’s** warrant requirement. Under the community caretaking exception, police officers may impound vehicles that jeopardize public safety and the efficient movement of traffic. Neither officer provided testimony that defendant’s car was parked illegally, posed a safety hazard, or was vulnerable to vandalism or theft. Although defendant’s car was not located close to his home when the officers impounded it, there was no evidence that it would have been vulnerable to vandalism or theft if it were left in its residential location or that it posed a safety hazard. Also, the court concluded that seizure and inventory search of defendant’s car was a pretext for an investigatory search for evidence of narcotics trafficking. (*United States v. Cervantes* (9th Cir. 2012) 703 F.3rd 1135, 1140-1143.)

Impounding of a vehicle upon arrest of its driver for DUI, where the passenger could not be verified as the car’s lawful owner and wasn’t licensed anyway, and when the car was parked in a private parking structure for an apartment building where neither the defendant nor the passenger lived, and the car was at a red curb where it could interfere with the ingress and egress of other cars and impede access by emergency vehicles, was held to be within the requirements of the community caretaking doctrine. (*United States v. Torres* (9th Cir. July 14, 2016) 828 F.3rd 1113, 1118-1120.)

The **Fourth Amendment** did not require suppression of evidence from an inventory search of defendant's vehicle because the trial court found that the vehicle was blocking a driveway and parked far enough out in the roadway to create a traffic hazard and that the inventory search was pursuant to established police policy. (*People v. Quick* (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1006, 1010-1011.)

When Alternatives to Impounding a Vehicle are Available:

An inventory search incident to impoundment was reasonable even though defendant could have made other arrangements for the safekeeping of his property. “[T]he real question is not what ‘could have been achieved,’ but whether the **Fourth Amendment** requires such steps The reasonableness of any particular governmental activity does not necessarily or invariably turn on the existence of alternative ‘less intrusive’ means.” (*Colorado v. Bertine* (1987) 479 U.S. 367, 373-374 [93 L.Ed.2nd 739]; quoting *Illinois v. Lafayette* (1983) 462 U.S. 640, 647 [77 L.Ed.2nd 65].)

“(T)he **Fourth Amendment** (does not compel) officers to exhaust alternatives before they may impound a vehicle. (Citation)” (*United States v. Torres* (9th Cir. 2016) 828 F.3rd 1113, 1119, fn. 2; where defendant complained that the officers did not offer her the option of having someone else come to take control of the vehicle.)

“[T]he police had no **Fourth Amendment** obligation to offer the driver an opportunity to avoid impoundment.” (*United States v. Penn* (9th Cir. 2000) 233 F.3rd 1111, 1116.)

V.C. § 14602.6(a)(1): *Driving on a Suspended License (or Never Had a License), per V.C. § 14601.1 (or V.C. § 12500):* The authority to impound a vehicle and hold it for 30 days, per **V.C. § 14602.6(a)(1)**, when a person is arrested for driving on a suspended license or never had a license, including when the vehicle has been in an accident, is a discretionary act by law enforcement and does not generate civil liability when the vehicle is not held for 30 days. (*California Highway Patrol v. Superior Court [Walker]* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1144.)

Use of **V.C. §§ 14602.6** and **22852** to impound vehicles and hold them for 30 days, with the provisions for a post-seizure administrative hearing within two days of a request from the vehicle's owner to determine whether the impound was proper and the existence of any mitigating factors, was held to be lawful and not a violation of equal protection, due process, or the **Fourth**

Amendment's search and seizure requirements. (*Alviso v. Sonoma County Sheriff's Department et al.* (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 198.)

Note: The initial impound of the vehicle was not contested, eliminating any need to discuss the possible applicability of the rules on law enforcement's "community caretaking" function. (*Id.*, at p. 214.)

A police department has discretion to establish guidelines that would allow an impounded vehicle to be released in less than 30 days, under **V.C. § 22651(p)**, in situations where a fixed 30-day statutory impoundment period, under **V.C. § 14602.6(a)(1)**, may also potentially apply. (95 *Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen* 1 (2012).)

A police department's policy regarding impounding vehicles, which sought to implement **V.C. §§ 14602.6 and 14607.6** is within the wide discretion of the police chief because it neither creates new law nor conflicts with existing law but, rather, simply implemented existing law. The "Police Protective League" is without standing to challenge such a policy where the policy does not conflict with the **Vehicle Code**. (*Los Angeles Police Protective League v. City of Los Angeles* (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 907.)

Note: **V.C. § 14607.6** deals with forfeiture as a nuisance of a motor vehicle if it is driven on a highway by a driver with a suspended or revoked license, or by an unlicensed driver, who is a registered owner of the vehicle at the time of impoundment and has a previous misdemeanor conviction for a violation of **V.C. §§ 12500(a), 14601, 14601.1, 14601.2, 14601.3, 14601.4, or 14601.5**.

Holding onto an impounded vehicle for 30 days, under authority of **V.C. § 14602.6(a)**, is an unlawful seizure under the **Fourth Amendment** absent the establishment of some legal justification for the vehicle's continued seizure. (*Brewster v. Beck* (9th Cir. 2017) 859 F.3rd 1194, 1196-1197.)

Specifically left undecided, the issues having been conceded by the parties, was the legality of the

initial impound under the **Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment** due process clauses, and the applicability of the “Community Caretaking” theory to the driver being unlicensed.

But see *United States v. Cervantes* (9th Cir. 2012) 703 F.3rd 1135, where it was held that impounding a vehicle when the defendant did not have a valid license, pursuant to **V.C. §§ 12500(a), 14602.6(a)(1), and 22651(h)(1)**, violated the “Community Caretaking” rules in that defendant had pulled over to the curb and legally parked his car when stopped. The fact that defendant’s car was not located close to his home was held to be of minor importance. (pp. 1140-1143.)

Note: This section is used by some as authority to cite the unlicensed driver of a motor vehicle even though the driving occurred in other than in the officer’s presence. No case yet discusses the validity of this theory.

Impounding a Vehicle Used for Prostitution, per Local Ordinance:

The California Supreme Court has ruled that a local ordinance that purports to allow for the seizure and forfeiture of a motor vehicle used for purposes of prostitution or to acquire any controlled substance has been preempted by state law and therefore unenforceable. (*O’Connell v. City of Stockton* (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1061.)

However, see **V.C. § 22659.6**, below, authorizing such a local ordinance, at least in three cities, in a pilot project.

V.C. § 22659.6: Effective January 1, 2018, the California Legislature enacted the following pilot program:

(a) Notwithstanding any other law, the Cities of Los Angeles, Oakland, and Sacramento may each adopt an ordinance to conduct a 24-month pilot program in which law enforcement officers of the city may, pursuant to a valid arrest, remove a vehicle used in the commission, or attempted commission, of pimping in violation of **P.C. § 266h**, pandering in violation of **P.C. § 266i**, or solicitation of prostitution in violation of **P.C. § 647(b)(2)** or **(3)**.

(b) If either city elects to implement the pilot program described in **subdivision (a)**, it shall do *all* of the following:

(1) Offer a diversion program to prostitutes cited or arrested in the course of the pilot program.

(2) Authorize the removal of a vehicle only if the individual committing, or attempting to commit, a crime described in **subdivision (a)** is the sole registered owner of the vehicle. If that individual is not the sole registered owner, the other registered owner or owners of the vehicle shall be provided an opportunity to take possession of the vehicle.

(3) Reimburse an individual for the costs associated with towing and impounding the vehicle if he or she is not found guilty of the crime for which the vehicle was impounded or if the charge of committing, or attempting to commit, the crime for which the vehicle was impounded was dismissed.

(c)

(1) Within six months of the completion of the pilot program described in **subdivision (a)**, each of the participating cities shall issue a report that describes, at a minimum, all of the following:

(A) The number of individuals cited, and the number of individuals arrested, during the pilot program for the commission, or attempted commission, of a crime described in **subdivision (a)**.

(B) The number of vehicles towed during the pilot program because they were used in the commission, or attempted commission, of a crime described in **subdivision (a)**.

(C) The number of minor victims of a crime described in **subdivision (a)** that law enforcement encountered during the course of the pilot program.

(D) Whether the implementation of the pilot program impacted the number of citations or arrests for commission, or attempted commission, of a crime described in **subdivision (a)**.

(2)

(A) The report described in **paragraph (1)** shall be submitted to the Legislature, including the Chairs of the Senate and Assembly Committees on Public Safety, the Senate President pro Tempore, and the Speaker of the Assembly, and to the Governor and Attorney General.

(B) A report to be submitted pursuant to **subparagraph (A)** shall be submitted in compliance with **Gov't. Code § 9795**.

(d) An ordinance adopted pursuant to this section shall contain, but not be limited to, the following provisions:

(1) At the time of arrest, the person shall be notified that his or her vehicle will be towed and given information on how the vehicle may be retrieved.

(2) The registered owner or his or her agent may retrieve the vehicle at any time.

(3) The registered owner or his or her agent is responsible for all towing and storage fees related to the seizure of a vehicle pursuant to this section.

(4) If a vehicle is not claimed by the registered owner within 30 days and the legal owner is a motor vehicle dealer, bank, credit union, acceptance corporation, or other licensed financial institution legally operating in this state, or is another person who is not the registered owner but holds a security interest in the vehicle, the legal owner shall be given notice that the car has been seized and shall be given an opportunity to retrieve the vehicle. The

vehicle shall be released to the legal owner upon payment of all towing and storage fees due.

(e) This section shall not be construed to limit the authority of any peace officer to impound a vehicle pursuant to any applicable provision of this code.

(f) This section shall remain in effect only until January 1, 2022, and as of that date is repealed.

V.C. § 2814.2: *Impoundment of a Vehicle at a Sobriety Checkpoint:*

Subd. (a): A driver of a motor vehicle who fails to stop and submit to a sobriety checkpoint inspection conducted by a law enforcement agency when signs and displays are posted requiring that stop is guilty of an infraction.

Subd. (b): Impoundment of a vehicle at a sobriety checkpoint is prohibited if the driver's only offense is a violation of **V.C. § 12500** (driving without a valid license).

Subd. (c): Requires a law enforcement officer, in the case of a driver who is in violation of **V.C. § 12500**, to make a reasonable attempt to identify the registered owner of the vehicle and release the vehicle to him or her if licensed, or to a licensed driver authorized by the registered owner. If a notice to appear is issued to the unlicensed driver, the name and driver's license number of the licensed driver to whom the car is released shall be listed on the officer's copy of the notice. When a vehicle cannot be released, it shall be *removed* pursuant to **V.C. § 22651(p)**, whether or not a notice to appear is issued.

V.C. § 14602: A vehicle removed pursuant to this section shall be released to the registered owner or his or her agent at any time the facility to which the vehicle has been removed is open, upon presentation of the registered owner's or his or her agent's valid driver's license and proof of current vehicle registration.

A police department has discretion to establish guidelines that would allow an impounded vehicle to be released in less than 30 days, under **V.C. § 22651(p)**, in situations where a fixed 30-day statutory impoundment period, under **V.C. § 14602.6(a)(1)**, may also potentially apply. (95 *Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen* 1 (2012).)

The “Patdown” (or “Protective Search”) of a Vehicle for Weapons:

General Rule: Whenever, during a lawful contact with an individual, an officer develops a “*reasonable belief*,” based on specific articulable facts, that the suspect’s vehicle may contain a weapon, anywhere within the passenger area of that vehicle that a weapon may reasonably be expected to be found may be checked for that purpose. (*Michigan v. Long* (1983) 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 [77 L.Ed.2nd 1201, 1220].)

Anything else seen in plain sight during such a check for weapons is admissible in court. (See “*Plain Sight Observations*,” above)

Examples:

Observation of a knife in the vehicle in plain sight during a traffic stop, whether the knife is legal or not, justifies a search of the vehicle for additional weapons. (*People v. Lafitte* (1989) 211 Cal.App.3rd 1429.)

Contact of two people in a car behind a 24-hour market, in a dark area, with knowledge that one of the suspects was recently arrested for a weapons offense, justifies a search of the vehicle for weapons. (*People v. Brueckner* (1990) 223 Cal.App.3rd 1500.)

Observation of a passenger reaching under the seat (i.e., a “*furtive movement*”) and the sound of metal hitting metal justifies checking under that seat for weapons. (*People v. King* (1990) 216 Cal.App.3rd 1237.)

An officer may constitutionally search the compartments of a vehicle upon a “*reasonable belief*” that “the suspect poses a roadside danger” arising from “the possible presence of weapons in the area surrounding a suspect.” (*People v. Bush* (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1048; based upon six-year-old information that the person stopped was a kick-boxer and had a history of violence.)

Checking the passenger area of vehicle for firearms based upon a “*reasonable suspicion*,” which came as a result of an identified citizen’s report to law enforcement, enhanced by the driver’s lack of cooperation, that the occupants may have guns, held to be lawful. (*Haynie v. County of Los Angeles* (9th Cir. 2003) 339 F.3rd 1071.)

Based upon anonymous information that defendant was sitting in his vehicle with a handgun, such information being sufficiently

corroborated to amount to a reasonable suspicion, the detention of the defendant and other passengers and a search of the vehicle for the gun was legally justified. (*People v. Dolly* (2007) 40 Cal.4th 458.)

But, searching a vehicle for weapons, despite the driver's attempt to evade the officer by making a couple of quick turns and hiding in the dark, is illegal absent specific and articulable reasons to believe that the driver is dangerous or that he might gain immediate control of a weapon. (*Liberal v. Estrada* (9th Cir. 2011) 632 F.3rd 1064, 1083-1084.)

It is irrelevant that the subject has already been removed from the vehicle. The courts feel that the subject may break away from police control, or may be permitted to reenter the vehicle and retrieve a weapon before the "*Terry*" investigation is over. (*Michigan v. Long*, *supra*, at pp. 1051-2052 [77 L.Ed.2nd at p. 1221].)

Referring to *Terry v. Ohio* (1968) 392 U.S. 1 [20 L.Ed.2nd 889].)

See also *McHam v. State of South Carolina* (2013) 746 S.E. 2nd 41, where the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the opening of the defendant's car door by a state trooper during a lawful traffic stop as the vehicle's passengers were rummaging around in the vehicle, ostensibly looking for the vehicle's registration and proof of insurance. When the door was opened, contraband was observed in plain sight. While opening the door was ruled to be a search, it was justified due to the officer's reasonable safety concerns.

Statutory Automobile Inspections:

V.C. § 2805(a):

Elements:

Any law enforcement officer who is member of:

- The California Highway Patrol;
- A city police department;
- A county sheriff's office; *or*
- A district attorney's office as an investigator;

Whose primary responsibility is to conduct vehicle theft inspections;

For the purpose of locating stolen vehicles;

May inspect:

- Any vehicle of a type required to be registered under the Vehicle Code; *or*
- Any identifiable vehicle component thereof;

When found on a highway; or at any public:

- Garage;
- Repair shop;
- Terminal;
- Parking lot;
- New or used car lot;
- Automobile dismantler's lot;
- Vehicle shredding facility;
- Vehicle leasing or rental lot;
- Vehicle equipment rental yard;
- Vehicle storage pool; *or*
- Other similar establishment; *or*

Any agricultural or construction work location where work is being actively performed;

May inspect the *title* and *registration* of such vehicles;

In order to establish, as to that vehicle or identifiable vehicle component, the rightful:

- Ownership; *or*
- Possession.

V.C. § 2805(b):

Elements:

Provides the same authority to inspect:

The following equipment:

- Implements of husbandry;

- Special construction equipment;
- Forklifts;
- Special Mobile equipment;

When at:

The places listed in **subd. (a)** (above); *or*

Upon a highway either while:

- Incidentally operated; *or*
- Being transported.

Note: **Subd. (c)** provides that, whenever possible, such inspections shall be conducted at *a time and in a manner* so as to minimize any interference with, or delay of, business operations.

Penalties for Refusal to Comply:

Refusing to comply with an officer's request to conduct a lawful search pursuant to **P.C. § 2805(a)** or **(b)** is a *misdemeanor*. (See **V.C. § 2800(a)** and **P.C. § 148(a)(1)**; and *People v. Woolsey* (1979) 90 Cal.App.3rd 994, 1000, 1001, fn. 3)

Relevant Definitions:

Identifiable Vehicle Component: Any component which can be distinguished from other similar components by a serial number or other unique distinguishing number, sign, or symbol. (**V.C. § 2805(a)**)

Garage: A building or other place wherein the business of storing or safekeeping vehicles of a type required to be registered under this code and which belong to members of the general public is conducted for compensation. (**V.C. § 340**)

Repair Shop: A place where vehicles subject to registration under this code are repaired, rebuilt, reconditioned, repainted, or in any way maintained for the public at a charge. (**V.C. § 510**)

Terminal: A place where a vehicle of a type listed in **V.C. § 34500** is regularly garaged or maintained, or from which the vehicle is operated or dispatched. (**V.C. § 595**)

(Note: **Section 34500** lists “*motortrucks*,” “*truck tractors*,” “*buses*,” large trailers, and similar large vehicles.)

Automobile Dismantler: Any person (not excluded by **V.C. § 221**) who is engaged in the business of buying, selling, or dealing in vehicles of a type required to be registered under this code, including nonrepairable vehicles, for the purpose of dismantling the vehicles, who buys or sells the integral parts and component materials thereof, in whole or in part, or deals in used motor vehicle parts. (**V.C. § 220**; see this section and **§ 221** for exceptions.)

Case Law:

The section has been held to be constitutional. (*People v. Calvert* (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1820, 1831-1834; *People v. Woolsey* (1979) 90 Cal.App.3rd 994, 1001-1002; *Solander v. Municipal Court* (1975) 45 Cal.App.3rd 664, 667.)

However, there are *limitations*: **Section 2805** *does not* authorize the warrantless search of property *not* being used for commercial purposes or otherwise open to the public. (*People v. Roman* (1991) 227 Cal.App.3rd 674; *People v. Calvert, supra*, at pp. 1828-1829.)

Such a warrantless “*search*” is justified as an administrative search of a “*closely regulated business*,” and must be done in a reasonable manner. (*People v. Potter* (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 611; see also *People v. Lopez* (1981) 116 Cal.App.3rd 600.) (See “*Closely Regulated Businesses or Activities*,” under “*Warrantless Searches*,” above.)

“The regulatory scheme authorizing warrantless inspections must meet three requirements: (1) the scheme must serve a substantial government interest; (2) the warrantless inspections must be necessary to further the regulatory scheme; and (3) the inspection program “must perform the two basic functions of a warrant: it must advise the owner of the commercial premises that the search is being made pursuant to the law and has a properly defined scope, and it must limit the discretion of the inspecting officers.” (*People v. Potter, supra*, at p. 619; citing (*New York v. Burger* (1987) 482 U.S. 691, 702-703 [96 L.Ed.2nd 601].)

However, see *People v. Turner* (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 182, where **V.C. § 2805** was cited by the California Supreme Court as authority for an officer to check an already lawfully stopped vehicle, in an other-than-commercial context, for its registration.

The **Fourth Amendment** prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures applies to commercial premises as well as private homes. (*New York v. Burger* (1987) 482 U.S. 691, 699 [96 L.Ed.2nd 601, 612]; *People v. Doty* (1985) 165 Cal.App.3rd 1060, 1066.)

However, a Legislature may enact statutes authorizing warrantless *administrative* searches of commercial property without violating the **Fourth Amendment**. (*Donovan v. Dewey* (1981) 452 U.S. 594, 598-599 [69 L.Ed.2nd 262, 268-269]; *People v. Paulson* (1990) 216 Cal.App.3rd 1480, 1483-1484.)

V.C. § 2805 has been held to meet the standards for a “*closely regulated business*,” and thus have a relaxed search and seizure standard. (*People v. Calvert* (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1820; *People v. Woolsey* (1979) 90 Cal.App.3rd 994.)

An auto repair garage may be subjected to a warrantless search by auto theft detectives under authority of **V.C. § 2805**, whether or not the business is open to the public. (*People v. Potter* (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 611.)

Such a statute is constitutional under the **Fourth Amendment** if it serves a substantial governmental interest, the warrantless search is done to further the statutory scheme, and the inspection program serves the two basic functions of a search warrant; i.e., giving the owner notice that the search is being made pursuant to law and limiting the scope of the search. **Section 2805** meets these requirements. (*Ibid.*)

Note: Commercial vehicles may be constitutionally subjected to warrantless administrative inspections under the **Fourth Amendment**, commercial trucking being a “*pervasively regulated industry*” under the criteria as set out in *New York v. Burger*, *supra*. (*United States v. Delgado* (9th Cir. 2008) 545 F.3rd 1195; upholding a Missouri statute allowing for such inspections.)

Use of Force: And should the owner/occupant of the business refuse, he or she is subject to arrest, however, forcible entry of the business is not

lawful. An administrative search warrant should be obtained. (See *People v. Woolsey*, *supra*, at p. 1004; (*Colonade Catering Corp. v. United States* (1970) 397 U.S. 72, 74, 77 [25 L.Ed.2nd 60, 63-65].)

Non-commercial property: **Section 2805** does *not* authorize the warrantless search of property not being used for commercial purposes or is otherwise open to the public. (*People v. Roman* (1991) 227 Cal.App.3rd 674; *People v. Calvert* (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1820, 1828-1829.)

Statutory Automobile Searches:

V.C. § 9951(c)(2): Downloading the Contents of an “*Event Data Recorder*” (i.e., “*EDR*”):

Court Order Requirement: A court order is required for law enforcement to retrieve data from a “*Event Data Recorder*” (“*EDR*”), which is a part of a “*Sensing and Diagnostic Module*” (“*SDM*”), also known as a “*Black Box*.”

But see *People v. Christmann* (Just. Ct. 2004) 3 Misc. 3rd 309, 314 [776 N.Y.S.2nd 437]; holding that downloading data from the SDM *does not* require a search warrant.

See *People v. Diaz* (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 743, at p. 746, fn. 2, for a complete physical description of an “*EDR*” and “*SDM*.”

Subd. (b) “*Recording Device*,” *Defined*: As used in this section, “*recording device*” means a device that is installed by the manufacturer of the vehicle and does one or more of the following, for the purpose of retrieving data after an accident:

- (1) Records how fast and in which direction the motor vehicle is traveling.
- (2) Records a history of where the motor vehicle travels.
- (3) Records steering performance.
- (4) Records brake performance, including, but not limited to, whether brakes were applied before an accident.
- (5) Records the driver's seatbelt status.
- (6) Has the ability to transmit information concerning an accident in which the motor vehicle has been involved to a central communications system when an accident occurs.

Subd. (d): *Information Retrieved for Diagnostic Purposes*: Information retrieved by a motor vehicle dealer or automotive

technician for diagnostic purposes, as allowed under **subd. (c)(3)** or **(4)**, may not be released to law enforcement.

Subd. (f): Vehicles Manufactured After July 1, 2004, Only: By its own terms, **section 9951** applies only to “motor vehicles manufactured on or after July 1, 2004.” (**Subd. (f)**)

Case Law:

People v. Diaz (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 743: The warrantless retrieval of data from an SDM from a lawfully seized vehicle where there is probable cause to believe it was driven with the driver under the influence, resulting in a vehicular manslaughter, is lawful as:

- (1) A search based upon probable cause (***Id.***, at 753-754);
- (2) The vehicle being the instrumentality of a crime (***Id.***, at pp. 754-757); and
- (3) There being no reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the SDM (***Id.***, at pp. 757-758.)

Violating the court order requirements of the section (i.e., failing to get a search warrant) does not require suppression of the retrieved data in that suppression is not required by the **United States Constitution**. (***People v. Xinos*** (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 637, 653-654 [review denied and case depublished May 18, 2011].)

See also ***People v. Christmann*** (Just. Ct. 2004) 3 Misc. 3rd 309, 314 [776 N.Y.S.2nd 437]; downloading data from the SDM *does not* require a search warrant.

In order to invoke the provisions of this section, a criminal defendant must show that she was prejudiced by the warrantless downloading of the data from the SDM, under the standards as provided for in ***People v. Watson*** (1956) 46 Cal.2nd 818, 836. (See ***People v. Diaz***, *supra*, at p. 760.)

I.e.: “(W)hether the error has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” (***People v. Watson***, *supra*.)

In *Diaz*, V.C. § 9951 didn't apply to her vehicle anyway in that she was driving a 2002 Chevrolet Tahoe. (*People v. Diaz*, *supra*, at p. 759.)

V.C. § 2814.1: Vehicle Checkpoints: A County Board of Supervisors is authorized by statute to establish a vehicle-inspection checkpoint to check for violations of V.C. §§ 27153 and 27153.5 (exhaust and excessive smoke violations).

V.C. § 2814.1(d): Motorcycle-only checkpoints are prohibited.

Veh. Code § 2810.2(d) & (e): *Vehicle Stops Involving Agricultural Irrigation Supplies:*

Where a vehicle stop is made pursuant to this section (allowing for the inspection of agricultural supplies that are in plain view for the purpose of inspecting the bills of lading, shipping, or delivery papers, or other evidence, to determine whether the driver is in legal possession of the load, whenever the vehicle is on an unpaved road within the jurisdiction of the Department of Parks and Recreation, the Department of Fish & Game, the Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, the State Lands Commission, a regional park district, the U.S. Forest Service, or the Bureau of Land Management, or is in a timberland production zone), if the driver is in violation of V.C. § 12500 (driving without a valid license), the peace officer who makes the stop shall make a reasonable attempt to identify the registered owner of the vehicle and release the vehicle to him or her. Impoundment of the vehicle is prohibited if the driver's only offense is V.C. § 12500.

Searching a Vehicle for a Driver's License and/or Vehicle Registration, VIN Number, Proof of Insurance, etc.:

General Rule: The general rule, now perhaps totally eaten up by the exceptions, not to mention the recognized dangerousness of a traffic stop, is that an officer making a traffic stop must allow an occupant of a motor vehicle to locate and produce his own driver's license and registration. (*People v. Jackson* (1977) 74 Cal.App.3rd 361.)

Exceptions: Case law has been quick to find exceptions. For instance, a police officer may check for registration (or a driver's license) without permission when:

- The circumstances call for further investigation of the vehicle's ownership. (*People v. Webster* (1991) 54 Cal.3rd 411, 430-431.)

- The driver tells the officer where it is and does not object to the officer entering to look for it. (*Ingle v. Superior Court* (1982) 129 Cal.App.3rd 188, 194; “. . . it would defy common sense *not* to hold that an officer, who has a right to see a motorist's driver's license, may enter a vehicle to obtain the license when the motorist, who is outside the vehicle, has told him [or her] where it is and has not otherwise objected to his [or her] entering the car without a warrant.” (Italics added.) See also *People v. Lopez* (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 815, 824-825.)
- Under the circumstances, the officer reasonably felt that it was necessary for his or her own protection. (*People v. Martin* (1972) 23 Cal.App.3rd 444, 447.)
- Where a legitimate concern for “*officer's safety*” dictates that the officer control the movements of the occupant of a vehicle. (*People v. Faddler* (1982) 132 Cal.App.3rd 607, 610-611; see also *People v. Hart* (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 479.)
- The vehicle is abandoned. (*People v. Turner* (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 181-183.)

Searches for Vehicle Documentation: The California Supreme Court has ruled that during a lawful traffic stop, at least after a demand for the driver's license and other vehicle documentation is made and a negative response is obtained (see *United States v. Lopez* (C.D.Cal. 1979) 474 F.Supp. 943, 948-949.), a warrantless, suspicionless intrusion into the vehicle for the limited purpose of locating such documentation is lawful, even if the driver denies that any such documentation exists. In so doing, the officer may look in any location where it is reasonable to believe he or she might find such documentation. (*In re Arturo D.* (2002) 27 Cal.4th 60; *Arturo D.* was joined with the companion case, *People v. Hinger*, out of the Fourth District Court of Appeal.

This would include *under the front seat* (whether looking from the front or rear of the seat), in a *glove compartment*, and over the *visor*. It would probably *not* include within *containers* found in the vehicle or the *trunk*, absent some articulable reason to believe why such documentation might actually be there. (*Id.*, at p. 86, and fn. 25.)

This right of police officers to conduct such searches is constitutionally acceptable “in light of the pervasive regulation of

vehicles capable of traveling on the public highways, . . . (and the reduced expectation of privacy while driving a vehicle on public thoroughfares.” (*Id.*, at p. 70; citing *People v. Webster*, *supra*, and *New York v. Class* (1986) 475 U.S. 106 [89 L.Ed.2nd 81].)

See also *People v. Lopez* (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 815, 826; noting that the fact that it was defendant’s purse which was searched is irrelevant to the legal issues involved in that such a search is lawful when it “includes ‘areas within a vehicle where such documentation reasonably may be expected to be found.’”

Some of that “*pervasive regulation*,” cited by the Supreme Court in *Arturo D.*, includes:

- **V.C. § 4462(a):** Requirement that the *vehicle’s registration* be produced on demand of a peace officer.
- **V.C. § 12951(b):** Requirement that the *driver’s license* be produced on demand of a peace officer.
- **V.C. § 2805(a):** Right of the California Highway Patrol and other listed peace officers whose primary duties are to conduct vehicle theft investigations to inspect a motor vehicle for its title in order to determine ownership.
- Although not mentioned by the Supreme Court, it would seem that **V.C. § 16028(a)**, requiring production of proof of insurance upon demand when being cited for another offense, could be added to this list.

Checking for a *Vehicle’s Identification Number* (“VIN”):

Merely moving papers off the dash so as to make visible the VIN commonly found in that location, resulting in observation of a gun on the floor, was held to be lawful. (*New York v. Class* (1986) 475 U.S. 106 [89 L.Ed.2nd 81].)

However, looking under the hood of a car has been held to be a search, and is illegal absent probable cause. (*United States v. Soto* (9th Cir. 1979) 598 F.2nd 545.)

And lifting an opaque car cover and opening the car’s door while looking for a VIN is also illegal. (*United States v. \$277,000.00 U.S. Currency* (9th Cir. 1991) 941 F.2nd 898.)

Chapter 10:

Searches of Residences and Other Buildings:

General Rule: More so than any other thing or place which is subject to search, a warrantless entry into a residence is *presumptively unreasonable* and, therefore, absent proof of an exception to the rule, is unlawful. (*Payton v. New York* (1980) 445 U.S. 573, 586 [63 L.Ed.2nd 639]; *People v. Williams* (1988) 45 Cal.3rd 1268, 1297; *People v. Bennett* (1998) 17 Cal.4th 373, 384; *United States v. Arreguin* (9th Cir. 2013) 735 F.3rd 1168, 1174.)

“Evidence recovered following an illegal entry of the home is inadmissible and must be suppressed.” (*United States v. Shaibu* (9th Cir. 1990) 920 F.2nd 1432, 1425.)

Query: Does not the *human body* enjoy an even higher expectation of privacy? See “*Searches of Persons*” (Chapter 8), above.

Private Residences enjoy the perhaps highest “*expectation of privacy*” of any object or place that may be subject to a search. (*People v. Ramey* (1976) 16 Cal.3rd 263; *Payton v. New York*, *supra*.)

“(W)hen it comes to the **Fourth Amendment**, the home is first among equals “ (*Florida v. Jardines* (2013) 569 U.S. 1, 6 [133 S.Ct. 1409; 185 L.Ed.2nd 495].)

“A man can still control a small part of his environment, his house; he can retreat thence from outsiders, secure in the knowledge that they cannot get at him without disobeying the Constitution. That is still a sizable hunk of liberty—worth protecting from encroachment. A sane, decent, civilized society must provide some such oasis, some shelter from public scrutiny, some insulated enclosure, some enclave, some inviolate place which is a man's castle.” (*Lavan v. City of Los Angeles* (9th Cir. 2012) 693 F.3rd 1022, 1028, fn. 6; quoting *Silverman v. United States* (1961) 365 U.S. 505, 511, fn. 4 [5 L.Ed.2nd 734]; see also *United States v. On Lee* (2nd Cir. 1951) 193 F.2nd 306, 315-316.)

“It is axiomatic that the ‘physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the **Fourth Amendment** is directed.’” (*Welsh v. Wisconsin* (1984) 466 U.S. 740, 748 [80 L.Ed.2nd 732]; *United States v. United States District Court* (1972) 407 U.S. 297, 313 [32 L.Ed.2nd 752, 764; *United States v. Brooks* (9th Cir. 2004) 367 F.3rd 1128, 1133; *People v. Thompson* (2006) 38 Cal.4th 811, 817.)

Individuals ordinarily possess the highest expectation of privacy within their homes, which is an area that typically is “afforded the most stringent **Fourth Amendment** protection.” (*United States v. Martinez-Fuerte* (1976) 428 U.S. 543, 561 [49 L.Ed.2nd 1116, 1130].)

This same degree of privacy is accorded *the curtilage* of the home, as well. (*United States v. Warner* (9th Cir. 1988) 843 F.2nd 401, 405; *United States v. Romero-Bustamante* (9th Cir. 2003) 337 F.3rd 1104, 1109; *United States v. Davis* (9th Cir. 2008) 530 F.3rd 1069; see below.)

However, the protections afforded the “*curtilage*” of one’s home *do not* apply “to an empty structure used occasionally as sleeping quarters.” (*United States v. Barajas-Avalos* (9th Cir. 2004) 359 F.3rd 1204, 1209-1216.)

See “*Curtilage of the Home*,” below.

Warrantless entries by police into a residence are presumed illegal unless justified by either consent, or probable cause with exigent circumstances. (*Payton v. New York*, *supra*, at p. 586 [63 L.Ed.2nd at pp. 650-651]; *People v. Coddington* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 575.)

“As a general rule, to satisfy the **Fourth Amendment**, a search of a home must be supported by probable cause, *and* there must be a warrant authorizing the search.” (*United States v. Brooks* (9th Cir. 2004) 367 F.3rd 1128, 1133, citing *Nathanson v. United States* (1933) 290 U.S. 41, 47 [78 L.Ed. 159].)

“Government officials ‘bear a heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that might justify warrantless searches or arrests’ (within one’s home). [Citation]” (*Conway v. Pasadena Humane Society* (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 163, 172.)

“While the ‘**Fourth Amendment** protects the individual’s privacy in a variety of settings,’ in none of these settings ‘is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual’s home—a zone that finds its roots in clear and specific constitutional terms: “The right of the people to be secure in their . . . houses . . . shall not be violated.”’” (*People v. Superior Court (Corbett)* (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 670, 680; quoting *Payton v. New York* (1980) 445 U.S. 573, 589 [100 S.Ct. 1371; 63 L.Ed.2nd 639].)

Other Buildings and Places:

Commercial Businesses:

The **Fourth Amendment's** search and seizure rules apply “to commercial premises as well as to homes.” (*Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.* (1978) 436 U.S. 307, 312 [56 L.Ed.2nd 305]; *City of Los Angeles v. Patel* (June 22, 2015) __ U.S. __, __ [135 S.Ct. 2443, 192 L.Ed.2nd 435].)

However, such protection from governmental intrusions apply only to the private areas of a commercial establishment. It is not a **Fourth Amendment** violation for government officials (i.e., police officers) to enter areas of a commercial establishment that are open to the general public, even when the entry is done for the purpose of conducting an investigation. (*Patel v. City of Montclair* (9th Cir. 2015) 798 F.3rd 895.)

See also *Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco* (1967) 387 U.S. 523 [18 L.Ed.2nd 930], and *See v. City of Seattle* (1967) 387 U.S. 541 [18 L.Ed.2nd 943]; holding that the entry of an inspector into an area of a private business being used as a residence constituted a search, and that entry into a locked warehouse, respectively, were illegal. These cases, however, have since been limited to areas of a business where a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, as described in *Katz v. United States* (1967) 389 U.S. 347, 3612 [19 L.Ed.2nd 576, 588]. (See *Patel v. City of Montclair, supra.*, at p. __.)

Hotel and Motel Rooms are accorded the same protection as one's residence.

Hotel: Stoner v. California (1964) 376 U.S. 483, 490 [11 L.Ed.2nd 856, 861]; *United States v. Alvarez* (9th Cir. 1987) 810 F.2nd 879; see also *United States v. Brooks* (9th Cir. 2004) 367 F.3rd 1128; *United States v. McClenton* (3rd Cir. 1995) 53 F.3rd 584, 587-588; see also *People v. Villalobos* (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 310; *United States v. Young* (9th Cir. 2009) 573 F.3rd 711, 715-716; *People v. Torres et al.* (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 989, 993.)

Motel: People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3rd 1268, 1297, *People v. Bennett* (1998) 17 Cal.4th 373, 384-386; *United States v. Cormier* (9th Cir. 2000) 220 F.3rd 1103, 1108-1108; *United States v. Bautista* (9th Cir. 2004) 362 F.3rd 584; *People v. Villalobos, supra.*;

People v. Parson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 332, 345; *United States v. Franklin* (9th Cir. 2010) 603 F.3rd 652.)

After a hotel (or motel) guest's rental period has expired, or has been lawfully terminated, or the defendant has abandoned the room, the guest no longer has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the hotel room. (*United States v. Haddad* (9th Cir. 1977) 558 F.2nd 968, 975; see also *United States v. Procknow* (7th Cir. 2015) 784 F.3rd 421.)

However, it has also been held that any additional time established by the hotel/motel's pattern and practice for allowing guests to stay past the listed checkout time, and taking into account any specific agreement between the management and the guest, will be added to the time period the guest is lawfully in the room. He or she does not lose his or her expectation of privacy until this occurs, making a warrantless entry up until then unlawful. (*United States v. Dorais* (9th Cir. 2001) 241 F.3rd 1124.)

Also, one who rents a hotel room with a stolen credit card *does not* have standing to challenge the otherwise unlawful entry of the room by law enforcement. (*People v. Satz* (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 322.)

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal disagrees, and has held that despite renting a motel room with a stolen credit card, the defendant did not lose his standing to challenge an unlawful entry until the motel's manager took some affirmative steps to repossess the room. In this case, the manager was still seeking payment for the room. The Court noted that at the time the officers entered the defendant's room, the status of the credit card as stolen was yet to be confirmed. (*United States v. Bautista* (9th Cir. 2004) 362 F.3rd 584.)

Also, a defendant has not lost his expectation of privacy in his hotel room (which was later, after the fact, discovered to have been rented with a stolen credit card) by the hotel locking him out where he was locked out pursuant to a policy to do so after a dangerous weapon (a firearm) is found in the room by hotel employees. Locking him out, in this case, was not done with the intent to evict him. (*United*

States v. Young (9th Cir. 2009) 573 F.3rd 711, 715-720.)

The Ninth Circuit, straining to differentiate the facts of *Bautista*, also held that the occupant of a hotel room has no reasonable expectation of privacy when the occupancy is achieved through credit card fraud. (Also see *United States v. Cunag* (9th Cir. 2004) 386 F.3rd 888.)

In *Cunag*, the defendant was never a lawful occupant. In *Bautista*, the Court ruled that the defendant was a lawful occupant, despite the use of a stolen credit card, until the motel's manager took affirmative steps to repossess the room; a questionable distinction.

Also, paying the rent with counterfeit bills does not deprive a defendant of her expectation of privacy in her motel room absent evidence that she knew the bills she used were counterfeit. Also, the defendant's expectation of privacy does not abate absent evidence to the effect that the motel manager had attempted to evict the defendant, or enlist the police to help him do so. (*People v. Munoz* (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 126.)

Whether or not a defendant abandoned a motel room is a question of the defendant's intent, as determined by "objective factors" (as opposed to his actual subjective intent) such as the defendant's words and actions. Abandonment does not "necessarily" turn on whether a motel's management elects to repossess. (*People v. Parson* (2008) 44 Cal.4th 332, 342-348; defendant fled from the motel room in order to avoid arrest.)

The issue is "whether the person so relinquished his interest in the property that he no longer retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in it at the time of the search." (*Id.*, at p. 346.)

The Court, in *Parson*, also rejected the argument that abandonment may not be found where the motel manager did not retake physical possession of

the motel room from the guest prior to the challenged search. (*Id.*, at pp. 347-348.)

Even though the occupant intends to use the motel room for only one night for some illicit purpose, having a home nearby, it is still an “*inhabited dwelling*” for purposes of finding a first degree burglary and a first degree robbery (P.C. §§ 460(a), 212.5(a), respectively.) that occurs in the room. (*People v. Villalobos* (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 310.)

There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the guest register of a hotel or motel, at least as far as the tenant is concerned. (See *City of Los Angeles v. Patel* (June 22, 2015) __ U.S. __ [135 S.Ct. 2443, 192 L.Ed.2nd 435].) Police officers, therefore, are not constitutionally precluded from viewing such a register for the purpose of checking the residents for warrants (*United States v. Cormier* (9th Cir. 2000) 220 F.3rd 1103, 1107-1108.), at least when done with the consent of the hotel or motel. (*Patel, supra.*)

However, it was also held in *Patel* that a provision of the Los Angeles Municipal Code (§41.49(3)(a)), authorizing warrantless on-site inspections of hotel (and motel) guest records upon the demand of any police officer, is facially invalid under the **Fourth Amendment** because a police officer’s non-consensual inspection of hotel guest records constitutes a **Fourth Amendment** search and that such searches are unreasonable where the record inspection scheme does not afford an opportunity for pre-compliance judicial review. (*City of Los Angeles v. Patel, supra.*)

A search warrant, however, is legally unnecessary. All that is needed is to provide a hotel or motel’s management an opportunity for a pre-inspection determination of reasonableness by a neutral decision-maker. An administrative subpoena or warrant, even if issued ex-parte, is legally sufficient, so long as the hotel or motel’s management is given the opportunity to file a motion to quash. (*Ibid.*)

Note: There is no statutory provision for an “administrative subpoena,” at least as issued by a law enforcement agency, in California. Administrative, or “Inspection” warrants, are authorized under CCP Code §§ 1822.50-1182.60. (See “*Inspection (or Administrative) Warrants,*”

under “*Other Warrants*,” under “*Search Warrants*,” above.)

However, a City Council is empowered to issue an administrative subpoena for documentary records, per **Govt. Code § 37104**. (*City of Santa Cruz v. Patel* (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 234.)

The Supreme Court further held, however, that: “Nothing in our opinion calls into question those parts of § 41.49 that require hotel operators to maintain guest registries And, even absent legislative action to create a procedure along the lines discussed above . . . police will not be prevented from obtaining access to these documents. As they often do, hotel operators remain free to consent to searches of their registries and police can compel them to turn them over if they have a proper administrative warrant . . . or if some other exception to the warrant requirement applies, including exigent circumstances.” (*City of Los Angeles v. Patel*, *supra*, 135 S.Ct. at p. 2454.)

Note: The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal indicated in *Patel v. City of Montclair* (9th Cir. 2015) 798 F.3rd 895, 900, fn. 3, that it is in accord. “We do not understand the Supreme Court’s recent decision in a similar case involving the constitutionality of a city ordinance allowing for warrantless inspection of hotel records to hold otherwise (referring to *City of Los Angeles v. Patel*, *supra*.)”

However, see *United States v. Cervantes* (9th Cir. 2017) 859 F.3rd 1175 [As amended at 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 18017; Sep. 12, 2017], differentiating one’s “premises,” which would include a hotel room, from his “residence,” where the person lives on a more permanent basis, when interpreting search and seizure conditions of one’s “mandatory supervision” provisions pursuant to **P.C. § 1170(h)(5)**, under California’s “**Post-Release Community Supervision Act of 2011**.”

A rented room in a *boarding house* receives the same protections. (*United States v. McDonald* (1948) 335 U.S. 451 [93 L.Ed. 153].)

A *garage* to one’s residence receives the same constitutional protections as the residence itself. (*United States v. Oaxaca* (9th Cir. 2000) 233 F.3rd 1154.)

A weekend fishing retreat is an “inhabited dwelling.” (*United States v. Graham* (8th Cir. 1992.) 982 F.2nd 315.)

A hospital room is an “inhabited dwelling.” (*People v. Fond* (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 127, 131-132.)

Even a jail cell is an “inhabited dwelling.” (*People v. McDade* (1991) 230 Cal.App.3rd 118, 127-128; a first degree robbery case.)

But see “Jail Cells,” under “Prisoner Searches,” under *Searches of Persons*” (Chapter 8), above.

Recreational Vehicles: Where the victim lives in her RV (which had a truck-style cab with doors and was described as a class C-style, with a bed over the cab) full time, entering into the RV with the intent to commit a felony is a residential first degree burglary. (*People v. Trevino* (July 5, 2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 120.)

Military Housing:

Military personnel, living off base in a motel, but with the housing paid for by the military as an alternative to living in the on-base barracks, retain the same privacy protections as anyone else in the civilian world. (*People v. Rodriguez* (1966) 242 Cal.App.2nd 744.)

The same rule applies to any off-base military housing, at least when the case is a state case being investigated by state law enforcement officers for presentation in state court. (*People v. Miller* (1987) 196 Cal.App.3rd 307.)

However, on the base, a commanding officer may authorize a warrantless search of property, including the serviceman’s locker (*People v. Shepard* (1963) 212 Cal.App.2nd 697, 700.) and his room in the barracks. (*People v. Jasmin* (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 98.)

Evidence properly being seized pursuant to a service member’s commanding officer’s (or “competent military authority’s”) oral or written authorization to search a person or an area, for specified property or evidence or for a specific person (see **Military Rules of Evidence, Rule 315(a) & (b)**), the results may be used in state court. (*People v. Jasmin, supra*, at p. 110.)

Curtilage of the Home: The **Fourth Amendment** protections against warrantless searches and seizures extend to the *curtilage* around one's home; i.e., that area around the house normally used for living purposes. (*United States v. Warner* (9th Cir. 1988) 843 F.2nd 401, 405; *United States v. Romero-Bustamante* (9th Cir. 2003) 337 F.3rd 1104, 1109; *Florida v. Jardines* (2013) 569 U.S. 1 [133 S.Ct. 1409; 185 L.Ed.2nd 495].)

“At common law, the curtilage is the area to which extends the intimate activity associated with the ‘sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life,’ [Citation], and therefore has been considered part of the home itself for **Fourth Amendment** purposes. Thus, courts have extended **Fourth Amendment** protection to the curtilage; and they have defined the curtilage, as did the common law, by reference to the factors that determine whether an individual reasonably may expect that an area immediately adjacent to the home will remain private.” (*Oliver v. United States* (1984) 466 U.S. 170, 180 [80 L.Ed.2nd 214, 225].)

See also *People v. Strider* (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1393, 1399, fn. 3.

The curtilage of a home extends to those areas immediately proximate to a dwelling, which “harbors those intimate activities associated with domestic life and the privacies of the home.” (*United States v. Dunn* (1987) 480 U.S. 294, 301, fn. 4 [94 L.Ed.2nd 326, 334-335].)

The factors to consider in determining the boundaries of the curtilage include:

- The proximity of the area to the house;
- Whether the area is included within an enclosure around the house;
- The nature of the uses made of the area; *and*
- Steps taken to protect the area from observation by people passing by.

(*United States v. Dunn*, *supra*; *United States v. Davis* (9th Cir. 2008) 530 F.3rd 1069, 1077-1080; *People v. Lieng* (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1213; *United States v. Perea-Rey* (9th Cir. 2012) 680 F.3rd 1179, 1183-1185; *United States v. Johnson* (9th Cir. 2001) 256 F.3rd 895, 900-904.)

However, even though within the curtilage of a suspect's home, a hole in the ground which is in a "common area" of an apartment complex does not carry with it the same privacy expectations. Therefore, it was not unlawful for police, observing defendant from a vantage point outside the curtilage while he was engaged in apparent narcotic transactions, to come onto the property and lift a board covering the hole where defendant kept contraband, despite the lack of a warrant. (*People v. Shaw* (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 833.)

Also, the protections afforded the "curtilage" of one's home do not apply when the alleged home was nothing more than "an empty structure used occasionally as sleeping quarters." (*United States v. Barajas-Avalos* (9th Cir. 2004) 377 F.3rd 1040, 1054-1058; a twelve-foot travel trailer on the property without any hookups or other indications that it "harbor(ed) those intimate activities associated with domestic life and the privacies of the home.")

Observations made into the curtilage of the home from the defendants' driveway, when the driveway was an area accessible to the neighbors, were properly used to obtain a search warrant. The use of night vision goggles was irrelevant. (*People v. Lieng* (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1213.)

One's porch, at the front door, is part of the curtilage of a home, and is in fact the "classic exemplar of an area 'to which the activity of home life extends.'" (*Florida v. Jardines* (2013) 569 U.S. 1 [133 S.Ct. 1409, 1415; 185 L.Ed.2nd 495]; *United States v. Lundin* (9th Cir. 2016) 817 F.3rd 1151, 1158.)

Use of a drug-sniffing dog at the front door of a suspect's home, which is within the curtilage, is a search and illegal absent a search warrant. (*Florida v. Jardines, supra.*)

See also *United States v. Burston* (8th Cir. 2015) 806 F.3rd 1123; applying the rule of *Jardines* to a drug-dog's sniff in the area immediately outside defendant's apartment, within six to ten inches of a window.

A person's fenced off backyard is within the curtilage of his home. (*United States v. Struckman* (9th Cir 2010) 603 F.3rd 731, 739.)

A carport attached to the side of defendant's house was within the curtilage of the home. (*United States v. Perea-Rey* (9th Cir. 2012) 680 F.3rd 1179, 1183-1189.)

Entering the defendant’s driveway, through an open or unlocked gate to a low, chain-link fence, to contact and talk with (consensual encounter) a subject observed working in the driveway, even if that area is considered to be part of the curtilage of the residence, is not illegal. (*People v. Lujano* (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 175, 182-185; “(T)he officers exercised no more than the same license to intrude as a reasonably respectful citizen—any door-to-door salesman would reasonably have taken the same approach the house.”)

The “constitutionality of police incursion into curtilage depends on ‘whether the officer’s actions are consistent with an attempt to initiate consensual contact with the occupants of the home’” (*Id.*, at p. 184; citing *United States v. Perea-Rey* (9th Cir. 2012) 680 F.3rd 1179, 1188.)

The Virginia Supreme Court has held that entering defendant’s driveway to search a vehicle (a motorcycle in this case) that was in plain view and visible from the street, with probable cause to believe it was stolen, is lawful. The issue in this case is whether the **Fourth Amendment’s** “automobile exception” permits a police officer, uninvited and without a warrant, to enter private property and search a vehicle parked a few feet from a home. (See *Collins v. Commonwealth* (2016) 292 Va. 486.)

Note: Certiorari has been granted in this case and is on appeal to the United States Supreme Court.

Officers who enter the curtilage (i.e., the front porch) of the defendant’s home at 4:00 a.m. with the intent to make a warrantless arrest do so unlawfully absent exigent circumstances, and therefore cannot rely upon any resulting exigency (i.e., defendant attempting to escape from the back of the house) to justify an arrest in the backyard. (*United States v. Lundin* (9th Cir. 2016) 817 F.3rd 1151, 1158, reiterating the rule that “exigent circumstances cannot justify a warrantless search when the police ‘create the exigency by engaging . . . in conduct that violates the **Fourth Amendment.**” (quoting *Kentucky v. King* (2011) 563 U.S. 452, 462 [179 L.Ed.2nd 865].)

Note: The continuing validity of this case is questionable, given the U.S. Supreme Court’s rejection of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal’s so-called “*Provocation Rule*,” in *County of Los Angeles v. Mendez* (May 30, 2017) __ U.S.

___, ___ [137 S.Ct. 1539; 198 L.Ed.2nd 52].) See “*Provocation Rule*,” under “Arrests” (Chapter 4), above.

In *Sims v. Stanton* (9th Cir. 2013) 706 F.3rd 954 (certiorari granted), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal held that entering the curtilage of a home in pursuit of a suspect with the intent to detain him when the subject is ignoring the officer’s demands to stop, at worst a misdemeanor violation of P.C. § 148, is illegal. The warrantless fresh or hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect into a residence (or the curtilage of a residence) is limited to felony suspects only. The United States Supreme Court, however, reversed this decision in *Stanton v. Sims* (Nov. 4, 2013) 571 U.S. ___ [134 S.Ct. 3; 187 L.Ed.2nd 341].

The Ninth Circuit’s decision was based upon the Court’s interpretation of the United States Supreme Court decision in *Welsh v. Wisconsin* (1984) 466 U.S. 740 [80 L.Ed.2nd 732], and conflicts with the California Supreme Court’s reasoning in *People v. Thompson* (2006) 38 Cal.4th 811 (see “Warrantless entry to arrest a DUI (i.e., “*Driving while Under the Influence*”) suspect,” under “Arrests” (Chapter 4), above).

However, the United States Supreme Court, in interpreting its own decision on *Welsh*, noted that they only held there that a warrantless entry into a residence for a minor offense *not involving hot pursuit* was an exception to the normal rule that a warrant is “usually” going to be required. Per the Court, there is no rule that residential entries involving hot pursuit are limited to felony cases. In this case, there was a “hot pursuit.” (*Stanton v. Sims, supra*, citing *Welsh*, at p. 750.)

It is an open, undecided issue, with authority going both ways, as to whether it is lawful for an officer to conduct a “knock and talk” at other than the front door. The U.S. Supreme Court declined to resolve the issue. (*Carroll v. Carman* (Nov. 10, 2014) 574 U.S. ___ [135 S.Ct. 348; 190 L.Ed.2nd 311]; determining that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity in that the issue is the subject of conflicting authority.)

However, while declining to decide the correctness of the generally held opinion that a police officer, in making contact with a resident, is constitutionally bound to do no more than restrict his “movements to walkways, driveways,

porches and places where visitors could be expected to go,” the Court cited a number of lower federal and state appellate court decisions which have so held: E.g., *United States v. Titemore* (2nd Cir. 2006) 437 F.3rd 251; *United States v. James* (7th Cir 1994) 40 F.3rd 850, vacated on other grounds at 516 U.S. 1022; *United States v. Garcia* (9th Cir. 1993) 997 F.2nd 1273, 1279-1280; and *State v. Domicz* (2006) 188 N.J. 285, 302. (*Carroll v. Carman, supra*, at p. ___ [135 S.Ct. at pp. 351-352].)

Temporary or Impermanent Residences:

General Rule:

The same rules may apply to *temporary* or *impermanent residences*, such as a *tent* in a public campground (*United States v. Gooch* (9th Cir. 1993) 6 F.3rd 673, 678.) or *migrant farm housing* on private property. (*LaDuke v. Nelson* (9th Cir. 1985) 762 F.2nd 1318, 1331-1332.)

“(T)here is no **Fourth Amendment** rule that provides for protection only for traditionally constructed houses.” (*United States v. Barajas-Avalos* (9th Cir. 2004) 377 F.3rd 1040, 1055-1056; a trailer and a Quonset hut.)

Tents:

A defendant’s *tent*, located on Bureau of Land Management property, exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances (purposely hidden), and that it was therefore illegal to search it without a search warrant. (*United States v. Sandoval* (9th Cir. 2000) 200 F.3rd 659.)

The **Fourth Amendment** was held to protect the defendant’s privacy interests in his tent, which was located on a public campground. The Court found that defendant had both a subjective and an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the tent. There were no exigent circumstances that justified the warrantless arrest of defendant in his tent. The Court found that the tent was more like a house than a car for the purpose of **Fourth Amendment**. The court held that defendant’s tent was a “non-public” place for the purpose of the **Fourth Amendment** analysis, even though the tent was pitched on public property. The Court further found that defendant had no less of a reasonable expectation of privacy at a public campground than he would have

at a private campground. (*United States v. Gooch* (9th Cir. 1993) 6 F.3rd 673.)

The Ninth Circuit held, however, that the area immediately around a tent, at a campsite, which is open to the public and exposed to public view, did *not* have an expectation of privacy. (*United States v. Basher* (9th Cir. 2011) 629 F.3rd 1161, 1169.)

However, in a Washington States case, a tent set up on public property was found not to be protected by the **Fourth Amendment**. (*State v. Cleator* (1993) 857 P.2nd 306, 308-309.)

The area around defendant's tent which he had set up illegally (having been cited there before for illegal camping) in a public preserve where camping required a permit, which defendant did not have, was also not protected by the **Fourth Amendment**. (*People v. Nishi* (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 954, 957-963; no legitimate expectation of privacy in the area under a tarp next to his tent.)

Defendant was found to have “a reasonable expectation of privacy” for **Fourth Amendment** purposes in an aluminum frame covered with tarps that was erected within a designated site on land specifically set aside for camping during a music festival. The court declared: “One should be free to depart the campsite for the day's adventure without fear of this expectation of privacy being violated.” (*People v. Hughston* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1068-1071.)

A *cardboard box*, located on a public sidewalk, in which defendant lived, *did not* have the same reasonable expectation of privacy, and therefore could be searched without a search warrant. (*People v. Thomas* (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1331, 1333-1335.)

A *cave* on federal property where defendant did not have a legal right to be. (*United States v. Ruckman* (10th Cir. 1986) 806 F.2nd 1471, 1474; the court noting that the lack of a “legal right to occupy the land and build structures on it,” were factors “highly relevant” to the issue of the defendant's expectation of privacy.)

A “*squatter's community*” on public property is *not* protected by the **Fourth Amendment**. (*Amezquita v. Hernandez-Colon* (1st Cir. 1975) 518 F.2nd 8, 11-12.)

Neither is *under a bridge abutment*. (*State v. Mooney* (1991) 588 A.2nd 145, 152, 154.)

Businesses: A warrantless arrest in a private area of a business, when the area entered is not exposed or visible to the public and not the subject of any lawful business regulation by law enforcement, and without an exigency excusing the lack of a warrant, violates the occupant's expectation of privacy. (*People v. Lee* (1986) 186 Cal.App.3rd 743; citing *G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States* (1977) 429 U.S. 338 [50 L.Ed.2nd 530]; see also *United States v. Driver* (9th Cir. 1985) 776 F.2nd 807, 809-810.)

There is a "plainly . . . reasonable, legitimate, and objective expectation of privacy within the interior of . . . covered buildings, and it is equally clear that expectation is one society is prepared to observe. (*Dow Chemical Co. v. United States* (1986) 476 U.S. 227, 236 [90 L.Ed.2nd 226, 236].)

This extension of *Ramey* does *not* include areas of a business which are "freely accessible to the public." *People v. Lee*, *supra*, at pp. 746-747.)

Referring to *People v. Ramey* (1976) 16 Cal.3rd 263, involving warrantless arrests within one's own residence. See "*Ramey; Within One's Own Residence*," under "*Case Law Limitations*," under "*Arrests*," above.

Lee does *not* affect the applicability of a regulatory scheme authorizing warrantless inspections of the private areas of some regulated businesses, unless the search is being conducted for the purpose of seeking contraband or evidence of crime under the guise of an administrative warrant. (*Id.*, at p. 749; *Donovan v. Dewey* (1981) 452 U.S. 594, 598, fn. 6 [69 L.Ed.2nd 262, 268].)

Use of an administrative, or "*inspection*" warrant, issued by a court for the purpose of regulating building, fire, safety, plumbing, electrical, health, labor or zoning codes, does not justify an entry by police to make an arrest given the lesser proof standards needed to obtain an administrative warrant. If an entry is effected for the purpose of arresting the occupant, an arrest warrant will have to be obtained. (*Alexander v. City and County of San Francisco* (1994) 29 F.3rd 1355.)

There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the guest register of a hotel or motel. Police officers, therefore, are not precluded from viewing such a register for the purpose of checking the residents for warrants. (*United States v. Cormier* (9th Cir. 2000) 220 F.3rd 1103, 1107-1108.)

Except, however, if the hotel or motel management objects, in which case law enforcement must use some form of administrative subpoena or warrant, or other court order, that affords the hotel/management an opportunity to seek a pre-inspection determination by a neutral decision-maker as to the legitimacy of the request for inspection of the records. (*City of Los Angeles v. Patel* (June 22, 2015) __ U.S. __, __ [135 S.Ct. 2443, 192 L.Ed.2nd 435].)

However, where officers unsuccessfully rang a “call bell” on the counter in the public area of a business, knocked and announced their presence before entering the work area of the business, entry was lawful after no one responded. Contacting defendant in an office off of the work area was upheld holding that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the work area in that a reasonable employee would expect someone to enter the work area under these circumstances. (*United States v. Lewis* (8th Cir. 2017) 864 F.3rd 937.)

Workplace Searches of Government Employees:

Rule: “Searches and seizures by government employers or supervisors of the private property of their employees . . . are subject to the restraints of the **Fourth Amendment**.” However, “(p)ublic employees’ expectations of privacy in their offices, desks, and file cabinets, like similar expectations of employees in the private sector, may be reduced by virtue of actual office practices and procedures, or by legitimate regulation.” (*O’Connor v. Ortega* (1987) 480 U.S. 709, 715, 717 [94 L.Ed.2nd 714, 721, 723].)

“The workplace includes those areas and items that are related to work and are generally within the employer’s control . . . even if the employee has placed personal items in them, . . .” (*Id.*, at pp. 715-716 [94 L.Ed.2nd at p. 722].)

Reasonableness: “(R)easonableness rather than probable cause (is) the standard, balancing the ‘employees’ legitimate expectation of privacy against the government’s need for supervision, control, and the efficient operation of the workplace.” (*United States v. Gonzalez* (9th Cir. 2002) 300 F.3rd 1048, 1049-1050; citing *O’Connor v. Ortega, supra*, at pp. 719-720 [94 L.Ed.2nd at p. 724].)

In *Gonzalez*, a warrantless, suspicionless search of a government employee’s backpack was conducted as a part of a program to combat employee theft. Upholding the lawfulness of such a search, the Court noted that the fact that the defendant had signed a form upon initial employment acknowledging that such random searches would be

conducted (lessening the defendant's expectation of privacy) added to the reasonableness of the search.

See also *United States v. Taketa* (9th Cir. 1991) 923 F.2nd 665, 673-674, where a search of a D.E.A. agent's office by his supervisors was tested by the *O'Connor* standard of "reasonableness" and not probable cause because the search was a part of an internal, employee misconduct investigation, the search was upheld.

Public Restrooms, Adult Bookstore Booths and Dressing Rooms:

Rule: It is considered to be a "general exploratory search," and thus, a **Fourth Amendment** violation, to spy on persons using public toilets, but perhaps *not* in other areas where there is a lesser expectation of privacy. (See below)

Examples:

Pay toilets in an amusement park, where officers watched from an observation pipe leading from the roof to the individual booths; observations suppressed. (*Bielicki v. Superior Court* (1962) 57 Cal.2nd 602.)

Men's restroom in a department store, where the police officers positioned themselves in the crawl space between the ceiling and the next floor, watching through a legitimately installed vent; observations suppressed. (*Britt v. Superior Court* (1962) 58 Cal.2nd 469.)

Note: There is no reason to believe the same rule wouldn't apply to the women's restroom.

"The bathroom, including a public bathroom stall, is perhaps the epitome of a private place. . . . (F)or over 50 years California case law has ensured that persons in a public toilet may reasonably expect they are not being secretly watched." (*In re M.H.* (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 699, 706-707; finding that videotaping a person in a doorless high school bathroom stall violated that person's right to privacy and constituted a violation of P.C. § 647(j)(1); disorderly conduct.)

Doorless stalls in a public restroom with the police officer in the ceiling, looking down into the stall. Although the officer could have lawfully observed the illegal activity by simply walking into the bathroom, observing that same activity from inside the ceiling above the stall violated the **Fourth Amendment**. (*People v. Triggs* (1973) 8 Cal.3rd 884; disapproved on other grounds.)

However, looking into a *curtained booth* where sexually explicit films were shown in an “*adult bookstore*” was upheld. The curtains were found to be there to exclude light; not to provide the occupant with any reasonable expectation of privacy. Looking into the individual booths, therefore, was lawful. (*People v. Freeman* (1977) 66 Cal.App.3rd 424, 432-433; see also *Tily B., Inc. v. City of Newport Beach* (1998) 69 Cal.App.4th 1; involving an adult entertainment business, where a city ordinance required an attendant to be stationed in the restroom “to prevent specified activities” was upheld.)

It was also held to be lawful to look over and under a department store *fitting room* door where there was a two-foot gap under the three-foot high door, and another two-foot gap between the top of the door and the ceiling. While the door was intended to provide a minimal protection to modesty, it did not reasonably provide the occupant with an expectation of privacy. (*In re Deborah C.* (1981) 30 Cal.3rd 125, 137-139.)

Spying Into Bathrooms, Etc.; Statutes:

P.C. § 647(k)(1) makes it a misdemeanor to look through a hole or opening, or otherwise view, by means of any instrumentality including, but not limited to, a periscope, telescope, binoculars, camera, motion picture camera, or camcorder, into the interior of a bathroom, changing room, fitting room, dressing room, or tanning booth, or into the interior of any other area in which the occupant has a reasonable expectation of privacy.

P.C. § 647(k)(3) makes it a misdemeanor to “use a concealed camcorder, motion picture camera, or photographic camera of any time to secretly videotape, film, photograph, or record by electronic means,” someone “in a state of full or partial undress, for the purpose of viewing the body of, or the undergarments worn by, that other person,” without the victim’s knowledge or consent, while “in the interior of a bedroom, bathroom, changing room, fitting room, dressing room, or tanning booth, or the interior of any other area in which that other person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, with the intent to invade the privacy of that other person.”

Two-Way Mirrors: **P.C. § 653n**, makes it a misdemeanor to install or maintain a “*two-way mirror*” permitting the observation of any restroom, toilet, bathroom, washroom, shower, locker room, fitting room, motel room, or hotel room. The section specifically excludes state or local public penal, correctional, custodial, or medical institutions.

Problem: When Officers Trespass: The fact that an officer might be “trespassing” upon the defendant’s property (within the *curtilage*, without entering the premises) is relatively insignificant when determining whether the **Fourth Amendment** has been violated. The issue is one of “*reasonableness*” under the circumstances. The fact that a trespass may be involved is but one factor to consider when determining reasonableness. (*People v. Manderscheid* (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 355, where walking around to the back of the defendant’s house to knock, while looking for an armed parolee-at-large, held to be lawful, differentiating the rule of *People v. Camacho* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 824 [see below], on the facts and the relative seriousness of the crime involved.)

See also *People v. Chavez* (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1493, where walking to the side of the house and climbing over a six foot fence, past a locked gate, was lawful when the officer observed, in plain sight, a cocked revolver on the ground at the side of the house. The necessity to retrieve the weapon, for safety purposes, allowed for the entry of the side yard.

It is an open, undecided issue, with authority going both ways, as to whether it is lawful for an officer to conduct a “knock and talk” at other than the front door. The U.S. Supreme Court declined to resolve the issue. (*Carroll v. Carman* (Nov. 10, 2014) 574 U.S. __ [135 S.Ct. 348; 190 L.Ed.2nd 311]; determining that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity in that the issue is the subject of some conflicting authority.)

However, while declining to decide the correctness of the generally held opinion that a police officer, in making contact with a resident, is constitutionally bound to do no more than restrict his “movements to walkways, driveways, porches and places where visitors could be expected to go,” the Court cited a number of lower federal and state appellate court decisions which have so held: E.g., *United States v. Titemore* (2nd Cir. 2006) 437 F.3rd 251; *United States v. James* (7th Cir 1994) 40 F.3rd 850, vacated on other grounds at 516 U.S. 1022; *United States v. Garcia* (9th Cir. 1993) 997 F.2nd 1273, 1279-1280; and *State v. Domicz* (2006) 188 N.J. 285, 302. (*Id.*, at p. __ [135 S.Ct. at pp. 351-352].)

Securing the Premises Pending the Obtaining of a Search Warrant:

Fourth Amendment: The securing of a residence by police, pending the obtaining of a warrant, is subject to **Fourth Amendment** protections. (*United States v. Lindsey* (9th Cir. 1989) 877 F.2nd 777, 780.)

General Rule: Where police officers are already at a residence without a warrant when evidence is lawfully discovered (e.g., by a *plain sight observation*), the discovery of which provides probable cause to search the rest of the residence, but

when any other evidence in the house is likely to disappear or be destroyed while a search warrant is obtained (i.e., an “*exigency*;” see *People v. Superior Court [Irwin]* (1973) 33 Cal.App.3rd 475.), the officers have three options:

- Seize only that which is in plain sight, and ignore what might be found in the rest of the house.
- Seek *consent* to search the entire residence from the residents. (See “*Consent Searches*,” below)
- *Secure the residence* (i.e., detain its occupants and guard the house) pending the obtaining of a search warrant. (See below)

Exigency of the Officers’ Own Making: The old rule was that although a police officer may, with exigent circumstances, enter and secure a residence (or other protected place) pending the obtaining of a warrant or consent to search, the law did not allow a warrantless entry and securing of the premises if the exigency was of the officers’ own making.

With Probable Cause: Officers, with probable cause which would have justified the obtaining of a search warrant, but hoping to obtain an oral consent to search instead, knock on the front door only to be told by the occupants that admission is being denied. The fact that evidence may now be destroyed, etc., while a warrant is obtained is not an excuse to make a warrantless entry to secure the house. (*People v. Shuey* (1973) 13 Cal.App.3rd 835; see also *United States v. Driver* (9th Cir. 1985) 776 F.2nd 807.)

The continuing validity of *Shuey* and *Driver* is questionable in light of the United States Supreme Court decision in *Kentucky v. King* (2011) 563 U.S. 452, 459-472 [179 L.Ed.2nd 865]. See below.

However, assuming the continuing validity of *Shuey* and *Driver*, when a house *is* illegally entered and secured by law enforcement under these circumstances, and a warrant is thereafter obtained using *only* that information developed prior to and independent of the illegal entry as the probable cause, a subsequent search of the premises under authority of the warrant will be upheld. (*Segura v. United States* (1984) 468 U.S. 796 [82 L.Ed.2nd 599]; *People v. Angulo* (1988) 199 Cal.App.3rd 370; *People v. Lamas* (1991) 229 Cal.App.3rd 560, 571.)

But, per the Ninth Circuit, even though the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine does not apply to the lawful search of a residence

after the house was “detained” for an unreasonable time while a search warrant was obtained, the resulting evidence recovered from the residence when the home was searched with the warrant will be suppressed anyway in that the officers were not acting reasonably in taking 26½ hours to get the warrant, and some punishment must follow such an unreasonable delay. (*United States v. Cha* (9th Cir. 2010) 597 F.3rd 995, 1003-1004.)

Even when observations made during an illegal entry are used in the warrant affidavit, the courts have held that that part may be excised from the affidavit and the remainder then retested for the existence of probable cause. If it is there, the search will be upheld. (*People v. Gesner* (1988) 202 Cal.App.3rd 581.)

If it is not, the evidence must be suppressed. (*People v. Machupa* (1994) 7 Cal.4th 614.)

If the retested warrant is held to be valid, those items illegally observed during the initial illegal entry should still be admissible under the “*inevitable discovery rule*.” (*People v. Gesner, supra*, at pp. 591-592.)

See *United States v. Lundin* (9th Cir. 2016) 817 F.3rd 1151, 1158, reiterating the rule that “exigent circumstances cannot justify a warrantless search when the police ‘create the exigency by engaging . . . in conduct that violates the **Fourth Amendment**.’” (quoting *Kentucky v. King* (2011) 563 U.S. 452, 462 [179 L.Ed.2nd 865].)

In *Lundin*, the Ninth Circuit held that officers who enter the curtilage (i.e., the front porch) of the defendant’s home at 4:00 a.m. with the intent to make a warrantless arrest do so unlawfully, and therefore cannot rely upon any resulting exigency (i.e., defendant attempting to escape from the back of the house) to justify an arrest in the backyard.

Note: The continuing validity of this case is questionable, given the U.S. Supreme Court’s rejection of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal’s so-called “*Provocation Rule*,” in *County of Los Angeles v. Mendez* (May 30, 2017) __ U.S. __, __ [137 S.Ct. 1539; 198 L.Ed.2nd 52].) See “*Provocation Rule*,” under “Arrests” (Chapter 4), above.

With No Probable Cause: If, however, there was legitimately no opportunity to get a warrant before the exigency develops (i.e., the exigency was *not* of the officers' own making), the premises may be entered and secured and the status quo maintained while a warrant is obtained. (*People v. Superior Court [Irwin]* (1973) 33 Cal.App.3rd 475.)

New Rule? The United States Supreme Court has provided considerable clarification on this issue, appearing to establish a new rule. If so, the new rule is that so long as the officers' actions in knocking on the door and identifying themselves, and presumably seeking a consensual entry, does not itself constitute a violation or threatened violation of the **United States Constitution** (i.e., the **Fourth Amendment**), there is no penalty for doing so. Should the occupants then attempt to destroy or secret evidence, that's their choice. (*Kentucky v. King* (2011) 563 U.S. 452, 459-472 [179 L.Ed.2nd 865].)

Note: The *King* case, however, specifically does not decide what is, and what is not, an exigent circumstance allowing for an immediate warrantless entry. In *King*, the officers were in pursuit of a fleeing felon when they heard noises from inside consistent with evidence being destroyed. The issue whether being denied a consensual entry is itself an exigent circumstance was not discussed.

Securing Cases:

Securing a residence as a crime scene is a “*seizure*” subject to **Fourth Amendment** protection. (*United States v. Alaimalo* (9th Cir. 2002) 313 F.3rd 1188, 1192, fn. 1.)

But, with “*probable cause*” to believe a residence may contain evidence of a crime, the residence may constitutionally be seized as a “*crime scene.*” (*Dixon v. Wallowa County* (9th Cir. 2003) 336 F.3rd 1013.)

With *probable cause* to believe that contraband is contained in a particular residence, and a *reasonable belief* that if the house is not immediately secured the evidence will be destroyed, officers may enter to secure the house pending the obtaining of a search warrant or a consent to do a complete search. (*United States v. Alaimalo, supra.*)

A five-hour seizure of the defendant's residence, pending the obtaining of a search warrant, was justified when the officers had probable cause to believe weapons from a drive-by shooting, which had occurred shortly

before, might be in the house. (*In re Elizabeth G.* (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 496.)

Where it appears that confederates of a person arrested for selling narcotics will learn of the arrest and destroy or secret contraband still in the house, it is lawful to secure the house pending the obtaining of a search warrant. (*Ferdin v. Superior Court* (1974) 36 Cal.App.3rd 774, 781; *People v. Freeny* (1974) 37 Cal.App.3rd 20.)

A three-minute sweep of a house to check for persons reasonably believed to be in the house who might destroy evidence, was held to be lawful. (*People v. Seaton* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598.)

Entering and securing a residence pending the obtaining of a search warrant was supported by exigent circumstances when officers received information that the occupant was about to destroy or remove contraband from the residence. (*United States v. Fowlkes* (9th Cir. 2015) 804 F.3rd 954, 969-971.)

The fact that it took about an hour to coordinate the officers necessary to make the warrantless entry and securing of defendant's apartment was irrelevant; the exigency still existed. (*Id.*, at p. 971.)

See also *United States v. Dent* (1st Cir. Me. 2017) 867 F.3rd 37, where the court held that pending the obtaining of a search warrant, the securing of the residence, including doing a protective sweep during which illegal contraband was observed, did not affect the legality of the search warrant where there was no evidence that either the warrant or the decision to seek the warrant was based on anything the officers discovered during their warrantless entry. The court found that the process of applying for the search warrant had already been initiated based on other independent sources of information and that drugs observed under an air mattress were not included in the search warrant affidavit.

Miscellaneous Issues:

Detention of a Residence: It is proper for the police to temporarily “*detain*” a residence, guarding it from the outside and preventing people from entering, when there is a *reasonable suspicion* that contraband or evidence of a crime is inside, at least until the officers can determine through their investigation whether or not to seek a search warrant. (*Illinois v. McArthur* (2001) 531 U.S. 326 [148 L.Ed.2nd 838]; *People v. Bennett* (1998) 17 Cal.4th 373.)

In determining what is reasonable, a court must balance the privacy-related concerns of the resident with the law enforcement-related concerns, considering four factors: (1) Whether the police had probable cause to believe that the defendant's residence contained evidence of a crime or contraband; (2) whether the police had good cause to fear that, unless restrained, the defendant would destroy the evidence or contraband before the police could return with a warrant; (3) whether the police made reasonable efforts to reconcile their law enforcement needs with the demands of personal privacy; and (4) whether the police imposed the restraint for a limited period of time; i.e., whether the time period was no longer than reasonably necessary for the police, acting with diligence, to obtain the warrant. (*United States v. Cha* (9th Cir. 2010) 587 F.3rd 995, 1000; citing *Illinois v. McArthur*, *supra.*, at p. 331-332.)

In *United States v. Cha*, *supra*, detaining the defendant's residence for 26½ hours while a search warrant was obtained was held to be unreasonable, requiring the suppression of the resulting evidence.

In *Segura v. United States* (1984) 468 U.S. 796 [82 L.Ed.2nd 599], 19 hours (during which the house was detained from inside) was held to be reasonable in that the officers did not exploit the delay, only eight of the 19 hours was when a judge was available, and the defendants were both in custody anyway.

A thirteen hour seizure of a hotel room held to be reasonable in that the seizure occurred at midnight with the warrant obtained by the following afternoon, at 1:00 p.m., and the defendants were in custody during this time period. (*United States v. Holzman* (9th Cir. 1989) 871 F.2nd 1496, 1507-1508.)

Detention of the Residents Outside: Also, with probable cause justifying the obtaining of a search warrant, the residents may be lawfully detained outside pending the arrival of the search warrant. (*Illinois v. McArthur*, *supra.*)

But see *United States v. Bailey* (2nd Cir. 2011) 652 F.3rd 197, reversing the Second Circuit Court of Appeal, where the defendant wasn't detained until after driving at least a mile from his home, and resolving a split of authority among other circuits, the United States Supreme Court held that *Michigan v. Summers* (1981) 452 U.S. 692 [69 L.Ed.2nd 340, 349-350], does not permit the detention of occupants beyond the immediate vicinity of the premises which is the subject of a search warrant, at least when the sole reason for the detention is that the person's home was about to be searched. If police officers elect to detain an individual after he leaves the immediate vicinity of the premises being searched, that detention must be justified by some other rationale.

See “*Detentions Away from the Place being Searched*,” under “*Detentions*” (Chapter 3), above.

Knock and Talk: Where the officer *does not* have probable cause prior to the contact (thus, he is not able to obtain a search warrant), there is no constitutional impediment to conducting what is known as a “*knock and talk*,” making contact with the occupants of a residence for the purpose of asking for a consent to enter. (*United States v. Cormier* (9th Cir. 2000) 220 F.3rd 1103, 1108-1109.)

“Absent express orders from the person in possession against any possible trespass, there is no rule of private or public conduct which makes it illegal per se, or a condemned invasion of the person’s right of privacy, for anyone openly and peaceably, at high noon, to walk up the steps and knock on the front door of any man’s ‘castle’ with the honest intent of asking questions of the occupant thereof—whether the questioner be a pollster, a salesman, or an officer of the law.” (*Davis v. United States* (9th Cir. 1964) 327 F.3rd 301, 303.)

Knocking at the defendant’s motel room door and asking (as opposed to demanding) the occupants to open the door to speak with them is, when the defendant comes outside, no more than a lawful consensual encounter when nothing is said or done which would have indicated to defendant that he was not free to leave or return to his room. (*United States v. Crapser* (9th Cir. 2007) 472 F.3rd 1141, 1145-1147.)

State authority similarly upholds the practice. (*People v. Colt* (2004) 118, Cal.App.4th 1404, 1410-1411.)

See also *People v. Michael* (1955) 45 Cal.2nd 751, at page 754, where the California Supreme Court noted that: “It is not unreasonable for officers to seek interviews with suspects or witnesses or to call upon them at their homes for such purposes. Such inquiries, although courteously made and not accompanied with any assertion of a right to enter or search or secure answers, would permit the criminal to defeat his prosecution by voluntarily revealing all of the evidence against him and then contending that he acted only in response to an implied assertion of unlawful authority.”

The key to conducting a lawful “*knock and talk*,” when there is no articulable suspicion that can be used to justify an “*investigative detention*,” is whether “a reasonable person would feel free ‘to disregard the police and go about his business.’” [Citation] If so, no articulable suspicion is required to merely knock on the defendant’s door and inquire

of him who he is and/or to ask for consent to search. (*People v. Jenkins* (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 368.)

The information motivating an officer to conduct a knock and talk may be from an anonymous tipster. There is no requirement that officers corroborate anonymous information before conducting a knock and talk. (*People v. Rivera* (2007) 41 Cal.4th 304.)

But see *Orhorhaghe v. INS* (9th Cir. 1994) 38 F.3rd 488, where officers positioned themselves so as to be certain the defendant could not escape or leave, they deliberately revealed their previously concealed firearms, the contact occurred in a non-public place, the officers acted in an aggressive manner suggesting that compliance was not optional, and the officers outnumbered defendant four-to-one. The contact was held to be an unlawful detention.

And see *United States v. Jerez* (7th Cir. 1997) 108 F.3rd 684, where a similar situation was held to constitute an “*investigative detention*,” thus requiring an “*articulable reasonable suspicion*” to be lawful, because the officers knocked on the motel room door in the middle of the night continually for a full three minutes, while commanding the occupants to open the door.

An otherwise lawful “*knock and talk*,” where officers continued to press the defendant for permission to enter his apartment after his denial of any illegal activity, converted the contact into an unlawfully “extended” detention, causing the Court to conclude that a later consent-to-search was the product of the illegal detention, and thus invalid. (*United States v. Washington* (9th Cir. 2004) 387 F.3rd 1060.)

An anonymous 911-hangup call, traceable to a particular motel, but without sufficient information to determine which room the call may have come from, did not allow for the non-consensual entry into the defendant’s room merely because of the suspicious attempts by the person who answered the door to keep the officers from looking inside, and her apparent lies concerning no one else being there. (*United States v. Deemer* (9th Cir. 2004) 354 F.3rd 1130.)

Although police officers are allowed to approach a home to contact individuals inside and conduct a “knock and talk,” in this case, the evidence did not support the Border Patrol Agents’ argument that they entered defendant’s property to initiate a consensual encounter with him. The court concluded that it was not objectively reasonable, as part of a knock-and-talk, for the agent to bypass the front door, which he had seen defendant open in response to a knock by a suspected illegal alien

moments earlier, and intrude into an area of the curtilage where an uninvited visitor would not be expected to appear (i.e., carport attached to the side of the house). By trespassing onto the curtilage and detaining defendant, the agent violated defendant's **Fourth Amendment** rights. (*United States v. Perea-Rey* (9th Cir. 2012) 680 F.3rd 1179, 1183-1189.)

It is an open, undecided issue, with authority going both ways, as to whether it is lawful for an officer to conduct a "knock and talk" at other than the front door. The U.S. Supreme Court declined to resolve the issue. (*Carroll v. Carman* (Nov. 10, 2014) 574 U.S. __ [135 S.Ct. 348; 190 L.Ed.2nd 311]; determining that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity in that the issue is the subject of some conflicting authority.)

However, while declining to decide the correctness of the generally held opinion that a police officer, in making contact with a resident, is constitutionally bound to do no more than restrict his "movements to walkways, driveways, porches and places where visitors could be expected to go," the Court cited a number of lower federal and state appellate court decisions which have so held: E.g., *United States v. Titemore* (2nd Cir. 2006) 437 F.3rd 251; *United States v. James* (7th Cir 1994) 40 F.3rd 850, vacated on other grounds at 516 U.S. 1022; *United States v. Garcia* (9th Cir. 1993) 997 F.2nd 1273, 1279-1280; and *State v. Domicz* (2006) 188 N.J. 285, 302. (*Id.*, at p. __ [135 S.Ct. at pp. 351-352].)

See "Knock and Talk," under "Detentions" (Chapter 3), above.

The Doctrine of "Consent Once Removed:"

In the situation where an undercover police officer, or even a paid informant, has already been invited into a criminal suspect's home where, through observations while there, probable cause is established resulting in the undercover officer or informant signaling other officers, the backup officers may then lawfully make a warrantless entry. (*United States v Bramble* (9th Cir. 1966) 103 F.3rd 1475, 1478-1479; *United States v. Yoon* (6th Cir. 2005) 398 F.3rd 802.)

"Once consent has been obtained from one with authority to give it, any expectation of privacy has been lost. We seriously doubt that the entry of additional officers would further diminish the consenter's expectation of privacy, and, in the instant case, any remaining expectation of privacy was outweighed by the legitimate concern for the safety of [the officers inside]. (Citations omitted.)" (*United States v Bramble*, *supra*, at p. 1478.)

Observing Contraband from Outside a Residence: When a law enforcement officer observes contraband in plain sight from outside the house, such as through an open window or door, the officer *may not* make a warrantless entry to seize that evidence absent an exigent circumstance. (***Horton v. California*** (1990) 496 US. 128, 137 fn. 7 (and cases cited therein) [110 L.Ed.2nd 112, 123].)

Note: Exigent circumstances might be present when occupants of the house observe the police officer observing the contraband, thus creating the circumstance where it is reasonable to believe the evidence will be destroyed before a warrant can be obtained. In such a case, it might be appropriate to make an immediate entry for purposes of “*securing*” the residence pending the obtaining of a search warrant. (See “*Securing the Premises,*” above.)

Exigent circumstances allowing an immediate entry were found where the suspect was observed through the open door near the contraband under circumstances where it appeared he might have been the victim of an overdose. (***People v. Zabelle*** (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1282.)

Observing what appeared to be a cocked revolver at the side of a house (i.e., in the cartilage) behind a six foot fence with a locked gate, allowed for the officer to scale the fence to recover the weapons for officer safety purposes, and because it was believed that a child might be present in the house. (***People v. Chavez*** (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1493.)

And, before exigent circumstances, or a resulting search warrant, can be used as a basis for entering a residence, it must be first determined whether the police officer’s initial observations were in fact lawful; i.e., made from a position or location the officer had a legal right to be. (***United States v. Garcia*** (9th Cir. 1993) 997 F.2nd 1273, 1279; ***People v. Ortiz*** (1994) 32 Cal.App.4th 286, 291; see also ***People v. Camacho*** (2000) 23 Cal.4th 824; where observations from the side of defendant’s house held to be illegal.)

Using a Ruse to Cause a Suspect to Open his Door:

Split of Authority: While “*knock and talks*” are legal (see above), there is a split of authority on the issue of whether an officer, without probable cause, may use a ruse or subterfuge to make warrantless observations inside a residence.

Held to be Illegal:

Causing a suspect to open his door for the purpose of allowing the officer the opportunity to make a “*plain sight observation*” of

contraband within the residence is illegal. (*People v. Reeves* (1964) 61 Cal.2nd 268.)

In order to lawfully gain an intentional visual access to the inside of a residence, one or more of three circumstances must be present:

- The occupant voluntarily and knowingly opens the door in response to a request, but not a threat or command, such as in a “*knock and talk*” (see above);
- The officers have a search warrant; *or*
- The offices have probable cause and exigent circumstances justifying the lack of a warrant.

(*United States v. Washington* (9th Cir. 2004) 387 F.3rd 1060, 1070-1071; officers refused to allow defendant to shut the door during an otherwise lawful “*knock and talk*,” making the inside of defendant’s apartment clearly visible.)

Using a ruse to trick people outside during a narcotics investigation at an apartment complex, for the purpose of confronting as many people as they could lure outside, resulted in the defendant’s illegal detention when he was surrounded by a team of officers all dressed in raid gear. “A deception used to gain entry into a home and a ruse that lures a suspect out of a residence is a distinction without much difference. . . .” (*People v. Reyes* (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 7, 12-13.)

Use of an administrative, or “inspection” warrant, issued by a court for the purpose of regulating building, fire, safety, plumbing, electrical, health, labor or zoning codes, does not justify a concurrent entry (i.e., entering with the inspectors) by police to make an arrest when the police attempt to use the lower standard of proof needed to obtain an administrative warrant as their justification for entering. If an entry is effected for the purpose of arresting the occupant, an arrest warrant will have to be obtained. (*Alexander v. City and County of San Francisco* (1994) 29 F.3rd 1355.)

Posing as a potential buyer of a residence, thus gaining entry for the purpose of making observations of illegal activity, is an illegal ruse. (*People v. De Caro* (1981) 123 Cal.App.3rd 454.)

But see People v. Lucatero (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1110, below.

A real estate agent who, upon showing a house to potential buyers, observed an abnormal amount of electronic equipment and suspected that the items were stolen. She called police who made a warrantless entry with the agent and, after an extensive search, seized stolen property. Although criticizing *De Caro* to some extent, the Court still held the warrantless entry to be illegal. The Court held that the agent, while authorized to show prospective buyers the house, was not authorized to allow the police in for the purpose of conducting a criminal investigation. The authority of a real estate agent, “is limited, as is all consensual authority, by the terms of the consent and the purpose for which it was given. [Citations] A real estate agent is authorized to consent to the entry of persons the agent believes in good faith to be potential purchasers of the property.” (*People v. Jaquez* (1985) 163 Cal.App.3rd 918.)

Held to be Legal:

Merely knocking on the defendant’s door and then stepping to the side for purposes of insuring the safety of the officers (a common police practice) *is not* an illegal ruse merely because the defendant (who was under the influence of methamphetamine at the time) came out about 20 feet looking for the source of the knocking and got himself arrested. (*People v. Colt* (2004) 118, Cal.App.4th 1404; *United States v. Crapser* (9th Cir. 2007) 472 F.3rd 1141, 1145-1147.)

When police officers who knock at the door are invited in by the occupants who did not know it was the police at the door when they made the invitation, there is no subterfuge requiring the suppression of any observations made by the officers as they enter. (*Mann v. Superior Court* (1970) 3 Cal.3rd 1.)

Making an anonymous phone call to the occupant of a residence, warning him that “the police are coming; get rid of the stuff,” causing defendant to leave the house with his contraband in hand, is not illegal. (*People v. Rand* (1972) 23 Cal.App.3rd 579; “Where the ruse does no more than to cause a defendant, activated by his own decision, to do an incriminating act—whether that act be a sale to an undercover agent or a jettisoning of incriminating material—no illegality exists.” (*Id.*, at p. 583; see also *People v. Martino* (1985) 166 Cal.App.3rd 777, 789; phone call to cocaine dealer.)

An undercover narcotics agent, misrepresenting his identity by claiming to be a potential buyer of narcotics, acts lawfully when invited into the defendant's home for the purpose of purchasing narcotics despite the lack of a warrant. (*Lewis v. United States* (1966) 385 U.S. 206, 208-209 [17 L.Ed.2nd 312].)

A police officer who, with information from an untested informant that drugs were in a house that was for sale, posed as a potential buyer and was shown the house by the real estate agent, during which entry the officer made corroborating observations with which he later obtained a search warrant. The entry was held to be lawful where the officer did no more than could any prospective buyer. (*People v. Lucatero* (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1110.)

The *Lucatero* Court differentiated its facts from *People v. De Caro*, *supra*, noting that the prior ruling's conclusion that the entry was illegal was "*dicta*" only (i.e., not necessary to its decision) and incorrectly decided.

The *Lucatero* Court also differentiated its facts from those of *People v. Jaquez*, *supra*, where the officers entered with the real estate agent's permission for the known purpose of conducting a warrantless police investigation. In *Jaquez*, the real estate agent was not authorized to allow police into the house to conduct a criminal investigation. In *Lucatero*, where the officer posed as a potential buyer, the real estate agent *was* authorized to allow in potential buyers.

The *Lucatero* Court also differentiated this case from others where ruses were held to be illegal, the Court noting that "(t)his is not a ruse in which the officer is invited in under the ruse that he is a meter reader and then does not read the meter, or that he is a friend of the repairman, but then engages in investigatory behavior inconsistent with a friend's visit." (Citing *State v. Nedergard* (Wash. Ct.App. 1988) 753 P.2nd 526.)

Possible Resolution; Kentucky v. King: The issue has possibly been resolved by the Supreme Court in the recent decision of *Kentucky v. King* (2011) 563 U.S. 452, 459-472 [179 L.Ed.2nd 865]:

So long as the officers' actions in knocking on the door and identifying themselves, and presumably seeking a consensual entry, does not itself constitute a violation or threatened violation of the **United States Constitution** (i.e., the **Fourth Amendment**),

there is no penalty for doing so. Arguably, therefore, any observations in made in the process of doing so should be lawful.

Searches Incident to Arrest: Whenever a person is arrested, officers may (depending upon the circumstances) search the person and the area within that person's immediate reach. (*Chimel v. California* (1969) 395 U.S. 752 [23 L.Ed.2nd 685].)

In a Residence: This includes within a house, and may involve, as a part of a "*protective sweep*" (see below), looking "in closets and other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched." (*Maryland v. Buie* (1990) 494 U.S. 325, 334 [108 L.Ed.2nd 276, 286].)

However, looking any further than the adjoining rooms require "articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene." (*Maryland v. Buie, supra*, at pp. 327, 334 [108 L.Ed.2nd at pp. 282, 286]; *United States v. Lemus* (9th Cir. 2009) 582 F.3rd 958, 962.)

See "*Protective Sweeps*," below.

Arresting a subject in his home justifies a search of the *Chimel* "lunging area" incident to arrest, at least where there are still unsecured people and possibly unaccounted for third parties in the residence. (*People v. Summers* (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 288.)

However, the U.S. Supreme Court recently restricted searches incident to arrest when searching a vehicle in *Arizona v. Gant* (2009) 556 U.S. 332 [173 L.Ed.2nd 485]. In *Gant*, it was held that a warrantless search of a vehicle incident to arrest is lawful *only* when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search. This same rule is likely to apply to searches incident to arrest in a residence, or anywhere else.

Although the United States Supreme Court has indicated that *Gant* is limited to "circumstances unique to the vehicle context" (See *Riley v. California* (June 25, 2014) 573 U.S. ___, ___ [134 S.Ct. 2473, 2492; 189 L.Ed.2nd 430], citing *Gant* at p. 343), at least one California court has applied it to the residential situation. (See *People v. Leal* (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1051; arrest in a residence.)

The *Leal* court, citing *Summers* and *Gant*, noted that there are limitations to this rule: “A different rule of reasonableness applies when the police have a degree of control over the suspect but do not have control of the entire situation. In such circumstances—e.g., in which third parties known to be nearby are unaccounted for, or in which a suspect has not yet been fully secured and retains a degree of ability to overpower police or destroy evidence—the **Fourth Amendment** does not bar the police from searching the immediate area of the suspect’s arrest as a search incident to an arrest.” (*Id.*, at p. 1060.)

The *Leal* Court also held that the rule of *Gant* was retroactive (see pp. 1065-1066); a questionable decision in light of the decision in *Davis v. United States* (2011) 564 U.S. 229, 236-239 [180 L.Ed.2nd 285], where it was held that decisions such as *Gant* are *not* retroactive. (See “*Is Gant Retroactive?*” under “*Searches of Vehicles*,” above.)

Citing *United States v. Fleming* (7th Cir. 1982) 667 F.2nd 602, 605-608, the *Leal* Court noted that handcuffing alone is probably not enough to fully secure the suspect. (*Id.*, at p. 1062.)

“*Protective Sweeps:*”

Defined: A quick, limited premises search incident to a *lawful arrest* in a residence has been upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court if the arresting officers have a “*reasonable belief*” that there is another person on the premises who poses a danger to those on the arrest scene. (*Maryland v. Buie* (1990) 494 U.S. 325 [108 L.Ed.2nd at pp. 282, 286]; *People v. Dyke* (1990) 224 Cal.App.3rd 648, 661; *People v. Block* (1971) 6 Cal.3rd 239.)

“A ‘protective sweep’ is a quick and limited search of premises, incident to an arrest and conducted to protect the safety of police officers or others.” (*People v. Ormonde* (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 282, 292.)

A protective sweep of a trailer upheld when a suspect in a narcotics trafficking case, upon seeing the officers’

approach, ducked back out of sight, attempted to close the door, and closed the blinds. (*United States v. Arellano-Ochoa* (9th Cir. 2006) 461 F.3rd 1142; protective sweep made after an immediate warrantless entry was made, defendant was arrested, and a gun was observed on the floor near the front door.)

A protective sweep (although not referred to it as such) during the execution of a search warrant, where the officers had knowledge that a suspect had a firearm registered to him, is also reasonable at least when that suspect had not yet been found. (See *Los Angeles County v. Rettele* (2007) 550 U.S. 609 [167 L.Ed.2nd 974].)

“(T)he type of criminal conduct underlying the arrest or search is significant in determining if a protective sweep is justified.” (*People v. Ledesma* (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 857; 865; see *People v. Werner* (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1208; an earlier incident of domestic violence does not indicate that someone inside with weapons might be present.

Having detained outside all the members of a family at a birthday party, such detentions having been held to be illegal, and with no reason to believe anyone else was in the plaintiffs’ apartment, the warrantless search of the apartment could not be upheld as a protective sweep. (*Sialoi v. City of San Diego* (9th Cir. 2016) 823 F.3rd 1223, 1237-1238.)

Limitation: Protective sweeps of the areas of the home beyond the immediate area (i.e., any adjoining rooms) of the arrest will *not* be upheld absent an *articulable reason* for believing someone in the home is present who constitutes a potential danger to the officers. (*United States v. Furrow* (9th Cir. 2000) 229 F.3rd 805; see also *People v. Sanders* (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318; *United States v. Lemus* (9th Cir. 2009) 582 F.3rd 958, 962; *United States v. Lundin* (9th Cir. 2016) 817 F.3rd 1151, 1161.)

Areas immediately adjacent to the location of the arrest, such as closets and other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be launched, may be searched without any cause to believe there may be people there. (See *Maryland v. Buie*, *supra*, at p. 334 [108

L.Ed.2nd 276, 286]; and see “*Searches Incident to Arrest*,” above.)

To search beyond the areas immediately adjacent to the location of an arrest, the courts have been lenient on the reasons, so long as it can be argued that the officer was reasonably in fear for his safety. (E.g.; See ***People v. Ledesma*** (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 857; A **Fourth** Wavier search of a probationer’s room, on probation for narcotics related offenses, when a resident appeared to be under the influence of drugs and others were known to be in the house during a prior contact.)

But the courts will *not* uphold a protective sweep where there are no specific articulable facts indicating the presence of someone who might be a danger to the officers. (E.g., see ***United States v. Chaves*** (11th Cir. 1999) 169 F.3rd 687, 692; ***United States v. Colbert*** (6th Cir. 1996) 76 F.3rd 773, 777-778; ***United States v. Delgado-Pérez*** (1st Cir. P.R. 2017) 867 F.3rd 244.)

A “lack of knowledge cannot constitute the specific, articulable facts required by ***Buie***.” (***United States v. Bagley*** (10th Cir. KS 2017) 877 F.3rd 1151.)

An exception to the probable cause requirement for entering and searching a residence is when an officer has a “*reasonable belief*” (or “*reasonable suspicion*”) to believe that other people might be inside who constitute a danger to the officers or others at the scene. In such a case, the law allows a limited “*protective sweep*” to insure that no one might be there who constitutes such a danger. (***People v. Ormonde*** (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 282; entry into a residence following a domestic violence-related arrest out front held to be illegal when the officer only wanted to check to see if anyone might be there, with no reason to believe that there was.)

See also ***People v. Werner*** (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1205-1210, where it was held that an earlier incident of domestic violence does not indicate by itself that someone inside with weapons might be present. After defendant’s arrest on the front porch, a warrantless entry under the theory of a protective sweep, with no articulable facts

indicating the presence of anyone inside who might be a danger, held to be illegal.

An officer's general experience that domestic violence incidents often involve danger to responding officers held to be insufficient to justify a protective sweep. (*Id.*, at pp. 1208-1209.)

In *Werner*, the protective sweep argument was used by the Attorney General on appeal to justify an officer following a friend of the arrestee back into the house to retrieve personal items for the arrestee, during which excursion contraband was observed in plain sight. While such an entry was held to be an illegal protective sweep, given the lack of any articulable reason to believe there might be someone inside who constituted a danger, it was noted that the same is not true where it is the arrestee himself who is asking permission to go back into the residence. In such a circumstance, entering with the arrestee even without permission would be lawful. (*Id.* at p. 1210, fn. 9; citing *Washington v. Chrisman* (1982) 455 U.S. 1 [70 L.Ed.2nd 788].)

Further, protective sweeps “may extend only to a cursory inspection of those spaces where a person may be found. The sweep lasts no longer than is necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger and in any event no longer than it takes to complete [the police action] and depart the premises. [fn. omitted]” (*Maryland v. Buie*, *supra.*, at pp. 335-336 [108 L.Ed.2nd at p. 287].)

However, a protective sweep of a residence, where the resident is a parolee, is lawful with or without a suspicion that others might be present in that the whole house was subject to search anyway under the parolee's **Fourth** waiver conditions. (*United States v. Lopez* (2007) 474 F.3rd 1208.)

A protective sweep is *not* justified by the fact that the defendant is arrested at the door holding a weapon absent evidence to believe that there is someone else inside who might constitute a threat to the officers. (*United States v. Murphy* (9th Cir. 2008) 516 F.3rd 1117, 1120-1121;

protective sweep upheld, however, because there was a second outstanding suspect who might have been inside.)

But a cursory check of the immediately adjoining living room was upheld where defendant was arrested at the threshold. The plain sight observation of a firearm under the couch cushion upheld. (*United States v. Lemus* (9th Cir. 2009) 582 F.3rd 958.)

See dissenting opinion to the Court's denial of an en banc rehearing, at (9th Cir. 2010) 596 F.3rd 512, by Kozinski, C.J.

The detention of two individuals found opening the garage of a residence where officers were present for reasons not explained in the record, where one of them (i.e., defendant) appeared to be nervous and wore baggie clothing apparently containing a number of unknown items, did not justify the detention of the individuals nor the patdown of defendant for weapons under the theory of a protective sweep. (*United States v. Job* (9th Cir. 2017) 871 F.3rd 852, 860-862.)

Arresting a person immediately *outside* of the house, with cause to believe that there may be others inside who could constitute a danger to the officers, warrants a protective sweep of the house. (*People v. Maier* (1991) 226 Cal.App.3rd 1670, 1675; *People v. Ledesma, supra*, at p. 864, fn. 3; *United States v. Hoyos* (9th Cir. 1989) 892 F.2nd 1387 [reversed on other grounds]; *United States v. Wilson* (5th Cir. 2001) 306 F.3rd 231, 238-239; *United States v. Watson* (5th Cir. 2001) 273 F.3rd 599, 603; *Sharrar v. Felsing* (3rd Cir. 1997) 128 F.3rd 823; *United States v. Colbert* (6th Cir. 1996) 76 F.3rd 773; *United States v. Henry* (D.C. Cir. 1995) 48 F.3rd 1282, 1284; *United States v. Paopao* (9th Cir. 2006) 469 F.2rd 760, 765; see also *United States v. Pile* (8th Cir. 2016) 820 F.3rd 314; *United States v. Alatorre* (8th Cir. 2017) 863 F.3rd 810.)

However, merely knowing that the defendant's wife and son live with him, but having no reason to believe they were dangerous or that they were even home at the time, is insufficient cause to do a protective sweep of the home after detaining the defendant immediately outside. (*People v. Celis* (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 676-680.)

Celis also raises, but does not answer the question whether to make entry into the house to conduct the protective sweep after an arrest that occurs outside requires only a “reasonable suspicion” that persons are inside who constitute a threat to the officers, or whether full-blown “probable cause” is needed. (*Id.*, at p. 678.)

But with defendant already arrested and secured (handcuffed and put into a patrol car), and with no reason to believe anyone else was in the house, a protective sweep was held *not* to be justified. (*United States v. Lundin* (9th Cir. 2016) 817 F.3rd 1151, 1161.)

Detentions Outside the House: The California Supreme Court left open the question of whether merely “detaining” someone outside the home will allow for a “protective sweep” of the home for dangerous suspects, absent “probable cause” to believe someone is in fact inside who constitutes a danger to the officers. (*People v. Celis*, *supra*, at p. 680.)

At least one other state has upheld such a protective sweep upon detaining a suspect outside on the front porch. (*State v. Revenaugh* (1999) 173 Idaho 774, 776-777.)

A protective sweep of a commercial establishment (i.e., a gambling house) when an arrest is made outside has also been upheld and the officers had a “reasonable suspicion” that a second robbery suspect might be inside. (*United States v. Paopao* (9th Cir. 2006) 469 F.2rd 760, 765-767.)

Other Situations: Protective sweeps have also been upheld in situations other than with an arrest. For instance:

In conducting a **Fourth** Waiver search where the suspect was on probation for narcotics-related offenses, a resident appeared to be under the influence of drugs, and others were known to be in the house during a prior contact. (*People v. Ledesma* (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 857.)

Officers lawfully inside the house with consent. (*United States v. Gould* (5th Cir. 2004) 364 F.3rd 578.)

By an officer left behind to secure a residence while a search warrant is obtained. (*United States v. Taylor* (6th Cir. 2001) 248 F.3rd 506, 513.)

While executing a search warrant. (*Drohan v. Vaughn* (1st Cir. 1999) 176 F.3rd 17, 22.)

Protective sweep of a bedroom after the lessee had given consent to search other parts of an apartment. (*United States v. Patrick* (D.C. Cir. 1992) 959 F.2nd 991, 996-997.)

Some cases, however, have indicated that to be lawful, a protective sweep must follow a lawful arrest within the home. (See *United States v. Davis* (10th Cir. 2002) 290 F.3rd 1239, 1242, fn. 4; *United States v. Reid* (9th Cir. 2000) 226 F.3rd 1020, 1027.)

The legality of making a protective sweep of a house where officers are lawfully in the house for some purpose other than to make an arrest was specifically left unanswered by the California Supreme Court. (*People v. Celis, supra*, at pp. 678-679.)

A protective sweep of a residence, where the resident is a parolee, is lawful with or without a suspicion that others might be present in that the whole house was subject to search anyway under the parolee's **Fourth** waiver conditions. (*United States v. Lopez* (2007) 474 F.3rd 1208.)

Plain Sight Observations, from a location the police officer has a legal right to be, are lawful and not considered to be a search. (*People v. Block* (1971) 6 Cal.3rd 239, 243; *North v. Superior Court* (1972) 8 Cal.3rd 301, 306.) Thus, evidence so observed when an officer is already lawfully inside, or otherwise may lawfully enter a residence or its curtilage, is subject to seizure. For instance:

Contraband observed through the open door of a motel room while arresting the defendant just outside, may be seized. But a search warrant must be used, or probable cause and exigent circumstances must be found, or the suspect's consent must be obtained, in order to lawfully search of the rest of the room. (*People v. LeBlanc* (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 157.)

Observations of contraband located within the curtilage of the defendant's home from a lawful position outside that curtilage are lawful. (*People v. Channing* (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 985.)

Observation of defendant's growing marijuana plants from a neighbor's property, without the neighbor's knowledge or permission, looking into

defendant's adjacent backyard, held to be lawful. Defendant did not have standing to challenge the trespass into the neighbor's yard, and did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in what was growing in his own yard, in that his marijuana plants were plainly visible. (*People v. Claeys* (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 55.)

Observations of defendant retrieving contraband from a hole in the ground in the common area of an apartment complex, while the observing officers were standing on adjacent private property with the permission of the property's owner, were lawful. (*People v. Shaw* (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 833.)

The observations of contraband within the "curtilage" of the defendant's home, while the officers were walking around the house in an attempt to find an occupant, was upheld. (*United States v. Hammett* (9th Cir. 2001) 236 F.3rd 1054.)

But see People v. Camacho (2000) 23 Cal.4th 824, where the California Supreme Court held that observations from the side of the residence, 40 feet from the sidewalk, with nothing there to indicate that the public was inferably invited to that side, were unlawful, at least when the officers were checking nothing more than a complaint of loud music, it was late at night, and they failed to first try knocking at the front door.

See also the dissent, at pp. 832 et seq., listing numerous federal circuit court decisions seemingly in disagreement with the rule of *Camacho*.

Observation of contraband in plain sight by police officers who made a warrantless entry into a residence, responding to an emergency call from someone in apparent distress, was lawful, and justified the obtaining of a search warrant to search the residence. (*United States v. Snipe* (9th Cir. 2008) 515 F.3rd 947.)

An officer standing on his tiptoes, adding about three inches to his height, in order to see over a six foot fence, was lawful. Observation of a firearm behind the fence by so doing was a "plain sight observation." (*People v. Chavez* (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1493, 1499-1502.)

When evidence of a different crime is discovered during a lawful warrant search, even if the officers are participating in the search hoping to find evidence of a different crime for which there is not yet probable cause, such "plain sight" observations are lawful and may therefore be used to obtain a second search warrant and/or in the interrogation of the in-custody suspect. (*People v. Carrington* (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 160, 164-

168, impliedly overruling *People v. Albritton* (1982) 138 Cal.App.3rd 79, which previously held such plain sight observations, unless totally “inadvertent,” were unlawful.)

In *People v. Carrington, supra.*, officers from agency #2 accompanied officers from agency #1 who were executing a lawful search warrant in their own case. The officers from agency #2 were there for the purpose of making “plain sight” observations of evidence related to their agency’s own investigation. Upon making such observations, this information was used to obtain a second warrant directed specifically at agency #2’s investigation. This procedure was approved by the California Supreme Court.

“Even assuming the officers (from the agency #2) . . . hoped to find evidence of other offenses, their subjective state of mind would not render their conduct unlawful. . . . The existence of an ulterior motivation does not invalidate an officer’s legal justification to conduct a search.” (*Id.*, at p. 168; citing *Whren v. United States* (1996) 517 U.S. 806 [135 L.Ed.2nd 89], for the argument that an officer’s subjective motivations for being on the search party are irrelevant so long as the search, viewed “objectively,” is lawful.)

Observations made into the curtilage of the home from the defendants’ driveway, when the driveway was an area accessible to the neighbors, were properly used to obtain a search warrant. The use of night vision goggles was irrelevant. (*People v. Lieng* (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1213.)

Evidence observed in plain view by officers entering a residence with the suspect’s consent and with exigent circumstances, while the officers did a protective sweep and check for victims of a shooting, justified a later warrantless entry to seize and process that evidence so long as the police did not give up control of the premises. (*People v. Superior Court [Chapman]* (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1014-1021.)

Preserving the Peace:

A warrantless entry into a residence when necessary to “*preserve the peace*” in the execution of a restraining order, allowing the defendant’s daughter to retrieve certain property, was held to be lawful. Reasonable force was also properly used when necessary to effectively preserve the peace. (*Henderson v. City of Simi Valley* (9th Cir. 2002) 305 F.3rd 1052.)

The lawfulness of a warrantless entry into a residence was upheld by the United States Supreme Court, at least when there was a fight going on

inside the residence and the officers had “*an objectively reasonable basis for believing*” that immediate action was necessary in order to prevent someone from being seriously injured. (*Brigham City v. Stuart* (2006) 547 U.S. 398 [164 L.Ed.2nd 650], a case appealed from a decision of the Utah Supreme Court finding the entry to be a violation of the **Fourth Amendment**.)

“[L]aw enforcement officers may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.” (*City & County of San Francisco v. Sheehan* (May 18, 2015) __ U.S. __, __ [135 S.Ct. 1765; 191 L.Ed.2nd 856]; quoting *Brigham City v. Stuart*, *supra*, at p. 403.)

Officers responding to a call of a disturbance, finding a pickup truck in the driveway which had apparently been in an accident, blood on the truck and on clothes in the truck, broken windows in the house, and defendant, barricaded inside, screaming and throwing things. Defendant had a visible cut on his hand. One officer forced his way in and defendant pointed a rifle at him. Noting that, “(i)t requires only ‘an objective reasonable basis for believing’ that ‘a person within [the house] is in need of immediate aid,’” and that the officer was acting reasonably when he made the warrantless entry into defendant’s home, the Court found the entry to be lawful. (Citations Omitted; *Michigan v. Fisher* (2009) 558 U.S. 45 [175 L.Ed.2nd 410].)

“Officers do not need ironclad proof of ‘a likely serious, life-threatening’ injury to invoke the emergency aid exception (to the warrant requirement.” Also, the officer’s subjective motivations for entering were irrelevant, the test being an objection one. (*Id.*, at p. 49.)

Also, the Court noted the reality of such a situation when a police officer is forced to decide what to do: “It does not meet the needs of law enforcement or the demands of public safety to require officers to walk away from a situation like the one they encountered here. Only when an apparent threat has become an actual harm can officers rule out innocuous explanations for ominous circumstances. But ‘[t]he role of a peace officer includes preventing violence and restoring order, not simply rendering first aid to casualties.’ (citing *Brigham City*, *supra*, at p. 406.)” (*Ibid.*)

Note: While the Supreme Court in neither *Brigham City v. Stuart* nor *Fisher* use the label, it can be argued that these cases are consistent with the “*community caretaking doctrine*” theory of

conducting a warrantless entry into the respective residences. (See below.)

Entry into a residence held to be lawful when officers reasonably believed that people inside were in need of immediate aid following a report that they had been involved in a large fight. (*People v. Lester* (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 291.)

Review was granted by the California Supreme Court in this case and the decision was depublished, making it unavailable for citing; 1/15/2014.

Preventing the Destruction of Evidence: A warrantless entry into a residence for the purpose of preventing the destruction of evidence may be lawful, depending upon what the evidence is. (*People v. Huber* (1965) 232 Cal.App.2nd 663; *Ker v. California* (1963) 374 U.S. 23, 40-41 [10 L.Ed.2nd 726].)

Rule: “*Probable cause*” to believe that evidence will “imminent(ly)” be destroyed (or a suspect will escape) will justify a warrantless entry into a residence. (*People v. Strider* (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1393; entry into a residence while chasing a subject with a firearm in his pocket, a potential violation of P.C. § 12031(a)(1) (loaded firearm in public; now P.C. § 25850(a)), held to be illegal in that the front yard defendant was in was not a “public place” under the circumstances, as required by the statute.)

A three-minute sweep of a house to check for persons *reasonably believed* to be in the house who might destroy evidence in a homicide case was held to be lawful. (*People v. Seaton* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598.)

Where it appears that confederates of a person arrested for selling narcotics will learn of the arrest and destroy or secret contraband still in the house, it is lawful to secure the house pending the obtaining of a search warrant. (*Ferdin v. Superior Court* (1974) 36 Cal.App.3rd 774, 781; *People v. Freeny* (1974) 37 Cal.App.3rd 20.)

With “*probable cause*” to believe that contraband is contained in a particular residence, and a “*reasonable belief*” that if the house is not immediately secured the evidence will be destroyed, officers may enter to secure the house pending the obtaining of a search warrant or a consent to do a complete search. (*United States v. Alaimalo* (9th Cir. 2002) 313 F.3rd 1188; see also *Sandoval v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t.* (9th Cir. 2014) 756 F.3rd 1154, 1161; *Sialoi v. City of San Diego* (9th Cir. 2016) 823 F.3rd 1238.)

Differentiating Felony vs. Misdemeanor cases:

Entering a house without consent to take a suspected DUI driver into custody and to remove him from the house for identification and arrest by a private citizen who saw defendant's driving, and to preserve evidence of his blood/alcohol level, has been held to be legal. (*People v. Thompson* (2006) 38 Cal.4th 811.)

Note: The Court differentiated on its facts *Welsh v Wisconsin* (1984) 466 U.S. 740 [80 L.Ed.2nd 732], where it was held that a first time DUI, being no more than a civil offense with a \$200 fine under Wisconsin law, was not aggravated enough to allow for a warrantless entry into a residence to arrest the perpetrator. The cut off between a minor and a serious offense seems to be whether or not the offense is one for which incarceration is a potential punishment. (*People v. Thompson, supra*, at pp. 821-824, citing *Illinois v. McArthur* (2001) 531 U.S. 326, 336, 337 [148 L.Ed.2nd 838].)

See also *People v. Hampton* (1985) 164 Cal.App.3rd 27, 34: A warrantless entry was upheld to prevent the destruction of evidence (the blood/alcohol level) and there was reason to believe defendant intended to resume driving. *Welsh* can be distinguished by the simple fact that California treats DUI cases as serious misdemeanors as well as the defendant, in *Welsh*, no longer had his car available to him.

But the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal, arguing the continuing validity of, *Welsh*, has held that California's interpretation under *Thompson* is wrong, and that a warrantless entry into a home to arrest a misdemeanor driving-while-under-the-influence suspect is a **Fourth Amendment** violation. (*Hopkins v. Bonvicino* (9th Cir. 2009) 573 F.3rd 752, 768-769; finding that warrantless entries into residences in misdemeanor cases "will seldom, if ever, justify a warrantless entry into the home.")

In *Sims v. Stanton* (9th Cir. 2013) 706 F.3rd 954 (certiorari granted), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal held that entering the curtilage of a home in pursuit of a suspect with the intent to detain him when the subject is ignoring the officer's demands to stop, at worst a misdemeanor violation of **P.C. § 148**, is illegal. The warrantless fresh or hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect into a residence

(or the curtilage of a residence) is limited to felony suspects only. The United States Supreme Court, however, reversed this decision in *Stanton v. Sims* (Nov. 4, 2013) 571 U.S. ___ [134 S.Ct. 3; 187 L.Ed.2nd 341].

The Ninth Circuit's decision was based upon the Court's interpretation of the United States Supreme Court decision in *Welsh v Wisconsin* (1984) 466 U.S. 740 [80 L.Ed.2nd 732], and conflicts with the California Supreme Court's reasoning in *People v. Thompson* (2006) 38 Cal.4th 811 (see "Warrantless entry to arrest a DUI (i.e., "Driving while Under the Influence") suspect," above).

However, the United States Supreme Court, in interpreting its own decision on *Welsh*, noted that they only held there that a warrantless entry into a residence for a minor offense *not involving hot pursuit* was an exception to the normal rule that a warrant is "usually" going to be required. Per the Court, there is no rule that residential entries involving hot pursuit are limited to felony cases. In this case, there was a "hot pursuit." (*Stanton v. Sims, supra*, citing *Welsh*, at p. 750.)

See also *United States v. Johnson* (9th Cir. 2001) 256 F.3rd 895, 908, fn. 6; "In situations where an officer is truly in hot pursuit and the underlying offense is a felony, the **Fourth Amendment** usually yields. (Citation) However, in situations where the underlying offense is only a misdemeanor, law enforcement must yield to the **Fourth Amendment** in all but the 'rarest' cases." (Citing *Welsh v. Wisconsin* (1984) 466 U.S. 740, 753 [80 L.Ed.2nd 732].)."

Officers entering a home on a loud music complaint upheld despite the Supreme Court's holding in *Welsh*, ruling that the situation was more akin to a "community caretaking" issue than the one where it was necessary to find an exigent circumstance. (*United States v. Rohrig* (6th Cir. 1996) 98 F.3rd 1506.)

Entering a residence with probable cause to believe only that the non-bookable offense of possession of less than an ounce of marijuana is occurring (**H&S § 11357(b)**), is closer to the *Welsh* situation, and a violation of the **Fourth Amendment** when entry is made without consent or a warrant. (*People v. Hua* (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1027; *People v. Torres et al.* (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 989, 993-998.)

The *Torres* Court also rejected as “speculation” the People’s argument that there being four people in the defendants’ hotel room indicted that a “marijuana-smoking party” was occurring, which probably involved a bookable amount of marijuana. (*People v. Torres et al.*, *supra*, at p. 996.)

Welfare Checks; the “Community Caretaking Function;” and the “Emergency Aid Doctrine:”

Rule: Checking for victims in a residence upon a “reasonable belief” that someone inside a residence is in need of aid, or that there is an imminent threat to the life or welfare of someone inside, justifies an immediate warrantless entry. (*People v. Ray* (1999) 21 Cal.4th 464; *Tamborino v. Superior Court* (1986) 41 Cal.3rd 919; *People v. Ammons* (1980) 103 Cal.App.3rd 20.)

In *Ray*, *supra*, a “plurality” of the California Supreme Court ruled that under the so-called “emergency aid doctrine,” which is a subcategory of a law enforcement officer’s “community caretaking” duties, a warrantless entry into a residence may be allowed whenever police officers “reasonably believe” someone inside is in need of assistance or action must be taken to preserve the occupant’s property.

“The appropriate standard under the community caretaking exception is one of reasonableness: Given the known facts, would a prudent and reasonable officer have perceived a need to act in the proper discharge of his or her community caretaking functions?” (*Id.* at pp. 476-477.)

Three justices in *Ray* found this “emergency aid doctrine” to be a subcategory of the “community caretaking” rationale, and not a form of “exigent circumstance.” (*People v. Ray*, *supra*, at p. 471.) Three concurring justices found such a situation to come within the standard “exigent circumstance” rationale. (*Id.*, at p. 480.)

Community Caretaking:

There is some debate whether the “community caretaking” theory applies to anything other than vehicles. (See *Ray v. Township of Warren* (3rd Cir. 2010) 626 F.3rd 170, 175-177.) However, California and the Ninth Circuit have both used the community

caretaking argument to justify warrantless entries of residences on various occasions. (See *People v. Ray*, *supra.*; *United States v. Cervantes* (9th Cir. 2000) 219 F.3rd 882, 888-890; *Martin v. City of Oceanside* (9th Cir. 2004) 360 F.3rd 1078, 1081-1083; *United States v. Russell* (9th Cir. 2006) 436 F.3rd 1086.)

See also *United States v Snipe* (9th Cir. 2008) 515 F.3rd 947, 951-952. While the 9th Circuit here doesn't use the term "community caretaking," it does take the rules as announced in *United States v. Cervantes*, *supra*, and modifies the elements of the doctrine based upon the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in *Brigham City v. Stuart* (2006) 547 U.S. 398 [164 L.Ed.2nd 650].

Also, while the United States Supreme Court does not use the phrase "*community caretaking*," the Court has upheld warrantless entries into residences where there is "*an objectively reasonable basis for believing*" that immediate action was necessary in order to prevent someone from being seriously injured. (See *Brigham City v. Stuart*, *supra*, and *Michigan v. Fisher* (2009) 558 U.S. 45 [175 L.Ed.2nd 410]; see below.)

Under the "*Community Caretaking Function*," a police officer may enter a residence without a warrant, as a community caretaker, where the officer has a reasonable belief that an emergency exists that requires his attention. In addition, the "reasonable belief" standard "is a less exacting standard than probable cause." Finally, a search or seizure under the community caretaking function is reasonable if the governmental interest in law enforcement's exercise of that function, based on specific and articulable facts, outweighs the individual's interest in freedom from government intrusion. (*United States v. Smith* (8th Cir. 2016) 820 F.3rd 356; upholding the warrantless entry into a residence for the purpose of checking for a person the officers reasonably believed was being held by defendant against her will.)

The "*community caretaking*" theory was held to justify officers entering a home on a loud music complaint. In balancing (1) whether immediate government action was required, (2) whether the governmental interest was sufficiently compelling to justify a warrantless intrusion, and (3) whether the defendant's expectation of privacy was diminished in some way by his actions of generating the loud music, the Court ruled that a warrantless entry to address the problem of the loud music was reasonable. (*United States v. Rohrig* (6th Cir. 1996) 98 F.3rd 1506.)

In so ruling, the Sixth Circuit cites the California Supreme Court case of *People v. Lanthier* (1971) 5 Cal.3rd 751, where the warrantless search of a college student's locker was upheld when it was noted that a "noxious odor" was emanating from it, much to the discomfort of the other students. The "ongoing nuisance" justified a warrantless intrusion into the student's locker.

Subsequently, however, the Sixth Circuit seems to have had second thoughts whether "community caretaking" applies to residences. (See *United States v. Williams* (6th Cir. 2003) 354 F.3rd 497, 508; "(D)espite references to the doctrine in *Rohrig*, we doubt that community caretaking will generally justify warrantless entries into private homes.")

The "*community caretaking function*" has been held to be inapplicable to the situation where police officers make a warrantless entry into a mental patient's home after his detention for a mental evaluation per **W&I § 5150**, despite the fact that **W&I § 8102(a)** commands a peace officer to confiscate firearms and other deadly weapons in such a situation. (*People v. Sweig* (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1145; petition granted.)

The *Sweig* Court also found, however, that a search warrant is not permitted under **P.C. § 1524** (see "*Statutory Grounds for Issuance (P.C. § 1524(a))*," under "*Searches with a Search Warrant*" (Chapter 6), above) when the defendant is detained pursuant to **H&S § 5150** only. The Court suggested that the Legislature should fix the problem with a legislative amendment to **Section 1524**.

The California Supreme Court granted a petition in *Sweig*, making it unavailable for citation pending the Court's decision.

Also, the California Legislature amended **P.C. § 1524**, effective 1/1/10, adding a number of additional grounds for obtaining a search warrant, including to recover firearms and other deadly weapons where a person has been committed for observation pursuant to **H&S § 5150**.

Also, the "*community caretaking*" theory was found to be inapplicable when officers entered the defendant's locked-off property based upon little more than a neighbor's unsubstantiated belief that the defendants might have been the victims of a "drug rip-off" the night before. Finding a small amount of marijuana

debris at the edge of the defendants' property and a small depression leading under the fence was not legally sufficient. Also, the officers appeared more concerned with investigating allegations that the defendants were cultivating marijuana. The community caretaking theory is inapplicable when the police act to solve crime as opposed to coming to the aid of persons. (*People v. Morton* (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 1039.)

Under the “*emergency exception*,” an officer may enter a home without a warrant to investigate an emergency that threatens life or limb so long as there is “*objectively reasonable grounds to believe that an emergency exists and that his immediate response is needed*.” The Court noted that this exception derives from a police officer’s “*community caretaking function*.” The other possible exception to the warrant requirement is known as the “*exigency exception*,” which stems from the officer’s investigatory function. Under this theory, an officer may enter a residence without a warrant if he has “probable cause to believe that a crime has been or is being committed and a reasonable belief that his entry is needed to stop the destruction of evidence or a suspect’s escape or to carry out other crime prevention or law enforcement efforts.” Both exceptions require that the officer have an objectively reasonable belief that the circumstances justify an immediate entry. (*Espinosa v. City and County of San Francisco* (9th Cir. 2010) 598 F.3rd 528, 534-536; see also *Sandoval v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t*. (9th Cir. 2014) 756 F.3rd 1154, 1161; *Sialoi v. City of San Diego* (9th Cir. 2016) 823 F.3rd 1238.)

Under the “community caretaking” exception to the **Fourth Amendment**, police officers who responded to an emergency call to help a suicidal person acted reasonably when they entered the house to perform a cursory search for firearms or other dangerous weapons after defendant had come outside. The trial court did not err in denying a motion to suppress evidence of drug manufacturing equipment and an assault weapon that the officers found inside the house that were observed in plain sight. The record did not expressly show that the officers believed defendant was suicidal and a danger to himself when they entered defendant’s residence, but it was reasonable to infer that they entertained such a belief and that although they did not take defendant to a mental health facility, they would have done so had not probable cause developed for defendant’s arrest. (*People v. Ovieda* (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 614, 619-623.)

Emergency Aid Doctrine:

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal:

In earlier cases, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal applied a three-point standard in order to employ what the Court referred to as the “*emergency aid*” exception to the **Fourth Amendment** as a function of law enforcement’s “*community caretaking function*,” and required a finding of three circumstances to be applicable:

- The police must have “*reasonable grounds*” to believe that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property; *and*
- The search must *not* be primarily motivated by an intent to arrest and seize evidence; *and*
- There must be some reasonable basis, “*approximating probable cause*,” to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched.

(*United States v. Cervantes* (9th Cir. 2000) 219 F.3rd 882, 888-890; *Martin v. City of Oceanside* (9th Cir. 2004) 360 F.3rd 1078, 1081-1083; *United States v. Martinez* (9th Cir. 2005) 406 F.3rd 1160; *United States v. Russell* (9th Cir. 2006) 436 F.3rd 1086.)

However, in *United States v Snipe* (9th Cir. 2008) 515 F.3rd 947, 951-952, the Ninth Circuit modified these rules in light of *Brigham City v. Stuart* (2006) 547 U.S. 398 [164 L.Ed.2nd 650] (*see below*) and *Whren v. United States* (1996) 517 U.S. 806 [135 L.Ed.2nd 89], deleting altogether the officers’ subjective motivations as being irrelevant, and finding only as necessary a “objectively reasonable basis for concluding that an emergency is unfolding in the place to be entered.” (See below.)

Now, the Ninth Circuit finds the following factors to be necessary: Whether (1) considering the totality of the circumstances, law enforcement had an objectively reasonable basis for concluding that there was an immediate need to protect others or themselves from serious harm, and (2) the search’s scope and manner were

reasonable to meet the need. (*United States v Snipe, supra.*, at p. 952; see also *Hopkins v. Bonvicino* (9th Cir. 2009) 573 F.3rd 752, 763, fn. 5.)

A police officer's entry into a residence, motivated out of a concern for the welfare of a nine-year-old child who the officers suspected had been left home alone at night, was lawful under the so-called "*emergency doctrine*," which is derived from the officers' "*community caretaking function*." The "*emergency doctrine*" is an exception to the **Fourth Amendment's** restrictions on warrantless residential entries, and "may be justified by the need to protect life or avoid serious injury." (*United States v. Bradley* (9th Cir. 2003) 321 F.3rd 1212.)

The "*Emergency Aid*" exception to the search warrant requirement has been understood to permit law enforcement officers to enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant or other officers from imminent injury. There has to be a "*reasonable basis*" for concluding that there is an imminent threat of violence to the occupants to justify this exception to the search warrant requirement. The government bears the burden of showing specific and articulable facts to justify invoking this exception. (*Sandoval v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't.* (9th Cir. 2014) 756 F.3rd 1154, 1163-1165; finding the officers' warrantless entry into the residence under the circumstances of this case, where there was no probable cause to believe a burglary was occurring, and where the observed occupants were attempting to comply with the officers' commands, to be illegal.)

Making a warrantless entry into defendant's residence and bedroom where the officer believed that defendant may be concealing a victim inside was held to be reasonable. Although defense counsel was legally ineffective for not having made a motion to suppress the weapons and ammunition found therein ("There was at least a chance that such a motion would have succeeded."), the state habeas courts were not unreasonable in denying the writ in that although the officer inarticulately referred to the entry as a "protective sweep," the "emergency aid doctrine" arguably allowed for the warrantless entry. (*Mahrt v. Beard* (9th Cir. 2017 849 F.3rd 1164, 1171-1172.)

California courts are in accord:

Responding to a radio call concerning a male being shot several times, and finding a wounded female and an injured male on the front porch, with blood on the front entrance indicating someone with injuries either entered or exited the residence, without any other way to determine whether the reported male with a gunshot wound might be in the house requiring aid, forcing entry into the residence (conceded by the parties) and then into a locked upstairs bedroom (the issue in the case) was lawful under the “*emergency aid doctrine*.” Also, for the protection of the police, not knowing where the shooter(s) might be, forcing entry into the bedroom to make sure the suspects weren’t there was also reasonable for the officers’ protection as they conducted an investigation. (*People v. Troyer* (2011) 51 Cal.4th 599.)

The Court further rejected defendant’s argument that the officers needed “*probable cause*” to believe someone inside needed aid. The test, citing *Brigham City v. Stuart, supra*, at p. 400, is merely having an “objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with injury.” (*Id.* at pp. 606-607.)

The Court rejected the dissenting justices’ conclusion that there were other reasonable, innocent explanations for what the police first found. It is not the officers’ responsibility to eliminate the possibility of other reasonable explanations, but rather to act on the reasonable belief that additional victims who need immediate assistance may be somewhere in that house. (*Id.* at p. 613.)

Quoting *Brigham City v. Stuart* (2006) 547 U.S. 398, 401 [164 L.Ed.2nd 650] (below), California’s Second District Court of Appeal, citing the “*emergency aid doctrine*,” noted that; “police may enter a home without a warrant when they have an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury.” In the instant

case, the officers were told by the radio dispatch operator that someone had reported hearing a screaming woman and distressed moaning at the location. Upon arrival, consistent with the radio dispatch call information, the officers could hear from the outside loud voices—both male and female—engaged in an argument inside the house. One officer additionally saw through the window that two males in the house were gesturing as if arguing. Under these circumstances, it was objectively reasonable for an officer to believe that immediate entry was necessary to render emergency assistance to a screaming female victim inside or to prevent a perpetrator from inflicting additional immediate harm to that victim or others inside the house. Upon making entry and finding two females, who told the officers that they were okay, did not make unreasonable a check of the rest of the house for another female who was reported to be in distress. The fact that the original call actually concerned a different residence across the street did not make the search of defendant’s home unreasonable. “We do not with a ‘hindsight determination’ upend the officers’ objectively reasonable conclusion that an exigency existed at the location simply because we subsequently learn of contrary facts unknown to the officers at the time they made their decision” (citing *People v. Troyer* (2011) 51 Cal.4th 599.) The plain sight observation of illegal drugs in a closet, where a victim or a suspect could have been hiding, was upheld. (*People v. Pou* (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 143, 151-153.)

The United States Supreme Court’s Rule:

In *Brigham City v. Stuart* (2006) 547 U.S. 398 [164 L.Ed.2nd 650]: The Supreme Court ignored efforts by the lower courts to categorize the entry into a house upon viewing an altercation through the window as coming within the “*emergency aid doctrine*,” “*community caretaking*,” or any other label, and merely noted the exigency of protecting the occupants from being hurt. In so doing, the Court held that a warrantless entry into a residence is lawful when police have “*an objectively reasonable basis for believing*” that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury, and then the manner of the officers’ entry was also reasonable.

Expanding upon the discussion in *Brigham City*, but still not using the phrase “*community caretaking*,” the Supreme Court further

held that officers responding to a call of a disturbance, finding a pickup truck in the driveway which had apparently been in an accident, blood on the truck and on clothes in the truck, broken windows in the house, and defendant, barricaded inside, screaming and throwing things. Defendant had a visible cut on his hand. One officer forced his way in only to have defendant point a rifle at him. Noting that “(i)t requires only ‘an objective reasonable basis for believing’ that ‘a person within [the house] is in need of immediate aid,’ and that the officer was acting reasonably when he made the warrantless entry into defendant’s home, the Court found the entry to be lawful. (Cites Omitted; *Michigan v. Fisher* (2009) 558 U.S. 45 [175 L.Ed.2nd 410].)

“Officers do not need ironclad proof of ‘a likely serious, life-threatening’ injury to invoke the emergency aid exception (to the warrant requirement. Also, the officer’s subjective motivations for entering were irrelevant, the test being an objection one. (*Id.*, at p. 49.)

Also, the Court noted the reality of such a situation when a police officer is forced to decide what to do: “It does not meet the needs of law enforcement or the demands of public safety to require officers to walk away from a situation like the one they encountered here. Only when an apparent threat has become an actual harm can officers rule out innocuous explanations for ominous circumstances. But ‘[t]he role of a peace officer includes preventing violence and restoring order, not simply rendering first aid to casualties.’ (citing *Brigham City*, *supra*, at p. 406.)” (*Ibid.*)

Where officers entered a mentally ill woman’s room at a group home, were threatened with a knife, retreated to the hallway, called for backup, but then forced their way back into the room without waiting for the backup to arrive, and shot her, the officers were held to have been justified as a matter of law in making the first entry under the emergency aid exception under the **Fourth Amendment**. (*City & County of San Francisco v. Sheehan* (May 18, 2015) __ U.S. __, __ [135 S.Ct. 1765; 191 L.Ed.2nd 856].)

The Supreme Court declined to decide whether making the second entry of plaintiff’s room, having initially backed out when confronted by the knife-wielding plaintiff, was constitutional under the circumstances, it not having been briefed on appeal, but rather (in overruling the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeal) found that the officers had qualified immunity from civil liability in that the officers' choice to reenter the room without waiting for backup or otherwise planning a strategy did not violate clearly established law. (*Id.*, 135 S.Ct. at pp. 1174-1178.)

Police officers may make a warrantless entry into a residence whenever they have “*an objectively reasonable basis for believing*” that an occupant or the officers are imminently threatened with serious injury. (*Ryburn v. Huff* (2012) 565 U.S. 469 [132 S.Ct. 987; 181 L.Ed.2nd 966]; reversing the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal’s earlier decision that had held that unverified rumors that the plaintiffs’ son had threatened to “shoot up” a high school, along with the son’s mother, who was generally uncooperative, running back into the house when asked about firearms in the house, was insufficient to justify an immediate entry.

Other Cases:

Two warrantless entries to look for a missing eight-year-old girl based upon probable cause to believe that she, or her body, might be in the apartment. (*People v. Panah* (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 464-469.)

Information that “*suspicious activity*” was taking place at a home, finding a rear sliding door slightly ajar, with the lights and a television on inside, but with no one responding to the officers’ attempts to get the attention of the occupants, was sufficient “*probable cause*” to believe that a resident in the house might have been in danger or injured. (*Murdock v. Stout* (9th Cir. 1995) 54 F.3rd 1437.)

Sheriff’s Deputies responding to a shooting call, not knowing whether the defendant had shot himself or whether there was a second victim or a possible shooter in the house, were justified in making a warrantless entry to look for more victims and/or a possible shooter. (*United States v. Russell* (9th Cir. 2006) 436 F.3rd 1086.)

The warrantless entry of the defendant’s trailer, based upon “*probable cause*” to believe a kidnap victims were inside, was justified. (*People v. Coddington* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 580.)

Whether or not the FBI agents in *Coddington* actually needed full-blown “*probable cause*” to believe the victims were inside and in immediate need of rescue was not discussed. Arguably, a simple “*reasonable suspicion*” would have been sufficient.

An emergency 911 call reporting an accidental stabbing justified a warrantless entry of a hotel room for the limited purpose of ensuring the safety of those inside. (*People v. Snead* (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 380, 386.)

Responding to a domestic violence call, officers contacted a woman who, although denying there was a problem, appeared to be frightened and apparently had been struck. The warrantless entry was upheld based upon what the Court determined to be sufficient “*probable cause.*” (*People v. Higgins* (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 247, 252-255.)

Responding to a call concerning a “*shooting,*” a bullet hole was found in a patio door and blood on the patio floor. Entry was justified for the purpose of checking for possible shooting victims. (*People v. Soldoff* (1980) 112 Cal.App.3rd 1.)

And see *United States v. Martinez* (9th Cir. 2005) 406 F.3rd 1160, a questionable legal analysis attempting to differentiate the differences between “*exigent circumstance*” and the “*emergency doctrine*” as it relates to a domestic violence situation. The Court found that checking a residence for a potential domestic violence victim fell under the later.

Entry into a residence to check for the possible presence of a domestic violence victim who had telephoned police minutes earlier to ask for assistance in returning to the apartment to retrieve her belongings, but who couldn’t be found upon the officers’ arrival, was held to be lawful under the circumstances. (*United States v. Black* (9th Cir. 2007) 482 F.3rd 1035.)

While the case was analyzed as a “*welfare check*” and “*exigent circumstances,*” the Court noted in a footnote (fn. 1) that the same result would be applicable if analyzed under the “*emergency aid doctrine.*”

See dissenting opinion to the Court’s denial of an en banc rehearing, at (9th Cir. 2007) 482 F.3rd 1044, by Kozinski, C.J.

Entry into a motel room to check the welfare of the occupant whose four-year old son and an employee of the motel told officers that the occupant was unconscious and could not be woken up, held to be sufficient of an “*exigent circumstance*,” supported by “*probable cause*,” to justify a warrantless entry. (*People v. Seminoff* (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 518, 528-530.)

Observation of contraband in plain sight by police officers who made a warrantless entry into a residence, responding to an emergency call from someone in apparent distress (“*Get the cops here now*,” followed by the caller being disconnected), was lawful, and justified the obtaining of a search warrant to search the residence. (*United States v. Snipe* (9th Cir. 2008) 515 F.3rd 947.)

The Third District Court of Appeal (Shasta County) found that although, under the “*emergency aid*” doctrine, an officer must have “*an objectively reasonable basis*” to believe someone inside is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury in order to justify a warrantless entry (citing *Brigham City v. Stuart, supra.*), the officer may look through the defendant’s side window (which the Court found to be at a location, at the side of the house, that implicated the **Fourth Amendment**), an admittedly lesser intrusion than making entry, with no more than a “*reasonable suspicion*” to believe that someone inside might need their assistance. (*People v. Gemmill* (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 958.)

Also see Calabretta v. Floyd (9th Cir. 1999) 189 F.3rd 808, where it was held that an entry of a residence for the purpose of investigating a possible child abuse, where there were no exigent circumstances requiring an immediate entry, requires full “*probable cause*” and a search warrant.

And see *United States v. Deemer* (9th Cir. 2004) 354 F.3rd 1130; where it was held that an anonymous 911-hangup call, traceable to a particular motel, but without sufficient information to determine which room the call may have come from, did not allow for the non-consensual entry into the defendant’s room to see if anyone needed help merely because of the suspicious attempts by the person who answered the door to keep the officers from looking inside, and her apparent lies concerning no one else being there.

With a citizen’s report that plaintiff had been in a minor traffic accident and had the odor of alcohol on his breath, officers forced entry into his home under the supposition that a layperson might

misinterpret the fruity smell of a person's breath who is on the brink of a diabetic coma as being under the influence of alcohol. Absent any other evidence that plaintiff was in fact about to suffer a diabetic coma, the Court rejected this argument as "both simple and audacious." The Court also rejected the officers' claim that they felt plaintiff might have been injured given the fact that the traffic accident was so minor that there was no damage to either car. (*Hopkins v. Bonvicino* (9th Cir. 2009) 573 F.3rd 752, 759, 763-766.)

With a missing victim, and sufficient suspicious circumstances causing an officer to reasonably believe that the victim may die if immediate action is not taken, a warrantless entry into a private area may be lawful. No warrant is required "when an emergency situation requires swift action to prevent imminent danger to life." "(I)f the facts available to the officer at the moment of the entry would cause a person of reasonable caution to believe that the action taken was appropriate," the officer may lawfully make a warrantless entry into a residence or other private area. (*People v. Rogers* (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1136, 1144-1145, 1153-1161; with prior information that defendant may have secreted a missing victim in a storage room, and the defendant's nervousness and lack of cooperation, the immediate, warrantless entry into the storage area was held to be lawful.)

Following the reasoning in *Rogers*, the Court held that officers were justified in making entry into a darkened apartment when no one would answer their knocking to check the welfare of a woman and her child who hadn't been heard from all day following a violent "domestic violence" incident with her live-in boyfriend the night before, when no one could locate her and it was known that it was uncharacteristic of her not to answer her home or cellphone for the whole day. (*People v. Hockstraser* (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 883, 895-901.)

Plain sight observations made while lawfully inside the apartment provided probable cause to search the defendant's vehicle parked outside the apartment, where the victim's dismembered body was then found. (*Id.*, at pp. 901-905.)

The warrantless entry and search of a residence is lawful so long as there is an objectively reasonable basis for believing that someone inside or the officer is in serious danger, the manner of entry is reasonable, and the scope of the subsequent search is reasonable.

(United States v. Reyes-Bosque (9th Cir. 2010) 596 F.3rd 1017, 1029-1030.)

Exigent Circumstances and Officer Safety: “The exigency exception (to the search warrant requirement) permits warrantless entry where officers ‘have both probable cause to believe that a crime has been or is being committed and a reasonable belief that their entry is necessary to prevent . . . the destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some other consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts.’” (*Sandoval v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t.* (9th Cir. 2014) 756 F.3rd 1154, 1161; *Sialoi v. City of San Diego* (9th Cir. 2016) 823 F.3rd 1238.)

A possible trafficker in narcotics, ducking back into his residence upon the approach of peace officers, while attempting to shut the door and close the blinds, is an exigent circumstance justifying an immediate, warrantless entry. *United States v. Arellano-Ochoa* (9th Cir. 2006) 461 F.3rd 1142.)

With probable cause to believe a burglary is in progress, a warrantless forced entry into a residence would be appropriate. However, under circumstances where the officers should have known that the occupant of a house was not a burglar (e.g., the ex-wife of the person believed to be the resident, with the ex-wife having been given the residence in the divorce, and under circumstances where it was not reasonable to believe that she was burglarizing the house), a forced entry and confronting the occupant at gunpoint is a **Fourth Amendment** violation subjecting the officers to civil liability. (*Frunz v. City of Tacoma* (9th Cir. 2006) 468 F.3rd 1141.)

Scaling a six foot fence past a locked gate,, and thus entering defendant’s side yard, was lawful when necessary to retrieve a firearm observed on the ground where the officer feared for his own safety and the safety of a seven year old minor who was suspected of being in the house. (*People v. Chavez* (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1493, 1503.)

The warrantless entry and search of a residence is lawful so long as there is an objectively reasonable basis for believing that someone inside or the officer is in serious danger, the manner of entry is reasonable, and the scope of the subsequent search is reasonable. (*United States v. Reyes-Bosque* (9th Cir. 2010) 596 F.3rd 1017, 1029-1030.)

Responding to a 911 call concerning a person climbing over a fence into a residential backyard, and finding defendant who matched the description, where defendant did not resist or attempt to flee and without any indication of the presence of burglar tools or that the house was being broken into, was held to be insufficient cause to enter the curtilage of

defendant's home (i.e., his fenced-off backyard) nor probable cause to arrest him for attempted burglary or even trespass. A gun found on him in a search incident to arrest should have been suppressed. (*United States v. Struckman* (9th Cir 2010) 603 F.3rd 731, 739-747; suggesting that the officers should asked him more questions and check his claims that he was in his own backyard before arresting him.)

Police officers may make a warrantless entry into a residence whenever they have an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant or the officers are imminently threatened with serious injury. (*Ryburn v. Huff* (2012) 565 U.S. 469 [132 S.Ct. 987; 181 L.Ed.2nd 966]; reversing the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal's decision that had held that unverified rumors that the plaintiffs' son had threatened to "shoot up" a high school, along with the son's mother, who was generally uncooperative, running back into the house when asked about firearms in the house, was insufficient to justify an immediate entry.

The same theory apparently applies to a warrantless entry of a business by animal control officers for the purpose of checking on the welfare of animals in a pet store. The court held that exigent circumstances (the strong odor of deceased animals' flesh) justified the officers' warrantless entry into the shop and seizure of the animals pursuant to authority under **P.C. § 597.1**, finding that "the statutory language authorizing immediate seizure when an animal control officer 'has reasonable grounds to believe that very prompt action is required to protect the health or safety of others' is the equivalent of the exigent circumstances exception familiar to search and seizure law. That exception allows entry without benefit of a warrant when a law enforcement officer confronts an emergency situation requiring swift action to save life, property, or evidence." (*Brodén v. Marin Humane Society* (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1212, 1220-1221.)

Kicking open an upstairs locked bedroom door while checking for possibly wounded victims at a shooting scene, and for officers' safety while they conducted an investigation, when it is unknown whether the shooting suspect(s) might be in the house, was reasonable. (*People v. Troyer* (2011) 51 Cal.4th 599, 613.)

Following a suspected illegal alien to defendant's home, and observing the illegal alien to walk to a carport at the side of the house, held not to justify an warrantless entry of the carport by Border Patrol agents, where defendant and the alien were arrested. (*United States v. Perea-Rey* (9th Cir. 2012) 680 F.3rd 1179, 1183-1189.)

In *Sims v. Stanton* (9th Cir. 2013) 706 F.3rd 954, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal held that entering the curtilage of a home in pursuit of a suspect

with the intent to detain him when the subject is ignoring the officer's demands to stop, at worst a misdemeanor violation of **P.C. § 148**), is illegal. The warrantless fresh or hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect into a residence (or the curtilage of a residence) is limited to felony suspects only. The United States Supreme Court, however, reversed this decision in *Stanton v. Sims* (Nov. 4, 2013) 571 U.S. ___ [134 S.Ct. 3; 187 L.Ed.2nd 341].

The Ninth Circuit's decision was based upon the Court's interpretation of the United States Supreme Court decision in *Welsh v Wisconsin* (1984) 466 U.S. 740 [80 L.Ed.2nd 732], and conflicts with the California Supreme Court's reasoning in *People v. Thompson* (2006) 38 Cal.4th 811 (see "Warrantless entry to arrest a DUI (i.e., "Driving while Under the Influence") suspect," above).

However, the United States Supreme Court, in interpreting its own decision on *Welsh*, noted that they only held there that a warrantless entry into a residence for a minor offense, *not* involving hot pursuit, was an exception to the normal rule, and that a warrant is "usually" going to be required. Per the Court, there is no rule that residential entries involving hot pursuit are limited to felony cases. (*Stanton v. Sims, supra*, citing *Welsh*, at p. 750.)

Where officers respond to a call concerning two white males, ages 18 to 20, going over a backyard fence and looking in windows, but find instead three Hispanic male juveniles sitting in a bedroom of the house, ages 14 to 18, listening to music, watching TV, and playing video games, it was held that there was insufficient probable cause to make entry into the residence or to take the males into custody. (*Sandoval v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't.* (9th Cir. 2014) 756 F.3rd 1154, 1161-1163.)

With only a reasonable suspicion to believe that the occupant of a house might be involved in criminal activity, ordering him out of the house and to back up as he did so, and holding onto him (albeit without handcuffs) with his hands behind his back while asking for his consent to search his person, was illegal. Full probable cause was necessary. The subsequent consent to search his person and his house was the product of that illegal detention. (*People v. Lujano* (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 175, 185-189.)

Upon hearing a conversation during a lawful wiretap that defendant was about to destroy or remove drugs from his apartment, officers were reasonable in making an immediate entry to secure the apartment pending the obtaining of a search warrant. The fact that it took an hour from the time of the overheard phone call until entry could be made did not detract

from the exigency. (*United States v. Fowlkes* (9th Cir. 2015) 804 F.3rd 954, 968-969.)

Having detained outside all the members of a family at a birthday party, such detentions being illegal, and it already having been determined that none of the family members were not even close to the description given of some suspects seen carrying firearms, and without any reason to believe that any of the family members were in possession of any firearms, officers were not justified in making a warrantless entry into the family's apartment for the purpose of looking for a second weapon. (*Sialoi v. City of San Diego* (9th Cir. 2016) 823 F.3rd 1223, 1238.)

A warrantless search of a residence based upon an exigency is unlawful absent both probable cause to believe that a crime has been or is being committed and a reasonable belief that entry is necessary to prevent the destruction of evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some other consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts. (*Id.*, at p. 1238, citing *Sandoval v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't.* (9th Cir. 2014) 756 F.3rd 1154, 1161.)

Defendants' motion to suppress was properly denied where exigent circumstances justified two animal control officers looking into the window of the garage on defendants' property with the knowledge that a horse that was thin and being housed in an unsafe corral had escaped from the property, where the officers knew there had been prior calls to the property in response to reported concerns about the conditions of horses and pit bull dogs on the property, and that they were reasonably concerned about whether a dog that was heard whining inside the garage was in distress and living in unhealthy conditions. Through the garage window, a "slat mill" (known to be used to train fighting dogs) could be seen. Exigent circumstances, and while looking for a resident, also justified the officers walking into and inspecting defendant's fenced backyard to check the condition of the dogs they could hear barking incessantly from there. Suspecting that the property was being used for dog fighting purposes, the later warrant obtained for the residence and property, based upon the above observations, was valid. (*People v. Williams* (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 111, 119-125.)

Entering a residence to search for a warrant subject, where the subject's documentation all said that he lived there, and despite his mother's verbal claim that he did not, was reasonable. (*Sharp v. County of Orange* (9th Cir. 2017) 871 F.3rd 901, 917-919.)

Emergency Exception and the Odor of Ether:

In cases where the odor of ether is apparent, coming from a particular location indicating the presence of an illicit drug lab and creating a hazardous, potentially explosive, situation, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal has held that although the odor by itself is *not* probable cause, it is a dangerous situation needing immediate action. Therefore, so long as (1) the police have reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property, (2) their assistance is not primarily motivated by the intent to arrest a person or seize evidence, *and* (3) there is some reasonable basis, “*approximating probable cause*,” to associate the emergency with the area or place to be entered, then the “*emergency doctrine*” will allow for a warrantless entry to neutralize the emergency. (*United States v. Cervantes* (9th Cir. 2000) 219 F.3rd 882.)

And then, any plain sight observations made while lawfully in the house neutralizing the danger can provide the necessary probable cause to secure the house, arrest the occupants, and obtain a search warrant for the rest of the house. (*People v. Hill* (1974) 12 Cal.3rd 731.)

State authority is in apparent agreement: The odor of ether *is* an exigent circumstance, given the potential volatility of ether, to justify an immediate warrantless entry to “*neutralize*” the dangerous situation. (*People v. Messina* (1985) 165 Cal.App.3rd 931; *People v. Osuna* (1987) 187 Cal.App.3rd 845.)

The odor of ether plus other circumstances which corroborate the suspected presence of an illicit substance *will* normally establish probable cause. (*People v. Stegman* (1985) 164 Cal.App.3rd 936; *People v. Patterson* (1979) 94 Cal.App.3rd 456; *People v. Torres* (1981) 121 Cal.App.3rd Supp. 9.)

Executing an Arrest Warrant:

An arrest warrant constitutes legal authority to enter the suspect’s residence and search for him. (*People v. LeBlanc* (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 157, 164.)

Similarly, police are authorized to enter a house without a warrant where the suspect is a parolee who had no legitimate expectation of privacy against warrantless arrests. (*People v. Lewis* (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 662, 671; *In re Frank S.* (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 145, 151.)

Surrounding a barricaded suspect in his home is in effect a warrantless arrest, justified by the exigent circumstances. The passage of time during the ensuing standoff does not dissipate that exigency to where officers are expected to seek the authorization of a judge to take the suspect into physical custody. (*Fisher v. City of San Jose* (9th Cir. 2009) 558 F.3rd 1069; overruling its prior holding (at 509 F.3rd 952) where it was ruled that failure to obtain an arrest warrant during a 12 hour standoff resulted in an illegal arrest of the barricaded suspect.)

Entry of a residence to execute a *bench warrant*, issued by a neutral magistrate upon a defendant's failure to appear in court, is lawful despite the fact that the bench warrant was issued without a finding of probable cause. (*United States v. Gooch* (9th Cir. 2007) 506 F.3rd 1156.)

But, before a police officer may enter a home, absent consent to enter, the officer must have a *reasonable belief*, falling short of probable cause to believe, the suspect lives there *and* is present at the time. (*People v. Downey* (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 652, 657-662.)

But see prior decisions from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal finding that "*probable cause*" to believe the person who is the subject of the arrest warrant is actually inside at the time is the correct standard. (*United States v. Gorman* (9th Cir. 2002) 314 F.3rd 1105; *People v. Phillips* (9th Cir. 1974) 497 F.2nd 1131; *United States v. Diaz* (9th Cir. 2007) 491 F.3rd 1074; *United States v. Gooch, supra*, at p. 1159, fn. 2; *Cuevas v. De Roco* (9th Cir. 2008) 531 F.3rd 726; *United States v. Mayer* (9th Cir. 2008) 530 F.3rd 1099, 1103-1104.)

See "*Sufficiency of Evidence to Believe the Suspect is Inside*," below.

"Because an arrest warrant authorizes the police to deprive a person of his liberty, it necessarily also authorizes a limited invasion of that person's privacy interest when it is necessary to arrest him in his home." (*Steagald v. United States* (1981) 451 U.S. 204, 214-215, fn. 7 [68 L.Ed.2nd 38, 46].)

"Thus, for **Fourth Amendment** purposes, an arrest warrant founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is *reason to believe* the suspect is within." (Italics added; *Payton v. New York* (1980) 445 U.S. 573, 603 [63 L.Ed.2nd 639, 661].)

“It is not disputed that until the point of Buie's arrest the police had the right, based on the authority of the arrest warrant, to search anywhere in the house that Buie might have been found, . . .” (*Maryland v. Buie* (1990) 494 U.S. 325, 330 [108 L.Ed.2nd 276, 283].)

If the person is in a *third party's home*, absent consent to enter, a *search warrant* for the residence must be obtained in addition to the arrest warrant. (*Steagald v. United States*, *supra*, at pp. 211-222 [68 L.Ed.2nd at pp. 45-52]; *People v. Codinha* (1982) 138 Cal.App.3rd 167; see **P.C. § 1524(a)(6)**)

Failure, however, to obtain a search warrant will not benefit the subject with the outstanding arrest warrant, but serves only to protect the homeowner (i.e., the “third party”) should evidence of criminal activity be discovered during the entry of his residence. The person with the outstanding arrest warrant will generally be without standing to contest the entry of the warrantless entry of the residence. (*United States v. Bohannon* (2nd Cir. 2016) 824 F.3rd 242.)

Sufficiency of Evidence to Believe the Suspect is Inside: The amount of evidence a law enforcement officer must have indicating that a sought-after criminal suspect is in fact presently inside his own residence in order to justify a non-consensual entry, with or without an arrest warrant, has been debated over the years:

The United States Supreme Court, in *Payton v. New York* (1980) 445 U.S. 573 [63 L.Ed.2nd 639], merely states that a police officer must have a “*reason to believe*” the suspect is inside his residence, without defining the phrase.

An early California lower appellate court found that the officers needed only a “*reasonable belief*,” or “*strong reason to believe*,” the suspect was home. (*People v. White* (1986) 183 Cal.App.3rd 1199, 1204-1209; rejecting the defense argument that full “*probable cause*” to believe the subject was inside is required; see also *United States v. Magluta* (11th Cir. 1995) 44 F.3rd 1530, 1535, using a “*reasonable belief*” standard.)

Other authority indicates that a full measure of “*probable cause*” is required. (See *Dorman v. United States* (D.C. Cir. 1970) 435 F.2nd 385, 393; *United States v. Vasquez-Algarin* (3rd Cir. 2016) [821 F.3rd 467; see also *People v. Phillips* (9th Cir. 1974) 497 F.2nd 1131; a locked commercial establishment, at night; and *United States v. Gorman* (9th Cir.

2002) 314 F.3rd 1105; defendant in his girlfriend's house with whom he was living.)

The California Supreme Court, interpreting the language of **P.C. § 844** (i.e., “*reasonable grounds for believing him to be (inside)*”), has found that any arrest, with or without an arrest warrant, requires *probable cause* to believe the subject is inside in order to justify a non-consensual entry into a residence. (*People v. Jacobs* (1987) 43 Cal.3rd 472, 478-479; *but*, see below.)

In order to conduct a **Fourth** Waiver search of a residence, an officer must have probable cause to believe that the residence to be searched is in fact the parolee's (or probationer's) residence. (*Motley v. Parks* (9th Cir. 2005) 432 F.3rd 1072, 1080-1082; *United States v. Franklin* (9th Cir. 2010) 603 F.3rd 652; *United States v. Bolivar* (9th Cir. 2012) 670 F.3rd 1091, 1093-1095.)

However, noting that five other federal circuits have ruled that something less than probable cause is required, and that the Ninth Circuit is a minority opinion, the Fourth District Court of Appeal (Div. 2) found instead that an officer executing an arrest warrant or conducting a probation or parole search may enter a dwelling if he or she has only a “*reasonable belief*,” falling short of probable cause, that the suspect lives there and is present at the time. Employing that standard, the entry into defendant's apartment to conduct a probation search was lawful based on all of the information known to the officers. Accordingly, the court upheld the trial court's conclusion that the officers had objectively reasonable grounds to conclude the defendant/probationer lived at the subject apartment and was present at the time, and therefore the officers had the right to enter the apartment to conduct a warrantless probation search. (*People v. Downey* (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 652, 657-662.)

Also arguing that the California Supreme Court, in *People v. Jacobs*, *supra* (pg. 479, fn. 4), did *not* find that probable cause was required, contrary to popular belief. (*Id.*, at p. 662; see above.)

Note: The “*present at the time*” requirement apparently only applies to executing an arrest warrant. It has never been required that a person on a **Fourth** waiver be home at the time of a warrantless entry and search. (See *People v. Lilienthal* (1978) 22 Cal.3rd 891, 900.)

Without mentioning *Downey*, the Ninth Circuit cites *Motley v. Parks*, *supra*, with approval, continuing to hold that full probable cause to believe that the target of a **Fourth** Waiver search resides

in the place to be searched is necessary. (*United States v. Bolivar* (9th Cir. 2012) 670 F.3rd 1091, 1093-1095.)

Officers knew defendant had lived at the suspect residence at one time but also had newer information that he had moved elsewhere, although there was still some indication that he was maybe visiting the prior residence or that the occupants knew where he could be located; insufficient to establish probable cause. (*Cuevas v. De Roco* (9th Cir. 2008) 531 F.3rd 726.)

Information from a neighbors and, separately, an anonymous informant, all indicating that defendant had returned to his reported address and was selling marijuana at that residence, established probable cause to believe he was living there again. (*United States v. Mayer* (9th Cir. 2008) 530 F.3rd 1099, 1103-1104.)

Third Parties Entering with Police: It is a **Fourth Amendment** violation to allow third parties (e.g.; the news media) into a constitutionally protected area, such as the defendant’s home, without the occupant’s permission, even when the officers themselves are entering legally (e.g.; serving a search warrant). (*Wilson v. Layne* (1999) 526 U.S. 603 [143 L.Ed.2nd 818]; creating federal civil liability.)

It was not error, however, to deny defendants’ motions to suppress the physical evidence seized from their property where the media was present on the front yard of the defendants’ compound, in that their presence did not violate the **Fourth Amendment** because the front yard was not curtilage, and there was no basis to find a reasonable expectation of privacy in the front yard. But the **Fourth Amendment** was violated by escorting certain members of the media into the backyard. Nonetheless, it was not necessary to suppress any evidence resulting from the execution of the warrant because the police conducted the search within the parameters of the warrant, and there was no suggestion that any member of the media discovered or developed any evidence seized from the property. (*United States v. Duenas* (9th Cir. 2012) 691 F.3rd 1070, 1079-1083.)

“Knock and Notice:” Any time a police officer makes entry into the residence of another to arrest (**P.C. § 844**) or to serve a search warrant (**P.C. § 1531**), the officer must first comply with the statutory “knock and notice” rules. (See above.)

The same rule applies to *entries for “investigative purposes”* as well, although arguably not coming within the provisions of **P.C. §§ 844 or 1531**. (*People v. Miller* (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 190, 201.)

Knock and notice requirements also apply to entries made for purposes of conducting a “**Fourth Waiver search.**” (*People v. Constancio* (1974) 42 Cal.App.3rd 533, 542; *People v. Lilienthal* (1978) 22 Cal.3rd 891, 900; *People v. Mays* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 969, 973, fn. 4; *People v. Murphy* (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 546, 553.)

However, recent authority has noted that violating knock and notice rules should not result in the suppression of any resulting evidence, at least absent aggravating circumstances. (*Hudson v. Michigan* (2006) 547 U.S. 586 [165 L.Ed.2nd 56].) This new rule applies whether executing a search warrant (i.e., *Hudson*) or to make an arrest. (*In re Frank S.* (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 145.)

However, see *United States v. Weaver* (D.C. Cir. 2015) 808 F.3rd 26, where the D.C. Court of Appeal rejected the applicability of *Hudson v. Michigan, supra*, in an arrest warrant service situation, and held that federal agents violated the knock-and-announce rule by failing to announce their purpose before entering defendant’s apartment. By knocking but failing to announce their purpose, the agents gave defendant no opportunity to protect the privacy of his home. The exclusionary rule was the appropriate remedy for knock-and-announce violations in the execution of arrest warrants at a person’s home.

See “*Knock and Notice,*” under “*Searches With a Search Warrant*” (Chapter 6), above.

Chapter 11:

New and Developing Law Enforcement Technology:

The Problem: The United States Supreme Court (in *Kyllo v. United States* (2001) 533 U.S. 27 [150 L.Ed.2nd 94].), as well as the federal Congress and California's Legislature, has indicated a concern with developing surveillance technology which may be used to eavesdrop upon and decipher activities in constitutionally protected areas.

See also *United States v. Hill* (9th Cir. 2006) 459 F.3rd 966, 979, where it was noted that: "Technology is rapidly evolving and the concept of what is reasonable for **Fourth Amendment** purposes will likewise have to evolve."

And *People v. Michael E.* (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 261, 276-279, where the Court included a whole segment criticizing the current trend of referring to computers and cellphones as "*containers of information*," predicting the coming of a whole new body of law dealing with electronic devices. "Since electronic storage is likely to contain a greater quantity and variety of information than any previous storage method, . . . '[r]elying on analogies to closed containers or file cabinets may lead courts to "oversimplify a complex area of Fourth Amendment doctrines and ignore the realities of massive modern computer storage.'" [Citation.]" (Citing *United States v. Carey* (10th Cir. 1999) 172 F.3rd 1268, 1275.) Interestingly enough, however, most of the authority the Court cites here are container-search cases.

The United States Supreme Court agrees, at least as to cellphones, ruling that given the amount of personal information contained on the modern-day "smart phone," such a device is indeed entitled to greater protection from warrantless searches. (See *Riley v. California* (June 25, 2014) 573 U.S. __ [134 S.Ct. 2473, 2484-2485; 189 L.Ed.2nd 430].)

The Supreme Court has pointed out that a physical trespassory intrusion (physically entering a protected area or property) is not always required to create a **Fourth Amendment** search issue. Per the Court; "(s)ituations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals without trespass would remain subject to *Katz* analysis" (referring to *Katz v. United States* (1967) 389 U.S. 347, 3612 [19 L.Ed.2nd 576, 588].); i.e., whether a "reasonable expectation of privacy" was violated. (*United States v. Jones* (2012) 565 U.S. 400, 411 [132 S.Ct. 945, 953; 181 L.Ed.2nd 911].)

See also *United States v. Cotterman* (9th Cir. 2013) 709 F.3rd 952, 962-968, dealing with a search of a suspect's laptop computer, and discussing

“(t)he nature of the contents of electronic devices differs from that of luggage as well. Laptop computers, iPads and the like are simultaneously offices and personal diaries. They contain the most intimate details of our lives: financial records, confidential business documents, medical records and private emails. This type of material implicates the **Fourth Amendment’s** specific guarantee of the people’s right to be secure in their ‘papers.’”

The Second District Court of Appeal (Div. 5) has held that when interpreting a minor’s conditions of probation, reference to defendant’s “property,” as “reasonably construed, does *not* include electronic data. (*In re I.V.* (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 249, 259-263; citing *United States v. Lara* (9th Cir. 2016) 815 F.3rd 605, 610-614.)

Thermal Imaging Device: The use of a “*thermal imaging device*” (also known as a “*FLIR*,” for “*Forward Looking Infra Red*.”) to read the amount of heat coming from a person’s home, without prior judicial authorization, is an unconstitutional invasion of one’s right to privacy in the home. (*Kyllo v. United States* (2001) 533 U.S. 27 [150 L.Ed.2nd 94].)

“To withdraw protection of this minimum expectation (of privacy in one’s home) would be to permit police technology to erode the privacy guaranteed by the **Fourth Amendment**. We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,’ [Citation] constitutes a search—at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public use. This assures preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the **Fourth Amendment** was adopted. On the basis of this criterion, the information obtained by the thermal imager in this case was the product of a search. [footnote omitted]” (*Id.*, at p. 34 [150 L.Ed.2nd at p. 102].)

As a “*search*,” a search warrant is necessary before a thermal imaging device can be used to deduce the presence and quantity of heat coming from a person’s home. (*Ibid.*)

California’s limited authority also holds that use of such a device is an unreasonable invasion of one’s expectation of privacy, at least when used to measure heat from a person’s private dwelling. (*People v. Deutsch* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1224.)

But, evidence from the use of a thermal imaging device, when lawfully obtained with judicial authorization (i.e., a search warrant), may be used

as a part of the probable cause for a second search warrant. (*United States v. Huggins* (9th Cir. 2002) 299 F.3rd 1039.)

A search warrant authorizing the use of a thermal imaging device must be supported by probable cause, or such a warrant will be held to be invalid. (*People v. Gotfried* (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 254.)

A *Buster*: Use of a “*Buster*” on a vehicle at the Mexico/U.S. border, given the lack of any proof that the defendant was exposed to any danger from the radioactivity in the device, does *not* require any suspicion in a border search. (*United States v. Camacho* (9th Cir. 2004) 368 F.3rd 1182.)

A “*Buster*” is “a handheld portable density gauge. . . . It contains a tiny bead of radioactive material called barium 133 that’s inside a sealed container. . . . (W)hen the actuating trigger is pushed, the container rolls to an open slot and exposes the radiation in a forward direction (providing a reading on the density of an object.” A higher reading than normal indicates that something not normally there is hidden in the object being evaluated, such as in the spare tire in this case. (*Id.*, at p. 1184.)

Note that the Court in *Camacho* differentiated the *Buster* from x-rays of a person which, per the court, *does* require a “*heightened level of suspicion*” (i.e., a “*reasonable suspicion*.” See *United States v. Camacho*, *supra*, p. 1186, fn. 1) to use in a border search situation given the potential personal health issues of exposing a person’s body to x-rays. (See also *United States v. Ik* (9th Cir. 1982) 676 F.2nd 379, 382.)

Also note that using the *Buster* on a vehicle or other container in other than a border search situation would likely require full “*probable cause*” under the theory of *Kyllo*, *supra*, in that it is inspecting items contained within the vehicle or container itself and not just heat emanating from the vehicle or other container. However, there is no case law on this issue as of yet.

***Spike Mike*:** The warrantless use of a “*spike mike*,” which, though contact with a heating duct, was able to pick up defendant’s conversations while inside his home, was held to be a **Fourth Amendment** violation. (*Silverman v. United States* (1961) 365 U.S. 505 [5 L.Ed.2nd 734].)

***Aerial Surveillance*:** *Overflights* over a suspect’s backyard (i.e., within the “*curtilage*” of the home), so long as the observers are in the legal (“*navigable*”) airspace, when naked-eye observations of illegal activity below are made, are *legal*, whether the observers are on routine patrol or are responding to a specific tip and/or otherwise purposely looking into the defendant’s yard. (*California v. Ciraolo* (1986) 476 U.S. 207 [90 L.Ed.2nd 210].)

California's previous rule that observations of contraband within the curtilage of one's home (i.e., the yard) under such circumstances should be suppressed (see *People v. Cook* (1985) 41 Cal.3rd 373; *People v. Ciraolo* (1984) 161 Cal.App.3rd 1081.) was overruled in *California v. Ciraolo*, *supra*. Passage of **Proposition 8** in June, 1982, dictates that California follow the federal rule.

The federal Environmental Protection Agency's use of aerial photography, flying at the legal "*navigable altitude*," was held to be within its statutory authority, as a regulatory and enforcement agency requires no explicit authorization to employ methods of observation available to the public. Additionally, the taking of photographs of petitioner's complex from navigable airspace was not a search prohibited by the **Fourth Amendment**. (*Dow Chemical Co. v. United States* (1986) 476 U.S. 227 [90 L.Ed.2nd 226].)

Overflights conducted by officers of a greenhouse situated 125 yards from a two-story residence did not constitute a search requiring a warrant under the **Fourth Amendment**. (*United States v. Broadhurst* (9th Cir. 1986) 805 F.2nd 849, 849-850, 856-857.)

Note: See "*Drones*," below.

Drones:

As of yet, there are no California criminal statutes nor reported cases specifically dealing with the use of "drones," or unmaned aerial surveillance tools.

However, **Civ. Code § 1708.8** provides for the potential civil liability of a person for a physical invasion of privacy which includes when that person knowingly enters the airspace above the land of another person without permission or while committing a trespass in order to capture a visual image, sound recording, or physical impression of the plaintiff engaging in a private, personal, or familial activity, and the invasion occurs in a manner that is offensive to a reasonable person.

Also, effective December 21, 2015, anyone who owns a small unmanned aircraft of a certain weight (between .55 and 55 pounds) must register with the Federal Aviation Administration's Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) registry before they fly outdoors. People who previously operated their UAS must register by February 19, 2016. People who do not register could face civil and criminal penalties. (See **14 Code of Federal Regulations, Part I & Part 21**; and <https://registermyuas.faa.gov/>.)

Unmanned Aircraft weighing more than 55 pounds *cannot* use this registration process and must register using the Aircraft Registry process.

See also “**Small UAS Rule, “Part 107”** of the Federal Aviation Regulations, effective August 29, 2016, for regulations relevant to the “non-hobbyist” drone users.

Gov’t. Code §§ 853, 853.1; Civil. Code § 43.101: *Destruction of Drones by Government Entities; Immunity From Liability:*

A local public entity and/or a public employee of a local public entity is immune from any damage they cause to an unmanned aircraft (e.g., a drone) that is interfering with the operation or support of emergency medical services, firefighting services, or search and rescue services provided by the local public entity.

Gov’t. Code § 853.5: *Drones; Definitions:*

The following definitions shall apply to this chapter:

(a) “*Unmanned aircraft*” means an aircraft that is operated without the possibility of direct human intervention from within or on the aircraft.

(b) “*Unmanned aircraft system*” means an unmanned aircraft and associated elements, including, but not limited to, communication links and the components that control the unmanned aircraft that are required for the pilot in command to operate safely and efficiently in the national airspace system.

Pen. Code § 402: *Sightseeing at the Scene of an Emergency; Drones:*

(a)(2) The misdemeanor crime of sightseeing at the scene of an emergency is expanded as of January 1, 2017, to include a person, regardless of his or her location, who operates or uses an unmanned aerial vehicle, remote piloted aircraft, or drone at the scene of an emergency.

Punishment: Misdemeanor; 6 months in county jail and/or a fine of up to \$1,000. (P.C. § 19)

Facial Recognition Software:

The use of software that allows the matching of one's face by matching from a photograph some 16,000 recognition points to photographs already in law enforcement possession has not yet been tested in the courts.

Stingray (Kingfish) Device:

Pursuant to the California **Electronic Communications Privacy Act (P.C. §§ 1546-1546.4)**, a search warrant must be obtained before law enforcement may use a "*Stingray*" device.

A "*Stingray*" (or "*Kingfish*") device, also known as cell-site simulators, are usually used to pinpoint the location of a cellphone but can also in some cases intercept calls and text messages.

See "*The California Electronic Communications Privacy Act: P.C. §§ 1546-1546.4,*" under "*Searches of Cellphones, Disks, Computers and Other High Tech Devices*" under "*Searches of Containers*" (Chapter 13), below.

See also "*The Federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et seq.*" under "*P.C. § 1524.2(b): Records of Foreign Corporations Providing Electronic Communications or Remote Computing Services,*" under "*Searches With a Search Warrant*" (Chapter 6), above.

Automated License Plate Readers:

A "*license plate recognition system*" is defined as "a searchable computerized database resulting from the operation of one or more mobile or fixed cameras combined with other computer algorithms to read and convert images of registration plates and the characters they contain into computer-readable data," or "automated license plate recognition (ALPR) data." Statutes in the **Civil Code** require ALPR operators to maintain reasonable security procedures and practices, including protecting ALPR information from unauthorized access, detection, use, modification, or disclosure. A use and privacy policy, establishing minimum standards, must be implemented. (**Civ. Code §§ 1798.90.5, 1798.90.51, 1798.90.52, 1798.90.53, 1798.90.54, 1798.90.55.**)

The use of an automated license plate recognition (ALPR) system provided the necessary reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop, as required by the **Fourth Amendment**, because the LPR system merely automated what could otherwise be accomplished by checking the license-plate

number against a hot sheet of numbers or using other investigative tools. (*United States v. Williams* (8th Cir. 2015) 796 F.3rd 951.)

Where a “high risk” stop of a suspected stolen vehicle was made, such stop being precipitated by a misreading of the license plate by an “automated license plate reader” and where the stop was made without first making a visual verification that the license on the stopped vehicle was as interpreted by the plate reader, the lawfulness of such a stop was held to be a triable issue for a civil jury to decide. (*Green v. City & County of San Francisco* (9th Cir. 2014) 751 F.3rd 1039, 1045-1046; discounting without discussion the possibility that the stop was based upon a reasonable mistake of fact.)

In a case in which two organizations petitioned for a writ of mandate to compel disclosure of requested automated license plate reader (ALPR) data pursuant to the **California Public Records Act**, the California Supreme Court, reversing a lower court, concluded that the ALPR scan data at issue are not subject to **Govt. Code § 6254(f)**’s exemption for records of investigations. The process of ALPR scanning does not produce records of investigations because the scans are not conducted as a part of a targeted inquiry into any particular crime or crimes. Regarding the application of the catchall exemption set forth in **Govt. Code § 6255(a)**, the Supreme Court noted the trial court appeared to have placed significant weight on speculative concerns about possible disclosure of mobile ALPR patrol patterns, without record evidence to support its conclusions. The Court held this to be error. (*American Civil Liberties Union Foundation v. Superior Court* (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1032.)

Electronic Tracking Devices (Transmitters) and “Pinging” a Cellphone:

Electronic Tracking Devices are lawful to use in tracking, so long as the route used is otherwise open to view and so long as the installation of the tracking device itself was not accomplished in violation of the **Fourth Amendment**. (*United States v. Knotts* (1983) 460 U.S. 276 [75 L.Ed.2nd 55]; but see *United States v. Jones. infra.*)

However, the act of putting a tracking device (e.g., a “Global Positioning System,” or “GPS”) onto a vehicle, even the exterior or undercarriage, is a **Fourth Amendment** search. (*United States v. Jones* (2012) 565 U.S. 400 [132 S.Ct. 945; 181 L.Ed.2nd 911]; overruling prior cases to the contrary.)

The Court in *Jones* did not indicate, however, whether a search warrant would be necessary, declining to rule on whether such a search, even if warrantless, was “reasonable” under the

circumstances because that argument had been “forfeited” when not raised at the trial court level. (*United States v. Jones*, *supra*, at pp. 412-413.)

Note: The inference is that a lawful exception to the search warrant requirement might apply, depending upon the circumstances.

In *Knotts*, *supra*, the tracking device (i.e., a “beeper”) was already contained in a five-gallon drum when given to the defendant who put it in his car. There being no installation of the device onto or into defendant’s car by law enforcement, there was no “search” involved.

United States v. Jones, *supra*, specifically did not rule whether the act of tracking a vehicle through the use of a GPS was a **Fourth Amendment** issue that required a search warrant (132 S.Ct., at p. 954) although the minority opinion argued that the use of a GPS for “an extended period of time” (e.g., a month) would require a warrant. (132 S.Ct. at p. 964.)

See also *United States v. Wahchumwah* (9th Cir. 2013) 710 F.3rd 862, 868, refusing to extend the theory of *Jones* to the use of a buttonhole audio-video device in a suspect’s home by an undercover agent who was in the defendant’s home by invitation.

Leaving the tracking device, located in a container, turned on after it disappears into a house (at least when done without a search warrant) is an invasion of privacy, and unlawful. (*United States v. Karo* (1984) 468 U.S. 705 [82 L.Ed.2nd 530].)

When the transmitter is contained inside property which has been stolen, defendant’s possession of the stolen property in his vehicle (*United States v. Jones* (4th Cir. 1994) 31 F.3rd 1304, in a stolen mail bag.) or in a motel room (*People v. Erwin* (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 15, in a stolen bank bag.) does *not* make the warrantless “search” unlawful.

Note: In *Karo*, the transmitter was followed while it was moved about inside a private residence, then to two different storage facilities, and into a second residence; a circumstance not present in the Fourth Circuit’s *Jones* or in *Erwin*.

In following stolen stereo speakers containing tracking devices into a home, exigent circumstances of a fresh crime and the possibility that the speakers would be destroyed if officers waited for a warrant, justified an immediate entry to secure the house. (See *People v. Hull* (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1448, 1452, 1455-1457.)

In a post-Supreme Court *United States v. Jones* case, the Eight Circuit Court of Appeal concluded that a police detective did not commit a trespass when he located a suspect's car in a parking lot by using the suspect's key fob to trigger the car's alarm. The court reasoned that the detective had lawfully seized the key fob and the "mere transmission of electric signals alone" through the key fob was not a trespass on the car. (*United States v. Cowan* (8th Cir. 2012) 674 F.3rd 947, 956.)

In a case prior to the Supreme Court decision in *United States v. Jones*, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal initially found that the placing of an electronic transmitter onto the undercarriage of defendant's vehicle while the vehicle is in his driveway, *within* the curtilage of the home, and without a warrant, was lawful (See *United States v. Pineda-Moreno* (9th Cir. 2010) 591 F.3rd 1212, certiorari granted.).

When reconsidered in light of *Jones*, the 9th Circuit reversed itself, finding it to be a **Fourth Amendment** violation. (*United States v. Pineda-Moreno* (9th Cir. 2012) 688 F.3rd 1087.) The Court, however, affirmed defendant's conviction again. While noting that under *Jones*, the attaching of a GPS onto defendant's vehicle while in parked within the curtilage of defendant's residence was indeed illegal, the officers, in good faith, were merely following existing precedent. As such, defendant was not entitled to the suppression of the resulting evidence per the U.S. Supreme Court's rule that the Exclusionary Rule does not apply under such circumstances. (*Ibid.*, citing *Davis v. United States* (2011) 564 U.S. 229, 236-239 [180 L.Ed.2nd 285].)

See also *United States v. Sparks* (1st Cir. 2013) 711 F.3rd 58; holding that the use of a GPS prior to the U.S. Supreme Court's Decision in *United States v. Jones*, *supra*, even if done in violation of the **Fourth Amendment**, does not require the suppression of the resulting evidence due to the officer's good faith reliance in earlier binding precedence. (Accord; *United States v. Barraza-Maldonado* (8th Cir. 2013) 732 F.3rd 865; noting the Ninth

Circuit's original rule under *United States v. Pineda-Moreno*, *supra*, which, at the time, had held that no warrant was necessary.)

But see *United States v. Katzin* (3rd Cir. 2013) 732 F.3rd 187, ruling that "good faith" didn't save the evidence discovered after using a GPS without a warrant on defendant's vehicle in violation of *Jones*, in that the prior cases were in conflict on this issue.

Note: This appears to be a minority opinion.

California follows the majority rule, dictated by *Davis v. United States*, *supra*, that because California case law allowed for the warrantless placement of a GPS device by law enforcement at the time such a device was placed on the co-defendant's car in this case (i.e., 2007), the fact that the United States Supreme Court has since held that such conduct required a warrant does not dictate exclusion of the tracking device evidence. (*People v. Mackey* (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 32, 93-97.)

A minor, as a condition of probation when the minor is a **W&I § 601** ward of the court for being an excessive truant, may lawfully be required to wear a GPS tracking device. (*In re A.M.* (2013) 220 Cal. App. 4th 1494, 1498-1501.)

However, requiring a recidivist sex offender to wear a satellite-based monitor (SBM) for the rest of his life, done for the purpose of tracking the individual's movements and to "obtain information," constitutes a "search," under the **Fourth Amendment**, and under the theory of *United States v. Jones*, *supra*. The fact that North Carolina's SBM program is civil in nature does make it any less of a **Fourth Amendment** search issue. (*Grady v. North Carolina* (Mar. 30, 2015) __ U.S. __ [135 S.Ct. 1368; 191 L.Ed.2nd 459]; case remanded for the purpose of determining the reasonableness of the search under the circumstances.)

P.C. § 637.7: The California Legislature has chosen to legislatively restrict the use of electronic tracking devices:

Use of Electronic Tracking Devices:

Subd. (a): No person or entity in this state shall use an electronic tracking device to determine the location or movement of a person.

Exceptions:

Subd. (b): When the registered owner, lessor, or lessee of a vehicle has consented to the use of the electronic tracking device with respect to that vehicle.

Subd. (c): An otherwise lawful use of an electronic tracking device by a law enforcement agency.

Subd. (d): “*Electronic tracking device*” is defined as any device attached to a vehicle or other movable thing that reveals its location or movement by the transmission of electronic signals.

Subd. (e): A violation is a misdemeanor.

Subd. (f): A violation is also grounds for revocation of a business license.

Note: In enacting this section, effective 1/1/1999, the Legislature noted the following: “The Legislature finds and declares that the right to privacy is fundamental in a free and civilized society and that the increasing use of electronic surveillance devices is eroding personal liberty. The Legislature declares that electronic tracking of a person’s location without that person’s knowledge violates that person’s reasonable expectation of privacy. (**Stats 1998, ch. 449, Section 1.**)

“Pinging” a Cellphone:

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeal has ruled that using data emanating from a suspect’s pay-as-you-go cellphone to determine its real-time location as he transported drugs along public thoroughfares was lawful. Agents located defendant at a rest stop, with a motorhome filled with marijuana, by “pinging” his phone. There was no **Fourth Amendment** violation since defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the GPS data and location of his cellphone because authorities tracked a known number that was voluntarily used while traveling on public thoroughfares; no extreme comprehensive tracking was present in his case. (*United States v. Skinner* (6th Cir. 2012) 690 F.3rd 772.)

Pinging a victim’s cellphone, using its GPS capabilities to track defendant who had just stolen it in a robbery, was not a **Fourth Amendment** violation. (*People v. Barnes* (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th

1508, 1517-1519; no trespassory placing of the GPS into the defendant's property, and no expectation of privacy violated.

The Court, however, discussed the expanding concerns with the development of high-tech methods impacting privacy rights, not offering a solution. (*Id.*, at p. 1519.)

See also **P.C. § 1546** et seq., California's "**Electronic Communications Privacy Act**," which, by statute, greatly restricts law enforcement's access to electronic communication information from a service provider in California.

Note, however, that exigent circumstances will excuse the pinging of a suspect's cellphone without a warrant or court order. (*United States v. Caraballo* (2nd Cir. Vt. Aug 1, 2016) 831 F.3rd 95; need to locate a violent homicide suspect out of fear for the safety of informants and undercover officers.)

An en banc panel of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal, in overruling its own prior 3-judge decision (See *United States v. Davis* (11th Cir. 2014) 754 F.3rd 1205.), held that obtaining cell site location information without a search warrant, used at trial to show that defendant was near the scene of charged robberies and placing and receiving cellphone calls, as is authorized by **18 U.S.C. § 2703(d)**, was *not* a violation of the **Fourth Amendment** in that defendant did not have any expectation of privacy in the cellphone provider's records at issue. (*United States v. Davis* (11th Cir. 2015) 785 F.3rd 498.)

See also *United States v. Carpenter* (6th Cir. 2016) 819 F.3rd 880, finding the use of a court order issued by a magistrate judge pursuant to **Section 2703(d)** of the "**Stored Communications Act**" to obtain cellphone use/location records to be lawful in that the business records maintained by the defendants' wireless carriers did not reveal anything about the content of any cellphone calls.

18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) requires a court order, but does not require a showing of probable cause, to obtain cell site information from a cellphone carrier. The Court ruled, however, that the evidence here did not need to be suppressed in that the police officers, prosecutors, and judge, all reasonably relied upon the statute as written, not

having reason to know that it would be held unconstitutional.

Note: A Writ of Certiorari was granted by the U.S. Supreme Court in *United States v. Carpenter* to consider whether the **Fourth Amendment** requires a showing of probable cause and a search warrant in such a circumstance.

And see *United States v. Dorsey* (Cal. 2015) 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23693; a federal district court ruling that an order for cell phone location information obtained pursuant to **18 U.S.C. § 2703(d)**, part of the federal **Stored Communications Act**, did not implicate the **Fourth Amendment**.

Accord: *United States v. Rosario* (N.D. ILL. 2017) 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73921; 2017 WL 2117534; holding that the Government's acquisition of cell-site location information (CSLI) from a third-party provider did not constitute a search in violation of the **Fourth Amendment**.

Even if a "Ping Order," issued under the federal pen-trap statute, **Section 2703(d)** of the **Stored Communications Act**, and state law, was issued in violation of the federal pen-trap statute or state law, defendant was not entitled to suppression of the evidence as neither the pen-trap statute nor the **Texas Code of Criminal Procedure** provides for suppression of evidence as a remedy for a violation. (*United States v. Wallace* (5th Cir. Tex. 2017) 857 F.3rd 685.)

In a case in which defendants were convicted of conspiracy to commit kidnapping due to involvement in a scheme through which they sought to assist Orthodox Jewish women to obtain divorces from recalcitrant husbands, district court properly denied suppression of historic cell site location information (CSLI) obtained pursuant to **Stored Communications Act** in that such information is not protected by the **Fourth Amendment**. Individuals do not have an expectation of privacy in their historic cell site location information. (*United States v. Stimler* (3rd Cir. 2017) 864 F.3rd 253.)

See also *United States v. Thompson* (10th Cir. Kan. 2017) 866 F.3rd 1149, where the Court held that cellphone users lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in their historical CSLI because they voluntarily convey CSLI to third parties who create records of

that information for their own business purposes. In so ruling, the court followed the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Eleventh Circuits, which have already held that CSLI is a business record created by a third party, the cell phone service providers, from information that cellphone users turn over voluntarily. The Court also noted that until the Supreme Court instructs the lower courts otherwise, it was bound to follow the **Fourth Amendment's** "third-party doctrine."

The Court recognize that this issue is presently before the Supreme Court in *United States v. Carpenter, surpa.*

However, the federal Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, in a split 2-1 decision, found the warrantless, extended, accessing of two of defendants' cell-site data (221 days' worth of cell site location information [CLSI], which itself yielded an impressive 29,659 location data points for defendant Graham and 28,410 for co-defendant Jordan, enough to provide a "reasonably detailed account of their movements" during the intervals covered by the disclosure orders) amounted to an unconstitutional search under the **Fourth Amendment**. Officers obtained court orders pursuant to the "**Stored Communications Act**" (18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), but not search warrants. The resulting information was used against the defendants at trial. The Appellate Court refused, however, to order the suppression of the collected information because of the **Fourth Amendment's** "good faith" exception, and thus affirmed both the defendants' convictions of various charges associated with a series of armed robberies. (*United States v. Graham* (4th Cir. 2015) 796 F.3rd 332.)

The court rejected the application of the third-party doctrine, under *Smith v. Maryland* (1979) 442 U.S. 735 [61 L.Ed.2nd 220], which holds that a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily conveyed to a third-party in that the defendants did not voluntarily convey their CSLI to the cellphone carrier. (*Ibid.*)

Flashlights and Spotlights:

The use of flashlights to illuminate the interior of a handbag held to be of no constitutional significance. (*People v. Capps* (1989) 215 Cal.App.3rd 1112, 1123.)

Officers standing in an open field, using a flashlight to look inside a barn, held to be lawful. (*United States v. Vela* (W.D. Tex. 2005) 486 F.Supp.2nd 587, 590.)

“Flashlighting” or “spotlighting” a person, by itself, is *not* a detention. (*People v. Franklin* (1987) 192 Cal.App.3rd 935; *People v. Rico* (1979) 97 Cal.App.3rd 124, 130.)

A person who exposes his facial features, and/or body in general, to the public, in a public place, has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his appearance. (See *People v. Benedict* (1969) 2 Cal.App.3rd 400, 403-404; “The latter phenomenon (defendant’s physical characteristics) was in plain sight of the officer and observed by him without any semblance of a search or seizure; his use of a flashlight to observe the pupillary reaction was not improper. The utilization of the light from a flashlight directed to that which is in plain sight ordinarily does not render observation thereof a search;” citing *People v. Cacioppo* (1968) 264 Cal.App.2nd 392, 397.)

However, see *People v. Garry* (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1100, where it was held to be a detention when the officer spotlighted the defendant and then walked “briskly” towards him, asking him questions as he did so.

Binoculars:

The use of binoculars to enhance what the officer can already see, depending upon the degree of expectation of privacy involved under the circumstances, is normally lawful. (*People v. Arno* (1979) 90 Cal.App.3rd 505.)

Using binoculars from 50 yards away to watch defendant load boxes into his car upheld. (*United States v. Grimes* (5th Cir. 426 F.2nd 706, 708.)

Using binoculars during surveillance of a chicken house from a pasture was lawful. (*Hodges v. United States* (5th Cir. 1957) 243 F.2nd 281, 282.)

Similarly, observation of a marijuana patch while flying at an altitude of some 1,500 to 2,000 feet, visible to the naked eye (and then enhanced through the use of binoculars), did not violate the defendant’s privacy rights. (*Burkholder v. Superior Court* (1979) 96 Cal.App.3rd 421; see also *People v. St Amour* (1980) 104 Cal.App.3rd 886, observations made from 1,000 to 1,500 feet, again enhanced through the use of binoculars, held to be lawful and *People v. Joubert* (1981) 118 Cal.App.3rd 637.)

Night Vision Goggles:

The use of night vision goggles was held to be irrelevant when used to observe areas within the curtilage of defendants' residence. (*People v. Lieng* (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1227-1228.)

A Controlled Tire Deflation Device ("CTDD"):

The use of a "controlled tire deflation device" by the Border Patrol to stop a vehicle suspected of being used to smuggle controlled substances over the US/Mexico border held to be a detention only (thus requiring only a reasonable suspicion) and not excessive force under the circumstances. (*United States v. Guzman-Padilla* (9th Cir. 2009) 573 F.3rd 865.)

Note: The "controlled tire deflation device," or "CTDD," is an accordion-like tray containing small, hollow steel tubes that puncture the tires of a passing vehicle and cause a gradual release of air, bringing the vehicle to a halt within a quarter to half a mile.

Videotaping and Photographing:

General Rule: "Video surveillance does not in itself violate a reasonable expectation of privacy. Videotaping of suspects in public places, such as banks, does not violate the **Fourth Amendment**; the police may record what they normally may view with the naked eye. (Citation)" (*United States v. Taketa* (9th Cir, 1991) 923 F.2nd 665, 667.)

However, in a place where a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, to videotape him without a court's authorization (i.e., a search warrant) is illegal. (*Id.*, at pp. 675-677.)

A warrantless videotape surveillance in the mailroom of a hospital, open to some 800 hospital employees but not of the defendant's private workspace, did not violate the defendant's expectation of privacy and was therefore lawful. (*United States v. Gonzalez* (9th Cir. 2003) 328 F.3rd 543.)

In a homicide investigation where defendant was the primary suspect, "the police surveillance and photographing of defendant entering and exiting the drop-off point is not a subject of **Fourth Amendment** protection since defendant knowingly exposed his whereabouts in public." *People v. Maury* (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 384-385.)

The **Fourth Amendment's** protections do not extend to information that a person voluntarily exposes to a government agent, including an undercover agent. A defendant generally has no privacy interest in that which he voluntarily reveals to a government agent. Therefore, a government agent may make an audio-video recording of a suspect's statements even in the suspect's own home, and those audio-video recordings, made with the consent of the government agent, do not require a warrant. (*United States v. Wahchumwah* (9th Cir. 2013) 710 F.3rd 862, 866-868; an investigation involving the illegal sale of eagle feathers under the **Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act (16 U.S.C § 668(a))** and the **Lacey Act (16 U.S.C. §§ 2271(a)(1) & 3373(d)(1)(B),)**)

The Court further noted that the fact that the technology is not generally available to the public, and is more intrusive than mere audio surveillance, is irrelevant to the **Fourth Amendment** analysis. (*Id.*, at p. 868.)

However, the warrantless installation of a hidden video camera in a suspect's home, leaving it operating after the informant leaves the premises, is a **Fourth Amendment** violation. (*United States v. Nerber* (9th Cir. 2000) 222 F.3rd 597, 604, fn. 5; *United States v. Wahchumwah*, *supra.*, at p. 867.)

But, see *People v. Rodriguez* (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 232, 239; stopping and detaining gang members *for the purpose of* photographing them is illegal without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Merely being a member of a gang, by itself, is not cause to detain.

Note also that a police dash-cam video of an arrest is subject to release to the news media following a **California Public Records Act (Gov. Code, §§ 6250 et seq.)** request (and therefore likely subject to discovery by the defendant as well), in that it does *not* constitute a confidential "personnel record" under **Penal Code §§ 832.7 or 832.8.** (*City of Eureka v. Superior Court* (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 755, 761-765.)

Videotaping From Off the Property:

Placing a surveillance video camera on a utility pole about 200 yards from the front of defendant's rural residence/trailer and barn, monitoring the camera for about 10 weeks, was held not to be a

Fourth Amendment violation in that nothing was viewed that anyone in public could not have seen. The Court also reasoned that the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) could have stationed an agent at that location around the clock and seen the same thing. The fact that it was easier to do this by means of a video camera did not make it a **Fourth Amendment** violation. (*United States v. Houston* (6th Cir. 2016) 813 F.3rd 282.)

But see *United States v. Vargas* (2014) 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184672, reaching the exact opposite conclusion, where a Washington State federal trial court held that the **Fourth Amendment** requires law enforcement to first obtain a search warrant in order to continuously (six weeks, in this case) videotape the front of defendant's home and yard even though the camera, with zooming and panning capabilities, was set up on a public utility pole some 100 yards from defendant's home, well off his property.

Videotaping and Photographing by Private Citizens:

A private citizen has a **First Amendment** right to videotape public officials (i.e., police officers) in a public place, and the arrest of the citizen for a Massachusetts state wiretapping violation, violated the citizen's **First** and **Fourth Amendment** rights. (*Glik v. Cunniffe* (1st Cir. 2011) 655 F.3rd 78, 82-84.)

Police lack the authority to prohibit a citizen from recording commissioners during a town hall meeting "because [the citizen's] activities were peaceful, not performed in derogation of any law, and done in the exercise of his **First Amendment** rights[.]". (*Jacobucci v. Boulter* (1st Cir. 1999) 193 F.3rd 14.)

A state's eavesdropping statute that attempts to prohibit the recording of another without the consent of all parties does *not* preclude the audiovisual-recording of police officers performing their official duties in a public place, at least when the officers are speaking at a volume audible to bystanders. Such a statute has been held, under these circumstances, to violate the **First Amendment's** right to free-speech and free-press. (*ACLU v. Alvarez* (7th Cir. 2012) 679 F.3rd 583; "The act of making an audio or audiovisual recording is necessarily included within the **First Amendment's** guarantee of speech and press rights as a corollary of the right to disseminate the resulting recording." Pg. 595; see

also *Fordyce v. City of Seattle* (9th Cir. 1995) 55 F.3rd 436, 439-440.)

And it has been held that; “The **First Amendment** protects the right to gather information about what public officials do on public property, and specifically, a right to record matters of public interest.” (*Smith v. City of Cumming* (11th Cir. 2000) 212 F.3rd 1332, 1333.)

The Ninth Circuit has also recognized, without discussing the issue, the **First Amendment’s** protections for one who records bystanders who happened to be viewing public demonstrations, even without their consent. (See *Fordyce v. City of Seattle, supra*, at p. 439; finding the applicability of the state’s eavesdropping statute to be an undecided issue.)

Citing *Fordyce* in an unpublished opinion, the Ninth Circuit further recognized the **First Amendment** right to photograph the scene of a traffic accident. (*Adkins v. Limtiaco* (9th Cir. 2013) 537 Fed. Appx. 721 [2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 16643].)

See also *Turner v. Driver* (5th Cir. 2017) 848 F.3rd 678, where it was held that at least until the decision in this case, whether or not the **First Amendment** protects a person’s right to record the police was an undecided issue in the Fifth Federal Circuit [Texas], providing the officers with qualified immunity when they detained him and took his video camera. However, arresting him was clearly a **Fourth Amendment** violation for which the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity.

However, there is some authority for the argument that an airport security check point constitutes a “uniquely sensitive setting” where “order and security are of obvious importance,” and thus entitled to greater protection than out on the street. Whether or not law enforcement officers may prohibit an uncooperative (i.e., refusing to provide evidence of his identity) suspect from recording TSA agents and other law enforcement officers at an airport security checkpoint is an open question, at least providing officers with qualified immunity from civil liability when they seize the suspect’s camera over his objection and delete (or attempt to do so) the contents. (*Mocek v. City of Albuquerque* (10th Cir. 2015) 813 F.3rd 912; while defendant was acquitted of all criminal charges after a jury trial, the officers were found to have qualified immunity in the resulting civil case.)

The federal Third Circuit Court of Appeal has held in two separate cases, where plaintiffs alleged that police officers illegally retaliated against them for exercising their **First Amendment** right to record public police activity, that private individuals have a **First Amendment** right to observe and record police officers engaged in the public discharge of their duties, although the defendant police officers were held to have qualified immunity in that the rule was, per the Court, not well-settled at the time. (*Fields v. City of Philadelphia* (3rd Cir. 2017) 862 F.3rd 353.)

Also, as of January 1, 2016, California's resisting arrest statutes (i.e., **P.C. §§ 69 and 148**) specifically state that photographing, videotaping, or audio recording, is not an interference with the officer's performance of his duties. (**Subdivisions (b) and (g)**, respectively.)

P.C. § 632: Illegal Eavesdropping on Confidential Communications:

However, a hidden security video camera that takes pictures, but with no sound, is *not* a violation of **section 632**, but only because of the lack of a sound-recording capability. (*People v. Dremmam* (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1349.)

Metal Detectors: The use of metal detectors (or “*magnetometers*”) constitute a search, but are lawful without a search warrant or individualized suspicion when:

On School Campuses: Random metal detector searches of students, without any individualized suspicion, are justified by the “*special needs*” of keeping weapons off campuses. The **Fourth Amendment** is not violated by such searches where the government need is great, the intrusion on the individual is limited, and a more rigorous standard of suspicion is unworkable. (*In re Latasha W.* (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1524.)

At Airports: As an “*administrative search*,” not intended to be a part of a criminal investigation to secure evidence, but to insure that dangerous weapons will not be carried onto an airplane and to deter potential hijackers from attempting to board, pre-departure screening procedures, including the use of a magnetometer, is lawful despite the lack of any particularized suspicion or a warrant. (*People v. Hyde* (1974) 12 Cal.3rd 158.)

The legality of such searches depends upon the balancing of society's interest in safe air travel with the right of the individual passenger to be free from unnecessary government intrusions. Airport searches are reasonable when: (1) They are no more

extensive or intensive than necessary, in light of current technology, to detect weapons or explosives; (2) they are confined in good faith to that purpose; and (3) passengers are given the opportunity to avoid the search by electing not to fly. (*United States v. Marquez* (9th Cir. 2005) 410 F.3rd 612; A second, more intense, yet random screening of passengers as a part of airline boarding security procedures, held to be constitutional.)

Dogs:

Used to Search:

General Rule: When properly trained, dogs may be used to sniff packages, cars, etc. As a general rule (depending upon its location), there is no reasonable expectation of privacy around a container sniffed by a dog. (*People v. Mayberry* (1982) 31 Cal.3rd 335; *United States v. Diaz* (6th Cir. 1994) 25 F.3rd 392, 296.)

A sniff by a trained drug detection dog in a public place is not a “*search*” within the meaning of the **Fourth Amendment**. (*United States v. Place* (1983) 462 U.S. 696, 707 [77 L.Ed.2nd 110, 121]; *People v. \$48,715* (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1515-1516.)

Use of a dog to sniff a motel room was lawful where the officers and the dog were voluntarily admitted by the defendant into the room and the dog was held on a six-foot leash. The dog was where it had a lawful right to be. (*United States v. Esquelin* (1st Cir. 2000) 208 F.3rd 315.)

“(A) canine sniff is not a ‘*search*’ under the **Fourth Amendment** and thus ‘neither a warrant, nor probable cause, nor reasonable suspicion’ is required for its use. *United States v. Lingenfelter* 997 F.2nd 632, 639 (9th Cir. 1993).” (*United States v. Todhunter* (9th Cir. 2002) 297 F.3rd 886, 891.)

The **Fourth Amendment** is not implicated when only the external features of a package, like the address label, are examined. (*United States v. Hoang* (9th Cir. 2007) 486 F.3rd 1156, 1160.)

“A dog alert can provide the probable cause needed for a search warrant.” (*People v. Bautista* (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 229, 236; citing *United States v. Spetz* (9th Cir.

1983) 721 F.2nd 1457, 1464; *Estes v. Rowland* (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 508, 532.)

Only when the police conduct a canine sniff in a private place, or in a manner which otherwise violates a reasonable expectation of privacy, is the resulting intrusion a search. (*Romo v. Champion* (10th Cir. 1995) 46 F.3rd 1013, 1016-1017.)

Running a properly trained narcotics-sniffing dog around a vehicle that is otherwise lawfully stopped for a traffic infraction does not implicate the **Fourth Amendment**, and is therefore not a search. As such, the defendant's expectation of privacy is not violated. Assuming the dog is properly trained and that the traffic stop is not unlawfully prolonged, probable cause is lawfully established, justifying a warrantless search, when the dog alerts on a part of the car. (*Illinois v. Caballes* (2005) 543 U.S. 405 [160 L.Ed.2nd 842], rejecting the argument that to do so "unjustifiably enlarge(s) the scope of a routine traffic stop into a drug investigation.")

But, if the dog-sniff is conducted after the purposes of the traffic stop are completed, and thus during an unlawfully prolonged detention, then it is illegal and the resulting evidence will be suppressed. (*Rodriguez v. United States* (Apr. 21, 2015) ___ U.S. ___ [135 S.Ct. 1609; 191 L.Ed.2nd 492]; the dog's alert to the presence of drugs being seven to eight minutes after the purposes of the traffic stop had been completed.)

And should a dog "instinctively" jump into the car, without assistance, facilitation, or other intentional act by the dog's handler, alerting once inside the car, no search or **Fourth Amendment** violation has occurred. (*United States v. Pierce* (3rd Cir. 2010) 622 F.3rd 209.)

"The postal-inspector's 'use of a well-trained narcotics detection dog . . . [did] not implicate legitimate privacy interests.'" (*United States v. Jefferson* (9th Cir. 2009) 566 F.3rd 928, 933.)

Threatening to use a drug-sniffing dog, when such use does not require the suspect's consent and is otherwise lawful,

will also not invalidate the resulting consent to search. (*United States v. Todhunter* (9th Cir. 2002) 297 F.3rd 886, 891.)

A properly certified drug-detection dog's alert on a container in a vehicle establishes probable cause (as opposed to merely a reasonable suspicion) to search that container even though it is never verified that the item actually contains something the dog is trained to detect. The fact that the dog sniffed into the open bed of a pickup truck does not make the dog's acts a search. And even if it is, a dog's instinctive acts done without an officer's instigation does not violate the **Fourth Amendment**. (*People v. Stillwell et al.* (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 996.)

The United States Supreme Court reaffirmed this rule in *Florida v. Harris* (2013) 568 U.S. 237 [133 S.Ct. 1050; 185 L.Ed.2nd 61], where the Court rejected an attempt by the Florida Supreme Court to impose a more rigorous standard on the prosecution. (See *Harris v. State* (Fla. 2011) 71 So.3rd 756.) The Supreme Court criticized Florida's failure to apply the standard probable cause definition when it attempted to create a strict evidentiary checklist to assess a drug-detection dog's reliability.

Per the Court: "The question—similar to every inquiry into probable cause—is whether all the facts surrounding a dog's alert, viewed through the lens of common sense, would make a reasonably prudent person think that a search would reveal contraband or evidence of a crime. A sniff is up to snuff when it meets that test." (*Id.*, at p. 248.)

But where the prosecution fails to disclose to the defense that a police dog had a history of mistaken identifications, such a failure being a violation of the discovery requirements of *Brady v. Maryland* (1963) 373 U.S. 83, and where the dog's scent evidence was the only evidence linking the defendant to the getaway car and was the only evidence corroborating "strikingly weak" eyewitness identifications, a resulting conviction is subject to being reversed. (*Aguilar v. Woodford* (2013) 725 F.3rd 970, 981-985.)

Note: Per **P.C. § 141(c)**; “(a) prosecuting attorney who intentionally and in bad faith alters, modifies, or withholds any physical matter, digital image, video recording, or relevant exculpatory material or information, knowing that it is relevant and material to the outcome of the case, with the specific intent that the physical matter, digital image, video recording, or relevant exculpatory material or information will be concealed or destroyed, or fraudulently represented as the original evidence upon a trial, proceeding, or inquiry, is guilty of a felony”

But, where the records used to support a dog’s training and reliability have been redacted to the point where it is impossible to tell whether there is any negative information contained therein, such records may not be enough to support a determination of probable cause. (*United States v. Thomas* (9th Cir. 2013) 726 F.3rd 1086, 1095-1095.)

A properly certified dog’s “alert,” or any change in his behavior in reaction to the odor of drugs, as opposed to his trained “indication,” was sufficient to establish probable cause to search defendant’s vehicle. A final indication by the dog was unnecessary. Thus the subsequent entry by the dog into the car (by jumping through an open window of the car) was not an illegal search. (*United States v. Moore* (10th Cir. 2015) 795 F.3rd 1224.)

See also *United States v. Jackson* (8th Cir. 2016) 811 F.3rd 1049; properly trained narcotics dog alerting on marijuana in a private plane.

Movement of containers to be sniffed, without taking the containers from the defendant (*United States v. Harvey* (8th Cir. 1992) 961 F.2nd 1361, 1363-1364.), or otherwise interfering with the defendant’s possessory interests (*United States v. Johnson* (9th Cir. 1993) 990 F.2nd 1129, 1132-1133.), does *not* implicate the **Fourth Amendment**.

A consent to search, unless specifically limited, does not preclude the use of a drug detection dog, at least where the

defendant should have been aware that the dog may be used and failed to object when it was. (*People v. Bell* (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 754; *United States v. Perez* (9th Cir. 1994) 37 F.3rd 510, 516.)

An “alert” by “a certified, reliable narcotics detector dog,” with nothing more, is sufficient to establish probable cause to arrest. (*United States v. Cedano-Arellano* (9th Cir. 2003) 332 F.3rd 568.)

The United States Supreme Court held that bringing a drug-sniffing dog onto the front porch of a suspect’s home (i.e., the “curtilage”) for the purpose of sniffing for evidence of contraband is a search, and a violation of the **Fourth Amendment** absent a search warrant. The fact that others are impliedly invited onto the porch for the purpose of knocking on the door is not relevant when the officers come into the same area to search for evidence of drugs. (*Florida v. Jardines* (2013) 569 U.S. 1 [133 S.Ct. 1409; 185 L.Ed.2nd 495].)

Whether or not the theory of *Jardines* is applicable to a drug-sniffing dog used around the outside, and leaning up against, the open bed and tool box in a suspect’s truck (which would over-rule prior case law), was left open by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal, holding that pursuant to the “faith-in-case law” rule of *Davis v. United States* (2011) 564 U.S. 229, 236-239 [180 L.Ed.2nd 285], it was unnecessary to decide the issue. (*United States v. Thomas* (9th Cir. 2013) 726 F.3rd 1086, 1092-1095.)

The rule of *Jardines* has been extended to the locked, but shared hallway, outside defendant’s apartment, even though the hallway was open to other residents and their guests. (*United States v. Whitaker* (7th Cir. 2016) 820 F.3rd 849.)

A dog sniff performed at a traffic stop, unless supported by independent reasonable suspicion or done during the time it would have taken to complete the purposes of the traffic stop, can cause the stop (or detention) to become “unlawfully prolonged,” and will be held to be illegal. (*United States v. Evans* (9th Cir. 2015) 786 F.3rd 779, 787-788.)

Sniffs of a Person:

Being more intrusive, dogs sniffs of a person are considered, at least by the Federal Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal, to be a search controlled by the **Fourth Amendment**, and therefore require *probable cause*. (**B.C. v. Plumas** (9th Cir. 1999) 192 F.3rd 1260.)

In a school setting, however, with students having a diminished right to privacy, only a “*reasonable suspicion*” is required to justify the sniff of the student’s person. (**Ibid.**)

And it is the opinion of the California Attorney General that a policy of unannounced, random, neutral dog sniffing of students’ personal belongings, such as backpacks, purses, jackets, and outer garments, after ordering students to leave these items in a classroom and remain in another area, would be unconstitutional absent some suspicion or probable cause to support the search. (83 **Opn.Cal.Atty.Gen.** 257 (2000))

Used to Track (or Trail):

The use of a properly trained dog to track a suspect is lawful, and the evidence of canine tracking is admissible in court. (**People v. Craig** (1978) 86 Cal.App.3rd 905; “(W)e choose to require each particular dog’s ability and reliability to be shown on a case-by-case basis.” (**Id.**, at pp. 916-917.)

See also **People v. Malgren** (1983) 139 Cal.App.3rd 234; dog tracked suspect for 35 minutes over about seven-tenths of a mile.

Per **Malgren**, the following must be shown before dog trailing evidence is admissible:

- The dog’s handler was qualified by training and experience in the use of the dog;
- The dog was adequately trained in tracking humans;
- The dog has been found to be reliable in tracking humans;

- The dog was placed on the track where circumstances indicted the guilty party to have been; *and*
- The trail had not become stale or contaminated.

(But see *People v. Jackson* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 325, below, holding that this final element is not necessary to the admission into evidence of dog trailing evidence, or that a hearing pursuant to *People v. Kelly* (1976) 17 Cal.3rd 24.) or E.C. § 402 is not necessary before the jury can hear the evidence where the prosecution lays an adequate foundation for such evidence.)

Use of a dog to track defendant’s scent from a stolen vehicle to where defendant was being detained held to supply the necessary “*fair probability*” which, with other evidence, justified the defendant’s search and subsequent arrest for the theft of the vehicle. (*In re Lennies H.* (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1232, 1239.)

There is some authority requiring the corroboration of dog-tracking evidence, but the corroborative evidence need not necessarily independently link the accused to the crime. “The corroborative evidence need only support the accuracy of the tracking itself.” (*People v. Gonzales* (1990) 218 Cal.App.3rd 403, 414.)

Use of a “*scent transfer unit*,” which extracts scents from an object, transferring the scents to a sterile gauze pad from which a dog may obtain the suspect’s scent (see also *People v. Jackson* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 291.) requires proof of the unit’s reliability and acceptability in the scientific community, per “*Kelly/Frye*,” and that it was properly used by the handler, to be admissible in court. (*People v. Mitchell* (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 772; *People v. Willis* (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 379.)

Referring to the standards for the admission into evidence of new scientific techniques, per *People v. Kelly* (1976) 17 Cal.3rd 24; and *Frye v. United States* (D.C. Cir. 1923) 293 F. 1013.)

But see *People v. Jackson*, *supra*, at pp. 298-326, below, where it was held that a hearing under *Kelly* or E.C. § 402 was not necessary before the jury could hear the evidence

in that the prosecution laid an adequate foundation for such evidence.

But, where the prosecution fails to disclose to the defense that a police dog, used in a “scent transfer” identification of the defendant, had a history of mistaken identifications, such a failure being a violation of the discovery requirements of *Brady v. Maryland* (1963) 373 U.S. 83, and where the dog’s scent evidence was the only evidence linking the defendant to the getaway car and was the only evidence corroborating “strikingly weak” eyewitness identifications, a resulting conviction is subject to being reversed. (*Aguilar v. Woodford* (2013) 725 F.3rd 970, 981-985.)

Note: Per **P.C. § 141(c)**: It is a felony for a prosecutor to purposely withhold material evidence favorable to the defense.

Dog trailing evidence was properly admitted at both phases of a capital murder trial because a hearing under *Kelly* (*People v. Kelly* (1976) 17 Cal.3rd 24.) or **E.C. § 402** was not necessary before the jury could hear the evidence in that the prosecution laid an adequate foundation for such evidence. There’s no foundational requirement that, prior to admission of dog trailing testimony, the scent presented to the dog must be shown not to be stale or contaminated. (*People v. Jackson* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 298-326, 362-365.)

To the extent that *People v. Malgren, supra*, held to the contrary on the requirement that scent presented to the dog must be shown not to be stale or contaminated, that case is disapproved. (*Id.*, at p. 325.)

Use of Dogs in Making Arrests:

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal had previously held that “*deadly force*,” when evaluating the use of force by a law enforcement agency through the use of a police dog, should be defined as: “*Force which is reasonably likely to cause (or which ‘had a reasonable probability of causing’) death.*” (*Vera Cruz v. City of Escondido* (9th Cir. 1997) 139 F.3rd 659, 663; use of a police dog is *not* deadly force.)

“(T)he force used to arrest [the plaintiff] was severe” because the dog bit the plaintiff three times, dragged him

between four and ten feet, and “nearly severed” his arm. (*Chew v. Gates* (9th Cir. 1994) 27 F.3rd 1432, 1439.)

However, use of a police dog to bite and hold a potentially dangerous fleeing felon for up to a minute, until the arresting officer could insure that the situation was safe, did not constitute the use of “*deadly force*,” and was therefore not a violation of the **Fourth Amendment** (seizure), despite the fact that the suspect’s arm was severely injured by the dog. (*Miller v. Clark County* (9th Cir. 2003) 340 F.3rd 959.)

The above, however, was a minority opinion. As a result, the Ninth Circuit has recently changed its mind, adopting the majority rule, agreeing that even in the use of a police dog, “*deadly force*” should be defined as “*force that creates a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury.*” (*Smith v. City of Hemet* (9th Cir. 2005) 394 F.3rd 689.)

“*Deadly Force as Defined by the Model Penal Code § 3.11(2)* (1962): “Force that the actor uses with the purpose of causing or that he knows to create a substantial risk of causing *death or serious bodily injury.*” (*Emphasis added.*)

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal further held in *Smith* that the defendant pleading guilty to resisting arrest, per **P.C. § 148(a)(1)**, does not preclude him from suing the officers for using unreasonable force so long as the officer’s legal actions can be separated from his use of unreasonable force. The California Supreme Court later ruled in *Yount v. City of Sacramento* (2008) 43 Cal.4th 885, that it is not necessary to find the officers’ lawful actions divisible from their use of unreasonable use of force in order for the criminal defendant to be guilty of resisting arrest and still sue. Based upon this theory, the Ninth Circuit found that a criminal defendant, even after pleading guilty to resisting arrest per **P.C. § 148(a)(1)**, may sue the officer for using unreasonable force in a continuous course of action so long as at least part of the officer’s actions were lawful. (*Hooper v. County of San Diego* (9th Cir. 2011) 629 F.3rd 1127.)

Note: Both *Smith* and *Hooper* are dog bite cases.

However, the use of a police dog does not necessarily constitute the use of deadly force under all circumstances. It depends upon the circumstances of the case in question. In such a case, the issue for a civil jury is to merely determine whether the force used was reasonable under the circumstances. (*Thompson v. County of Los Angeles* (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 154.)

Where the dog's handler closely followed his police dog and called her off very quickly after the initial contact with the plaintiff, and due to the officer's close proximity to his dog, the encounter between plaintiff and the dog was so brief that the officer did not even know if contact had occurred, where the risk of harm posed by this particular use of force, and the actual harm caused, was moderate, the district court properly determined that the use of force in this instance was not severe. Summary judgment for the City of San Diego was upheld. (*Lowry v. City of San Diego* (9th 2017) 858 F.3rd 1248.)

Shooting Dogs in Self-Defense:

Officers are expected to use some discretion in the execution of a warrant to avoid the taking of unnecessarily excessive (i.e., "cumulative") property and engaging in unnecessarily destructive behavior. (*San Jose Charter of the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club v. City of San Jose* (9th Cir. 2005) 402 F.3rd 962; the shooting of several dogs without having considered alternative methods of controlling the dogs.)

A dog is property. The unreasonable seizure of that property is a violation of the **Fourth Amendment**. It is clearly established that unreasonably killing a person's dog is an unconstitutional seizure of property under the **Fourth Amendment**. But shooting and killing a suspect's dog may be justified when done in the necessary defense of oneself; e.g., when the dogs posed an imminent threat to the officers who were attempting to execute a search warrant. (*Brown v. Battle Creek Police Dep't* (6th Cir. 2016) 844 F.3rd 556.)

Cellphones, Disks, Computers and Other High Tech Devices:

See "Searches of Cellphones, Disks, Computers and Other High Tech Devices," under "Searches of Containers" (Chapter 13), below.

Chapter 12:

Open Fields:

General Rule: The constitutional protections relating to homes *do not* apply to *open fields* beyond the curtilage of the home. (*Oliver v. United States* (1984) 466 U.S. 170 [80 L.Ed.2nd 214].)

The **Fourth Amendment**, by its terms, protects only “*persons, houses, papers and effects.*” Open fields do not come within these four protected categories. ((2012) 565 U.S. 400, 404-413 [132 S.Ct. 945, 949-954; 181 L.Ed.2nd 911]; *Florida v. Jardines* (2013) 569 U.S. 1 [133 S.Ct. 1409; 185 L.Ed.2nd 495].)

Therefore, trespassing onto defendant’s open land does not implicate the Constitution, and any observations made while doing so are admissible. (*Ibid*; see also *Hester v. United States* (1924) 265 U.S. 57 [68 L.Ed. 898].)

Narcotics officers entered the defendant’s land, past “No Trespassing” signs and barbed wire fencing. Entry into such an area, not part of the curtilage of any home, was not contested. (*United States v. Barajas-Avalos* (9th Cir, 2004) 359 F.3rd 1204.)

A warrantless airplane search, acting on a tip, at altitudes of between 300 to 700 feet, resulting in observation of defendant’s half-football-field-sized marijuana grow, was lawful. (*Dean v. Superior Court* (1973) 35 Cal.App.3rd 112.)

Similarly, observation of a marijuana patch from 1,500 to 2,000 feet, visible to the naked eye (and then enhanced through the use of binoculars), did not violate the defendant’s privacy rights. (*Burkholder v. Superior Court* (1979) 96 Cal.App.3rd 421; see also *People v. St. Amour* (1980) 104 Cal.App.3rd 886, observations made from 1,000 to 1,500 feet, again enhanced through the use of binoculars, held to be lawful; and *People v. Joubert* (1981) 118 Cal.App.3rd 637.)

Observations made into private areas from an “open field” beyond the curtilage of the home are lawful. (*United States v. Dunn* (1987) 480 U.S. 294 [94 L.Ed.2nd 326].)

California expressly follows the federal rule. (*People v. Channing* (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 985.)

Observations made from a common driveway used by other residents and the public into the curtilage of defendant's home (i.e., his garage) were lawful, and properly used in the affidavit for a search warrant. (*People v. Lieng* (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1221-1227.)

Use of night vision goggles doesn't change the result. (*Id.*, at pp. 1227-1228.)

The warrantless entry onto plaintiffs' property to seize marijuana plants, originally observed by aerial surveillance, held to be lawful under the "open fields doctrine." (*Littlefield v. County of Humboldt* (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 243, 250-254.)

“[T]he special protection accorded by the **Fourth Amendment** to the people in their “persons, houses, papers, and effects,” is not extended to the open fields. The distinction between the latter and the house is as old as the common law.” (*Ibid.*, citing *Oliver v. United States, supra*, at pp. 176-179.)

Chapter 13:

Searches of Containers and Electronic Devices:

General Rule: As a general rule, a search warrant will be required in order to search a container of any type. “The **Fourth Amendment** of the United States Constitution prohibits the government from engaging in unreasonable searches and seizures of a person’s ‘effects.’” (*People v. Pereira* (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1111; see also *United States v. Monghur* (9th Cir. 2009) 588 F.3rd 975.)

Although there is some authority for the proposition that; “(t)he rationale justifying a warrantless search of an automobile that is believed to be transporting contraband arguably applies with equal force to any movable container that is believed to be carrying an illicit substance” (*United States v. Ross* (1982) 456 U.S. 798, 809 [72 L.Ed.2nd 572, 584.]), the courts have not yet specifically extended this rationale to objects in containers other than when the container is in a vehicle or seized incident to a suspect’s arrest. (See Justice Stevens’ dissent in *California v. Acevedo* (1991) 500 U.S. 565, 598 [114 L.Ed.2nd 619, 646], predicting that this this may be the next step.)

Also, property in the possession or under the control of a subject who is booked into custody is subject to search: “Once articles have lawfully fallen into the hands of the police they may examine them to see if they have been stolen, test them to see if they have been used in the commission of a crime, return them to the prisoner on his release, or preserve them for use as evidence at the time of trial. (*People v. Robertson* 240 Cal.App.2d 99 (1966) 105-106) During their period of police custody an arrested person’s personal effects, like his person itself, are subject to reasonable inspection, examination, and test. (*People v. Chaigles* 237 N.Y. 193 [142 N.E. 583, 32 A.L.R. 676], Cardozo, J.)” (*People v. Rogers* (1966) 241 Cal.App.2nd 384, 389.)

As the law stands today, however, a search warrant will still generally be required under these circumstances. (*Smith v. Ohio* (1990) 494 U.S. 541, 542 [108 L.Ed.2nd 464, 467].)

See *Robey v. Superior Court* (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1218, 1236-1240, reiterating the general rule that “the **Fourth Amendment's** protection extends to letters and other sealed packages in shipment.”

A person has an expectation of privacy in his or her private closed containers. (*United States v. Welch* (9th Cir. 1993) 4 F.3rd 761, 764; a woman’s purse.)

Cardboard boxes belonging to a homeless person, being a place where the homeless person stores his or her most private belongings, may not be searched without a warrant or consent. (*United States v. Fultz* (9th Cir. 1998) 146 F.3rd 1102.)

While the odor of marijuana coming from a mailed package will justify the seizure of such package, it does not excuse the lack of a search warrant when law enforcement opens the package without exigent circumstances. (*Robey v. Superior Court* (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1218, 1223-1243; overruling *People v. McKinnon* (1972) 7 Cal.3rd 899, 909; which had held to the contrary.)

Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement: There are a number of legal theories justifying a warrantless search of containers. For instance:

Incident to Arrest: When a person is lawfully arrested, the police have a right to make a contemporaneous warrantless search (i.e., a search “*incident to arrest*”) of the defendant’s person (*Weeks v. United States* (1914) 232 U.S. 383 [58 L.Ed. 652].) and things under his immediate control. (*Carroll v. United States* (1925) 267 U.S. 132 [69 L.Ed.2nd 543].)

Transportation Required: This rule, however, only applies when the defendant is to be transported somewhere. If cited and released at the scene, no search, absent probable cause to believe the container contains some seizable contraband or evidence, is allowed. (See “*Searches Incident to Arrest*,” “*Transportation Requirement*,” under “*Searches of Persons*,” above; and *People v. Brisendine* (1975) 13 Cal.3rd 528; and *United States v. Robinson* (1973) 414 U.S. 218 [38 L.Ed.2nd 427].)

However, if the arrestee has been secured (i.e., handcuffed and placed into a patrol car) in preparation to being transported, the U.S. Supreme Court has held the lunging area around him is no longer subject to being searched, at least when arrested out of the arrestee’s vehicle. (*Arizona v. Gant* (2009) 556 U.S. 332 [173 L.Ed.2nd 485]; see “*Vehicle Searches*,” above, and “*Incident to Arrest, In a Vehicle*,” below.)

Although the United States Supreme Court has indicated that *Gant* is limited to “circumstances unique to the vehicle context” (See (*Riley v. California* (June 25, 2014) 573 U.S. ___, __ [134 S.Ct. 2473, 2492; 189 L.Ed.2nd 430], citing *Gant* at p. 343), at least one California court has applied it

to the residential situation. (See *People v. Leal* (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1051; arrest in a residence.)

Property in the possession of a subject who is booked into custody is subject to search:

A person who is to be booked, and who has objects in his possession, may be subjected to an *inventory search* despite the lack of probable cause. (*Illinois v. Lafayette* (1983) 462 U.S. 640 [77 L.Ed.2nd 65].)

The right to conduct a warrantless booking search includes the right to search containers (e.g., purse, wallet, cellphone etc.) “*immediately associated with the person of an arrestee.*” (*Illinois v. Lafayette, supra; People v. Hamilton* (1988) 46 Cal.3rd 123, 137; see also *People v. Diaz* (2011) 51 Cal.4th 84; searches of containers “*immediately associated with the person.*”)

Diaz involved the warrantless search of a cellphone seized incident to arrest. The United States Supreme Court impliedly overruled *Diaz* on this point, holding that a cellphone seized incident to arrest may not be searched without a search warrant or exigent circumstances. (*Riley v. California* (June 25, 2014) 573 U.S. ___ [134 S.Ct. 2473; 189 L.Ed.2nd 430].)

The California Supreme Court concluded in a warrantless cellphone search case (reversing a lower appellate court decision) that the search of defendant’s cellphone would not have been proper even under its prior decision in *People v. Diaz* (2011) 51 Cal.4th 84 (a search incident to arrest case), and that a reasonably well-trained officer would have known this. Defendant was not under arrest when officers searched his phone. Under *Riley v. California* (June 25, 2014) 573 U.S. ___ [134 S.Ct. 2473; 189 L.Ed.2nd 430], which overruled *Diaz*, even if defendant had been properly arrested, a warrant was required to search his cellphone. The search in this case violated the **Fourth Amendment**; the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply. Also, the search was not the result of negligence, nor did it

result from any pressure to apply a newly enacted statutory scheme that was confusing and complex. The officers' conduct, including the search, was deliberate. Exclusion of the evidence in this case serves to deter future similar behavior. (*People v. Macabeo* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1212-1226.)

Cellphones are not "containers" for purposes of the vehicle exception to the search warrant requirement. (*United States v. Camou* (9th Cir. 2014) 773 F.3rd 932, 941-943.)

See also *United States v. Lara* (9th Cir. 2016) 815 F.3rd 605, 610-611; declining to include defendant's cellphone under the category of a "container," in defendant's **Fourth** wavier search conditions.

Incident to Arrest, In a Vehicle: When arresting an occupant of a motor vehicle, the officer may search the person arrested *and* the passenger areas of the vehicle, *and any containers within the passenger area of the vehicle.* (*New York v. Belton* (1981) 395 U.S. 752 [69 L.Ed.2nd 775].)

This includes containers belonging to passengers other than, and in addition to, the person arrested. (*People v. Mitchell* (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 672; *People v. Prance* (1991) 226 Cal.App.3rd 1525; see also *Wyoming v. Houghton* (1999) 526 U.S. 295 [143 L.Ed.2nd 408], making containers left in a vehicle by passengers subject to search when searching a vehicle with *probable cause* to believe the vehicle contains contraband.)

If, however, the passenger takes the container (such as a purse) with him or her upon being ordered out of a vehicle, is that container subject to search? *Probably not* (see *United States v. Vaughan* (9th Cir. 1983) 718 F.2nd 332.), absent some reason to believe it may contain a weapon, in which case a "patdown" of the container may be appropriate.

But see *People v. Lopez* (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 815, 822-828, upholding the warrantless search of defendant's purse retrieved from her vehicle when the officer is making a limited search for identification and/or vehicle documentation.

But, remember that a search incident to an arrest must be “contemporaneous in time and place” with the arrest. (*People v. Stoffle* (1992) 1 Cal.App.4th 1671; *People v. Boissard* (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 972.) (See “Incident to Arrest,” under “Searches of Persons,” above.)

Severely limiting the rule of *Belton*, the U.S. Supreme Court decided in *Arizona v. Gant* (2009) 556 U.S. 332 [173 L.Ed.2nd 485], that a warrantless search of a vehicle incident to arrest is lawful *only* when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search. As an alternate theory under *Gant*, likely to be applicable only to searches incident to arrest in a vehicle, the officer may search for evidence relevant to the charge of arrest whenever it is “reasonable to believe” that such evidence is present in the car.

People v. Diaz (2011) 51 Cal.4th 84, created an exception to *Gant*, finding that containers “immediately associated with the person” are still subject to a search incident to arrest, even though the suspect has been arrested and secured, and even if the container, removed from the defendant’s person, is not searched until later.

In so far as *Diaz* refers to cellphones, this case has been impliedly overruled by the United States Supreme Court in *Riley v. California* (June 25, 2014) 573 U.S. __ [134 S.Ct. 2473; 189 L.Ed.2nd 430]. (See also *People v. Macabeo* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1212-1226.)

Cellphones are not “containers” for purposes of the vehicle exception to the search warrant requirement. (*United States v. Camou* (9th Cir. 2014) 773 F.3rd 932, 941-943.)

See also *United States v. Lara* (9th Cir. 2016) 815 F.3rd 605, 610-611; declining to include defendant’s cellphone under the category of a “container,” in defendant’s Fourth wavier search conditions.

See “Incident to Arrest,” under “Searches of Vehicles” (Chapter 9), above.

With Probable Cause, In a Vehicle: When there is *probable cause* to search a motor vehicle encountered on the street or in public, or any specific containers in that vehicle, a warrantless search of the containers in the motor vehicle is lawful. (*United States v. Ross* (1982) 456 U.S. 798 [73 L.Ed.2nd 572]; *California v. Acevedo* (1991) 500 U.S. 565, 580 [114

L.Ed.2nd 619, 634]; *People v. Schunk* (1991) 235 Cal.App.3rd 1334, 1340-1343.)

The old rule (see *United States v. Chadwick* (1977) 433 U.S. 1 [53 L.Ed.2nd 538].), that with probable cause to search a *particular container* located in a vehicle, a search warrant would be required, is no longer a valid rule. (*California v. Acevedo*, *supra*.)

And see *Wyoming v. Houghton* (1999) 526 U.S. 295 [143 L.Ed.2nd 408], holding that the searching of a passenger's personal property left in a vehicle, with probable cause to believe there is seizable contraband *somewhere* in the vehicle, is lawful.

Also note that probable cause to believe there are controlled substances *somewhere* in the vehicle, even if the amount suspected is only enough for one's personal use, justifies a search of the *entire* vehicle including the trunk and engine compartment. (*People v. Hunter* (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 371; *People v. Dey* (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1318; finding the *United States v. Ross*, *supra*, has, in effect, overruled prior cases to the contrary. (E.g.; see *Wimberly v. Superior Court* (1976) 16 Cal. 3d 557; *People v. Gregg* (1974) 43 Cal. App. 3d 137.)

Cellphones are not "containers" for purposes of the vehicle exception to the search warrant requirement. (*United States v. Camou* (9th Cir. 2014) 773 F.3rd 932, 941-943; extending the prohibitions on warrantless cellphone searches seized incident to arrest (*Riley v. California* (June 25, 2014) 573 U.S. ___ [134 S.Ct. 2473; 189 L.Ed.2nd 430] to those seized in a vehicle with probable cause.

See "With Probable Cause," under "Searches of Vehicles" (Chapter 9), above.

See also *United States v. Lara* (9th Cir. 2016) 815 F.3rd 605, 610-611; declining to include defendant's cellphone under the category of a "container," in defendant's **Fourth** wavier search conditions.

See the extensive review of the law by the California Supreme court on searches of containers found in vehicles at *Robey v. Superior Court* (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1218, 1223-1243.

*When at Least One Person in a Vehicle is Subject to a **Fourth** Waiver:*

A search of the female defendant's purse left in the car when an officer is conducting a parole search of a male parolee, is illegal absent a reasonable suspicion to believe that the parolee had joint access, possession or control over the purse. (*People v. Baker* (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1152.)

But, a warrantless search of those areas of the passenger compartment of a vehicle where an officer reasonably expects that the parolee could have stowed personal belongings or discarded items when aware of police activity, as well as a search of personal property located in those areas if the officer reasonably believes that the parolee owns those items or has the ability to exert control over them (a chip bag and a pair of woman's shoes in this case), is lawful. *People v. Schmitz* (2012) 55 Cal.4th 909, 916-933.)

The same rule holds true as to probationers. (*People v. Cervantes* (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 860, 871.)

When officers find a container (backpack in this case) during a lawful **Fourth** waiver search, they only need a "reasonable suspicion," as opposed to probable cause, to believe that the container belongs to or is controlled by the subject with the **Fourth** waiver in order to search it. (*United States v. Bolivar* (9th Cir. 2012) 670 F.3rd 1091, 1093-1095.)

With Defendant's Admission as to the Contents:

When a suspect makes "an unequivocal, contemporaneous, and voluntary disclosure (to a law enforcement officer) that a package or container contains contraband," it is arguable that he waives any reasonable expectation of privacy as to the contents of that container, eliminating the need to obtain a search warrant. (*United States v. Monghur* (9th Cir. 2009) 588 F.3rd 975, 978-981; citing *United States v. Cardona Rivera* (7th Cir. 1990) 904 F.2nd 1149.)

However, a jail inmate talking over a jail telephone, where he is warned that his conversations were subject to monitoring, asking a friend to retrieve what officers understood to be a gun (although defendant only referred to it as "the thing") from a container (also described in vague, generic terms) in the closet of his girlfriend's home, does *not* waive any expectation of privacy defendant had in the container that was later retrieved by law enforcement and

illegally searched without a search warrant. (*United States v. Monghur, supra.*)

Abandoned Property: Any containers (or any other property) abandoned by a suspect, thus relinquishing at least an *objectively reasonable expectation of privacy*, if not also the subject's *subjective expectation of privacy*, may be seized and searched without probable cause and without a search warrant. (*In re Baraka H.* (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1039.)

E.g.: A minor, who appeared to officers to be conducting narcotics transactions with passing motorists, retrieved controlled substances from a paper bag discarded on the ground some distance beyond the minor's reach. When detained, the bag was retrieved by the officers and searched and marijuana was recovered. By distancing himself from the bag, despite a lack of an intent to permanently abandon the property, the minor gave up any reasonable expectation of privacy in the bag's contents. (*In re Baraka H., supra.*)

Observations of defendant retrieving contraband from a hole in the ground, covered by a piece of wood, in the common area of an apartment complex, while the observing officers are standing on adjacent private property with the permission of the property's owner, were lawful, as was the warrantless retrieval of the contraband found in the hole. (*People v. Shaw* (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 833.)

There is no expectation of privacy in a duffle bag left in an apartment laundry room open to anyone, even though placed out of the way on a high shelf. (*United States v. Fay* (9th Cir. 2005) 410 F.3rd 589.)

Trashcans: There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the trash containers one places out on the curb for pick up. (*California v. Greenwood* (1988) 486 U.S. 35 [100 L.Ed.2nd 30].)

Leaving a cellphone at the scene of a crime negates the suspect's expectation of privacy in the contents of that phone, and is therefore abandoned property despite the suspect's subjective wish to retrieve it, which he fails to act on. "Abandonment . . . is not meant in the strict property-right sense, but rests instead on whether the person so relinquished his interest in the property that he no longer retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in it at the time of the search." (*People v. Daggs* (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 361.)

However, the abandonment must be voluntary. Property abandoned as a result (i.e., the “*direct product*”) of an unlawful detention (or unlawful arrest) may *not* be lawfully searched. (*United States v. Stephens* (9th Cir. 2000) 206 F.3rd 914.)

However, shipping a package while using a fictitious name and return address *does not* necessarily mean that the defendant has abandoned the property shipped. Abandonment is a question of fact, and depends upon the totality of the circumstances. The test is whether defendant’s words or actions would cause a reasonable person in the searching officer’s position to believe that the property was abandoned. Where defendant asked for a routing number and made a number of telephone inquiries concerning the status of the package he had shipped, he was properly found to have *not* abandoned the package despite the use of a phony name and return address. (*People v. Pereira* (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1106; “The appropriate test is whether defendant’s words or actions would cause a reasonable person in the searching officer’s position to believe that the property was abandoned.” *Id.*, at p. 113.)

There is no privacy right in the mouthpiece of the PAS device, which was provided by the police and where defendant abandoned any expectation of privacy in the saliva he deposited on the device when he failed to wipe it off. Whether defendant subjectively expected that the genetic material contained in his saliva would become known to the police was irrelevant because he deposited it on a police device and thus made it accessible to the police. The officer who administered the PAS test testified that used mouthpieces were normally discarded in the trash. Thus, any subjective expectation defendant may have had that his right to privacy would be preserved was unreasonable. (*People v. Thomas* (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 338.)

Shipping a package containing contraband, using a false name, does not indicate that the defendant intended to abandon the package, at least when he makes efforts at a later time to insure that the package has been delivered. (*People v. Pereira* (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1113-1114; see also *Robey v. Superior Court* (June 27, 2013) 56 Cal.4th 1218, 1224, where the Court held that

the People had waived this argument, but cited *Pereira* with approval.)

The co-occupant of a vehicle, when she gets out of the car leaving her purse in the car, has not “abandoned” her purse. “Simply getting out of the car and leaving the purse on the floorboard does not constitute abandonment” (*People v. Baker* (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1161.)

By throwing his backpack onto the roof of a house upon the approach of police officers, defendant abandoned any expectation of privacy in that backpack that he might have previously had. (*United States v. Juszcyk* (10th Cir. Kan. 2017) 844 F.3rd 1213.)

See “Abandoned Property,” under “Searches and Seizures” (Chapter 5), above.

During a Fourth Waiver Search of a Residence:

When officers find a container (backpack in this case) during a lawful **Fourth** waiver search, they only need a “reasonable suspicion,” as opposed to probable cause, to believe that the container belongs to or is controlled by the subject with the **Fourth** waiver in order to search it. (*United States v. Bolivar* (9th Cir. 2012) 670 F.3rd 1091, 1093-1095.)

The search of defendant’s purse, found in a room recognized by the officers to be a room where defendant was staying with her young son, when the search was based upon a **Fourth** waiver made by a probationer who owned the house, was found to be illegal absent any evidence to believe that the probationer had access to that room or to the purse itself. (*People v. Carreon* (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 866, 879-880.)

Special Needs Searches:

Search of Luggage in a Subway Facility: Implemented in response to terrorist attacks on subways in other cities, a program was designed to deter terrorists from carrying concealed explosives onto the New York’s subway. The city program established daily inspection checkpoints at selected subway facilities where officers searched bags that met size criteria for containing explosives. Subway riders wishing to avoid a search were required to leave the station. In a bench trial, the district court found that the program comported with the **Fourth Amendment** under the “special needs

doctrine.” On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed, finding that the program was reasonable and therefore constitutional. In particular, the court found that preventing a terrorist attack on the subway was a special need, which was weighty in light of recent terrorist attacks on subway systems in other cities. In addition, the court found that the disputed program was a reasonably effective deterrent. Although the searches intruded on a full privacy interest, the court further found that such intrusion was minimal, particularly as inspections involved only certain size containers and riders could decline inspection by leaving the station. (*MacWade v. Kelly* (2nd Cir. 2006) 460 F.3rd 260.)

See also “*Special Needs Searches and Seizures*,” under “*Warrantless Searches*” (Chapter 7), above.

Other “Expectation of Privacy” Issues:

A jail inmate talking over a jail telephone, where he is warned that his conversations were subject to monitoring, asking a friend to retrieve what officers understood to be a gun (although defendant only referred to it as “*the thing*”) from a container (also described in vague, generic terms) in the closet of his girlfriend’s home, does *not* waive any expectation of privacy defendant had in the container that was later retrieved by law enforcement and illegally searched without a search warrant. (*United States v. Monghur* (2009) 588 F.3rd 975, 978-981.)

Monghur differentiated these facts from a similar circumstance where defendant told law enforcement officers, clearly and unequivocally, that a particular container contained contraband. The Court in this case found that such a concession waived any expectation of privacy defendant might have had in the container, thus allowing for a warrantless search of that container. (*United States v. Cardona-Rivera* (7th Cir. 1990) 904 F.2nd 1149.)

With Consent of a Third Person having Common Authority:

Paper bags left by defendant in an acquaintance’s garage, where the acquaintance had free access to the bags, may be lawfully searched with consent from the acquaintance. By leaving the bags with the acquaintance, knowing and not objecting to the fact that she (the acquaintance) would go into the bags, defendant “*assumed*

the risk” that she would allow others to look into the bags. (*People v. Schmeck* (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 280-282.)

A business that owns the company’s computers may consent to the search of a computer used by an employee, at least when the employee is on notice that he has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the computer he is using. (*United States v. Ziegler* (9th Cir. 2006) 474 F.3rd 1184.)

Allowing another person unrestricted access to a mutually owned computer negates any expectation of privacy the first person might have had. A co-owner has actual authority to give consent to the police to search. And if it turns out that the person is not actually a co-owner, the doctrine of apparent authority may justify the search. (*United States v. Stanley* (9th Cir. 2011) 653 F.3rd 946, 950-952.)

See “Consent Searches” (Chapter 16), below.

The “Single Purpose Container” Theory:

Where “some containers . . . by their very nature cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance,” a warrant is not needed to open the container and inspect its contents. In such a case, it is as if the item in the container was in “*plain sight*.” (*Arkansas v. Sanders* (1979) 442 U.S. 753, 764, fn. 13 [61 L.Ed.2nd 235]; overruled on other grounds in *California v. Acevedo* (1991) 500 U.S. 565 [114 L.Ed.2nd 619].)

“(I)f the distinctive configuration of a container proclaims its contents, the contents cannot fairly be said to have been removed from the searching officer’s view,” just as “if the container were transparent.” (*Robbins v. California* (1981) 453 U.S. 420, 427 [69 L.Ed.2nd 744]; overruled on other grounds in *United States v. Ross* (1982) 456 U.S. 798 [72 L.Ed.2nd 572].)

Plastic wrapped green blocks found *not* to be within this exception, in *Robbins*.

Per the plurality, for this rule to apply; “(A) container must so clearly announce its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or otherwise, that its contents are obvious to an observer.” (*Robbins v. California, supra*, at p. 428.)

It's a question of whether a defendant has a "*reasonable expectation of privacy*" in the contents of a container. There is none if the contents are within a container that meets the requirements of this rule. (*United States v. Gust* (9th Cir. 2005) 405 F.3rd 797; a gun case that just as easily could have contained a musical instrument.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal in *Gust* limited the applicability of this rule by holding that the nature of the container must be evaluated in light of "the objective viewpoint of a layperson, rather than the subjective viewpoint of a trained law enforcement officer, and without sole reliance on the specific circumstances in which the containers were discovered." In other words, the officers' expertise, and the circumstances under which the container is found, must be ignored. (Citing *United States v. Miller* (9th Cir. 1985) 769 F.2nd 554.)

The California Supreme Court discussed the theory that a distinctive odor (of marijuana) might fit within this category of warrantless searches, it declined to decide the issue because the record was not sufficiently developed at the trial court level. (*Robey v. Superior Court* (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1218, 1241-1243, and concurring opinion at 1247-1254.)

Containers First Searched by Non-Law Enforcement: Contraband found by a civilian in a container, such as when a United Parcel Service ("UPS") or Federal Express employee opens and inspects the contents of a package being shipped through their respective businesses, is not subject to suppression. When law enforcement is subsequently notified after such an inspection, the contents of the package may be field tested by a law enforcement officer, seized, and submitted to a law enforcement lab for further testing; all without a warrant. (*People v. Warren* (1990) 219 Cal.App.3rd 619; see also *United States v. Jacobsen* (1984) 466 U.S. 109 [80 L.Ed.2nd 85]; *United States v. Young* (9th Cir. 1998) 153 F.3rd 1079.)

Why? Once a private party (i.e., non-law enforcement) has made a search and revealed his findings to the police, the defendant's expectation of privacy has been intruded upon to the extent of the private search. Thus, where employees of a private freight carrier found apparent narcotics during the search of a package, then returned the substance to the package and informed narcotics agents, the agents' removal of the substance from the package did not constitute a search, because it did not exceed the scope of the earlier private search. (*United States v. Jacobsen*, *supra*, at p. 116,

119 [80 L.Ed.2nd at p. 96, 98] see also *People v. Yackee* (1984) 161 Cal.App.3rd 843; cocaine found by airline agent.)

The **Fourth Amendment** was not implicated by a police officer's view of property found in defendant's vehicle and inventoried by a private repossessor. (*People v. Shegog* (1986) 184 Cal.App.3rd 899, 902.)

A government agent may test suspicious substances discovered during a search by a private person without having to obtain a search warrant. (*People v. Warren, supra*, at p. 623.)

A private citizen viewing discs taken by the citizen from the defendant's bedroom, and then showing the same discs to a police officer, is not an illegal search. Also, the fact that the officer may view images on those discs not previously seen by the citizen is irrelevant "if the police knew with substantial certainty" that the same type of images would be found. But looking at other unmarked discs not previously viewed by the private citizen, not knowing for sure what might be on them, requires a search warrant. (*People v. Wilkinson* (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1569-1574.)

Note: The argument that a container, not already opened and viewed by the private citizen, can be opened by the police officer "if the police knew with substantial certainty" that it contains more of the same, comes from *United States v. Runyan* (5th Cir. 2001) 275 F.3rd 449, 463.)

Another possible exception to the general rule: "(T)he police do not exceed the scope of a prior private search when they examine the same materials that were examined by the private searchers, but they examine these materials more thoroughly than did the private parties. [Citation.]" (*United States v. Runyan, supra.*, at p. 464.)

But see also *United States v. Lichtenberger* (6th Cir. 2015) 786 F.3rd 478; Laptop evidence and evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant issued on the basis of its contents had to be suppressed because the police officer could not testify with a "virtual certainty" that she didn't view more than the defendant's girlfriend had seen in the previous private search. The search, and the resulting

search warrant, therefore violated defendant's **Fourth Amendment** rights.

See also *United States v. Bowman* (8th Cir. 1990) 907 F.2nd 63, where law enforcement viewing the contents of one bundle wrapped in plastic and duct tape already opened by an airport employee allowed for the opening of four identical bundles because the opened bundle “spoke volumes as to [the] contents [of the remaining bundles]—particularly to the trained eye of the officer.” (pg. 65.)

Downloading video files with sexually suggestive titles after viewing none-pornographic files that had been found by the owner of a computer store on defendant's computer, and then viewing the downloaded videos without a warrant, held to be beyond the scope of the private search and illegal. (*People v. Michael E.* (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 261, 268-279.)

If, however, the civilian is acting according to a governmental directive (e.g.; FAA guidelines for searching packages at an airport), the civilian *may* be held to the same standard as a law enforcement officer. (*United States v Ross* (9th Cir. 1994) 32 F.3rd 1141; *United States v. Young* (9th Cir. 1998) 153 F.3rd 1079.)

However, a mere “*tacit agreement*” between a law enforcement officer and a civilian that the civilian will conduct a particular search which the officer could not lawfully perform himself, as ruled to be illegal in *People v. North* (1981) 29 Cal.3rd 509, is no longer enough to invalidate the search since passage of **Proposition 8**. (*People v. Wilkinson* (2008) 163 Cal. App. 4th 1554, 1565; noting that the rule *North* to be invalid at least “to the extent *North* requires nothing more than the officer's knowledge and failure to protect the defendant's rights to attribute a private search to the government.”

An airline employee who had in the past been a paid informant for the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”), who opened a package after being encouraged by the DEA to do so on a routine basis, expecting a probable reward from DEA because of having received rewards for opening similar packages before, was held to be a government agent even though he had not been directed to open this particular package. (*United States v. Walther* (9th Cir. 1981) 652 F.2nd 788.)

Note, however, it is doubtful whether merely having been informed by law enforcement of the power to open and inspect packages automatically turns a civilian into a police agent. (See *People v. Wachter* (1976) 58 Cal.App.3rd 311, 920-923, finding that even a police officer, when off duty and acting out of mere curiosity, may *not* be acting as a law enforcement officer in conducting a search.)

See also *People v. Peterson* (1972) 23 Cal.App.3rd 883, 893; off-duty police trainee searching a container in his apartment house garage out of concern for his own safety.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal declined to extend this rule to a hotel room and to a backpack in the hotel room, both of which had been looked into previously by non-law enforcement hotel employees. While the package in *United States v. Jacobsen* (1984) 466 U.S. 109 [80 L.Ed.2nd 85], contained nothing but contraband (i.e., cocaine), defendant's hotel room and his backpack in this case contained other items that were not illegal and to which the defendant maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy. (*United States v. Young* (9th Cir. 2009) 573 F.3rd 711, 720-721.)

Where a store employee found child pornography on defendant's computer that had been given to him by defendant to work on, and then detectives viewed the same images, suppression was not warranted under the **Fourth Amendment**. Defendant had voluntarily turned over his computer to the store with the understanding that that its employees would inspect the system in furtherance of its repair. The employee's prior viewing of the images had extinguished defendant's expectation of privacy in his computer's contents. The detectives did not exceed the scope of the employee's prior search. (*United States v. Tosti* (9th Cir. 2013) 733 F.3rd 816, 821-823.)

Exterior of a Container:

There is no expectation of privacy in the outside of a piece of mail sent to the defendant. "(B)ecause the information is foreseeably visible to countless people in the course of a letter reaching its destination, 'an addressee or addressor generally has no expectation of privacy as to the outside of mail.'" (*People v. Reyes* (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1189-1192; quoting *United States v.*

Osunegbu (1987 5th Cir.) 822 F.2nd 472, 380, fn. 3; see also *United States v. Jefferson* (9th Cir. 2009) 566 F.3rd 928, 933.)

In *Reyes*, an employee of a private postbox company spontaneously handed officers defendant's mail when the officers inquired as to whether defendant had rented a box at that facility even though the employees didn't "normally" hand over a clients' mail absent a court order. Defendant was never told that his mail would be kept private.

Customs Inspections: Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has held that evidence lawfully observed by a *customs inspector*, during a warrantless border search and resealed in its container, may later be seized from that container without a warrant by law enforcement officers after a controlled delivery to the defendant. "(O)nce a container has been found to a certainty to contain illicit drugs, the contraband becomes like objects physically within the plain view of the police, and the claim to privacy is lost. Consequently, the subsequent reopening of the container is not a 'search' within the intendment of the **Fourth Amendment**." (*Illinois v. Andreas* (1983) 463 U.S. 765 [77 L.Ed.2nd 1003].)

The Court did note, however, that at some point after an interruption of control or surveillance of a container, such as when the defendant changes the contents of the container, the defendant may regain a legitimate privacy right. (*Id.*, at p. 772 [77 L.Ed.2nd at p. 1011].)

See "*Border Searches*" (Chapter 14), below.

"*Manipulating*," "*Squeezing*" or "*Poofing*" Containers: Whether or not a container can be "*manipulated*," "*squeezed*," or "*poofed*" without implicating the **Fourth Amendment** is subject to a difference of opinion, and depends upon the circumstances. For instance:

At an Airport: At least where there is some need for heightened security, such as when dealing with *airline luggage*, squeezing a package and noting the odor of the expended air has been held to be lawful. (*People v. Santana* (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 543; *United States v. Lovell* (5th Cir. 1988) 849 F.2nd 910.)

However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal disagrees. Squeezing a bag checked with an airline to facilitate smelling its contents is an unconstitutional search. (*Hernandez v. United States* (9th Cir. 1965) 353 F.2nd 624.)

At a Bus Station: Although a lower federal appellate court has held that squeezing one's luggage in a bus is such a minor intrusion that it could not reasonably be considered a search for purposes of the **Fourth Amendment** (*United States v. Viera* (5th Cir. 1981) 644 F.2nd 509.), the United States Supreme Court apparently disagrees, and has held that the squeezing of a soft-sided suitcase on a bus, thus noting the feel of a “brick” of contraband, is a search and illegal if done without probable cause. (*Bond v. United States* (2000) 529 U.S. 334 [146 L.Ed.2nd 365].)

During a Detention and Patdown: If a police officer feels what *might* be a controlled substance in the pocket of a suspect during a patdown for weapons, and “manipulates” (*Minnesota v. Dickerson* (1993) 508 U.S. 366, 378 [124 L.Ed.2nd 334, 345]; *People v. Dickey* (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 952, 957.) or “shakes” it (*United States v. Miles* (9th Cir. 2001) 224 F.3rd 1009.) in an attempt to confirm or verify his suspicions, the manipulation or shaking of the object is *a search* for contraband, done without *probable cause*, and illegal.

But, feeling a bulge that is believed to be a weapon, and manipulating it in an attempt to verify that it is a weapon, which requires no more than a *reasonable suspicion*, is lawful. (*United States v. Mattarolo* (9th Cir. 1999) 209 F.3rd 1153.)

See “Frisks,” under “Searches of Persons,” above.

Detention of a Container: A container, with a “reasonable and articulable suspicion” that it may have contraband or other evidence of illegal activity inside, may be *detained* for a reasonable period of time to allow for an investigation concerning its possible contents. (*United States v. Hernandez* (9th Cir. 2002) 313 F.3rd 1206; package mailed to the defendant detained by postal inspectors.)

“(W)e conclude that when an officer's observations lead him reasonably to believe that a traveler is carrying luggage that contains narcotics, the principles of *Terry* and its progeny would permit the officer to detain the luggage briefly to investigate the circumstances that aroused his suspicion, provided that the investigative detention is properly limited in scope.” (*United States v. Place* (1983) 462 U.S. 696, 706 [77 L.Ed.2nd 110, 120].)

Although the sender of a package through the U.S. mails retains little if any interests after the package is sent (*United States v. Place, supra*, at p. 718, fn. 5 [77 L.Ed.2nd at p. 128].), the intended recipient retains possessory and privacy rights in the package's contents. (*Walter v. United States* (1980) 447 U.S. 649, 654 [65 L.Ed.2nd 410, 416]; *United States v. Gill* (9th Cir. 2002) 280 F.3rd 923, 929.) However, the recipient of a mailed package has only a reasonable expectation that delivery will not be delayed. So long as the package is delivered on time, the **Fourth Amendment** is not implicated merely by a temporary diversion of that package. (*United States v. Demoss* (8th Cir. 2002) 279 F.3rd 632, 639; *United States v. England* (9th Cir. 1992) 971 F.2nd 419, 420-421.)

An addressee has both a possessory and a privacy interest in a mailed package. (*United States v. Hernandez, supra*, at p. 1209; *United States v. Hoang* (9th Cir. 2007) 486 F.3rd 1156, 1159; *United States v. Jefferson* (9th Cir. 2009) 566 F.3rd 928, 933-935.)

The “*possessory interest*” in a mailed package, however, is “solely in the package’s timely delivery. (*United States v. Hoang, supra*, at p. 1160, citing *United States v. England, supra*, at pp. 420-421; *United States v. Jefferson, supra*.)

A postal inspector in Alaska had sufficient reasonable suspicion to detain defendant’s package when he was told that defendant was behaving suspiciously by asking about Postal Service drug detection practices, and the package listed a fictitious sender and addressee and an incomplete California return address, was shipped with delivery confirmation service, had a handwritten label, and was heavily taped. Marijuana and excessive money had also been found in defendant’s home some months earlier. The court was satisfied that the length of detention between initial seizure and the development of probable cause, 22 hours, was not unreasonable, particularly given the difficulty of travel in Alaska with a drug-sniffing dog. (*United States v. Lozano* (9th Cir. 2010) 623 F.3rd 1055.)

Seizing defendant’s luggage from a common area on an Amtrak train during a drug-interdiction investigation, without any suspicion to believe that it contained contraband other than the fact that it was without tags, and then wheeling it down the aisle while asking who it belonged to and inspecting the contents after no one

claimed ownership, was an illegal seizure and search, and a **Fourth Amendment** violation. (*United States v. Hill* (10th Cir. 2015) 805 F.3rd 935.)

How long a container may be detained (i.e., a “reasonable time”) depends upon the circumstances. (*United States v. Van Leeuwen* (1970) 397 U.S. 249, 252 [25 L.Ed.2nd 282, 285]; 29 hours okay.)

United States v. Hernandez (9th Cir. 2002) 313 F.3rd 1206; twenty-two hours held to be justifiable.

United States v. Dass (9th Cir. 1988) 849 F.2nd 414; packages held from seven to twenty-three days found to be excessive.

United States v. Mitchell (11th Cir. 2009) 565 F.3rd 1347; holding onto the hard drive from defendant’s computer for 21 days before a warrant was obtained was an unreasonable retention of the defendant’s property, violating the **Fourth Amendment**.

United States v. Aldaz (9th Cir. 1990) 921 F.2nd 227; three to five day detention found to be reasonable under the circumstances.

United States v. Gill (9th Cir. 2002) 280 F.3rd 923, 926-929; six-day delay, over a weekend, okay.

United States v. Lozano (9th Cir. 2010) 623 F.3rd 1055; 22 hours, particularly given the difficulty of travel in Alaska with a drug-sniffing dog, was held to be lawful.

United States v. Mayomi (7th Cir. 1989) 873 F.2nd 1049, 1053-1054: A two-day detention of two letters was acceptable because it was supported by probable cause.

United States v. Sullivan (9th Cir. 2015) 797 F.3rd 623, 633; 21 days between the seizure of the defendant’s laptop computer and the obtaining of a search warrant held to be reasonable in that defendant was in custody for that time period and would not have been able to use his laptop anyway. Also, defendant was a parolee subject to search and seizure conditions, and then, 17 days into the detention of his laptop, he gave his consent to search it, all of which lessened his privacy interests.

Also note:

A ten-minute delay does not significantly interfere with the timely delivery of a package in the normal course of business, and therefore does not even need a reasonable suspicion to justify. The package would have been delivered at the same time even without this delay. (*United States v. Hoang* (9th Cir. 2007) 486 F.3rd 1156.)

But see United States v. Place (1983) 462 U.S. 696 [77 L.Ed.2nd 110]: The detention of a suspect's luggage at an airport for exposure to a trained narcotics dog was held to exceed the bounds of a permissible investigative detention and was unreasonable under the **Fourth Amendment**. The evidence obtained from the subsequent search of the luggage was held to be inadmissible where the luggage was detained for *90 minutes* and where the officers failed to accurately inform the suspect of the place to which they were transporting his luggage, the length of time he might be dispossessed, and what arrangements would be made for the return of the luggage if the investigation dispelled the suspicion.

A key factor in *Place* was that the containers (the defendant's suitcases) were seized from *his person* as opposed to the mail.

Detention of a package mailed via the United States postal service during that time period up to when delivery has been guaranteed is reasonable and therefore lawful despite the lack of any suspicion to believe it contains contraband. (*United States v. Jefferson* (9th Cir. 2009) 566 F.3rd 928, 933-935; during which time a narcotics-sniffing dog was used to alert on the package and a search warrant was obtained.)

Holding onto the package beyond this time period, to be lawful, requires an “articulable (reasonable) suspicion that the package

contains contraband or evidence of illegal activity.” (*Id.*, at p. 935.)

Searches of Cellphones, Disks, Computers and Other High Tech Devices:

Issue: The legality of searching and retrieving information from cellphones, computer disks, thumb drives, computers, and other such high tech “containers” of information, seized from suspects or found during the search of a residence, etc., when done without a search warrant, is an issue.

Originally, it was assumed that the general law on “containers” would be applicable, and that, as a general rule, a search warrant would be required. (See *Smith v. Ohio* (1990) 494 U.S. 541, 542 [108 L.Ed.2nd 464].)

Recent Trend:

However, see, where the Court included a whole segment criticizing the current trend of referring to computers and cellphones as “containers of information,” predicting the coming of a whole new body of law dealing with electronic devices. ““Since electronic storage is likely to contain a greater quantity and variety of information than any previous storage method, . . . ’[r]elying on analogies to closed containers or file cabinets may lead courts to “oversimplify a complex area of **Fourth Amendment** doctrines and ignore the realities of massive modern computer storage.”” [Citation.]” (*People v. Michael E.* (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 261, 276-279; citing *United States v. Carey* (10th Cir. 1999) 172 F.3rd 1268, 1275.)

Note: Interestingly enough, however, most of the authority the *Michael* Court cites here are container-search cases.

The U.S. Supreme Court finally recognized that cellphones are entitled to enhanced **Fourth Amendment** protections from other “containers,” and found that the search of a cellphone found on a person upon his arrest is unlawful absent the obtaining of a search warrant. (*Riley v. California* (June 25, 2014) 573 U.S. __ [134 S.Ct. 2473; 189 L.Ed.2nd 430].)

See *Id.*, 134 S.Ct. at pp. 2489-2491, for a detailed description of the capabilities of the modern-day “smart phone,” adding to the privacy interests in such devices that outweigh the governmental interest in conducting warrantless searches upon the owner.

Other courts are now following suit: (See *United States v. Camou* (9th Cir. 2014) 773 F.3rd 932, 941-943; holding that cellphones are not containers for purposes of the vehicle exception to the search warrant requirement.

See also *United States v. Lara* (9th Cir. 2016) 815 F.3rd 605, 610-611; declining to include defendant's cellphone under the category of a "container," in defendant's **Fourth** wavier search conditions.

However, a search of a cellphone "incident to arrest" (as opposed to a **Fourth** waiver search, as occurred in *Lara, supra.*) was clearly lawful prior to *Riley*, and therefore, the officer's "good faith" reliance upon that pre-*Riley* binding precedent will save a warrantless search of defendant's cellphones found on his person when he was arrested. (*United States v. Lustig* (9th Cir. 2016) 830 F.3rd 1075, 1977-1085.)

The *Lustig* Court also upheld the more thorough search of the same cellphones four days later in that they were in continuous police custody during that time. (*Id.*, at p. 1085; see *United States v. Burnette* (9th Cir. 1983) 698 F.2nd 1038, 1049, upholding a later search when the object searched has remained in continuous police custody after being lawfully searched once.)

Arguable Continued Exceptions to the Search Warrant Requirement:

Arguably, exceptions to the search warrant requirement may still be found when the high tech device is:

- Seized from the suspect's person incident to his arrest (*Carroll v. United States* (1925) 267 U.S. 132 [69 L.Ed. 543].)

This exception, however, has been held specifically *not* to apply to *cellphones* in that cellphones do not pose a danger to officers and once seized, it is unlikely any evidence contained in the phone is going to be destroyed. When balanced with the large amount of personal information likely to be found in cellphones, a warrantless intrusion into the phone is not justified under the **Fourth Amendment** absent exigent circumstances. (*Riley v. California* (June 25, 2014) 573 U.S. __ [134 S.Ct. 2473; 189 L.Ed.2nd 430]; *People v. Macabeo* (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1212-1226.)

- In a vehicle for which there is already probable cause to search. (*California v. Acevedo* (1991) 500 U.S. 565, 580 [114 L.Ed.2nd 619].)
- In the person's possession when that person is booked into jail. (*People v. Rogers* (1966) 241 Cal.App.2nd 384, 389.)

But see *United States v. Camou* (9th Cir. 2014) 773 F.3rd 932, 941-943; extending the prohibitions on warrantless cellphone searches

seized incident to arrest, under *Riley v. California*, *supra*, to those seized in a vehicle with probable cause.

There may be circumstances, however, where a person loses any expectation of privacy to the contents of his cellphone, such as when he is a resident of a correctional programs's residential reentry facility and he has been warned both that cellphones are prohibited and that any such cellphones found at the facility are subject to search. (See *United States v. Jackson* (8th Cir. Iowa 2017) 866 F.3rd 982.)

- When the container is seized under authorization of a search warrant and to inspect its contents, using “technological aids,” requires further expert assistance. E.g., seizing an undeveloped roll of film, as authorized by a warrant, does not require a second warrant to develop that film. (See *People v. Superior Court [Nasmeh]* (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 85, 98, fn. 4; citing out-of-state authority for this theory; *State v. Petrone* (Wis. 1991) 161 Wis.2nd 530.)

See also *People v. Rangel* (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1317; where it was held that a cellphone having been lawfully seized pursuant to the warrant, a second warrant authoring the detective to search the cellphone is unnecessary. “(A) second warrant to search a properly seized computer (or cellphone, in this case) is not necessary where the evidence obtained in the search did not exceed the probable cause articulated in the original warrant.”

Property in the possession or under the control of a subject who is booked into custody is subject to search: “Once articles have lawfully fallen into the hands of the police they may examine them to see if they have been stolen, test them to see if they have been used in the commission of a crime, return them to the prisoner on his release, or preserve them for use as evidence at the time of trial. (*People v. Robertson* 240 Cal.App.2d 99, 105-106) During their period of police custody an arrested person's personal effects, like his person itself, are subject to reasonable inspection, examination, and test. (*People v. Chaigles* (1923) 237 N.Y. 193 [142 N.E. 583, 32 A.L.R. 676], Cardozo, J.)” (*People v. Rogers* (1966) 241 Cal.App.2nd 384, 389.)

See also *United States v. Giberson* (9th Cir. 2008) 527 F.3rd 882, where it was held that some circumstances might lead searching officers to a reasonable conclusion that documentary evidence they are seeking would be contained in computers found at the location,

authorizing the search of those containers despite the failure of the warrant to list computers as things that may be searched.

It was recommended, however, that the computer be seized and a second warrant be obtained.

But see *United States v. Payton* (9th Cir. 2009) 573 F.3rd 859, 861-864, where it was held that failure to include the magistrate's authorization to search defendant's computer, even though in the statement of probable cause the affiant indicated a desire to search any possible computers found in defendant's house, was a fatal omission. Searching defendant's computer, therefore, went beyond the scope of the warrant's authorization.

- With Exigent Circumstances:

The search of the defendant/minor's cellphone was reasonable at its inception for purposes of the **Fourth Amendment** because a loaded firearm and its magazine cartridge had been seized from a trashcan earlier, the defendant had lingered outside the principal's office where the student (a known friend of defendant's) suspected of possessing the firearm was being detained, and where the defendant was questioned after trying to get away. While being questioned, the defendant physically resisted while fingering his cellphone in his pocket. A warrant was not necessary before school officials searched the data on the phone because school officials needed only a reasonable suspicion to conduct a warrantless search, and were confronted by a situation in which a loaded firearm had been discovered on school property and they were reasonably concerned that the defendant might be using his phone to communicate with other students who might possess another firearm or weapon that the officials did not yet know about. (*In re Rafael C.* (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1288.)

- *The Person is Without Standing:*

A suspect's "standing" should also be considered; i.e., is it a device in which the suspect has a reasonable expectation of privacy? (*United States v. Caymen* (9th Cir. 2005) 404 F.3rd 1196; *People v. Daggs* (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 361; cellphone abandoned at the scene of the crime deprives the defendant of standing to contest its search.)

Case Law:

Proof that defendant had been receiving child pornography on his computer from two traffickers in such material, despite the lack of any evidence that the defendant himself solicited such material, was held to be sufficient probable cause to justify a finding that defendant knowingly, and illegally, possessed such material, justifying the issuance of a search warrant for defendant's residence and his computer. (*United States v. Kelley* (9th Cir. 2007) 482 F.3rd 1047.)

The same rule is applicable a "mirror port," which is similar to a pen register, but which allows the government to collect the "to" and "from" addresses of a person's e-mail messages, the IP addresses of the websites the person visits, and notes the total volume of information sent to or from the person's account. (*United States v. Forrester* (9th Cir. 2008) 512 F.3rd 500.)

A search warrant authorizing the search for specific documents, during which a computer was found under circumstances where it was reasonable to believe that the computer was a container of those documents, allowed for the seizure of (and probably search of) the computer, even though the computer was not specifically listed in the warrant. Also, a computer is not entitled to a heightened level of proof. (*United States v. Giberson* (9th Cir. 2008) 527 F.3rd 886-889.)

Downloading and installing onto one's computer "LimeWire," a file-sharing program which allows users to search for and share with one another various types of files, compromises a participant's expectation of privacy in the contents of the affected files, thus allowing for a warrantless search of those files via LimeWire by law enforcement. (*United States v. Ganoe* (9th Cir. 2008) 538 F.3rd 1117.)

It is irrelevant that the defendant attempted unsuccessfully to install a program included with LimeWire that if installed properly, prevents others from accessing his files. It is also irrelevant that the investigator discovered defendant's child pornography through the use of a program unavailable to the general public. Neither circumstance means that defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his files when he used a file-sharing program such as LimeWire. (*United States v. Borowy* (9th Cir. 2010) 595 F.3rd 1045, 1048.)

The Court in *Borowy* further held that the investigator had probable cause to open up his files based upon discovering files with names that were explicitly suggestive of child pornography and that they were discovered using a search term known to be

associated with child pornography, resulting with two such files being “red-flagged” by the program, indicating that they contained child pornography. (*Id.*, at p. 1049.)

A properly qualified expert officer’s opinion, connecting common characteristics of a child molester with known facts related to a child molest and the molester’s act of hiding his computer, establishes probable cause supporting a search warrant for that computer. (*People v. Nicholls* (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 703.)

Customs Officers at an international border, or the “*functional equivalent*” of a border (e.g., an international airport) may search a person’s computer without any reasonable suspicion. (*United States v. Arnold* (9th Cir. 2008) 533 F.3rd 1003.)

The Court further held that a high-tech container, such as a computer, *does not* require a higher standard of probable cause for a warrant application, even when “*expressive* (i.e., **First Amendment**) *material*” is involved. (*Id.*, at p. 1010.)

California is in accord with *Arnold*, holding that, “(a) computer is entitled to no more protection than any other container.” (*People v. Endacott* (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1346; suspicionless search of defendant’s laptop computers upon his arrival at Los Angeles International Airport from Thailand upheld.)

Note: Arnold and *Endacott* are questionable authority on this issue in light of subsequent cases talking about all the personal information that is available on one’s computer. (E.g., see *People v. Michael E.* (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 261, 276-279, above.)

Endacott further held that the fact that the computer is further searched at some time after the initial border crossing is irrelevant. The right to do a warrantless, suspicionless search continues indefinitely. (*Id.*, at p. 1350.)

The seizure of defendant’s computer and all computer related items (e.g., compact disks, floppy disks, hard drives, memory cards, DVDs, videotapes, and other portable digital devices), based upon no more than the discovery of one printed-out photo of child pornography, was lawful in that it was reasonable to conclude that the picture had come from his computer and that similar pictures were likely to be stored in it. (*United States v. Brobst* (9th Cir. 2009) 558 F.3rd 982, 994.)

Failure to include the magistrate's authorization to search defendant's computer, even though in the statement of probable cause the affiant indicated a desire to search any possible computers found in defendant's house, was a fatal omission. Searching defendant's computer, therefore, went beyond the scope of the warrant's authorization. (*United States v. Payton* (9th Cir. 2009) 573 F.3rd 859, 861-864.)

The fact that the issuing magistrate testified to an intent to allow for the search of defendant's computers, and that the warrant included authorization to search for certain listed records which might be found in a computer, was held to be irrelevant. (*Id.* at pp. 862-863.)

But see *United States v. Giberson* (9th Cir. 2008) 527 F.3rd 882, where it was held that some circumstances might lead searching officers to a reasonable conclusion that documentary evidence they are seeking would be contained in computers found at the location, authorizing the search of those containers despite the failure of the warrant to list computers as things that may be searched. It was recommended, however, that the computer be seized and a second warrant be obtained.

A city did not violate an employee's (a police officer) **Fourth Amendment** rights and right to privacy under the **Federal Stored Communications Act (18 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et seq.)** by obtaining and reviewing transcripts of the employee's text messages sent via a city pager where there were reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search was necessary for a non-investigatory work-related purpose because the search was done in order to determine whether the character limit on the city's contract was sufficient to meet the city's needs. Also, the city and a police department had a legitimate interest in ensuring that employees were not being forced to pay out of their own pockets for work-related expenses, or on the other hand, that the city was not paying for extensive personal communications. The search was permissible in its scope because reviewing the transcripts was reasonable because it was an efficient and expedient way to determine whether the employee's overages were the result of work-related messaging or personal use. (*Ontario v. Quan* (2010) 560 U.S.746 [177 L.Ed.2nd 216].)

Declining to rule on the application of an employee's privacy rights in the workplace, as they relate to the use of high-tech devices, the Court assumed for the sake of argument, without deciding, that the plaintiff/respondent had a right to privacy in the contents of text messages made via an employer-issued pager. However, the "special needs" of the workplace allow for this

intrusion into plaintiff/respondent's privacy rights when conducted for a "noninvestigatory, work-related purpose." (*Id.*, 130 S.Ct. at pp. 2629-2630]; i.e., to determine whether the allotted number of messages was insufficient, requiring employees to pay for office-related messages, or whether employees were using the pagers for non-work related purposes.)

See also "*The Federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et seq.*" under "*P.C. § 1524.2(b): Records of Foreign Corporations Providing Electronic Communications or Remote Computing Services,*" under "*Searches With a Search Warrant*" (Chapter 6), above.

A single photograph of a nude minor (female child who is between 8 and 10 years old), by itself, is insufficient to establish probable cause for a search warrant. But a second such photo, under the "totality of the circumstances," is enough. (*United States v. Battershell* (9th Cir. 2006) 457 F.3rd 1048.)

However, a single photograph of a nude minor (female of about 15 to 17 years of age), when combined with other suspicious circumstances (e.g., 15 computers in house found in complete disarray, with two minors not belonging to the defendant, where the defendant a civilian, is staying in military housing), *may* be enough to justify the issuance of a search warrant. (*United States v. Krupa* (9th Cir. 2011) 658 F.3rd 1174, 1177-1179; but see dissent, pp. 1180-1185.)

The fact that the defendant may not have owned the computers that the affiant was asking to search at the time of the crime (a homicide) did not preclude the possibility that she had transferred information or records—particularly photographs—to computers owned at the time of the search. (*People v. Lazarus* (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 734, 767; noting that personal computers often hold "diaries, calendars, files, and correspondence.")

Allowing another person unrestricted access to a mutually owned computer negates any expectation of privacy the first person might have had. A co-owner has actual authority to give consent to the police to search. And if it turns out that the person is not actually a co-owner, the doctrine of apparent authority may justify the search. (*United States v. Stanley* (9th Cir. 2011) 653 F.3rd 946, 950-952.)

The standard to be applied when evaluating the legality of the length of time a suspect is deprived of his property pending a search is one of "reasonableness," taking into account the "totality of the circumstances," and not necessarily requiring that the Government pursue the least

intrusive course of action. Determining reasonableness requires a “balancing test,” balancing “the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.” (Citations omitted; *United States v. Sullivan* (9th Cir. 2015) 797 F.3rd 623, 633; finding 21 days to be reasonable during which time the defendant’s laptop was in law enforcement custody, in that defendant was in custody at the time so he couldn’t use it anyway, was subject to a **Fourth** waiver, gave consent, and where the computer had to be transferred to a different agency to conduct the necessary forensic search.)

A search warrant, supported by probable cause, authorized the police to search defendant’s house and seize gang indicia of any sort. Such indicia could logically be found in defendant’s cellphone, which had the capacity to store people’s names, telephone numbers and other contact information, as well as music, photographs, artwork, and communications in the form of emails and messages. Defendant’s phone was the likely container of many items that were the functional equivalent of those specifically listed in the warrant. The text messages seized during the search of defendant’s phone were related to a gang-related assault that he was suspected of committing, and their suppression was thus not required under the exclusionary rule. (*People v. Rangel* (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1315-1317.)

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeal has found that tracking a user’s cellphone location without a warrant using GPS technology (by “pinging” it from various cell towers) is different than putting a GPS tracking device on a motorist’s vehicle without a warrant. The Court upheld the drug conviction of a man found with his son near a Texas rest stop with over 1,000 pounds of marijuana in their motor home. Because he had no reasonable expectation of privacy concerning the location of his cellphone, the court ruled, there was no **Fourth Amendment** violation. (*United States v. Skinner* (6th Cir. 2012) 690 F.3rd 772, 777-781.)

See also “*Juveniles and Electronic Device and/or Social Media Probation Conditions*,” under “*Juveniles*,” under “**Fourth Waiver Searches**” (Chapter 15), below.

Search of Unauthorized Cellphone Recovered at CDCR:

P.C. § 4576: CDCR (California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation) shall *not* access data or communications that have been captured using available technology from the *unauthorized* use of a wireless communication device except after obtaining a search warrant.

The California Electronic Communications Privacy Act: P.C. §§ 1546-1546.4: Statutory restrictions on warrantless searches of cellphones and other electronic devices was enacted by the California Legislature, effective on January 1, 2016.

Specifically, **P.C. § 1546.1**, Compelling Production of Electronic Communication Information, provides:

Subd. (a) Except as provided in this section, a government entity shall *not* do any of the following:

- (1) Compel the production of or access to electronic communication information from a service provider.
- (2) Compel the production of or access to electronic device information from any person or entity other than the authorized possessor of the device.
- (3) Access electronic device information by means of physical interaction or electronic communication with the electronic device. This section does not prohibit the intended recipient of an electronic communication from voluntarily disclosing electronic communication information concerning that communication to a government entity.

Subd. (b) A government entity may compel the production of or access to *electronic communication information* from a service provider, or compel the production of or access to electronic device information from any person or entity other than the authorized possessor of the device only under the following circumstances:

- (1) Pursuant to a *warrant* issued pursuant to **P.C. §§ 1523 et seq.**, and subject to **subd. (d)** (see below).
- (2) Pursuant to a *wiretap order* issued pursuant to **P.C. §§ 629.50 et seq.**
- (3) Pursuant to an *order for electronic reader records* issued pursuant to **Civil Code § 1798.90**.
- (4) Pursuant to a *subpoena* issued pursuant to existing state law, provided that the information is not sought for the purpose of investigating or prosecuting a criminal offense, and compelling the production of or access to the

information via the subpoena is not otherwise prohibited by state or federal law. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to expand any authority under state law to compel the production of or access to electronic information.

(5) Pursuant to an order for a pen register or trap and trace device, or both, issued pursuant to **P.C. §§ 630 et seq.**

Subd. (c) A government entity may access *electronic device information* by means of physical interaction or electronic communication with the device only as follows:

(1) Pursuant to a *warrant* issued pursuant to **P.C. §§ 1523 et seq.**, and subject to **subd. (d)** (see below).

(2) Pursuant to a *wiretap order* issued pursuant to **P.C. §§ 629.50 et seq.**

(3) Pursuant to a tracking device search warrant issued pursuant to **P.C. §§ 1523(a)(12)** and **1534(b)**.

(4) With the *specific consent* of the authorized possessor of the device.

(5) With the *specific consent* of the owner of the device, only when the device has been reported as lost or stolen.

(6) If the government entity, in good faith, believes that an *emergency* involving danger of death or serious physical injury to any person requires access to the electronic device information.

(7) If the government entity, in good faith, believes the device to be *lost, stolen, or abandoned*, provided that the entity shall only access electronic device information in order to attempt to identify, verify, or contact the owner or authorized possessor of the device.

(8) Except where prohibited by state or federal law, if the device is *seized from an inmate's possession* or found in an area of a correctional facility under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation where inmates have access and the device is not in the possession of an individual and the device is not known or believed to

be the possession of an authorized visitor. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to supersede or override **P.C. § 4576**.

P.C. § 4576: Search of Unauthorized Cellphones Recovered at CDCR; see above.

(9) Except where prohibited by state or federal law, if the device is seized from an authorized possessor of the device who is serving a term of parole under the supervision of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation or a term of postrelease community supervision under the supervision of county probation.

(10) Except where prohibited by state or federal law, if the device is seized from an authorized possessor of the device who is subject to an electronic device search as a clear and unambiguous condition of probation, mandatory supervision, or pretrial release.

(11) If the government entity accesses information concerning the location or the telephone number of the electronic device in order to respond to an emergency 911 call from that device.

(12) Pursuant to an order for a pen register or trap and trace device, or both, issued pursuant to **P.C. §§ 630 et seq.**

Subd. (d) Any warrant for electronic information shall comply with the following:

(1) The warrant shall describe with particularity the information to be seized by specifying the time periods covered and, as appropriate and reasonable, the target individuals or accounts, the applications or services covered, and the types of information sought, provided, however, that in the case of a warrant described in **subdivision (c)(1)**, the court may determine that it is not appropriate to specify time periods because of the specific circumstances of the investigation, including, but not limited to, the nature of the device to be searched.

(2) The warrant shall require that any information obtained through the execution of the warrant that is unrelated to the objective of the warrant shall be sealed and shall not be

subject to further review, use, or disclosure except pursuant to a court order or to comply with discovery as required by **P.C. §§ 1054.1 and 1054.7**. A court shall issue such an order upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe that the information is relevant to an active investigation, or review, use, or disclosure is required by state or federal law.

(3) The warrant shall comply with all other provisions of California and federal law, including any provisions prohibiting, limiting, or imposing additional requirements on the use of search warrants. If directed to a service provider, the warrant shall be accompanied by an order requiring the service provider to verify the authenticity of electronic information that it produces by providing an affidavit that complies with the requirements set forth in **E.C. § 1561**. Admission of that information into evidence shall be subject to **E.C. § 1562**.

Subd. (e) When issuing any warrant or order for electronic information, or upon the petition from the target or recipient of the warrant or order, a court may, at its discretion, do either or both of the following:

(1) Appoint a special master, as described in **P.C. § 1524(d)**, charged with ensuring that only information necessary to achieve the objective of the warrant or order is produced or accessed.

(2) Require that any information obtained through the execution of the warrant or order that is unrelated to the objective of the warrant be destroyed as soon as feasible after the termination of the current investigation and any related investigations or proceedings.

Subd. (f) A service provider may voluntarily disclose electronic communication information or subscriber information when that disclosure is not otherwise prohibited by state or federal law.

Subd. (g) If a government entity receives electronic communication information voluntarily provided pursuant to **subdivision (f)**, it shall destroy that information within 90 days unless one or more of the following circumstances apply:

- (1) The entity has or obtains the specific consent of the sender or recipient of the electronic communications about which information was disclosed.
- (2) The entity obtains a court order authorizing the retention of the information. A court shall issue a retention order upon a finding that the conditions justifying the initial voluntary disclosure persist, in which case the court shall authorize the retention of the information only for so long as those conditions persist, or there is probable cause to believe that the information constitutes evidence that a crime has been committed.
- (3) The entity reasonably believes that the information relates to child pornography and the information is retained as part of a multiagency database used in the investigation of child pornography and related crimes.
- (4) The service provider or subscriber is, or discloses the information to, a federal, state, or local prison, jail, or juvenile detention facility, and all participants to the electronic communication were informed, prior to the communication, that the service provider may disclose the information to the government entity.

Subd. (h) If a government entity obtains electronic information pursuant to an emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury to a person, that requires access to the electronic information without delay, the government entity shall, within three court days after obtaining the electronic information, file with the appropriate court an application for a warrant or order authorizing obtaining the electronic information or a motion seeking approval of the emergency disclosures that shall set forth the facts giving rise to the emergency, and if applicable, a request supported by a sworn affidavit for an order delaying notification under **P.C. § 1546.2(b)(1)**. The court shall promptly rule on the application or motion and shall order the immediate destruction of all information obtained, and immediate notification pursuant to **P.C. § 1546.2(a)(1)** if that notice has not already been given, upon a finding that the facts did not give rise to an emergency or upon rejecting the warrant or order application on any other ground. This subdivision does not apply if the government entity obtains information concerning the location or the telephone number of the electronic device in order to respond to an emergency 911 call from that device.

Subd. (a)(2) of § 1546.2 specifically provides that “(n)otwithstanding **paragraph (1)**, notice is not required if the government entity accesses information concerning the location or the telephone number of an electronic device in order to respond to an emergency 911 call from that device.”

Subd. (i) This section does not limit the authority of a government entity to use an administrative, grand jury, trial, or civil discovery subpoena to do any of the following:

(1) Require an originator, addressee, or intended recipient of an electronic communication to disclose any electronic communication information associated with that communication.

(2) Require an entity that provides electronic communications services to its officers, directors, employees, or agents for the purpose of carrying out their duties, to disclose electronic communication information associated with an electronic communication to or from an officer, director, employee, or agent of the entity.

(3) Require a service provider to provide subscriber information.

Subd. (j) This section does not limit the authority of the Public Utilities Commission or the State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission to obtain energy or water supply and consumption information pursuant to the powers granted to them under the **Public Utilities Code** or the **Public Resources Code** and other applicable state laws.

Note: In other words, a search warrant is *not* necessary for the collection of data related to “smart meters.”

Subd. (k) This chapter shall not be construed to alter the authority of a government entity that owns an electronic device to compel an employee who is authorized to possess the device to return the device to the government entity’s possession.

P.C. § 1546 provides the relevant definitions.

Subd. (a) An “*adverse result*” means any of the following:

- (1) Danger to the life or physical safety of an individual.
- (2) Flight from prosecution.
- (3) Destruction of or tampering with evidence.
- (4) Intimidation of potential witnesses.
- (5) Serious jeopardy to an investigation or undue delay of a trial.

Subd. (b) “*Authorized possessor*” means the possessor of an electronic device when that person is the owner of the device or has been authorized to possess the device by the owner of the device.

Subd. (c) “*Electronic communication*” means the transfer of signs, signals, writings, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectric, or photo-optical system.

Subd. (d) “*Electronic communication information*” means any information about an electronic communication or the use of an electronic communication service, including, but not limited to, the contents, sender, recipients, format, or location of the sender or recipients at any point during the communication, the time or date the communication was created, sent, or received, or any information pertaining to any individual or device participating in the communication, including, but not limited to, an IP address. Electronic communication information does not include subscriber information as defined in this chapter.

Subd. (e) “*Electronic communication service*” means a service that provides to its subscribers or users the ability to send or receive electronic communications, including any service that acts as an intermediary in the transmission of electronic communications, or stores electronic communication information.

Subd. (f) “*Electronic device*” means a device that stores, generates, or transmits information in electronic form. An electronic device does *not* include the magnetic strip on a driver’s license or an identification card

Subd. (g) “*Electronic device information*” means any information stored on or generated through the operation of an electronic device, including the current and prior locations of the device.

Subd. (h) “*Electronic information*” means electronic communication information or electronic device information.

Subd. (i) “*Government entity*” means a department or agency of the state or a political subdivision thereof, or an individual acting for or on behalf of the state or a political subdivision thereof.

Subd. (j) “*Service provider*” means a person or entity offering an electronic communication service.

Subd. (k) “*Specific consent*” means consent provided directly to the government entity seeking information, including, but not limited to, when the government entity is the addressee or intended recipient or a member of the intended audience of an electronic communication. Specific consent does not require that the originator of the communication have actual knowledge that an addressee, intended recipient, or member of the specific audience is a government entity.

Query: How does this requirement affect a person’s pre-search waiver of his **Fourth Amendment** rights as a condition of probation or parole?

Subd. (l) “*Subscriber information*” means the name, street address, telephone number, email address, or similar contact information provided by the subscriber to the provider to establish or maintain an account or communication channel, a subscriber or account number or identifier, the length of service, and the types of services used by a user of or subscriber to a service provider.

P.C. § 1546.2 deals with the procedures for obtaining a warrant as a followup to an emergency situation, and is a part of the **California Electronic Communications Privacy Act (CalECPA)**. Pursuant to **CalECPA’s** provisions, within 10 days after use of a tracking device has ended, the officer must notify the person about the nature of the government investigation and provide a copy of the warrant. In addition, the provisions of **P.C. 1546.2(b)** now apply to permit a delay in notification of the target if the court determines that there is reason to believe that notification may have an adverse result.

P.C. § 1546.2(a)(2) provides that “(n)otwithstanding **paragraph (1)**, notice is not required if the government entity accesses information concerning the location or the telephone number of an electronic device in order to respond to an emergency 911 call from that device.”

P.C. § 1546.4 describes the suppression provisions and other remedies when information is obtained illegally.

Gov’t. Code § 53166(b), also effective January 1, 2016, provides that:

Every local agency that operates cellular communications interception technology shall do both of the following:

(1) Maintain reasonable security procedures and practices, including operational, administrative, technical, and physical safeguards, to protect information gathered through the use of cellular communications interception technology from unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure.

(2) Implement a usage and privacy policy to ensure that the collection, use, maintenance, sharing, and dissemination of information gathered through the use of cellular communications interception technology complies with all applicable law and is consistent with respect for an individual’s privacy and civil liberties. This usage and privacy policy shall be available in writing to the public, and, if the local agency has an Internet Web site, the usage and privacy policy shall be posted conspicuously on that Internet Web site. The usage and privacy policy shall, at a minimum, include all of the following:

(A) The authorized purposes for using cellular communications interception technology and for collecting information using that technology.

(B) A description of the job title or other designation of the employees who are authorized to use, or access information collected through the use of, cellular communications interception technology. The policy shall identify the training requirements necessary for those authorized employees.

(C) A description of how the local agency will monitor its own use of cellular communications interception technology to ensure the accuracy of the information

collected and compliance with all applicable laws, including laws providing for process and time period system audits.

(D) The existence of a memorandum of understanding or other agreement with another local agency or any other party for the shared use of cellular communications interception technology or the sharing of information collected through its use, including the identity of signatory parties.

(E) The purpose of, process for, and restrictions on, the sharing of information gathered through the use of cellular communications interception technology with other local agencies and persons.

(F) The length of time information gathered through the use of cellular communications interception technology will be retained, and the process the local agency will utilize to determine if and when to destroy retained information.

Relevant definitions are provided in **Subd. (a)**.

(1) “*Cellular communications interception technology*” means any device that intercepts mobile telephony calling information or content, including an international mobile subscriber identity catcher or other virtual base transceiver station that masquerades as a cellular station and logs mobile telephony calling information.

(2) “*Local agency*” means any city, county, city and county, special district, authority, or other political subdivision of the state, and includes every county sheriff and city police department.

Subd. (c):

(1) Except as provided in **para. (2)**, a local agency shall not acquire cellular communications interception technology unless approved by its legislative body by adoption, at a regularly scheduled public meeting held pursuant to the **Ralph M. Brown Act (Gov’t. Code §§ 54950 et seq.)**, of a resolution or ordinance authorizing that acquisition and the usage and privacy policy required by this section.

(2) Notwithstanding **para. (1)**, the county sheriff shall not acquire cellular communications interception technology unless the sheriff provides public notice of the acquisition, which shall be posted conspicuously on his or her department's Internet Web site, and his or her department has a usage and privacy policy required by this section.

Subd. (d) Describes civil remedies for violating this section.

See also "*The Federal **Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701 et seq.***" under "*P.C. § 1524.2(b): Records of Foreign Corporations Providing Electronic Communications or Remote Computing Services,*" under "*Searches With a Search Warrant*" (Chapter 6), above.

Chapter 14:

Border Searches:

General Rule: The United States has a governmental interest in keeping drugs and undocumented aliens, etc., out of the country. Therefore, the search and seizure standards are relaxed a bit at the International Borders. (*Carroll v. United States* (1925) 267 U.S. 132, 154 [69 L. Ed. 543, 551-552].)

“(B)order searches ...[are] considered to be ‘reasonable’ by the single fact that the person or item in question has entered into our country from outside.” (*United States v. Ramsey* (1977) 431 U.S. 606, 619 [52 L.Ed.2nd 617, 628].)

“(A)t least with respect to the **Fourth Amendment’s** suspicion requirements, a routine border search ‘is by its very nature reasonable.’” (*United States v. Guzman-Padilla* (9th Cir. 2009) 573 F.3rd 865, 877; quoting *United States v. Dobson* (9th Cir. 1986) 781 F.2nd 1374, 1376.)

“‘The task of guarding our country’s border is one laden with immense responsibility.’ *United States v. Bravo*, 295 F.3rd 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 2002). Border agents serve as our first line of defense in preventing people intent on violating our laws from coming into our country.” (*United States v. Hernandez* (9th Cir. 2002) 314 F.3rd 430, 433-434.)

However, while Border Patrol agents may conduct routine searches “without any articulable level of suspicion,” they still need “probable cause” to make a warrantless arrest. (*Id.*, at p. 434.)

“The Government’s interest in preventing the entry of unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith at the international border.” (*United States v. Flores-Montano* (2004) 541 U.S. 149, 152 [158 L.Ed.2nd 311]; see also *United States v. Cotterman* (9th Cir. 2013) 709 F.3rd 952, 960.)

“The government has more latitude to detain people in a border-crossing context [Citation], but such detentions are acceptable only during the time of extended border searches [Citations].” (*United States v. Juvenile [RRA-A]* (9th Cir. 2000) 229 F.3rd 737, 743.)

The authority to conduct warrant border searches may include subjects who, mistakenly at the border, are turned around without ever having entered a foreign country (Canada, in this case). Routine searches at the border do not require a warrant or any level of suspicion, regardless of whether the motorist intends to cross the border or has mistakenly arrived at the border. Second, that defendant subjectively did not intend to cross the border is irrelevant as

well. There is no reliable way for the Customs and Border Protection officers to tell the difference between a motorist who has just crossed the border and a “turnaround” motorist who is at the border area by mistake. (*D.E. v. Doe* (6th Cir. Mich. 2016) 834 F.3rd 723.)

8 U.S.C. § 1357(a): The statutory arrest and search authority for officers and employees of the Immigration and Nationalization Service (i.e., Border Patrol) is contained in **8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)**: “*Powers Without a Warrant*. Any officer or employee of the Service authorized under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General shall have power without a warrant:”

- To interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien as to his right to be or to remain in the United States. (**Subd. (1)**)
- To arrest aliens entering, or who have already entered, the United States illegally. (**Subd. (2)**)
- To conduct warrantless searches of private lands within 25 miles of the border. (**Subd. (3)**.)

However, private dwellings within this 25-mile area are excluded under the terms of this statute from those areas subject to a warrantless search. Although not specifically stated in the statute, *the curtilage* of a home (which would typically include the back and side yards of a residence), by case law, is included within this exclusion. (*United States v. Romero-Bustamente* (9th Cir. 2003) 337 F.3rd 1104.)

- To arrest for felony violations of the immigration laws. (**Subd. (4)**)
- To arrest for **(A)** any offense against the United States, committed in the officer’s or employee’s presence; *or* **(B)** any federal felony. (**Subd. (5)**)

Title 8 U.S.C. § 1357(c) provides for the power to search the person and personal effects in the possession of any person seeking admission to the United States, with “*reasonable cause*” to suspect that grounds for denial of admission would be disclosed by such search.

Because the United States has many miles of shoreline, the Government must also have authority to stop and search boats off the coast in order to effectively guard our borders:

The statutory authority for Customs Agents to conduct boat and vehicle searches is contained in **19 U.S.C. § 1581(a)**: “Any officer of the customs may at any time go on board of any vessel or

vehicle at any place in the United States . . . or at any other authorized place, without as well as within his district, and examine the manifest and other documents and papers, and examine, inspect, and search the vessel or vehicle and every part thereof and any person, trunk, package, or cargo on board, and to this end may hail and stop such vessel or vehicle, and use all necessary force to compel compliance.”

It has been stated that this statute “reflects the ‘impressive historical pedigree’ of the Government’s power and interest, [citation]. It is axiomatic that the United States, as sovereign, has the inherent authority to protect, and a paramount interest in protecting, its territorial integrity.” (*United States v. Flores-Montano* (2004) 541 U.S. 149, 153 [158 L.Ed.2nd 311, 317].)

The statutory authority for the Coast Guard to search vessels is contained in **14 U.S.C. § 89(a)**: “The Coast Guard may make inquiries, examinations, inspections, searches, seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and waters over which the United States has jurisdiction, for the prevention, detection, and suppression of violations of laws of the United States. For such purposes, commissioned, warrant, and petty officers may at any time go on board of any vessel subject to the jurisdiction, or to the operation of any law, of the United States, address inquiries to those on board, examine the ship’s documents and papers, and examine, inspect, and search the vessel and use all necessary force to compel compliance. When from such inquiries, examination, inspection, or search it appears that a breach of the laws of the United States rendering a person liable to arrest is being, or has been committed, by any person, such person shall be arrested or, if escaping to shore, shall be immediately pursued and arrested on shore, or other lawful and appropriate action shall be taken; or, if it shall appear that a breach of the laws of the United States has been committed so as to render such vessel, or the merchandise, or any part thereof, on board of, or brought into the United States by, such vessel, liable to forfeiture, or so as to render such vessel liable to a fine or penalty and if necessary to secure such fine or penalty, such vessel or such merchandise, or both, shall be seized.”

31 U.S.C. § 5317: *Interdiction Authority*: Customs officials have the lawful authority to conduct interdiction inspections:

Subd. (b): “(A) customs officer may stop and search, at the border and without a search warrant, any vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or other

conveyance, any envelope or other container, and any person entering or departing from the United States.” (See *United States v. Seljan* (9th Cir 2008) 547 F.3rd 993, 1001; a currency interdiction inspection, resulting in the recovery of evidence that defendant was traveling to the Philippines to have sex with underage minors; no suspicion required.)

“(S)earches made at the border, pursuant to the longstanding right of the sovereign to protect itself by stopping and examining persons and property crossing into this country, are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border.” (*United States v. Flores-Montano* (2004) 541 U.S. 149, 152-153 [158 L.Ed.2nd 311].)

Customs Officers at an international border, or the “*functional equivalent*” of a border (e.g., an international airport), may search a person’s computer without any reasonable suspicion. (*United States v. Arnold* (9th Cir. 2008) 533 F.3rd 1003.)

The Court further held that a high-tech container, such as a computer, *does not* require a higher standard of probable cause for a warrant application, even when “expressive (i.e., **First Amendment**) material” is involved. (*Id.*, at p. 1010.)

California is in accord with *Arnold*. (*People v. Endacott* (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1346.)

Endacott also held that the fact that the computer is further searched at some time after the initial border crossing is irrelevant. The right to do a warrantless, suspicionless search continues indefinitely. (*Id.*, at p. 1350.)

Endacott also agrees with *United States v. Arnold*, *supra*, in holding that, “(a) computer is entitled to no more protection than any other container.” (*Ibid.*)

But see *Riley v. California* (June 25, 2014) 573 U.S. ___ [134 S.Ct. 2473; 189 L.Ed.2nd 430], where the U.S. Supreme Court, recognized that cellphones are entitled to enhanced **Fourth Amendment** protections from other “containers,” ruling that the search of a cellphone found on a person upon his arrest is unlawful absent the obtaining of a search warrant. The same reasoning likely applies to computers.

See *People v. Michael E.* (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 261, 276-279, where the Court included a whole segment criticizing the current trend of referring to computers and cellphones as “*containers of information*,” predicting the coming of a whole new body of law dealing with electronic devices. ““Since electronic storage is likely to contain a greater quantity and variety of information than any previous storage method, . . . ’[r]elying on analogies to closed containers or file cabinets may lead courts to “oversimplify a complex area of Fourth Amendment doctrines and ignore the realities of massive modern computer storage.”” [Citation.]” (Citing *United States v. Carey* (10th Cir. 1999) 172 F.3rd 1268, 1275.)

Routine vs. Non-Routine Searches: In determining what level of suspicion of criminal activity is required to justify any particular search, courts, at one time, would break down the searches into “*routine*” and “*non-routine*,” which in turn would be determined by the “*level of intrusiveness*” involved. (*United States v. Flores-Montano* (2004) 541 U.S. 149 [158 L.Ed.2nd 311].)

Routine Searches may be performed with *no specific particularized suspicion*, under authority of **19 U.S.C. § 1581(a)**, as described above. Such searches have been held to include searches of *handbags, luggage, shoes, pockets* and the *passenger compartments of cars*. (*United States v. Montoya De Hernandez* (1985) 473 U.S. 531 [87 L.Ed.2nd 381]; *United States v. Ramos-Saenz* (9th Cir. 1994) 36 F.3rd 59; *United States v. Sandoval Vargas* (9th Cir. 1988) 854 F.2nd 1132; *United States v. Palmer* (9th Cir. 1978) 575 F.2nd 721.)

See also *United States v. Flores-Montano* (9th Cir. 2005) 424 F.3rd 1044, applying **section 1581(a)**, rejecting the defendant’s argument that **19 U.S.C. § 482** (which does talk in terms of a necessary reasonable suspicion) applied to the border searches of vehicles.

In-coming international mail, including packages, are included within this category. “Border searches of international mail are per se ‘*reasonable*’ under the **Fourth Amendment**, without any need to show probable cause.” (*People v. Blardony* (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 791, 794-795; citing *United States v. Ramsey* (1977) 431 U.S. 606, 619-622 [52 L.Ed.2nd 617, 628-630]; and *United States v. Ani* (9th Cir. 1998) 138 F.3rd 390, 392.)

The requirement under **19 U.S.C. § 1582** that there be a “*reasonable suspicion*” justifying the search of in-coming mail is not constitutionally required, and a violation of this requirement will not result in suppression of any evidence. (*People v. Blardony*, *supra*, at p. 794; *United States v. Ani*, *supra*.)

X-ray examination of luggage, bags, and other containers at a border is *routine* and requires neither a warrant nor individualized suspicion. (*United States v. Okafor* (9th Cir. 2002) 285 F.3rd 842.)

The taking of a gas tank out of a vehicle to inspect its contents, given the minimal intrusiveness of such an act, is considered by the United States Supreme Court to be a “*routine*” search, *not* requiring any articulable suspicion to justify. (*United States v. Flores-Montano* (2004) 541 U.S. 149 [158 L.Ed.2nd 311]; overruling the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion to the contrary in *United States v. Molina-Tarazon* (2002) 279 F.3rd 709.)

Use of a “*Buster*” on a vehicle, given the lack of any proof that the defendant was exposed to any danger from the radioactivity in the device, does not require any suspicion in a search at the border. (*United States v. Camacho* (9th Cir. 2004) 368 F.3rd 1182.)

A “*Buster*” is “a handheld portable density gauge. . . . It contains a tiny bead of radioactive material called barium 133 that’s inside a sealed container. . . . (W)hen the actuating trigger is pushed, the container rolls to an open slot and exposes the radiation in a forward direction (providing a reading on the density of an object).” A higher reading than normal indicates that something not normally there is hidden in the object being evaluated, such as the spare tire in this case. (*Ibid.*)

The search of a passenger’s cabin on a cruise ship, upon returning from a foreign port, is a “*routine border search*” and does not require any suspicion. (*People v. Laborde* (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 870.)

Non-Routine Searches require a “*reasonable suspicion*” the person or thing to be searched contains something illegal, and have been held to include *body cavity searches*, *strip searches*, *patdowns* and *involuntary x-ray searches*. (*United States v. Montoya De Hernandez* (1985) 473 U.S. 531 [87 L.Ed.2nd 381]; *United States v. Vance* (9th Cir. 1995) 62 F.3rd 1152.)

Factors: The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal, in ***United States v. Molina-Tarazon***, *supra*, found three factors which, when present, warrant the finding that a particular search is non-routine; i.e., (1) the use of force, (2) danger, and (3) fear. The Court, perhaps stretching its credibility a bit, found evidence of each in the removal of a vehicle's gas tank.

The United States Supreme Court overruled ***Molina-Tarazon***, so far as it related to the intrusiveness of taking a gas tank out of a vehicle, finding instead that to do so *does not* require any articulable suspicion. (***United States v. Flores-Montano*** (2004) 541 U.S. 149 [158 L.Ed.2nd 311].)

See also ***United States v. Cedano-Arellano*** (9th Cir. 2003) 332 F.3rd 568; a certified detection dog's alert on defendant's gas tank, plus defendant's nervousness, evasiveness and suspicious responses, sufficient "*reasonable suspicion*" to justify the removal of his gas tank.

X-Rays of the Person: An x-ray search requires a "*heightened level*" of suspicion because it is potentially harmful to the health of the suspect. (***United States v. Ek*** (9th Cir. 1982) 672 F.2nd 379, 382.)

The United States Supreme Court in ***United States v. Montoya De Hernandez***, *supra*, at pp. 540-541, criticized the use of the phrase "*heightened level of suspicion*," preferring to use the standard "*reasonable suspicion*" requirement.

Use of a "*Buster*," however, on a vehicle, given the lack of any proof that the defendant was exposed to any danger from the radioactivity in the device, does not require any suspicion in a search at the border. (***United States v. Camacho*** (9th Cir. 2004) 368 F.3rd 1182.)

Extended Detentions at the border, and all *stops* or *detentions away from the border*, are also non-routine. (***United States v. Montoya De Hernandez***, *supra*, and ***People v. Superior Court*** (1973) 33 Cal.App.3rd 523.)

Cutting Open Luggage, if permanent damage is caused, is likely to be held to be a non-routine search, depending upon the extent of

the damage. (*United States v. Okafor* (9th Cir. 2002) 285 F.3rd 842.)

Destructiveness of the Search: More recent authority has criticized the practice of classifying border searches as routine or non-routine. Rather, the “*destructiveness*” of the search is the more important factor to consider. (*United States v. Cortez-Rocha* (9th Cir. 2004) 383 F.3rd 1093, citing *United States v. Flores-Montano* (2004) 541 U.S. 149 [158 L.Ed.2nd 311].)

In *Cortez-Rocha*, *supra*, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal, in a split, two-to-one decision, held that cutting open a spare tire of a vehicle is not so destructive as to require a finding of a reasonable suspicion in order to justify.

Removal of a gas tank is not so destructive as to require a reasonable suspicion to justify. (*United States v. Flores-Montano*, *supra*; overruling the Ninth Circuit Court’s opinion to the contrary.)

Drilling a 5/16-inch hole into the bed of a pickup truck, the damage being minimal and not affecting the security and safety of its passengers, does not require a reasonable suspicion to justify. (*United States v. Chaudhry* (9th Cir. 2005) 424 F.2nd 1051.)

Unscrewing and pulling apart the inside door panels to a vehicle, where the panels could be reinstalled without any damage to the vehicle, does not require a reasonable suspicion. (*United States v. Hernandez* (9th Cir. 2005) 424 F.3rd 1056.)

Reasonableness of the Search:

Even a border search which may be conducted with no suspicion must be reasonable in its manner and scope. (*United States v. Seljan* (9th Cir. 2007) 497 F.3rd 1037, 1042-1045; a currency interdiction search, as authorized by **31 U.S.C. § 5317(b)**, of an out-bound envelope resulting in discovery of evidence that defendant traveled to the Philippines for illicit purposes, where letters were initially merely scanned and not read.)

Border agents seized defendant's laptop at the U.S.-Mexico border in response to a Treasury Enforcement Communication System (TECS) alert that was based in part on defendant's previous conviction for child molestation. The initial search at the border turned up no incriminating material. Only after defendant’s laptop was shipped almost 170 miles away and subjected to a

comprehensive forensic examination were images of child pornography discovered. The court held that the forensic examination of defendant's laptop required a showing of reasonable suspicion under the **Fourth Amendment**. The court ruled that defendant's TECS alert, prior child-related conviction, frequent travels, crossing from a country known for sex tourism, and collection of electronic equipment, plus the parameters of the Operation Angel Watch program, taken collectively, gave rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. When combined with the other circumstances, the fact that an agent encountered at least one password protected file on the laptop contributed to the basis for reasonable suspicion to conduct a forensic examination. An alert regarding possession of child pornography justified obtaining additional resources to properly determine whether illegal files were present. (*United States v. Cotterman* (9th Cir. 2013) 709 F.3rd 952, 962-970.)

“Reasonable suspicion” necessary for such an intrusive search is defined as; “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” (*Id.*, at p. 968.)

The “Functional Equivalent of a Border:” “Border searches need not occur at an actual border, but may take place at the ‘functional equivalent’ of a border, or at an ‘extended border (see below).” (*United States v. Guzman-Padilla* (9th Cir. 2009) 573 F.3rd 865, 877; citing *United States v. Cardona* (9th Cir. 1985) 769 F.2nd 625, 628.)

An International Airport, receiving flights from a foreign country, is the “functional equivalent of a border.” Opening luggage therefore requires no suspicion, while cutting open the luggage, damaging it, requires a *reasonable suspicion*, to be lawful. (*United States v. Okafor* (9th Cir. 2002) 285 F.3rd 842.)

The first port where a vessel docks on arrival from a foreign country is the functional equivalent of an international border. (*People v. Laborde* (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 870, 874.)

Similarly, a *regional sorting hub* for express consignment services, like those offered by UPS, is the “functional equivalent of a border” and not an “extended border.” (See below). The test for determining the difference is whether the facility (at Louisville, Kentucky, in this case) is where packages are searched “at the last practicable opportunity before its passage over the international border.” (*United States v. Abbouchi* (9th Cir. 2007) 502 F.3rd 850.)

See also *United States v. Seljan* (9th Cir. 2008) 547 F.3rd 993, where the Court held the same for a FedEx regional sorting facility in Oakland, California, where defendant's mail, bound for the Philippines, was lawfully subjected to warrantless inspections by U.S. Customs Service inspectors.

The “Extended Border Search Doctrine:”

The “Reasonable Cause to Suspect” Rule: While a search at the International border or the “*functional equivalent of a border*” (see above), done under authority of 19 U.S.C. § 1582, does not require any suspicion to justify, a search under the “*extended border search doctrine*,” done upon containers that have already been imported and are searched “*wherever found*,” are authorized by 19 U.S.C. § 482, and require the presence of a “*reasonable cause to suspect*” (i.e., a “*reasonable suspicion*”), to be lawful. (*United States v. Ramsey* (1977) 431 U.S. 606, 612-613 [52 L.Ed.2nd 617]; *United States v. Taghizadeh* (9th Cir. 1994) 41 F.3rd 1263, 1265; *United States v. Cardona* (9th Cir. 1985) 769 F.2nd 625, 627; *United States v. Sahanaja* (9th Cir. 2005) 430 F.3rd 1049.)

Extended border searches based upon less than probable cause are lawful so long as:

- (1) The totality of the circumstances, including the time and distance elapsed as well as the manner and extent of surveillance, convince the fact finder with *reasonable certainty* that any contraband in or on the vehicle at the time of search was aboard the vehicle at the time of entry into the United States; *and*
- (2) The government agents conducting the search have a *reasonable suspicion* that the search may uncover contraband or evidence of criminal activity.

(*United States v. Villasenor* (9th Cir. 2010) 608 F.3rd 467, 471-472.)

Case Law:

This rule applies to packages that are being sent *from* the United States to a foreign country, even though it has not yet left the country, at least where it has been put into the hands of the mail service and is “*all but certain*” that it will be leaving the country. (*Alexander v. United States* (9th Cir. 1966) 362 F.2nd 379, 382.)

An extended border search, which occurs after the actual entry into the United States has been made, tend to intrude more on an individual's normal expectation of privacy. It must therefore be justified by a "*reasonable suspicion*" that the subject of the search was involved in criminal activity. (*United States v. Guzman-Padilla* (9th Cir. 2009) 573 F.3rd 865, 877.)

An extended border search requires that law enforcement possess a "*reasonable certainty*" that a border has been crossed, either by the vehicle in question or by contraband suspected to be within the vehicle. (*Id.*, at p. 878, 879-881.)

A Border Patrol Agent observed defendant's pickup truck some 70 miles north of the U.S.–Mexico border on Interstate 70, with Baja California license plates, traveling at 90 miles-per-hour while the other vehicles were driving between 70 and 80 mph. Also, defendant was weaving in and out of traffic and did not make eye contact with the agent after he pulled his marked vehicle alongside the passenger side of his truck. The agent affected a traffic stop. Defendant consented to a search of his truck resulting in eight kilograms of cocaine being recovered. The stop was held by an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal to have been supported by a reasonable suspicion based upon the fact that the location was the last checkpoint on that interstate, the truck had Mexican plates, and the erratic driving that the agent recognized as common among smugglers. (*United States v. Valdes-Vega* (9th Cir. 2013) 738 F.3rd 1074, 1076-1081.)

Use of a "*Controlled Tire Deflation Device*" (or "CTDD") by Border Patrol agents to stop a vehicle for which there was a reasonable suspicion that it was involved in smuggling people or contraband across the border was held to be lawful and, under the circumstances, not an excessive use of force. (*United States v. Guzman-Padilla* (9th Cir. 2009) 573 F.3rd 865.)

See "A *Controlled Tire Deflation Device* ("CTDD")," under "*New and Developing Law Enforcement Technology*" (Chapter 11), above.

Following defendant after seeing his car on the United States side but near the border, after which a municipal police officer was told to stop defendant, and where a drug sniffing dog alerted on defendant's vehicle, was a valid extended border search supported by a reasonable suspicion, based upon informant information and

defendant's unusual behavior after crossing the border. (*United States v. Villasenor* (9th Cir. 2010) 608 F.3rd 467.)

The search was upheld in *Villasenor* despite a 45 minute detention while awaiting the arrival of a drug-sniffing dog, after a 20 minute surveillance, and where defendant was not seen crossing the border but where it was apparent that he'd just come from Mexico.

A forensic search of the defendant's laptop computer, conducted some 170 miles away from the border and over five days after the laptop was seized at the border, held *not* to come within the "extended border search" doctrine. Defendant's computer never cleared customs, so it cannot be said that it ever entered the United States. (*United States v. Cotterman* (9th Cir. 2013) 709 F.3rd 952. 961-962; "A border search of a computer is not transformed into an extended border search simply because the device is transported and examined beyond the border.")

Immigration Checkpoints Away from the Border:

Established checkpoints located away from the border, such as at San Clemente, on Interstate 5, and Fallbrook, on Interstate 15, were, at one time, considered to be the "*functional equivalent*" of a border, and therefore subject to the same rules, even though these two points are miles from the U.S./Mexican border. (See *United States v. Martinez-Fuerte* (1976) 428 U.S. 543 [49 L.Ed.2nd 1116].)

At the time, a checkpoint was thought to be the "*functional equivalent of the border*" only when the government has proven to a "reasonable certainty that the traffic passing through the checkpoint is international in character. [Citation] In practical terms, this test means that border equivalent checkpoints intercept no more than a negligible number of domestic travelers." (*United States v. Jackson* (5th Cir. 1987) 825 F.2nd 853, 860.)

Actual "*border checkpoints*" implicate the broader powers of the federal government to conduct searches and seizures of persons for *immigration, drug interdiction, or other purposes* at the border or its functional equivalent. (See *United States v. Montoya de Hernandez* (1985) 473 U.S. 531, 541-542 [87 L.Ed.2nd 381, 391-392]; *United States v. Ramsey* (1977) 431 U.S. 606, 616 [52 L.Ed.2nd 617, 626].)

More recent authority, however, recognizes that such checkpoints are merely "*immigration checkpoints*," and not the equivalent of an

international border. (*United States v. Franzenberg* (S.D.Cal. 1990) 937 F.Supp. 1414; *United States v. Machuca-Barrera* (5th Cir. 2001) 261 F.3rd 425, 432, fn. 15.)

Therefore, it has been held that stops at such points for immigration purposes is lawful despite the lack of “*reasonable suspicion*,” requiring only that such stops be “*selective*.” (*United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, supra.*)

But the search of a vehicle at an immigration checkpoint, away from the border, may require “*probable cause*” to justify. (*United States v. Ortiz* (1975) 422 U.S. 891 [45 L.Ed.2nd 623].)

Although argued that such checkpoints are for the purpose of enforcing immigration rules, their use in also preventing drug trafficking has recently been challenged in *United States v. Soto-Zuniga* (9th Cir. 2016), 837 F.3rd 992, where the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal remanded the case back to the trial court to allow defense discovery into the records of the San Clemente checkpoint in order to properly litigate the legitimacy of such a use.

Roving Patrols: Border Patrol vehicle stops, away from the border, are held to the same **Fourth Amendment** standards as any other domestic law enforcement agency. (*Almeida-Sanchez* (1973) 413 U.S. 266 [37 L.Ed.2nd 596]; *United States v. Brignoni-Ponce* (1975) 422 U.S. 873 [45 L.Ed.2nd 607].)

An investigatory stop of a vehicle may be based upon a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot, based upon an evaluation of the “*totality of the circumstances*.” The fact that the circumstances, taken individually and in isolation, may all have some reasonable, non-criminal explanation, does not mean that a border patrol agent does not have legal cause to stop and investigate a possible drug smuggler. (*United States v. Arvizu* (2002) 534 U.S. 266 [151 L.Ed.2nd 740].)

The non-exclusive list of factors a court may use in determining whether a stop and detention is lawful include:

- The characteristics of the area in which a vehicle is encountered.
- Proximity to the border.
- Recent illegal border crossings in the area.
- Erratic or evasive driving behavior.
- Aspects of the vehicle.
- The behavior or appearance of the driver.

(*United States v. Brignoni-Ponce*, *supra*, at pp. 884-885 [45 L.Ed.2nd at pp. 618-619].)

See also *United States v. Berber-Tinoco* (9th Cir. 2007) 510 F.3rd 1083, adding:

- Usual patterns of smuggling in the area;
- Previous alien or drug smuggling in the area;
- Behavior of the driver, including “obvious attempts to evade officers;”
- Appearance or behavior of passengers;
- Model and appearance of the vehicle; *and*
- Officer experience.

See *United States v. Diaz-Juarez* (9th Cir. 2002) 299 F.3rd 1138; Driving late at night in a high crime area, near the International Border, apparently looking for something, in a vehicle from another area and with a modified suspension, held in this case sufficient to justify a stop and detention.

Also, state (including local) law enforcement officers have limited statutory authority to detain and question individuals regarding their immigration status if:

- The person is illegally present in the United States;
- The person has previously been convicted of a felony in the United States and since left the country or was deported;
- The state or local law enforcement official obtains “*appropriate confirmation*” from the INS of the immigration status of the individual;
- The state or local law enforcement official only detains the individual for as long as is reasonably required for the INS to assume federal custody of the individual for the purposes of deportation or removal.

(8 U.S.C. § 1252c(a); *United States v. Vasquez-Alvarez* (10th Cir. 1999) 176 F.3rd 1294, 1296.)

Note the Ninth Circuit’s unsupported conclusion that absent “a *particularized reasonable suspicion* that an individual is not a citizen,” it is a **Fourth Amendment** violation to ask him or her about the subject’s

citizenship (see *Mena v. City of Semi Valley* (9th Cir. 2003) 332 F.3rd 1255, 1264-1265.) was reversed by the United States Supreme Court (Certiorari granted, 2004)

The U.S. Supreme Court rejected this reasoning in the *Mena* case, reversing *Mena* while holding that it is *not* an unconstitutional expansion of the original reasons for the detention merely to make inquiry as to a person's citizenship status. *Muehler v. Mena* (2005) 544 U.S. 93 [161 L.Ed.2nd 299]; specifically reversing the Ninth Circuit on this issue.)

A roving Border Patrol agent may stop a vehicle if he has reasonable suspicion to believe the vehicle is involved in illegal activity. Here, the agent was an experienced officer who had been patrolling Highway 77 near Raymondville, Texas, for almost one year, forty-five miles north of the border, well south of the Sarita checkpoint. The agent saw defendant and his passengers acting as if they were very nervous when they saw him. Finally, defendant was driving a type of vehicle known to be popular among smugglers, on a highway and on a day of the week popular among them. Based on these factors, the court held that the agent had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant. (*United States v. Ramirez* (5th Cir. 2016) 839 F.3rd 437.)

Search of a Residence:

Search of a residence, away from the border, after following a suspected illegal alien to the residence, requires full probable cause and a search warrant, absent an exigency. Although police officers are allowed to approach a home to contact individuals inside and conduct a “knock and talk,” in this case, the evidence did not support the Border Patrol Agents' argument that they entered defendant's property to initiate a consensual encounter with him. The court concluded that it was not objectively reasonable, as part of a knock-and-talk, for the agent to bypass the front door, which he had seen defendant open in response to a knock by a suspected illegal alien moments earlier, and intrude into an area of the curtilage where an uninvited visitor would not be expected to appear (i.e., carport attached to the side of the house). By trespassing onto the curtilage and detaining defendant, the agent violated defendant's **Fourth Amendment** rights. (*United States v. Perea-Rey* (9th Cir. 2012) 680 F.3rd 1179, 1183-1189.)

The San Ysidro Port of Entry, in San Diego, is state land and not federal, although the attached facilities belong to the federal government. A federal Immigration and Naturalization Agent at that location may therefore lawfully make a citizen's arrest for a state criminal violation (e.g., driving while under the

influence) and turn him over to state and local law enforcement officers. (*People v. Crusilla* (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 141.)

Chapter 15:

Fourth Waiver Searches:

“Prior Consents:” Search & Seizure (“Fourth Waiver”) Conditions:

General Rule: All parolees, and some probationers, and in some cases, pre-trial defendants, are subject to what is commonly referred to as a “**Fourth Waiver**,” i.e., where the subject has agreed, prior to the fact, to waive any objections to being subjected to searches and seizures without the necessity of the law enforcement officer meeting the standard **Fourth Amendment** requirements of *probable cause* and a *search warrant*. (See *Vandenberg v. Superior Court* (1970) 8 Cal.App.3rd 1048, 1053.)

The same rules apply to “probation searches” under the “**Post-Release Community Supervision Act of 2011**,” P.C. §§ 3450 et seq. (*People v. Douglas* (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 855, 863-873.)

Searches of a parolee and his property are reasonable, so long as the parolee’s status is known to the officer and the search is not arbitrary, capricious, or harassing. (*People v. Schmitz* (2012) 55 Cal.4th 909, 916-933; discussing the search of a non-parolee’s vehicle and its contents when the parolee is a passenger in the car.)

Parole: A warrantless search of those areas of the passenger compartment of a vehicle where an officer reasonably expects that the parolee could have stowed personal belongings or discarded items when aware of police activity, as well as a search of personal property located in those areas if the officer reasonably believes that the parolee owns those items or has the ability to exert control over them, is lawful. (*Ibid.*)

PRCS: The search of an individual’s hotel room, when the individual was subject to the “mandatory supervision” provisions of “**Post-Release Community Supervision Act of 2011**,” was held not to be an “arbitrary, capricious, or harassing” search when the officer had not had any prior contact with the defendant, there was no indication that the search had been conducted for an improper purpose, and it appeared to have been conducted solely for legitimate law-enforcement purposes. Also, the search was not conducted at an unreasonable time or in an unreasonable manner. (*United States v. Cervantes* (9th Cir. 2017) 859 F.3rd 1175)

[As amended at 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 18017; Sep. 12, 2017].)

Probation: Similarly, a vehicle search based on a passenger's probation status may extend beyond the probationer's person and the seat he or she occupies, but is confined to those areas of the passenger compartment where the officer reasonably expects that the probationer could have stowed personal belongings or discarded items when aware of police activity. (*People v. Cervantes* (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 860, 866-872.)

The courts and the Legislature may, under certain limited circumstances, condition the freedom of parolees, some probationers, and (in some cases) even pretrial detainees, upon an agreement that law enforcement, probation officers and/or parole agents, be allowed to search and seize a subject's person and possessions without probable cause and without a search warrant. (*People v. Bravo* (1987) 43 Cal.3rd 600, 610; *In re York* (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1133, 1150.)

It is the prosecution's burden of proving that the defendant was on parole (or probation), and therefore subject to the conditions of a **Fourth** waiver, at the time of the warrantless search. (*People v. Pearl* (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1280.)

Parole v. Probation: Consent:

Although imposed as a condition of the subject's parole or probation, such a waiver, albeit coerced at least to some extent (in so far it is imposed in lieu of incarceration where the subject is to be placed on probation), is often considered by some courts to be a form of "prior consent." (*In re Tyrell J.* (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68, 79-80, overruled on other grounds.)

Note: In re Tyrell J., supra, has been specifically overruled by the California Supreme Court in In re Jaime P. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 128, on the issue of whether an officer had to know of the probation condition prior to the search. *Tyrell J.* is cited in this outline for its other still-valid legal points.

See "Searching While In Ignorance of a Search Condition," below.

The California Supreme Court has noted that while probationers consent to the imposition of search and seizure conditions, typically to avoid further incarceration, similar search and seizure conditions are imposed on parolees upon their release on parole without their consent since the parole statutes (e.g., **P.C. § 3067**) were amended to eliminate the a need for parolee’s consent (**Stats. 2012, ch. 43, § 49**). A parolee’s lack of consent is therefore irrelevant. (*People v. Schmitz* (2012) 55 Cal.4th 909, 919-921, and fn. 9.)

The amendment to **P.C. § 3067**, eliminating the requirement that the inmate agree in writing to search and seizure conditions, was effective as of 6/27/2012.

Parole: A condition of *all paroles*, after the parolee has been released from prison, is that the parolee submit to searches by his or her parole officer, or “*other peace officer at any time of the day or night, with or without a search warrant and with or without cause.*” (**Cal. Code of Regs, Title 15, § 2511; P.C. § 3067(a); People v. Hernandez** (1964) 229 Cal.App.2nd 143; *People v. Perkins* (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 454, 472; *People v. Cervantes* (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 860, 869, fn. 9.)

Statutory Authorization: The **Penal Code** provides that; “The Legislature finds and declares that the period immediately following incarceration is critical to successful reintegration of the offender into society and to positive citizenship. It is in the interest surveillance of parolees . . .” (**P.C. § 3000(a)(1)**)

P.C. § 3067(c) vs. Cal. Code of Regs, Title 15, § 2511:

P.C. § 3067 applies, by its terms (**subd. (c)**), to any parolee whose offense for which he or she is paroled occurred *on or after* January 1, 1997, as well as prison inmates released on what is known as “*postrelease community supervision.*” Otherwise, the language of **Cal. Code of Regs, Title 15, § 2511** controls:

For parolees whose offense for which he or she is on parole *occurred before 1/1/1997*: “You and your residence and any property under your control may be searched without a warrant at any time by any agent of the Department of Corrections or any law enforcement officer.” (**Cal. Code of Regs, Title 15 § 2511**)

The language in this parole condition that allows for a search of property “under (the parolee’s) control,” when the place to be searched is a residence, does not allow for the search of a third-party’s residence even though the parolee is a frequent visitor and even though there is evidence that he is dealing drugs out of that third-party’s residence. (*United States v. Grandberry* (9th Cir. 2013) 730 F.3rd 968, 980-982,)

For parolees whose offense for which he or she is on parole occurred on or after 1/1/1997 and prison inmates released on “*postrelease community supervision*.” Any inmate released on parole or postrelease community supervision must agree in writing “to be subject to search or seizure by a parole officer or other peace officer at any time of the day or night, with or without a search warrant and with or without cause.” (P.C. § 3067(a))

Officer’s Prior Knowledge: Note *United States v. Caseres* (9th Cir. 2008) 533 F.3rd 1064, at pp. 1075-1076, which *erroneously* held that an officer conducting a parole search must have been aware prior to the search that P.C. § 3067(a) was applicable to the defendant, i.e., that the prior conviction leading to his parole status occurred on or after January 1, 1997.

California case law appears to be to the contrary. (See *People v. Solorzano* (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1026, 1030-1032; citing *People v. Middleton* (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 732.; it is not necessary that the searching officer was aware of the existence of a signed parole search agreement, as required by P.C. § 3067, so long as he knew that the subject was on parole.)

Note: In that the language of P.C. § 3067(a) is substantially similar to that of Cal. Code of Regs, Title 15 § 2511, the arresting officers’ knowledge of the date of the prior conviction *should* be irrelevant on the issue of the legality of a parolee’s **Fourth** waiver search.

However, see “*Searching While In Ignorance of a Search Condition*,” below.

Post-Release Community Supervision Act of 2011:

Supervision by County Probation: Felons released from custody who were sentenced under the “**Post-Release Community Supervision Act of 2011**,” are subject to “post-release community supervision” (“**PRCS**”) instead of state parole. They will be supervised by a county agency designated by the board of supervisors. In most, if not all, counties, this will be the county’s probation department. (See the “**Post-Release Community Supervision Act of 2011**,” P.C. §§ 3450 et seq.)

See P.C. § 3067: Inmates released from prison on “postrelease community supervision” are added to those inmates (i.e., those released on parole) who are subject to search and seizure by a parole officer or other peace officer at any time of the day or night, with or without a search warrant, and with or without cause.

“**The Realignment Act** provides that a defendant sentenced to state prison is “subject to a mandatory period of supervision following release, either parole supervision by the state (§ 3000 et seq.), or postrelease community supervision by a county probation department. (§ 3450 et seq.)” (*People v. Douglas* (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 855, 863-873.)

“During the period of mandatory supervision, the defendant shall be supervised by the county probation officer in accordance with the terms, conditions, and procedures generally applicable to persons placed on probation, for the remaining unserved portion of the sentence imposed by the court.” (P.C. § 1170(h)(5)(B))

P.C. § 3453: A postrelease community supervision agreement includes the following among its conditions:

(f): The person, and his or her residence and possessions, shall be subject to search at any time of the day or night, with or without a warrant, by an agent of the supervising county agency or by a peace officer.

This also allows for the warrantless withdrawal of a blood sample from a person subject to postrelease community supervision, in a DUI case, despite the

lack of consent or exigent circumstances. (*People v. Jones* (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1257, 1265-1269.)

“A **PRCS** search condition, like a parole search condition, is imposed on all individuals subject to **PRCS**. (§ 3465.)” (*People v. Douglas* (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 855, 864; see also *People v. Young* (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 972, 979.)

“If a police officer knows an individual is on **PRCS**, he may lawfully detain that person for the purpose of searching him or her, so long as the detention and search are not arbitrary, capricious or harassing.” (*Id, supra*, at p. 863.)

“(A)n officer’s knowledge that the individual is on **PRCS** is equivalent to knowledge that he or she is subject to a search condition.” (*Id, supra*, at p. 865.)

Also, “An officer ‘knows’ a subject is on **PRCS** if his belief is objectively reasonable.” (*Id, supra*, at p. 865.)

An order revoking defendant’s postrelease community supervision (**PRCS**) did not violate his due process rights because a “*Morrissey*-complaint” (*Morrissey v. Brewer* (1972) 408 U.S. 471 [33 L.Ed.2nd 484].) informal hearing before the supervising agency had been held. The record did not suggest that the probation officer who conducted the probable cause hearing was involved in defendant’s arrest. The order also did not violate defendant’s equal protection rights on the ground that the procedure used to revoke his **PRCS** differed from that applied to a parole revocation, under *Morrissey*, because he had not shown that he was similarly situated to a state prison parolee. (*People v. Gutierrez* (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 393, 399-404.)

Given the similarities between California’s mandatory supervision and parole, and the State’s comparably weighty interest in supervising offenders placed on both forms of supervision, the **Fourth Amendment** analysis in defendant’s case was held to be governed by the line of precedent applicable to parolees. Because defendant was subject to mandatory supervision per **P.C. § 1170(h)(5)**, enacted as part of California’s **Criminal Justice**

Realignment Act of 2011, the suspicionless search condition to which he was subject rendered the warrantless, suspicionless search of his hotel room reasonable under the **Fourth Amendment**. The hotel room could be deemed a “premises” under defendant’s control (differentiating it from a “residence”). Also, the district court, in sentencing defendant on the parole violation, did not abuse its discretion by imposing a supervised release condition requiring defendant to be subject to suspicionless searches. (*United States v. Cervantes* (9th Cir. 2017) 859 F.3rd 1175 [As amended at 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 18017; Sep. 12, 2017].)

Probation: A condition of *some* (but not all) *probationary* terms is that the probationer submit to searches by a probation officer or any law enforcement officer without probable cause or a warrant. (*People v. Mason* (1971) 5 Cal.3rd 759, 763-764.)

Government Interests: Probationary searches advance at least two related government interests;

- Combating recidivism; *and*
- Helping probationers integrate back into the community.

(*United States v. Lara* (9th Cir. 2016) 815 F.3rd 605, 612; citing *Samson v. California* (2006) 547 U.S. 843, 849 [165 L.Ed.2nd 250], and *United States v. Knights* (2001) 534 U.S. 112, 120-121 [151 L.Ed.2nd 497].)

General Principles: There are four general principles that related to probationary **Fourth** wavier searches:

- (1) Whether a search is reasonable must be determined based upon the circumstances known to the officer when the search is conducted.
- (2) The rationale for warrantless probation searches is consent based.
- (3) Because probation searches are undertaken to deter further offenses by the probationer and to ascertain whether he is complying with the terms of his probation, the scope of permitted search must be reasonably related to the purposes of probation.
- (4) Whether the purpose of the search is to monitor the probationer or to serve some other law enforcement

purpose, or both, the search in any case remains limited in scope to the terms articulated in the search clause.

(*People v. Romeo* (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 931, 449-450.)

Statutory Authorization: A court may impose any “reasonable conditions, as it may determine are fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done, . . . (and) for the reformation and rehabilitation of the probationer.” (P.C. § 1203.1(j))

“(A) court when granting probation may impose ‘reasonable conditions as it may determine are fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done, that amends may be made to society for breach of the law, for any injury done to any person resulting from that breach, and generally and specifically for the reformation and rehabilitation of the probationer.’” (*People v. Leon* (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 943, 948-949; see also *People v. Douglas* (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 855, 863-873.)

“(A)dult probationers, in preference to incarceration, validly may consent to limitations upon their constitutional rights.” (*People v. Olguin* (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 384.)

However; “(a) probation condition that imposes limitations on a person’s constitutional rights must closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of the condition to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad.” (*In re Sheena K.* (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890.)

Although defendant had met a false imprisonment victim through social media several months before the crime, a probation condition upon conviction that allows law enforcement unrestricted computer searches for material prohibited by law was overbroad under the **Fourth Amendment**. Such a condition allows for searches of vast amounts of personal information unrelated to defendant’s criminal conduct or his potential future criminality. A narrower means might include either requiring defendant to provide his social media account and passwords to his probation officer for monitoring, or restricting his use of, or access to, social media websites and applications without the prior approval of his probation officer. A condition requiring defendant not to delete his browser history was held to be valid, assuming a properly narrowed condition

monitoring his use of social media can be fashioned.
(*People v. Appleton* (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, 721-728.)

Validity of a Fourth Waiver Condition: A Fourth Wavier
condition of probation will be upheld *unless*:

- The wavier has no relationship to the crime for which the offender was convicted; *and*
- The wavier relates to conduct that is not in itself criminal; *and*
- The waiver is not reasonably related to preventing future criminality.

(See *People v. Shimek* (1988) 205 Cal.App.3rd 340, 342; *People v. Lent* (1975) 15 Cal.3rd 481, 486; *In re Frank V.* (1991) 233 Cal.App.3rd 12232, 1242; *People v. Moret* (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 839, 845; *People v. Olguin* (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379-380.)

Note: The Supreme Court, in *People v. Mason* (1971) 5 Cal.3rd 759, erroneously listed these criteria in the *disjunctive*, when in fact they are to be considered in the *conjunctive*. (*People v. Lent*, *supra*, at p. 486, fn. 1; *In re Ricardo P.* (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 676, 684.)

Note: In other words, all three conditions have to apply before a probation condition is subject to being struck.

Note: Given the above factors, probationary search and seizure conditions are commonly applied to narcotics and theft-related offenses, and sometimes crimes of violence where the use of a weapon was involved.

Note: Review was granted in *Ricardo P.* by the California Supreme Court on Feb. 17, 2016 (365 P.3rd 343.).

When the probationer is a juvenile, because the purpose of juvenile law is to rehabilitate (See **W&I § 202(b)**), the *third* of the above factors is perhaps the most important. (*In re Tyrell J.* (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68, 87, overruled on other

grounds; see also *In re Bonnie P.* (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1089.)

See “*Juveniles*,” below.

Unconstitutionally vague probation conditions may be cured by amending the conditions so that the probationer will know a particular association, place, or item is within a prohibited category. (*People v. Gaines* (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1035].)

“Even if a condition of probation has no relationship to the crime of which a defendant was convicted and involves conduct that is not itself criminal, the condition is valid as long as the condition is reasonably related to preventing future criminality.” (*People v. Olguin* (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379-380; upholding a probation condition requiring defendant, convicted of DUI-related charges, to notify the probation officer of the presence of any pets in his home.)

Probation conditions may require a gang member to provide his passwords to electronic devices and social media websites to allow warrantless searches. (*People v. Ebertowski* (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1174-1177.)

But it violates the **Fifth Amendment** self-incrimination privilege to require a probationer to waive his self-incrimination rights even if related to a sex-offender management program as mandated by P.C. § 1203.067. However, when a mandatory waiver of the defendant’s psychotherapist-patient privilege is construed as requiring waiver only insofar as necessary to enable communication between the probation officer and the psychotherapist, such a condition was held to *not* be overbroad or in violation of defendant’s constitutional right to privacy. (*People v. Rebulloza* (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1065.)

Note: Review was granted, depublishing this case, on June 10, 2015, and is therefore not citable pending a decision by the California Supreme Court. (188 Cal. Rptr.3rd 372.) On May 10, 2017, the case was transferred to the Court of Appeal for the Sixth Appellate District for reconsideration in light of the decision in *People v. Garcia* (2017) 2 Cal.5th 792, below.

In *People v. Garcia* (2017) 2 Cal.5th 792, at pp. 800-814, a probation condition under P.C. §1203.067(b)(3), requiring waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination and participation in polygraph examinations, was held by the California Supreme Court *not* to violate the **Fifth Amendment** and is not overbroad, as interpreted to require that probationers answer all questions fully and truthfully, knowing that compelled responses cannot be used against them in a subsequent criminal proceeding. A probationer must be advised, before treatment begins, that no compelled statement (or the fruits thereof), elicited in the course of the mandatory sex offender management program, may be used against the probationer in a criminal prosecution. Also, mandating that sex offenders waive any psychotherapist-patient privilege does not violate the right to privacy as construed to intrude on the privilege only to the limited extent specified in the condition itself.

So long as a federal district court makes a factual finding establishing some nexus between defendant's computer use and one of the statutory goals articulated in the federal probation condition statutes (i.e., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B), (C) or (D)), it is not an abuse of discretion to impose a condition of supervised release permitting the search of defendant's personal computers. The nexus was held to be sufficient in this case. (*United States v. Bare* (9th Cir. 2015) 806 F.3rd 1011, 1017-1019.)

Although defendant had met a false imprisonment victim through social media several months before the crime, a probation condition upon conviction that allows law enforcement unrestricted computer searches for material prohibited by law was overbroad under the **Fourth Amendment**. Such a condition allows for searches of vast amounts of personal information unrelated to defendant's criminal conduct or his potential future criminality. A narrower means might include either requiring defendant to provide his social media account and passwords to his probation officer for monitoring, or restricting his use of, or access to, social media websites and applications without the prior approval of his probation officer. A condition requiring defendant not to delete his browser history was held to be valid, assuming a properly narrowed condition

monitoring his use of social media can be fashioned. (*People v. Appleton* (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, 721-728.)

A search condition for a person on probation for burglary such as: “You are not to possess tools used for the express purpose of facilitating a burglary or theft such as pry bars, screw drivers, pick lock devices, universal keys or implements or other such devices without the express permission of your supervising probation officer,” is too vague to be lawful. However, it will be upheld if rewritten to contain either an “express knowledge” element (e.g.: “(D)o not possess a tool that you know or reasonably should know is used to facilitate a burglary or theft.”), or an express intent element (e.g.: “(D)o not possess a specified tool with the intent to commit a burglary or theft” or “do not possess a specified tool with the purpose of committing a burglary or theft.”) (*People v. Carreon* (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 866, 881-883.)

Defendant’s search condition that he submit to searches of his text messages, emails, and photographs on his electronic devices where he was convicted of a weapons offense was held to be overbroad absent a showing that there was a connection between his use of a cellular phone and criminality, past or future. Here, there was no such showing. (*People v. Bryant* (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 396.)

Note: Review was granted in this case by the California Supreme Court on July 26, 2017 (2017 Cal. LEXIS 5937), pending a decision in the case of *In re Ricardo P.* (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 676 (review granted; see above).

Upon conviction for attempted robbery and assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury, the trial court did not abuse its discretion under **P.C. § 1203.1(j)** in concluding that an electronics-search probation condition was reasonable under *Lent* because, given defendant’s unique family and personal history (e.g., suicides, drug use, gang affiliation, economic stress), it would allow the probation department to effectively supervise defendant. The probation condition satisfied constitutional standards because infringement on defendant’s privacy rights was outweighed by the State’s strong need to closely monitor his conduct and protect public safety. Also, there were no

facts showing defendant's electronics contained the type of private information meriting heightened protection or that a search of those devices would be more intrusive than a warrantless search of his home, to which defendant had not objected. The record did not support the argument that the probation condition was unnecessarily broad or would result in an unjustified invasion of defendant's privacy rights. (*People v. Trujillo* (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 574, 582-589.)

Following his conviction for domestic abuse, defendant was placed on probation with a condition authorizing the search of "*electronic storage devices*" such as cellular phones and computers, under his control. Defendant appealed and challenged the validity of the condition on the grounds that (1) the condition was unreasonable under *People v. Lent* (1975) 15 Cal.3rd 481, because it bore no relationship to his current offense or potential future criminality; (2) the condition was unconstitutional under the **Fourth** and **Fifth Amendments** because his privacy and privilege against self-incrimination far outweigh the State's interests, and also infringes on the privacy interests of third parties; and (3) the condition was unconstitutionally overbroad because its potential impact on his **Fourth Amendment** rights exceeds what is reasonably necessary to serve the government's legitimate interest in ensuring that he complies with the terms of his probation. The Court rejected defendant's first two claims but agreed that the condition was nonetheless unconstitutionally overbroad. Per the Court, even though the electronic storage device search condition was reasonable under *Lent* because it served to help ensure that defendant obeys all laws, the condition was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to pass constitutional muster. The condition's broad language "permitted unprecedented intrusion into his private affairs—and it does so on a record that demonstrates little likelihood, or even possibility, that evidence of illegal activity will be found in the devices the condition subjects to a warrantless search." There was no evidence in the record that electronic devices played any role in defendant's crime. "Under these circumstances, there appear[ed] to be no substantial reason for believing that evidence of future criminal activity by defendant is likely to be found on electronic storage devices under his control." Thus, the Court concluded that on the record in

this case the electronic storage device search condition was unconstitutionally overbroad because its potential impact on defendant's **Fourth Amendment** rights exceeds what is reasonably necessary to serve the government's legitimate interest in ensuring that he complied with the terms of his probation. (*People v. Valdivia* (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 1130.)

After pleading guilty to felony vandalism with gang enhancements, defendant was placed on probation with a number of conditions including that he "[s]ubmit person, vehicle, residence, property, personal effects, *computers and recordable media* . . . to search at any time with or without a warrant, and with or without reasonable cause, when required by P.O. [i.e., a probation officer] or law enforcement officer." Defendant challenged the electronics condition (in italics, above). The court upheld the validity of this condition in that it "related to preventing future criminality." (*People v. Acosta* (Feb. 6, 2018) ___ Cal.App.5th ___, __ [2018 Cal. App. LEXIS 94].)

*The language of the specific **Fourth Waiver** condition must be considered.* There being no statutorily-required standard language, a court is free to limit the search and seizure conditions as it deems to be appropriate under the circumstances. A judge who wishes to impose some unusual restrictions on law enforcement officers' powers to conduct **Fourth Waiver** searches has the legal authority to do so. (*People v. Bravo* (1987) 43 Cal.3rd 600, 607, fn. 6.)

Any limitations in the conditions are binding on the searching officers. For instance, a search and seizure condition specifically limited to narcotics cannot be used to justify a search for stolen property. (*People v. Howard* (1984) 162 Cal.App.3rd 8.)

However, so long as the area being searched could contain items allowed to be searched for under the terms of the **Fourth Waiver**, the officer's subjective intent (e.g., searching for stolen property where only a search for narcotics was authorized) is irrelevant, and the search will be upheld. (*People v. Gomez* (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1008.)

Some **Fourth Waivers** include language authorizing a warrantless search only "upon request," "as requested," or

“*whenever requested.*” Even though ordinarily the defendant need not be present during the search (*People v Lilienthal* (1978) 22 Cal.3rd 891, 900.), courts have interpreted the above language to mean that the probationer must either be present, or at least be notified beforehand about an impending search. If he is not, the resulting evidence will be suppressed. (See *People v. Mason* (1971) 5 Cal.3rd 759, 763; *People v. Superior Court [Stevens]* (1974) 12 Cal.3rd 858, 861.)

See *People v. Romeo* (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 931, 946-949, where the prosecution’s failure to offer evidence of the scope of two residents’ probation conditions resulted in an incomplete record as to what could be searched, resulting in suppression of all evidence found in the residence.

Fourth waiver probation conditions, such as; to “submit [his] person and property, including any residence, premises, container or vehicle under [his] control to search and seizure,” held *not* to reasonably include defendant’s cellphone. (*United States v. Lara* (9th Cir. 2016) 815 F.3rd 605, 609-612: “Just as it makes no sense to call a cell phone a ‘container’ for purposes of a search incident to arrest (*Riley [v. California]* (June 25, 2014) 573 U.S. ___, ___ [134 S.Ct. 2473, 2482; 189 L.Ed.2nd 430].) or search of an automobile (*Camou* [(9th Cir. 2014) 773 F.3rd 932.]), it makes no sense to call a cell phone a ‘container’ for purposes of a probation search.”)

A cellphone also held *not* to come within the category of “property.” (*Id.*, at p. 609.)

The Second District Court of Appeal (Div. 5) has held that when interpreting a minor’s conditions of probation, reference to defendant’s “property,” as “reasonably construed, does *not* include “electronic data.” (*In re I.V.* (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 249, 259-263; citing *United States v. Lara*, *supra*.)

However, see *People v. Sandee* (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 294, at pages 302-304, where the Court noted that because the Ninth Circuit uses a balancing test, while California uses an objective test, in analyzing whether the probationer consented to the search by accepting the specific probation search conditions at issue (see pg. 303, fn. 6), *United States v. Lara*, *supra*, is not persuasive authority and does not

preclude a finding that the search of text messages contained in defendant's cellphone was lawful under defendant's **Fourth** waiver conditions allowing for the search of her "property" and "personal effects."

Recognizing that "the government's interest in supervising parolees is 'substantial,'" more so than with probationers, the Ninth Circuit differentiated its decision in *Lara* (as well as *Riley*) and held that a parolee's cellphone was subject to a warrantless search. The fact that the warrantless search of defendant's phone was delayed by three days after his arrest was held not to be unreasonable. (*United States v. Johnson* (9th Cir. 2017) 875 F.3rd 1265, 1273-1276.)

The Court also noted that while the severity of the crimes for which an arrestee is on parole should probably be a consideration, it is not practical for officers to be held to a requirement that they check a parolee's criminal history before conducting a warrantless search of his cellphone. Therefore, defendant's status as a parolee by itself was held to be sufficient to justify a warrantless search of his cellphone. (*Id.*, at p. 1275.)

Sex Offender Registration of Internet Identifiers per Pen. Code § 290.024; Internet Identifier Defined:

Sex offenders convicted of a felony on or after *January 1, 2017*, are required to register Internet identifiers if a court at sentencing finds that any one of the following applies:

- (1) The defendant used the Internet to collect any private information to identify the victim of the crime;
- (2) The defendant was convicted of human trafficking pursuant to **P.C. § 236.1(b)** (sex trafficking) or **P.C. § 236.1(c)** (sex trafficking involving minors) and used the Internet to traffic the victim; *or*
- (3) The defendant was convicted of a felony involving obscene matter (**P.C. §§ 311 through 311.12**) and used the Internet to prepare, publish, distribute, send, exchange, or download the obscene

matter or matter depicting a minor engaging in sexual conduct.

“*Internet identifier*” is defined as “any electronic mail address or user name used for instant messaging or social networking that is actually used for direct communication between users on the Internet in a manner that makes the communication not accessible to the general public.” An Internet identifier does *not* include passwords, date of births, social security numbers, or PIN numbers.

Non-Disclosure of Internet Identifiers to the Public; Pen. Code § 290.45:

Law enforcement is prohibited from disclosing an offender’s Internet identifiers to a non-law enforcement entity or person, except by court order (as an exception to the right of law enforcement to disclose information about a sex offender when necessary to ensure public safety).

A law enforcement agency may use an Internet identifier submitted with a sex offender’s registration or to release it to another law enforcement agency *only* for the purpose of investigating a sex-related crime, a kidnapping, or human trafficking.

Juvenile Probationers: Juvenile probationers may also be subjected to a **Fourth Waiver** requirement. (*In re Tyrell J.* (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68, 87, overruled on other grounds.)

General Rules:

“The state, when it asserts jurisdiction over a minor, stands in the shoes of the parents’ [citation], thereby occupying a ‘unique role . . . in caring for the minor’s well-being.’ [Citation.] . . . [¶] The permissible scope of discretion in formulating terms of juvenile probation is even greater than that allowed for adults. ‘[E]ven where there is an invasion of protected freedoms “the power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults”’ [Citation.] This is because juveniles are deemed to be ‘more in need of guidance and supervision than adults, and because a minor’s constitutional rights

are more circumscribed.’ [Citation.] Thus, “‘a condition of probation that would be unconstitutional or otherwise improper for an adult probationer may be permissible for a minor under the supervision of the juvenile court.’” [Citations.]” (*In re Erica R.* (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 907, 911-912; quoting *In re Victor L.* (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 909-910.)

The “*special needs*” of the juvenile probation system, with its “goal of rehabilitating youngsters who have transgressed the law, a goal that is arguably stronger than in the adult context,” allows for stricter controls. (*In re Tyrell J.*, *supra*, overruled on other grounds.)

So long as the conditions imposed are tailored specifically to meet the needs of the juvenile concerned, taking into account not only the circumstances of the crime but the juvenile’s entire social history, probationary conditions, even which otherwise infringe upon the constitutional rights of the juvenile, will be upheld. (*In re Binh L.* (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 194, 203-205.)

But the Juvenile Court’s discretion is not unlimited. A probation condition is invalid if it (1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality. (*In re Malik J.* (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 896, 901; quoting *People v. Lent* (1975) 15 Cal.3rd 481, 486.)

Statutory Authority:

W&I § 727 provides that “[i]f a minor is adjudged a ward of the court on the ground that he or she is a person described by **Section 601** or **602**, the court may make any reasonable orders for the care, supervision, custody, conduct, maintenance, and support of the minor, including medical treatment, subject to further order of the court.” (**Subd. (a)(1)**) **Subd. (a)(2)** authorizes the court, in its discretion, to place a ward on probation without the supervision of the probation officer, and to impose

“reasonable conditions of behavior as may be appropriate under this disposition.” In all other cases, however, “the court shall order the care, custody, and control of the minor to be under the supervision of the probation officer” (**Subd. (a)(3)**)

W&I § 730(b): “The court may impose and require any and all reasonable conditions that it may determine are fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced.” (See *In re Malik J.* (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 896, 900.)

W&I §§ 790 et seq., which provides for a post-plea diversion program, mandates a **Fourth Amendment** waiver as a condition in every grant of deferred entry of judgment (**W&I § 794**).

Diversion in a pre-plea situation pursuant to **W&I §§ 654 and 654.2**, however, placing a juvenile on informal probation, does not provide for the imposition of a **Fourth** waiver. Absent statutory authority to do so, a court, therefore, is prohibited from imposing a **Fourth** waiver on a juvenile under such circumstances. (*Derick B. v. Superior Court [People]* (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 295.)

Juveniles and Electronic Device and/or Social Media Probation Conditions: The First District Court of Appeal’s various divisions have issued a series of published decisions in rapid succession discussing the legality of imposing conditions of probation that include the warrantless searches of a minor’s electronic devices and the requirement that the minor provide a probation officer with the minor’s passwords to those devices.

In re Erica R. (First Dist. Div. 2, 2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 907: Defendant juvenile admitted to the misdemeanor possession of ecstasy after a school counselor found a baggie of pills in her purse, the trial court imposed as a condition of probation that she be required to submit to a search of her

electronic devices and to provide her passwords to her probation officer. Defendant challenged these conditions as unreasonable under *People v. Lent* (1975) 15 Cal.3rd 481, 486. The court concluded that because there was no evidence connecting her electronic device or social media usage to her offense or to a risk of future criminal conduct, the conditions were unreasonable. (*In re Erica R.*, at pp. 911-915.)

Under *Lent*, which applies to both juvenile and adult probationers, a condition is *invalid* if it; (1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality. (*Id.*, at p. 912; *In re Ricardo P.* (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 676, at p. 684; *In re J.B.* (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 749, 753-759.)

“This test is conjunctive—all three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term.” (*In re Ricardo P.*, *supra*, quoting *People v. Olguin* (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379.)

Note: Review was granted by the California Supreme Court on Feb. 17, 2016 (365 P.3rd 343.) in *Ricardo P.*

In re Malik J. (First Dist. Div. 3, 2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 896: The Court upheld probation conditions to the extent that they required defendant to permit searches of electronic devices in his possession, but found those conditions requiring family members to comply, and also the portion requiring defendant to provide passwords to social media accounts, to be overbroad. With respect to the passwords to social media sites, the court noted that officers do not have the unfettered right to retrieve any information accessible from electronic devices in a probationer’s possession, information stored in a remote location cannot be considered in the probationer’s possession nor entirely within his

or her control, and access to remotely stored information may also implicate privacy interests of third persons. In examining such devices, officers must first disable the device from any Internet or cellular connection in order to limit the search to information stored on the device, in the probationer's possession, and subject to his or her control. (*Id.* at pp. 900-906.)

Note *People v. Sandee* (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 294, 299, fn. 3, where the court's approval of a detective using a **Fourth** waiver condition as the grounds for viewing defendant's text messages was limited to just the text messages. Foreshadowing the possible suppression of more obscure information from a cellphone, the court warned: "(T)his case does not present the issue of whether a probation search condition permits law enforcement to use a cell phone to access other type of data that may raise third party privacy concerns, such as using the cell phone connection to access a shared databases or social networking site with restricted access."

In re Ricardo P. (First Dist, Div. 1, 2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 676: In a case where defendant was found to have committed two counts of felony first degree burglary, probation conditions imposed on the minor pursuant to **W&I 700** were held to be unconstitutionally overbroad where it required the minor to submit to warrantless searches of his electronics, "including passwords." The Court found that the conditions as imposed infringed on his rights to privacy and expression without being sufficiently tailored to his offenses. The stated purpose in imposing the condition was to permit monitoring of the minor's involvement with illegal drugs, particularly marijuana, but the condition did not limit the types of data that might be searched in light of that under the *Lent* standard (*People v. Lent* (1975) 15 Cal.3rd 481.) in that searches of a minor's electronic devices are sufficiently related to future criminality in that they enable the effective

supervision of a minor's compliance with other drug-related, probation conditions. (*In re Ricardo P.*, at pp. 683-693; disagreeing with *In re Erica R.*, *supra*, holding here that electronic device monitoring was reasonably related to a minor's uncharged alleged drug use.)

Note: Review was granted on Feb. 17, 2016 (365 P.3rd 343.) in *Ricardo P.*

In re Patrick F. (First Dist. Div. 5, 2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 104: Where the juvenile was determined to be a ward of the court for having committed a second degree burglary, but told his probation officer that he used marijuana frequently and had committed the burglary to get money to buy his marijuana, the conditions of his probation reasonably included a search term requiring the juvenile to submit any electronic devices and passwords under his control to search by a probation officer or a peace officer with or without a search warrant as such a condition was reasonably related to monitoring his future criminality. However, the condition was overbroad as drafted in that it did not limit the types of data (whether on the phone or accessible through the phone) that could be searched. While the juvenile's privacy interest in the information contained in his electronic devices was trumped by the State's interest in effectively monitoring his probation, that interest was trumped only to the extent the information was reasonably likely to yield evidence of drug use and other criminal activity or noncompliance with his probation conditions. The Court further held that the juvenile lacked standing to raise the privacy interest of third parties who might be affected by his search conditions.

In re J.B. (First Dist. Div. 3, 2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 749, 753-759: Where defendant admitted to the crime of petty theft, the juvenile court imposed a condition of probation that required him to permit searches of, and disclose all passwords to, his electronic devices and social media sites. The Court of Appeal found such a condition, under the

circumstances, and according to the criteria set out in *People v. Lent* (1975) 15 Cal.3rd 481, to be unreasonable. In this case, the challenged electronic search condition had no relationship to the crime of petty theft or to the specific offense that minor admitted committing. There was no evidence in the record that the minor used e-mail, texting or social networking websites to facilitate his offense. The court's suggestion that the minor may have used "the Internet to arrange to meet in a certain place with the idea of stealing items" was pure speculation. (*Id.*, at p. 754.)

In re Alejandro R. (First Dist. Div 1, 2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 556, 561-570: An electronics search condition imposed under **W&I Code § 730(b)** against defendant juvenile who admitted to being an accessory to illegal drug sales was valid under *Lent*, *supra*, in that it was imposed with the goal of preventing defendant from selling and consuming illegal drugs. However, the condition was overbroad as imposed in that it permitted officers to review all sorts of private information that was highly unlikely to shed any light on whether defendant was complying with the other conditions of his probation, drug-related or otherwise. To satisfy the juvenile court's concern that defendant might use a cellphone and social media to communicate about drug use and sales, the scope of the condition must be limited to programs used for interpersonal communication (e.g., such as text messages, voicemail messages, photographs, e-mail accounts, and social media accounts.). The Court also upheld a condition that defendant must attend school, finding it to be neither vague nor overbroad.

In re Mark C. (First Dist. Div. 2, 2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 520, 526-535: A probation condition requiring a juvenile to submit to warrantless searches of his electronics, including passwords, was held to be invalid under *Lent* in that there was no relationship between the condition and the underlying offense of possessing a prohibited knife on school grounds. Using electronic devices is not in itself criminal. Nor is using password-protected

services such as social media criminal, nor is it reasonably related to any future criminality by the juvenile.

In re A.S. (First Dist. Div. 5, 2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 758: As part of probation, defendant juvenile was ordered to submit her electronics, including passwords, to warrantless searches by law enforcement. The Court of Appeal noted this condition imposed by the same judge had been reversed or modified in a number of other cases. But, under the circumstances of this case, the condition was reasonable. “[T]he electronic search condition is reasonably related to deterring future criminality because it facilitates the type and level of supervision of (defendant) which is absolutely necessary for her to succeed on probation.”

In re P.O. (First Dist. Div. 1, 2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 288: Defendant was granted probation with a condition that he provide his electronic passwords to his probation officer. Defendant appealed arguing that the condition was unreasonable and unconstitutionally overbroad. Noting the various cases with inconsistent holdings and referencing various cases on this issue pending in the Supreme Court, the Court here held the condition in this case was not unreasonable because it was reasonably related to future criminality. However, it was still overbroad because it was not narrowly tailored to further defendant’s rehabilitation. The court modified that condition and also struck conditions requiring “good behavior” and “good citizenship” as unconstitutionally vague.

The Fourth District Court of Appeal (Div. 1) has added to the discussion:

Conditions of probation restricting defendant minor’s use of electronics or requiring the submission of those electronics to search were held to be reasonably related to his supervision, under valid under *Lent*, and were constitutional. The contested conditions reasonably related to the

probation department's supervision of defendant in that compliance with these conditions provided the probation department with the practical information necessary to enforce the uncontested conditions. The sentencing court could reasonably infer an increased risk that defendant, who demonstrated a sexual attraction to children, would seek to possess child pornography or contact potential victims via the Internet as the result of the attraction he demonstrated. The conditions the Juvenile Court imposed on defendant would deter him from reoffending. (*In re George F.* (June 28, 2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 734.)

The Sixth District Court of Appeal has also expressed its opinion:

Defendant minor recorded photographs and video on his cellular phone of consensual sexual activity between himself and Jane Doe, both under 18 years old. He later extorted money from Doe by threatening to disclose the recordings to other students at their high school. He was placed on juvenile probation after admitting to felony possession of child pornography (**P.C. § 311.11(a)**) and extortion (**P.C. §§ 518, 520**). Defendant argued that a probation condition requiring him to submit all electronic devices under his control to warrantless search by the probation department and to provide passwords necessary to access information on those devices is unconstitutionally overbroad. Given the direct relationship between defendant's offenses and his use of an electronic device, the Court find the search condition to be appropriately tailored and affirmed. (*In re Q.R.* (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 1231.)

Note: Decisions concerning the constitutionality of search conditions which include the electronic

devices of a minor, challenged as being overbroad, are pending in the California Supreme Court in at least two cases; *In re Ricardo P.* (Oct. 22, 2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 676; review granted on Feb. 17, 2016 (365 P.3rd 343.); and *In re R.S.* (Apr. 28, 2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 239; review granted on July 26, 2017 (2017 Cal. LEXIS 5951.)

Parole vs. Probation: Although there is some authority for the argument that the rules are the same, whether discussing the issue of a parole search or a probation search, when a **Fourth** Waiver is the issue (see *People v. Hoeninghaus* (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1192-1198.), the United States Supreme Court has indicated that parolees have a lesser expectation of privacy than probationers, hinting that they (i.e., parolees) therefore may be subject to stricter controls. (*Samson v. California* (2006) 547 U.S. 843, 850 [165 L.Ed.2nd 250].)

The state “has an overwhelming interest in supervising parolees because parolees . . . are more likely to commit future criminal offenses.” (*Id.*, at p. 853. See also *United States v. Sullivan* (9th Cir. 2015) 797 F.3rd 623, 634; and *People v. Perkins* (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 454, 473, citing *Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott* (1998) 524 U.S. 357, 365 [141 L.Ed.2nd 344]; see also *United States v. Cervantes* (9th Cir. June 19, 2017) 859 F.3rd 1175 [As Amended at 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 18017; Sep. 12, 2017].)

Recognizing this, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal has overruled any of its prior decisions that have held to the contrary. (*United States v. King* (9th Cir. 2013) 736 F.3rd 805.)

See also *United States v. Lara* (9th Cir. 2016) 815 F.3rd 605, 610; “(A) probationer’s privacy interest is greater than a parolee’s,” citing *Samson v. California*, *supra*, at p. 850; see also *United States v. Job* (9th Cir. 2017) 871 F.3rd 852, 859-860.)

Given the similarities between California’s mandatory supervision and parole, and the State’s comparably weighty interest in supervising offenders placed on both forms of supervision, the **Fourth Amendment** analysis in defendant’s case was held to be governed by the line of precedent applicable to parolees. Because defendant was subject to mandatory supervision per **P.C. § 1170(h)(5)**, enacted as part of California’s **Criminal Justice Realignment Act of 2011**, the suspicionless search condition to

which he was subject rendered the warrantless, suspicionless search of his hotel room reasonable under the **Fourth Amendment**. The hotel room could be deemed a “premises” under defendant’s control. Also, the district court, in sentencing defendant on the parole violation, did not abuse its discretion by imposing a supervised release condition requiring defendant to be subject to suspicionless searches. (*United States v. Cervantes* (9th Cir. June 19, 2017) 859 F.3rd 1175 [As amended at 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 18017; Sep. 12, 2017].)

California courts are in accord, holding that a split sentence under P.C. § 1170(h)(5) is “akin to a state prison commitment,” and that mandatory supervision is therefore “more similar to parole than probation.” (See *People v. Martinez* (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 759, 763; quoting *People v. Fandinola* (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1422-1423.)

A “*Special Needs*” Search: In either case (i.e., parole or probation), such a condition of parole or probation, commonly referred to as a “**Fourth Waiver**,” is an important variance from the normal search and seizure rules.

“(T)he government may dispense with the warrant requirement in situations when “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable.”” (*In re Tyrell J.* (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68, 77, overruled on other grounds, citing *Griffin v. Wisconsin* (1987) 483 U.S. 868, 873 [97 L.Ed.2nd 709, 717].)

A “**Fourth Waiver**,” at least when applied to an adult probationer, is in effect a *prior consent* given by the probationer to submit his or her person, home, vehicle and other possessions to search or seizure by any probation officer or other law enforcement officer, any time, day or night, without requiring the searching probation officer or police officer to obtain a search warrant, or to demonstrate the existence of probable cause. It is a waiver of the subject’s **Fourth Amendment** rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. (See *In re Tyrell J.*, *supra*, at pp. 79-80, overruled on other grounds; *Vandenberg v. Superior Court* (1970) 8 Cal.App.3rd 1048, 1053; *People v. Bravo* (1987) 43 Cal.3rd 600, 608-610; *In re York* (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1133, 1149; *People v. Hernandez* (1964) 229 Cal.App.2nd 143.)

As a result, considering the important governmental interest in operating probation or parole systems, as well as the need to

protect the public, when balanced with the diminished expectation of privacy enjoyed by probationers and parolees, **Fourth Waiver** searches are now commonly classified as “*Special Needs*” searches which may be reasonable despite the lack, in some instances, of any particularized suspicion justifying the search. (*Griffin v. Wisconsin* (1987) 483 U.S. 868, 875 [97 L.Ed.2nd 709, 718]; *In re Tyrell J.*, *supra*, at pp. 76-77, overruled on other grounds; *People v. Reyes*, *supra*, at pp. 748, 751-752.)

Note: While a *probationer* is given a choice whether to accept the probation conditions (the alternative being incarceration), parolees and juveniles typically are not. The “*prior consent*” theory, therefore may be hard to justify with parolees and juveniles. Therefore, in such cases, the theory that one who has validly waived his or her **Fourth Amendment** rights has a *diminished expectation of privacy* as a result, as a “*special needs*” search, is perhaps a stronger justification. (*In re Tyrell J.*, *supra*, at p. 86, overruled on other grounds; *People v. Reyes* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743, 749-750.)

The United States Supreme Court, in *Griffin v. Wisconsin*, *supra*, at p. 876 [97 L.Ed.2nd at p. 719], found three reasons supporting the conclusion that the operation of a probation system presented such “*special needs*:”

- A warrant requirement would interfere to an appreciable degree with the probation system, setting up a magistrate rather than the probation officer as the judge of how close the supervision the probationer requires.
- The delay inherent in obtaining a warrant would make it more difficult for probation officials to respond quickly to evidence of misconduct.
- A warrant and probable cause requirement would reduce the deterrent effect that the possibility of expeditious searches would otherwise create.

See also the concurring opinion in *United States v. Crawford* (9th Cir. 2004) 372 F.3rd 1048, at pages 1066-1072, describing a parole **Fourth Waiver** search as a “*special needs*” search.

However, the United States Supreme Court, in *Samson v. California* (2006) 547 U.S. 843, 852, fn. 3 [165 L.Ed.2nd 250].

declined to decide whether a parole **Fourth** Waiver involved a “*special need*.”

Diversion in a pre-plea situation pursuant to **W&I §§ 654 and 654.2**, however, placing a juvenile on informal probation, does not provide for the imposition of a **Fourth** waiver. Absent statutory authority to do so, a court, therefore, is prohibited from imposing a **Fourth** waiver on a juvenile under such circumstances. (*Derick B. v. Superior Court [People]* (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 295.)

See “*Special Needs Searches*,” under “*Warrantless Searches*” (Chapter 7), above.

Pre-Trial:

Similar **Fourth** Waivers may also be imposed as a condition of an “*O.R.*” (i.e., “*Own Recognizance*”) release pending trial, and have been held to be lawful if reasonably related under the circumstances of a particular case to the prevention and detection of further crime and to the safety of the public. (*In re York* (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1133.)

The Ninth Circuit disagrees, holding that a **Fourth** Waiver cannot be imposed on a pretrial defendant as a condition of release. (*United States v. Scott* (9th Cir. 2005) 450 F.3rd 863.)

However, a trial court lacks inherent authority to impose conditions of bail once a defendant posts the scheduled bail amount. The court distinguished such a situation from releasing a defendant on his or her own recognizance (OR), because OR release does permit a court to impose reasonable conditions of bail. In this case, the court struck the **Fourth** waiver as a condition of bail. A concurring justice believed that trial courts do have inherent authority to impose conditions of bail, even when the scheduled amount is posted. (*In re Webb* (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 44, 51-56.)

Warrantless Blood-Draws of a DUI Suspect:

Where defendant’s blood was taken over his objection and without a warrant and without exigent circumstances, *Missouri v. McNeely* (2013) 569 U.S. 141 [133 S.Ct. 1552; 185 L.Ed.2nd 696], held that a blood draw is illegal. However, where defendant is subject to search and seizure conditions under his “post-release community supervision” (**PRCS**) terms, there is no need for a search warrant.

With probable cause to believe that he was driving while under the influence of alcohol when he had a traffic accident, his mandatory **PRCS** search and seizure conditions, authorizing the blood draw without the necessity of a search warrant, is not in violation of the **Fourth Amendment**. (*People v. Jones* (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1257, 1262-1269.)

Taking a DNA Sample:

Where defendant, who was on searchable parole, is arrested on rape charges, and officers extracted a DNA sample without a search warrant, defendant's later motion to suppress the results of the DNA test was properly denied by the trial court. The undisputed evidence showed that that search was "not arbitrary, capricious, or harassing." The prosecution bore the burden of establishing the search was reasonable, and it met that burden in this case beyond a reasonable doubt. (*People v. Perkins* (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 454, 471-474.)

Constitutionality: The advanced waiver of **Fourth Amendment** rights, imposed as a condition of accepting probation or parole, has been held to be constitutional. (*Zap v. United States* (1946) 328 U.S. 624 [90 L.Ed. 1477]; *People v. Mason* (1971) 5 Cal.3rd 759, 764-765.)

Expectation of Privacy:

While a number of legal theories, including "*prior consent*" and "*special needs*" (see above), have justified the upholding the legality of **Fourth** Waiver searches over the years, another theory espoused by some courts is that persons subject to a **Fourth** Waiver have a *reduced expectation of privacy*, depriving them of any "*standing*" to object to the search. (*People v. Valasquez* (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 555, 558; *People v. Viers* (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 990, 993; *People v. Biddinger* (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1219; *People v. Ramos* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 504-506; *Samson v. California* (2006) 547 U.S. 843 [165 L.Ed.2nd 260]; *People v. Smith* (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1360-1361.)

However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal has taken it a step further and specifically held that a probationer (which has a higher expectation of privacy than does a parolee) who's probationary offense was for anything other than a violent felony, cannot be searched based upon a **Fourth** waiver alone. (*United States v. Job* (9th Cir. 2017) 871 F.3rd 852, 859-865.)

Note: This conclusion is not supported by any other case law. While there is no California state case to the contrary, there are many cases where a **Fourth** waiver suspect was on probation for a non-violent offense—even misdemeanors—where the lawfulness of a suspicionless search was upheld without debate. (See “*Standard of Proof Required*,” below.)

Standard of Proof Required:

Probation: A probation search with no *warrant*, *probable cause*, or even a *reasonable suspicion*, so long as it does not exceed the scope of the consent given, and is not done for purposes of harassment or some arbitrary or capricious reason, meets, in the opinion of the California Supreme Court, both federal (**Fourth Amendment**) and state (**Art. 1, § 13**) constitutional requirements. (*People v. Bravo* (1987) 43 Cal.3rd 600; *People v. Brown* (1987) 191 Cal.App.3rd 761; see also *People v. Reyes* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743, 748-749, commenting on *Bravo*.)

This includes juvenile probation. (*In re Tyrell J.* (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68, overruled on other grounds.)

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal has, as a rule, assumed that, at the very least, a “*reasonable suspicion*” of renewed criminal activity is required for both parole and probation **Fourth** Waivers. (See *United States v. Stokes* (9th Cir. 2002) 292 F.3rd 964; “*reasonable suspicion*” found, so the issue not discussed.)

However, most recently, the Ninth Circuit has conceded that the issue of whether a **Fourth** waiver search may be conducted where there is less than a reasonable suspicion is really not yet settled, at least sufficiently to hold an officer civilly liable. (*Motley v. Parks* (9th Cir. 2005) 432 F.3rd 1072, 1083-1088; officers entitled to qualified immunity on this issue. See below.)

The U.S. Supreme Court has specifically left open the question whether or not a probationer on a **Fourth** Waiver may be searched on less than a reasonable suspicion. (*United States v. Knights* (2001) 534 U.S. 112, 120, fn. 6. [151 L.Ed.2nd 497]; see also *United States v. King* (9th Cir. 2013) 736 F.3rd 805, 808.)

Until the U.S. Supreme Court does rule on this issue, it is acknowledged that the California rule is that no suspicion is needed to conduct a **Fourth** waiver search on a probationer.

(*People v. Medina* (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 1571; probationers having “consented” to warrantless, suspicionless searches.)

But in *Samson v. California* (2006) 547 U.S. 843 [165 L.Ed.2nd 260], the Supreme Court hinted strongly that although a suspicionless search of a parolee is constitutional, probationers probably have more rights than parolees and may require a higher (i.e., a “reasonable suspicion”) standard.

See also *United States v. Lara* (9th Cir. 2016) 815 F.3rd 605, 610; “(A) probationer’s privacy interest is greater than a parolee’s,” citing *Samson*, *supra*, at p. 850.)

Where a probation order clearly expressed a suspicionless search condition, defendant was unambiguously informed of it, and he accepted it, a suspicionless search of his residence was held to be lawful. Defendant’s acceptance of the search condition significantly diminished his reasonable expectation of privacy. The search conducted in the present case intruded on defendant’s legitimate expectation of privacy only slightly and the governmental interests at stake were substantial. (*United States v. King* (9th Cir. 2013) 736 F.3rd 805, 808-810.)

The *King* court ruled that because California courts have interpreted the following as not requiring any suspicion, citing *People v. Bravo* (1987) 43 Cal. 3rd 600, and *People v. Woods* (1999) 21 Cal. 4th 668, and because suspicionless searches are constitutional, that when a probationer agrees to such a condition as a part of his probation, a suspicionless search of his person, property, premises and vehicle is therefore lawful: “Defendant is subject to a warrantless search condition, as to defendant’s person, property, premises and vehicle, any time of the day or night, with or without probable cause, by any peace, parole or probation officer.” (*Ibid.*)

The term “suspicionless search” refers to a search for which the police have less than reasonable suspicion. The term covers both a search as to which there is some (but not enough) suspicion and a search that is, for example, conducted randomly with no individualized suspicion. (*Id.*, at p. 987, fn. 1)

However, the Ninth Circuit also is of the opinion that a probationer convicted of a non-violent offense, such as

simple drug possession, has a “reasonable expectation of privacy (that) is greater than that of probationers such as King because he (defendant in the drug case) was not convicted of a particularly ‘serious and intimate’ offense.” (*United States v. Lara* (9th Cir. 2016) 815 F.3rd 605, 609-612.)

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal has taken it a step further and specifically held that a probationer (which has a higher expectation of privacy than does a parolee) who’s probationary offense was for anything other than a violent felony, cannot be searched based upon a **Fourth** waiver alone. (*United States v. Job* (9th Cir. 2017) 871 F.3rd 852, 860.)

Parole: Older California case authority to the effect that a police officer needs a “reasonable suspicion” of renewed criminal activity before conducting a parole **Fourth** Waiver search (See *People v. Burgener* (1986) 41 Cal.3rd 505, 534-535.) was overruled in *People v. Reyes* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743.

In *Reyes*, the California Supreme Court adopted the reasoning of *In re Tyrell J.* (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68 (overruled on other grounds), and, overruling *Burgener*, determined that as with juvenile probationers, parolees do not retain a reasonable expectation of privacy, and may therefore be searched even without even a “reasonable suspicion” of renewed criminal activity or other parole violation.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal avoided deciding the issue in a number of recent cases. (See *United States v. Crawford* (2004) 372 F.3rd 1048; *Moreno v. Baca* (9th Cir. 2005) 431 F.3rd 633; and *Motley v. Parks* (9th Cir. 2005) 432 F.3rd 1072, 1083-1088.)

The United States Supreme Court has now unequivocally settled the rule, agreeing with California’s analysis of this issue, at least as it relates to parolees. (*Samson v. California* (2006) 547 U.S. 843 [165 L.Ed.2nd 260]; search of a parolee’s person.)

See also *United States v. Lopez* (9th Cir. 2007) 474 F.3rd 1208, 1212-1214, where the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal followed *Samson* in finding that a suspicionless parole **Fourth** Waiver search of a parolee’s residence was valid.

Limitation: Searches Conducted for Purposes of Harassment:

A probationer (or parolee) subject to a search condition retains the right to be free from a search that is *arbitrary, capricious* or *harassing*. A search is arbitrary “when the motivation for the search is unrelated to rehabilitative, reformatory or legitimate law enforcement purposes, or when the search is motivated by personal animosity toward the parolee.” A search is a form of harassment when its motivation is a mere “*whim or caprice*.” (***People v. Reyes*** (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743, 754; ***People v. Medina*** (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 1571, 1577.)

“It is only when the motivation for the search is wholly arbitrary, when it is based merely on a whim or caprice or when there is no reasonable claim of a legitimate law enforcement purpose, e.g., an officer decides on a whim to stop the next red car he or she sees, that a search based on a probation search condition is unlawful.” (***People v. Cervantes*** (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1404, 1408.)

“Nor do we condone searches that are conducted for illegitimate reasons, such as harassment.” (***United States v. King*** (9th Cir. 2013) 736 F.3rd 805, 810.)

The search of an individual’s hotel room, when the individual was subject to the “mandatory supervision” provisions of “**Post-Release Community Supervision Act of 2011**,” was held not to be an “arbitrary, capricious, or harassing” search when the officer had not had any prior contact with the defendant, there was no indication that the search had been conducted for an improper purpose, and it appeared to have been conducted solely for legitimate law-enforcement purposes. Also, the search was not conducted at an unreasonable time or in an unreasonable manner. (***United States v. Cervantes*** (9th Cir. 2017) 859 F.3rd 1175 [As amended at 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 18017; Sep. 12, 2017].)

For parolees, see **P.C. § 3067(d)**: “It is not the intent of the Legislature to authorize law enforcement officers to conduct searches for the sole purpose of harassment.”

Fourth Waiver searches have been held to be *unreasonable* if conducted *too often*, at an *unreasonable time*, when it is *unreasonably prolonged*, or for any other reasons establishing *arbitrary or oppressive conduct* by the searching officers. A search is arbitrary or oppressive when the motivation for the search is *unrelated to a rehabilitative, reformatory or legitimate law enforcement purpose*, or when the search is *motivated by personal animosity* toward the parolee or probationer. (***People v. Reyes***,

supra, at pp. 753-754; see also *People v. Clower* (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1737, 1741; *United States v. Follette* (S.D.N.Y. 1968) 282 F.Supp. 10, 13; and *In re Anthony S.* (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1004.)

The United States Supreme Court found California's restrictions on arbitrary, capricious or harassing searches as an important ingredient in upholding the constitutionality of a suspicionless **Fourth** Waiver search of a parolee. (*Samson v. California* (2006) 547 U.S. 843 [165 L.Ed.2nd 260].)

The fact that a particular officer searched defendant twice within a 24-hour period, did not establish by itself that he was harassing the him. The legitimate law enforcement purpose of the second search (after having found nothing illegal on defendant or in his car, less than 24 hours earlier) was substantiated by the fact that the officer knew defendant was on parole for a narcotics violation, that he associated with drug users, and because he was observed at the time of the second search in a high-narcotics area some 3½ to 4 miles from his home without any real reason for being there. (*People v. Sardinias* (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 488.)

A public strip search of a probationer or parolee may in fact be unreasonable, and grounds for suppression of the resulting evidence. However, where the parolee is moved to a location where he cannot be seen by members of the general public (behind the patrol car, with police officers blocking anyone's view), his pants lowered and the band on his underwear pulled back only to the extent necessary to see into his crotch area, such is not a strip search conducted in public. Under the circumstances, such a search was considered to be reasonable. (*People v. Smith* (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1354.)

Who May Conduct a Fourth Waiver Search?

California Rule: California law is clear, as indicated by the terms of the standard **Fourth** Wavier conditions, probation and parole searches are not limited to probation and parole officers. *Any law enforcement officer* is typically authorized to conduct such searches. (*People v. Mason* (1971) 5 Cal.3rd 759, 766 [probation]; *People v. Reyes* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743 [parole].)

Federal Rule: The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal's theory that **Fourth** Waiver searches are a rehabilitative tool for use by probation officers only, with local law enforcement's attempt to use a **Fourth** Wavier to justify a warrantless search as being no more than a "ruse" for conducting a new criminal investigation and a violation of the **Fourth Amendment** (e.g.,

see *United States v. Ooley* (9th Cir. 1997) 116 F.3rd 370.), has been overruled by the United States Supreme Court. (*United States v. Knights* (2001) 534 U.S 112 [151 L.Ed.2nd 497]; see also *United States v. Stokes* (9th Cir. 2002) 292 F.3rd 1164.)

A probation officer confronted with an uncooperative, irate individual who was present in the house of a juvenile probationer during a **Fourth** wavier search, when the detained visitor appeared to be a gang member and who was overly dressed for the weather, and who attempted to turn away and cover his stomach when ordered not to do so, lawfully patted down the suspect for weapons. (*People v. Rios* (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 584, 598-600.)

The Court further determined that a probation officer has the legal authority to detain and patdown a non-probationer pursuant to **P.C. § 830.5(a)(4)** (i.e.; enforcing “violations of any penal provisions of law which are discovered while performing the usual or authorized duties of his or her employment.”) (*Id.*, at p. 600.)

Need to Seek Permission from the Probation or Parole Officer:

Probation: It has long been the rule, at least in probation searches, that a local law enforcement officer need *not* even seek the permission of a probation officer. (See *People v. Mason* (1971) 5 Cal.3rd 759.)

Note federal law is to the contrary, based on the terms of the **Federal Probation Act**, which is *not* applicable to state cases. (See *United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez* (9th Cir. 1975) 521 F.2nd 259.)

Parole: Prior California authority to the effect that in a parole situation a local law enforcement officer must first receive authorization from the parole officer (e.g., see *People v. Coffman* (1969) 2 Cal.App.3rd 681, 688-689; *People v. Natale* (1978) 77 Cal.App.3rd 568, 574.) has arguably been overruled by *People v. Reyes* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743, which finds the standards for probation and parole searches to be the same.

Even prior to *Reyes, supra*, there was some California authority that at least where seeking the prior approval of the parole officer would be a “*meaningless formality*,” such as when “any parole officer who refused to authorize a search given an articulable reasonable suspicion of criminal activity ‘would have been derelict in his duties,’” calling the parole officer is unnecessary. (*People v. Brown* (1989) Cal.App.3rd 187, 192.)

Note: Despite the lack, under California law, of any legal requirement to contact the appropriate parole officer or office before undertaking a parole search, the California Department of Correction requests and recommends, in instances involving the search of a parolee's *residence* or *business*, that you do so anyway, for operational reasons as well for reasons of safety and cooperation.

Federal authority, at least from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal, may still be holding onto the theory that parole is a tool for parole authorities for controlling parolees, and not something that local law enforcement is entitled to use. (See *United States v. Jarrad* (9th Cir. 1985) 754 F.2nd 1451, 1454; referring to a parole officer who authorizes a search at the request of the police as the police officers' agent, or "stalking horse;" see also *Latta v. Fitzharris* (9th Cir. 1975) 521 F.2nd 246, 247, and *United States v. Hallman* (3rd Cir. 1966) 365 F.2nd 289.)

Searching While In Ignorance of a Search Condition: Whether a police officer must personally know of a probation or parole search and seizure condition (i.e., a "Fourth Waiver") before conducting a search in order for the search to be later declared "lawful" has been the subject of some debate.

Issue: When a police officer conducts a warrantless search of a person or that person's property or residence, which, as it turns out, is not supported by probable cause and/or exigent circumstances, and then belatedly discovers that the person being searched is subject to a probation or parole-imposed Fourth Waiver, may the search still be upheld?

Earlier Case Law tended to lean towards finding such searches to be lawful, at least if based upon a probation Fourth Waiver. (*In re Tyrell J.* (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68, 85; *People v. Valasquez* (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 555.)

When dealing with a "parole search and seizure condition," the courts were not so prone to excusing the officer's failure to know of the existence of a Fourth Waiver. (See *In re Martinez* (1970) 1 Cal.3rd 641.)

Also, there was authority that an *illegal arrest* of someone subject to probationary search and seizure conditions does not result in suppression of any evidence recovered incident to the arrest, in that the subject has waived any right to seek suppression of the evidence seized. (*People v. Valasquez, supra*, at p. 559.)

Juvenile probationers have been held to the same standards as are adults (*In re Marcellus L.* (1991) 229 Cal.App.3rd 134 144-146; *In re Tyrell J.*, *supra*, overruled on other grounds.), although, perhaps, for different reasons.

See *People v. Lewis* (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 662, at pages 668-669, using *In re Tyrell J.* to uphold the warrantless entry into a residence and arrest of a parolee-at-large/robbery suspect in his home, holding that the arresting officer's lack of knowledge of the arrestee's probation **Fourth** Waiver is irrelevant.

Present State of the Rule:

The California Supreme Court ruled as recently as 1994 that a juvenile probationer, on the street, may be lawfully searched even though the officer does not discover until after the fact that he was on probation and subject to search and seizure conditions. (*In re Tyrell J.* (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68.)

However, the California Supreme Court refused to extend the rule of *In re Tyrell J.* to the search of a residence when it was belatedly discovered that the suspect's brother (and co-occupant) was subject to a **Fourth** Waiver, attaching more value to the privacy rights of a co-tenant who is not subject to search conditions. (*People v. Robles* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789.)

Finally, recognizing that they might have gone too far in *In re Tyrell J.*, *supra*, a majority of the Supreme Court invalidated the search of a residence as to both the co-tenant (who was *not* on a **Fourth** Waiver), and the suspect who was discovered, after the fact, to be on parole, and thus subject to search and seizure conditions. (*People v. Sanders* (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318.)

While refusing to specifically overrule *In re Tyrell J.*, the Court noted the “*chilly reception*” the decision has received, and, at the very least, limited it to its facts; i.e., the search of a juvenile's person, as opposed to the search of a residence in an adult case.

The First District Court of Appeal, in *People v. Bowers* (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1261, read *Sanders* as limiting the rule of *In re Tyrell J.* to juvenile cases, given the unique “*special needs*” of the juvenile court probation system. In an adult prosecution, whether of a parolee or a probationer, and irrespective of whether it is the subject's home or person (or, presumably, his vehicle or other

personal possessions) that is being searched, not knowing of a **Fourth Amendment** search and seizure condition will preclude the use of such a waiver to save an otherwise illegal search. (*People v. Bowers*, *supra*, at pp. 1268-1269.)

Myers v. Superior Court (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1247, is in accord, noting the *Tyrell J.* is limited to probation searches of a juvenile.

But the Fifth District Court of Appeal went even further and took it upon itself, in effect (without specifically stating so), to overrule *Tyrell J.* and hold that a juvenile probationer, searched illegally, is protected by the rule of *Sanders*: An officer cannot rely upon a **Fourth** Wavier that he didn't know about at the time of the search. (*In re Joshua J.* (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 359.)

Since *Sanders*, courts have consistently ruled against the legality of searches done when the prosecution attempted to validate the search under the theory that the officer belatedly discovered that the defendant was subject to either probation or parole search and seizure conditions:

Searching law enforcement officers must be aware of a juvenile's waiver of his or her probationary search and seizure rights when searched after being stopped in a motor vehicle. (*People v. Hester* (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 376, 392-405.)

An otherwise illegal search of a residence is *not* saved by a belatedly discovered probation **Fourth** Waiver search and seizure condition. (*People v. Bowers* (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1261; see also *People v. Lazalde* (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 858; a decision out of the Sixth Appellate District, involving an adult probationer and a motel room.)

The illegal search of an adult on the street, where it was belatedly discovered that he was on a probation **Fourth** wavier, is not made retroactively valid. (*People v. Hoeninghaus* (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1180.)

It is irrelevant whether the **Fourth** Waiver is based upon a probationary, or a parole, search and seizure condition. The rule is the same. (*Id.*, at pp. 1192-1198.)

The same rule has been held to apply to the person of a parolee who is found in public. (*People v. Jordan* (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 544, 552-553; see also *People v. Bowers, supra.*)

Where the issue of the officer's knowledge, or lack thereof, of a search and seizure condition was not resolved in the trial court (*Sanders* being decided after the hearing), a remand to the lower court for further evidence on this issue, and not reversal of the judgment, is the proper remedy for an appellate court. (*People v. Moore* (2006) 39 Cal.4th 168.)

If, however, the trial court record shows the officer's lack of prior information about the defendant's **Fourth** Wavier status, there is no need for a remand to the trial court for further hearings. (*People v. Miller* (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 545.)

However, the taint of an illegal traffic stop may be attenuated by the existence of an outstanding arrest warrant (*People v. Brendlin* (2008) 45 Cal.4th 262; *People v. Carter* (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 522, 529-530.) or a **Fourth** waiver (*People v. Bates* (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 60, 65-71; *People v. Bower* (1979) 24 Cal.3rd 638; no.), depending upon the circumstances.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal is in accord, noting that *Whren v. United States* (1996) 517 U.S. 806 [135 L.Ed.2nd 89], upholding "pretext stops," cannot be used to justify a detention or search based upon a belatedly discovered search condition. Per the Ninth Circuit, the theory of *Whren* is limited to those circumstances where a police officer is aware of facts that would support an arrest. "(A)lthough *Whren* stands for the proposition that a pretextual seizure based on the illegitimate subjective intentions of an officer may be permissible, it does not alter the fact that the pretext itself must be a constitutionally sufficient basis for the seizure and the facts supporting it must be known at the time it is conducted." (*Moreno v. Baca* (9th Cir. 2005) 431 F.3rd 633, 640.)

"Police officers must know about a probationer's **Fourth Amendment** search waiver before they conduct a search in order for the waiver to serve as a justification for the search." (*United States v. Job* (9th Cir. 2017) 871 F.3rd 852, 859-860.)

Finally, recognizing that the case law and legal commentary was uniformly in opposition to the rule of *In re Tyrell J.*, the California Supreme Court reversed itself and held that a detention and search of a minor on probation with search and seizure conditions could not be justified by the belatedly discovered **Fourth** waiver. (*In re Jaime P.* (2006) 40 Cal.4th 128.)

A detective's "vague recollection" of having seen defendant's name on a postrelease community supervision (**PRCS**) list within the last two months, while remembering that he had arrested defendant on a weapons-related offense in 2011, was held to be sufficient prior knowledge of defendant's status as being subject to a **Fourth** waiver. The warrantless, suspicionless search of defendant, during which an illegal firearm was discovered, was therefore held to be a lawful **Fourth** waiver search based upon the officer's "objectively reasonable belief" defendant was still on **PRCS** in that that belief proved to be accurate. (*People v. Douglas* (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 855, 868-869.)

The prosecution was properly permitted to rely on hearsay evidence, specifically, an officer's testimony about information obtained from a computer database, corroborated by his prior knowledge of the two owners of the searched residence, to prove the state-of-mind exception under E.C. § 1250(a)(1) that the officer had advance knowledge of the probationary status of the owners of the home. (*People v. Romeo* (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 931, 946-949.)

Exceptions:

It is not necessary that the searching officer was aware of the existence of a signed parole search agreement, as required by P.C. § 3067, so long as he knew that the subject was on parole. (*People v. Solorzano* (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1026, 1030-1032; citing *People v. Middleton* (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 732; see also *People v. Douglas* (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 855, 868-869.)

But note United States v. Caseres (9th Cir. 2008) 533 F.3rd 1064, at pp. 1075-1076, which erroneously (in this author's opinion) held that an officer conducting a parole search must have been aware prior to the search that P.C. § 3067(a) was applicable to the defendant, i.e., that the prior conviction leading to his parole status occurred on or after January 1, 1997.

Determining that a person is on parole is enough information to justify a police officer's assumption that he or she is subject to a **Fourth** waiver. (*People v. Middleton* (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 732.)

Where an officer is erroneously told that the defendant is on parole, only to find out later that he was subject to a probationary **Fourth** waiver instead, the search will be upheld. It is not relevant what type of **Fourth** waiver applies to the defendant. (*People v. Hill* (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1344.)

A suspect subject to search and seizure conditions is estopped from complaining about being searched by an officer who was unaware of the search conditions when the officer's failure to know of the conditions was because defendant misidentified himself. (*People v. Watkins* (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1403, warrantless search of a vehicle; *People v. Mathews* (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 601, 608-611, warrantless search of defendant's cellphone.)

A detective's "vague recollection" of having seen defendant's name on a postrelease community supervision (**PRCS**) list within the last two months, while remembering that he had arrested defendant on a weapons-related offense in 2011, was held to be sufficient prior knowledge of defendant's status as being subject to a **Fourth** waiver. The warrantless, suspicionless search of defendant, during which an illegal firearm was discovered, was therefore held to be a lawful **Fourth** waiver search based upon the officer's "objectively reasonable belief" defendant was still on **PRCS** in that that belief proved to be accurate. (*People v. Douglas* (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 855, 868-869.)

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Arresting and Searching While in Ignorance of an Existing Warrant of Arrest: The same theory may be used to find unlawful a search based upon a de facto arrest on less than probable cause when trying to justify

the arrest (or a detention) by a belatedly-discovered existing arrest warrant. (*Moreno v. Baca* (9th Cir. 2005) 431 F.3rd 633.)

Parole and Probation Revocation Hearings:

Parole Hearings: Evidence recovered in an illegal parole search is admissible in a parole revocation proceeding. (*Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott* (1998) 524 U.S. 357 [141 L.Ed.2nd 344].)

The need to use illegally seized evidence, from both **Fourth** and **Fifth Amendment** violations, in parole revocation hearings, outweighs the policy considerations underlying the Exclusionary Rule (i.e., deterring illegal police conduct.), and therefore is admissible in such circumstances. (*In re Martinez* (1970) 1 Cal.3rd 641, 648-650.)

Probation Hearings: The same theory used in *Martinez* has been used to allow the admission of illegally seized evidence in probation revocation hearings. (*People v. Hayko* (1970) 7 Cal.App.3rd 604.)

Entering a Residence; Probable Cause or Reasonable Suspicion?

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal has ruled that in order to conduct a **Fourth** Waiver search of a residence, an officer must have “*probable cause*” to believe that the residence to be searched is in fact the parolee’s (or probationer’s) residence. *Motley v. Parks* (9th Cir. 2005) 432 F.3rd 1072, 1080-1082; *United States v. Howard* (9th Cir. 2006) 447 F.3rd 1257, 1262-1268; *United States v. Franklin* (9th Cir. 2010) 603 F.3rd 652; *United States v. Bolivar* (9th Cir. 2012) 670 F.3rd 1091, 1093-1095; *United States v. Grandberry* (9th Cir. 2013) 730 F.3rd 968, 973.)

Noting that five other federal circuits have ruled that something less than probable cause is required, and that the Ninth Circuit is a minority opinion (see *United States v. Gorman* (9th Cir. 2002) 314 F.3rd 1105.), the Fourth District Court of Appeal (Div. 2) has found that an officer executing an arrest warrant or conducting a probation or parole search may enter a dwelling if he or she has only “*a reasonable belief*,” falling short of probable cause to believe, the suspect lives there and is present at the time. Employing that standard, the entry into defendant’s apartment to conduct a probation search was lawful based on all of the information known to the officers. Accordingly, the court upheld the trial court’s conclusion that the officers had objectively reasonable grounds to conclude the defendant/probationer lived at the subject apartment and was present at the time, and therefore the officers had the right to enter the apartment to

conduct a warrantless probation search. (*People v. Downey* (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 652, 657-662.)

Also noting that the California Supreme Court, in *People v. Jacobs*, *supra* (pg. 479, fn. 4), did *not* find that probable cause was required, contrary to popular belief. (*Id.*, at p. 662.)

Note: The “*present at the time*” requirement apparently only applies to executing an arrest warrant, despite language in the *Downey* decision saying that it applies to both **Fourth** Waiver searches and executing arrest warrants. It has never been required that a person on a **Fourth** waiver be home at the time of a warrantless entry and search. (See *People v. Lilienthal* (1978) 22 Cal.3rd 891, 900.)

Without mentioning *Downey*, the Ninth Circuit cites *Motley v. Parks*, *supra*, with approval, for the proposition that full probable cause to believe that the target of a **Fourth** Waiver search resides in the place to be searched is necessary. (*United States v. Bolivar* (9th Cir. 2012) 670 F.3rd 1091, 1093-1095.)

Searching without a warrant a residence defendant was observed entering and exiting, but with insufficient information to believe that the parolee/defendant lived at that residence (i.e., all available information indicated that his home address was elsewhere), held to be illegal. (*United States v. Grandberry* (9th Cir. 2013) 730 F.3rd 968, 975-980.)

The fact that the apartment that was searched might have been “under defendant’s control” held to be irrelevant. The issue is whether there is probable cause to believe defendant actually lived there. (*Id.*, at pp. 980-982: “(W)e conclude that the ‘property under your control’ provision cannot refer to a place where someone else, but not the parolee, lives.”)

Searching a Container; Probable Cause or Reasonable Suspicion?

When officers find a container (backpack in this case) during a lawful **Fourth** waiver search, they only need a “*reasonable suspicion*,” as opposed to probable cause, to believe that the container belongs to, or is controlled by, the subject with the **Fourth** waiver in order to search it. (*United States v. Bolivar* (9th Cir. 2012) 670 F.3rd 1091, 1093-1095.)

Duration of a Fourth Waiver:

A parole **Fourth** Waiver continues until he has had his formal parole hearing where he has the opportunity to contest the proposed revocation and parole is formally revoked. Being arrested and incarcerated on a parole hold pending a revocation hearing does not, in itself, negate a **Fourth** Waiver. (*People v. Hunter* (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1147.)

A probationer on a **Fourth** Waiver is also subject to warrantless searches and seizures until he has been accorded the right to a probation revocation hearing, even if in custody while awaiting that hearing, and even though, pending his hearing, a court has “summarily revoked” his probation. (*People v. Barkins* (1978) 81 Cal.App.3rd 30.)

Defendant was released from prison and placed on postrelease supervision for one year. The terms of supervision included a **Fourth** waiver. One year and one day after defendant’s release, his probation officer conducted a search of defendant’s home and discovered child pornography. Defendant filed a motion to suppress arguing that his postrelease supervision was complete at the time of the search. The trial court disagreed and denied the motion. The Court of Appeal upheld the denial, holding that **P.C. § 3456**, which states that a person shall be discharged within 30 days of completing postrelease supervision, means there is a 30-day window of continuing supervision following completion. (*People v. Young* (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 972.)

P.C. § 3456 provides for the termination of postrelease supervision after three years six months and one year as follows: **(a)** The county agency responsible for postrelease supervision . . . shall maintain postrelease supervision over a person . . . until one of the following events occurs:

- (1)** The person has been subject to postrelease supervision pursuant to this title for three years at which time the offender shall be immediately discharged from postrelease supervision.
- (2)** Any person on postrelease supervision for six consecutive months with no violations of his or her conditions of postrelease supervision that result in a custodial sanction may be considered for immediate discharge by the supervising county.
- (3)** The person who has been on postrelease supervision continuously for one year with no violations of his or her

conditions of postrelease supervision that result in a custodial sanction shall be discharged from supervision within 30 days. (See *People v. Young*, *supra*, at p. 980.)

See also *People v. Leiva* (2013) 56 Cal.4th 498, where it was held that a possible probation violation occurring after the expiration of a defendant's probationary period is not punishable despite an earlier summary revocation of probation which is imposed by a court prior to the expiration of the probationary period. P.C. § 1203.2(a)'s "tolling" provisions only allow for a court to retain jurisdiction beyond the probationary period in order to punish for probation violations that are alleged to have occurred *prior* to the expiration of that probationary period.

Good Faith Belief in the Existence of a Search Condition: The United States Supreme Court recently ruled (in a 5-to-4 decision) that an officer's good faith reliance on erroneous information will not invalidate an arrest even when that information comes from a law enforcement source, so long as the error was based upon non-reoccurring negligence only. However, deliberate illegal acts, or a reckless disregard for constitutional requirements, or reoccurring or systematic negligence, will *not* excuse the resulting unlawful arrest. (*Herring v. United States* (2009) 555 U.S. 135 [172 L.Ed.2nd 496].)

See "Mistaken Belief . . . that a **Fourth Waiver** Exists, . . .," under "Arrests" (Chapter 4), above.

Miscellaneous:

Burden of Proof:

The prosecution has the burden of proving that defendant was subject to searchable probation or parole. (*People v. Williams* (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 130.)

Once the prosecution has offered a justification for a warrantless search or seizure, the defendant must then present any arguments as to why that justification is inadequate. This specificity requirement does not place the burden of proof on defendants; "the burden of raising an issue is distinct from the burden of proof." (*People v. Perkins* (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 454, 474, quoting *People v. Williams*, *supra*.)

Rights of Third Persons not subject to the **Fourth Waiver**, but who happen to live with a person who is subject to *search and seizure* conditions:

Rule: A warrantless search of a residence based upon a probationer's (or parolee's) search and seizure conditions, when the probationer is a co-

occupant of the residence, is lawful as a matter of law, even over the objection of another co-tenant (the probationer's mother who also lived there, in this case). The principles behind *Georgia v. Randolph* (2006) 547 U.S. 103 [164 L.Ed.2nd 208], *Randolph* being a consensual search issue unrelated to a **Fourth** waiver search, are inapplicable. (*Smith v. City of Santa Clara* (9th Cir. 2017) 876 F.3rd 987, 991-995.)

See “*Co-Occupants (Roommates, Husband and Wife, or Parent and Child)*,” under “*Consent Searches*” (Chapter 16), below, discussing the principles of *Georgia v. Randolph*.

Common Areas:

Even over the objection of the person who is *not* subject to a **Fourth** Waiver, the police may search the **Fourth** Waiver subject's private areas and all common areas. Only the non-**Fourth** Waiver subject's private areas are protected from being searched. (*Russi v. Superior Court* (1973) 33 Cal.App.3rd 160, 168-171.)

In extending the rule of *Whren v. United States* (1996) 517 U.S. 806 [135 L.Ed.2nd 89 (i.e., that the officer's subjective intent is irrelevant) to the **Fourth** Waiver situation, the California Supreme Court upheld the search of the common areas of a residence, looking for evidence against Suspect A, while using Suspect B's **Fourth** Waiver as the legal justification, eventually resulting in recovery of evidence tending to incriminate Suspect C (i.e., defendant Woods). (*People v. Woods* (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668.)

“It long has been settled that a consent-based search is valid when consent is given by one person with common or superior authority over the area to be searched; the consent of other interested parties is unnecessary. (*People v. Boyer* (1989) 48 Cal.3rd 247, 276 . . . ; *People v. Haskett* (1982) 30 Cal.3rd 841, 856 . . . *People v. Viega* (1989) 214 Cal.App.3rd 817, 828 . . . see *People v. Clark* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 979 . . . [search of a car].) Warrantless consent searches of residences have been upheld even where the unmistakable purpose of the search was to obtain evidence against a non-consenting cohabitant. (E.g., *United States v. Matlock* (1974) 415 U.S. 164, 170 [. . . 39 L.Ed.2nd 242] [roommate's consent, obtained after defendant was arrested and removed from the scene, sufficient]; *People v. Haskett*, *supra*, 30 Cal.3rd at pp. 856-857.)” *People v. Woods*, *supra*, at pp. 675-676.)

But, see the limitations put on such searches when the attempted use of another's search and seizure conditions was not discovered until *after* the search for evidence against a co-habitant who was *not* on a **Fourth** Waiver. (*People v. Robles* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789; *People v. Sanders* (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318; *In re Jaime P.* (2006) 40 Cal.4th 128; see above.)

The California Supreme Court has differentiated **Fourth** waiver searches of residences from those of vehicles. Given the higher expectation of privacy involved in a residence, it has been held that officers generally may only search those portions of the residence over which they reasonably believe the **Fourth** waiver suspect has complete or joint control. Those areas that are exclusively possessed or controlled by others are off limits. Common areas are subject to being searched. In the case of a vehicle, with its lower expectation of privacy, a warrantless search of those areas of the passenger compartment where an officer reasonably expects that the parolee could have stowed personal belongings or discarded items when aware of police activity, as well as a search of personal property located in those areas if the officer reasonably believes that the parolee owns those items or has the ability to exert control over them, is lawful. (*People v. Schmitz* (2012) 55 Cal.4th 909, 916-933.)

The same rule holds true for probationers. (*People v. Cervantes* (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 860, 866-872.)

“(A) warrantless search, justified by a probation search condition, may extend to common areas, shared by non-probationers, over which the probationer has ‘*common authority*.’ (*United States v. Matlock* (1974) 415 U.S. 164, 171 [39 L. Ed. 2nd 242, 250, . . .].) The ‘*common authority*’ theory of consent rests ‘on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched.’ (*Id.* at p. 171, fn. 7 [39 L. Ed. 2nd, at p. 250]” (*People v. Smith* (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 912, 916.)

The fact that a parolee or probationer lives with a third person who is not subject to search and seizure conditions cannot be used to immunize the one who *is* subject to a **Fourth** Waiver from

government scrutiny. (*People v. Kanos* (1971) 14 Cal.App.3rd 642, 650-651; *Russi v. Superior Court*, *supra*, at pp. 166-167.)

However, per the Ninth Circuit, the language in this parole condition that allows for a search of property “*under (the parolee’s) control*,” when the place to be searched is a residence, does not allow for the search of a third-party’s residence even though the parolee is a frequent visitor and even though there is evidence that he is dealing drugs out of that third-party’s residence. (*United States v. Grandberry* (9th Cir. 2013) 730 F.3rd 968, 980-982,)

But, there must be at least “*probable cause*” to believe that the person subject to the **Fourth** Waiver does in fact live there, as opposed to merely staying with the resident on an occasional basis. (*United States v. Howard* (9th Cir. 2006) 447 F.3rd 1257; see also *Motley v. Parks* (9th Cir. 2005) 432 F.3rd 1072, 1080-1082; *United States v. Bolivar* (9th Cir. 2012) 670 F.3rd 1091, 1093-1095; *United States v. Grandberry*, *supra*, at p. 973-980; *Smith v. City of Santa Clara* (9th Cir. 2017) 876 F.3rd 987, 995-996.)

But see *People v. Downey* (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 652, 657-662, above, where it was held that only a “*reason to believe*,” being a standard less than probable cause, that the subject lives there is necessary.

Any evidence lawfully seized during a parole or probation search may be used in court against whomever the circumstances tend to connect it to. That may turn out to be the cotenant who was not on probation or parole. (*Russi v. Superior Court*, *supra*, at pp. 167-168; *People v. Woods*, *supra*.)

This rule is *not* conditioned upon the third person’s knowledge of the existence of the **Fourth** Waiver to which his or her cotenant was subject. (*Russi v. Superior Court*, *supra*, at p. 170.)

Also, it matters not whether the cotenant is the parolee or probationer’s wife, live-in “significant other,” or just some “drinking buddy.” (*People v. Triche* (1957) 148 Cal.App.2nd 198, 203.)

Search and Seizure Conditions Discovered After the Fact: It is quite clear now that when the search and seizure conditions of one co-tenant are belatedly discovered (i.e., after an otherwise illegal, warrantless search), given the importance of the non-waiver

subject's privacy rights in a residence, any evidence found as a result will not be admissible against that person. (*People v. Robles* (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789; *People v. Sanders* (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318; *In re Jaime P.* (2006) 40 Cal.4th 128; see above.)

Private Areas:

A **Fourth** Waiver imposed on one cotenant will *not* justify the search of areas or property *exclusive* to a third person. (*People v. Veronica* (1980) 107 Cal.App.3rd 906.)

“Neither reason nor authority support the proposition that police may conduct a general search of the private belongings of one who lives with a probationer.” To justify searching the property exclusive to a non-probationer or non-parolee, the officers will need “*some cause*” to believe the person subject to search and seizure conditions has secreted contraband in the property of a third person. (Italics added; *People v. Alders* (1978) 87 Cal.App.3rd 313, 317-318.)

The searching officers need only entertain a “*reasonable suspicion*,” based upon an evaluation of all the surrounding circumstances, that the item to be searched was either owned, or (at least jointly) controlled by, the person subject to the **Fourth** Waiver. (*People v. Boyd* (1990) 224 Cal.App.3rd 736, 745-346, 749-750.)

While some older cases have required that an officer have full “*probable cause*” to believe that a place or item to be searched is owned, controlled, or jointly possessed by the **Fourth** Waiver suspect (e.g., see *People v. Montoya* (1981) 114 Cal.App.3rd 556, 562.), the more recent cases, and the weight of authority, have held that so long as the searching officers have a “*reasonable suspicion*,” the resulting search will be upheld. (*People v. Palmquist* (1981) 123 Cal.App.3rd 1, 12; *People v. Boyd*, *supra*, at p. 750.)

See *People v. Smith* (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 912; search of defendant, non-probationer's purse, under the theory that the person subject to the search and seizure conditions (a male) had joint authority over her purse, was upheld.

A search of the female defendant's purse left in the car when an officer is conducting a parole search of a male parolee, is illegal absent a reasonable suspicion to believe that the parolee had joint

ownership, possession, or control over the purse. (*People v. Baker* (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1152.)

A warrantless search of those areas of the passenger compartment of a vehicle where an officer reasonably expects that the parolee could have stowed personal belongings or discarded items when aware of police activity, as well as a search of personal property located in those areas if the officer reasonably believes that the parolee owns those items or has the ability to exert control over them, is lawful. (*People v. Schmitz* (2012) 55 Cal.4th 909, 916-933.)

The Court further noted that **Fourth** waiver for probationers is a matter of choice, such a person agreeing to the giving up his or her **Fourth Amendment** search and seizure protections in exchange for avoiding a jail sentence. Parolees, on the other hand, at least since the applicable statute (i.e., **P.C. § 3067**) was amended (effective 6/27/12), aren't given a choice. **Fourth** waiver conditions are involuntarily imposed upon them. As a result, "parolees have fewer expectations of privacy than probationers, because parole is more akin to imprisonment than probation is to imprisonment." Therefore, the fact that defendant's passenger was a parolee, as opposed to a probationer, is a "salient circumstance" in setting out the rule of this case. But the Court never indicates that the general rule is any different between cases involving probationers and parolees. (*Id.*, at pp. 921-922.)

Also, the Court noted that defendant's (vehicle driver or owner) lack of knowledge that his passenger was subject to search and seizure conditions is irrelevant to the legality of the parole search. (*Id.*, at pp. 922-923.)

The factors to consider in determining what areas and items in a vehicle are subject to search include the nature of that area or item, how close and accessible the area or item is to the parolee, the privacy interests at stake, and the government's interest in conducting the search. (*Id.*, at p. 923.)

Also, because "cause" is not required to justify such a search, an officer does not have to articulate facts demonstrating that the parolee actually placed personal items or discarded contraband in the open areas of the

passenger compartment. The issue in court is going to be whether, when viewed objectively, it was reasonable for the officer to assume that any particular area or item might contain the parolee's personal property or be somewhere that he might be expected to secret items he didn't want the police to find. (*Id.*, at p. 926.)

The search of a non-probationer's purse, when found in the middle of a jointly occupied bedroom, was upheld. The fact that the probationer was a male and the non-probationer defendant was a female, is not dispositive. "To rule otherwise would enable a probationer to flout a probation search condition by hiding drugs in a cohabitant's purse or any other hiding place associated with the opposite gender." (*People v. Ermi* (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 277, 280-282.)

A warrantless search of the garage in which defendant was living was not justified under the **Fourth Amendment** where there was nothing in the record to aid an objective evaluation of the scope of the home owner's advance consent. No evidence was produced as to what were the terms of the specific search and seizure conditions applicable to the residents of house and garage that was searched. Guests (the defendant here being a non-probationer who was living in the probationers' garage) are entitled to demand adherence to the proper scope of their host's search conditions, despite the usual rule prohibiting the assertion of someone else's **Fourth Amendment** rights in search and seizure cases. (*People v. Romeo* (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 931, 949-955.)

That problem could have been resolved had the prosecution introduced into evidence, under **E.C. § 1280**, the public records exception, a copy of the residents' search and seizure conditions as ordered by the court, or the searching officer's own testimony as to what he knew those conditions to be. (*Id.*, at p. 955.)

"(I)n the case of probation searches, the officer must have some knowledge not just of the fact someone is on probation, but of the existence of a search clause broad enough to justify the search at issue." *People v. Douglas* (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 855, 863; citing *People v. Bravo* (1987) 43 Cal. 3rd 600, 605-606, 608.)

When it is Unknown Who Owns the Property About to be Searched:

Where the officers do not know who owns or possesses a place or item to be searched, and such information can be easily ascertained, it *may*, depending upon the circumstances, be incumbent upon them to attempt to determine ownership in order to protect the privacy interests of the third persons involved (see below).

“If it is *objectively unreasonable* for officers to believe that the residence or item falls within the scope of a search condition, any evidence seized will be deemed the product of a warrantless search absent other considerations.” (Italics added; *People v. Tidalgo* (1981) 123 Cal.App.3rd 301, 306-307.)

However, the officers may still act upon appearances, so long as they act reasonably.

While some courts argue that officers may have a duty to inquire as to the ownership or control of certain items (see *People v. Montoya* (1981) 114 Cal.App.3rd 556, 562-563.), other more reasoned court decisions recognize that “an officer could hardly expect that a parolee (or probationer) would claim ownership of an item which he knew contained contraband.” (*People v. Britton* (1984) 156 Cal.App.3rd 689, 701.)

If an officer reasonably believes he will not receive an honest answer, there appears to be no legal reason why he or she must either inquire, or accept the answer as true if inquiry is in fact made. (*People v. Boyd* (1990) 224 Cal.App.3rd 736, 746-750; see also *United States v. Davis* (9th Cir. 1991) 932 F.2nd 752, 760.)

Searching without a warrant a residence defendant was observed entering and exiting, but with insufficient information to believe that the parolee/defendant lived at that residence (i.e., all available information indicated that his home address was elsewhere), held to be illegal. (*United States v. Grandberry* (9th Cir. 2013) 730 F.3rd 968, 975-980.)

The fact that the apartment that was searched might have been “under defendant’s control” held to be irrelevant. The issue is whether there is probable cause to believe defendant lived there. (*Id.*, at pp. 980-982: “(W)e conclude

that the ‘property under your control’ provision cannot refer to a place where someone else, but not the parolee, lives.”)

A female resident’s probation search condition did not allow for the search of a purse and drawers found in the residences’ separate living unit (i.e., the garage) where there was no evidence of the probationer’s actual access to, or control over, the contents of the purse or drawers, and no evidence of a family relationship or equivalent familiarity between the probationer and the defendant. The searching officers did not have an “objectively reasonable belief” that the probationer had authority over the contents of either the drawers or the purse found in the defendant’s separate living quarters. (*People v. Carreon* (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 866, 877-881.)

Detention of Third Persons:

Police may lawfully detain visitors to a probationer’s home while executing a “**Fourth Waiver**” search for purposes of identifying the visitors (as possible felons) and for the officers’ safety. (*People v. Matelski* (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 837; *People v. Rios* (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 584, 593-595.)

Third party occupants of a home searched under the conditions of a **Fourth** waiver may lawfully be detained during the search. The justifications for such a detention include:

- The need to prevent flight in the event incriminating evidence is found;
- Minimizing the risk of harm to the officers, *and*
- Facilitating the orderly completion of the search while avoiding the use of force.

(*Sanchez v. Canales* (9th Cir. 2009) 574 F.3rd 1169, citing *Muehler v. Mena* (2005) 544 U.S. 93 [161 L.Ed.2nd 299]; a search warrant case.)

In a Vehicle:

A search and seizure condition justifies a detention without a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, including while in a vehicle, and a search of the car under the terms of the defendant’s **Fourth** waiver. (See *People v. Viers* (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 990, 993-994; defendant stopped in his vehicle.)

Viers further held that it was irrelevant that the officers were unaware of defendant’s probation status when the search was conducted; a conclusion that has since been abrogated by *People v. Sanders* (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318. (See *Myers v. Superior Court* (124 Cal.App.4th 1247.)

See “*Searching While In Ignorance of a Search Condition*,” above.

A warrantless search of those areas of the passenger compartment of a vehicle where an officer reasonably expects that the parolee could have stowed personal belongings or discarded items when aware of police activity, as well as a search of personal property located in those areas if the officer reasonably believes that the parolee owns those items or has the ability to exert control over them, is lawful. (*People v. Schmitz* (2012) 55 Cal.4th 909, 916-933.)

The Court further noted that a **Fourth** waiver for probationers is a matter of choice, such a person agreeing to the giving up his or her **Fourth Amendment** search and seizure protections in exchange for avoiding a jail sentence. Parolees, on the other hand, at least since the applicable statute (i.e., **P.C. § 3067**) was amended (effective 6/27/12), aren’t given a choice. **Fourth** waiver conditions are involuntarily imposed upon them. As a result, “parolees have fewer expectations of privacy than probationers, because parole is more akin to imprisonment than probation is to imprisonment.” Therefore, the fact that defendant’s passenger was a parolee, as opposed to a probationer, is a “salient circumstance” in setting out the rule of this case. But the Court never indicates that the general rule is any different between cases involving probationers and parolees. (*Id.*, at pp. 921-922.)

Also, the Court noted that defendant’s (vehicle driver or owner) lack of knowledge that his passenger was subject to search and seizure conditions is irrelevant to the legality of the parole search. (*Id.*, at pp. 922-923.)

The factors to consider in determining what areas and items in a vehicle are subject to search include the nature of that area or item, how close and accessible the area or item is to the parolee, the privacy interests at stake, and the

government's interest in conducting the search. (*Id.*, at p. 923.)

Also, because “*cause*” is not required to justify such a search, an officer does not have to articulate facts demonstrating that the parolee actually placed personal items or discarded contraband in the open areas of the passenger compartment. The issue in court is going to be whether, when viewed objectively, it was reasonable for the officer to assume that any particular area or item might contain the parolee’s personal property or be somewhere that he might be expected to secret items he didn’t want the police to find. (*Id.*, at p. 926.)

Knock and Notice:

The “*knock and notice*” provisions of **Penal Code §§ 844 and 1531** apply to searches conducted pursuant to a probation or parole condition. (See **P.C. § 3061**; *People v. Rosales* (1968) 68 Cal.2nd 299, 303-304; *People v. Kanos* (1971) 14 Cal.App.3rd 642, 651-652; *People v. Constancio* (1974) 42 Cal.App.3rd 533, 542; *People v. Lilienthal* (1978) 22 Cal.3rd 891, 900; *People v. Mays* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 969, 973, fn. 4; *People v. Urziceanu* (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 747, 789-792; *People v. Murphy* (2005) 37 Cal.4th 490.)

See “*Knock and Notice*,” under “*Searches With a Search Warrant*” (Chapter 6), above.

This includes the doctrine of “*substantial compliance*,” where forced entry may be made so long as the “*policies and purposes*” (i.e., respecting the right to privacy within the home and avoiding violent confrontations) of the knock-notice rules have been satisfied. (*People v. Montenegro* (1985) 173 Cal.App.3rd 983, 988-989.)

However, a court *may not* impose a waiver of the knock and notice requirements as a condition of probation. (*People v. Freund* (1975) 48 Cal.App.3rd 49, 56-58.)

Detentions, Patdowns and Arrests:

Detentions: A search and seizure condition justifies a detention without a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. (*People v. Viers* (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 990, 993-994.)

Viers further held that it was irrelevant that the officers were unaware of defendant's probation status when the search was conducted; a conclusion that has since been abrogated by *People v. Sanders* (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318. (See *Myers v. Superior Court* (124 Cal.App.4th 1247.)

See "*Searching While In Ignorance of a Search Condition*," above.

"If a police officer knows an individual is on **PRCS**, he may lawfully detain that person for the purpose of searching him or her, so long as the detention and search are not arbitrary, capricious or harassing." (*People v. Douglas* (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 855, 863.)

Patdowns:

Old Rule: When the rule was that a parole search required at least a "*reasonable suspicion*" of renewed criminal activity, a police officer could not justify a patdown (frisk) search of a detained suspect for weapons based upon the detainee's status as a parolee alone, in the absence of other suspicious circumstances furnishing grounds to believe he may be armed, unless, perhaps, it was known that his prior offense involved the use of weapons. (*People v. Williams* (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1100, 1105, 1108; *People v. Montenegro* (1985) 173 Cal.App.3rd 983.)

New Rule: Because under the present state of the law, a parolee or probationer may be searched without any cause (See *People v. Reyes* (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743.), this rule (requiring a reasonable suspicion) is *probably* no longer valid, at least pending review of the necessary standards by the United States Supreme Court. (See "*Standard of Proof Required*," above.)

Arrests: The fact that a person is a parolee-at-large, and subject to search or seizure without a warrant or probable cause, justifies a warrantless entry into the subject's house for the purpose of arresting him. (*People v. Lewis* (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 662.)

There is no authority, however, allowing for a non-consensual transportation of a parolee or probationer to his house, absent probable cause to arrest the subject. In that a non-consensual transportation of a subject is generally considered to be an arrest (*Dunaway v. New York* (1979) 442 U.S. 200, 206-216 [60 L.Ed.2nd 824, 832-838]; see "*Detentions*," above), and thus illegal absent probable cause to arrest the subject, it is likely that the use

of a **Fourth** Waiver condition as an excuse to transport the subject from a remote location back to his house, absent probable cause to arrest him, would *not* be upheld.

Out-of-State Probationer or Parolee: The validity of a search of a probationer or parolee from another state, supervision for whom has been transferred to California pursuant to **Penal Code §§ 11175 et seq. (Uniform Act for Out-of-State Parolee (and Probationer) Supervision)**, is to be determined by California Law. (*People v. Reed* (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 135.)

AIDS & HIV: A parole or probation officer seeking the assistance of law enforcement to apprehend or take into custody a parolee or probationer who has a record of assault on a peace officer, *must*, by statute, inform the officers of the suspect's infliction with AIDS or HIV. (**P.C. § 7521**)

Chapter 16:

Consent Searches:

Rule: A valid *consent* is a lawful substitute for both a search warrant and probable cause. (*United States v. Matlock* (1974) 415 U.S. 164, 165-166 [39 L.Ed.2nd 242, 246]; *Vandenberg v. Superior Court* (1970) 8 Cal.App.3rd 1048, 1053; *United States v. Russell* (9th Cir. 2012) 664 F.3rd 1279, 1281; (*Fernandez v. California* (Feb. 25, 2014) 571 U.S. ___, ___ [134 S.Ct. 1126, 1132-1137; 188 L.Ed.2nd 25]; *People v. Arredondo* (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 186, 193-194.)

Note: Petition for Review was granted by the California Supreme Court in *People v. Arredondo* on June 8, 2016, making this case unavailable for citation.

“It is well settled that a search conducted pursuant to a valid consent is constitutionally permissible.” (Citation omitted; *United States v. Soriano* (9th Cir 2004) 361 F.3rd 494, 501; *Schneckloth v. Bustamonte* (1973) 412 U.S. 218, 222 [36 L.Ed.2nd 854, 860]; *People v. Harris* (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 671, 685.)

“‘Consent searches are part of the standard investigatory techniques of law enforcement agencies’ and are ‘a constitutionally permissible and wholly legitimate aspect of effective police activity.’” (*Fernandez v. California*, *supra*, at p. 1132, quoting *Schneckloth v. Bustamonte*, *supra*, at pp. 231-232 [36 L.Ed.2nd 854],).

Why do people consent? Would a person who has something to hide really consent to being searched? *Yes!*

Some persons are more concerned with what they perceive to be the *appearance of guilt*, and feel they must consent to avoid such an appearance, hoping the law enforcement officer will either lose interest or fail to find whatever it is the person hopes to keep concealed. Consent under these circumstances, however, if the person reasonably should have felt like he or she had the option of refusing, is still a valid consent. (See *People v. James* (1977) 19 Cal.3rd 99, 114.)

Limitation: A consent, to be lawful, must be “*freely and voluntarily*” given. (*Bumper v. North Carolina* (1969) 391 U.S. 543, 548 [20 L.Ed.2nd 797, 802]; *People v. Smith* (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 572, 576-577; *United States v. Russell* (9th Cir. 2012) 664 F.3rd 1279, 1281; *People v. Ling* (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1, 7; see also *People v. Superior Court (Corbett)* (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 670, 680-681; a signed consent held to be involuntary in that the interrogating officers ignored defendant’s prior repeated refusals to consent.)

Burden of Proof: The prosecution bears the burden of showing that the defendant’s consent to search is voluntary and unaffected by coercion. (*Schneckloth v. Bustamonte* (1973) 412 U.S. 218 [36 L.Ed.2nd 854]; *Estes v. Rowland* (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 508, 527; *United States v. Bautista* (9th Cir. 2004) 362 F.3rd 584; *United States v. Johnson* (9th Cir. 2017) 875 F.3rd 1265, 1276.)

“This burden cannot be discharged by showing no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority.” (*Bumper v. North Carolina, supra*; *People v. Ling, supra*.)

“Whether consent to search was voluntarily given is ‘to be determined from the *totality of all the circumstances*.’” (Italics added; *United States v. Soriano* (9th Cir. 2003) 361 F.3rd 494, 501; citing *Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra*; see also *Pavao v. Pagay* (9th Cir. 2002) 307 F.3rd 915, 919; *United States v. Crapsler* (9th Cir. 2007) 472 F.3rd 1141, 1149; *People v. Espino* (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 746, 762.)

“(T)he government’s burden to show voluntariness cannot be discharged by showing no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority.” (*United States v. Perez-Lopez* (9th Cir. 2003) 348 F.3rd 839, 846; see also *United States v. Bautista* (9th Cir. 2004) 362 F.3rd 584, 589.)

“(T)he analysis naturally involves distinguishing consent from assent. “Consent, in law, means a voluntary agreement by a person in the possession and exercise of sufficient mentality to make an intelligent choice, to do something proposed by another [Assent] means mere passivity or submission, which does not include consent.”” (*People v. Ling* (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1, 8; quoting *People v. Fields* (1979) 95 Cal.App.3rd 972, 977.)

“On appeal, evidence regarding the question of consent must be viewed in the light most favorable to the fact-finder’s decision.” (*United States v. Kaplan* (9th Cir. 1990) 895 F.2nd 618, 622.)

Factors: As described in *People v. Ramirez* (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1548, at page 1558, the following are among the factors that will be taken into consideration in determining the validity of a consent to search, although none of these factors are necessarily dispositive in and of itself:

- Whether the person consenting was in custody.
- Whether the arresting officers had their guns drawn.

- Whether *Miranda* warnings had been given. (*But*, see *Miranda*, below.)
- Whether the person consenting was told that he or she had a right not to consent.
- Whether the person consenting was told that a search warrant could be obtained.

(See also *United States v. Soriano*, *supra*, at pp. 968-969; *United States v. Rodriguez-Preciado* (9th Cir. 2005) 399 F.3rd 1118, 1126; *United States v. Crapser* (9th Cir. 2007) 472 F.3rd 1141, 149; *United States v. Brown* (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3rd 410, 415; *United States v. Vongxay* (9th Cir. 2010) 594 F.3rd 1111, 1119-1120; (*Liberal v. Estrada* (9th Cir. 2011) 632 F.3rd 1064, 1082-1083; *United States v. Russell* (9th Cir. 2012) 664 F.3rd 1279, 1281; *United States v. Johnson* (9th Cir. 2017) 875 F.3rd 1265, 1276-1277.)

Circumstances Affecting Voluntariness:

Under Arrest:

The fact alone that the suspect is *under arrest* is not enough to demonstrate coercion. (*United States v. Watson* (1976) 423 U.S. 411 [46 L.Ed.2nd 598]; *People v. Llamas* (1991) 235 Cal.App.3rd 441, 447.)

A “person's in-custody status, even when he is handcuffed, does not automatically vitiate his consent; this is ““but one of the factors, but not the only one, to be considered by the trial judge who sees and hears the witnesses and is best able to pass upon the matter.””” (*People v. Byers* (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 856, 864; quoting *People v. Llamas*, *supra* .)

Being detained outside an apartment, ordered to the ground by an officer with a drawn gun, arrested, handcuffed, placed in the back of a van, and surrounded by several officers, held to be insufficient to vitiate the suspect’s consent to enter his apartment and search his room. (*People v. Byers*, *supra*, at pp. 864-865.)

But if he is unlawfully under arrest (i.e., without probable cause), then any resulting consent obtained at that time will be invalid. (*People v. Espino* (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 746, 762-765.)

Use of Firearms: Attempting to obtain a consent from a suspect while *firearms* are being displayed will inevitably result in a finding that the consent was coerced. (***People v. McKelvy*** (1972) 23 Cal.App.3rd 1027, 1034: “(N)o matter how politely the officer may have phrased his request for the object, it is apparent that defendant’s compliance was in fact under compulsion of a direct command by the officer. . . . The evidence established ‘no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority.’”))

In ***McKelvy***, the defendant was standing in a police spotlight, surrounded by four police officers, all of whom were armed with either a shotgun or a carbine. Handing over contraband to the officers under these circumstances was held *not* to be a consensual act.

Even an *implied assertion of authority* by the police officer may be enough to invalidate a consent to search. (***People v. Fields*** (1979) 95 Cal.App.3rd 972, 976; ***Amos v. United States*** (1921) 255 U.S. 313, 317 [65 L.Ed.2nd 654, 656].)

Threatening to Obtain a Search Warrant: While telling a suspect that officers will obtain a warrant invalidates a consensual search under circumstances where the officers *do not* actually have the necessary probable cause to obtain a warrant, threatening to get a warrant when the officers *do* have the necessary probable cause is lawful and will not, by itself, invalidate a resulting consent. (***People v. Robinson*** (1957) 149 Cal.App.2nd 282, 286; ***People v. Goldberg*** (1984) 161 Cal.App.3rd 170, 188; ***Bumper v. North Carolina*** (1968) 391 U.S. 543 [20 L.Ed.2nd 797] ***United States v. Soriano*** (9th Cir. 2003) 361 F.3rd 494, 971; ***People v. Williams*** (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 949, 961.)

With officers approaching and asking defendant at the airport if they could search him, while also telling him that he had the right to refuse but that he would be detained until a search warrant could be obtained although it was uncertain whether one could be obtained, after which defendant responded, “You may as well search me now,” resulted in a voluntary search. Defendant’s search was not obtained as the result of threats or coercion. (***United States v. Pariseau*** (9th Cir. 2012) 685 F.3rd 1129.)

Threatening to Use a Drug-Sniffing Dog: Threatening to use a drug-sniffing dog, when such use does not require the suspect’s

consent and is otherwise lawful, will not invalidate the resulting consent to search. (*United States v. Todhunter* (9th Cir. 2002) 297 F.3rd 886, 891.)

Threatening the Suspension of One's Driver's License and Other Consequences for Refusing a Blood Test after a DUI Arrest:

“A motorist’s submission to a chemical test, if freely and voluntarily given, is actual consent under the **Fourth Amendment**. That the motorist is forced to choose between submitting to the chemical test and facing serious consequences for refusing to submit, pursuant to the implied consent law, does not in itself render the motorist’s submission to be coerced or otherwise invalid for purposes of the **Fourth Amendment**.” (*People v. Harris* (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 671, 689.)

I.e.: “. . . that he did not have the right to talk to a lawyer when deciding whether to submit to a chemical test, that his driver's license would be suspended if he refused to submit to a chemical test, and that his refusal could be used against him in court.” (*Id.*, at p. 690.)

The results of defendant’s warrantless blood draw was improperly suppressed by the trial court where the arresting officer told defendant that the test was required by law, that comment being an accurate statement of the implied consent law. The fact that the officer did not inform defendant of the consequences of refusing was also not enough, by itself, to require suppression of the blood test results. Although providing an admonition about the consequences of withdrawing consent is to be considered in the totality of the circumstances surrounding the consent to a warrantless blood draw, the **Fourth Amendment** does not require the admonition in order to find a voluntary consent. (*People v. Agnew* (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 4-20; a decision of appellate division of the Santa Clara County Superior Court.)

However, in another prosecution for driving under the influence of alcohol, a different panel of the same appellate division of the Santa Clara County Superior Court disagreed with *Agnew* and held that blood draw evidence should have been suppressed under the **Fourth**

Amendment in that under the totality of the circumstances, the People failed to show that defendant actually—freely and voluntarily—consented to a blood draw to which she had physically submitted after an incomplete implied consent admonishment. The admonishment, which stated that defendant was required to submit to a blood test, but did not include the consequences of refusal and was misleading. Defendant had a **Fourth Amendment** right, notwithstanding implied (or “deemed”) consent, to refuse and to bear the consequences of such a refusal. Implied consent does not constitute real or actual consent in fact, for purposes of the **Fourth Amendment**. Also, the People failed to offer any evidence of any advance express consent by defendant, or even that she was a licensed California driver. (*People v. Mason* (2016) 8 Cal.App.5th Supp. 11, 18-33.)

Per the Court, such implied consent “is not real or actual consent in fact for purposes of the **Fourth Amendment**, though it may be perfectly fine for purposes of administrative proceedings involving forfeiture of driving privileges under the implied consent law upon a refusal to submit to a duly requested chemical test.” (*Id.*, at pp. 27-28; see *Hughey v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles* (1991) 235 Cal.App.3rd 752, 757.)

Threatening to Search the Home of a Loved One:

Even though defendant eventually consented to the search of his residence in writing, that consent was not obtained until after he had repeatedly asserted his rights, and only after the officers threatened to disrupt defendant’s parents’ lives by searching their residence as well. As ruled by the trial court, “by the time (defendant) put his name and signature on that page (i.e., the written consent form), that did not mean much.” (*People v. Superior Court (Corbett)* (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 670, 680-681.)

Implying Guilt: It is arguably improper to purposely put a subject in the position where he feels that by exercising his right to refuse, he would be incriminating himself or admitting participation in illegal activity. (*Crofoot v. Superior Court* (1981) 121 Cal.App.3rd 717, 725.)

For example: “*You don’t have anything in your pockets you don’t want me to see, do you?*” (Negative response) “*Then you wouldn’t mind me looking, would you?*” (See *Ibid.*)

“(I)mplicit in the officer’s statement is the threat that by exercising his right to refuse the search (the suspect) would be incriminating himself or admitting participation in illegal activity.” (*Ibid.*)

Using a Ruse: A free and voluntary consent, as a general rule, may not be obtained by, or as the product of, a ruse. (*People v. Reyes* (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 7, 13; *People v. Reeves* (1964) 61 Cal.2nd 268, 273; *People v. Miller* (1967) 248 Cal.App.2nd 731.)

But, where the ruse is only partial, and does not disguise the scope of the proposed search, then the resulting search may be upheld. (*People v. Avalos* (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1568.)

Threats to Take Away One’s Children: Threatening to take away one’s children, letting social services take them, if the person does not cooperate, will negate a consent to search. (*United States v. Soriano* (9th Cir. 2003) 346 F.3rd 963.)

In *Soriano*, the consent was saved when a federal agent immediately interrupted the police officer who made the threat, and assured the female subject that she was not then a suspect, nor likely to be arrested, and therefore need not worry about having her children taken away. However, the decision was a split decision, with the dissent arguing that the woman’s consent was still not free and voluntary despite the agent’s attempt to save it. (See pp. 975-979.)

See also *Lynum v. Illinois* (1963) 372 U.S. 528, 534 [9 L.Ed.2nd 922, 926]; and *United States v. Tingle* (9th Cir. 1981) 658 F.2nd 1332, 1336; two confession cases where statements were rendered involuntary due to threats to take the children away if the subjects did not cooperate.

And see *In re Rudy F.* (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1124, where a consent to search was negated by the threat to “book” the person’s children; the issue not even being contested on appeal.

Other Inducements:

Telling defendant that the owner of the house had already consented to the search, a truthful statement, resulting in defendant giving his own consent to the search of his room in that house, *did not* invalidate defendant's consent. (*People v. Monterroso* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 743, 758-759.)

Per *Delia v. City of Rialto* (9th Cir. 2010) 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 26968 (certarori granted; eventually affirmed at *Delia v. City of Rialto* (9th Cir. 2012) 682 F.3rd 1213, without further discussion), threatening an employee with the loss of his job if he didn't retrieve certain items from his home was *not* a voluntary consent and a **Fourth Amendment** search violation.

However, because the U.S. Supreme Court, having granted certiorari, held that the attorney hired by the city to investigate the plaintiff and who made the threat had qualified immunity (see *Filarsky v. Delia* (2012) 566 U.S. 377 [132 S.Ct. 1657; 182 L.Ed.2nd 662].), the issue of the voluntariness of the plaintiff's consent was never discussed by the Supreme Court.

Combination of Factors: Being under arrest, in handcuffs, without having received his *Miranda* rights and without having been told of his right to refuse a consent search, held *not* to be enough to prevent defendant from validly consenting to the search of his room. (*People v. Monterroso*, *supra*, at pp. 757-759.)

Note: But this combination of factors certainly made it an issue that could have gone either way.

During a Consensual Encounter:

Asking a person for consent to search his person does not, by itself, convert a consensual encounter into a detention "as long as the police do not convey a message that compliance with their requests is required." (*United States v. Washington* (9th Cir. 2007) 490 F.3rd 765, 770.)

After defendant, who had prior drug and firearm-related convictions, paid cash for a last-minute, one-way ticket without checking any luggage, an officer asked defendant for permission to

search his bag and his person. Defendant consented twice and spread his arms and legs to facilitate the search. The officer felt something hard and unnatural in defendant's groin area and arrested him. The appellate court determined that defendant voluntarily consented to a patdown search because he was not in custody, officers told him he was free to leave, and officers did not tell him that they could obtain a search warrant if he refused to consent. The scope of the search was reasonable because it was reasonable for the officer to assume the consent included the groin area since the officer specifically advised defendant that the officer was looking for narcotics, defendant lifted his arms and spread his legs, defendant never objected or revoked consent, the search did not extend inside the clothing, and the officer methodically worked his way up defendant's legs before searching the groin. (*United States v. Russell* (9th Cir. 2012) 664 F.3rd 1279.)

A Suspect's Failure to Object:

The failure to object to police entry by itself, when no request for permission to enter was made, does not constitute effective consent. (*United States v. Johnson* (9th Cir. 2017) 875 F.3rd 1265, 1276-1278; citing *United States v. Shaibu* (9th Cir. 1990) 920 F.2nd 1423, 1428.)

Manner of Inquiry: It is not so much what the officer is asking, but rather the “*manner or mode*” in which it is put to the citizen which determines whether the response is voluntary or not. (*People v. Franklin* (1987) 192 Cal.App.3rd 938, 941.)

Reasonable Person Test: For a consent search to be valid, the suspect must *reasonably* believe, under the circumstances, he has a choice. (*People v. James* (1977) 19 Cal.3rd 99, 116.)

Note: Asking for consent to search in a manner implying (even if not expressly stating) that the suspect is being offered a choice, helps to prove that a positive response was voluntary. For instance: “*Sir, do you mind if I look in your car?*” Or, “*Sir, may I look in your car?*” Not; “*I’m going to search your car!*”

Product of a Constitutional Violation: A suspect’s consent to search given immediately (i.e., without sufficient intervening factors) after each of the following will likely be held to be invalid:

Rule: If an otherwise voluntary consent is the direct product of some other illegal police act (e.g.; illegal search, arrest, detention, etc.), then the consent and the resulting direct products of the consent may also be suppressed. (***People v. Valenzuela*** (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 817, 833.)

See also ***People v. Haven*** (1963) 59 Cal.2nd 713, 719; ***People v. Poole*** (1986) 182 Cal.App.3rd 1004, 1012; ***People v. \$48,715 United States Currency*** (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1507; ***United States v. Washington*** (2004) 387 F.3rd 1060; ***People v. Krohn*** (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1294; ***People v. Werner*** (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1210-1212; ***In re J.G.*** (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 402, 408-413.)

Illegal Search:

“The rule is clearly established that consent induced by an illegal search or arrest is not voluntary, and that if the accused consents immediately following an illegal entry or search, his assent is not voluntary because it is inseparable from the unlawful conduct of the officers.” (***Burrows v. Superior Court***, *supra*; ***People v. Johnson*** (1968) 68 Cal.2nd 629, 632; ***People v. Haven*** (1963) 59 Cal.2nd 713, 719.)

But, a search done under the authority of a search warrant that is held only to be partially invalid may not require the suppression of evidence recovered from a consensual search of another property obtained during the execution of the warrant. (See ***United States v. SDI Future Health, Inc.*** (9th Cir. 2009) 568 F.3rd 684, 707-708.)

See also ***People v. Lawler*** (1973) 9 Cal.3rd 156, 163.)

Illegal Detention:

As a “seizure” of one’s person, the products of an illegal detention are also subject to being suppressed under the Exclusionary Rule. (See ***People v. Krohn*** (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1294; detaining defendant for drinking in public, when he was not in a public place, is an illegal detention and requires the suppression of the controlled substances found on his person in a subsequent consensual search.)

“Where an illegal detention occurs, unless ‘subsequent events adequately dispel the coercive taint of the initial illegality, i.e., where there is no longer causality, the subsequent consent is’ ineffective.” *People v. Zamudio* (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 340; citing *People v. \$48,715 United States Currency* (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1514.)

But, an illegal detention (or arrest) does not serve to invalidate a *previously obtained*, otherwise lawful, consent. (*People v. \$48,715 United States Currency*, *supra*, at pp. 1513-1515.)

“Where an illegal detention occurs, unless ‘subsequent events adequately dispel the coercive taint of the initial illegality, i.e., where there is no longer causality, the subsequent consent is’ ineffective. (Citations.)” (*People v. Zamudio* (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 341.)

Generally, a consent to search obtained during an unlawfully prolonged detention will require the suppression of any evidence discovered during the resulting search. (See *United States v. Chavez-Valenzuela* (9th Cir. 2001) 268 F.3rd 719.)

However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal has held that a minimally prolonged detention (e.g., a couple of minutes), at least when motivated by other newly discovered information even though that new information by itself might not constitute a reasonable suspicion, does not make the prolonging of the detention unreasonable. Under such circumstances, a minimally prolonged detention is not unlawful. A consent to search obtained during that disputed time period is lawful. (*United States v. Turvin et al.* (9th Cir. 2008) 517 F.3rd 1097.)

But, note that the fact that a suspect is being *illegally detained* does *not* necessarily mean, by itself, that the consent is involuntary. (See *People v. Llamas* (1991) 235 Cal.App.3rd 441; noting, but *not* addressing the issue

whether being illegally detained invalidated a consent under the “*fruit of the poisonous tree*” doctrine.)

Under the “*fruit of the poisonous tree*” doctrine, subsequent events may dispel the coercive taint of the initial illegality, making a subsequent consent lawful. (See *United States v. Ibarra* (10th Cir. 1992) 955 F.2nd 1405, 1411, fn. 8.)

See “*Consent During an Illegally Prolonged Detention*,” below

Illegal Arrest:

Handcuffing a person suspected of possible involvement in a narcotics transaction, but where the officer testified only that he was “uncomfortable” with the fact that defendant was tall (6’ 6”) and that narcotics suspects sometimes carry weapons (although the officer did not pat him down for weapons), converted a detention into an arrest, making the subsequent consent to search involuntary. (*People v. Stier* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 21.)

With only a reasonable suspicion to believe that the occupant of a house might be involved in criminal activity, ordering him out of the house and to back up as he did so, and holding onto him (albeit without handcuffs) with his hands behind his back while asking for his consent to search his person, was illegal. Full probable cause was necessary. The subsequent consent to search his person and his house was the product of that illegal detention was invalid. (*People v. Lujano* (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 175, 182-185; “If consent is induced by an illegal arrest or detention, the illegality vitiates the consent and may require suppression of seized evidence unless attenuating circumstances dissipate the taint.”)

Where defendant is unlawfully under arrest (i.e., without probable cause), any resulting consent obtained at that time is likely invalid, depending upon the totality of the circumstances. (*People v. Espino* (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 746, 762-765; also finding it irrelevant that defendant was told that he was not under arrest.)

Illegal Interrogation. (***People v. Superior Court [Keithley]*** (1975) 13 Cal.3rd 406, 410; following the violation of the suspect's *Miranda* rights.)

Right to Counsel Violation: Without informing a charged defendant's lawyer *in violation of the subject's Sixth Amendment rights* (i.e., after his arraignment). (***Tidwell v. Superior Court*** (1971) 17 Cal.App.3rd 780, 789.)

But see ***United States v. Kon YuLeung*** (2nd Cir. 1990) 910 F.2nd 33, 38-40 (consent valid despite having been indicted); and ***United States v. Hidalgo*** (11th Cir. 1993) 7 F.3rd 1566, 1570, both holding that obtaining a defendant's consent to search is not a critical stage of the proceedings protected by the **Sixth Amendment**.)

Consent During an Illegally Prolonged Detention:

General Rule: Prolonged Detentions are Illegal: A traffic stop (or any other detention) which is reasonable in its inception may become unreasonable if prolonged beyond that point reasonably necessary for the officer to complete the purposes of the stop or detention. (***People v. McGaughran*** (1979) 25 Cal.3rd 577.)

Under the theory of ***McGaughran***, a consent obtained during an unconstitutionally prolonged detention may be subject to suppression as the product of that illegal detention. (See ***People v. Llamas*** (1991) 235 Cal.App.3rd 441, 447; and ***People v. Valenzuela*** (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 817, 833.)

An otherwise lawful “*knock and talk*,” where officers continued to press the defendant for permission to enter his apartment after his denial of any illegal activity, converted the contact into an unlawfully “*extended*” detention, causing the Court to conclude that a later consent-to-search was the product of the illegal detention, and thus invalid. (***United States v. Washington*** (9th Cir. 2004) 387 F.3rd 1060.)

Lawfully Prolonged Detentions:

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal has held that a minimally prolonged detention (e.g., a couple of minutes), at least when motivated by other newly discovered information even though that new information by itself might not constitute a reasonable suspicion, does not make the prolonging of the detention

unreasonable. Under such circumstances, a minimally prolonged detention is not unlawful. (*United States v. Turvin et al.* (9th Cir. 2008) 517 F.3rd 1097.)

Developing new information to the effect that a vehicle's passenger might be an under-age prostitute and that the defendant driver her pimp, a continued detention for the purpose of investigating that possibility was lawful. (*United States v. Rodgers* (9th Cir. 2011) 656 F.3rd 1023, 1027; Extending a traffic stop for the purpose of investigating other crimes for which there is no suspicion constitutes an illegal detention. But it is also a rule that "(a) 'period of detention [may be] permissibly extended [where] new grounds for suspicion of criminal activity continue . . . to unfold.'" (Citing *U.S. v. Mayo* (9th Cir. 2005) 394 F.3rd 1271.)

After Detention Ends: If the person voluntarily consents to having his vehicle searched after he is free to leave, there is no prolonged detention. The officer is under no obligation to advise him that he is no longer being detained (or that he has a right to refuse to allow the officer to search). (*Robinette v. Ohio* (1996) 519 U.S. 33 [136 L.Ed.2nd 347].)

However; the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal believes that a consent search, obtained after the purposes of the traffic stop had been satisfied, is invalid as a product of an illegally prolonged detention, the extended detention being the result of the officer's unnecessary inquiries made during the traffic stop. (*United States v. Chavez-Valenzuela* (9th Cir. 2001) 268 F.3rd 719, amended at 279 F.3rd 1062.) *Robinette* was not discussed by the Court.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal was, at one time, of the belief that an officer must be able to "articulate suspicious factors that are particularized and objective" in order to "broaden the scope of questioning" beyond the purposes of the initial traffic stop." (*United States v. Murillo* (9th Cir. 2001) 255 F.3rd 1169, 1174.); a questionable rule in light of *Robinette*.)

But see the dissenting opinion in the denial for a rehearing en banc in *United States v. Chavez-Valenzuela*, *supra*, pointing out the absurdity of what Justice O'Scannlain refers to as the "seven minute rule," noting this decision's conflict with *Robinette* and other Supreme Court authority. (281 F.3rd 897.)

The Ninth Circuit's argument on this issue was similar to that made by the Ohio Supreme Court, and rejected by the

U.S. Supreme Court, in *Robinette*: Per the Ohio Supreme Court: “When the motivation behind a police officer’s continued detention of a person stopped for a traffic violation is not related to the purpose of the original, constitutional stop, and when that continued detention is not based on any articulable facts giving rise to a suspicion of some separate illegal activity justifying an extension of the detention, the continued detention constitutes an illegal seizure. (73 Ohio St.3rd at p. 650.)”

Contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s published opinions on this issue, the Supreme Court has held: “Even when law enforcement officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may pose questions, ask for identification, and request consent to search luggage—provided they do not induce cooperation by coercive means.” (*United States v. Drayton* (2002) 536 U.S. 194 [153 L.Ed.2nd 242.]; citing *Florida v. Bostick* (1991) 501 U.S. 429, 434-435 [115 L.Ed.2nd 389, 398-399].)

Most recently, in *Illinois v Caballes* (2005) 543 U.S. 405 [160 L.Ed.2nd 842], the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the argument that allowing a narcotics-sniffing dog to sniff around the outside of a vehicle that was lawfully stopped for a traffic offense “unjustifiably enlarge(s) the scope of a routine traffic stop into a drug investigation.” Per the Supreme Court: No expectation of privacy is violated by this procedure, and therefore does not implicate the **Fourth Amendment**.

Also, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s unsupported conclusion that, absent “a *particularized reasonable suspicion* that an individual is not a citizen,” it is a **Fourth Amendment** violation to ask him or her about the subject’s citizenship (see *Mena v. City of Simi Valley* (9th Cir. 2003) 332 F.3rd 1255, 1264-1265; reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court in *Muehler v. Mena* (2005) 544 U.S. 93, 100-101 [161 L.Ed.2nd 299].)

California courts seem to be in line with these latest Supreme Court pronouncements on the issue: “Questioning during the routine traffic stop on a subject unrelated to the purpose of the stop is not itself a **Fourth Amendment** violation. Mere questioning is neither a search nor a seizure. [Citation.] While the traffic detainee is under no obligation to answer unrelated questions, the Constitution does not prohibit law enforcement officers from asking. [Citation.]” (*People v. Brown* (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 493,

499-500; see also *People v. Gallardo* (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 234, 239; asking for consent to search during the time it would have taken to write the citation that was the original cause of the stop is legal, despite the lack of any evidence to believe there was something there to search for.)

Citing *Muehler v. Mena*, *supra*, the Ninth Circuit eventually conceded that so long as questioning of a legally detained suspect does not unlawfully prolong the detention, “mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure” under the **Fourth Amendment**. Therefore, questioning a detainee about possible criminal activity *unrelated* to the cause of the detention, and without a “*particularized suspicion*” to support a belief that the detainee is involved in that unrelated activity, is lawful. (*United States v. Mendez* (9th Cir. 2007) 467 F.3rd 1077, 1079-1081.)

The Scope of the Consent; i.e., what areas may be searched based upon the consent given?

Burden of Proof: The prosecution bears the burden to prove that a warrantless search was within the scope of the consent given. (*People v. Cantor* (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 961, 965.)

Test: The scope of the consent is measured by a standard of *objective reasonableness* based upon all the surrounding circumstances: “What would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?” (*Florida v. Jimeno* (1991) 500 U.S. 248, 251 [114 L.Ed.2nd 297, 303]; (*People v. Tully* (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 983-984; *United States v. Lopez-Cruz* (9th Cir. 2013) 730 F.3rd 803, 809-811; *People v. Crenshaw* (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1408; *People v. Pickard* (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th Supp. 12, 15.)

The test is: “(W)hat would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?” “(A)n officer does not exceed the scope of a suspect’s consent by ‘searching’ when the officer asked only if he or she could ‘look.’” Checking under the trunk’s carpet lining in the suspect’s vehicle, therefore, was no more than part of an otherwise lawful search based upon the defendant’s consent to “look” for anything that they were “not supposed to have.” (*United States v. McWeeney* (9th Cir. 2006) 454 F.3rd 1030, 1034-1035.)

Case Law:

In determining the reasonableness of a searching officer's conduct in a consensual search of a residence, a court must balance the extent of the intrusion into defendant's privacy rights with the governmental interest justifying it. (*People v. Smith* (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 572, 577-580; upholding the opening of the door to a noisy clothes dryer so that the officers could maintain control of a potentially dangerous situation and to communicate with subjects in the house.)

When defendant turned around and raised his arms in response to the officer's statement; "Hey, I'd like to shake you down real quick, if you don't mind," this was held to be a consent to a patdown only, and not to a full body search. (*People v. Tufono* (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1534, 1542-1543; recovery of a vial during a full search held to be illegal.)

Consenting to being searched for weapons did not allow for the officer reaching into his pocket and retrieving marijuana. (*People v. Rice* (1968) 259 Cal.App.2nd 399, 403.)

And giving an officer permission to enter his home for the purpose of finding someone who had run into the house did not authorize the search for a crowbar used in a burglary and found in a bedroom closet. (*People v. Superior Court [Arketa]* (1970) 10 Cal.App.3rd 122.)

"(N)either a general consent to search a particular premises nor a consent to search for specific items, includes the right to intercept telephone calls to the premises involved." (*People v. Harwood* (1977) 74 Cal.App.3rd 460, 468.)

A suspect's consent to "search" his phone does not include the right to answer in-coming phone calls. (*United States v. Lopez-Cruz* (9th Cir. 2013) 730 F.3rd 803, 809-811.)

However, the rule of *Florida v. Jimeno* (1991) 500 U.S. 248, 251 [114 L.Ed.2nd 297, 303] (above) was applied to uphold a car search that involved removing a plastic vent cover on a door post which displayed striation marks indicating recent removal or tampering. (*People v. Crenshaw* (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1414.)

Stepping aside while swinging the door open to an officer who was responding to an incomplete 911 call for help, was held to be a consent to enter. (*Pavao v. Pagay* (9th Cir. 2002) 307 F.3rd 915.)

Voluntarily consenting to the search of his vehicle, during which only money was found, and then later that day admitting that methamphetamine was hidden in a particular place in the vehicle, was sufficient to reasonably cause the officers to believe that they had consent to go back into the vehicle to recover the meth. (*United States v. Rodriguez-Preciado* (9th Cir. 2005) 399 F.3rd 1118, 1131, as amended at 416 F.3rd 939.)

With defendant agreeing to the officer's request to "check (defendant's car) real quick and get you on your way," the scope of that consent was exceeded at some point before the search had continued for fifteen minutes without finding anything, and certainly when the officer later pulled a box from the trunk and removed the back panel to the box by unscrewing some screws. (*People v. Cantor* (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 961.)

When asked for consent to search his person, a reasonable person would expect that an officer will then ask him to exit his vehicle for the purpose of conducting that search. (*United States v. Washington* (9th Cir. 2007) 490 F.3rd 765, 770-771.)

Consent to search defendant's truck found to extend to a second search absent any evidence to indicate that defendant was limiting his consent to the first search only. (*People v. Valencia* (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 922.)

After defendant, who had prior drug and firearm-related convictions, paid cash for a last-minute, one-way ticket without checking any luggage, an officer asked defendant for permission to search his bag and his person. Defendant consented twice and spread his arms and legs to facilitate the search. The officer felt something hard and unnatural in defendant's groin area and arrested him. The appellate court determined that defendant voluntarily consented to a patdown search because he was not in custody, officers told him he was free to leave, and officers did not tell him that they could obtain a search warrant if he refused to consent. The scope of the search was reasonable because it was reasonable for the officer to assume the consent included the groin area since the officer specifically advised defendant that the officer was looking for narcotics, defendant lifted his arms and spread his legs, defendant never objected or revoked consent, the search did

not extend inside the clothing, and the officer methodically worked his way up defendant's legs before searching the groin. (*United States v. Russell* (9th Cir. 2012) 664 F.3rd 1279, 1281-1284.)

In contrast, see *United States v. Sanders* (8th Cir. 2005), 424 F.3d 768, 776, where the suspect consented to a search of his person but then withdrew consent by actively shielding his groin area from the officer's search.

Consent to search the Plaintiff's vehicle held *not* to extend to her private documents found in the vehicle. (*Winfield v. Trotter* (2nd Cir. 2013) 710 F.3rd 49; officer opened and read a private letter.)

A suspect's general consent to search his car does not allow the officers to drill through the floor of the trunk. "Cutting" or "destroying" an object during a search requires either explicit consent for the destructive search or probable cause. (*United States v. Zamora-Garcia* (8th Cir. Ark. 2016) 831 F.3rd 979.)

Multiple Searches Based Upon a Single Consent: A "single grant of consent" does not, as a matter of law, prohibit more than one search depending upon the facts and circumstances. (*People v. Valencia* (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 922, 928-932.)

However, the general rule is that "a consent to search usually involves an 'understanding that the search will be conducted forthwith, and that only a single search will be made.'" (*Id.*, at p. 937, quoting *People v. Logsdon* (Ill. Ct. App. 1991) 567 N.E.2nd 746, 748.)

The non-exclusive list of factors to consider when assessing the reasonableness of conducting more than one search based upon a single grant of consent include, but is not limited to, the following:

- (1) Whether the defendant place any limitations on the scope of the initial consent.
- (2) The amount of time that passed between the grant of consent and the contested search.
- (3) Whether police remained in control of the area being searched prior to conducting the second search.
- (4) Whether the officers were searching a residence or other area that is entitled to a heightened expectation of privacy.
- (5) Whether the suspect was arrested between the initial search and the subsequent search.

- (6) Whether the searches were part of a continuous criminal investigation having a single objective.
- (7) Whether the defendant had advance knowledge of, and an opportunity to object to, a subsequent search.

(People v. Valencia, supra, at pp. 936-937.)

In *Valencia*, the Court held that a second search of defendant's vehicle based upon an earlier consent was lawful given the fact that defendant's expectation of privacy with respect to his vehicle was not diminished by the second search, it was defendant's vehicle and not his residence being searched, there was no evidence that defendant was arrested, or even detained, between the two searches, the time period between searches was very minimal, and defendant did not limit his consent to a particular time or place. (*Id.*, at pp. 938-940.)

Implied Consent to Provide Blood Sample as a Condition of the Privilege to Drive; V.C. § 23612(a)(1):

Vehicle Code § 23612(a)(1)(D) provides in part: "The person shall be told that his or her failure to submit to, or the failure to complete, the required chemical testing will result in a fine, mandatory imprisonment if the person is convicted of a violation of **Section 23152** or **23153**, and the suspension of the person's privilege to operate a motor vehicle" for one year or more depending upon the motorist's driving history.

Subdivision (a)(4) of **V.C. § 23612** also provides that the officer "*shall* also advise the person that he or she does not have the right to have an attorney present before stating whether he or she will submit to a test or tests, before deciding which test or tests to take, or during the administration of the test or tests chosen, and that, in the event of a refusal to submit to a test or tests, the refusal may be used against him or her in a court of law."

Although California's implied consent law does not make refusal a misdemeanor, it does impose certain enhancements upon the person's conviction for DUI:

V.C. § 23577 provides: "If a person is convicted of a violation of **Section 23152** or **23153** and at the time of the arrest leading to that conviction that person willfully failed refused a peace officer's request to submit to, or willfully

failed to complete, the chemical test or tests pursuant to **Section 23162**, the court shall impose the following penalties, . . . (between 2 to 18 days imprisonment, depending upon the person’s prior criminal history.)”

Note: Where a DUI arrestee is forced, over his objection, to submit to a warrantless blood test (as opposed to a breath test), it is possible that threatening incarceration for refusing to submit to that blood test may be a **Fourth Amendment** violation, resulting in the the suppression of the results of that blood test. (See *Birchfield v. North Dakota* (June 23, 2016) __ U.S. __, __ [136 S.Ct. 2160;195 L.Ed.2nd 560].)

While it is an unsettled issue in California as to whether blood extracted from a person incident to an arrest for driving under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol allows for the use of that same blood for other purposes; e.g., DNA testing, other jurisdictions have held that the use of blood taken pursuant to such an implied consent is limited to the purpose of testing one’s blood/alcohol only, there being no consent, express or implied, to use it for other purposes. (See *State v. Binner* (Ore. 1994) 131 Ore.App. 677, 682-683; *State v. Gerace* (Ga. 1993) 210 Ga.App. 874, 875-876 [437 S.E.2nd 862, 863.]

However, testing of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) from saliva that defendant deposited on the mouthpiece of a preliminary alcohol screening (PAS) device, connecting defendant with a series of residential burglaries where genetic material had been left, was not an illegal search. The court reasoned in part that the breath sample was used only to measure any blood alcohol in defendant's body, consistent with **V.C. § 23612(h) & (i)**, while the saliva, in which defendant could claim no right to privacy, was a mere incident to the PAS test. The subsequent testing of the saliva was thus not dependent on defendant's express or implied consent under **V.C. § 23612(a)(1)**. (*People v. Thomas* (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 338, 343-344.)

It was initially an undecided issue whether California’s Implied Consent statute (**V.C. § 23612(a)(1)**) applies when an arrested DUI suspect has neither expressly refused nor consented to a blood draw, which would negate the warrant requirements of *Missouri v. McNeely* (2013) 569 U.S. 141 [133 S.Ct. 1552; 185 L.Ed.2nd 696], where the Supreme Court held that being arrested for driving while under the influence did not allow for a non-consensual warrantless blood test absent exigent circumstances beyond the fact that the

blood was metabolizing at a normal rate. Other jurisdictions have split on this issue. (See *State v. Flonnory* (2013) 2013 Del. Super. LEXIS 261 (yes); and *State v. Butler* (Ariz. 2013) 302 P.3rd 609 (no).)

California's "implied consent law," **Veh. Code § 23612**, has since been held to be a factor, among the "totality of the circumstances," in determining whether or not a DUI arrestee has given "actual consent" to a warrantless blood draw. (*People v. Harris* (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 671, 681-692.)

"(A)ctual consent to a blood draw is not 'implied consent,' but rather a possible result of requiring the driver to choose whether to consent under the implied consent law. (Citation.) '[T]he implied consent law is explicitly designed to allow the driver, and not the police officer, to make the choice as to whether the driver will give or decline to give actual consent to a blood draw when put to the choice between consent or automatic sanctions. Framed in the terms of "implied consent," choosing the "yes" option affirms the driver's implied consent and constitutes actual consent for the blood draw. Choosing the "no" option acts to withdraw the driver's implied consent and establishes that the driver does not give actual consent.' (Citation)" (*Id.*, at p. 686.)

Note: To put this rule into a formula: *Implied consent per V.C. § 23612 + circumstances consistent with consent = actual consent.*

Also note **V.C. § 13384** (effective since 1999) requiring all new and renewed driver's licenses to include the applicant's express written consent to submit to a chemical test or tests of that person's blood, breath, or urine, or to submit to a preliminary alcohol screening test pursuant to **V.C. § 23136** (persons under 21 years of age with a blood alcohol level of .01% or higher), when requested to do so by a peace officer, with the applicant signing a written declaration consenting to the above.

Subd. (a): "The department shall not issue or renew a driver's license to any person unless the person consents in writing to submit to a chemical test or tests of that person's blood, breath, or urine pursuant to **(Vehicle Code) Section 23612**, or a preliminary alcohol screening test pursuant to **(Vehicle Code) Section 23136** (persons under 21 years of

age with a blood alcohol level of .01% or higher), when requested to do so by a peace officer.”

Subd. (b): “All application forms for driver’s licenses or driver’s license renewal notices shall include a requirement that the applicant sign the following declaration as a condition of licensure: ‘I agree to submit to a chemical test of my blood, breath, or urine for the purpose of determining the alcohol or drug content of my blood when testing is requested by a peace officer acting in accordance with **(Vehicle Code) Section 13388** [PAS test] or **23612** [deemed consent] of the Vehicle Code.’”

The legal effect of this mandated written consent has yet to be tested, although the Court in *People v. Mason* (2016) 8 Cal.App.5th Supp. 11, 26, below, noted that, “(p)roof of that consent by (defendant) here would have at least brought the case closer to the probation condition or advance express consent context.” However, the Court still “doubt(ed)” it would “automatically” encompass the “rights and concerns” addressed under the **Fourth Amendment**. In *Mason*, no evidence of the defendant’s status as a licensed driver was in the record, so the issue was not decided.

Also, the implied consent provisions under **V.C. § 23612(a)(5)**, where, by statute, blood may be drawn from an unconscious or dead DUI suspect, does not overcome the need for a search warrant without a showing of exigent circumstances. (See *People v. Arredondo* (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 186, 193-205, & fn. 7.)

Note: Petition for Review was granted by the California Supreme Court in *People v. Arredondo* on June 8, 2016, making this case unavailable for citation.

The results of defendant’s warrantless blood draw was improperly suppressed by the trial court where the arresting officer told defendant that the test was required by law, that comment being an accurate statement of the implied consent law. The fact that the officer did not inform defendant of the consequences of refusing was also not enough, by itself, to require suppression of the blood test results. Although providing an admonition about the consequences of withdrawing consent is to be considered in the totality of the circumstances surrounding the consent to a

warrantless blood draw, the **Fourth Amendment** does not require the admonition in order to find a voluntary consent. (*People v. Agnew* (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 4-20; a decision of appellate division of the Santa Clara County Superior Court.)

However, in another prosecution for driving under the influence of alcohol, a different panel of the same appellate division of the Santa Clara County Superior Court disagreed with *Agnew* and held that blood draw evidence should have been suppressed under the **Fourth Amendment** in that under the totality of the circumstances, the People failed to show that defendant actually—freely and voluntarily—consented to a blood draw to which she had physically submitted after an incomplete implied consent admonishment. The admonishment, which stated that defendant was required to submit to a blood test, but did not include the consequences of refusal and was misleading. Defendant had a **Fourth Amendment** right, notwithstanding implied (or “deemed”) consent, to refuse and to bear the consequences of such a refusal. Implied consent does not constitute real or actual consent in fact, for purposes of the **Fourth Amendment**. Also, the People failed to offer any evidence of any advance express consent by defendant, or even that she was a licensed California driver. (*People v. Mason* (2016) 8 Cal.App.5th Supp. 11, 18-33.)

The Supreme Court in *McNeely* did not intend to give a driver arrested for DUI the right to demand that officers obtain a search warrant in order to force a blood draw. Refusal to submit to a blood test, whether or not the arresting officer chooses to seek a search warrant, is a “*refusal*” and allows for the administrative suspension of the driver’s license. (*Espinoza v. Shiomoto* (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 85, 103-116.)

Express vs. Implied Consent: A person’s consent may be “*express*” or “*implied*.” (*Torbet v. United Airlines, Inc.* (9th Cir. 2002) 298 F.3rd 1087, 1089; *People v. Panah* (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 466-467.)

Express Consent: Answering in the affirmative when asked for consent to search is the most obvious example of an “*express consent*.”

Also, however, an affirmative head-nod made by defendant to his son in response to an officer’s request for permission for his son to retrieve a gun from defendant’s tent, held to be an express consent. (*United States v. Basher* (9th Cir. 2011) 629 F.3rd 1161, 1168-1169.)

Implied Consent: An “*implied consent*” exists when, considering the “*totality of the circumstances*,” a reasonable person would have understood that the person from whom a consent is requested is agreeing to a search. (*United States v. Jenkins* (4th Cir. 1993) 986 F.2nd 76, 79.)

Raising one’s arms into the air after being asked by a police officer for consent to search his person was held to be the defendant’s implied consent to such a search. (*United States v. Vongxay* (9th Cir. 2010) 594 F.3rd 1111, 1119-1120.)

“(O)nly in narrow circumstances may consent be implied by actions and in most implied consent cases it is the suspect himself (as opposed to a third party) who takes an action which implies consent.” *Espinosa v. City and County of San Francisco* (9th Cir. 2010) 598 F.3rd 528, 536.)

Examples Where Consent was Found:

Upon submission to having one’s luggage x-rayed (*Torbet v. United Airlines, Inc., supra.*) and/or by walking through a magnetometer (*United States v. Aukai* (9th Cir., 2007) 497 F.3rd 955.) at an airport.

See “*Airport Searches*,” under “*Warrantless Searches*” (Chapter 7), above.

Upon entering a military base where signs are posted warning that persons on the base are subject to being searched. (*United States v. Ellis* (5th Cir. 1977) 547 F.2nd 863, Naval base; *United States v. Jenkins, supra*, military base; *Morgan v. United States* (9th Cir. 2003) 323 F.3rd 776, Air Force base.)

A civilian staying in the on-base housing of a military serviceman has possibly impliedly waived his right to privacy when his property (e.g., computers) is searched. (*United States v. Krupa* (9th Cir. 2011) 658 F.3rd 1174, 1179-1180.)

Defendant visiting a county jail visitor center is subject to search, particularly where signs are posted warning him that he was subject to search. This includes outside lockers on the jail property where visitors could deposit items not allowed in the jail. “Implied consent” applies to administrative searches of closely regulated businesses, including a county jail. (*People v. Boulter* (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 761.)

A co-owner of a laptop computer has actual authority to give consent to the police to search. And if it turns out that the person is not actually a co-owner, the doctrine of apparent authority may justify the search when it reasonably appears under the circumstances that she did have such authority. (*United States v. Stanley* (9th Cir. 2011) 653 F.3rd 946, 950-952.)

In response to a police officer's question; "Mind if we come in?" where the apartment owner then opened the door wider, and moved out of the way, it was held that the owner had impliedly consented to the officers' entry. (*United States v. Faler* (8th Cir. Iowa 2016) 832 F.3rd 849; see also *United States v. Rodriguez* (8th Cir. Neb. 2016) 834 F.3rd 937.)

Totality of the Circumstances: Consent may be implied as determined by the *totality of all the circumstances*. For instance, in the case of a military base, one impliedly consents to the search of his or her vehicle when driving upon the base and noting:

- The barbed-wire fence;
- The security guards at the gate;
- The sign warning of the possibility of search; *and*
- A civilian's common-sense awareness of the nature of a military base.

(*United States v. Jenkins* (4th Cir. 1993) 986 F.2nd 76, 78; *Morgan v. United States* (9th Cir. 2003) 323 F.3rd 776, 787-788.)

Specific Issues:

- May a suspect *withdraw consent* once it's given? *Yes.* (*People v. Martinez* (1968) 259 Cal.App.2nd Supp. 943, 945; *United States v. McWeeney* (9th Cir. 2006) 454 F.3rd 1030, 1035; see also (*United States v. Krupa* (9th Cir. 2011) 658 F.3rd 1174.)

But see People v. Schomer (1971) 17 Cal.App.3rd 427, where an unlimited search for a runaway minor of the defendant's apartment was allowed for some twenty minutes until defendant realized that the officers were getting close to his marijuana, at which time he tried to withdraw the consent. The marijuana was seen in plain sight. Defendant testified that he did not object to the officers searching for a person, but objected to them looking for narcotics. The attempted withdrawal of consent was held to be ineffective under these circumstances where the defendant later testified that

he had not objected to the officers searching for a person, but only to searching for contraband.

And see “Warrantless Searches,” “Airport Searches,” above, where by submitting one’s carryon luggage and/or his person to the initial x-ray and/or magnetometer screening at an airport, a person loses his right to revoke permission when asked to submit to a secondary screening. (*Torbet v. United Airlines, Inc.* (9th Cir. 2002) 298 F.3rd 1087, 1089-1090.)

Where officers “created a setting in which the reasonable person would believe that he or she had no authority to limit or withdraw their consent,” the resulting consent search may be invalidated. (*United States v. McWeeney, supra*, at pp. 1036-1037.)

Per the Court in *McWeeney* (at p. 1037), factors to consider in evaluating this issue include, but are not limited to:

- The language used to instruct the suspect;
 - The physical surroundings of the search;
 - The extent to which there were legitimate reasons for the officers to preclude the suspect from observing the search;
 - The relationship between the means used to prevent observation of the search and the reasons justifying the prevention;
 - The existence of any changes in circumstances between when consent is obtained and when the officers prevent the suspect from observing the search; and
 - The degree of pressure applied to prevent the suspect either from observing the search or voicing his objection to its proceeding further.
- May a suspect *limit the consent* to certain areas? *Yes. (Ibid.)*

But, if he does not limit the consent to a specific area, the officer may search the whole thing reasonably believed to be included in the request. E.g.; A consent to search one’s car, unless specifically limited, includes the whole car and any containers in the car. (*People Clark* (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 977-980.)

- May a *drug-sniffing dog* be used without obtaining any more than a general consent to search? *Yes*; at least when it is a vehicle (as opposed to

a residence) being searched, the defendant should have been aware that a dog was available, and he failed to object when the dog was used. (*People v. Bell* (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 754.)

See also *People v. \$48,715 United States Currency* (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1515-1516: ““A “sniff” by a trained drug-sniffing dog in a public place is not a “search” within the meaning of the **Fourth Amendment**’ at all. Accordingly, no consent is needed for participation of the dog. (Citation)” (See also *United States v. Todhunter* (9th Cir. 2002) 297 F.3rd 886, 891.) (See “Dogs Used to Search,” above.)

- May a suspect *place conditions* on the search? (E.g.; “Yes officer, but only if I may be present.”) Arguably; *Yes*.

If a person may limit the areas to be searched, it would seem that he could also impose any conditions he chooses. (See *People Clark, supra*, recognizing the validity of a conditional consent even though not discussing the issue.)

- May an officer *use a ruse or deception* in obtaining a consent? Generally, *No*.

Consent has to be given freely and voluntarily, with a knowledge of the right to refuse. If the suspect reasonably misconstrues, due to an officer’s misrepresentations, the purpose of the search, it will probably be held to be involuntary. (See *People v. Reeves* (1964) 61 Cal.2nd 268, 273; *People v. Mesaris* (1970) 14 Cal.App.3rd 71.)

But, a ruse is but one factor to consider. If, under the totality of the circumstances, a suspect is *not* materially misled as to the privacy rights he is giving up by consenting, the search will be held to be valid. (*People v. Avalos* (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1569.)

- Can a suspect who is *under arrest* validly consent to being searched? *Yes*.

The fact that the defendant is in custody at the time is but one factor to consider when determining whether that defendant gave a free and voluntary consent. (*United States v. Crapser* (9th Cir. 2007) 472 F.3rd 1141, 1149.)

- Does a *consensual search of a residence* have to be based upon some level of suspicion. *No*.

Conducting a “*knock and talk*,” and asking the homeowner for consent to conduct a search of the residence, follows the same rules as in the case of a “*consensual encounter*” of a person on the street, and need not be supported by even a “*reasonable suspicion*.” (*People v. Rivera* (2007) 41 Cal.4th 304; contact initiated due to an uncorroborated anonymous tip.)

Other Elements of a Consent Search:

The Right to Refuse: There is no legal requirement that a suspect be told that he has a right to refuse to consent. (*Ohio v. Robinette* (1996) 519 U.S. 33 [136 L.Ed.2nd 347]; *Schneekloth v. Bustamonte* (1973) 412 U.S. 218 [36 L.Ed.2nd 854]; *United States v. Drayton* (2002) 536 U.S. 194 [153 L.Ed.2nd 242]; *People v. Monterroso* (2004) 34 Cal.4th 743, 757-759; *People v. Williams* (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 949, 961.)

The fact he has been asked for consent should indicate to a reasonable person that he has a right to refuse.

However, should an officer tell a suspect he has the right to refuse, this fact adds to the weight of the argument that his consent was voluntary.

A person’s refusal to consent to a search is *not* admissible in court against that person to show a *consciousness of guilt*, even where the officers had a legal right to make a warrantless entry. To use a person’s refusal “merely serves to punish the exercise of the right to insist upon a warrant.” I.e.; “(A) penalty imposed by courts for exercising a constitutional right.” (*People v. Wood* (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 803, 808; *People v Keener* (1983) 148 Cal.App.3rd 73, 79.)

Miranda: There is no requirement that a suspect be advised of his *Miranda* rights (per *Miranda v. Arizona* (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2nd 694].) prior to giving a valid consent. (*People v. Brewer* (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 442; *People v. Monterroso*, *supra*.)

Nor is it relevant that the subject had already invoked his *Miranda* rights. (*United States v Kon Yu Leung* (2nd Cir. 1990) 910 F.2nd 33, 38; *United States v. Hidalgo* (11th Cir. 1993) 7 F.3rd 1566; *United States v. Shlater* (7th Cir. 1996) 85 F.3rd 1251, 1255-1256.)

Requesting a consent to search is not an interrogation, does not implicate the **Fifth Amendment**, and does not require a *Miranda* admonishment. (*People v. Ruster* (1976) 16 Cal.3rd 690, 700; *People v. Woolsey* (1979) 90 Cal.App.3rd 994; *People v. Ramirez* (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1559; *Doe v. United States* (1988) 487 U.S. 201 [101 L.Ed.2nd 184]; *United States v. Henley* (9th Cir. 1993) 984 F.2nd 1040, 1042-1043; *United States v. Hidalgo* (11th Cir. 1993) 7 F.3rd 1566; *United States v. Kon Yu Leung* (2nd Cir. 1990) 910 F.2nd 33, 38; *United States v. Shlater* (7th Cir. 1996) 85 F.3rd 1251, 1255-1256; *United States v. Russell* (9th Cir. 2012) 664 F.3rd 1279, 1281-1282.)

But see *United States v. Reilly* (9th Cir. 2000) 224 F.3rd 986, 994, where it was erroneously held that a defendant's invocation of his right to an attorney precluded officers from asking him for his consent to search.

An advisal of one's *Miranda* rights before asking for consent to search is *some* evidence, however, that his consent is given freely and voluntarily, in that the giving of a *Miranda* admonishment infers that he is not without rights. (*United States v. Morning* (9th Cir. 1995) 64 F.3rd 531, 533.)

Note also, older authority indicating that illegally continuing an interrogation after the suspect invokes his *Miranda* rights, followed by a request for a consent search, *will* likely result in the consent being held to be invalid (*People v. Superior Court [Keithley]* (1975) 13 Cal.3rd 406, 410.), which is questionable authority in light of the rule that the "*fruit of the poisonous tree*" doctrine does not apply to *Miranda* violations. (*Oregon v. Elstad* (1985) 470 U.S. 298 [84 L.Ed.2nd 222]; *Dickerson v. United States* (2000) 530 U.S. 428, 441 [147 L.Ed.2nd 405, 418]; *United States v. Patane* (2004) 542 U.S. 630 [159 L.Ed.2nd 667].)

And the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal has recently called into question whether the giving of a *Miranda* admonishment is really a factor that should be considered at all when determining the validity of a consent to search. (*United States v. Perez-Lopez* (9th Cir. 2003) 348 F.3rd 839, 846-847, criticizing its own contrary decision in *United States v. Morning*, *supra*.)

Written Consent: There is no legal requirement that a consent to search be obtained in writing. However, obtaining a suspect's consent in writing tends to help to convince a court of the voluntariness of the resulting consent. (*United States v. Rodriguez* (2006) 464 F.3rd 1072, 1078.)

Answering the Telephone:

Consent to enter a residence does *not* include an implied consent to answer the telephone while there. (***People v. Harwood*** (1978) 74 Cal.App.3rd 460.)

However, while lawfully in a residence, probable cause to believe that a caller might be the fugitive defendant, officers may answer the telephone and pretend to be a resident when done for the purpose of attempting to locate the defendant. (***People v. Ledesma*** (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 704.)

Giving law enforcement permission to search a cellphone does not, without more, include the right to answer in-coming calls and/or pretend to be the defendant. (***United States v. Lopez-Cruz*** (9th Cir. 2013) 730 F.3rd 803, 809-811.)

Consent by Others:

General Rule: Police may rely upon the consent of whoever they “*reasonably believe*,” under the circumstances, possesses common authority over the premises. (***Illinois v. Rodriguez*** (1990) 497 U.S. 177 [111 L.Ed.2nd 148]; ***People v. Reed*** (1967) 252 Cal.App.2nd 994, 996; ***People v. Superior Court [Walker]*** (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1198-1201.) The person giving consent must have either the “*actual authority*,” or the “*apparent authority*,” to give consent:

“*Actual Authority*;” Where the owner of property has expressly granted authority for a person to give consent, or where it is known that the person has mutual use or joint access, then he or she is said to have “*actual authority*” to consent to a search of that property. (***United States v. Davis*** (9th Cir. 2003) 332 F.3rd 1163, 1169; ***People v. Superior Court [Walker]***, *supra*, at pp. 1205-1208 .)

“*Apparent Authority*;” A determination made based upon the circumstances and whether the officers reasonably believe that the person giving consent had the authority to do so. (***United States v. Fiorillo*** (9th Cir. 1999) 186 F.3rd 1136; ***People v. Superior Court [Walker]***, *supra*, at pp. 1208-1214; ***United States v. Arreguin*** (9th Cir. 2013) 735 F.3rd 1168, 1174-1178; see also ***United States v. Casey*** (1st Cir. 2016) 825 F.3rd 1.)

To establish “*apparent authority*,” the prosecution must show:

- The police believed an untrue fact that they used to assess the consenters’ control over the area to be searched;
- It was objectively reasonable for the officers to believe that the fact was true; *and*
- If that fact were true, the consenters would have had actual authority to give that consent.

(*United States v. Reid* (9th Cir. 2000) 226 F.3rd 1020, 1025; *United States v. Enslin* (9th Cir. 2003) 315 F.3rd 1205, 1215; *United States v. Ruiz* (9th Cir. 2005) 428 F.3rd 877; *Espinosa v. City and County of San Francisco* (9th Cir. 2010) 598 F.3rd 528, 536-537.)

Where U.S. Marshals knew that the person giving consent was a resident of the home, and had no reason to know that defendant was occupying a back bedroom, the officers could reasonably assume the consenters/resident had the authority to authorize entry into that back bedroom. (*United States v. Enslin, supra.*)

When the estranged wife retains property within the residence, remains liable for rent, civil liability for accidents, etc., and has not established a permanent residence elsewhere, she still has the “*apparent authority*” to allow police into her residence where the husband still lives. (*People v. Bishop* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 220.)

The fact that the husband had changed the locks is only indicative of the level of antagonism, and is not a limitation of the wife’s authority to allow the police to enter and search. (*Ibid.*)

Paper bags left by defendant in an acquaintance’s garage, where the acquaintance had free access to the bags, may be lawfully searched with consent from the acquaintance. By leaving the bags with the acquaintance, knowing and not objecting to the fact that she (the acquaintance) would go into the bags, defendant “*assumed the risk*” that she would

allow others to look into the bags. (*People v. Schmeck* (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 280-282.)

Apparent authority found where the resident of a house gave consent to search a container set out in plain sight and no one objected when such consent was requested. (*United States v. Ruiz* (9th Cir. 2005) 428 F.3rd 877.)

However, the search of a purse based upon the consent of the purse owner's boyfriend was held to be unlawful because it was unreasonable for the officers to think that the boyfriend had the necessary authority. (See *United States v. Welch* (9th Cir. 1993) 4 F.3rd 761.)

“(A) guest who has the run of the house in the occupant's absence has the apparent authority to give consent to enter an area where a visitor normally would be received.” (*People v. Ledesma* (2006) 39 Cal.4th 657, 703-704.)

And, although receiving consent to enter a residence *does not* infer a consent to answer the telephone while in the residence (*People v. Harwood* (1977) 74 Cal.App.3rd 460, 458.), the telephone may be answered where the officers have probable cause to believe defendant will be calling and taking the time to get a warrant would compromise the officer's ability to quickly locate and apprehend him. (*People v. Ledesma, supra*, at p. 704.)

A business that owns the company's computers may consent to the search of a computer used by an employee, at least when the employee is on notice that he has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the computer he is using. (*United States v. Ziegler* (9th Cir. 2007) 474 F.3rd 1184.)

Where officers seized evidence from defendant's home office, his wife had the apparent authority to grant the police access to the materials because there were no objective indications that her access to the office was limited. (*United States v. Tosti* (9th Cir. 2013) 733 F.3rd 816, 723-724.)

But the mere fact that a person answers the door is insufficient by itself to allow officers to reasonably

conclude that they had a valid consent to search the entire residence. Officers entering “in a state of near ignorance” based upon the consent given by the person answering the door, who was later determined to be a mere visitor, without making further inquiry of the person as to his status, was not reasonable. Search of the residence based upon that person’s consent held to be unlawful. (*United States v. Arreguin* (9th Cir. 2013) 735 F.3rd 1168, 1174-1178.)

“In searching a probationer’s residence, officers are not required either to inquire about the ownership of or access rights to each item on the premises or to believe the probationer's statements on this topic. (Citations)” (*People v. Carreon* (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 866, 877-878.)

In *Carreon*, officers searched the defendant’s room (a converted garage) under the authority of the home-owner’s **Fourth** waiver, believing the probationer had access to any room that was unlocked. The Court found this belief to be unreasonable, having failed to consider any other circumstances that may have indicated that the probationer did not in fact have free access to defendant’s room. (*Id.*, at pp. 877-881.)

Examples:

Landlord:

A landlord may *not* give a valid consent for police to search a renter’s home, the renter having a superior right to possession at least for the duration of the agreed rental period. (*Chapman v. United States* (1961) 365 U.S. 610, [5 L.Ed.2nd 828]; *People v. Roman* (1991) 227 Cal.App.3rd 674.)

However, a landlord has a right to inspect the home for violations of the rental agreement, with notice to the renter and at a reasonable time, and under other limited circumstances. (**Civil Code § 1954**) Anything they observe in the process may serve as probable cause to obtain a warrant for a search by law enforcement.

Same rule applies to the manager or clerk in a hotel or motel. (*Stoner v. California* (1964) 376 U.S. 483 [11 L.Ed.2nd 856]; *People v. Burke* (1962) 208 Cal.App.2nd 149, 160-161.)

And with an *apartment manager*. (*People v. Roberts* (1956) 47 Cal.2nd 374, 377.)

“[A] landlord may not give valid third party consent to a police search of a house rented to another. [Citations.] The same principle applies to prevent a finding of third party consent where the leased property is an apartment unit [citation], a room in a boarding house [citation], a garage [citation], or a locker [citation]. Likewise, a hotel clerk may not consent to the search of an occupant's room. [Citations.]” (*People v. Superior Court [Walker]* (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1200.)

Military personnel, living off base in a motel, but with the housing paid for by the military as an alternative to living in the on-base barracks, retain the same privacy protections as anyone else in the civilian world. (*People v. Rodriguez* (1966) 242 Cal.App.2nd 744.)

The same rule applies to any off-base military housing, at least when the case is a state case being investigated by state law enforcement officers for presentation in state court. (*People v. Miller* (1987) 196 Cal.App.3rd 307.)

However, on the base, a commanding officer may authorize a warrantless search of property, including the serviceman's locker (*People v. Shepard* (1963) 212 Cal.App.2nd 697, 700.) and his room in the barracks. (*People v. Jasmin* (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 98.)

Evidence properly seized pursuant to a service member's commanding officer's (or "competent military authority") oral or written authorization to search a person or an area, for specified property or evidence or for a specific person (see **Military Rules of Evidence, Rule 315(a) & (b)**), the results

may be used in state court. (*People v. Jasmin*, *supra*, at p. 110.)

Parent:

A parent may give consent to search the home and even the child's room over the child's objection, *except* areas exclusive to the child (e.g.; a footlocker which was locked by the child). (*In re Scott K.* (1979) 24 Cal.3rd 395, 404-405.)

The search of an adult child's bedroom in his parents' home, made with the consent of a parent, is reasonable "absent circumstances establishing the son has been given exclusive control over the bedroom." (*People v. Daniels* (1971) 16 Cal.App.3rd 36; see also see also *United States v. Casey* (1st Cir. 2016) 825 F.3rd 1; grandparents had "apparent authority" to give consent to officers to search defendant's room where defendant lived there for free and the the grandparents had open access to his unlocked bedroom.)

Parents of an 18-year-old adult son were held to have "actual" authority to give consent to search the son's room when the son did not pay rent, and there was no evidence of any agreement on the part of the parent not to enter the son's room. (*United States v. Rith* (10th Cir. 1999) 164 F.3rd 1323.)

Father, with the apparent authority to allow police officers to search his entire residence, including the bedroom of his adult son, under circumstances where the father and defendant son had apparent free access to each other's room, validly authorized police to enter the son's room. (*People v. Oodham* (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1.)

Query: If the adult child is paying rent and there is nothing else to suggest that the parents have free access to the child's room, would not the landlord-tenant rules (See **Civil Code §§ 789.3, 1954**) be applicable?

Parents have to have access to their minor child's bedroom and the power to give consent to the search of the bedroom to the police in order to properly execute their duty of

supervision and control over the child. “In the absence of evidence suggesting a parent has abdicated this role toward his or her child, police officers may reasonably conclude that a parent can validly consent to the search of a minor child's bedroom.” (*In re D.C.* (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 978.)

The Court reaffirmed the California Supreme Court’s decision in *In re Scott K.*, *supra*, noting that a minor may retain the right to exclude others from areas that are exclusive to the minor (a footlocker which was locked by the child). (*In re D.C.*, *supra*, at pp. 987-988.)

The Court also rejected the contrary rule of *United States v. Whitfield* (D.C. Cir. 1991) 291 U.S. App. D.C. 243 [939 F.2nd 1071], which held that a parent does not have the authority to consent to the search of their adult son’s bedroom. (*In re D.C. supra*, at pp. 986-987.)

Child: Whether or not a child may validly allow police into the family residence depends upon a determination whether, under the circumstances, it is reasonable to believe that the child had the authority to do so.

An 11-year-old step-daughter, baby-sitting in the defendant’s absence, was held *not* to have the authority to admit the police. (*People v. Jacobs* (1987) 43 Cal.3rd 472.)

“Minor children . . . do not have coequal dominion over the family home. [Citation.] Although parents may choose to grant their minor children joint access and mutual use of the home, parents normally retain control of the home as well as the power to rescind the authority they have given. ‘It does not startle us that a parent’s consent to a search of the living room in the absence of his minor child is given effect; but we should not allow the police to rely on the consent of the child to bind the parent. The common sense of the matter is that the . . . parent has not surrendered his privacy of place in the living room to the discretion of the . . . child; rather, the latter [has] privacy of place there in the discretion of the former.’ [Citations.]” (*Id.*, at p. 482.)

The Court recognized, however, that the rule is not absolute: “In some circumstances, a teenager may possess sufficient authority to allow the police to enter and look about common areas.” (*Id.*, at p. 483.)

But, where a 12-year-old abuse victim led police to her aunt’s house and where, in her aunt’s absence, the victim was in charge of the house, living and working there, the victim could validly give consent to search for implements used to abuse her when the aunt had initially invited police inside, and after the aunt was arrested and removed from the house. (*People v. Santiago* (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1540.)

The 16-year-old daughter of the defendant had the apparent authority to allow the officers the right to enter defendant’s residence. (*People v. Hoxter* (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 406.)

Co-Occupants (Roommates, Husband and Wife, Parent and Child): When two or more people have equal access to a residence (e.g.; roommates, husband and wife, etc.), the rules regarding one co-occupant giving consent vary depending upon the circumstances:

The adult sister sharing an apartment with her adult brothers does *not* have apparent authority to consent to the search of the brothers’ bedroom. (*Beach v. Superior Court* (1970) 11 Cal.App.3rd 1032, 1034–1035.)

When adult roommates have separate rooms, exclusive control by each of the individuals over his or her own room is presumed, absent evidence to the contrary. (*United States v. Almeida-Perez* (8th Cir. 2008) 549 F.3rd 1162, 1172; *U.S. v. Barrera-Martinez* (N.D. Ill. 2003) 274 F.Supp.2nd 950, 962.)

Generally, consent to a search given by someone with authority cannot be revoked by an *absent* co-occupant’s denial of consent, even if that denial is clear and contemporaneous with the search. (*United States v. Matlock* (1974) 415 U.S. 164, 172 [39 L.Ed.2nd 242]: The mutual use of property carries with it the risk that just one

of the occupants might permit a search of the common areas.)

Defendant in *Matlock* was in a patrol car out front of the residence. For purposes of this rule, he was deemed to be “absent.”

See also *People v. Haskett* (1982) 30 Cal.3rd 841, 855-857; with defendant outside in a police car, objecting, but his wife, in the residence, saying okay, the entry was held to be lawful.

But, when two equally-situated cotenants, both present at the scene, are asked for permission to enter and/or search a residence, with one saying “yes” but the other saying “no,” entry and/or search may *not* be made absent an exigent circumstance or a search warrant. The “no” takes precedence. (*Georgia v. Randolph* (2006) 547 U.S. 103 [164 L.Ed.2nd 208].)

“(W)hen an occupant consents to a search, but a co-occupant who ‘is present at the scene ... expressly refuses to consent,’ the co-occupant’s refusal ‘prevails, rendering the warrantless search unreasonable and invalid as to’ him.” (*People v. Byers* (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 856, 862; quoting *Georgia v. Randolph*, *supra*, at p. 106.)

However; “(w)hen the police obtain consent from a co-occupant who is off the premises, they must comply with the knock-and-announce rule.” *People v. Byers*, *supra*.)

However, “when a search is conducted pursuant to an absent co-tenant’s consent, the purposes of the knock-notice requirement (Citation.) do not include preventing law enforcement from seeing or seizing evidence pursuant to the consent exception,” finding the failure to comply with knock and notice to be harmless error. (*Id.*, at p. 864.)

Also, the fact that the defendant was not given the opportunity to object is irrelevant,

at least “(s)o long as there is no evidence that the police have removed the potentially objecting tenant from the entrance for the sake of avoiding a possible objection,. (Id., at p. 867.)

California authority to the contrary (e.g., see *People v. Wilkins* (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 761, 769-776.) is no longer valid in light of this Supreme Court opinion.

Randolph listed a number of exceptions to this rule:

- Where there is a “*recognized hierarchy*” (e.g., parent vs. child), objections from the one with the inferior status may be ignored.
- With a reasonable (articulable) fear for the safety of the person inviting officers inside, or anyone else inside, entry may be made to check the victim’s welfare and/or to stop pending violence.
- An objection from an *absent cotenant* (even if handcuffed in a patrol car immediately out front) may be ignored, at least so long as he is not led away from the scene for the purpose of justifying an entry into the residence. (But see *Fernandez v. California* (Feb. 25, 2014) 571 U.S. ___, ___ [134 S.Ct. 1126, 1132-1137; 188 L.Ed.2nd 25], below.)
- It is not necessary to solicit possible objections from a cotenant, even if that person is inside and/or available and even if it could be expected that that person would object.
- Any other exigent circumstance (safety of the occupants, protection of possible physical evidence, etc.) may justify an immediate entry, at least until the scene is secured and/or the suspects detained pending the obtaining of a search warrant.
- Entering with the victim of domestic violence, at her request, for the purpose of protecting her as she collects her belongings.

- The consenting cotenant may retrieve evidence and bring it out to the police.
- With probable cause, a search warrant may be obtained for the search of the residence.

The Supreme Court in **Randolph** specifically held that an officer has *no* duty to seek out other cotenants to see if anyone objects. An objecting cotenant must be at the scene to object. (*Id.*, at p. 122.)

The rule of **Randolph** does not govern when a minor objects to the search of his room but is overruled by his mother. **Randolph** applies only to disagreements between joint *adult* occupants having apparently equal authority over a residence. (*In re D.C.* (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 978, 988-989.)

Issue: When the objecting co-occupant is arrested and taken away from the scene:

The Ninth Circuit has ruled that when an objecting cotenant is taken to jail before the consenting cotenant shows up at the scene and gives his consent, the rule of **Randolph** still applies. It is not necessary, despite the specific language in **Randolph** to the contrary, that the objecting party be taken away “*for the purpose of*” avoiding the rule of **Randolph**. (*United States v. Murphy* (9th Cir. 2008) 516 F.3rd 1117, 1124-1125.)

The Ninth Circuit took it even a step further, setting out a new rule: “Once a co-tenant has registered his objection, his refusal to grant consent remains effective barring some objective manifestation that he has changed his position and no longer objects.” (*Ibid.*)

At least four other federal circuits and two state Supreme Courts disagree with **Murphy** on this issue. (See *United States v. Hudspeth* (8th Cir. 2008) 518 F.3rd 954; *United States v. Henderson* (7th Cir. 2008) 536 F.3rd 776; *United States v. Shrader* (4th

Cir. Apr. 4, 2012) 675 F.3rd 300; *United States v. Cooke* (5th Cir. 2012) 674 F.3rd 491, 499; *People v. Stimple* (Colo. 2012) 267 P.3rd 1219, 1221-1226; *State v. St. Martin* (2011) 334 Wis.2nd 290, 306-310.)

Subsequent to *Murphy*, the Ninth Circuit decided *United States v. Brown* (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3rd 410, which reemphasized the rule that a cotenant must have been removed “for the purpose of” avoiding a possible objection, ruling that there must be some evidence that that was the purpose of the police in taking the defendant from the scene. It was also noted that there is no duty to ask the absent cotenant for consent. (*Id.*, pp. 414-418.)

The United States Supreme Court shot down this theory altogether, noting that so long as it is “objectively reasonable” for officers to remove the objecting party from the premises (e.g. there was probable cause to arrest him), then officers may come back later and seek the consent for a warrantless entry from the remaining co-tenant. The now absent co-tenant’s previous objection is no longer valid. The officers’ *subjective motivations* for removing the objecting co-tenant are irrelevant so long as the removal was objectively reasonable. (*Fernandez v. California* (Feb. 25, 2014) 571 U.S. ___, ___ [134 S.Ct. 1126, 1132-1137; 188 L.Ed.2nd 25].)

When a cotenant, who is absent from the scene, consents to a law enforcement entry into a residence, but another cotenant who is present at the scene objects, an entry is unlawful. (*Tompkins v. Superior Court* (1959) 59 Cal.2nd 65.)

But note, should the present cotenant fail to object, consent from the absent cotenant allows the entry. (*People v. Viega* (1989) 214 Cal.App.3rd 817.)

And also note *United States v. Rith* (10th Cir. 1999) 164 F.3rd 1323, where the absent parents’ permission to enter the house took precedence over

the present 18-year-old son's objection to the officers' entry.

With roommates, the consenting co-occupant may only consent to entry of his personal room and any common areas. He may not give a valid consent to another co-tenant's private room. (*People v. Boyer* (1989) 48 Cal.3rd 247, 276; *United States v. Davis* (9th Cir. 2003) 332 F.3rd 1163.)

When the estranged wife retains property within the residence, remains liable for rent, civil liability for accidents, etc., and has not established a permanent residence elsewhere, she still has the apparent authority to allow police into her residence where the husband still lives. (*People v. Bishop* (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 220.)

The fact that the husband had changed the locks is only indicative of the level of antagonism, and is not a limitation of the wife's authority to allow the police to enter and search. (*Ibid.*)

Randolph was not violated when officers searched defendant's residence after obtaining his cotenant fiancée's consent to search their joint residence. Defendant, who was inside but refusing to answer the door or phone calls made to him, never expressly refused to consent to the entry and search, acquiescing in letting his fiancée deal with the police. At best, defendant "implicitly" refused to allow the police to enter and search by not answering the door or his cellphone. The Court declined to extend *Randolph* to include implied refusals. (*United States v. Moore* (9th Cir. 2014) 770 F.3rd 809, 813-814.)

Also, there was nothing in *Randolph* to prevent the officers from using a battering ram to gain access when the fiancée, who was locked out, expressly consented to the use of such a method to gain entry. (*Id.*, at p. 814.)

But see *United States v. Williams* (8th Cir. 2008) 521 F.3rd 902, 907, where it was held that by the defendant slamming the door shut on the officers and closing the deadbolt door lock, there was sufficient "affirmative conduct" to qualify as an express refusal to consent to the officers' entry.

A warrantless entry into defendant's apartment was justified under the **Fourth Amendment** when officers received the voluntary consent of defendant's housemate. The consent was not coerced even though the housemate was handcuffed and in custody outside the apartment. The officer credibly testified that the housemate admitted to having drugs and a gun in his bedroom and that no threats or promises were made to obtain consent to search the bedroom to retrieve these items. The trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence on whether the officers waited long enough to comply with the knock-notice requirement when they entered the apartment, but the error was harmless because exclusion of evidence, the only relief requested, was not the proper remedy. (*People v. Byers* (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 856, 862-865.)

A warrantless search of a residence based upon a probationer's (or parolee's) search and seizure conditions, when the probationer is a co-occupant of the residence, is lawful as a matter of law, even over the objection of another co-tenant (the probationer's mother who also lived there, in this case). The principles behind *Georgia v. Randolph* (2006) 547 U.S. 103 [164 L.Ed.2nd 208], *Randolph* being a consensual search issue unrelated to a **Fourth** waiver search, are inapplicable. (*Smith v. City of Santa Clara* (9th Cir. 2017) 876 F.3rd 987, 991-995.)

Evidence of a Defendant's Refusal to Consent to a Warrantless Search:

It is improper for a prosecutor to introduce evidence of, or comment to a jury about, a defendant's refusal to consent to a warrantless search of his property. (*People v. Wood* (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 803; *People v. Keener* (1983) 148 Cal.App.3rd 73, 79; "Presenting evidence of an individual's exercise of a right to refuse to consent to entry in order to demonstrate a consciousness of guilt merely serves to punish the exercise of the right to insist upon a warrant.")

Sanctions for Violations:

If the consent is held to be involuntary, then all the direct products of that "consent" will be suppressed under the "*fruit of the poisonous tree*" doctrine. (See cases cited above.)

If an otherwise voluntary consent is the direct product of some other illegal police act (e.g.; illegal arrest, detention, etc.), then the consent and the resulting direct products of the consent may also be suppressed. (*People v. Valenzuela* (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 817, 833.)

A consent to search that is the product of an illegal detention is also subject to suppression, as are the products of that search. (*People v. Krohn* (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1294.)

Handcuffing a person suspected of possible involvement in a narcotics transaction, but where the officer testified only that he was “uncomfortable” with the fact that defendant was tall (6’ 6”) and that narcotics suspects sometimes carry weapons (although the officer did not pat him down for weapons), converted a detention into an arrest, making the subsequent consent to search involuntary. (*People v. Stier* (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 21.)